

The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party

Documents and Analysis

Edited by

Tony Saich and Benjamin Yang

With a Contribution by Benjamin Yang



THE RISE TO POWER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

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EDITED BY TONY SAICH

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Preface

This project was made possible by a generous grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington. This grant was supplemented by extra funding from the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, and the Sinologisch Instituut, Leiden. The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences provided a grant for two research trips to the People's Republic of China.

The project originated with discussions in the mid-1980s initiated by Professor Roderick MacFarquhar among Fairbank colleagues, in particular Dr. Timothy Cheek and Dr. Hans van de Ven. The major conclusion of these discussions was that the massive amount of new sources that had become available as a result of the "opening up" of the People's Republic of China in the 1980s, when combined with those available in the Republic of China on Taiwan, the now former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, allowed for a comprehensive reappraisal of the rise to power of the Chinese communist movement.

The idea of a documentary history was inspired by the classic work produced at Harvard by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John King Fairbank in the early 1950s, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. The new work was to contain many sources that were unavailable at that time, but, as it was designed to provide a comprehensive introduction for students in a single collection to the CCP's rise to power, it had to include a number of already translated documents.

Early in 1986, I was brought into the discussions. That summer, Professor MacFarquhar and I were quartered in the same hotel in Beijing while we were both conducting research at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Further discussions led to my agreeing to direct the project, and steps were taken to contact Chinese scholars and research institutes engaged in work on CCP history and to collect materials to supplement those already available at Harvard and Leiden. Apart from the help from various scholars and institutes in the People's Republic of China, the staff of the Bureau of Investigation Archives (Taipei) provided copies of valuable materials. In addition, Dr. Eugene Wu and the staff of the Harvard-Yenching Library as well as the library staff of the Sinologisch Instituut, Leiden, and the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, all helped in locating materials. Nancy Hearst of the Fairbank Center Library deserves special mention for her enthusiasm in tracking down relevant materials and making me aware of new, interesting publications.

Now that the materials had been compiled, the process of selection, translating, editing, and interpretation began. Dr. Benjamin Yang worked as a consultant to the project in its early stages and was a constant source of wisdom and advice. He provided basic information for the initial drafts of the commentaries covering 1927 to 1938. This work drew largely on the research he had carried out for his

book *From Revolution to Politics. Chinese Communists on the Long March* (1990). I put these drafts into final form, adding materials like debate on party history, work in the white areas, and some additional documentation on the origins of the Second United Front. For better or worse, I am solely responsible for the general introduction, the remaining chronological introductions, the quality of the translations, and their annotation.

The eight chronological introductions place each document in its specific historical context, while the general introduction is intended to introduce the reader to the broader issues of the Chinese communist revolution to which the documents relate.

Unless specifically stated, the translations were done by Sarah Burgess, Gu Wei-qun, Guo Xiaolin, Hong Xiaolin, Huang Yasheng, Tony Saich, Peter Wan, and Yin Xiaohuang. Pei Minxin deserves special mention for the large amount of translation work he undertook. If it had not been for him, the project would probably still be running.

The following people read all or part of the manuscript, and their advice kept me from falling into some of the pitfalls that lay along the way: David Apter, Richard Baum, Gregor Benton, Timothy Cheek, Christina Gilmartin, Kathleen Hartford, Roderick MacFarquhar, Benjamin Schwartz, Lawrence Sullivan, Frederick Teiwes, Fritjof Tichelman, and C. Martin Wilbur.

The administration of the project would have been impossible without the professional guidance of Anne Denna, Nancy Deptula, and Patrick Maddox. Antonina Colbert did sterling work to help type up the manuscript. At a crucial stage, Doug Merwin of M.E. Sharpe stepped in to resolve the issue of publication.

Two people deserve special mention. Without Roderick MacFarquhar's help and enthusiasm, the project would never have even started let alone been finished. His advice was invaluable at every step. Professor John King Fairbank showed great enthusiasm for the project, and I learned much from our numerous discussions. Further, he cast a critical and editorial eye over virtually the entire manuscript and provided much sound advice.

Finally, I would like to thank all the members of the Fairbank Center for making my visits there such pleasant ones. Without the benefit of the seminars and lunch-time discussions this manuscript would be in far worse shape.

Tony Saich
Amsterdam, June 1991

Abbreviations and Notes

A.B.	Anti-Bolshevik [League]
ACFTU	All-China Federation of Trade Unions
CC	Central Committee
CP	Communist Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEC	Central Executive Committee
Comintern	Communist International
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CYL	Communist Youth League
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
GMD	Guomindang
PLA	People's Liberation Army
Politburo	Political Bureau
PRC	People's Republic of China
SYL	Socialist Youth League
YL	Youth League
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

Single Square Brackets [] are used for editorial insertions in the text.

Double Square Brackets [[]] are used for summarized sections or passages.

Transcription

The system of transcription for Chinese names and places used in the text is the *Hanyu pinyin* system. This system is used now by the People's Republic of China and is increasingly used by scholars in the West. However, for a number of familiar names the *Hanyu pinyin* system has not been used. These are the following:

<i>Familiar spelling</i>	<i>Hanyu pinyin</i>
Canton	Guangzhou
Chiang Kai-shek	Jiang Jieshi
Jehol	Rehe
Kalgan	Zhangjiakou
Manchuria	Manzhouguo
Sun Yat-sen	Sun Zhongshan
Whampoa	Huangpu
Yangtze River	Changjiang

Beijing has been used throughout the text rather than other forms such as Beiping or Peking.

Chronology of the Chinese Communist Movement 1919–1949

1919

- 2–6 March: Founding Congress of the Third Communist International (Comintern) held in Moscow.
- 4 May: Nationalist May Fourth Movement breaks out in Beijing.
- 25 July: Soviet Russia announces the abolition of all unequal treaties with China (Karakhan Declaration).

1920

- January: Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu discuss the possibility of setting up a CP.
- April: Gregory Voitinsky arrives in China as a representative of the Vladivostok Branch of the Bolshevik's Far Eastern Bureau. In April and May, he confers with Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai about the establishment of communist organizations in China.
- August: First communist small group founded in Shanghai. By spring 1921 similar organizations have been set up in Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan, and Canton.
- November: "Manifesto of the CP" drafted and the party journal *The Communist* launched.

1921

- 3 June: Maring (Hendricus Sneevliet) arrives in China as the first official representative of the ECCI.
- 23 July–
Early August: First National Congress held in Shanghai and the CCP is formally founded. Chen Duxiu is elected secretary of the Provisional Central Executive Bureau.
- August: Chinese Labor Secretariat founded under CCP leadership in Shanghai.
- November: CCP preliminary work plan published.
- 23 December: Maring meets with Sun Yat-sen in Guilin.

1922

- 12 January: Hong Kong sailors' strike breaks out and successfully concludes on 5 May.
- 1–6 May: Chinese Labor Secretariat sponsors First National Labor Congress in Canton.

- 6 July: Chen Duxiu writes to Voitinsky opposing the idea of cooperation with the GMD.
- 11 July: Maring delivers his report to the ECCI suggesting the idea of the CCP operating as a “bloc within” the GMD.
- 16–23 July: Second National Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai.
- 28–30 August: Hangzhou Plenum convened by Maring to approve the idea of CCP members entering the GMD.
- 4 September: First group of CCP leaders join the GMD.
- 6 September: Chen Duxiu appointed to the nine-person committee set up to plan the reorganization of the GMD.
- October: Headquarters of the CCP moves to Beijing.

1923

- 26 January: Sun Yat-sen and A.A. Joffe, a special envoy of Soviet Russia, issue their Joint Manifesto pledging Soviet support for China.
- 7 February: Beijing-Hankou Railway Workers’ Strike crushed by troops of the northern warlord Wu Peifu.
- 15 February: Headquarters of the CCP moves back to Shanghai.
- April: Party headquarters moves to Canton.
- 12–20 June: Third National Congress of the CCP held in Canton. The Congress approves Maring’s view that CCP members can join the GMD as individuals. Chen Duxiu elected chair of the Central Bureau with Mao Zedong as secretary.
- June: Central Bureau decides to return party headquarters to Shanghai as quickly as possible. The move is carried out in late July.
- August: Maring leaves China.
- 6 October: Michael Borodin arrives in Canton as the permanent delegate of Soviet Russia.
- 24–25 November: First Plenum of the CCP CEC held in Shanghai and calls for the reorganization of the GMD.

1924

- 20–30 January: First National Congress of the GMD convenes in Canton. The GMD is reorganized and CCP-GMD cooperation formally established.
- 14–16 May: First Enlarged Meeting of the CCP CEC held in Shanghai. It decides the GMD is composed of a friendly left wing and a hostile right wing.
- 16 June: Whampoa Military Academy founded in Canton.
- 7 October: First Russian ship arrives in Canton with weapons for the GMD.
- 13 October: Borodin appointed as adviser to the GMD Revolutionary Committee.
- 13 November: Sun Yat-sen leaves Canton for Beijing, marking the end of his effective leadership of the GMD.

1925

- 11-22 January: Fourth National Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai. The Congress resolution reflects Chen Duxiu's caution about CCP involvement with the GMD. Chen Duxiu elected general secretary of the CEC.
- 12 March: Sun Yat-sen dies in Beijing.
- 1-9 May: Second National Labor Congress and the First Peasant Congress held in Canton.
- 30 May: May 30 Movement breaks out in Shanghai when International Settlement police open fire on demonstrators.
- 1 June: CCP sets up the Shanghai General Labor Union to try to gain control over the movement.
- 1 July: Formation of the GMD national government announced with Wang Jingwei as chair and Borodin as senior advisor.
- 20 August: Liao Zhongkai, an ardent supporter of communist participation in the GMD and the alliance with Soviet Russia, murdered in Canton.
- October: Second Enlarged Meeting of the CEC held in Beijing. It decides that the time is ripe to convert the party from a "small group" into a "central mass political party."

1926

- 4-19 January: Second National Congress of the GMD convenes in Canton and pledges continued support for the policy of cooperation with the CCP.
- 21-24 February: Special meeting of the CCP CEC convened in Beijing. It decides that work among the peasantry must be strengthened during the Northern Expedition.
- 20 March: "Zhongshan Incident" takes place, with Chiang Kai-shek declaring martial law and claiming that a gunboat under communist command was planning to kidnap him.
- 15-22 May: GMD CEC meeting adopts measures to restrict CCP activity in the GMD.
- 9 July: Northern Expedition launched with Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief.
- 12-18 July: Fourth Plenum of the CCP CEC meets in Shanghai to discuss Northern Expedition. Policy focuses on cooperation with the bourgeoisie rather than seizure of power.
- 4-5 November: Meeting of CCP leadership convened at which Chen Duxiu criticizes the views of the Canton party organization.
- 13 December: Special meeting of the Party Center is held in Hankou. Chen criticizes "leftism" in the party, and the decision is taken to support Wang Jingwei.

1927

- 10–17 March: Third Plenum of the GMD CEC meets, attended mainly by members of the GMD-left and the CCP. It moves to undermine Chiang's military power. It is the last time CCP leaders attend a GMD CEC meeting.
- 5 April: Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei issue joint statement emphasizing continued collaboration between the CCP and the GMD.
- 6 April: Soviet Embassy compound in Beijing raided. Li Dazhao and other CCP leaders are arrested; several, including Li, are later executed.
- 12 April: Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers massacre Communists in Shanghai and a purge of Communists begins in many eastern and southern cities.
- 27 April–9 May: Fifth National Congress of the CCP convenes in Hankou. The Congress does not order a break with the GMD, but delegates argue about how to push ahead with the peasant movement without upsetting cooperation. Chen Duxiu remains general secretary.
- 21 May: "Horse Day" massacre takes place in Changsha, a military suppression of communist-led mass organizations.
- 30 June: Enlarged meeting of the CCP CC adopts an eleven-point resolution acknowledging that the GMD is the leader of the national revolution.
- 12 July: CCP leadership is reformed. Chen Duxiu resigns as general secretary and new five-person temporary Standing Committee of the Politburo is chosen.
- 15 July: Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announces the end of cooperation with the CCP.
- 1 August: Communist-led Nanchang Uprising launched. The uprising is quickly defeated, and some of the remnants under Zhu De flee to the mountains. The day is subsequently celebrated as the founding of the Red Army.
- 5 August: Wang Jingwei begins a wide-scale purge of Communists.
- 7 August: CCP Party Center convenes an Emergency Conference in Hankou under the supervision of Comintern representative Lominadze. Qu Qiubai takes Chen Duxiu's place as general secretary. The meeting calls for armed struggle against the GMD.
- 9 August: Temporary Politburo meets and elects a three-person Standing Committee comprising Qu Qiubai, Li Weiham, and Su Zhaosheng. The meeting decides to send Mao Zedong and Peng Gongda to take charge of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan and to reorganize the Hunan Party Committee.
- 19 September: With the failure of the uprising apparent, Mao Zedong decides to abandon the party's orders to attack Changsha and retreats to the Jinggang Mountains.

- 9–10 November: Enlarged meeting of the Temporary Politburo convenes in Shanghai and decides to sever all relations with the GMD and calls for uprisings throughout the country.
- 11–14 December: Uprising by the Communists in the south (Canton Commune) ends in a massive defeat.

1928

- April: Mao Zedong and Zhu De join forces in the Jinggang Mountains to form the first and most influential communist base area in the countryside.
- 18 June–10 July: Sixth National Congress of the CCP is held in Moscow because of security concerns. It takes place under the direct supervision of Bukharin. The revolution in China is depicted as being in a trough between two waves. The soviet is designated as the instrument of political power for the future.
- 19 July: First Plenum of the CC elects the new Politburo.
- 20 July: New Politburo meets and elects Xiang Zhongfa as general secretary.
- November: Li Lisan replaces Cai Hesen in the Politburo.

1929

- 8 February: ECCI sends a letter to the CCP claiming that signs of a new revolutionary high tide in China are visible.
- 22 April: Stalin openly criticizes Bukharin for “right opportunism,” and Bukharin loses his position in the Comintern.
- 25–30 June: Second Plenum of the CC is held in Shanghai, and the “leftist” trend in the party increases. “Rightism” is defined as the greatest danger at the present time.
- 5 October: Politburo decision attacks Chen Duxiu for his “Trotskyite” and “liquidationist” tendencies.
- 26 October: ECCI writes to the CCP telling it that the new revolutionary tide has arrived and that the party must take over its leadership.
- Late December: Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army of the Red Army is held in Gutian and adopts a resolution drafted by Mao Zedong.

1930

- April: Zhou Enlai leaves China for Moscow, thus leaving effective power within the party in the hands of Li Lisan.
- 5 April: War breaks out between Chiang Kai-shek’s troops and those of Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. In November Chiang is victorious.
- May: Li Lisan convenes two conferences in Shanghai: the National Conference of Delegates from the Red Armies (mid-May) and the National Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas (20–23 May). The former calls for the establishment of a

- national Soviet regime, while the latter abandons the former guerrilla warfare tactics in favor of mobile warfare. This paves the way for the decision to attack major cities.
- 11 June: Li Lisan presides over Politburo meeting in Shanghai that decides the revolutionary upsurge has arrived. Wuhan is to be seized as part of the takeover of one or more provinces.
- 18 July: National Conference of CCP Organizations opens in Shanghai. It announces that the party should organize uprisings and that the party is the one preparing to take power. It calls for action committees to be established at the central and local levels.
- 23 July: The party in Shanghai receives the ECCI's response to Li Lisan's policy that seems to approve of it but expresses concern.
- 27 July: Peng Dehuai's Third Army captures Changsha but is able to hold it for only seven days.
- August: Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai are sent back to China from Moscow to moderate Li Lisan's policies.
- 6 August: Li Lisan chairs the first meeting of the Central Action Committee, which calls on the whole party to mobilize for immediate revolution.
- 23 August: First Front Army formed with Mao Zedong as general political commissar.
- 24 August–
12 September: Second attack on Changsha takes place without success.
- 24–28 September: Third Plenum of the CC meets in Shanghai chaired by Qu Qiubai. Li Lisan is criticized for tactical errors, particularly concerning the speed and development of the revolution.
- 16 November: ECCI letter of October arrives in China. It criticizes Li Lisan's mistakes as ones of line.
- December: GMD's First Suppression Campaign defeated within one month. Futian Incident occurs. The Twentieth Army led by Liu Tiechao revolts but is swiftly defeated.

1931

- 7 January: Fourth Plenum of the CC is held in Shanghai under the supervision of Pavel Mif, who had arrived in China in late December 1930. The Plenum harshly condemns Li Lisan. Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Li Weihai are dismissed from the Politburo, and Wang Ming is added. Xiang Zhongfa remains general secretary but real power lies with Wang Ming. Central Soviet Bureau established with Zhou Enlai as secretary.
- 17 January: He Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong make public their opposition to the Fourth Plenum and demand the convocation of an emergency congress.

- 18 January: He Mengxiong and key supporters, not including Luo Zhanglong, are arrested by the British police and handed over to the GMD. They are executed on 7 February.
- 27 January: Luo Zhanglong expelled from the CCP.
- May–June: GMD's Second Suppression Campaign rebuffed.
- 21 June: General Secretary Xiang Zhongfa is arrested in Shanghai and is executed by the GMD on 24 June. Wang Ming takes over as acting general secretary.
- July–October: GMD's Third Suppression Campaign launched under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.
- 18 September: Japanese troops invade northeast China.
- 1–5 November: Gannan Conference (First Party Congress of the Central Soviet) convenes and criticizes Mao Zedong's harshness in dealing with the Futian Incident. Mao is transferred to work in the soviet government.
- 7–20 November: First All-China Soviet Congress convenes in Ruijin and founds the Chinese Soviet Republic as a national regime. Mao Zedong is appointed chair of the soviet government. Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao are appointed vice-chairs with Zhu De as chair of newly created Central Revolutionary Military Commission.
- December: Zhou Enlai arrives in Jiangxi and formally assumes the position of secretary of the Central Soviet Bureau.

1932

- 9 January: CCP Party Center passes a resolution urging an "initial victory in one or more provinces."
- May: Chiang Kai-shek sets up General Headquarters for the Fourth Suppression Campaign.
- 8 October: Ningdu Conference of the Central Soviet Bureau convenes. Mao is strongly criticized, and on 23 October Zhou Enlai replaces Mao Zedong as political commissar of First Front Army.
- 11 October: Fourth Front Army is forced by the suppression campaign to leave the E-Yu-Wan Soviet Base Area and withdraw westward.
- 15 October: Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi, and other Trotskyites are arrested by the GMD in Shanghai.
- October: Third Front Army forced to leave Hubei and flee north.
- 29 December: Fourth Front Army founds the Revolutionary Committee of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Base Area.

1933

- January: Party Center headed by Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian is forced to leave Shanghai and move to the Jiangxi Soviet, where it merges with the Central Soviet Bureau.
- 15 February: Anti–Luo Ming campaign begins in the Jiangxi Central Soviet.

- 26–28 February: First Front Army in the Central Soviet gains a victory in the Fourth Suppression Campaign.
- 1 June: Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic launches the Land Investigation Movement.
- October: GMD launches its Fifth Suppression Campaign against the Central Soviet. In the same month Otto Braun, the Comintern's military advisor to the CCP, arrives in Jiangxi.
- 26 October: Secret peace agreement signed between the Red Army and the Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian.
- 20 November: The Nineteenth Route Army leaders declare a revolt against the GMD. By late December, the loosely knit government set up by the rebellion collapses under pressure from advancing GMD troops.

1934

- 15–18 January: Fifth Plenum of the CC convenes in Ruijin. Bo Gu's political report stresses that the revolutionary situation is excellent.
- 22 January–
3 February: Second All-China Soviet Congress convenes in Ruijin. Mao Zedong elected chair of the Central Government, and Zhang Wentian elected chair of the Council of People's Commissars.
- 28 April: Central Red Army loses the battle at Guangchang.
- 21 October: CCP CC moves out of Ruijin and embarks on the Long March.
- 10 November: GMD forces occupy Ruijin.
- 11 December: CCP Politburo meets at Tongdao and again on 18 December at Liping, and the original decision to move north to meet the Second and Sixth Army Corps is scrapped.

1935

- 15–18 January: An enlarged meeting of the Politburo convenes at Zunyi. Bo Gu is criticized for implementing a mistaken military line, and Mao Zedong is elected a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
- 15 May: Zhang Guotao and the Fourth Front Army set up the Northwest Special Committee of the CCP in the Sichuan-Xikang Border Area.
- 30 May: Zhang Guotao announces formation of the "Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic."
- 14 June: Rally held to mark the reunion of the First and Fourth Front Armies.
- 18 June: Qu Qiubai is executed having been arrested by the GMD in February.
- 26 June: Politburo meets at Lianghekou to deal with urgent military

- matters. Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong differ over which direction the Red Armies should move. Zhang wants to move east, while Mao, in the name of the Party Center, decides to move north.
- 18 July: Zhang Guotao named political commissar of the Red Army with Zhu De as commander-in-chief.
- 25 July–
20 August: Comintern's Seventh Congress adopts a new policy calling for a united front of all classes to resist fascism.
- 1 August: CCP Mission to the Comintern headed by Wang Ming publishes the August First Declaration advocating a national united front against the Japanese.
- 5–6 August: Politburo meets at Shawo to try to solve the political differences between the First and Fourth Front Armies. The decision to march north is confirmed.
- 10 September: Mao Zedong convenes emergency Politburo meeting at Baxi and again gets confirmation that the troops should march north. Zhang Guotao is not present.
- 12 September: CC meets at Ejie, and Mao Zedong delivers a report criticizing Zhang Guotao.
- 13–14 September: Zhang Guotao in a meeting held in Aba decides to move south. Mao Zedong is criticized as a "right opportunist."
- 15 October: Fourth Front Army's conference held in Zhuomubao decides to establish another Party Center headed by Zhang Guotao.
- 19 October: Central Red Army reaches Wuqizhen in north Shaanxi.
- 21 November: Zhang Hao, an envoy from the Comintern in Moscow, arrives in north Shaanxi.
- 5 December: Zhang Guotao telegrams the First Front Army informing it of his new "Party Center."
- 17 December: Politburo meets at Wayaobao to discuss the implications of the new united front strategy for China.

1936

- 22 January: Party Center passes a resolution denouncing Zhang Guotao.
- 28 January: Zhang Guotao at conference of party and army activists accepts the new united front policy.
- February: Zhang Guotao's troops defeated by the GMD and forced to retreat westward.
- 9 April: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang meet in Yan'an for secret talks about opposition to Japan.
- 5 May: CCP sends appeal to the Nanjing government calling for a cease-fire.
- June: Ren Bishi and He Long lead the remnants of the Second and Sixth Army Corps to meet up with the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi.

- July: Second and Sixth Army Corps and the Fourth Front Army decide to move north to join up with the First Front Army.
- 25 August: Zhang Wentian drafts an open letter on behalf of the CCP commending Chiang Kai-shek and referring to him as generalissimo.
- 17 September: Politburo passes resolution suggesting that an agreement be reached with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 8 October: The three major Red Army groups link up.
- 7 December: Mao Zedong assumes position of chair of the Central Military Council.
- 12 December: Xi'an Incident occurs. Chiang Kai-shek is taken captive by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. On 16 December Zhou Enlai goes to Xi'an for negotiations, having received instructions from the Comintern to resolve the issue peacefully. On 25 December, Zhang Xueliang accompanies Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing.

1937

- January: CCP moves its headquarters from Bao'an to Yan'an.
- 10 February: CCP CC sends a telegram to the Third Plenum of the GMD CC calling for a new period of CCP-GMD cooperation. The CCP calls for a cessation of civil war and convocation of a National Assembly and offers to abolish its independent political regime and to cease using the terms soviet and Red Army.
- 4 March: Liu Shaoqi sends a letter to the Party Center claiming that the party has suffered from "leftism" ever since the 7 August 1927 Emergency Meeting.
- 23-31 March: Politburo convenes an enlarged meeting in Yan'an to discuss the domestic situation and to criticize Zhang Guotao. A decision is adopted on Zhang Guotao's "mistakes."
- April: Liu Zhidan killed in combat with GMD troops in Shaanxi.
- 2-14 May: CCP conference of national party delegates is convened in Yan'an. Zhang Wentian rejects Liu Shaoqi's view that the party as a whole had suffered from "leftism" and reaffirms the party's and the Comintern's basic line as correct.
- May-June: Party Center convenes a conference in Yan'an on work in the white areas. Liu Shaoqi presides. While dropping his criticism of the Party Center during the Jiangxi period, he still criticizes "leftism" in the party and warns of "subjectivism" and "dogmatism."
- 7 July: Sino-Japanese War begins with the "incident" at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing.
- 9 August: Clash at Hongqiao Airport (Shanghai) between Chinese and Japanese troops takes place.
- 21 August: Nonaggression treaty is signed between the USSR and the Nationalist government in Nanjing.

- 22–25 August: Politburo convenes an enlarged meeting at Luochuan. The resolution calls for an “all-around war of resistance” and emphasizes the leading role of the CCP in the war. It formally adopts the “Ten Great Policies for Resistance Against Japan and National Salvation.”
- 25 August: Eighth Route Army formed with Zhu De as general commander and Ren Bishi as director of the Political Department.
- 22 September: CCP’s manifesto on GMD-CCP cooperation, drafted on 4 July, is made public by the Central News Agency of the central government.
- 10 October: New Fourth Army founded with Ye Ting as general commander and Xiang Ying as political commissar.
- 12 November: Mao Zedong addresses a meeting of party activists in Yan’an. He stresses the need for the CCP to retain its independence.
- 29 November: Wang Ming and seven members of the CCP Mission to the Comintern, including Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, arrive in Yan’an.
- 9–14 December: Politburo convenes in Yan’an to discuss Comintern policy and party work. Wang Ming prevails over Mao Zedong, but no formal resolution is drawn up. On Comintern instructions, the post of general secretary (held by Zhang Wentian) is abolished and a Secretariat formed comprising Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng, and Chen Yun. Mao retains his position as chair of the Military Council. Following the meeting, Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu leave for Wuhan to set up the Yangtze Bureau with Wang Ming as secretary.

1938

- 27 February–
- 1 March: Conflict between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming reaches a high point at a Politburo meeting. No formal resolution is adopted.
- 4 April: Zhang Guotao flees Yan’an to join the GMD.
- 18 April: Zhang Guotao is expelled from the CCP.
- 15 June: Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhou Enlai issue a public statement citing the heroic defense of Madrid as a good example for the defense of Wuhan. They propose mass mobilization to defend Wuhan.
- 5 August: GMD places restrictions on the activities of mass organizations in Wuhan.
- 14 September: Politburo meets to discuss news from the Comintern brought to Yan’an by Wang Jiaxiang. The Comintern approves the conduct of the war to date and suggests that Mao Zedong, not Wang Ming, should be the party leader.
- 29 September–
- 6 November: Sixth Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan’an. By the end of

the Plenum, Mao strongly expresses his differences with Wang Ming. However, in his opening remarks Mao asserts that the CCP takes second place to the GMD in the war against Japan. Mao states that the CCP's aim is to establish a "new democratic republic" based on Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People." In his closing remarks, Mao is more critical of the GMD, blaming it for not allowing the united front to assume a proper organizational form. Mao criticizes Wang Ming's approach of using legal channels to develop the communist movement and of shifting the focus of work from the countryside to the cities. Mao Zedong is placed in control of the daily work of the Secretariat.

25 October: Wuhan falls to the Japanese.

9 November: Yangtze Bureau is abolished and its former area of jurisdiction placed under two new bureaus, the Southern Bureau headed by Zhou Enlai (13 January 1939) and the Central Plain's Bureau headed by Liu Shaoqi.

1939

15 January–

4 February: Meeting of the First People's Council of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region convenes. It adopts a milder political line to be pursued during the war. Lin Boqu elected as chair of the Border Region government.

21–30 January: Fifth Plenum of the GMD CC meets and decides to step up its curbs on CCP activities.

10 February: CCP CC issues instructions concerning clashes between CCP and GMD troops.

10 June: Mao Zedong addresses a high-level cadres conference on the deteriorating relations with the GMD. He depicts all anti-communist activity as capitulation to the Japanese.

3–25 August: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo convened in Yan'an. It decides to stop the "storm membership drive" that had been in progress since the beginning of the war in 1937. Policy is to consolidate and to purge "undesirable elements."

9–18 September: National Political Consultative Assembly convenes its fourth session. The CCP tries to use the meeting to reject GMD attacks and to strengthen the anti-Japanese front. The GMD is unresponsive and criticizes the CCP's principal representative, Wang Ming.

October: GMD severs financial and logistical support to the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region government.

4 October: Mao Zedong publishes "Introduction to the Communist." It marks the beginning of Mao's attempt to define a new party history that is critical of Wang Ming and his supporters.

1940

- January: Secret agreement between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese to set up a new “National Government” made public.
- 15 January: Mao Zedong publishes “New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture.” For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the CCP publicly advances its claim to lead the revolution.
- 1 February: CCP CC issues resolution warning that capitulation is the greatest danger at the present time.
- 6 March: CCP CC issues directive on the question of administration of the anti-Japanese base areas. It proposes adoption of the “three thirds” system of government.
- 13 August: CCP’s Northern Bureau adopts the “Double Ten Policy” for the administration of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region.
- 20 August: “100 Regiments” Campaign is launched by the Eighth Route Army to attack the Japanese troops in North China. It concludes on 5 December.

1941

- January: “Southern Anhui Incident” (New Fourth Army Incident) occurs. The New Fourth Army troops are destroyed by the GMD.
- 20 January: New leadership of the New Fourth Army is announced that places it firmly under the control of Mao Zedong and his supporters. Chen Yi is made temporary commander and Liu Shaoqi appointed political commissar.
- 13 April: USSR and Japan conclude a five-year neutrality pact.
- 19 May: Mao Zedong delivers a speech to high-level cadres attending a study conference. He points out that the practical application of Marxism-Leninism in revolutionary work merits the most attention. (The speech is not published until 27 March 1942.)
- 22 June: Nazi Germany invades the Soviet Union.
- 2 July: Liu Shaoqi addresses the Central China Branch of the Party School on the question of how inner-party struggle should be conducted.
- 10 September–
22 October: An enlarged meeting of the Politburo convenes. The meeting marks the effective launch of the Rectification Campaign. The meeting decides that mistakes made by the party between 1931 and 1934 were ones of political line.
- 26 September: Central Secretariat publishes a decision on organizing study for senior cadres. A central study organization is formed with Mao Zedong as its head and Wang Jiaxiang as his deputy.
- 6–21 November: Second People’s Council of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region convenes. It decides on the policy of “Better Troops and Simpler Administration.”

- 4 December: Border Region government sends out a directive to all counties on implementing “Better Troops and Simpler Administration.”
- 9 December: CCP calls for the formation of an anti-Japanese and antifascist front in the Pacific to include all the governments and peoples who are opposed to Japan.

1942

- 28 January: Politburo ratifies a CC decision on land policy in the base areas. It is designed to appeal to all classes in the rural areas.
- 1 and 8 February: Mao Zedong addresses opening ceremony of the Central Party School in Yan'an. He highlights incorrect work methods in the party. The speech marks the formal beginning of the Rectification Campaign.
- 6 February: CC issues a directive explaining the need for moderation in current economic policy.
- 2–23 May: Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art convenes at which Mao Zedong outlines his policy.
- 27 May–11 June: Struggle sessions are held at the Central Research Institute to criticize Wang Shiwei.
- 28 May: Chen Duxiu dies.
- 8 June: Propaganda Department announces that a general study committee is to be set up in Yan'an with Mao Zedong as its head and Kang Sheng as his deputy.
- 19 October–
14 January 1943: CCP Northwest Bureau convenes a senior cadres conference that makes decisions supportive of Mao Zedong's view on party history and economic and administrative affairs. Mao delivers a speech on economic affairs setting forth the principles for future work.
- December: Party organs are instructed to begin investigation of cadres' backgrounds. However, the work formally begins only in April 1943.

1943

- 10 March: Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny* is published.
- 16–20 March: Politburo meets to discuss the question of strengthening party centralized leadership. The Secretariat is subordinated to the Politburo but is to carry out its day-to-day work. Mao Zedong appointed chair of the Politburo and the Secretariat. It is decided that the chair of the Secretariat will have the final power of decision on matters to be discussed at Secretariat meetings.
- 15 May: Comintern is dissolved.
- 26 May: CCP CC announces its agreement with the dissolution of the Comintern.

- 1 July: CCP begins to build up the public stature of Mao Zedong and his role in the history of the party.
- 6 July: Liu Shaoqi in an article attacks “false Marxists” and calls for party members to arm themselves with Mao Zedong’s system of thought.
- 15 August: CCP CC decision formally links the investigation of cadres with rectification.
- Early September–October: Politburo meets and criticizes Wang Ming’s “right opportunism” during the first year of the anti-Japanese war.
- 28 December: CC directives are sent out criticizing Wang Ming and Bo Gu for mistakes both during the anti-Japanese war and during the period 1931–34.

1944

- April: Japan’s Operation Ichigo attempts to clear a land route from Korea down to Hanoi.
- 12 April: Mao Zedong addresses a meeting of senior cadres in Yan’an. He calls for work in urban areas to be stepped up.
- 4–8 May: Substantive contacts take place between the GMD and the CCP in Xi’an.
- 21 May: Seventh Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan’an. It concludes on 20 April 1945. It meets on 21 May, 5 June, 9 November, 7 and 9 December 1944, 18 February, 31 March, and 20 April 1945. Mao Zedong chairs the Presidium and the meeting as a whole. While in session, the Presidium and the Plenum take over the work of the Secretariat and the Politburo.
- 5 June: Seventh Plenum at its second session issues an instruction on urban work and sets up an urban work committee with Peng Zhen as its head.
- 1 July: CCP directives clearly show that the party feels the war will end soon.
- 4 September: CC instructs urban work departments to be set up at all levels above the local party committee. Base area and urban work is placed on an equal footing.
- 10 November: General Patrick Hurley and Mao Zedong sign an agreement that is optimistically billed as one between the CCP and the national government of China.
- 22 November: GMD issues its own three-point agreement.

1945

- 3 February: An agreement is reached between the CCP and the GMD calling for a political consultative conference to discuss the establish-

- ment of constitutional government and the unification of military forces.
- February: Yalta Conference convenes.
- 1 March: Chiang Kai-shek makes it clear that while Communists and members of other parties can participate in the national government, the GMD will not give up its ultimate decision-making power until the people's congress has been convened to inaugurate constitutional government.
- 20 April: Seventh Plenum of the CCP CC concludes and adopts the resolution on party history. For the first time in such an official document, Wang Ming and Bo Gu are named as the "two dogmatists" who led the incorrect third "left line."
- 23 April–11 June: Seventh National Congress of the CCP convenes in Yan'an. Mao Zedong presents his report "On Coalition Government." The Congress adopts a new constitution drafted under Liu Shaoqi's guidance. The constitution stresses Mao Zedong Thought, stating that together with Marxism-Leninism it provides the guiding principles for all party work. A new CC of forty-four full and thirty-three alternate members is elected. Wang Ming and Bo Gu appear as numbers forty-three and forty-four respectively on the list of full members.
- 19 June: First Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Yan'an. Mao Zedong is elected chair of the CC, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. A Politburo of thirteen members is elected.
- 6 August: Atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima.
- 8 August: Soviet Russia declares war on Japan.
- 10 August: Japan indicates its intention to surrender.
- 14 August: Soviet Russia signs a treaty of alliance with the Chinese Nationalist government. Soviet Russia agrees to pull out of Manchuria by mid-November.
- 23 August: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo sets up the CC's Military Affairs Commission with Mao Zedong as chair. It decides that Mao Zedong should go to Chongqing for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.
- 25 August: CC publishes a declaration putting forward the slogans of peace, democracy, and unity.
- 26 August: Mao Zedong flies to Chongqing for negotiations, returning to Yan'an on 11 October 1945.
- 10 September: Communist troops successfully conduct the Shangdang battle.
- 14–15 September: Politburo meets to discuss work in the Northeast. It sets up a Northeast Bureau with Peng Zhen as secretary.
- 19 September: CC informs its bureaus that its policy is to expand in the north and defend in the south.

- 11 October: Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek issue a joint statement pledging the desire for peace and unity.
- End October: GMD-CCP armed clashes break out in eleven provinces.
- 21 December: CC sends a directive to the Northeast Bureau calling for long-term bases to be set up in the region.
- 23 December: General George C. Marshall arrives in China as President Harry Truman's envoy. This follows the resignation of Patrick Hurley in late November.

1946

- 10 January: Under General Marshall's mediation, the GMD and the CCP agree to a ceasefire to begin at midnight, 13 January.
- 10-31 January: Political Consultative Conference meets and succeeds in resolving most of the political and military differences between the CCP and the GMD.
- 1 February: CC issues a directive claiming that the most important form of struggle is now a peaceful, parliamentary one.
- 25 February: Three-person military committee (Marshall, Zhang Zhizhong, and Zhou Enlai) announces plans for large-scale troop reductions on both sides.
- 12 March: GMD forces occupy Shenyang, one day after Soviet withdrawal. General Marshall returns to the United States to report to President Truman.
- 15 April: Zhou Enlai declares that a state of hostilities exists in the northeast because of persistent GMD attacks.
- 18 April: General Marshall returns to China.
- 4 May: CCP CC issues a directive drafted by Liu Shaoqi calling for land reform instead of the policy of rent-reduction in order to attract peasant support during the Civil War.
- 7 June: A two-week ceasefire in the northeast is scheduled to begin. It is extended to the end of the month but to no avail.
- 14 June: United States passes legislation to provide military assistance to the GMD.
- 23 June: Mao Zedong demands that the United States cease all aid to the GMD and calls for U.S. withdrawal.
- 7 July: CCP CC launches a public attack on U.S. policy in China and demands withdrawal of U.S. forces.
- 4 August: Bo Gu, Ye Ting, Wang Ruofei, and Deng Fa are killed in a plane crash while flying from Chongqing to Yan'an.
- 10 October: Kalgan falls to the GMD. The CCP announces that this means certain civil war.
- 15 November-25 December: The National Assembly convenes in Nanjing. The CCP boycotts it.

1947

- 7 January: General Marshall returns to the United States admitting the failure of his mission in China.
- 1 February: Enlarged Politburo meeting is held in Yan'an primarily to discuss Mao Zedong's "Welcome the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution."
- 11 February: CCP delegation in Nanjing headed by Zhou Enlai is ordered to leave by the Nationalist government.
- 19 March: CCP withdraws from Yan'an.
- 26 March: CCP CC meets in Zaolingou Village (north Shaanxi) and decides to divide the CC in two. A Front Line Committee is established headed by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi. It remains in north Shaanxi to lead the national liberation struggle. A Work Committee is set up headed by Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De. It moves to the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area.
- 9 April: It is decided that the CC and the general headquarters of the PLA will remain in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region.
- 17 July–
13 September: CC Work Committee convenes the National Land Conference at Xibaipo Village (Hebei) and passes the "Outline Land Law of China."
- 1 September: Mao Zedong drafts a CC directive calling for a switch from strategic withdrawal to launching a nationwide counteroffensive.
- 10 October: CC approves and publishes the "Outline Land Law of China." Not only the land of landlords is to be appropriated but also houses and all movable property.
- 27 October: Nationalist government outlaws the Democratic League composed of third-party groups largely sympathetic to the CCP.
- 25–28 December: CCP CC convenes at Yangjiagou (north Shaanxi) to consider land policy as well as the general situation. This is preceded by preparatory meetings from 7 December. Mao Zedong warns that the "ultraleft" policy of 1931–34 of granting no land to landlords should not be repeated. Mao also raises the "10 basic military principles."

1948

- 12 January: Ren Bishi talks to an enlarged meeting of the Northwest Field Operations Military Front Committee about rural problems. He highlights the problem of too many middle peasants being classified as rich peasants and then being deprived of property.
- 23 January: Liu Shaoqi writes to Bo Yibo restating the integral link between land reform and party rectification and warns against encroachment on the rights of middle peasants.

- 3 and 6 February: Mao Zedong outlines a threefold categorization of “liberated areas,” each requiring a different land policy.
- 1 April: Mao Zedong, addressing the Congress of Cadres of the Shaan-Sui Liberated Area, warns against “ultraleft” tendencies.
- 22 April: Communist forces reoccupy Yan’an.
- 30 April–7 May: Secretariat of the CCP CC meets in Chengnan Village (Hebei) to discuss strategy for the war. It decides to concentrate forces on the Central Plains for attack as preparation for destruction of enemy troops north of the Yangtze.
- 25 May: CCP CC issues a directive drafted by Mao Zedong moderating land reform. Mao suggests that in some areas the conditions are not ripe for land reform.
- Late July–
31 August: Northeast Bureau of the CCP convenes a conference on urban work stressing its primacy over that in the rural areas.
- 1–22 August: Sixth Congress of the ACFTU is held in Harbin. Chen Yun is elected chair.
- 8–13 September: Enlarged meeting of the Politburo takes place at Xibaipo to undertake a major review of the previous couple of years and to plan for the future. It predicts a basic victory within five years and calls for a recentralization of control in the party. The center of gravity of party work is to be shifted from the rural areas to the cities.
- 12 September–
2 November: Communist forces engage in the Liao-Shen Campaign. This is Lin Biao’s eighth offensive, and it results in the total defeat of GMD forces in the northeast.
- 6 November–
10 January 1949: Communist forces launch the Huai-Hai Campaign, which opens the route to the Yangtze and beyond.
- 21 November–
31 January 1949: Communist forces launch the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign. Tianjin is taken on 15 January, and on 31 January communist troops enter Beijing.

1949

- 6–8 January: Politburo meets at Xibaipo and predicts that victory will be achieved during 1949 and 1950. The resolution adopted calls for moderation in policy when entering the south, proposing rent and interest reduction rather than land redistribution.
- 14 January: Mao Zedong presents eight conditions for the surrender of the GMD.
- 5–13 March: Second Plenum of the CCP CC convenes in Xibaipo. The Plenum reaffirms the conditions for peace, confirms that the Political

- Consultative Conference should be convened and that a democratic coalition government be formed. The switch of focus of work from the countryside to the cities is confirmed.
- 1 April: Unsuccessful peace talks between the GMD and the CCP begin in Beijing.
- 11–18 April: First Congress of the New Democracy Youth Federation convenes in Beijing.
- 20 April: With the CCP deadline for GMD acceptance of terms past, communist troops advance across the Yangtze.
- 23 April: Communist troops take over Nanjing.
- 27 May: Shanghai falls to communist troops.
- 1 July: Mao Zedong publishes “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.”
- 16 July: Association of Sino-Soviet Friendship is established with Guo Moruo as its chair.
- Late July–
31 August: Northeast Bureau of the CCP holds a city work conference and outlines CCP policy for urban work.
- 27 August: Northeast People’s Government is formed with Gao Gang as chair.
- 21–30 September: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference convenes in Beijing to prepare for the establishment of the PRC and the election of the People’s Government. On 27 September, it adopts the “Organic Law of the Central People’s Government” and the “Organic Law of the People’s Political Consultative Conference.”
- 1 October: PRC is formally founded with Mao Zedong as chair and Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Gao Gang (CCP), Song Qingling, Li Jishen, and Zhang Lan (democrats) as vice-chairs. Zhou Enlai is appointed premier of the State Council and minister of foreign affairs.

Introduction

The rise of Chinese communism has shaped the history of China for most of the twentieth century. Almost from the founding of the CCP in 1920 to its seizure of state power in 1949, its struggle with the GMD dominated the domestic stage of Chinese politics. From the founding of the PRC (1949) until the present, the CCP has presided over the world's most populous state. Its ambitious programs to transform these people's lives have affected everyone in staggering and sometimes catastrophic ways. On the international stage, the PRC's international behavior has had a major impact within the communist bloc, on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the balance of power in East Asia.

The CCP's struggle to gain power is a dramatic story of policy disputes and power struggles, intrigue and infighting, tragedy and ultimately triumph. The main outlines of this story have been known for a long time: a first congress in July 1921 inspired by the Bolshevik revolution and guided by a Comintern emissary that sought to find an identity for the fledgling party; a united front with the GMD from 1923 to 1927 that ended in disaster in 1927 when the GMD leader, Chiang Kai-shek, broke decisively with the CCP and slaughtered thousands; the early years in the wilderness when the guerrilla warfare gradually led to the buildup of base areas in south China; the increasingly ferocious campaigns by Chiang Kai-shek to exterminate the "bandits" that led to the evacuation of the central soviet area in October 1934; the epic journey of the Long March, which resulted in a sadly depleted Red Army arriving in northwest China a year later; the emergence of the military strategist Mao Zedong as the CCP's preeminent leader after bitter struggles with his political foes Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming; the formation of a second united front with the GMD to resist Japanese aggression in China in the mid-1930s; the expansion of the CCP during the anti-Japanese war and the creation of a new orthodoxy by Mao Zedong in Yan'an in the late 1930s and early 1940s; the slide from cooperation between the CCP and the GMD to civil war after the Japanese had been defeated; the better organization and discipline of the CCP's troops that led to a surprisingly swift triumph in the Civil War and the flight of the GMD to Taiwan.

Much was clear when *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* was published at Harvard four decades ago. Unclear then, however, were the answers to why, how, and even when and where many key events took place, and who had shaped them. With almost the complete documentation now available, the story can

I would like to thank Richard Baum, Michel Hunt, Benjamin Schwartz, Lawrence Sullivan, and C. Martin Wilbur for their comments on an earlier draft of this introduction. In particular, I would like to thank Roderick MacFarquhar and Frederick Teiwes, who both subjected this introduction to a very rigorous reading. These readers' suggestions have enabled me to correct certain faulty ideas, but I am afraid stubbornness has caused me to persist in what may be others.

be told here through contemporary CCP materials. The documents show how the CCP interpreted the revolution in which it was participating, how it devised policies to meet the changing circumstances, and how these were communicated both to party members and to the public at large. The message was not always the same, not even for party members. How much one was entitled to know or which particular interpretation of an event one was entitled to see depended on party rank.¹

The details of the Chinese revolution are, of course, unique but there are a number of general features that will be familiar to students of revolutions elsewhere. First, the traditional system in China had ceased to “deliver the goods” for its citizens and crucially for key groups such as the urban elites and intellectuals. Disillusionment set in and the imperial system lost its monopoly over feasible alternatives, allowing disaffected intellectuals to challenge the premises of state power. Second, the communist movement was able to thrive where the bases of power of local elites had been destroyed or lost the capacity to repress alternatives to its rule. There the Communists could establish local military superiority. Third, for the revolutionaries, the organization and organizational ethos were crucial in terms of providing the movement with its direction and purpose. This gave the activists their frame of reference. It enabled them to channel the energies of other social forces when necessary and to overcome the resistance and apathy of the local population.

The chronological introductions in this volume seek to place the documents in their specific historical context. They also reveal the high degree of policy diversity that existed within the CCP. The CCP has never been a monolithic entity despite the desires of some of its leaders and the misconceptions of some Western observers, particularly those writing in the 1950s when the influence of the Cold War was at its height.

In fact, the history of the CCP has been marked by great internal diversity and change. The documents selected reveal this policy diversity in two ways. First, they show the wide range of debate within the party on issues of strategy and tactics. Resolutions adopted were frequently compromises between different factions in the party. While this tendency was clearer in the first two decades, it persisted despite Mao’s consolidation of power in the 1940s. Second, there was a very strong regional dimension to the revolution. Put simply, the issue of strategy and tactics could look quite different depending on whether it was viewed from the top of a barren mountain or from a safe-house in Tianjin.

The First United Front, for example, brought contrasting responses from the underground party apparatus functioning in Shanghai, where the foreign presence dominated, and from the party apparatus working openly in Canton under the patronage of the GMD and free from foreign pressure. The local party organization often provided the focus of loyalty for its members, and the locality was frequently the source of policy initiative. In various base areas, the party had to be extremely flexible, on occasion, just to survive. Party documents frequently complain about this tendency toward localism, and the party devised various

institutional arrangements to try to improve accountability to the Center.

The choice of documents is, of course, subjective, and intends to highlight the aspects and issues which the author feels are most important for understanding the rise to power of the CCP. Indeed, revolution itself is a contested concept, and its interpretation depends on one's viewpoint or position of involvement.² Revolution is a mental construct. This is true for participants and observers alike. The symbols used by participants to describe the events taking place depend on whether one wants to create a feeling of solidarity and incitement to action or to form a bond of solidarity to repress what is taking place. Thus, terms such as *comrade*, *counterrevolutionary*, and *dictatorship of the proletariat* summon up different images, depending on from where one views them. Observers and interpreters of revolution are no less affected. Interpretation is influenced by one's own political position as well as by the particular questions in the social sciences which seem most relevant at any specific time.³

The concentration on the CCP inevitably leaves out other important aspects of the revolution in twentieth-century China. Communist success in seizing state power was aided by factors beyond its control, and a major part of the explanation for communist success lies in the failure of the alternatives. For example, the GMD's neotraditional response failed to come to terms with China's situation. While the Japanese invasion may have sounded the death-knell for the GMD, the work of Lloyd Eastman and others has shown that even without this it would have been difficult for the GMD to have constructed a credible institutional framework to govern China.⁴

Two issues on which the documents shed light on must be briefly discussed: the role of the Comintern and the role of the CCP's military. Then, three broader issues that the documents touch on implicitly will be reviewed: the emergence of the CCP, the relationship between the CCP and social forces in China, and the development of the CCP as an organization and its ideology.

The Role of the Comintern

During the 1950s, the assumption that the CCP was under the tutelage of Moscow led to attempts to see Comintern influence on the CCP in earlier phases of the revolution. It was not difficult to find.⁵ Indeed, some scholars saw the destruction of the First United Front in China as tantamount to a failure of Soviet policy or even more particularly of Stalin himself.⁶ The work of Benjamin Schwartz stands out as an exception. While he acknowledged the debt owed by the Chinese Communists to Bolshevik theory and organization, he was aware of traditional Chinese influences and the "originality" of Mao Zedong and his supporters, which was of increasing importance after 1927.⁷ The indigenous elements that had gone into Chinese communism became major objects for retrieval, particularly after the Sino-Soviet rupture became apparent in the early 1960s. Some researchers began to explore the "sinification of Marxism" and to stress that much had

happened in spite of Comintern interference rather than because of it.⁸

We can see now that there was continual tension between the CCP and the Comintern resulting from China's perceived position in the world revolution and Moscow's perception of Soviet geopolitical interest. Comintern influence was of major importance in the party's founding and development, but its authority was not always accepted or decisive in all periods.⁹ Yet it was a voice that could not be ignored, and until 1938, when the Comintern could articulate its message clearly and get it through the communication network to the CCP leadership, it had a reasonably decisive say.

Comintern agents in China enjoyed high prestige but had to find Chinese through whom they could transmit their orders and the Comintern's strategic and tactical visions. At best, they were always one step removed from the realities they were trying to influence and interpret.¹⁰ Even Chen Duxiu, who supported Maring's view of the need for cooperation with the GMD at the CCP's Third Congress (**Doc. A.19**), had originally rejected Maring's ideas (**Doc. A.9**). In fact, it was only after Maring appealed to Comintern discipline that he was able to bring Chen and other key CCP leaders briefly to his side. Conversely, Comintern agents relied on the Chinese leaders for their information about the local situation. Thus, Maring depended on Liao Zhongkai for information about the GMD and about cooperation with the CCP. Liao was on the left of the GMD and a strong supporter of such cooperation, perhaps leading Maring to adopt a positive assessment while underestimating opposition within the GMD.

Some previous analyses viewed Mao Zedong's rise to power within the CCP as occurring in spite of the Comintern, but it now appears that the Comintern was at least willing to acquiesce in Mao's rise and his victories over Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming (Moscow's own trainee). In both confrontations, the actions and words of the Comintern tended to favor Mao over his opponents.¹¹ Whether the Comintern clearly perceived what was at stake is another matter. Further, on a number of occasions the Comintern called for the CCP not to ape Soviet experience, but to develop its own policy, and the Comintern's Seventh Congress (1935) accepted that individual parties should have more freedom. Whether the Comintern approved of what was finally developed in China is a different question. Thus, the Comintern was not anti-Mao; nor was Mao inevitably opposed to the Comintern.¹²

The Role of the Military

Throughout the twentieth century, military strength has been a key factor in Chinese politics. The primary agent of CCP control of its base areas before 1949 and its seizure of state power was the military. Yet the CCP's Red Army was clearly different from previous warlord armies that had tried to rule China. By the early 1940s, it was a well-disciplined, multifunctional organization that submitted to party rule. This is not to say, however, that there were no tensions in the relationship.

Mao's initial breakthrough to the top leadership came at the Zunyi Conference (January 1935) with his criticism of the military tactics that had been used to defend the Central Soviet from GMD encirclement. Mao was identified with a correct military strategy that gained him the trust of most military leaders and, as his strategy proved successful, increasingly with other party leaders. The military commanders were Mao's staunchest supporters and were the first to praise Mao and his thought within the party. As Raymond Wylie has pointed out, it was military figures who rallied first to Mao's support after the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC (September–November 1938) and again in 1942 when they began publicly to praise Mao and his thought. This was one full year before such praise became common among party leaders.¹³ Also, the first collected works of Mao Zedong was published on the order of the military leader of the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area, Nie Rongzhen.¹⁴

Similarly, Mao held the army in high esteem, seeing in it the virtues of plain living and selfless devotion to the cause, which he felt were often lacking in the party. In times of stress, Mao would turn to the army for support such as during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, when he sought to purify the ranks of the party and the state. He felt that under the leadership of Minister of Defense Lin Biao, it embodied the "true spirit" of the revolution. Earlier, at the Lushan meeting in 1959 when Mao came under attack for his mishandling of the Great Leap Forward, he threatened to retreat again into the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government, even founding a new Red Army if necessary.¹⁵

This positive view of the army in the PRC has been widely held. Individual soldiers or units have frequently been promoted as models for emulation because of their embodiment of the communist spirit. The best example of this is Lei Feng, the soldier who was put forward in the early 1960s during the PLA campaigns to study the thought of Mao, again after the fall of the "Gang of Four" in 1976–77, and finally for young people to learn from after the party had called in the PLA to crush the student-led demonstrations in 1989. In the latter two cases the party wanted to restore its battered prestige and impress on the young that they should unthinkingly obey the party.

However, the close relationship between Mao and the military did not mean that the party was a military party.¹⁶ Mao was faithful to his dictum that "the party controls the gun." At the Seventh Party Congress (1945), despite Mao's close ties to the military and its previous importance for him, military representation in central party organs was not increased significantly. In the thirteen-person Politburo, for example, only Zhu De and Peng Dehuai could be classified as professional soldiers, and both had been figures of standing for a long time. However, the input of professional soldiers into military decision making did increase after the Congress and during the Civil War, when the military became crucial to the party's success. As Frederick Teiwes has remarked, there began a subtle long-term process which saw "increased military representation on authoritative policy-making bodies, greater professional military independence concerning military affairs, and the narrowing of civilian control to personal control by the Chairman."¹⁷

The PLA has never acted as a homogeneous group in the Chinese political system pursuing military interests against those of other apparats. On the whole, it has remained under party control or, more correctly, under that of the supreme leader, first Mao Zedong and later Deng Xiaoping. Thus, the cases of Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao, who were dismissed in 1959 and 1971, respectively, had more to do with political differences in the broad sense rather than the promotion of a narrow military interest.¹⁸ As with Mao, the military has provided Deng Xiaoping with a solid bedrock of support since his assumption of power in the late 1970s. For example, in 1989, despite obvious tensions, the military accepted Deng Xiaoping's tough line against the student-led protests.¹⁹

Party control of the military was backed up by a system of political commissars based on the pattern developed by the Red Army in Soviet Russia. The distinction of the military from other organizations before 1949 was blurred because leaders were often interchangeable. This overlap of personnel has continued since 1949, with many leaders concurrently holding party and military positions. This has contributed to the institutional overlap and lack of clear demarcation between different organizations that has been a major feature of PRC administrative life.

Finally, the military nature of the Chinese revolution has deeply affected the language of the CCP. While Marxism, especially in its Leninist form, is punctuated by the language of struggle, particularly that of class, the terminology of the CCP is one of war: war on class enemies or the struggle to achieve production targets or the battle to overcome nature. This language combined with the mobilization campaigns that accompanied policy initiatives or denunciations of enemies explains, in part, the severe nature of post-1949 Chinese politics.

The Emergence of the CCP

The story of the CCP's rise to power forms part of the much larger process of Chinese modernization. Crucial to the latter was the search for a suitable state structure to facilitate the pursuit of wealth and power and to enable China to assume "its rightful position" in the international arena. In the nineteenth century, the combination of internal degeneration and external pressure caused the imperial system to collapse. The institutions and belief system that had sustained successive dynasties were unable to meet China's contemporary needs. As the system rotted from within and was squeezed from without, some Chinese began to look for alternatives to guide future development. Their quest for new state and societal forms took on a number of guises. While the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) was not a "modern" revolutionary movement, it came about partially as a consequence of Western economic and intellectual intervention. Joseph Levenson has shown that the rebellion presented a fundamental challenge to the intellectual orthodoxy of Confucian China, and he has described how it adopted elements foreign to the traditional order of peasant rebellions, many of which foreshadowed the intellectual revolution of the twentieth century.²⁰ The "rebellion" convinced some of the necessity for reform

within the system. Others began to see the imperial system itself as the root cause of China's difficulties.

Initial reforms in the mid-nineteenth century consisted of a mechanical borrowing of certain features of Western "progress," particularly military ones, and were not intended to introduce new cultural values or systems of thought. This approach was best summed up in the phrase of the reformer Zhang Zhidong, "Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for the practical application" (*Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong*). The policy of selective adaptation proved short-sighted. Its supporters did not comprehend the interrelated nature of Western societies and failed to see that their technology could not easily be disentangled from the social and cultural matrix in which it was embedded.²¹

A second reaction was to fall back on China's xenophobic traditions and try to shut out the foreigners altogether, including their technology. At its most extreme, this view led to violent attacks on the foreign presence in China as witnessed in the Boxer Movement (1899–1900) with its slogan of "wipe out the foreigners."²²

The third reaction was to see China's tradition, with the emperor supported by Confucian principles reinforcing a system of hierarchical subordination, as the core of China's crisis. This caused certain groups to question the validity of China's tradition and even to propose all-out Westernization as a solution. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) caused, according to Benjamin Schwartz, "an almost traumatic change in the climate of literati opinion."²³ A moderate response to this situation was to modernize within the existing imperial structure as witnessed by the Hundred Days' Reform (11 June–21 September 1898). However, some intellectuals became profoundly disillusioned with their heritage and sought solutions outside China. In their search, these Chinese went to Japan, Europe, the United States, and, later, Soviet Russia for the ideas that might save the Chinese nation.

The collapse of the dynastic system in 1911 sharply focused on the issues of what kind of government system would replace the old imperial bureaucracy and what kind of authority relationships there would be. The crumbling of Confucianism left a gap in the intellectual sphere which Chinese intellectuals used other thought systems to fill. The period of intellectual ferment and discussion that followed was called the May Fourth Movement (1915–19).²⁴ The movement embraced a wide-ranging cultural and nationalistic renaissance and opened up a Pandora's box of solutions to China's problems. However, the movement did not offer an answer to the crucial question of political power. Pragmatic liberalism, anarchism, and the various forms of socialist thought that were popular in these years did not seem to offer the quick, total solution to China's problems that many saw as necessary. Intellectuals like Hu Shi, the liberal reformer who proposed reform by "inches and drops," seemed increasingly irrelevant.

A new factor emerged with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution which demonstrated the possibilities for radical change within the context of underdevelopment. To men like Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, a Bolshevik-style party appeared to offer a strong

organization committed to a radical break with the past, which could guide and coordinate change. However “sinified” Marxism-Leninism may have later become under Mao Zedong, it must be remembered that it was introduced into China by a generation of intellectuals who were profoundly disenchanted with their intellectual heritage and who sought China’s salvation in a foreign ideology. Marxism in its Leninist form seemed to provide an explanation for China’s humiliation that transcended the immediate situation and linked China’s domestic troubles to the international order. Domestically, the label of feudalism was used to describe the former imperial system and the subsequent degeneration of China into warlordism under which landlords exploited the peasantry. The concept of imperialism was used to explain the foreign enclaves and the collapse of native industry under pressure from the foreign powers. China’s national humiliation was linked to international forces, and thus, logically, its salvation was linked to the greater cause of working-class liberation from the shackles of capitalism. The choice of a Bolshevik form of organization represented an implicit acceptance that a basic political transformation was a prerequisite for any effective solution to the social problems confronting China. Yet, it also opened the door to future problems which the founding generation could not foresee. The choice of a party organized on the principle of democratic centralism may have offered the hope of rapid, coordinated action, but it also created a tension between authoritarian organization and the antidespotic, iconoclastic thrust of the May Fourth Movement.

Leninism seemed to offer an organizational ideology that was antithetical to a leader-centered traditional political culture. Yet, the concentration of power also inherent in the Bolshevik-style party created a tension between collective responsibility and individual power. This tension came to the fore briefly in the late 1920s under Li Lisan and more dramatically in Yan’an as Mao Zedong achieved an exalted status.²⁵ The humiliation of the writer Wang Shiwei and the Rectification Campaign launched in Yan’an (1941–44) marked the triumph of the party apparatus and its apparatchiks over the few cosmopolitan intellectuals who had managed to survive in the party since the days of the May Fourth Movement (**Docs. G.10, G.16, G.17, G.18, and G.19**). Finally, as Arif Dirlik has perceptively argued, the adoption of a Bolshevik organization put an end to the discussion of Marxism within the CCP. The “clichés of Bolshevism substituted for independent analysis,” and the organization itself and its principles substituted for theoretical analysis.²⁶

The CCP and Its Constituencies of Support

In the 1960s and 1970s, academics debated whether the Communists won because they responded as nationalists to the Japanese invasion, or because they proved capable of mobilizing the population through sound socioeconomic policies or, inevitably, some vaguely defined combination of the two. Chalmers Johnson provided the most cogent argument that essentially the Communists used the Japanese invasion to portray the CCP as a patriotic party.²⁷ Lucien Bianco offered a more

complex explanation that combined the national thesis with a stress on the socio-economic program of the Communists. He wrote, "it was the national problem, not the social problem, that acted as a catalyst" but added the important rider that "at the very heart of the decisive 'national' stage of the revolution lay the social problem."²⁸ By contrast, Mark Selden maintained that it was the Communists' program for socioeconomic transformation, as implemented in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, that had paved the way for their ultimate success.²⁹ Tetsuya Kataoka was almost alone in arguing that it was the CCP's organizational control that led to its victory.³⁰ Later, Shum Kui-kwong stressed the importance of the Second United Front for neutralizing the hostility of local elites and wooing the "intermediate classes" over to the CCP's side. Shum viewed this component of the equation as equally important to CCP success as peasant support.³¹

More recent research and newly available sources present an infinitely more complex picture of the party's policies and its relationship to different social forces in the Chinese countryside.³²

Perhaps the most striking thing about the documents and recent studies is that they reveal the extent to which the CCP had difficulty in mobilizing support within society. Establishing effective contact with both the workers and the peasantry proved to be a problem. In fact, mobilization was so acutely difficult on occasions that the question seems not to be why were the Communists so successful, but rather how did they ever manage to gain state power against such considerable odds.³³ The CCP was successful in putting down local roots where it showed flexibility in adapting policy to local circumstances, where initially it was good at micropolitics. By contrast, attempts to transform local environments to conform with predetermined ideological predispositions were unsuccessful. Thus, to succeed, local party leaders were forced to compromise on party principles and were left open to attacks by the Party Center or its commissioners for "crimes" such as "corruption," "tailism," "right opportunism," and pursuing "superstitious practices."³⁴

The Party and the Working Class

The founders of the CCP adopted the sectarian stance of basing their revolutionary strategy on the working class. The prime objective was to organize the working class and promote a social revolution through the use of the strike weapon (**Docs. A.1 and A.3**). The focus on labor organization was aided by the presence of the Comintern representative, Maring, who had begun his revolutionary career in the Dutch labor movement. Maring, however, was opposed to the initial decision to shun other classes and to adopt an attitude toward them of "independence, aggression, and hostility" (**Docs. A.8 and A.20**). This exclusionism was shown to be ineffective with the defeat of the Beijing-Hankou Railway Workers' Strike in February 1923. Defeat revealed to party members the inability of the working class to conduct the revolution by itself. The blow was all the harder because it was the railway workers

who had been most receptive to CCP ideas, as compared with the two other elements of the traditional revolutionary “holy trinity,” the miners and the sailors (**Docs. A.7** and **A.16**).

Despite the CCP’s grudging acceptance of cooperation with other classes, pride of place in the revolutionary struggle still remained with the working class. Yet, the party in Shanghai, Beijing, and other major industrial centers had great difficulty in penetrating the proletariat (see, for example, **Doc. A.5**).³⁵ Partly, this was owing to the fact that early party members were few in number and were almost exclusively intellectuals with little or no practical experience in organization and little genuine understanding of the social conditions of the nascent working class. In Beijing, some headway was made through the use of workers’ schools, and although education was used as “agitprop,” for instance to promote the idea of the eight-hour workday, party activists were wary of declaring themselves to be Communists.³⁶

The shortage of party members was especially a problem in China’s main industrial center, Shanghai (see **Doc. B.4**). Work in Shanghai was further hampered by the foreign presence. In addition, the Communists had to compete with other organizations that had already established a presence among the working class. In Shanghai, communist access was frequently blocked by the Green and Red Gangs and even by the YMCA, while in Canton the GMD and the anarchists enjoyed greater popularity and influence.³⁷ This caused party leader Chen Duxiu frequently to bemoan the situation with respect to labor work in Shanghai (see, for example, **Docs. A.19** and **A.28**). In May 1924, the Shanghai party committee summed up the results to date in labor organization as “nil” (**Doc. B.4**).

The outbreak of the May 30 Movement (1925) and the start of the Northern Expedition (1926) appeared to change this situation and enable the CCP to break out of its relative isolation (**Doc. B.10**).³⁸ Party membership expanded rapidly from just under 1,000 in January 1924 to 3,000 by October 1925 and then by leaps and bounds to around 58,000 at the time of the Fifth Party Congress (April 1927). However, these figures conceal problems. The party was still short of skilled personnel to organize on the ground and to develop extensive grass-roots support. Many of the new recruits, because of the reduced membership requirements, were not conversant with party norms.

As a result of its lack of labor power at the grass roots, the party attempted to gain control of the movement generated by nationalist sentiment from the top down. Thus, the CCP set up the Shanghai General Labor Union at the start of the May 30 Movement, but this had to be closed down in mid-September 1925 partly because of a lack of revolutionary momentum and partly because of attacks on it by various groups in Shanghai. Indeed, Chen Duxiu was later to admit that, despite the rhetoric, the movement in Shanghai had really been coordinated by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce and genuine communist influence seems to have been slight. This opportunism was combined with attempts to take over leading positions in existing organizations rather than building up solid grass-roots support.³⁹

The apparent initial success of this strategy lulled party leaders, particularly

those in Shanghai, into a false sense of security. A CCP-led revolution on the back of a swelling nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution seemed to be a possibility. Thus, in May 1926, Chen Duxiu was moved to claim that 1.25 million workers were under CCP leadership. This claim was based on a head-count of members in organizations whose representatives had attended the Third Labor Congress. However, the CCP had constructed no colossus but rather a Buddha that turned out to have feet of clay. As the strength of the movement ebbed, familiar problems resurfaced with labor work in Shanghai: the persistence of the guild tradition and the influence of the Green and Red Gangs (see, for example, **Doc. B.19**).

In the 1920s, the CCP did not develop the necessary support base in urban China; nor, as is argued below, was it able to build up solid support in the southern countryside. Once the military power of the GMD was turned on the CCP, it had very little with which to defend itself. Given the short history of the CCP and its small size, it was most unlikely that a sufficient base of support could have been developed. Building up an independent armed force was also out of the question, not only because of the lack of numbers and financial resources, but also because it would have inevitably speeded up the clash with the GMD, especially the powerful GMD right.

In this sense, the failure of the First Revolution was not caused directly by either rigid implementation of a misguided Comintern policy or the “capitulationism” and “opportunism” of Chen Duxiu vis-à-vis the GMD.⁴⁰ It was more closely related to the CCP’s inability to develop genuine support in urban and rural China⁴¹ and to develop a military force with which to defend itself.⁴² The CCP tended to follow behind events in China, interpreting positive signs as the next revolutionary wave that would cause history to flow in the right direction. When the waves came, the party was unable to channel the flow to its own benefit.

Yet, the period was not entirely without benefit to the CCP. Cooperation with the GMD had allowed the CCP to develop its organization on a much wider scale, especially in the south, than would otherwise have been the case. Further, it had been a valuable learning experience for the CCP. With expanded membership, it had begun to pay serious attention to its organizational structure. Despite all the problems, it had gained some influence in the southern labor movements, and more particularly the southern peasant movements, and had trained a body of cadres. It had no army of its own, but the CCP did have a number of military officers who had been trained in the Whampoa Military Academy. These officers would play an important role in the subsequent phase of the revolution. The vulnerability of the CCP to the GMD’s armed force was made more apparent when the Red Army was driven out of the Jiangxi Soviet. These two experiences deeply affected Mao Zedong and caused him to try to hold the Second United Front together for as long as possible during the 1940s.

The CCP only gave up its focus on the working class as the primary agent of revolutionary change when forced to do so by the prevailing circumstances. The failure of legal communism in 1927, and the further disasters wrought by first Li

Lisan's and then Qu Qiubai's insurrectionist policies (**Docs. C.18** and **C.19**, respectively), caused the CCP to lose effective contact with the major urban centers of Shanghai, Wuhan, and Canton.⁴³ This marked a break in substantial contact between the CCP and the working class for the next twenty-two years. However, the ideology of the CCP never ceased to stress working-class leadership over the peasantry. In the absence of the working class this meant the rule of its "vanguard," the party. As soon as conditions permitted, the party again reasserted the primacy of urban work over that in the countryside. In April 1944, Mao Zedong called for work in urban areas to be stepped up, and on 5 June the CC passed a resolution that highlighted this renewed emphasis (**Doc. G.24**).

It was circumstance which forced leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhang Guotao to retreat to the barren mountainous areas where they could put together a successful new strategy. They clearly recognized that the road to power in China had to pass through the countryside.

The CCP in the Countryside

The centrality of the discontented peasant affected practical revolutionaries and also social science observers. Revolutionary leaders such as Che Guevara saw rural bases and the mobilization of the peasantry as the way to seize state power. This revolutionary practice derived its origins from the experience of the Chinese revolution, but these perceptions related to a mythic form of the Chinese revolution rather than to its reality.

Since the 1960s, social science literature has placed strong emphasis on the central role played by the peasantry in the revolutionary process. The centrality of the peasant question dominated the work of social scientists such as Eric Wolf, Joel Migdal, and Theda Skocpol.⁴⁴ With respect to China, the most enthusiastic supporter of the peasants' central role in the revolution is to be found in the work of Ralph Thaxton. Thaxton takes James Scott's notion of the "moral economy of the peasant" as his point of departure. Scott's research on southeast Asia shows that the peasantry could actually influence the historical process to create a state form incorporating their communalist and egalitarian traditions.⁴⁵ Using these premises, Thaxton argues that the peasantry could conduct revolution without the insertion of outside organizers and that when the CCP came, it accommodated the "counter-values" of the peasantry and, in combination, they were able to overthrow the traditional local elite.⁴⁶

The CCP encountered great difficulties in finding a ready support base in the countryside. It proved to be no easier than in the urban areas. Most recent research on the CCP in the rural base areas indicates that it was not only difficult to mobilize the peasantry, but that, once mobilized, it was difficult both to maintain the momentum and to keep it under control. Indeed, Lucien Bianco has written that the CCP was in the difficult position of trying to initiate a peasant movement without peasants.⁴⁷

While as early as November 1922 Chen Duxiu had recognized the importance of the peasant question in China (**Doc. A.18**) the issue was not extensively addressed until the CCP's Fourth Congress in January 1925. Even so, the resolution adopted did not amount to a plan of action (**Doc. B.8**). In the more radical post-May 30 atmosphere, the CCP adopted a radical program of land confiscation, although it was swiftly reined in when perceived "peasant excesses" during the Northern Expedition were deemed to be threatening cooperation with the GMD. Mao Zedong took exception to this viewpoint and was greatly impressed with the power of the peasantry, as he depicted in his report of March 1927 (**Doc. B.20**). At the time of his report, however, Mao had not yet combined the notion of peasant power with military organization.

The main developments in the peasant movement were all in the south in Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. As the Northern Expedition moved out from the GMD strongholds in the south, large rural areas came under joint GMD-CCP control. Here peasant associations were established, often under the leadership of professionally trained peasant organizers. CCP supporters ran many of the associations, and the party leadership saw this as a way to gain control over the peasant movement. However, as in urban China, the CCP lacked sufficient local cadres. A July 1926 report on the peasant movement in Guangdong outlined the problem. While some 800,000 peasants were members of peasant associations in 60 counties, there were only 600 party members working in 20 counties (**Doc. B.18**). Thus, the party had weak links to many local communities. The CCP adopted the same head-counting, top-down approach to controlling the peasantry as they had used with respect to the working class in urban China. Thus, at the CCP's Fifth Congress, Chen Duxiu spoke of almost 10 million peasants being organized in the countryside via the peasant associations and seemed to count this as being synonymous with CCP control (**Doc. B.25**).

Yet, the communist presence was kept in place only by GMD military power. Once attacked by the GMD, CCP members had very little alternative but to retreat into more inhospitable rural areas. While CCP policy vis-à-vis the peasantry was radicalized in the wake of its defeat (**Doc. C.1**), the policy of rural-led uprisings to help recapture the urban centers weakened the CCP even further.⁴⁸ However, these failed uprisings did leave the CCP with the basis for the Red Army.

The *sine qua non* for CCP success was sustained control over a particular locality on the basis of military force. This provided the party with the time and space to devise policies relevant to the particular region. Moreover, a continuous CCP presence backed by armed force caused the local elite either to cooperate or acquiesce in CCP rule. For the peasantry, it offered a continuity of rule to which they could respond. Simple military control and rule through repression, however, would have rendered the CCP indistinguishable from the warlords of whom they had been so critical. As a result, the CCP found itself faced with devising policies to suit localities without compromising its general principles, while simultaneously avoiding driving potentially hostile groups into outright opposition.

The lack of alternatives for the local elites was vital. Thus, the CCP survived in those areas where it could gain a local military superiority over the GMD as in the base areas around Wuhan from 1928 to 1934⁴⁹ or where the invading Japanese forces had driven out the GMD as happened in north and northeast China from 1937 onward. Steven Levine has shown how the Japanese invasion destroyed the local elite in the northeast, thus making communist penetration much easier.⁵⁰ The Communists thus established themselves as a new “state authority” primarily by means of military conquest.⁵¹

Contrary to conventional wisdom, in the period after 1937 the rural elite was more readily attracted to the CCP program of resistance than was the local peasantry.⁵² Indeed, the threat posed by the Japanese forces bonded the CCP and the local elite together in an uneasy marriage of convenience. Further positive support in this period came from rural students and teachers.⁵³ In July 1927, when the CCP fully recognized the important role of the peasantry, it also pointed out the respect that school teachers enjoyed in local communities. As a result, the party called for the election of primary school teachers to the area executive committees of peasant associations (**Doc. C.1**). This was in marked contrast to the disdain with which such groups were viewed by the party when it tried to organize urban China during the early 1920s.

Kathleen Hartford has shown how in the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Base Area the CCP devised policy programs that sought to neutralize the threat from the local elite by co-opting them into the power structure and appearing to give them a place in the new political structure. The term she uses to describe this process is “power management.”⁵⁴ “Power management” was one of Peng Zhen’s main themes in his September 1941 report to the Politburo (**Doc. G.5**). Peng outlined local CCP policy for ensuring that the old power structure could be broken up without alienating the powerful traditional elite. Policy moderation formed one aspect, while the administrative solution was the “three-thirds” system of government that guaranteed the local elite one-third of governmental positions. Peng was at pains to point out that this approach needed a strengthening of the party apparatus at the village level to ensure that the local elite was not able to dominate the political process.

This co-optation of the local elite was accompanied by attempts to gain the support of the local peasantry for the CCP’s program of social reform. In this process, the CCP attempted to define political and economic relationships in the villages in terms of classification by class rather than by the traditional forms of patronage and familial relationships. The introduction of class as the defining characteristic in village life was new. However, many of the documents in the collection clearly reveal the continual problem that the CCP had in defining classes in the countryside precisely and working out a policy for land redistribution or interest and rent-reduction based on these suppositions.

Both in the early 1930s and in the period from 1937 onward, the party faced the problem of, first, winning acceptance by the local peasantry, second, getting them

mobilized for practical support, and then, finally, once mobilized trying to keep them under control. The politics of mobilization was complicated in the post-1937 period not only by the problems arising from the use of class labels but, more particularly, by the need not to alienate the local elite, a need partly created and defined by the Japanese invasion.

The attempts at accommodation with the local elites were reinforced by the earlier experiences with radical policy in the Jiangxi Soviet. There, radicalization had alienated groups such as the middle and rich peasants who were crucial to CCP survival. The CCP had decided that land redistribution was imperative for ensuring peasant support in their resistance to the GMD, but changes in landownership based on strict class definitions caused unforeseen economic and social problems that in turn led to further readjustment. Thus, the Soviet Land Law adopted in November 1931 (**Doc. D.8**) contained prescriptions more liberal than previous policy and did not mention land nationalization and collectivization. It represented a deliberate attempt to woo back the alienated “middle classes.” Later, between June and September 1933, many “middle peasants” were reclassified as “landlords,” with serious consequences for them. This reradicalization of policy began with the investigation movement that was again intended to ensure peasant support in the conflict with the GMD (**Doc. D.15**). Between October and December, the new “landlords” were demoted to the ranks of “middle peasants.” Finally, in early 1934, policy was radicalized once again with attacks on the “rich peasants.” This merry-go-round was halted only with the expulsion of the communist forces from their base area. The CCP did learn from this experience; as Shum Kui-kwong has noted, “No matter how successful the land revolution was in generating support within their base areas, their strength derived from the lower masses was no match for the reactionary order.”⁵⁵ Yet, the learning process was not complete, as the party never lost its inclination to radicalize policy once it felt securely embedded in an area.

Despite CCP emphasis on the support of the poor peasantry, this support was never firm, and when the rural dispossessed did act, they tended to take matters into their own hands, often producing a radicalization that went beyond party wishes. This occurred not only in Jiangxi but also in the Civil War period, 1945–49. The need to keep up with peasant voluntarism, combined with the desire to mobilize the poor peasantry against the GMD, lay behind the radical turn in land policy that began in May 1946 (**Doc. H.14**). “Land to the tillers” replaced the more moderate approach of rent and interest reduction.⁵⁶ Equal distribution of land became party policy (**Docs. H.16** and **H.17**), leading to a radical upsurge that threatened to undermine the party’s position in relationship to the middle peasantry as well as the local elites. Having mobilized the poor peasantry to support the CCP against the GMD in the Civil War, the CCP became afraid that social dislocation would undermine the war effort. In particular, the middle peasantry in recently liberated areas were being classified as rich peasants and being deprived of property (**Doc. H.18**). As a result, in late 1947 and early 1948, land reform was slowed down.⁵⁷

Invariably, the initial support for the CCP came from displaced rural elements such as students, rural school teachers, and roving groups of bandits. According to Pauline Keating's research on two counties in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, it was those who had lost farms after defaulting on tax or loan payments who joined the CCP fighting groups. She notes that it was the widespread anger against the local authorities for taxation that had enabled the communist partisans to set up two soviet governments in northwest China in the early 1930s.⁵⁸

This reliance on middle peasant and elite support forced the CCP to make many policy compromises. Thus, when He Long's Third Army arrived in north Guizhou in January 1934, it dropped its revolutionary propaganda in order to appeal to the local peasantry. To try to seek an identity of interests with the "celestial soldiers," it claimed that the latter's attacks on exorbitant taxes and levies could be interpreted as a form of primitive revolutionary struggle (**Docs. D.11** and **D.12**).

As Bianco contends, the economic policy pursued by the CCP did not ensure the party automatic peasant support.⁵⁹ It was always conditional. Hartford's study of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region shows that widespread and deep-seated peasant support was not necessary to produce CCP success. One can take this argument one step further to suggest that what was necessary for the CCP was not so much large-scale positive support, but that key and potentially hostile groups should acquiesce in party control. The CCP was assisted by the lack of any viable alternatives. Traditional power structures had broken down with the Japanese invasion, and the GMD appeared morally bankrupt and economically incompetent.

Organization and Ideology

Given rapidly changing circumstances and policy lines, it is not surprising that party organization was much more fluid than theory would have indicated. The notion of a modern mass political party run by activists was alien to the Chinese political culture, and a major process of adjustment and adaptation was necessary before the CCP became embedded in a local polity. Yet, CCP leaders intended that commitment to an overall organizational unity should link together the different locales within which the CCP had to work and provide a loyalty transcending that to particular individuals or regions. Commitment to the organization was strengthened by adherence to the ideology that gave a common purpose to action and linked it to "supranational" and "supernatural" forces that operated beyond the party itself.

For the activists who worked in the CCP, more than simple acquiescence was required, and commitment was provided by organization and ideology. The organization could transform all these disparate local experiences into a national goal; its ideology could give the experiment a greater importance and dignity for participants than mere survival. The presence of a resilient, disciplined revolutionary organization performed the crucial function of retaining the loyalty of the activists who might have otherwise deserted the cause.

Early Debates on the Nature of the Party

Before notions of organizational discipline could readily be accepted by the majority of members, however, there had to be a consensus about what kind of a party it should be and what its function was. Acceptance of a modern political party as a suitable form of organization could fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Confucian bureaucracy. It was expected to provide an institutional form that transcended the personal authority of an individual leader⁶⁰ and a rational hierarchical structure that would facilitate decision making and policy implementation. The introduction of such a party form was not easy, and from the beginning a number of problems emerged that have persisted in varying degrees throughout the party's existence. Here two problems will be considered.

First, there has been the continual tension between loyalty to the organization itself and to the supreme leader. Many of the CCP's early leaders were attracted to the Bolshevik form of organization because they felt that it would challenge what they saw as a traditional Chinese political culture that stressed obedience to the powerful individual leader.⁶¹ This view simplified the past, as the traditional system culminated in an institution centered on an individual, the "emperorship," and previous Chinese rulers had been aware of the role played by "abstract" institutions. In their search for organization, these early CCP leaders missed the fact that while, in theory, Bolshevik organization would transcend the individual, from the outset it was inseparable from the role of Lenin. Later, this tendency toward the domination of the organization by the supreme leader became more apparent under Stalin.

In addition, Bolshevik organization seemed to offer an alternative to the rule of individual warlords or the GMD, which, from its reorganization in the early 1920s, combined Leninist organization with leader worship. Sun Yat-sen was a supreme leader, a function subsequently taken over by Chiang Kai-shek. In the CCP, the reemergence of this tradition took longer and came with the assumption of supreme power by Mao Zedong in Yan'an in the 1940s. There were antecedents in the CCP, especially under Li Lisan's brief leadership. Chinese communist historians have blamed Chen Duxiu for authoritarianism and, after Chen's removal from power, Lominadze, the Comintern representative, denounced the "patriarchal" style of leadership in the party. He called for its replacement by the "collective model" of leadership (**Doc. C.3**). While his personality may have displayed this tendency, Chen does not appear to have sought total power, not even in the last years of his leadership. Debate remained very wide-ranging, and the question of collective control over the individual received consistent attention in party documents.

Second, there was the tension in lines of authority between the Party Center and the regional apparatus and noncentral party organs. While much of the Leninist party apparatus was theoretically in place by 1922, it did not always dominate life for party members. The problem was particularly acute in the early phase of party formation, but it persisted in varying degrees throughout the period under consideration. The regional autonomy that was inherent in the origins of the party exerted its

influence for a long time.⁶² Cells or local parties often owed their origins more to the local environment than to being a product of Comintern machinations or the influence of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. One example is the tension evident throughout the 1920s in the policy disputes between the nominal Party Center in Shanghai and the party organization in Canton.⁶³

The documents reveal the variety of views in the early debates about just what kind of a party it should be. The first party document of November 1920 had outlined the structure of a highly orthodox Bolshevik party, and the organizational outlines drawn up at the First and Second Party Congresses provided a detailed Bolshevik organizational structure (**Docs. A.1, A.3, and A.12**, respectively). However, this structure was not readily acceptable to all members and began to assume a reality only as the party expanded rapidly as a result of the May 30 Movement (1925). Among the first party members, anarchist influences were strong as were ideas of guild socialism (**Docs. A.5 and A.6**). Indeed, seven of the nine original members in the CP group in Canton were anarchists. Such members had to be purged from the organization, and the notion of the party as the focus of loyalty had to be substituted for the personal loyalty ties that dominated a number of the early party groups. The party's founding congress became the forum for debating these different views (see **Doc. A.2** for an official summary of these debates).

Founders such as Li Hanjun and Zhou Fuhai argued for the review of alternatives and placed stress on the need for a lengthy period of education. Li was opposed at this stage to direct involvement in the workers' movement.⁶⁴ Li felt that the working class was unprepared and had an inadequate understanding of Marxism. For him, the first task was to undertake a lengthy period of educational and propaganda work, organizing Marxist universities, publishing journals and pamphlets. Intellectuals were to be armed with Marxism and then workers were to be organized and educated to raise their class consciousness. While this was in progress, study could be done of the comparative values of Russian Bolshevism and German Social Democracy before deciding on which form was most suitable to China's needs. As a result of this trend of thinking, Li Hanjun was opposed to the creation of a tightly organized party based on the proletariat with the objective of establishing its dictatorship. While recognizing the need for some form of organization to conduct party work, he did not see it as vitally important. He preferred a more loosely based party that would also recruit students, intellectuals, and anyone who believed in Marxism and was willing to propagate it.

A tougher, highly orthodox line was argued by other founders such as Liu Renjing and Zhang Guotao. They favored the promotion of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate objective. They objected to joining the bourgeois democratic revolution and placed their faith in the power of the nascent working class and its organization under the leadership of the CCP. Finally, somewhat ironically, they were against recruitment of intellectuals into the party. It was this latter view that was reflected in the documents of the First Party Congress (**Docs. A.2, A.3, and A.4**).

A number of factors combined to instill the notion of the Bolshevik party among CCP members. First, there was the translation of key works and the promotion of the Bolshevik form of organization in the party press. Second, there was the influence of Comintern emissaries like Voitinsky and Maring who already had experience of such party organization and devoted considerable time to propagating their views. Indeed, Maring was appalled by the lack of discipline which he witnessed in the early CCP. Maring provided information on the idea and importance of party organization and of propaganda as a political weapon.⁶⁵ Further, he stressed the view that the struggle was linked to a much wider one: it was a part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. Within this context, according to Maring and subsequent Comintern agents, the national party was subordinate to the Comintern.⁶⁶

Third, in the early 1920s there was the gradual return of key figures, such as Cai Hesen, who had studied in Europe and had become acquainted with communist ideology and organization as well as the modern labor movement. As the 1920s progressed, the idea of a Bolshevik party was strengthened through the visits or training of key CCP figures in Soviet Russia. The first group of Chinese students went to Soviet Russia for study as early as spring 1921, and some 1,000 were trained in the 1920s and 1930s at the Communist University of the Working People of China.⁶⁷ While the students who returned from Soviet Russia were a very varied group, they had all received a thorough training in notions of party organization and discipline.

Despite the adoption of the Bolshevik form of organization from the beginning, the CCP has shown a remarkable degree of organizational fluidity, even since its seizure of power in 1949.⁶⁸ While the party was often bitterly divided over tactics and strategy, party organization provided the framework within which debates had to take place. This limited the options for groups opposed to a particular policy line dictated by the Center. Yet, in the early years, the nominal Party Center had little capacity, and perhaps little authority, to exert its will over the localities. The Center could quite simply be ignored, and in the first half of the 1920s, the local organizations enjoyed considerable independence in practice.

Only with the May 30 Movement did the party begin to move toward being a genuine mass party and were attempts made to establish a more differentiated central party apparatus with greater control over the regional organizations (**Doc. B.11**). While this was still often ignored, it did give the Party Center the capacity for concentrating power. In fact, as early as the Fourth Party Congress (January 1925) attempts were made to tighten up organization (**Docs. B.7** and **B.9**) in order to ensure survival, and improvements were seen as the way to enable the party to break out from being merely a collection of "small propaganda groups."⁶⁹ However, at the Fifth Party Congress (1927), Chen Duxiu was still complaining that something had to be done to enforce the discipline of the Center and adherence to its directives or the party would be little more than an accumulation of provincially based organizations (**Doc. B.25**).

The rush to create a mass party during the May 30 Movement did have an adverse effect on party development by permitting many new members to join who had little or no idea of communism or Bolshevik organization. To confront these problems and to equip the party as a fighting force to seize power, the Fifth Party Congress adopted a number of measures to tighten up centralization and discipline. For the first time, the basic Leninist notion of democratic centralism was included in the party's Constitution as the guiding principle of the party (**Doc. B.28**). Further, a Central Supervisory Committee was established as were counterparts at the lower levels. To these organs was entrusted the task of tightening up on discipline in the party.

This move toward tighter control and centralization was increased at the 7 August Emergency Conference (1927) as the effects of the collapse of CCP-GMD cooperation became apparent.⁷⁰ First, as the "Decision on Political Discipline" makes clear, the process of political surveillance and persecution in the party was stepped up. Surveillance over intellectuals in particular was to be increased, and they were blamed for the previous policy failures.⁷¹ Second, the Party Center was forced into an underground existence, and this was reflected in the development of a party profile conducive to such work. An extensive campaign was launched to "Bolshevize" the party further. This tendency became stronger after Li Lisan's removal from power after the failure of his insurrectionist policy. This stress was helped by the return from Soviet Russia of a group of students with a mandate to Bolshevize the party, and they effectively took over the running of the central party apparatus during the next few years (**Docs. C.21** and **D.18**). These men included Bo Gu, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang. Yet, while democratic centralism was first mentioned in the party Constitution adopted in June 1927 (**Doc. B.28**), organization as a cohesive factor was accepted only after the Rectification Campaign in Yan'an in the early 1940s.

Ideology and Struggle

The influence of the Comintern and the use of ideology as a weapon in inner-party struggle was increased by the events at the 7 August Emergency Conference (**Docs. C.2** and **C.4**). The removal of Chen Duxiu as party leader was a potentially traumatic event in CCP history. For many, Chen had been a symbol of progress not just from the May Fourth Movement but from his earlier struggle against the imperial system. A number of the early leaders had been drawn into the party because of personal connections and loyalty to Chen. In terms of the Chinese tradition, to turn on a respected senior and elder was of major significance.

Chen's removal was legitimized not merely through criticism of his "mistakes" but also through the invocation of ideological symbols to justify the attack. Adherence to the correct ideological line came to legitimize policy, and understanding of the "line" was a necessary condition for leadership. This had the effect of strengthening Comintern control over party leadership as the Comintern possessed a higher wisdom and vision of the revolutionary process than a mere national party. Concur-

rently, debate in the party became governed by the manipulation of ideological symbols with the result that genuine debate about policy disputes became even less feasible than before. As the resolution of the Second Plenum of the Sixth CC pointed out (June 1929, **Doc. C.14**), there was no such thing as peace in the party. Erroneous tendencies always had to be fought against. All too often policy dispute was raised to the level of line struggle.

Thus, the 7 August Emergency Conference ushered in ideological correctness as a key element in control, leadership, and cohesion within the CCP. This tendency and the problems it created were noted by Liu Shaoqi. In a letter of 4 March 1937, Liu suggested to the Party Center that methods in ideological struggle had always been excessive and had created a situation that blocked "calm discussion" of problems within the party. Further, he noted that the hallmark of the party since the 7 August meeting had been "leftism," which in turn had exacerbated the factionalism within the party (**Doc. E.22**).

Chen Duxiu had already noted, in December 1929, the lack of rational discussion within the party. He complained of the party leaders using the notion of "iron discipline" as a mechanism of control (**Doc. C.17**). Chen felt that this had created a situation where no one dared to speak out, with the result that strategy and tactics that many knew to be wrong were still implemented. Those who opposed party policy were labeled "Trotskyites," "anarchists," "right deviationists," "left deviationists," etc. Once labeled, their objection to policy was more easily dealt with by the Party Center. The idea of "correct line" also had consequences for the Party Center itself. It could not recognize faults in its own leadership, and thus policy failure was followed by the hunt for "scapegoats" who had sabotaged the party's correct line. As Chen Duxiu wrote, the party leadership became committed to covering up its mistakes in order to maintain its rule.

The tendency toward the dominance of an organizationally derived ideological truth was inherent in the choice of a Bolshevik organization from the beginning. Yet in the early stages it was not so readily apparent. The CCP had been organized before there had been any serious discussion of Marxism, and indeed the choice of a Bolshevik organization removed the need for theoretical analysis. As a result, "an organizationally defined analysis became for them [the original founders] a substitute for theoretical analysis."⁷² Naturally, it was presumed that those from Soviet Russia or their emissaries had a greater understanding of this problem and the relevant needs.

Certainly, the early 1930s were marked by intense inner-party struggles that took on a sharp ideological tone and resulted in fratricide within the party. The stress on secrecy, discipline, and reorienting work for life underground backed up by this drive for ideological orthodoxy brought the Party Center into conflict with operations in the rural soviets. In the soviets, the party operated openly as the local government, and compromise was the order of the day. The compromises made by local leaders in the base areas in order to survive looked like ideological laxness to those in the Party Center.

The criticism of local leaders contained another dimension of power struggle within it. When officials from the Party Center in Shanghai arrived in the base areas, they were given high positions as their standing deserved, but they were shut out from real power-holding. They were simply not a part of the local power structure.⁷³ Accusations of the flaunting of ideological correctness became the main weapon with which to attack the local leaders. This led to the arrest of many local leaders, the increase of factionalism, and in extreme cases fighting and murder. Such clashes were experienced in Jiangxi, E-Yu-Wan, Xiang-Exi, and the northwest (**Docs. D.2, D.6, D.13, D.14, and G.20**). One of the most extreme cases occurred with the Futian Incident of 1930 (**Doc. D.3**).⁷⁴

Opposition to the Party Center was confined to a limited number of strategies. The most effective tactic was to take over power at the Center. The struggles between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao and subsequently Wang Ming were both about seizing power at the Party Center in order to be able to implement conflicting policy programs.⁷⁵

A second strategy was to ignore central party directives as happened not only in the early 1920s but also on a number of occasions in the base areas in the early 1930s. Mao Zedong himself was very adept at turning a blind eye to those directives with which he did not agree. However, this could not provide a long-term solution to the problem and was at best viable only when the Party Center and its coercive apparatus were remote from the area.

Third, opponents could try to set up a rival organization to try to take over the legitimacy of the Party Center. This had been attempted by He Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong when they set up a second Jiangsu party committee in 1931 (**Doc. C.22**), and by Zhang Guotao in the mid-1930s when he began to use the name of the CC. This breakaway strategy never proved successful. Neither He and Luo nor Zhang was able to assume legitimacy, and indeed all were seen to have broken the most fundamental norms governing party discipline. Further, recognition by the Comintern was a crucial element in legitimation. The Comintern was unwilling to support such breakaways.

Finally, opponents could leave the party entirely. This was, in fact, the case with many of the original party members who were opposed to, or were not entirely happy with, the adoption of a Bolshevik form of organization. Sniping from the outside was quite easily dismissed as attacks by counterrevolutionaries.⁷⁶

Mao Zedong's Political Skill and the Rectification Campaign

The party clearly needed a guiding framework of reference that could rally the allegiance of most party members and give a purpose to their actions that was greater than simple survival. While a modern political party may have been alien to Chinese political culture, adherence to an idealistic belief system was not.⁷⁷ The ethical system that underpinned the Confucian state formed an important part of the

institutions of government, and the correct explanation of the world was an important part of the legitimacy to rule. The CCP was able to supply an ideology that provided an “entire cosmology that summed up all of human history on a cosmopolitan, supra-national basis.”⁷⁸ Yet, it had to be a belief system to which the party faithful could relate. This framework would also have to allow flexibility for local action while still linking it to some greater overall objective and would have to put an end to bloodshed. Having engaged in his own fratricidal struggles, Mao Zedong was to provide this framework in Yan’an in what is commonly referred to as the sinification of Marxism.⁷⁹

The documents covering the mid-1930s to early 1940s reveal what an able politician Mao Zedong was. He was able to outmaneuver Zhang Guotao, who commanded a far larger number of troops, and also Wang Ming, who supposedly possessed greater theoretical knowledge.⁸⁰ Mao responded quickly and practically to the rapidly unfolding events. The documents he produced concerning the Second United Front (**Docs. E.28, F.3, F.7, and F.8**), the rapidly changing military situation (**Docs. E.25, F.19, H.1, and H.8**), the dissolution of the Comintern (**Doc. G.21**), and the Soviet attitude toward the war (**Docs. F.20 and F.21**) stood in marked contrast to the sterile references to class analysis that marked those of the First United Front.⁸¹ Mao was able to reassure party leaders that he understood a rapidly changing world. More important, he appeared to be successful. As Teiwes has noted, “[I]n a movement weaned on the notion of ideological correctness, the apparent correlation between party success and Mao’s ideas was powerful persuasion indeed.”⁸²

Crucial to the clarification of organizational goals and the process of creating a binding loyalty was the Rectification Campaign of 1941–44 (**Docs. G.2, G.4, G.10, G.11, G.13, G.14, and G.19**). The need to tighten up organization and to produce ideological conformity was increased by the influx of new members who had been recruited during the “storm membership drives” and by the numbers of intellectuals who had come to Yan’an as patriots to resist the Japanese rather than as good Communists dedicated to social revolution (**Doc. G.3**).⁸³ For Mao, if this new organizational and ideological orthodoxy could be defined in such a way as to position him in the central role of the CCP’s revolutionary history, it would provide him with the legitimacy necessary to secure an unchallengeable leadership position. A crucial step in this process was the construction of an official party history adopted as a CC resolution in April 1945 (**Doc. G.25**).⁸⁴ Mao as the correct interpreter of the past would become the ideological authority defining the present and future course of revolution. Through this discourse, Mao created the necessary “symbolic capital” to enhance his own status as the revolution’s supreme leader and interpreter.⁸⁵

There was more to creating this Maoist discourse than simply providing a guiding framework for party members to relate to. It was also intended to end alternative discourses within the movement. Disagreement with Mao’s viewpoint would be tantamount to committing a mistake in “line.” Rectification was not just a peaceful proselytizing event but entailed the eradication of alternative intellectual responses

to his policy, no matter whether the challenge came from Wang Ming and his supporters or from those intellectuals who represented the cosmopolitan trend of the May Fourth Movement within the CCP. The creation of this single discourse eliminated the pluralism of ideas that had temporarily replaced the monism customary in the Chinese polity. Thus, the Rectification Campaign had to ensure that most party members would behave in a predictable way most of the time despite the enormously varied environments in which they operated. This left the party's security apparatus merely with the task of cleaning up the mess where this system broke down.

The new orthodoxy being constructed by Mao Zedong provided the basis for the "reattachment" of many disaffected intellectuals who had moved to the base areas. With the collapse of the imperial system, intellectuals as a group had been detached from the function of public service which they had fulfilled in the Confucian order. This detachment led them to take a more critical look at their own society. In John Fairbank's view this split the literati into two groups: "those in public service and those in public criticism."⁸⁶

One did not have to be a "true believer" to propagate the new orthodoxy. At worst, it simply provided the new "rules of the game" that should not be overstepped. Yet the work of Timothy Cheek on the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area shows that the version of Maoism propagated there sat quite comfortably with elite culture. Further, Cheek claims that the CCP successfully "attracted, motivated, organized and controlled deviance" among a number of metropolitan intellectuals. The party achieved this goal by allowing these intellectuals to view propaganda work as "an honorable vocation."⁸⁷

For those who may have wavered in terms of positive compliance, the linking of the Rectification Campaign and the "screening" of cadres served as warnings to those unwilling to accept the new orthodoxy. According to David Apter, the establishment of Mao Zedong Thought as the "way to a superior and more virtuous social existence" disguised Mao's "ruthless pursuit of power and the hardboiled morality of his leadership generally."⁸⁸ In Yan'an, Mao Zedong made it quite clear that the independent critical role of the intellectual as it had developed from the May Fourth Movement would no longer be tolerated within his republic. The rules were made plain in his Yan'an talks on literature and art (**Doc. G.10**), and in case anyone had missed the message there was the humiliation of Wang Shiwei to serve as a warning (**Docs. G.17** and **G.18**).⁸⁹

Rectification took on a more ominous note, not merely with the persecution of Wang Shiwei but also with the campaign to "screen" cadres, indicating that the threat of the use of terror was the obverse of education.⁹⁰ Ostensibly, the investigations that took place were to protect the party against presumed GMD and Japanese supporters who had infiltrated the party and the base areas. In August 1943, cadre screening and rectification were formally linked, and some 4,000 people were "screened" in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, 2,000 in Yan'an alone.⁹¹ While spies there may have been, the intensity of the movement indicated the kind of

paranoia that was to mark Mao Zedong in his later years. Kang Sheng, the organizer of the campaign, indicated its exaggerated nature by claiming that of those who “confessed” less than 10 percent were actually spies or enemies.⁹² This campaign would certainly have caused those contemplating openly challenging Mao and the Party Center to think twice for fear of being accused of being a traitor or a spy.

While the campaign in Yan’an forged a unified leadership that helped the CCP win the Civil War, the new system created there at its outset planted the roots of a number of problems that would come back to haunt the party. First, there was a distrust of independent intellectual criticism, which was thereafter associated with a lack of loyalty. Intellectuals have been almost continually regarded with suspicion since 1949. This reached a high point in the Cultural Revolution when intellectuals were denounced as the “stinking ninth category.”

Second, the emphasis on orthodoxy led to recurrent campaigns to cleanse people’s souls to enable them to be rescued from their errors. The hounding of people by Kang Sheng and the security apparatus during the “screening” campaign and the style of the criticism of Wang Shiwei were both to reappear as forms of struggle during the Anti-Rightist campaign of the mid-1950s and the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s.

Third, there was the stress on unity of thought within the party. This carried on the trend of negating genuine debate within the party, and since 1949, policy difference has regularly been interpreted as antiparty activity.

Fourth, there was the stress on the use of mass mobilization as a means to achieve a policy objective. Although this has been a permanent feature of post-1949 Chinese politics, the continual reliance on this method as a means of bringing about change has reduced it to a ritual. Particularly in the years since the Cultural Revolution was launched, this has resulted in the devaluation of the effectiveness of the method through overuse or through the direction of the movement toward spurious targets.

The CCP was successful in those areas where its cadres understood the local environment and where they were good at micropolitics. In part, this sensitivity to the locality was reinforced by the simple need to survive, and it provided the party with the strong rural bases from which it could launch its assault on the GMD-held areas or those evacuated by the Japanese after their defeat. On assuming power, the CCP’s policy-making center moved away from the countryside, and leaders soon forgot that survival and expansion had depended on detailed negotiation and brokerage. With state power in their hands, senior party leaders no longer felt the need to negotiate with other groups and social forces. When party members thought about the lessons of the revolution, it was increasingly in terms of the myth that had been created with the CCP being swept to power by a massive wave of popular peasant support. The party leadership became increasingly divorced from the everyday realities of politics, and policy making began to suffer.

Finally, the stress on organizational stability and ideological orthodoxy went, somewhat paradoxically, hand in hand with the accretion of power in Mao’s hands. Indeed, it went even further than this, as loyalty to the organization was reinforced

through a campaign to promote Mao Zedong the individual as the font of supreme wisdom in China's revolution, a campaign that built up momentum from July 1943 onward (**Docs. G.22** and **H.6**). At the time, it does not seem to have occurred to other senior leaders that the buildup of a Mao cult negated the stress on collective leadership and loyalty to the CCP as an organization. Indeed, it seems that senior party supporters of Mao saw the buildup of Mao not only as a necessary counter to the concurrent buildup of Chiang Kai-shek as a national leader but also as the way to bind the peasant party and army members together with the organization. Some leaders believed that the thought of Mao Zedong embodied the collective wisdom of the top leadership. While the persona of Mao did not dominate the CCP as totally as did that of Chiang Kai-shek, in it lay the seeds of future problems that would all but destroy the party during the Cultural Revolution.

Notes to Introduction

1. For example, the September 1935 Party Center resolution on Zhang Guotao's "mistakes" was for the eyes of CC members only (**Doc. E.3**). Clearly, it was felt that circulation within the party at large could prove destabilizing. Similarly, events could be interpreted in different ways depending on the audience. A good example is provided by the three documents included covering the Southern Anhui Incident of 1941. Mao Zedong's public statement stressed the premeditated action of the anticommunists in the GMD (**Doc. F.16**), while party members were told to use the Incident to reform the GMD and expel pro-Japanese elements within it (**Doc. F.17**). For the party elite, the interpretation offered related to the inner-party struggle between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming (**Doc. F.18**). Xiang Ying, who Mao saw as a Wang Ming supporter, was blamed for the Incident because of his "right opportunist" mistakes in the united front.

2. For a recent discussion of this see P. Calvert, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, pp. 16–29. For a stimulating discussion of conceptual thinking about revolutions in recent social science literature see R. Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence: Studies on Concept, Theory, and Method*.

3. For an excellent overview of the historical development of the analysis and interpretation of the Chinese communist revolution, see K. Hartford and S. M. Goldstein, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution," in K. Hartford and S. M. Goldstein (eds.), *Single Sparks: China's Rural Revolutions*, pp. 3–27.

4. L. Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*.

5. See, for example, R. C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*.

6. C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*. An earlier analysis originally published in 1938 that laid the blame at Stalin's feet was H. R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*.

7. B. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*.

8. Schram has analyzed in detail the process of the "sinification of Marxism" and the interplay of the traditional and Marxist in the persona of Mao Zedong. See, for example, S. R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. For Schram's most recent views see *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung* and his introductions to various volumes of *Mao's Road to Power*. For a recent view that sees the relationship between the CCP and the Comintern in terms of conflict see J. W. Garver, *Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism* and "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," *The China Quarterly*, no. 113 (March 1988): 29–59.

9. Arif Dirlik is the scholar most recently to argue that the role of the Comintern was

crucial for forging together the party in its nascent period. By contrast, Hans van de Ven highlights the indigenous roots of the communist movement. Not only did this localism have a strong impact on the first decade of the CCP but also there were regional groupings, such as that in Sichuan, that came into existence without reference to the Comintern and even without contact with the "founding fathers," Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. A. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, and H. J. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Search for a New Political Order, 1920–1927*.

10. For an account of the role of Maring and the problems he encountered, see T. Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring)*. The best account of Borodin's work in China is Lydia Holubnychy's uncompleted work *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923–25*. Otto Braun has written his own account of his work in China and the frustrations he encountered: see *A Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939*.

11. This is convincingly argued by F. C. Teiwes in "The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress," in his paper presented to the conference "New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution," Amsterdam and Leiden, January 1990.

12. Mao himself felt that the Comintern had played a progressive role up until 1927 and again between mid-1935 and its dissolution in 1943.

13. R. F. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory 1935–1945*, pp. 192–93. In particular, see Zhu De, "Jinian dang de ershiyi zhounian" (In Commemoration of the Twenty-First Anniversary of the Party), in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), 1 July 1942, p. 1.

14. *Mao Zedong xuanji* (n.p.: Jin-Cha-Ji xinhua shudian, 1944).

15. Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Lushan Conference," 23 July 1959, in Stuart Schram (ed.), *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, p. 139.

16. Even when the military effectively replaced the party in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966–69), Mao soon made it very clear that he fully intended that a revamped party would reassume its leadership role.

17. Teiwes, "The Formation of the Maoist Leadership."

18. For argumentation along these lines see T. Saich, *China: Politics and Government*, 149–56.

19. On this see T. Saich, "When Worlds Collide: The Beijing People's Movement of 1989," in T. Saich (ed.), *The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989*.

20. J. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*.

21. This kind of thinking has remained in China up to the present day. Deng Xiaoping's reform program of the 1980s essentially pursued a similar strategy designed to import the high technology needed for China's modernization without bringing in Western "bourgeois ideas."

22. Parallels can be drawn with China during the Cultural Revolution and the kind of paranoia that underlay the thinking of the "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan).

23. B. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, p. 42.

24. The best substantial account of the movement remains Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. A valuable account of the role of radical thought in the May Fourth Movement is contained in Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 57–190.

25. This tension is perceptively analyzed in L. R. Sullivan, "The Evolution of Chinese Communist Party Organization and Leadership Doctrine, 1921–1949," in a paper presented to the conference "New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution."

26. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, pp. 268–70.

27. C. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolu-*

tionary China, 1937–1945. Despite some wavering, Johnson restated his essential thesis in “Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 72 (December 1977): 766–85.

28. See L. Bianco, *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915–1949*. The need to pay attention to both the nationalist and social aspects had been strongly argued by Donald G. Gillin in “‘Peasant Nationalism’ in the History of Chinese Communism,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (February 1964).

29. M. Selden, *The Yen-an Way in Revolutionary China*.

30. Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China*. In the 1950s, it had been commonplace to argue that the “organizational weapon” was paramount. See Hartford and Goldstein, “Introduction,” pp. 9–13.

31. Shum Kui-kwong, *The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945*.

32. Of particular importance are Yung-fa Chen, *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945*; K. Hartford, *Step by Step: Reform, Resistance, and Revolution in Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region, 1937–1945*; P. Keating, *Two Revolutions: Village Reconstruction and Cooperativisation in North Shaanxi, 1934–1945*; and D. M. Paulson, *War and Revolution in North China: The Shandong Base Area 1937–1945*.

33. Hartford and Goldstein reach a similar conclusion and state that revolution at the basic level was a “political process, not the predetermined working out of structural factors or the inevitable Big Boom emanating from the mixture of revolutionary preconditions and revolutionary consciousness.” Hartford and Goldstein, “Introduction,” p. 33. This follows the kind of argumentation used in R. Aya, *Rethinking Revolutions and Collective Violence*.

34. This problem is dealt with in more detail in the following section.

35. On the general problems the CCP had in organizing labor in the period 1928 to 1935 see S. B. Thomas, *Labor and the Chinese Revolution: Class Strategies and Contradictions of Chinese Communism, 1928–48*.

36. Interview with Luo Zhanglong, summer 1988. Luo was one of the founders of the Beijing party organization and an important figure in the communist-led labor movement throughout the 1920s.

37. Much of the CCP’s early struggle was against the anarchists and other radical and socialist groupings.

38. The May 30 Movement broke out after police in the International Settlement, Shanghai, had opened fire on those protesting against imperialism. As a result, a large-scale movement against the imperialist presence in China developed. The Northern Expedition was the name given to the advance of the GMD-led armies in their drive to unify China.

39. Indeed the whole strategy of the CCP-GMD cooperation in the eyes of some CCP leaders was to take over the leading positions and thus to exert an influence out of all proportion to the actual numerical strength of the CCP.

40. Brandt in *Stalin’s Failure* had argued the first view, while orthodox CCP histories place the blame on Chen’s shoulders.

41. This point is argued in H. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*.

42. However, the Comintern did stress the view that the CCP should work within the framework of the united front and not develop its own, separate armed force. Given the circumstances, the development of an independent armed force would not have been practical and would have precipitated a break with the CCP even more quickly.

43. The Party Center did remain in Shanghai until 1933, but it is questionable how effective its contacts were.

44. E. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*; J. S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics and*

Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World; and T. Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics*, vol. 14 (April 1982): 351–75.

45. The classic statement is to be found in J. C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*.

46. See R. Thaxton, *China Turned Rightside Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World*. For a devastating critique of both Thaxton's method and his use of sources see Chen Yung-fa and G. Benton, *Moral Economy and the Chinese Revolution*.

47. See Lucien Bianco's masterful synthesizing essay, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937–1945," in Saich and van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

48. For the strategy of rebellions, inciting military mutinies and initiating peasant uprisings, as outlined by Qu Qiubai in August 1927, see **Doc. C.4**. For details of the Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising, see **Docs. C.6, C.7, and C.8**.

49. For information on the two main bases apart from Jiangxi, the E-Yu-Wan (Hubei-Henan-Anhui) and Xiang-Exi (West Hunan-Hubei) Soviets, see **Docs. D.4, D.5, D.6, and D.10**.

50. See S. I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948*. For documents on CCP penetration into the northeast, see **Docs. H.9, H.10, H.11, and H.12**. It should be pointed out, however, that the postwar base areas tended to be away from the developed centers, where the influence of the elites was probably weaker in any case.

51. Keating, *Two Revolutions*, p. 35.

52. See Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

53. In fact, local school teachers and college lecturers played prominent roles in the founding of a number of local party organizations.

54. Hartford, *Step by Step*.

55. Shum, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power*, p. 14.

56. A relatively moderate policy had been laid down in the CC decision of January 1942; see **Doc. G.6**.

57. The moderation of land reform culminated with the publication of the CC directive drafted by Mao Zedong on 24 May 1948 (**Doc. H.20**).

58. Keating, *Two Revolutions*, p. 80. The fact that initial communist support came from such groups is supported by other recent research. See Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

59. Bianco, "Peasant Responses to CCP Mobilization Policies."

60. On this issue see L. R. Sullivan, "The Evolution of Chinese Communist Organization.

61. Ibid. The tension created between the party norms and Mao Zedong's rise to supreme power is interestingly handled in F. C. Teiwes, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party: The CCP's Changing Leadership, 1937–1945," in T. Saich and H. J. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

62. On this point see H. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*. For the origins of the "small groups" in China see T. Saich, "Through the Past Darkly: Some New Sources on the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party," *International Review of Social History*, vol. 30, part 2 (1986): 167–82.

63. Many of the documents covering the period 1924 to 1927 (section B) touch on this issue and reveal the different policies and strategies of the two organizations.

64. For details of the First Party Congress see Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 1, pp. 60–69.

65. Apart from his regular contact with early party leaders and his briefings at meetings, Maring also published many articles in the Chinese communist press under one of his pen-names, Sun Duo (Sentot). For an English translation of these articles and others written while

he was in China, see Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 737–836.

66. Maring invoked Comintern discipline to get his views on cooperation with the GMD accepted. See **Doc. A.20** for his criticism of the lack of discipline in the movement.

67. This latter figure also includes those from the GMD. From 1925 to 1928 the university was called the Sun Yat-sen University of Working People of China. The first batch of fourteen students to go to Soviet Russia were from the Foreign Language School in Shanghai. For details of the training programs see M. F. Yuriev and A. V. Pantsov, “Comintern, CPSU (B) and Ideological and Organizational Evolution of the Communist Party of China,” in R. Ulyanovsky (ed.), *Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East*, pp. 283–333. The authors estimate that of the 118 top leaders in the CCP during the period before 1949, some 70 percent were trained in Soviet Russia.

68. A number of documents are included that cover the development of the party’s organizational structure. All seven party constitutions that were adopted before 1949 are included: First, 1921, **Doc. A.3**; Second, 1922, **Doc. A.15**; Third, 1923, **Doc. A.24**; Fourth, 1925, **Doc. B.9**; Fifth, 1927, **Doc. B.28**; Sixth, 1928, **Doc. C.13**; and Seventh, 1945, **Doc. H.7**.

69. In July 1922 the tendency toward being an academic study society was criticized and a call was made for the organization to become an “activist” party (**Doc. A.14**).

70. On this crucial meeting see **Docs. C.2, C.3, C.4, and C.5**.

71. On this point see Sullivan, “The Evolution of Chinese Communist Party Organization.”

72. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, p. 269.

73. This issue of localism and outside control has remained a problem for the CCP Party Center. Vogel has dealt with the problem in a later period with his history of Canton. E. F. Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968*.

74. For the fullest explanation of the incident see S. Averill, “The Futian Incident,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

75. For key documents in the development of Zhang Guotao’s policy and his clash with Mao Zedong, see **Docs. E.1, E.2, E.3, E.9, E.10, E.11, E.14, and E.15**. For Wang Ming’s policy on the united front, etc., see **Docs. E.5, E.26, and E.27**.

76. See, for example, the Politburo’s denunciation of Chen Duxiu in October 1929 as a “Trotskyite” and Chen’s reply (**Docs. C.16 and C.17**). For Zhang Guotao’s attack on the CCP after leaving Yan’an, see **Doc. E.16**.

77. C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, p. 16.

78. J. K. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800–1985*, p. 226.

79. For the development of Mao’s thought in the period under consideration, see Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. For the best account of the development of Maoism in Yan’an, see Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*.

80. For a recent account of these struggles see D. E. Apter, “Discourse as Power: Yan’an and the Chinese Revolution,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*; and D. E. Apter and T. Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*.

81. The problematic nature of trying to implement a policy of cooperation with the GMD based on a strict analysis of class forces is clearly seen by comparing **Docs. B.12, B.16, B.21, and B.24** with Mao’s writings in the later period.

82. Teiwe, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party.” For Mao’s economic and administrative policies, see **Docs. G.6 and G.7 and G.8 and G.9**, respectively.

83. At the party’s premier institute for ideological work, the Central Research Institute, 82 percent of the students were classified as urban intellectuals of whom 74 percent had

joined the party since 1937. Zhang Ruxin, "Zhongyang yanjiuyuan zhengfeng yilai sixiang gaizao zongjie" (Summary Concerning Thought Reform at the Central Research Institute Since Rectification), in *Jiefang ribao*, 31 October 1942. For an interesting account of the institute see the memoirs edited by Wen Jize et al., *Yan'an zhongyang yanjiuyuan huiyilu*.

84. For an analysis of the construction of this party history see T. Saich, "Writing or Re-writing Party History? The Construction of a Maoist Party History," in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

85. For the concept of symbolic capital see P. Bourdieu, *Outline of the Theory of Practice*, and Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflective Sociology*, pp. 123–39 and *passim*. For its adaptation and application to Mao Zedong and Yan'an, see Apter, "Discourse as Power: Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution," and Apter and Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse*.

86. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800–1985*, p. 253.

87. T. C. Cheek, "The Honorable Vocation: Intellectual Service in CCP Propaganda Institutions in North China, 1937–49," in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*.

88. Apter, "Discourse as Power: Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution."

89. On the humiliation of Wang Shiwei and its significance, see T. C. Cheek, "The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong's *Yan'an Talks* in the First CPC Rectification Movement," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 11 (1984): 25–57; see also Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and "Wild Lilies"*.

90. Peter Seybolt has argued that "terror" was a necessary component of the rectification drive in Yan'an. P. J. Seybolt, "Terror and Conformity. Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942–1943," *Modern China*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1986): 39–73. For a view that does not see Mao as leading a conscious effort to use terror to consolidate his personal power, see Teiwes, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party."

91. When the movement spread out to the general population, some 160,000 took part in confession rallies.

92. This was in a report Kang Sheng delivered on 29 March 1944 at a senior cadres' conference in the CCP's Northwest Bureau. It is extracted in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Book 4, p. 421. Not everyone arrested and later released saw this as a reason to become critical of CCP practice. Li Rui, who was arrested during this period, commented during an interview in 1989 that he saw his subsequent release as vindication of the party's correct approach.

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**THE RISE
TO POWER
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Commentary A

The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Origins of Cooperation with the Guomindang, 1920–1923

The CCP emerged from the cultural and political movement named for the incident of 4 May 1919. The period from roughly 1915 to 1921 saw the introduction to China of many new ideas for regenerating the Chinese state and society. Some of China's patriotic youth came to believe that the international credo of Marxism and its Leninist variant could provide China's national salvation. The spread of Marxism was aided by its adoption by a number of key intellectuals. The best known of these were the two founding fathers of the CCP, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, but there were others, such as Li Da, who played a key role in promoting the study of Marxism.¹

Apart from the intellectual attraction of Marxism, a number of factors led to an increase of its appeal in its Bolshevik form.² First, there was the Bolshevik revolution itself. It demonstrated to some Chinese the possibilities for radical change in the context of underdevelopment. Second, the growing prestige of Soviet Russia was boosted by the Karakhan Declaration (1919), which appeared to renounce the former czarist privileges in China. This portrayed new Soviet Russia in a favorable light in comparison with the old imperialist powers that seemed intent on dismembering China. Third, during the May Fourth Movement a politically conscious urban proletariat began its entry onto the political stage. Although the workforce remained small, its members were dramatically increasing, primarily as a result of World War I. China's tardy industrialization had been propelled forward as many foreign imports disappeared because of the war.

Finally, the Comintern took a strong interest in events in China and was able to promote the idea of the development of a revolutionary party to guide and control future actions. In April 1920, Voitinsky visited China as the head of a group sent by the Vladivostok Branch of the Bolshevik's Far Eastern Bureau. He and his fellow visitors found fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of a Bolshevik organization.³ According to the historian Arif Dirlik, the timing was fortuitous as the radical movement in China had reached a point of crisis because the previous ideological and organizational premises appeared to have run into a dead end.⁴ Voitinsky's group established contacts with radical intellectuals such as Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. Out of their discussions emerged the idea of founding a CP in China.⁵

Yet the early communist organizations in China did not simply emerge out of the blue; they evolved from the study societies set up during the May Fourth period. Out of study groups such as the New People's Study Society, the Awakening Society, and the Social Welfare Society came many of China's later communist leaders.⁶

The group in Shanghai was the first communist organization to be set up, most probably in August 1920.⁷ It functioned as the provisional Party Center until the First Congress was convened in the following year. Although the precise structure and names varied from place to place, by the time of the First Party Congress the communist organizations functioned in a threefold structure. Operating illegally at the core were the communist small groups; then there were units of the SYC operating semi-openly and providing a recruitment pool for the party; and finally the Marxist study societies presented a public face, trying to reach the widest possible audience.⁸

a) The First Party Congress (July–August 1921)— Pro-proletariat, Antibourgeoisie

The First Congress of the CCP that began its meeting on 23 July 1921 adopted a sectarian attitude of hostility toward cooperation with other forces in Chinese society and an exclusive focus on the working class. This attitude is already clear in "The Manifesto of the CCP" (**Doc. A.1**) drawn up in November 1920. The publication of this manifesto coincided with the launching of the party's first journal, the monthly *Gongchandang* (The Communist). Clearly, the organization was now thinking of itself as distinct from the other radical groupings and was trying to establish its own profile and program.

In a very simple fashion, the manifesto outlines basic concepts of communism, its goals, and the tasks of the CP. It is remarkable for its orthodoxy. It shows little feeling for China's situation or for the policy of tactical alliance with the bourgeoisie that was being developed at that time within the Comintern. The bourgeoisie is clearly identified as the key target to be destroyed in the process of class struggle. After the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the soviet was to provide the governmental form. Reflecting the anarchist ideas that were highly influential in the communist movement at the time, it states that the political ideal of communism is the abolition of state power.

These ideas dominated debates at the First Party Congress (see **Doc. A.2**).⁹ Essentially two main viewpoints were put forward, with Li Hanjun the main proponent of the minority view and Liu Renjing the fiercest defender of the majority viewpoint. In Li's opinion, it was too soon to become directly involved in the workers' movement as the working class was still unprepared and had an inadequate understanding of Marxism. As a result, the first task was to undertake a lengthy period of educational and propaganda work. First, intellectuals were to be armed with Marxism, and then workers were to be organized and educated to raise

their class consciousness. While this was in process, study could be made of the comparative values of Bolshevism and German Social Democracy, before it was decided which was most suitable to China's needs.

The "Program" and the "Resolution" passed by the Congress (**Docs. A.3, A.4**) both show the rejection of the minority view on crucial issues. The "Program" calls for the "revolutionary army of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalistic classes" and for the adoption of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both documents are uncompromising in their hostility to collaboration with other parties, groups, or the "yellow intellectual class." A related debate concerned whether party members should hold government posts. The "Program," in general, barred members from holding posts as government officials or members of parliament, but exempted soldiers, police officers, and civil service employees. The workers' movement was confirmed as the core of party work, with the chief aim being the creation of industrial unions.

The party itself was to adopt a secretive, hierarchical structure based on local soviets. Supreme power was vested in a CEC that still had to be set up. It would have the right to supervise and direct the finances, publications, and policies of any local soviet. The appeals of Li Hanjun for a decentralized system of power were thus rejected. The final session of the Congress elected the central leadership. As party membership was still small, it was decided to set up a Provisional Central Executive Bureau to maintain liaison, etc., with the various branches. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and Li Da were elected members with Chen as secretary. Zhang and Li were in charge of organization and propaganda respectively.¹⁰ In Chen Duxiu's continued absence, Zhou Fuhai was to deputize for him.

The reports of the Beijing and Canton party groups to the Congress (**Docs. A.5, A.6**) give an idea of party work in these localities. The first battle the communist groups faced was to eradicate the influence of the anarchists. In Canton, seven of the original members and in Beijing six of the original eight members were anarchists.¹¹ Most of the anarchists left these nascent organizations because they refused to accept the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. While work varied from place to place and, in reality, local organizational independence was a strong feature of the early years of party life, all the groups sought to establish propaganda organs to propagate Marxism and to involve themselves in the labor movement.

Despite the high-sounding phrases adopted by the Congress, party work was slow in getting off the ground because of continued differences of opinion, financial difficulties, and the fact that the newly elected party secretary, Chen Duxiu, did not return to Shanghai until late August-mid-September.¹² By November 1921, however, a preliminary work plan was agreed upon (**Doc. A.7**) and circulated to the localities. It tried to formalize party structure by calling on the five major districts to set up district executive committees, each recruiting some thirty members. This would allow a "formal CEC" to be set up in accordance with the party program. Labor work was stressed, and each district was instructed to have at least one labor

union under its control. The focus was on organizing railway workers, with the objective of creating a national railway union.

The exclusive focus on the working class and hostility toward the bourgeoisie ran counter to the policy line that was evolving in the Comintern. The Comintern's Second Congress (July–August 1920) had put forward the idea of a temporary alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie during the phase of the national revolution. It was in light of this that the Comintern had decided to send Maring as its representative to China. He arrived in June 1921.¹³ The subsequent period saw an attempt to force on the CCP a policy of cooperation with the bourgeoisie in the nationalist revolutionary movement.

b) The Second Congress (16–23 July 1922)—Pro-CCP Cooperation with the Bourgeois GMD—the “Bloc Without”

As Maring made clear in his July 1922 “Report” to the ECCI concerning his first year in China (**Doc. A.8**), he was very pessimistic about the work of the CCP. In contrast, his visit to Sun Yat-sen's headquarters in south China in the winter of 1921–22 produced a very favorable view of the GMD. In particular, the GMD's involvement in the Hong Kong sailors' strike (January–May 1922) left a deep impression on Maring. This led Maring to propose that CCP members join the GMD to form a bloc within. The ideological complication of the proletariat joining a bourgeois party was swept aside with the assertion that the GMD was not a bourgeois party at all but a combination of four groups: the intelligentsia, the Chinese patriots overseas, the soldiers, and the workers.

Initially the idea of CCP members joining the GMD was totally unacceptable to the CCP leaders, as Chen Duxiu's letter of 6 April 1922 to Voitinsky clearly shows (**Doc. A.9**). Yet by June 1922 signs of a shift in attitude were apparent. Presumably the influence of both Maring and the Youth International representative, Dalin, was beginning to take effect.¹⁴ The CCP's June “Statement” (**Doc. A.10**) referred to the GMD as the only existing political party that could be called a revolutionary party. Support was qualified for the GMD—it was only “relatively democratic and revolutionary”; while the southern (Canton) government's involvement in the labor movement was commented on favorably, the GMD's occasional dalliances with the imperialists externally and with northern militarists internally were criticized. However, this was the first public sign of a shift in views.

The Second Congress of the CCP (16–23 July 1922) confirmed the party's decision to join the democratic revolutionary movement in a temporary alliance (**Doc. A.11**).¹⁵ It is important to note that this decision referred to “all the nation's revolutionary parties,” not just the GMD. However, since the “democratic elements” did not represent the interests of the proletariat, the CCP was to promote an independent class movement. Lest cooperation be misconstrued, the “Manifesto” issued by the Congress (**Doc. A.12**) began with the statement that such cooperation should not be seen as a proletarian surrender to the capitalists. This willingness to

work with other groups was accompanied by a change in attitude toward work within the system. The idea of entering parliament to promote the interests of the proletariat and the poor peasant classes was positively embraced (**Doc. A.13**).

The Congress also sought to tighten up on organization in an attempt to transform the party from its intellectual study group origins into a more orthodox Leninist party (**Docs. A.14, A.15**). The CEC was enshrined as the most powerful organ in the party with the tasks of enforcing Congress decisions and examining and deciding on the policies and actions of the party.¹⁶ To overcome the tendency toward anarchy, the party was to operate under “centralized and iron-like laws.” However, constitutions of themselves do not establish discipline, and the party remained internally divided on key questions such as whether cooperation with the GMD should be pursued and, if so, what form it should take.

Work in the labor movement continued to be defined as the party’s main *raison d’être*, and the Congress outlined the role of the CCP in the labor movement (**Doc. A.16**). Labor unions were to represent all workers regardless of their political opinions while educating them toward acceptance of socialist and communist principles. The party itself, however, was the army of the class-conscious elements of the proletariat, and it embodied the objective of overthrowing capitalism.

The Congress acknowledged the need for some form of cooperation in the national revolution but favored a horizontal alignment alongside the GMD rather than a “bloc within” as had been proposed by Maring. On his return to China in the summer of 1922, Maring found the party in disarray; Chen Duxiu had tendered his resignation, and the other four members of the CEC all appear to have belonged to Zhang Guotao’s “small group.” This “small group” was based on the Labor Secretariat, and it attempted to recruit activists and delegate them work as a way to overcome what it saw as the inactivity of members such as Li Hanjun. It was also hostile to the idea of cooperation with the GMD.

c) The Third Congress (12–20 June 1923)—Pro-CCP Members Joining GMD as Individuals—“The Bloc Within”

To get his ideas accepted, Maring convened the Hangzhou Plenum (28–30 August 1922), the first plenum ever held by the CCP. To overcome the opposition of the majority, Maring was able to cite the “Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China” (**Doc. A.17**). This document, drafted by Radek on the basis of Maring’s statements, was an endorsement of the latter’s views. This imposition of Comintern discipline was intended to move the CCP away from its idealism and exclusionist position to embrace the bourgeoisie in a tactical alliance. Moreover, Maring used it to argue that CCP members should accept his view that they join the GMD to form a “bloc within.” While some form of tactical cooperation with the bourgeoisie was generally accepted within the CCP, the idea of forming a “bloc within” the GMD was strongly resisted and became a major point of controversy at the Third Party Congress.

The orthodox approach of the CCP was criticized by Radek at the Comintern's Fourth Congress (November–December 1922). He lambasted the Chinese Communists for their unworldliness, remarking on how they behaved like traditional Confucian scholars. Locking themselves away to study Marx and Lenin meant that they had failed to “associate themselves with the laboring masses.” Neither socialism nor the Soviet system should be on the political agenda; the current task of the party was to work together with the “revolutionary bourgeois elements” to “organize the struggle against European and Asiatic imperialism.”¹⁷ However, Radek did not identify this cooperation with forming a communist “bloc within” the GMD.

Chen Duxiu took the words of the Congress to heart and while in Moscow (November 1922) drafted “The Immediate Tactics of the Communist Party of China” (**Doc. A.18**). He noted the weak position of the proletariat in China and the failure of the bourgeoisie to oppose sufficiently the foreign imperialists and the native feudal class. Thus, the proletariat was to use its economic power to convince the bourgeoisie of the necessity of forming a united front. However, Chen was concerned with the preservation of CCP independence within the united front, and he remained skeptical whether this class collaboration could be achieved through the CCP operating as a “bloc within” the GMD.

This document is also remarkable for the first detailed handling of peasant policy by a senior CCP leader. Taking his cue from “The Theses on the Eastern Problem” adopted by the Comintern Congress, Chen outlined a detailed program. He acknowledged that the proletariat could not achieve its goals without the support of the “poor peasant masses.” Were the party to remain isolated from the peasantry, it would never be able to become a “great mass party.”

The party was in bad shape by the time it convened its Third Congress (12–20 June 1923).¹⁸ The brutal crushing of the February 1923 Beijing–Hankou railway workers’ strike had shattered the party’s high hopes for the workers’ movement.¹⁹ The destruction of the railway union, the best communist organization, and the ensuing crackdown on labor in general made many party members realize that the strength of the proletariat alone was insufficient. Maring’s reports to the Comintern at this time paint a very gloomy picture²⁰ that is echoed by Chen Duxiu’s report to the Party Congress (**Doc. A.19**).

The main point of contention at the Congress was the form of cooperation between the CCP and the GMD, and the main protagonists were Maring and Zhang Guotao (**Docs. A.20, A.21**, respectively). While Zhang accepted that for the sake of the revolution the GMD and the CCP should be more closely linked, he did not feel that the GMD yet represented the nationalist movement. Neither was the GMD geographically a national movement. Zhang felt that it should be supported only where it had strong links with the masses but not in the north where it had no organization. Given his background in the labor movement, Zhang would not accept subordination of it to the GMD. With the exception of Canton and Hankou, where Zhang saw no other choice, the CCP-controlled labor movement was to remain outside the GMD. Zhang received his strongest support from Cai Hesen, who

stressed that the bourgeoisie had no revolutionary significance and that it was important to build up an independent workers' party.²¹

Maring defended himself and Chen Duxiu against charges that they wished to dissolve the CCP through cooperation with the GMD. Again he invoked Comintern discipline to force his points home. In his view, the strong emphasis on the working class derived from an overestimation of the potential of the proletariat in China; he reasserted that the only way forward for the CCP was to develop the GMD from within. He accused both Zhang and Cai of ignoring the Comintern's January 1923 formulation that because the central task in China was the nationalist revolution, the activities of the GMD and the "young CCP" should be coordinated.

The Congress "Manifesto" and the "Resolution" on cooperation with the GMD (**Docs. A.22, A.23**, respectively) show that Maring's and Chen Duxiu's ideas carried the day.²² The "Manifesto" clearly acknowledged the GMD as the central force of the national revolution. The "Resolution" spelled out in more detail the need to rally around the GMD, noting that the weakness of the working class prevented the development of a mass communist party. *Within* the GMD, the communist organization would be maintained and attract to itself radical elements who would provide a solid basis for the development of the CCP.²³

Organizationally, the Congress made a number of minor adjustments in the Constitution (**Doc. A.24**); more importantly, the central party apparatus was clearly outlined (**Doc. A.25**). Membership of the CEC was increased to nine but, at its first session, it was to elect a five-person Central Bureau to exercise power on its behalf. The Bureau was to meet every week while the CEC was to meet only every four months. Thus, effective power was to remain centralized in a few hands. The CEC also elected a chair to preside over both organs, a secretary to handle party correspondence and documentation, and a party accountant.²⁴

Despite the passing of resolutions for cooperation with the GMD, the policy was not smoothly implemented immediately afterward; indeed it was hardly implemented at all. The Central Bureau of the party decided to move back to Shanghai as it felt that not much could be achieved with Sun Yat-sen and because it wanted to create new organizations in the north either to bring about a radical change in the dominant opinions within the GMD, or to create a new nationalist party. This was quite contrary to Maring's intentions, although even he was moved to muse about a GMD without Sun at its head.

The disillusionment with Sun stemmed from his obsession with a military solution to China's problems and his resistance to the reorganization of the GMD. This was fueled by what the Communists saw as his inactivity concerning the situation in Beijing. In June 1923, through the intrigues of Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was dismissed as president of the Republic. The CCP saw the resultant power vacuum as providing Sun with the perfect chance to place himself at the head of the national movement by going to Shanghai and convening there a national assembly. A letter by senior CCP members who were also in the GMD was sent to Sun to this effect (**Docs. A.26**).²⁵ However, Sun rejected these overtures, claiming that the assembly

was an impossibility and that when the merchants understood this they would rally to him.²⁶

The problem of realizing cooperation between the CCP and the GMD was a major topic discussed at the first meeting of the CEC on 24–25 November 1923.²⁷ The report of the Central Bureau (**Doc. A.27**) noted that some members still opposed the “Resolution” adopted at the Third Party Congress and that differences of opinion and lack of trust existed between members of the two parties. Lack of progress was mentioned in the regional reports to the meeting (**Doc. A.28**), the main exception being Guangdong. Borodin’s arrival in Canton had put life back into the process of expanding cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. The meeting reaffirmed the CCP’s principles of cooperation, calling for all members to join the GMD where its organization existed and to strive to create organizations where it did not (**Doc. A.29**). The meeting also confirmed the tactic of taking over the GMD from within. CCP members were to form secret organizations within the GMD, and all their political pronouncements were to come under party guidance.

The meeting addressed the problem of labor work. Most workers’ organizations in north and central China had been shattered in the aftermath of the February 1923 railway workers’ strike. In the future, work was to concentrate on the triumvirate of railway workers, sailors, and miners with the intention of creating a National Labor Union (**Doc. A.30**). The bleak situation with respect to labor organization was borne out by the regional reports, with only the situation in Anyuan seeming to be a bright spot.

Further cooperation between the CCP and the GMD was spurred by Borodin’s arrival with promises of even greater Soviet financial support and the reorganization of the GMD, which was to take place in January 1924.

DOCUMENTS 1920–1923

A.1 The Manifesto of the CCP (November 1920)²⁸

Dear Comrades!

This manifesto was agreed on by the CCP in November of last year. Since it does not contain all the communist principles, the manifesto has not been made public and is used only as guidance for accepting new party members. Since the original Chinese text of the manifesto could not be found here, I translated it from English. Because it was a year ago that this manifesto was agreed on, of course by now parts of it need to be revised and new things need to be added. I very much hope that every comrade will read it carefully because every Communist must pay attention to important documents such as this—the Manifesto of the CP. Furthermore, it is proposed that the communist group of the Chinese delegation to the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East discuss this document.²⁹ The result of the discussion will be given to the CCP for consideration and adoption.

Zhang³⁰

10 December 1921

1) Communist Ideals

A) Views on the Economy: Communists advocate social and common ownership and use of the means of production—machinery, factories, raw materials, land, transportation facilities, and so on. Once common ownership and common use of the means of production have been achieved, private property and the system of moneylending will naturally be eliminated. The current phenomenon of exploitation of man by man in society will cease to exist because the origin of the exploitation—surplus value—will cease to exist.

B) Views on Politics: Communists advocate the abolition of the state. Anything akin to current state institutions and government absolutely cannot be allowed to exist. Because the state, the army, and the courts protect the interests of the minority and oppress the majority working masses, they are very necessary when the means of production are privately owned. Of course, if private property and the system of moneylending are abolished, the state, the army, and the courts are no longer useful.

C) Views on Society: Communists will ensure that society has only one class (i.e., it will be classless)—this is the class of the laboring masses. The origin of all special powers in today's society is private property; special classes would not exist if no one could concentrate property.

2) The Communists' Goal

The goal of Communists is to create a new society in accordance with commu-

nist ideals. In order to make the realization of our ideal society feasible, the first step is the elimination of the present capitalist system. The elimination of the capitalist system requires strong power to defeat the capitalist countries. The power of the laboring masses—the proletariat—is growing stronger and is becoming more concentrated. This is precisely the result of class conflicts within capitalist countries. The form that this power takes is class struggle.

Thus the instrument to defeat capitalism is class struggle. Class struggle has always existed in human society, but because its form is determined by the development of the means of production, its form has changed a number of times. Class struggle also existed under the feudal system, but it differed from that in capitalist countries. Class struggle in capitalist countries is exceptionally intense, with a momentum great enough to shake the whole world. This power is becoming increasingly consolidated and eventually will eliminate capitalism. This kind of intensification of struggle is determined by the logic of history.

The CP's task is to organize and concentrate the power of this class struggle and to make the force opposing capitalism stronger.

To be successful, this [idea] must be propagated among workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors, and students. The objective is to organize some large industrial associations and combine them into a general federation of industrial associations, and also to organize a revolutionary, proletarian political party—the CP. The CP is to guide the revolutionary proletariat to fight against capitalists and to seize political power from them. This power is used to maintain the capitalist system. Instead, power will be placed in the hands of workers and peasants, just as the Russian CP did in 1917.

The revolutionary proletariat's industrial associations must use general strikes to cause constant agitation in capitalist countries to make the enemy of the working masses weaker and weaker. When the time of the final struggle to seize political power from capitalists is at hand, the CP will call a general, all-out strike. This will deal a fatal blow to the capitalist system.

After the proletariat defeats the capitalists, the industrial associations will become the organs responsible for the economy in the communist society.

The overthrow of capitalist government and transfer of political power to the revolutionary proletariat is only one of the goals of the CP, and it is already showing success. However, this will not be the end of the CP's task, as class struggle will continue to exist. Only its form will change and will become the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3) Recent Conditions of Class Struggle

As it appears now, the whole world can be viewed as a single capitalist institution. Therefore class struggle in one country can have repercussions in others. The result of the victory of the Russian proletarian revolution was the transformation of class struggle in Russia into the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. This causes class struggle in other countries to become more intense, and it tends toward the same form as class struggle in Russia—the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is no accident that the form of class struggle in Russia was transformed into the dictatorship of the proletariat; it is a natural state of affairs in the development of

human society. It is a natural state of affairs at the time when the capitalists are being defeated and a communist society is being created. At a certain moment, the political form that exists in Russia is destined to emerge. Therefore it is true that this political form is destined to emerge in every other country. This is the case because these countries are the same. If one looks at their methods of production and distribution, they are all capitalist. The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia only demonstrates that in one part of the world victory has been achieved in the struggle between the proletarian and capitalist. It would be a major mistake to believe that a single communist state can be established within the boundary of Russia at a time when the proletariat in other countries is still struggling against capitalism and has yet to achieve victory. Since the Russian proletariat cannot immediately establish a communist state, and since capitalism has already been overthrown, the proletariat has to defend itself against enemies within the country and without. This is obvious. Therefore only through the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat can the enemies within the country and without be successfully resisted. That is to say, the power of one class is used to create communist society. Furthermore this class will make the society of the future. The fulfillment of this task is ordained by history.

Moreover, this is characteristic not only of the development of Russian history but also of world history. Every country in the world will go through this phase of class struggle.

The meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat lies solely in that political power has been seized by the revolutionary proletariat. Yet this does not mean that residual forces of capitalism, such as counterrevolutionary forces, have been totally eradicated. This is not at all the case. The task facing the dictatorship of the proletariat is, on the one hand, to continue using force to fight the residual forces of capitalism and, on the other, to use revolutionary methods to produce many communist methods of construction. Methods like these will be devised by the elected representatives of the proletariat—those of the proletariat with the highest class consciousness and revolutionary spirit.

By the time capitalists' forces have been eliminated all over the world and productive activities begin to operate in accordance with communist principles, the dictatorship of the proletariat will move on to carve out a path leading to communism.

A.2 The First Congress of the CCP (August 1921)³¹

The Chinese communist organization was established in the middle of last year [1920]. Initially, the Shanghai organization had only five members. The leader is the editor of the well-received journal *New Youth* [Xin qingnian], Comrade Chen [Duxiu]. This organization has gradually expanded the scope of its activities and

now comprises six small groups³² with a total of fifty-three party members. The Congress was originally scheduled to open on 20 June, but because the delegates from Beijing, Hankou, Canton, Changsha, Jinan, and Japan did not all arrive in Shanghai until 23 July, the Congress only began then. Twelve representatives participated in the Congress. They came from seven localities, including Shanghai. Two localities sent one delegate each, and five localities sent two.³³

At the first session, the chairman, Comrade Zhang [Guotao], explained the significance of the Congress. The Congress was to formulate a program and a plan for practical work. An agenda was drawn up, and the Congress listened to reports concerning the activities of the local small groups and the general situation. In total, this took two days. These reports all pointed out three things: party members are very few; it is necessary to increase party membership; and the methods of organizing workers and making propaganda have to be improved. We are extremely pleased to mention here that Comrades Maring³⁴ and Nikolsky attended the First Congress and that they provided us with valuable guidance. Comrade Maring, in his speech, discussed his activities in Java and recommended that we should pay special attention to establishing workers' organizations.

Comrade Nikolsky told us about the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Far Eastern Secretariat³⁵ and gave his impressions of Russia. After this report, and on the basis of Nikolsky's suggestion, we decided to send a telegram to Irkutsk informing them of the progress of the Congress. Following Maring's recommendation it was decided to elect a commission to draft the program and the work plan. The commission was given two days to draft the plan and the program. During this period, there were no Congress sessions.

The third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the Congress were devoted to the study of the program. After a long debate, final decisions were reached, with the exception of one point that caused heated debate. This point was whether party members could, with the permission of the Executive Committee, become government officials and members of parliament. On this point, there were two different viewpoints. One was that there was no danger in our party members' becoming officials. Moreover, the selection of party members to enter parliament was even recommended so that they could carry out their work under party leadership. The other viewpoint did not accept this.

At the third meeting, the representatives did not reach an agreement, and at the fourth meeting the discussion became even more heated. One side firmly believed that acceptance into parliament could turn our party into a yellow party. They quoted the example of the Social Democratic Party in Germany to show that when people entered parliament they gradually abandoned their principles and became a part of the bourgeoisie, becoming traitors and recognizing the parliamentary system as the only means of struggle and work. So as not to undertake any activities in common with the bourgeoisie and in order to concentrate our forces for attack, we certainly should not participate in parliament but should engage in struggle outside it. Moreover, taking advantage of parliament could not improve our situation, yet

entering parliament might make people think that taking advantage of parliament, and only that, could improve our situation and enable us to be of service to the revolutionary cause. The others persisted in advocating that we must link open work with secret work. If we believed that the state could not be abolished within twenty-four hours and that a general strike could be suppressed by the capitalists, then political activities would be a necessity. Although opportunities for uprisings were few and far between, we had to make preparations in the meantime. We had to improve the workers' conditions, expand their outlook, and lead them to take part in the revolutionary struggle and the struggle for freedom of publication and assembly. The open propagation of our theories was an absolute condition for success, and the adoption of activities in common with other parties and factions oppressed in parliament could have brought partial success. However, we must point out to the people that it is futile to hope to build a new society within the old system even if we are the ones trying to do so. The working class must liberate itself because it is not possible to force it to carry out revolution. Otherwise, it will entertain illusions about parliament and adopt peaceful, instead of radical, means.

By the end, the issue still had not been resolved, and its resolution was left to the next Congress. The question of whether we should become government officials was intentionally avoided, but it was unanimously believed that we should not become ministers or provincial governors and that, in general, we should not take up important administrative posts. In China, the word "official" can be applied to all the posts mentioned above. However, we would permit our comrades to take up such official posts such as plant directors.

The sixth session of the Congress was held at night in a comrade's home. The meeting had only just started when a detective barged into the house.³⁶ Although he apologized for coming in by mistake, it was impossible for us to carry on with the meeting. The arrival of the detective did not damage the party, although after he came the police quickly arrived and carried out a search. After this incident, we were on our guard, and in order to continue the Congress we had to move to a small town nearby.³⁷

There we discussed the commission's draft of the practical work plan. Concerning our attitude to other parties and factions, there was a short but intense debate. Some people maintained that no matter whether in theory or in practice, the proletariat should always struggle against other parties and factions. At the same time, however, undertaking common activities with other parties and factions did not violate our party's principles. Also, we were to do our utmost to cooperate with all other elements to oppose our common enemy—the warlords who are the enemy of all other classes in society. Others advocated that although we should cooperate in activities with other parties and factions to oppose the common enemy, at the same time, we should not forsake principles and must criticize them in our newspaper. Even if we were not able to seize power immediately, at least we would be able to strengthen ourselves so that we would be able to take further action. Because our strength would inevitably be improved

by achievements in this respect, the ruling class that is in the process of replacing the current ruling class might not dare to oppress the people in the same way as the feudal lords. In this way, we could concentrate our revolutionary strength and expand our revolutionary activities. Therefore, even if the proletariat could not take over political power immediately, we should still unite with other classes to oppose the common enemy and strengthen ourselves so that we could struggle further to overthrow the class that has gained political power. In this way, one would be able to see that our unity with other classes is for the purpose of engaging in struggle of a destructive nature. However, the meeting made a decision in favor of the first option, namely, the recommendation submitted by the commission that drafted the practical work plan.

Because party members are few, the questions of organizing the peasantry and an army were suspended, and it was decided to concentrate our energies on organizing the factory workers. In order to win good and reliable comrades to our side, it was decided that party members must be admitted with special caution and via a strict selection process. In view of the fact that up to now our party has been composed almost entirely of intellectuals, the Congress decided to pay special attention to the organization of workers and their education in the communist spirit. The Central Bureau of the party was entrusted with the drafting of the party Constitution. After having elected three comrades to organize the Secretariat and having elected the Organization Department and the Propaganda Committee,³⁸ the Congress shouted the following slogans and declared the meeting closed: "Long Live the CP, Long Live the Third International, Long Live Communism—the Emancipator of Humankind."

A.3 The First Program of the CCP (July–August 1921)³⁹

1. Our party shall be named the Chinese Communist Party.
2. The program of our party is as follows:
 - a) With the revolutionary army of the proletariat, to overthrow the capitalistic classes and to reconstruct the nation from the labor class, until class distinctions are eliminated.
 - b) To adopt the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to complete the end of class struggle—abolishing classes.
 - c) To overthrow the private ownership of capital, to confiscate all the productive means, such as machines, land, buildings, semimanufactured products, and so on, and to entrust them to social ownership.
 - d) To unite with the Third International.
- 3) Our party, with the adoption of the soviet form, organizes the industrial and

agricultural laborers and soldiers, propagates communism, and recognizes the social revolution as our chief policy; it absolutely cuts off all relations with the yellow intellectual class and other such groups.

4) No discrimination as to sex or nationality is allowed in the membership; anyone who accepts the programs and policies of our party and who promises loyalty to our party after introduction by one of our members can be our comrade, but before he [she] enters our party, he [she] shall sever relations with any other party or group which opposes our program.

5) The procedure for introducing a member is this: the candidate should be suggested to the local soviet for investigation; the time for investigation is limited to at most two months. After investigation, through the consent of the majority of the members, the membership of the new applicant is recognized. If in that locality an executive committee has been established, its membership should be approved by that committee.

6) Until the time for disclosure is ripe, the doctrines of the party and even membership in it must be kept secret.

7) In any locality which has as many as five members, a local soviet can be organized.

8) The member of a soviet, through a formal introduction from his [her] local secretary can transfer to another local soviet.

9) In any local soviet numbering less than ten members, only one secretary is appointed to manage affairs; if the soviet has over ten members, a treasurer, an organizer, and a propagandist should be appointed; if the soviet has over thirty members, an executive committee should be organized. The rules of such a committee will be stipulated hereafter.

10) In various localities when the membership increases, the organizations of laborers, peasants, soldiers, and students should be utilized for external activity according to occupations, but such organizations should be under the direction of the local executive committee.

12) The finances, publications, and policies of any local soviet shall be supervised and directed by the CEC.

13) When the members exceed 500 or when more than five local executive committees have been established in the whole country, a convenient place should be chosen in which to organize an executive committee, including ten members elected by the national representative conference. When the above-mentioned conditions are not carried out, a provisional CEC should be organized to fill the need. The detailed regulations of the CEC will be stipulated thereafter.

14) The members, unless they are under pressure of existing law or have obtained consent from the party, cannot be government officials or members of parliament, but soldiers, policemen, and civil service employees are not held to this restriction.

15) This program can be amended when a bill concerning such amendments is passed by two-thirds of the representatives of the national representative conference.

A.4 The First Decision as to the Objects of the CCP (July–August 1921)⁴⁰

1) Labor Organization

To form industrial unions is the chief aim of our party. In any locality where there is more than one kind of industry, an industrial union shall be organized; if there is no great industry in a certain locality but only one or two factories, a factory union can be organized suitable to conditions in that locality.

The party should imbue the unions with the spirit of the class struggle. If the political struggle, fostered by various unions, does not agree with our program, this party should avoid becoming the puppet of other parties.

As to the existing guilds and technical unions, this party is allowed to send members to join these organizations in order to take the first step toward reorganization.

A labor union cannot be formed unless more than 200 members can be secured. At least two of our members should be sent to a new union to aid in organization.

2) Propaganda

Magazines, daily publications, encyclopedias, and pamphlets must all be under the management of the CEC or the provisional CEC.

Each locality can publish a union magazine, a daily and a weekly paper and pamphlets, and temporary circulars according to its needs.

Whether a publication is central or local, it should be directly managed and edited by the members of the party.

Any publication of a central or local [organization] must not contain articles inconsistent with the principles, policies, and decisions of the party.

3) Labor Supplementary Schools

As a labor supplementary school is the preparatory step in the organization of an industrial union, such schools should be formed within units of various industries, such as the transportation supplementary labor school, the textile supplementary school, etc. No supplementary school teaching several different kinds of work is permitted, except in those cases where the need for such an arrangement cannot be met.

In the supplementary school, only workers can be members of the managing board of the school that takes charge of school affairs. Teachers are employed by the party, but they can attend such board meetings.

Labor supplementary schools should gradually become the centers of labor organs; otherwise they are not permitted and can be suspended or reorganized by the party according to conditions.

The most important doctrine taught should be that which can awake the consciousness of laborers and show them the need for organizing labor unions.

4) Institution for Studying Labor Organization

This institution should be organized by the leaders of various industries, class-

conscious workers, and comrades of the party and should teach the proper methods of industrial organization.

The object of such an institution is to discipline the workers who carry on the practical work of the party so that special attention can be paid to such phases as the organization of labor unions, assistance in the various other movements of the proletariat, and investigation of the conditions of the labor unions and of the proletariat.

For the purpose of increasing the ability of the members, the institution may be divided into research groups in the following subjects: the history of the labor movement, the method of organizing factory laborers, Karl Marx's economic theories, and the present aspects of the labor movement of various nations. The results of this research may be published in a series. (In the discussion of these problems, special attention is paid to local conditions in China.)

5) The Attitude Toward Existing Political Parties

Toward existing political parties, an attitude of independence, aggression, and exclusion should be adopted. In the political struggle, in opposing militarism and bureaucracy, and in demanding freedom of speech, press, and assemblage, when we must declare our attitude, our party should stand up on behalf of the proletariat and should allow no relationship with the other parties or groups.

6) The Relationship Between the Party and the Third International

The central organ should make a report to the Third International every month. If necessary, a formal representative should be sent to be stationed in the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Third International in Irkutsk, and deputies should be sent to the various Far Eastern nations to further plans for union in the class struggle.

A.5 Report of the Beijing Communist Group. *Zhang Guotao* (July 1921)⁴¹

Comrades:

The Beijing communist organization was founded only ten months ago [October 1920]. Just a few intellectuals have joined this youthful organization, and most of them lack revolutionary experience. Because of changes in the political situation itself, our entire operation has encountered quite a few difficulties. For this reason, our work has not been very fruitful. We very much regret to say that we cannot report to you much more about our experiences at this Congress. However, we sincerely hope that this Congress will greatly enrich our experience and will issue principles and instructions concerning all our future activities.

Before beginning the report, I [Zhang Guotao] will give you as brief a description as possible of Beijing society.

1) As you know, Beijing is the political center of north China and, for the past

500 years, has been China's capital. In the Qing dynasty [1644–1911], many Manchus lived there, maintaining an unruly and lawless life-style because of their relationship to the emperor. Even now there are 200,000 such residents. Because of their continuing loyalty, they cannot find regular work. Apart from these good-for-nothings, there are high- and low-level civil and military officials on whom all manner of parasites hang. Then there are their family members. Finally, there are about 30,000 characters engaged in all kinds of suspicious professions. Beijing's population is only about 930,000 and, I dare say, half of them are loafing around. Indeed, one might say that Beijing is the strangest city in the world.

As I said, Beijing is the acknowledged political center. Hence people here should be concerned about politics. Yet this is far from the case. When China had an imperial system, people regarded politics as the emperor's personal concern. After the revolution, it was considered the business of the military. That is to say that politics is seen as the personal concern of senior and junior officers and of politicians who pursue their own selfish ends in struggles for all kinds of privileges. For this reason, people do not pay much attention to politics.

How can this passive attitude of people in Beijing be explained? First, people in Beijing remember very well what the ancient philosophers said—"Politics is not for the common people." This fatalistic idea is ingrained in their minds. Second, for thousands of years they lived under the oppression of a despotic system. Obedience and feelings of dependency are very strong. Third, industrial development is in its infancy and extreme egoism is rampant among workers. Steeped in a conservative, traditional ethos, they have no sense of collectivity; at teahouses or restaurants, one often sees signs saying "No Discussing Affairs of State." This kind of sanction on any discussions of state and political affairs seems designed to influence people from the lower classes.

After the revolution in "literature" (the popularization of *baihua*,⁴² etc.), for the first time the intellectuals felt the need for new ideals, aspirations, and ambitions. At the same time, disputes developed between China and Japan over the Shandong issue at the conference for dividing war booty. This provoked an unprecedented nationalist movement among students—the May Fourth Movement.⁴³ At that time, students made a great effort to get the masses interested in political matters, but to no avail. Without support from the masses, the student movement languished. This example demonstrates that in this political center the patriotic spirit of the intellectuals has not taken root among the proletariat.

The political movement among the intellectuals can be divided into three schools: (1) the democratic movement; (2) guild socialism; and (3) the anarchist movement. Supporters of the democratic movement do not have stable organizations. Guild socialism has only a small number of supporters. Therefore, their influence is limited. In order to spread their very confused ideas, they simply use whatever papers and other periodicals exist. Even the anarchists are no different from these people. Pick up any newspaper, even including those run by the warlords, and you can find articles about this mish-mash of different, confused ideas;

democracy, guild socialism, anarchism, and more. Naturally, this kind of movement, given the means employed, cannot achieve its purpose. As for anarchists, although they probably have realized how important it is to arouse the masses, besides giving out their little pamphlets and sitting in prison, they do not know what to do. For example, during the recent May Fourth Movement, the anarchists gathered together thirty people but were unable to organize demonstrations among workers. They just put out a few weeklies but because they could not organize their distribution in a sensible way, they were distributed randomly.

Those in intellectual circles think that the transformation of society needs their knowledge. The fulfillment of scientific tasks will enable them to gain influential positions, and so they want more education. They regard the proletariat as an ignorant, poor, and impotent class that can be used to further their goals. While intellectuals think themselves very important, the proletariat is not worth mentioning. This tendency on their part is very obvious and as a result is a big obstacle in the workers' revolutionary movement.

Comrades, based on what I have said, we face two important questions that need immediate resolution. First, how can we get the workers and the destitute interested in politics and use the spirit of rebellion to educate and organize them and get them involved in revolutionary work? Second, how can they be dissuaded from their desire to become scholars thus joining the intellectual circles? How can they be persuaded to participate in the revolutionary movement of the proletariat? Finally, how can they be made into a part of the proletariat?

In general, this government of warlords and bureaucrats is not stable at all. It does not have any consistent political direction. It would be easy to get rid of this government if the proletariat made an effort.

2) Beijing's economic situation is not very complex. Beijing is a political center, not an industrial or commercial one. In fact, only millionaires have money in banks. There are very few industrialists, and there are not many big merchants either. Some relatively large factories and enterprises such as editorial offices, publishing houses, the local treasury, precision machinery factories, measurement-equipment factories, and railways are all government institutions. Therefore, the factory owners and the employers are the government itself. To strengthen the patriotic spirit among the workers of the above-mentioned factories and enterprises and to make them work long hours, the government says, "You should do this for the prosperity of the country." Naturally, under such conditions it is very difficult to carry out propaganda work. It is more difficult than dealing with capitalists. Comrades, I would like to call your attention to this problem.

There are many rickshaw pullers among the workers, between fifty and sixty thousand. Although they do not work for the capitalists, they come from lower social strata and their work enables them to be in contact with people of all social backgrounds. We must find ways to conduct propaganda work among them.

3) In Beijing, it is common to see people being bullied. Foreigners insult Chinese; military officers harshly treat civilians; passengers drive on rickshaw pullers

with whips, canes, etc. In my opinion, no matter where, once things like that happen, we should seize the opportunity to arouse the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat.

Government officials, officers, bureaucrats, and the police compete to oppress the common people. The cars of the “VIP’s” can run down pedestrians with impunity. They can direct traffic as they please and deploy police to oppress people arbitrarily. All this indicates that there are many opportunities for propaganda among the masses.

Now let me return to talk about the past activities and the program of the Beijing communist organization. We should point out that in October last year when the organization was founded, a few sham Communists also joined. These people were really anarchists, and they made some trouble for us. Because of their extreme view of politics, they left the organization. After they left, things began to go smoothly. We do not have many people, so we cannot now propose any comprehensive tasks. We must concentrate on propaganda and organization work among intellectuals and workers.

Propaganda Work Among Workers

Beijing’s industry is not very developed. There are no big factories concentrating the workers in one place. For this reason, we decided to shift our attention to railway workers. However, all of us come from intellectual families and are distanced from the working class. Therefore the first thing to do was increase communication among the workers themselves. We decided to set up a workers’ supplementary school at Changxindian to train 2,000 railway workers. This school is not far from Beijing and it has three teachers—they are socialists.

This school is one way we approach workers. On more than one occasion our suggestions caused excitement. As a result, all kinds of classes have made demands, and ideas of wage increases, shortening working hours, and establishing trade unions have spread among the workers. Later, they set up a railway union with 340 to 350 members.

Comrades, we should not confine ourselves to setting up trade unions. After they are set up, we should guide the trade unions to fight with factory bosses. Only then can workers show concern for their own unions and believe in their strength. The workers are uneducated and illiterate. Only one out of ten can read a newspaper. Of course, propaganda work using printed materials is not effective. As you can see, we must fight these difficulties and overcome them at any cost.

In brief, the lessons we learned during this short time are: First, good relations should be established between those loyal to the workers’ cause and the workers themselves. Second, leaders should be selected from the workers. Third, we should remind them of the purpose of our organization and to use their own unions to fight with employers so that class hatred will be intensified. Fourth, we must seize every opportunity to encourage the masses to demonstrate and launch strikes.

Of course, because of inadequacies with our staff and a lack of funds we cannot expect to raise the general education level of the workers immediately. Through this school, we seek to achieve only the two aims outlined above. The purpose of the school is mainly to educate workers and get them accustomed to a situation in which they themselves elect those among them with high consciousness and enthusiasm to govern the school and the union. Student meetings provide good opportunities for propaganda work, and it is extremely important to develop the custom of calling public, mass meetings. This kind of meeting is the best way to develop people's sense of common interest and discipline.

What do we teach workers? We constantly tell them that they are being exploited by capitalist factory owners and that this is the reason why they have a wretched life. Also, we introduce them to the history of workers' movements in foreign countries. We constantly point out to them the significance and methods of becoming organized. We often give lectures and teach them how to read. At the same time, we teach them to use words to express their thoughts and make them write about their family's daily life and all the injustices happening in the factory. At first, they were rather reluctant, but we did produce some very good agitators. However, the task of finding true proletarian leaders is very difficult.

I think it is unnecessary to open such schools for workers from every profession. Only in those places where there are no workers' organizations and leaders is it necessary to have a school like this. Experience shows that we cannot have general schools but schools that are specialized, such as schools for textile and railway workers, etc. This kind of school is the necessary preparatory stage for setting up unions along professional lines.

With respect to the Beijing-Hankou Railway trade union, our effort is to get its workers to develop close relationships with us. At the same time, we pay special attention to strikes that occur here and there. Once, as soon as we heard about a strike launched by coal mine and other workers, Comrade Luo [Zhanglong] and I rushed there by train. We wanted to help the strikers but they did not believe that they could get help from outsiders and furthermore they suspected us of being spies and were afraid of us. Hence our effort failed.

Most of the propaganda publications we publish for the proletariat have only a few pages. We often encourage workers to write brief news pieces and print them in our or other publications. Our first publication was *Workers' Weekly* [Laodong zhoukan], but after the sixth issue, the government banned it. After this restraining order by the government, we changed the name to *Voice of Benevolence* [Rensheng], but after the third issue we had to cease publication because of lack of funds. We also put out some pamphlets such as *Workers' Victory* [Gongren de shengli] and *May Day* [Wuyijie]. These publications had a wide circulation. However, our main propaganda work so far has concentrated on increasing wages and shortening working hours. These demands have become the most effective slogans for our struggle.

I want to give an example to illustrate how important it is for workers to openly

organize strikes and demonstrations. As I said before, we planted the first seeds of propaganda work at Changxindian, and on 1 May last year the first strike occurred. I want to praise this strike organized by our comrades. On that day, a mass rally was called with thousands of people attending. Workers made agitational speeches, and some did not even have the opportunity to speak even though the rally lasted three hours. After the rally, they took to the streets. Some 1,500 people marched through the streets, holding banners bearing important slogans, singing revolutionary songs, and shouting "Higher wages; shorter working hours!" Less than one week after this demonstration, about ten small-scale incidents occurred in the factory that caused the management great concern. I would like to remind you, comrades, that we must work with workers who have a sense of discipline. In my opinion, the best way is to help them organize strikes and demonstrations. We must take every measure that can speed up this movement.

Propaganda Work Among Intellectuals

We tried to conduct propaganda work on a wider basis among intellectuals, but our printing house was under surveillance and we could not print anything. We translated some small pamphlets, *The Russian Revolution and Class Struggle* and *The Program of the Communist Party*, for example, but we have not printed the translated texts. We only circulated *The Communist Manifesto* and *Conversations on Economics*, which were printed in Shanghai.

Although one of our comrades is responsible for the publication of the journal *Dawn Light* [Shuguang], the journal is run jointly with others. We published some translations and creative pieces. When Professor [Bertrand] Russell was lecturing in Shanghai and endorsed guild socialism, we organized public debates to voice our criticism of him. Very often we have to argue with anarchists and social democrats, but most of the arguments are conducted in the form of public debates and private conversations rather than through articles.

In recent years, the number of public schools has increased appreciably. These schools first teach their students to be patriotic, but we are making an effort to get these schools to teach communism, and we have made some headway in that regard.

This is the end of my report, but let me add a few more things. Although we now concentrate all our energy on organizing and educating the masses, at the same time we should also pay attention to propaganda work directed toward intellectuals. Comrades, a bleak political situation pervades our corrupt society; unbearable social injustices and pathetic living conditions are all factors leading to the outbreak of revolution. Whether we can capitalize on the easily evoked revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and whether we can channel a democratic political revolution into a proletarian social revolution all depends on the degree of effort we put into the struggle where we hold high the red banner. This founding Congress should deal with all the tasks facing us in a concrete way and draw up specific work plans. It seems that the task of this Congress is not an easy one.

A.6 Report of the Canton CP. *Chen Gongbo* (July 1921)⁴⁴

1) Last Year

There was no organization here last year, nor was it possible to find people to do organizational work in Canton. When we returned to Canton, we established a daily newspaper, *The Socialist* [Shehuizhuyizhe];⁴⁵ but we cannot claim that *The Socialist* was a kind of organization. It was a propaganda organ. At that time Canton was ruled by the people from Guangxi, who cruelly repressed all kinds of movements; we also had financial problems then, so there was no progress.

At the end of last year, B and Perlin came to Canton and opened an office of the Russian News Agency [Rosta]. They took some measures to organize labor unions and wrote articles for the weekly magazine *The Workers' World* [Laodongjie].⁴⁶ Comrade Huang Lingshuang introduced them to the revolutionaries in Canton, and thus they were surrounded by the anarchists.⁴⁷ Although a CP was organized, it would have been more appropriate to have called it the anarchists' CP. Of the nine members of the party's executive committee, seven were anarchists; only Comrades Perlin and Stoyanovich were Communists.⁴⁸ Because of our different views, Tan Pingshan, Tan Zhitang, and I refused to join this group. The paper they published was called *The Worker* [Laodongzhe], with a circulation of 3,000 copies. At that time, two workers' organizations emerged in Canton: one was the Mechanical Workers' Club and the other was the Kuanshan [Foshan?] Workers' Club; Kuanshan is a small place about 25 kilometers from Canton. Each of the organizations had about forty to fifty members. Because we were not members of these clubs, we cannot provide detailed reports about them.

Comrade Chen Duxiu came to Canton in January together with Comrade B.⁴⁹ They had very intensive discussions and concluded that we must get rid of the anarchists. Just at that time, the anarchists left the party, so we began the building of the real CP, and we declared that the daily newspaper *The Socialist* was the official newspaper for party propaganda. Altogether there were nine party members, including Chen Duxiu, Stoyanovich, and Perlin.

Regrettably, we were in great need of funds. *The Worker* [as of 2 January 1921] had already folded; two labor unions had to close because of, first, financial difficulties and, second, the wide dissemination of anarchist thinking inside labor unions.

2) The Present Situation

Now our propaganda agency's newspaper is the daily paper *The Socialist*. This newspaper needs 700 *yuan* a month; it is very difficult to continue publishing. In addition, we have a Marxist Research Society with about eighty members. Twenty percent of the members are law students, 20 percent are students from universities and trade schools, and the rest are members of all kinds of political and editorial groups. There are no workers in these groups because it is very difficult for us to

establish contacts with them. It is even more difficult to establish ties with soldiers. In order to keep afloat the monthly magazine *The Communist* [Gongchandang]⁵⁰ and pay for the costs of the workers' evening schools, every month we appropriate 10 percent of each party member's income.

In Shanghai [error for Canton] we have established a school for mechanical workers. Thanks to help from the seven school committee members, we have propagated our principles and hope to increase the number of schools. In addition, we have also established the training institute for propagandists, which is directly managed by the propaganda committee. I was appointed director of the institute. This institute is the principal agency for carrying out socialist education in Guangdong Province. Many teachers are good comrades of ours. We hope that the training institute will set up affiliated evening schools for workers and schools for organizational work among workers. But the existence of this training institute depends on political connections; we can only use such connections.

3) Suggestions for the Future

A. Recruit new party members.

The number of party members in Canton is small; this reminds us that we should pay much more attention to this work. However, when just beginning such work, we should not be casual about admitting new party members. The situation in Canton is very different from that in other places. Even if we exclude the workers and soldiers, we can say that university students sympathize with the secretive anarchists, or are manipulated by the GMD. Because of such difficulties, we should be especially determined. In the future, we plan to recruit new party members from some Marxist groups, from the school for mechanical workers, and from the training institute for propagandists. If other people want to join our party, we cannot deal with them at the present time as it is not a part of our plan.

B. Establish labor unions.

This is a tough problem because, in the past year, the number of labor unions has increased to over one hundred. But all these labor unions have been contaminated by anarchism or are controlled by the GMD. We don't have to talk about the anarchists because there are only five or six in Canton. Of these, three are going to France very soon. We should also point out that, in general, the anarchists themselves have no organization. Our struggle with the GMD is a much tougher one because relations between the workers and the GMD have a long history. As early as ten years ago the GMD was trying to disseminate their ideas and influence among workers and soldiers. Last year, they also instigated the workers to go on strike to support General Chen [Jiongming].⁵¹ Many of the members of this party consider themselves socialist. The GMD CC has a propaganda department that is exclusively in charge of liaison work with the workers, especially with the machine tool workers and the mechanical workers.

Our number one task in organizing workers is to establish the mechanical workers' labor union and the railway workers' club. Now we are taking measures to organize the teachers' union.

On the surface we have ties with the GMD, but we are still trying to organize labor unions independently. Now we have connections with some labor unions like the barbers' union; we are taking effective measures to create influence among the mechanical workers' union. It seems that our initial efforts will succeed.

C. Establish schools for workers.

(i) Schools for labor unions

The plan to establish such schools is: ask each labor union to send two representatives to come to the school two or three times a week. The courses taught at the school include: organizational laws of labor unions, history of the labor movement, the current situation of the labor movement in Europe and America, etc. We think that this school will certainly achieve great results in two or three months and that many unions will be satisfied with our work.

(ii) Evening schools for workers

At the moment only one school is directly governed by our comrades. Although many schools have been established by workers who have ties with us, the work at these schools has not been smooth. The union of mechanical workers has the greatest influence in Canton. This union contains many members who support us. After this school has gained conspicuous results, we will start working on other schools.

D. Propaganda for the peasants.

Comrade Zhu Nuochen, a member of the Marxist group, founded *The New Village* [Xin nongcun] to disseminate our communist thought; we should do our best to help it and enable it to have great influence and expand its propaganda.

E. Ties with soldiers.

We purposefully put this point at the end because there are no soldiers in Canton. The soldiers in the army are either rotten eggs or bandits. They are dangerous; we must be very cautious with them. Many officers have our respect. We should win them over to our side before too long.

A.7 Circular of the CCP Central Bureau—Concerning Building and Developing the Party, the Youth League, Labor Unions, and Propaganda Work (November 1921)⁵²

Colleagues, please take note:

The following is the circular of the Central Bureau to each district:

1) According to the financial situation of each group, it has been decided that at a minimum the following four things must be done.

A) The five districts of Shanghai, Beijing, Canton, Wuhan, and Changsha must each recruit twenty comrades to form district executive committees, preferably this year and before the Congress next July at the latest. Thus, at the next Congress, the

CEC can be formally established in accordance with the party Program.⁵³

B) The membership of the country's SYL must exceed 2,000 before July of next year.

C) Each district must have more than one labor union under its direct control and establish solid relations with other labor unions. At next year's Congress, representatives from each district must give summarized reports about the labor situation in their respective districts.

D) The Central Bureau's Propaganda Department must publish more than twenty books (concerning true Communists) before July of next year.

2) On the labor movement, it was decided to use our entire strength to organize a national union of railway workers. Our comrades in Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha, Jinan, Nanjing, Tianjin, Zhengzhou, Hangzhou, and Changxindian should work hard on this project.

3) All districts must pay attention to the youth and women's movements. In the next few days, we shall be forwarding to you the reformulated manifestos and constitutions of the Youth League and the "Women's Federation." You should immediately start working on these movements in accordance with these new constitutions.

Secretary of the Central Bureau
T.S. Chen [Chen Duxiu]

A.8 Report of Comrade H. Maring to the Executive (11 July 1922)⁵⁴

From 10 December to the End of April 1922. Contacts with the GMD

On 10 December, with Comrade Zhang Tailei as interpreter I undertook a trip inland through Hunan to visit Sun Yat-sen. At the time, Sun had concentrated his troops in Guilin (Guangxi Province). As a guest of Sun Yat-sen I spent nine days there and then continued on to Canton, where I was in daily communication with GMD leaders during the sailors' strike.⁵⁵ I spent ten days in Canton and then left overland for Shantou [Swatow]. In my opinion, this trip to the south was the most important part of my stay in China. In Shanghai, I had become very pessimistic about the movement in China and its possibilities. In the south, I became convinced that fruitful work was possible. In a few provincial cities I saw how interested the young people are in socialist questions. I attended young people's meetings in Changsha, Guilin, Canton, and Haifeng, where there are student clubs concerned with anarchist and socialist theories. Of these youth organizations, one can say, in general, that they have contributed little in practical terms to the development of the

labor movement. Only in Changsha did our youth organization hold a demonstration against the Washington [Conference] and found an association of local textile workers, who went on strike at the end of December 1921. The two leaders of the youth organization were arrested and murdered by the governor.⁵⁶ Especially in the interior it is difficult for the young people to engage in practical work because conditions are still totally medieval. There is no transportation; I was in villages where neither European nor Japanese goods could be found, everything was still produced by the village itself. In such areas, one can do very little with local artisans for our purposes.

Now I would like to talk about the character of the GMD. In discussions with various leaders it became clear that there are four kinds of members in the GMD.

1) The leading *Intelligentsia*, mostly men who participated in the 1911 Revolution. A number of them became acquainted with socialism in Japan or France and call themselves Socialists. Sun Yat-sen is one of these, and he told me personally that he considers himself a Bolshevik. A group of three of Sun Yat-sen's aides published a monthly Marxist journal in Canton for some time. This was interrupted only when the expedition against the north was being organized. Also among the officers with whom I had contact, there was a great interest in the Russian revolution and the Red Army.

2) The *Immigrants*. These are the capitalist elements of the GMD. These Chinese have always financed the workers' party⁵⁷ and expect it to reunify China, to establish law and order, to eradicate the divisive influence of the constantly fighting *dujuns*,⁵⁸ and to defend China's independence from foreign domination. This Chinese bourgeoisie is situated in the colonies and has only very recently begun to set up capitalist firms in China. It has no clear political goal. The leadership of the GMD can never really express the needs of this group.

3) The *Soldiers* of the Southern Army. These déclassé elements, who live under very unfavorable conditions, have joined the party in some numbers, although some of the generals are against the political organization of soldiers. The younger officers who belong to the GMD conduct propaganda among the soldiers. Sun Yat-sen himself, after his arrival in Guilin, discussed the goals of the GMD organization in several meetings, and he specifically referred to the example of the Red Army.

4) The *Workers*. Especially in Guangdong Province and among the immigrants, Sun Yat-sen has long had contacts with workers. Leaders of his party supported the trade union organization in Canton and during the strikes always took the side of the workers. During the great sailors' strike in January of this year, it became clear to me how close the ties between the workers and the GMD are. The entire strike was led by leaders of this political organization.⁵⁹ The striking workers participated in the nationalist demonstrations of the party, and all the financial support came from the GMD. The communist group in Canton had no links whatsoever with the striking sailors and did not support the strike because the local party thought it could only work illegally. The ties between the GMD and strikers were so close that about 12,000 sailors in Canton, Hong Kong, and Shantou joined that political party.

The program of the party makes it possible for these very different groups to join the party. Its character is nationalist. It has three principles: it opposes foreign domination; it is for democracy; and it is for a worthy life for all citizens. This last demand is interpreted in a socialist sense by Sun Yat-sen. In 1920, Sun Yat-sen published a book on China's economic development.⁶⁰ This book contains his plans for a state capitalist economy; he states in the preface that this state capitalist economy must lead to a socialist form of production. Sun Yat-sen wants to develop China through the use of foreign loans, but he wants to exclude all foreign intervention in Chinese affairs. After the GMD had been defeated in the first revolution by Yuan Shikai, many members went over to the enemy camp.⁶¹ As a consequence, discipline was taken up in the program of the GMD as a fourth point. That is to say, unconditional obedience to the chair was demanded. On joining the party, members must swear an oath to this effect. This fourth principle is a hindrance to the growth of the party among young intellectuals. Sun Yat-sen complained to me about the younger intellectuals, who are interested in socialism, form small groups and sects, and are worthless as far as China's political life is concerned. Other party leaders told me that since the [1911] defeat of the Manchus the appeal of the party has decreased greatly because the nationalist principles of the party are not emphasized as strongly as before. The formulation of the program makes it possible for socialists to become members, and representatives of various socialist tendencies can be found among the members. Since Sun Yat-sen began to organize the expedition against the northern government, the party's situation has become abnormal. Congresses are not held. Sun Yat-sen has personal dictatorial powers, just as in the Southern [Canton] Government, whose president he was.⁶² The former Parliament of the Chinese Republic, which had been convened in Canton, gave Sun Yat-sen these powers. The expedition is his idea but he has been opposed from the beginning by General Chen Jiongming, the party secretary. This leader thought that the GMD should limit its activities to Guangdong Province at the present time. He opposed Sun Yat-sen's election as president of the Southern Government because he favors decentralization, not centralization. Because he wanted a federation of autonomous provinces, he was sympathetic to the policy of Wu Peifu. Guangdong Province had to bear nearly all the costs of the expedition. Chen Jiongming did not want to have any responsibility for the expedition. Although he was asked three times to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the expedition, he remained in Canton and refused to have anything to do with it. His troops, the best in the Southern Army, also remained in Guangdong. In January and February, a complete break between the two leaders of the GMD was avoided. I had three long discussions with Sun Yat-sen about the possibility of recognition of and an alliance with Russia. He felt that the Washington Conference had created an even more unfavorable situation for China, but he thought that an alliance with Russia would be a practical impossibility until the expedition against the north had been successful. He declared that after the expedition he would immediately propose an open alliance

with Russia. It was his opinion that Russia and China together could bring about the liberation of Asia. An untimely alliance with Russia would cause an immediate intervention by the Great Powers. He expressed the opinion that he thought it possible to settle Chinese affairs without intervention of the great powers if there were no links with Russia. I pointed out that his nationalist party propaganda must also lead to intervention, and that he dare not neglect this propaganda, because his entire position would be dependent on the support of a few generals who, at best, could lead him no further than another Nanjing compromise. Several times generals who linked up with him, left him again, and the example of Chen Jiongming shows that Sun Yat-sen's interpretation does not lead anywhere. In January, he would go no further than establishing unofficial links with Russia, and he declared himself prepared to send some of his best comrades to Russia.

In Canton, I met a few members of the Southern Government who all had a positive attitude toward the Russian Revolution. In particular, the president of the first Chinese Parliament, Zhang Ji, spoke in favor of a party dictatorship in China and hoped to be able to support the movement in the south by organizing revolutionary Chinese in the north, either in Mongolia or in Siberia. Only Chen Jiongming, with whom I spoke three times, wanted to know nothing of a party dictatorship. He also called himself a Socialist; while general of a revolutionary army in Fujian Province, he was completely on the side of the Russian Revolution. Developments in Russia had pushed him to the right. He defended the view that in Guangdong Province, which has a population of 30 million, it would be possible to institute state capitalism. Private capitalism could be pushed back, and politically a democratic form of government, with a high level of local autonomy, could be set up. In his view, centralization of all of China would be impossible and the GMD's program was insufficient. It was necessary to build a new socialist party. He financially supported a daily newspaper with a communist editorship, just as he had always helped striking workers. He wanted to send a representative to Russia and declared that he would have nothing against the *founding of a Comintern office in Canton*. Also, he hoped to reorganize the army with Russian military advisers. Although his attitude toward Sun Yat-sen was very negative, it was not clear at this time that an open break was imminent. Now, after his aide was murdered and he was dismissed as governor of Guangdong, this break has come about. He withdrew into the province with his army to await what measures Sun Yat-sen, who had returned to Canton, would undertake. He then turned against Sun Yat-sen, with the result that the latter was driven out,⁶³ the Southern Government was dissolved, and Chen Jiongming declared himself to be in agreement with the reorganization plans of Wu Peifu. At the time when I was with Chen Jiongming, he knew that Sun Yat-sen was concluding a military alliance with the Manchurian warlord, Zhang Zuolin. This tactic was defended with the claim that only in this way could Wu Peifu be defeated.

To date, the governor of Guangdong has possessed dictatorial powers in the

province. No reforms of a socialist nature have been carried out. In Canton, no measures have been taken that indicate a socialist policy is being followed. A few workers' representatives have been given jobs in the city administration, but their number is so small that they cannot exert any influence. The organization of trade unions, under Chinese conditions, has made great progress. The construction workers have a large modern trade union with branches in the province, and it has conducted a few successful local strikes for higher wages. This organization is under the influence of a few comrades. It seeks links with local federations in other Chinese cities and wants to set up a national union. More important than this organization is the Seamen's Union, which has around 12,000 members and which won the big strike in January against the steamship companies and the British government in Hong Kong, with the help of the GMD. Among the metal workers only old forms of labor organization exist, but people are now busy trying to form a modern union. I believe that I am not exaggerating when I estimate the number of unionized workers in Canton to be around 50,000. To date, one can find no Profinintern literature. To me it seems possible to bring the organized workers in Canton *into contact with the Profinintern*. There is a mutual-aid association of workers under the leadership of a Chinese comrade who came back from America and who is conducting communist propaganda. On 15 January, this organization held a demonstration with the youth group in commemoration of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Some 2,000 workers participated in this demonstration. Noticeably, the communist group stood *outside* of this propaganda.

The province has founded a school to train propagandists for the GMD. It gives evening classes to the workers in Canton. The curriculum provides for instruction in socialist theories.

After my trip through southern China, I visited the Russian legation in Beijing to report and to propose Russian representation in the south. The consul [A. Paikes] sent my preliminary report for Narkomindel and the Comintern to Russia. Because I could not take the overland route via Siberia, I left Shanghai on 24 April after some discussions with leaders of the communist organization and with members of the GMD CC there. I suggested to our comrades that they give up their exclusive attitude toward the GMD and that they begin to develop activities *within* the GMD, through which one can gain access much more easily to the workers and soldiers in the south. The small group does not have to give up its independence; on the contrary, the comrades must together decide which tactics they should follow within the GMD. The leaders of the GMD have told me that they will permit communist propaganda within their party. Our comrades were against the idea. The prospects for propaganda by the small groups, as long as they are not linked to the GMD, are dim. Only among the young is it more favorable. In Shanghai, a Russian comrade, a representative of the Youth International [S.A. Dalin] has arrived. Together with our Comrade Zhang Tailei, he arranged a youth congress in Canton; it took place in May. Especially in the south, youth organizations are well developed. If these local federations can be brought together it is possible to create an important youth

organization. I advised our party leadership to move its seat to Canton and to work openly there. On the return trip, I spoke with the Dutch comrades about the possibility of sending some Communists to Java to overcome the bad consequences of the government's policy.

With communist greetings

H. Maring

Moscow, 11 July 1922

To the ECCI.

Having returned from China as representative of the Comintern in the Far East, I hereby propose the following:

1) The establishment of a representation for the Comintern and Profintern⁶⁴ in Canton in the form of an office to undertake the distribution of communist literature in China, Japan, and Korea; to translate communist literature into the languages of these three countries; to print one of our English-language weeklies; to regulate and support relations between the nationalist and communist movements in China and Korea; and to report regularly to the Comintern and Profintern about such activities as well as on the situation in the various countries. At the same time, this office can serve as a center for the work among *youths* and *women*.

2) *Organization* of the office. The staff of the office should be limited to the smallest number possible. I firmly believe that a joint representative of the Comintern and the Profintern and a representative of the parties of each of the three countries will be enough. At the same time, the latter can take care of the translations into the national languages. For the time being, I do not see the necessity for our own printing shop since a printing shop to take over this work can be found very easily in Canton.

3) *Budget*. My estimation for the expenses of the office are 500 pounds sterling per month. Included in this are the costs of the English newspapers as well as all the current expenses. The budget must be guaranteed for one year.

[[Points 4 and 5 concern proposals for the improvement of work in the Dutch East Indies.]]

H. Maring.

Moscow, 11 July 1922

Explanatory Memorandum

1) *Concerning the Office in Canton*. Canton is the only city in the Far East where such a permanent representation is possible without being bothered by the authorities. Links via Hong Kong with the three countries are very favorable, and, with the help of Chinese sailors, the distribution of literature published there would not be difficult. The permanent presence of a representative of the Comintern and Profintern is made necessary by the situation of the young Chinese movement, especially in the south, the expansion of the labor movement, the problems in the Korean movement, and the important situation of the Japanese labor movement.

Optimally, there should be a *representative of the Comintern present* at the forthcoming conference of the Koreans to cooperate in the preparatory work there.

[[Point 2 concerns sending European Communists to Java to strengthen work in the colony.]]

H. Maring

A.9 Letter from Chen Duxiu to G. Voitinsky (6 April 1922)⁶⁵

Mr. Voitinsky,

This special missive concerns: the proposal of Mr. Maring that all the members of the CCP and the SYL should join the GMD. The following reasons are given for opposing this:

1) The revolutionary aims of the CP and the GMD and their basic policies are not the same.

2) The GMD policy of cooperation with America, Zhang Zuolin, Duan Qirui, and others is totally incompatible with communism.

3) The GMD has not published a party program. Other than in Guangdong, the people of each province regard it as a political party scrambling for power and profit. If the CP enters this party, the faith of members of society will be completely lost (particularly among the young), there will never be an opportunity for development.

4) Chen Jiongming of the Guangdong Shili [Zhili] clique, known as the GMD, in reality intensely opposes the Sun Yat-sen clique. If we join the GMD, we shall immediately meet with the hostility of the Chen clique and we will be unable to carry out activities in Guangdong.

5) The Sun Yat-sen clique of the GMD never tolerates the ideas of new members and uses lies as power.

6) The comrades from Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Changsha, and Wuhan have already met to consider the issue of joining the GMD and, unanimously, passed a resolution expressing total disapproval. In reality, this makes entry an impossibility.

Should the Third International discuss this matter, please, sir, take the responsibility of conveying Chen's six points.

A.10 Statement of the CCP on the Current Situation (15 June 1922)⁶⁶

[[**Section One:** Before the 1911 Revolution, China suffered from "feudal economic conditions" and increasing foreign encroachment. **Section Two:** The 1911 Revolution

tion failed to change the feudal system into a democratic political regime. The GMD took a conciliatory approach to Yuan Shikai in 1912 and to Duan Qirui in 1916. The CCP calls on the GMD to avoid a third defeat through conciliation by taking "the path of revolutionary struggle." Continued civil war in China only helps the imperialists and hinders the development of indigenous industry.]]

Three

[[The struggles between the GMD and its opponents such as Yuan Shikai and Duan Qirui demonstrate the following.]]

The struggle to achieve democracy is a struggle of one class to overthrow another; it is the replacement of one system by another. It cannot be seen as a struggle of one individual or one group for the overthrow of another individual or group.

Four

A genuine democratic party must show the people two things: (1) its party program and policies must be correlated with the concepts of democracy; and (2) from beginning to end, its actions must support democracy in the struggle against the warlords. Taking this into account, of all the political parties in China, only the GMD can be characterized as a relatively revolutionary democratic party, a relatively genuine democratic party. The party's program has not yet been fully elaborated. However, its public expression of the Three Principles of the People and its plans to develop the economy have a democratic character. In addition to its participation in the revolutionary movement, other actions of the GMD attest to its democratic spirit, such as the actions of its parliamentary representatives in 1911, 1913, and 1917 during the struggles in the parliament and against the opposition parties; the Canton government's [headed by Sun Yat-sen, 1921-22] not restricting the labor movement; its abolishing police regulations concerning "public order and national security"; and its abolishing the law by which workers were deprived of the right to strike. Often, however, this party's actions have been contradictory in nature. On occasion the GMD manifests a friendly attitude toward groups with imperialist tendencies, and on two occasions has worked hand-in-hand with the Beiyang militarists.⁶⁷ If the GMD wants to maintain its place in the democratic revolution, it must change this kind of vacillating policy.

[[Section Five: Revitalizing the presidency and restoring the legal power of parliament will not solve the current problems. The warlords continued to dominate and Li Yuanhong proved inadequate when he was last president in 1916-17. **Section Six:** A federation of autonomous provinces provides no solution. **Section Seven:** Those who hold the view that Wu Peifu is a supporter of democracy and is different from the nation's other warlords and thus has the strength to resolve the current problems are mistaken. He must be supported against the northeast warlord, Zhang Zuolin, but Wu is no democrat. Although he opposes the pro-Japanese

groupings in Beijing, he is also supported by foreigners. His use of troops against the south was antidemocratic, while his attempts to consolidate the north use feudal means. **Section Eight:** As long as the warlords remain they will fight against the democratic forces and among themselves. Thus, the warlords are the cause of civil war in China. The warlords prevent the creation of a so-called good government, as a military government can only be a “bad government.”]]

Nine

Advocates of good government! Just after uttering your cries of “Endeavor,” “Struggle,” and “Wage War on the Evil Forces,” Xu Shichang was exiled,⁶⁸ and you immediately opposed the Northern Expedition. In line with all revolutionary lessons, your compromising, petty bourgeois pacificism is an obstacle to realizing your slogans of “Endeavor,” “Struggle,” and “Wage War on the Evil Forces.” Can you realize your aim of a so-called good government while under the power of the warlords? Given the current atmosphere in Beijing, Tianjin, Baoding [Wu Peifu’s headquarters], do you think you can carry out your three principles and the six concrete aims of your program? After the fall of the Qing dynasty [1911], the Unification Party of Zhang Binglin et al. stridently advocated compromise with Yuan Shikai and opposition to continued war. After Yuan Shikai died, the Progressive Party of Liang Qichao et al. stridently advocated compromise with Duan Qirui and opposition to continued war. The results created reactionary turmoil. You with your petty bourgeois pacificism are heading down the same path!

GMD members! Originally, you were revolutionary fighters for the triumph of democracy. It would be better to fight and lose than make a compromise with the warlords and still perish. During the first year of the Chinese Republic [1912], Yuan Shikai made a pledge to support the Republic, and you compromised with Yuan Shikai. In 1916, when Duan Qirui proposed a restoration of parliament, you again compromised. Now you cannot once more compromise with the northern warlords when they propose to restore parliament and the constitution, to abolish the *dujun* system, and to demobilize the troops. Does the present constitutional parliament differ in any way from the parliament of the fifth and the sixth years of the Republic [1916–17]? Are not the hopes for abolishing the *dujun* system and for demobilization merely hopes that the tiger will shed its own skin? Would the change of title from *dujun* to commander-in-chief, as in Yunnan, Sichuan, and Hunan Provinces, make any difference?

Is there any hope whatever for a troop demobilization at a time when war between the militarists is at its height, when they are pitted against one another, and they are thus increasing their troop numbers? Previously [General] Xu Shuzheng said, “I am an advocate of disarmament, but wait until my soldiers are adequately trained and equipped, so that I may disarm the soldiers of my adversaries.” [General] Zhang Shaozeng said: “There are many problems in such provinces as Zhili, Jiangxi, and Henan, and each province needs to be brought under control. If Gener-

als Cao [Kun] and Wu [Peifu] should actually put the demobilization scheme into effect, can you imagine what would become of the provinces?" In reality, they cannot take the trouble to demobilize the troops and abolish the *dujun* system. This can be seen from the candid words spoken by these two Beiyang representatives. You must complete the historical task of the democratic revolution; do not act like these people; understand their empty words for the lies they are!

Workers, peasants, students, soldiers, police, and merchants! So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there will be no hope of disarming the provincial armies and abolishing the *dujun* system. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there will be no hope of reducing the demands for funds to cover military expenses, and this will disrupt further the entire national and local financial system. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, they will be able to secure new loans from the foreigners, bringing about an increase in foreign influence in China. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, the exorbitant levies and taxes will continue, the disorder and chaos will continue, and there will be no hope of restoring order in the regions. So long as the warlords are not overthrown, industry cannot develop, and how can education be maintained and promoted? So long as the warlords are not overthrown, there is no hope that their struggles to expand their spheres of influence will cease. Peasants, workers, and merchants are always the victims of these conflicts. Innocent soldiers and police fall before their bullets. Their war is without end. We must stop this endless sacrifice.

Only by joining the democratic struggle can warlordism be smashed and a genuine peace and prosperity be attained. There is no other way; certainly one cannot adopt the methods of compromise to attain a false peace. Some petty bourgeois figures and politicians use their tendency toward compromise to attain a false peace to oppose the democratic struggle, but we must not listen to them. Naturally, we all want peace, but real rather than false peace. We welcome a war to achieve democracy, to destroy the warlords and to liberate the people. We would sing the praises of this kind of war.

Ten

The CCP is the vanguard army of the proletariat, struggling for the proletariat and acting as its revolutionary party. Until the Chinese proletariat is able to seize power in its own hands, and considering the present political and economic conditions of China's development and all the historical processes now occurring in China, the proletariat's urgent task is to unite with the democratic parties to oppose the feudal warlords and in so doing create a democratic government.

The concrete aims of the present political struggle cannot be limited to a fight for the publication of data on public finances or for surveillance over elections, etc. Our immediate aims are as follows:

- 1) Reform of the tariff system; abolition of extraterritoriality and the special privileges of the great powers in China, estimation of railway subsidies made to

China by foreign capital, and immediate transfer of all railways to state management.

2) Elimination of the warlords, confiscation of the property of warlords and bureaucrats, and distribution of their landholdings to the poorest peasants.

3) Adoption of the system of universal suffrage.

4) Guarantee of the people's freedom of association, assembly, speech, and publication; annulment of the police regulations concerning safeguarding public order and the criminal law on the suppression of strikes.

5) Legislation to protect child and female labor and laws governing safety in factories and workers' insurance.

6) Law to restrict taxation on land.

7) Implementation of compulsory education.

8) Abolition of the *lijin* system⁶⁹ and of other surtaxes.

9) Revision of the legal code with the abolition of the death penalty and of physical torture.

10) Introduction of a progressive tax system.

11) Establishment of a system of equal rights of men and women before the law.

Under the rule of the feudal warlords, none of this minimum program can be carried out by the methods of compromise or by petition. The CCP's method is to invite the GMD, other democratic parties, and all revolutionary socialist groupings to participate in a joint conference and, on the basis of the above principles, establish a democratic united front to continue the fight against the warlords. Since this united fight is one to liberate the Chinese people from the double oppression of the great powers and the warlords, it is an inevitable war that is necessary for China at the present time.

A.11 Resolution on the "Democratic United Front" (July 1922)⁷⁰

The economic and political evolution of humankind constitutes, of course, class struggle. Because of major economic and political changes, it is inevitable that the bourgeoisie will fight against feudalism during the transition from feudalism to democracy. During the period of transition from democracy to communism, because of major economic and political changes, the proletariat must fight against the bourgeoisie.

The current history of humankind is a record of struggle. The great war waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie has not yet been victorious, while that between democracy and feudalism is still raging. Especially in the Eastern nations with their young industry, the power of feudalism persists in social traditions as well as in national sovereignty. In those nations where feudalism is powerful, the lives

and property of the people are firmly grasped in military hands; law and public opinion do not have any effect. Democratic elements must overthrow feudalism to secure the people's welfare. If the proletariat alone cannot bring about the revolution against feudalism, it must be helped by the democratic elements. Because the feudal militarists are the common enemy of the proletarians and democratic elements, the two groups must unite in common attack. Only in this way can they achieve freedom of the press, meeting, and assembly. No class can find the opportunity for development if it cannot secure these liberties. After the democrats achieve success, naturally, desiring privileges, they too will oppress the proletariat by using the political power seized from the feudal rulers. At that time, the power of the proletariat will depend on its ability to organize and fight as manifested in the period of the democratic struggle.

China is a republic in name, but in fact it is controlled by feudal warlords. Externally, it is a semi-independent nation controlled by international imperialistic powers. Under such economic and political conditions, with the twin internal and external pressures, it is imperative that the proletariat gain freedom and join the democratic revolutionary movement. There is no other way. We must realize that joining the democratic revolutionary movement does not mean that the proletariat surrenders to the democratic elements who represent only the bourgeoisie. Neither will victory by the democratic elements signal the complete liberation of the proletariat. Yet it is a fact that there must be a temporary alliance with the democratic elements to overthrow the exploitation by our common enemies—the feudal warlords internally and the international imperialists externally. Since the democratic elements do not constitute a political party that represents the proletariat or struggles on its behalf, under no circumstances should it [the proletariat] become dependent on them or merge with them even though it should unite with and assist these elements. It must assemble in the political party of the proletariat—under the CP's banner—and independently construct its own class movement.

The CP is not a party of utopians or revolutionary candidates but is a party that at all times stands for indefatigable work, striving hard for the benefit of the proletariat. In China's economic and political conditions, we recognize that a democratic revolution will benefit not only the bourgeoisie but also the proletariat. Thus, our CP should unite with all the nation's revolutionary parties⁷¹ and organize a democratic united front to bring about the overthrow of the feudal militarists and imperialist oppression and establish a real democratic, independent nation. We must call on all workers and peasants to join the struggle under our party's banner. We should tell them that this struggle, although it will not completely release the workers and peasants from their miseries, is the first step in helping them on the way to establishing their rights. At the same time, we should tell them again that the proletariat does not join this kind of struggle for the benefit of the democratic elements. The sacrifice is not for them but to gain a freedom that remains temporary. The proletariat must not forget its own independent organization during the struggle.

The Second Congress of the CCP approves the democratic united front as pro-

posed by the CEC because it meets the needs of the present conditions. From now on it should be expanded; regulations should implement the following plan:

A) The GMD and the SYL are asked to call a representative conference in a suitable place to discuss the best method of summoning other revolutionary parties and what should be done.

B) Members of parliament who support communism are to contact members who are truly democratic to form a democratic left-wing alliance.

C) Labor unions; peasant, merchant, teacher, and student associations; women's political alliances; lawyers' clubs; and editors' clubs in various cities are to organize a "democratic great alliance."

A.12 Manifesto of the Second Party Congress (July 1922)⁷²

[[Section One: International imperialism has wreaked havoc in China.]]

Two: China's Political and Economic Situation and the Oppression of the Toiling Masses

[[A new feature in China's political situation is that since the convocation of the Washington Conference, the imperialist powers have been conniving together in their division of China. British and American support for Wu Peifu in his conflict with Zhang Zuolin is evident. Further, it is clear that the imperialists want to destroy China's old economic system and replace it with capitalism.]]

China's infant bourgeoisie already can unite the nation's strength to oppose the foreign imperialists and the traitorous Beijing government. This was seen in the 1919 anti-Japanese movement [May Fourth Movement]. The Guangdong government organized by the GMD represents the enlightened bourgeois democratic movement. Although the Guangdong government has been turned over, the petty bourgeois democratic movement in China cannot be destroyed. In addition, there is China's intellectual class and the merchant and industrial bourgeoisie who want to avoid the deceit of the Americans. If they do this, their democratic movement can advance along the right track.

The 300 million peasants in China are the most important factor in the revolutionary movement. Because of the scarcity of land, density of population, rampant natural disasters, wars, and harassment by bandits, the extra levies imposed and exploitation by warlords, oppression by foreign commodities and rising living costs, the peasants have become increasingly poor and miserable. At present, three kinds of peasants can be distinguished: (1) wealthy rural landlords, (2) independent small peasant self-cultivators, and (3) tenant peasants and hired hands. The first kind is the minority; poor peasants of the second and the third kinds account for at least 95 percent [of the total rural population]. The poor peasants must rise in revolt if they

want to rid themselves of poverty and their miserable plight. Then, most of the poor peasants will be able to join forces with the workers in the revolution, thus guaranteeing the success of the Chinese revolution.

Since foreign goods flooded the Chinese market, the artisans, small shopkeepers, and employers have also become increasingly poor, even bankrupt. In addition, the development of capitalism in China has also speeded up the rate of proletarianization of the artisans. This enormous mass will, of course, bitterly hate the system of world capitalism that has brought them such miseries. They will then join the ranks of the revolutionaries.

The Chinese labor movement has already evolved out of this infancy period. The strikes that were staged for meeting economic demands by the sailors in Hong Kong and other workers are sufficient proof of the enormous strength of the workers and the rapid expansion of workers' organizations recently. Moreover, the workers suffer extreme oppression from Chinese and foreign capitalists; their revolutionary movement will advance continuously. The development of this revolutionary movement will produce the leading army of revolutionaries who will overthrow world capitalism in China.

Three

Many things show that those who have imposed the greatest miseries on the Chinese people (including the bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants) are the capitalist imperialists and the feudal forces of the warlords and bureaucrats. Thus, the democratic revolutionary movement to oppose these two forces is of great significance, because when the democratic revolution succeeds, we can gain independence and greater freedom. Therefore, we the proletariat must examine the political and economic situation of China today. We the proletariat and the poor peasants must support the democratic revolutionary movement. Moreover, we the proletariat believe that in the course of the current struggles, only the joint efforts of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat and the democratic revolutionary forces will enable the real democratic revolution to achieve extraordinary success.

3. The Tasks of the CCP and Its Current Struggle

1. The proletariat's offer to help the democratic revolution does not mean that the proletariat will conquer the bourgeoisie. Rather, this is a necessary step to shorten the life of the feudal system and to nurture the proletariat's real strength.

We the proletariat have our own class interests. When the democratic revolution succeeds, the proletariat will simply gain some liberties and rights, but will not achieve complete liberation. Moreover, the success of the democratic movement will only help the rapid development of the nascent bourgeoisie, who will come into opposition to the proletariat. Therefore, the proletariat must deal with the bourgeoisie immediately, establishing "a proletarian dictatorship in alliance with the poor

peasants.” If the organizational and fighting strength of the proletariat increases, this second struggle will succeed immediately after the victory of the democratic revolution.

2. The CCP is China’s proletarian political party. Its goal is to organize the proletariat, use the means of class struggle, establish the politics of the workers and peasants’ dictatorship, eradicate the system of private property, and advance gradually to a communist society.

In order to advance the current interests of the workers and peasants, the CCP is guiding the workers to help the democratic revolutionary movement, so that the workers and peasants can establish a democratic united front with the petty bourgeoisie. In the interests of the workers and poor peasants, the goals of struggle for the CCP in this united front are:

- 1) Eradicate internal chaos, overthrow the warlords, and build domestic peace.
- 2) Overthrow oppression by the international imperialists and win the complete independence of the Chinese nation.
- 3) Unify China proper (including the three provinces in the northeast)⁷³ and establish a real democratic republic.
- 4) Establish autonomous rule in Mongolia, Tibet, and Muslim Xinjiang to turn them into democratic autonomous republics.
- 5) Use the free federal system to unify China proper, Mongolia, Tibet, and Muslim Xinjiang in order to establish a Chinese Federal Republic.
- 6) Workers and peasants, irrespective of sex, should have unlimited voting rights in parliaments at all levels and city councils. They should have absolute freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, and strike.
- 7) Establishment of laws concerning workers, peasants, and women.
 - i) Improve workers’ benefits: (a) abolish the contract system, (b) adopt the eight-hour working day, (c) provide factory insurance, (d) protect women and child labor, (e) protect unemployed workers.
 - ii) Abolish the individual capitation tax, the river transportation tax, and other major taxes; regulate property tax provisions throughout the country—in both cities and villages.
 - iii) Abolish cash commissions and all other extra taxes; establish progressive income taxes.
 - iv) Make laws to limit the land lease rates.
 - v) Abolish all laws that restrict women. Women should enjoy equally all political, economic, social, and education rights.
 - vi) Improve the educational system and popularize education.

The seven proposals above will benefit the interests of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie and are the necessary conditions for liberating them from the current oppression. We must join in the common struggle to liberate ourselves! Workers and peasants must rally to the CCP’s flag and unite with the petty bourgeoisie in joining this struggle!

However, the workers should not become the appendage of the petty bourgeoisie

in this democratic united front; they must simultaneously fight for the interests of their own class. Therefore, it is very important to have organizations of workers both in the party and in the labor unions, so that the workers are frequently reminded that they constitute an independent class and that they may train their organizational and fighting capacities, prepare to unite the poor peasants to form soviets, and attain the goal of complete emancipation.

The CCP is a branch of the Comintern. Now it cries aloud to the Chinese workers and poor peasants: Rally to the flag of the CP and join our struggle quickly! It also cries aloud to all the oppressed people in China: Come and join the workers and peasants who have rallied to the flag of the CCP and take part in their struggle! It also cries aloud: Come and join our revolutionary friends in the world and advance shoulder to shoulder! "The union of the proletariat and the oppressed people all over the world" is the only means to liberate the whole world! March! March together!

Down with warlords!

Down with international imperialists!

Fight for peace!

Fight for freedom!

Fight for independence!

Long live peace, freedom, and independence!

Long live the liberation of all the oppressed masses!

Long live the CCP!

Long live the Comintern!

A.13 Resolution on Parliamentary Actions (July 1922)⁷⁴

1) In economically advanced nations, the smooth development of large-scale capitalist production over several decades has led to the consolidation of parliamentary politics, which provides a screen for the former. Against this background, parliamentary activities by political parties gradually became opportunist and reformist. That is to say, they became the parliamentary action of the Second International. The social democratic parties and the socialist parties of Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium simply focused all their energy on these legal, tongue-wagging, reformist activities and totally ignored proletarian revolutionary propaganda movements and all other necessary illegal work.

2) The Third International came into being in the midst of the bloody bankruptcy of opportunist reformism. That is to say, it came into being during the imperialist world war [1914-18]. The reevaluation of proletarian participation in "institutions of popular will" under bourgeois dictatorship is important in a number

of respects. It wipes the reformist makeup off the face of Marxism and elucidates the revolutionary nature of proletarian parliamentary action. It specifies the steps to be taken by the proletariat in its participation, abandonment, and withdrawal from the bourgeois parliament and in its total destruction of the bourgeois institution of the state. Finally it subjugates totally such legal action to illegal revolutionary action, thereby making revolutionary parliamentary activities an important method of instigating, or supporting, major revolutionary uprisings.

3) An economically backward China has become, on the one hand, a looting ground and a colony for imperialism and, on the other hand, an object of butchery and a land of corruption for armed forces fostered by international imperialism. Therefore, the democratic revolution has not yet succeeded and parliamentary politics has not yet been established. Although parliamentary forms have been established at various levels, they are constantly terrorized because of sabotage and threats of interference and havoc wreaked by the armed forces.

4) The CCP is the vanguard army representing the interests of the proletariat and the poor peasants of China. Therefore, it should enter the parliament that is often threatened and sabotaged by feudal armed forces. It should raise its voice against the recurrent evils of the military politics fostered by international imperialism and bring the democratic revolution to a high tide so as to achieve the goal of social revolution.

5) To conduct revolutionary parliamentary action, and in accordance with the principles passed by the Second Congress of the Third International, the CCP lays down the following rules:

a) Candidates for the national parliament will be named by the CEC; candidates for parliaments of provinces, municipalities, and counties will be named by regional and local executive committees and approved by the CEC. If the CEC considers all, or some, of those nominated to be unfit for their duties, it will order the regional or local executive committee to nominate others.

b) Qualifications of candidates will definitely not be limited to so-called learning or experience. One should feel free to nominate laborers in our party who are the bravest and the most imbued with revolutionary spirit.

c) Members of our party in the national parliament are under the absolute supervision and command of the CEC. Members in provincial, municipal, and county-level parliaments are under the absolute supervision and command of the CEC commissioner and of the regional and local executive committees. All major political issues will follow the guidelines issued by the CEC; members of our party in parliament, either as individuals or as a group (the parliamentary group of the CP), enjoy absolutely no autonomy. Drafts of speeches to be made by members to the national parliament shall be submitted in advance to the CEC for approval. Drafts of speeches to be made by members to provincial, municipal, and county-level parliaments shall be submitted in advance to the CEC commissioner and to the regional and local executive committees for approval.

d) Members of our party in parliament should take advantage of their inviolabil-

ity to participate in all mass movements and illegal organizations outside of parliament. Whenever demonstrations break out, members of our party in parliament should take the lead and should be at the forefront of the masses.

e) Members of our party in parliament must maintain constant, direct contact with the masses; make several visits a year to the district that elected them; call various voters' meetings; speak on political, economic, and international issues; and investigate new demands of the masses. Their speeches in parliament should be written in a language that can be understood by the masses and that arouses them. Regularly, they should be collected, printed in pamphlet form, and distributed in cities and the countryside.

f) When a member of our party refuses the supervision of the CEC or violates the CEC's guidelines, he or she shall be deprived immediately of his or her position as a member of parliament and expelled from the party.

A.14 Resolution on the Constitution of the Organization of the CP (July 1922)⁷⁵

We, the CP, are not a "Marxist society formed by intellectuals"; nor are we a "utopian, revolutionary society formed by a few Communists who place themselves above the masses," [but we] should be the "party organized by the most revolutionary masses among the proletariat, fighting on behalf of the interests of the proletariat and the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat." Because we are not intellectuals going around on the lecture circuit or utopian revolutionaries, we need not frequent research societies and libraries. Because we are the party fighting for the proletariat, we must go deep among the masses, forming a large-scale " 'mass' party." Because we are to organize a large-scale masses' party for the revolutionary movement, we must not forget two important rules:

- 1) Every action of the party must take deep root among the broad masses.
- 2) Within the party, there must be organization and training that serve the needs of the revolution.

Without strict, centralized, disciplined organization and training, a revolutionary party only possesses revolutionary ambitions without sufficient strength to launch a revolutionary movement.

Strict, centralized, and disciplined organization and training must observe the following principles:

- 1) From the central organs down to the small groups at the basic levels, there must be a well-organized system to avoid chaos; there must be a spirit of centralization and ironlike discipline to avoid anarchy.
- 2) All members must be trained by the party to conduct themselves in a military-like fashion.

3) All party members should not only be Communists in their words; more importantly, they must show themselves to be Communists by their deeds.

4) All party members must sacrifice their personal emotions, opinions, and interests to preserve party unity.

5) All party members must remember that the day that they do not work for the CP is the day that they undermine communism.

6) At all times and under all circumstances, the words and deeds of all party members must be those of the party. [No one] may use individualistic or local reasons to desert the party. To engage in the communist movement outside the supervision of the party is an individualistic act, not that of the party, and it belongs to anarcho-communism.

7) Every party member must understand that when the CP enforces centralization and training, they are not enforced in terms of the bourgeois concept of law and order; they must be practiced in accordance with the actual needs of the communist revolution.

Therefore the resolution of the Second Party Congress must point out that our CP must be turned into a party, not an academic society; and that it must be made a mass party capable of launching proletarian revolution, not a revolutionary association of a few utopians; and that our organization and training must be strict, centralized, and disciplined; and that our activities must not be separated from the masses.

A.15 Constitution of the CCP (July 1922)⁷⁶

Chapter One: Membership

1) Members of our party are not differentiated on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party's manifesto and constitution and are willing to serve our party loyally can become members of our party.

2) On joining the party, the prospective member must have one party member recommend him or her to the district [local] executive committee [*difang zhixing weiyuanhui*]. After the application is approved by the district executive committee, the district executive committee reports its decision to the area executive committee [*qu zhixing weiyuanhui*]; the area executive committee then reports to the CEC. After examination and approval by the area executive committee and the CEC, the applicant will become a formal party member. However, a worker can become a formal party member only after the district executive committee approves the application and reports to the area executive committee and the CEC.

3) New members recognized directly by the CEC or those who have already joined foreign communist parties recognized by the Comintern can become members of our party.

Chapter Two: Organization

4) In the countryside, in factories, on railways, in mines, barracks, schools, and other institutions and their surroundings, a cell [*zu*] group may be formed as long as there are between three and five members. Each cell elects one head; the cells are under the command of the local branch [*difang zhibu*]; if there are not yet local branches in the places where there are groups, the area executive committee may order the cells in question to come under the command of nearby branches or directly under the area executive committee; in places where there is no area executive committee, the groups are to come under and be supervised directly by the CEC. When in one institution or in two institutions combined, there are more than two cells, the district executive committee appoints various people to act as cadres for the organ[s] in question. Cells are the basic units of the party's organizational system that train party members and within which party members operate. All party members must join these cells.

5) If a locality has more than two party branches, the area executive committee should, with permission from the CEC, send personnel there to convene either a full members' or a delegates' congress. This congress should elect three people to form the district executive committee; it should also elect three alternate committee members—when committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be replaced temporarily by alternate members. In localities without area executive committees, the CEC is to send personnel down to organize the district executive committees, and they will be directly responsible to the Party Center. Once an area executive committee is set up, it is to take over the responsibilities and powers of that particular district executive committee.

6) If an area has more than two district executive committees and when the CEC thinks it is necessary to organize the area executive committee, it will send personnel to the area in question to call a delegates' meeting to elect five people to form the area executive committee as well as three alternate members; if committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be temporarily replaced by alternate members. When the CEC deems it necessary, it will entrust a district executive committee to take over temporarily the responsibilities and powers of the area executive committee. The jurisdiction of the area is determined by the CEC and is subject to constant change.

7) The CEC is to be composed of five members elected by the National Congress; three alternate members are also elected by the Congress; when members leave their posts, they must be replaced temporarily by alternate members.

8) The CEC's term of office is one year; for area and district executive committees it is six months. There is no set limit on the tenure of heads of cells, but they must be subject to reelection. District executive committees may appoint and dismiss cadres in party cells as they see fit.

9) The CEC implements all the resolutions passed by the Congress, deliberates and decides on our party's policies and all the methods of implementation; area and

district executive committees implement the resolutions passed by superior organs and, within their jurisdiction and authority, deliberate and decide on all the methods of execution. Every executive committee is to elect a committee chair to take overall charge of party affairs and decide on all methods of implementation; other committee members assist the committee chair in managing political, labor, youth, and women's movements.

10) The resolutions passed by the National Congress or the CEC and special problems that arise unexpectedly are to be handled by special commissions made up of several party members who are appointed by area and district executive committees; when such special commissions convene meetings, the chair of such meetings must be a member of an area or district executive committee.

Chapter Three: Meetings

11) All cells must meet once a week as convened by the cell head. All branches convene a full meeting of party members or of cell heads once a month. Each district executive committee should convene a meeting of party branches once a month; every six months the district executive committee calls a full meeting of the party members in the district or a meeting of cell heads. In each area, the executive committee is to convene every six months, on a fixed date, a delegates' congress. The National Congress is to be convened by the CEC on a fixed date once a year.

12) When the CEC deems it necessary, it may convene an unscheduled [*linshi*] National Congress; when over half the areas request it, the CEC must also convene an unscheduled congress.

13) The number of delegates to the National Congress or an unscheduled congress is to be determined by the CEC on an *ad hoc* basis.

14) Should a problem arise, a superior executive committee may order a subordinate executive committee to convene various kinds of unscheduled meetings.

15) The CEC must always send personnel to all places to convene various forms of unscheduled meetings. They are to be chaired by the special commissioners sent by the CEC.

16) The meetings of the central and local executive committees may be called by the committee chair at any time.

Chapter Four: Discipline

17) The National Congress is the highest organ of our party; when the National Congress is not in session, the CEC is the highest organ.

18) The resolutions of the National Congress and the CEC must be obeyed unconditionally by every member of our party.

19) Lower-level organs must implement fully the orders of higher organs. Should they refuse to do so, the higher-level organ must dismantle or reorganize them.

20) When over half the party members in a district protest the orders of the executive committee [of the district], they must report to the superior executive committee for judgment; when the district executive committee protests the orders of the area executive committee, it must report to the CEC for arbitration; when there are protests against the CEC, they must be reported to the National Congress or an unscheduled congress for judgment. However, prior to the outcome of the judgment, orders of superior organs must be executed.

21) Area or district executive committees and every cell must implement and propagandize all the policies made by the CEC; they are not allowed to make policies on their own. Whenever a major political problem occurs that concerns the whole country, area or district executive committees are not allowed to issue individual opinions before the CEC makes a statement. When any of the statements made by the area or district executive committees conflict with our party's manifesto, constitution, or the resolutions and policies made by the CEC, the CEC must order the reorganization of these committees.

22) Party members are not allowed to join any political party without special permission from the CEC. Those who have already joined other political parties must formally withdraw from them on being inducted into our party, unless special authorization is given.

23) No party member is allowed to serve as a government official in the bourgeois state without special permission from the CEC.

24) All party meetings are to be decided by the majority; the minority must unconditionally obey the majority.

25) If any party member commits any one of the following [mistakes], the district executive committee must expel him or her from the party:

- a) uses words or commits deeds that violate our party's political programs, constitution, or resolutions passed by the National Congress or all executive committees;
- b) fails to attend two consecutive meetings without any reason;
- c) fails to pay party dues for three months without any reason;
- d) fails to serve the party for four consecutive weeks;
- e) fails to reform at the end of a period of probation;
- f) discloses party secrets.

After the district executive committee expels any party member, it must report the reasons to the CEC and the area executive committee.

Chapter Five: Finances

26) The revenues of our party come from the following sources:

- a) Party dues: party members whose monthly income is below 50 *yuan* pay one *yuan*; those whose monthly income is over 50 *yuan* pay one percent of their income in dues each month; those who have no monthly income or those workers whose monthly income is below 20 *yuan* pay 20 cents a month. Party dues are waived for unemployed workers and imprisoned party members.

b) Inner-party levies.

c) Support sources from outside of the party.

27) All revenues and expenditures of our party are to be disposed of by the CEC.

Chapter Six: Appendix

28) The power to revise this Constitution belongs to the National Congress, and the right to interpret it belongs to the CEC.

31) This Constitution has been adopted by our party's Second National Congress (16–23 July 1922) and is effective from the day it is released by the CEC.

A.16 Resolution Concerning the “Labor Union Movement and the CP” (July 1922)⁷⁷

The Chinese labor movement is still in its infancy and cannot shake off the restraints imposed by the old guilds and artisans' organizations. At the same time, the struggles of the working class are no more than individual movements [to improve] the specific conditions of a certain craft or a particular factory; they are not universal movements. The workers' organizations are neither strong nor secure; there are few organized workers. It is the fundamental task of the CCP to study this situation carefully; to concentrate, expand, and command this movement legitimately.

In line with the current labor situation in China, the experiences of our past activities and the lessons from the labor movement in Europe in the recent past, we should use the following principles as our fundamental policies for the labor movement.

1) The struggle by the working class and poor working people to liberate themselves from robbery and exploitation by the bourgeoisie must be carried out together with the struggle for the interests of the most progressive element and the most capable fighters among the poor working people—the proletariat. Therefore, in its labor movement, the CCP must concentrate its energies on the movement to organize industrial workers, such as railway workers, sailors, and manufacturing and textile workers.

2) Why was the labor union founded? The labor union is an institution that protects and fights for the immediate interests of the workers. As the laborer is the creator of all goods, the laborer should enjoy the goods produced. This truth is the starting point of the real labor union.

3) The labor union should realize that the capitalists and the workers have nothing in common. Their conflict of interest is irreconcilable, so the labor union should not only avoid mediating between the interests of the capitalists and those of the

workers, but intensify such struggles. One struggle should follow another, and between struggles the labor union organization will become stronger and more secure, so as to prepare for yet another struggle. It is necessary to save most of the membership dues of the union as strike funds, but at the same time workers must avoid a fight in a disadvantageous situation.

4) The labor union should do its best to engage in the movement to improve workers' conditions; it should do everything that can lead to reforms under capitalism. At the same time, we must make the labor union advance quickly toward the ultimate goal of the labor movement, which is a movement to overthrow the capitalist system based on waged slaves and thoroughly change society according to communist principles.

5) When the labor union engages in the movement to improve economic conditions for laborers, it must move on to a movement for labor legislation. We should also make the labor union understand: adoption of labor legislation and improving working conditions both depend on a strong organization of the labor union. If we want to make labor legislation and improvement in working conditions truly materialize under capitalism, we need laborers in sufficiently great strength to pressure the government and factory owners.

6) Sometimes our comrades suggest that the labor union not get involved in political movements—this is a tendency of the anarchist labor unions and constitutes a very big mistake. This will weaken the labor union movement and keep it forever in an illegal position. Labor unions must fight for the independence of our nation and the political rights and freedom of our citizens (including the movement for universal suffrage and abolition of the criminal law against strikes). They must also occupy important positions in the democratic united front; only these actions will support the workers through to the final victory. But, at the same time, the meaning of these struggles provides the proletariat with its real revolutionary propaganda. They should not be used for the political objectives of the opportunists. Thus, we should prevent nonproletarian workers from leading labor unions. They must be led by the proletariat.

7) Of course, labor unions may struggle against individual foremen or employers, but the unions must treat and resist the employers as a class; they can also resist the contract system, as well as the system under which foremen oppress workers at will. Labor unions will expand only when all kinds of movements assume universal significance and become real class-based actions.

8) There are two most important tasks the labor union must do everything possible to fulfill: the first concerns collective contracts; the second is equal pay for equal work. Individual contracts are the employers' tool for exploitation. Using this tool, the employers can hire and fire workers at will, thus manipulating the price of labor. The labor union must do its best to fight for the following condition: the employer is not allowed to negotiate and conclude with individual workers any of the provisions concerning hiring and firing and other benefits and obligations. Only the labor union may represent workers in signing contracts with employers. It is also

one of the most clever and cruel means of the capitalists to divide workers into separate categories—based on race, age, and physical strength—and determine their pay according to these categories. The capitalists can use this method not only to rob more greedily those weak and young laborers, but also to split the working class into several groups with different interests, so that they may hate and compete with each other. Under these circumstances, the labor union must try to fight for equal pay for equal work. No matter whether the worker is a foreigner or Chinese, male or female, a strong young man, a boy, or an old man, they must receive the same pay as long as they do the same kind of work. No one is to deny them similar pay on grounds of biological and social differences. At the same time, however, we should not confuse ourselves. So-called equal pay for equal work does not mean to cut higher wages to meet lower wages, but to raise lower wages to the same level as the higher wages. These are the two basic tasks for the labor union. The success of the first will increase the workers' trust in the labor union and attract large numbers of them to join the movement; the success of the latter will prevent and eliminate mutual conflicts among workers so as to realize class unity and harmony.

9) The character of the labor union should not be identical with that of the guild. No employers are allowed into the labor union, but all workers who earn a wage must join the union, regardless of their sex, age, religious belief, region, ethnic origin, nationality, political view, or skill. Thus, labor unions should not have such procedures as membership dues that are too high and exhaustive preinduction investigations to limit the enrollment of workers. Only this will enable the labor union to become a union of the masses of the same class.

10) The main activities of the labor union are the struggles against the capitalists and the government; mutual help and emotional ties are only secondary objectives, because the labor union is a fighting unit, not an institution of group help.

11) The structure of the labor union is such that it will enable the union to become a very tightly united organization very soon, with centralized power and disciplined individual industrial sector unions. The sector unions of industrial workers should not be subdivided internally into "autonomous" groups along the lines of different professions, because they will become fragmented groups that prevent the union from waging struggles.

13) The best basic organization of the labor union is the factory committee. Workers in every factory in each industry organize a factory committee as their basic unit, and then organize a sector union. However, the factory committee is exclusively a workers' organization; it must never be composed of a mixture of factory employers and workers' representatives. At the same time, the factory committee should not be independent of the labor union.

14) But labor unions are only part of the structure of the sector union and do not count as ideal labor unions. The real labor unions should possess class harmony and disciplined training apart from being part of the structure of the sector union and having revolutionary goals. They must unite the whole working class and never allow any incidents of conflict between the special interests of one factory or among

the workers and the interests of the sector union to occur. They should also mediate between the interests of one sector union and those of the working class of the whole country.

15) There should be a unified organization of all the revolutionary labor unions in the world to fight against world capitalism. This unified organization of the world revolutionary labor unions is the Profintern. The CCP must organize labor unions to rally under the flag of the Profintern in accordance with the above principles. At the same time, the Chinese working class must avoid conflict of interest with the working class of the world. For example, increasing Chinese workers' wages will prevent foreign capitalists from hiring cheap Chinese labor to substitute for expensive foreign labor.

16) The difference between the CP and the labor union is that the CP is an organization of the proletarian elements with class consciousness from all classes; it is the vanguard of the proletariat and has a fixed party program; it is a proletarian political party whose aim is the overthrow of capitalism. The labor union is an organization of all workers (regardless of their political views); in the labor union, workers receive education on "how to struggle in the spirit of socialism and communism" and march toward the same objectives as the CP; but it is a moderate organization of all classes. Just as in a war the army has a vanguard, which is followed by the main strength of the army. The CP may be said to constitute the brain and the workers the body. Therefore, in any kind of labor movement, the CP must be the "vanguard" and the "brain." It must pay attention to all the activities of the labor union and should honestly and bravely lead the labor union movement.

17) In order to lead the labor unions and become the vanguard of the proletariat, the CP should have strong and effective groups in the labor unions, all factory committees, and all labor organizations; there should be few exceptions.

18) When they operate in the labor unions organized by the GMD, nongovernment political parties, or Christian organizations, the Communists must not instigate the workers to leave the established labor unions. Our tactic is to build up our own strength gradually in the labor unions in which they have greater strength, and ultimately to overthrow the leadership position of the GMD, nongovernment parties, or Christian organizations, so that we ourselves will seize the leading position.

19) To fight for the present interests of the workers, we Communists should always cooperate with the GMD, nongovernment parties, or even Christian organizations. But we must also always prove and explain to the workers that only the CP is the vanguard of the workers and their political party.

Additional resolutions:

The preceding resolution concerns the labor union movement of important industrial workers. It is the most important part. Below, several secondary resolutions are listed:

1) Workers' consumer cooperatives are organizations that defend the workers' interests; the CP must pay attention to and operate in these kind of organizations.

2) The CP should also penetrate and work inside the relatively progressive

guilds in order to drive employers out of the guilds; we may thus unite with other guilds that are either similar in character or use the raw materials to form a labor union.

3) The CP should also penetrate and work inside those very conservative guilds and the groups, clubs, and schools with which the bourgeoisie have established links to fool the people; we should organize small groups inside them.

A.17 Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China. *H. Maring* (August 1922)⁷⁸

Instructions for the Representative of IKKI [ECCI] in South China

I) Whole the activity⁷⁹ of the representative a.s.o must be based on the resolution of the II Kongress of Komintern in the Colonial Question -⁸⁰

II) The Exec. Committee sees the Guomindang party [GMD] as a revolutionary organization, which maintains the character of the revolution of 1912 and which tries to create an independent chinese republic.⁸¹ Therefore the task of the communist elements in China must be the following: (a) the Education of ideologically independent elements, which should form the nucleus of the Chinese kom.Party [CCP] in the Future; (b) this party will grow in agreement with the growing split between bourgeois—petty bourgeois and proletarian elements. Till that time the Communists are obliged to support the party Guomindang and specially this wing of the party which represents the proletarian elements and the manual workers.

III) For the fullfilling of these tasks the communists must organize communist groups of followers in the Guomindang and also Tradeunions—These groups must form an army which carries on the propaganda for the Ideas of the struggle against foreign imperialism and for the creation of a Chinese People's Republic, for the organization of the class struggle against foreign and chinese exploiters.

IV) For the fight against foreign imperialism a special propagandaorganization should be created. This organization must try to develop its work in whole the country on the base of a program of action not only against the open japanese oppression but also against the hypocritical politics of the british and american imperialism and for the alliance with Soviet-Russia, for the association with the revolutionary elements of Japan.⁸² This organization must be established if possible in agreement with Guomindang, but she should be totally independent of this party because Guomindang responsible for the Southern government, has from time to time to avoid a conflict with imperialist elements.

V) The fullfilling of the most principal task of the communists in China, the organization of the Labor masses, in this moment only possible in the form of the creation of tradeunions meets with obstacles by the existing form of organization of

the anachronistic G[u]ilds, which are based on localism. The greatest difficulty in the struggle against these gilds is the fact, that they not only exist for mutual help but that they are also organizations for the cult of the ancestors or local divinities. In regard to this religious superstition of the masses the struggle against the gilds in these quality must be avoided. and the attention of the workers must be concentrated on the fact that these organizations are not strong enough for the fullfilling of their economical task and that for this reason tradeunions must be established.

VI) The centralization of the unions should be realized in agreement to the industrial centres, in which already tradeunions exist. The solution of the problem if industrial or professional organizations must be organized depends totally on local conditions.

A.18 The Immediate Tactics of the CCP.

Chen Duxiu (November 1922)⁸³

The world economic situation points out to the proletariat of the whole world three lines of tactics in their common struggle against the world bourgeoisie.

1) In Europe and America the bourgeoisie accomplished its task of overthrowing the feudal aristocracy and establishing its own rule a century and a half ago. In these countries the economic conditions of the proletariat have reached a stage when they can and must overthrow the bourgeoisie and take power into their own hands.

2) In Japan the bourgeoisie has reached a stage in development in which they have thrown off the yoke of foreign imperialism and share political power in their own country with the militarists and nobility. Japanese politics are the politics of semi-feudalism and semi-capitalism. The task of the Japanese proletariat is to force the bourgeoisie into conflict with the feudal class. This is the more necessary now that the bourgeoisie has concentrated its forces and is capable of putting up a fight against the feudal class.

3) In the Eastern economically backward countries, like China and India, the proletariat is subjected to the combined domination of foreign imperialism and native feudalism. Not only has the proletariat remained weak, but the bourgeoisie has failed so far to concentrate its forces against the foreign imperialist and the native feudal class. Frequently, the bourgeoisie reveals a desire to protect their interests by shielding themselves behind the feudal lords and imperialists. In such countries the proletariat besides conducting a struggle for its own class interest must adopt tactics to compel the irresolute and cowardly bourgeoisie to organize their economic forces and to take up the fight against the imperialist and feudal class. The proletariat must by its economic power make the bourgeoisie understand the necessity for establishing a united front with the proletariat to overthrow their

common enemy—the native feudal militarists and international imperialists. The victory of the United Front will of course be a victory for the bourgeoisie. But only in the United Front will the young proletariat be able to fight by actual deeds and not by the mere avowal of principles. It can only develop its strength and its own independent class struggle in the complex process of the struggle in the United Front.

The Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern basing themselves on the world economic situation, pointed out to the proletariat of the Eastern Countries two lines of tactics required in the immediate struggle viz.: the Democratic United Front and the Anti-imperialist United Front. In its immediate struggles the Chinese proletariat should adopt these two lines of tactics as two inseparably connected lines of tactics and to apply them to the practical questions of the day in order to eliminate the two obstacles that lie in the path of development of the Chinese nation, viz.: native militarism and international imperialism.

The Political Problems

a) Unification and Self-determination.

The state of affairs prevailing in China today is that the militarists relying for support upon the foreign powers, divide and rule China and quarrel among themselves. This state of affairs is a great hindrance to the concentration of the forces of both the bourgeoisie and the workers. We must oppose the policy of the militarists of “divide and rule,” and support the bourgeoisie movement for the unification of the country. We must hasten the unification of the various democratic bourgeois groups, prevent splits among them and also prevent them from cooperating with the militarists. If, before the consolidation of forces of the national unification movement takes place, a local popular rising breaks out against the local militarists and in favor of self-determination, and if a democratic provincial government is established, which is favorable to labor and does not rely upon the imperialists, we must support it in order to counteract militarist influence and imperialist exploitation.

b) Our attitude towards the Guomintang [GMD] Party.

Although the Guomintang Party suffers from many defects and has committed many errors, nevertheless it is the only revolutionary democratic group in China. It is therefore an important element in the democratic United Front. The proletariat must not only cooperate with this Party in the struggle for democracy and unification, but it must also urge it to adopt the slogans of “Anti-Imperialism,” “Support of Working Class Interests” and “Freedom” in order to widen the scope of the struggle. We must carry on propaganda among the workers within the Guomintang Party, speed up the development of their class-consciousness and make them understand that the Guomintang Party is not the party of the proletariat. If the Guomintang Party allied itself with reactionary and dark forces—for example—Chang Tso Lin [Zhang Zuolin], Tuan Chi Jui [Duan Qirui] and Tsao Kun [Cao Kun]—or compromises with the imperialists, we must ruthlessly oppose it. *In a*

word, in any struggle which we may take up or in any combination we may make with other parties, we must always show our true face to the masses. Furthermore, we must maintain our complete independence in any arrangement we may make in a United Front.

c) The anti-imperialist United Front.

The main forces of the anti-imperialist United Front must be recruited from among the workers, peasants and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary Party or its elements. The fight must be directed against all imperialists. At the same time however we may combine with certain parties in a semi-national movement against a particular group of imperialists (the bourgeois opposition to Japan, for example).

d) The question of parliament.

The present parliament has been in existence for ten years. Neither the 8th year M.P.'s nor the 6th year M.P.'s can claim to represent the will of the people. We must demand the election of a new parliament based on universal suffrage and free from the domination of militarist influence. We must also demand the formation of a new government. Even during the existence of the present government, however, we must commence a movement in favor of labor legislation and the recognition of Soviet Russia.

e) Relations with Soviet Russia.

Soviet Russia is the only power in the world which has abandoned the policy of imperialism. We must urge the Chinese government to commence direct negotiations with her and absolutely to prevent the interference of any third power in the questions of the resumption of commercial intercourse, the Chinese-Eastern railway, the navigation of the river Sungari, the Boxer Indemnity and the Mongolian question.

f) The Mongolian Question.

According to the laws governing the development of the State, nationalities representing various stages of economic development, of varying historical development and of various races and languages can at best form only a Federal Republic and the political system of a centralized republic can hardly be applied. This applies particularly to the political situation at present prevailing in China. We must respect the principle of self-determination. We cannot compel people with a different historical and economic development and of different language and race to share our imperialist exploitation and militarist oppression. On these grounds we must not only recognize the independence of Mongolia in principle but we must render them active support in their effort to destroy the special privileges of the nobility and the lamas, and to lay the economic and cultural foundation for the independence of the Mongolian people.

The Labor Movement

The CP is the Party of the working class. It should therefore be based upon the working class and its activity should be concentrated upon the organization of and

propaganda among the working class. The Chinese Labor movement now reveals a tendency towards national organization and political struggle as well as economic struggle. Apart from supporting the demands of workers for reduction of hours and labor, increases in wages and labor legislation, the CP must strive to direct the above-mentioned tendencies along the following lines in order to increase the fighting power of the workers.

a) Systematic political propaganda.

The object of this is to induce the working class to advance from the passive, reformist and purely economic movement to an active revolutionary political and economic movement.

b) The factory-councils movement.

The trade-union movement in itself is not sufficient, because by it the influence of the workers is organized mainly outside of the particular industrial enterprise. To organize the influence of the workers within the industrial enterprise, they must organize factory councils for the purpose of eliminating the foreman, abolishing the system of indentured labor and other evils.

c) The organization of national miners and railwaymen's unions.

So far only the organizations of the railway workers, seamen and miners are regarded as powerful factors in the working class movement in China. The seamen have a national organization [General Industrial Federation of Chinese Seamen, founded autumn 1920]. It remains for the railwaymen and the miners to organize in a similar manner. This, after the big strikes, should not be difficult.

d) The organization of a Triple Alliance of Railwaymen, Seamen and Miners.

In a country where the Labor Movement is weak, national federations will not exist for long unless there are some powerful unions which can act as its support. Therefore, before such a National Federation of Labor Unions is organized, efforts should be made to combine the railwaymen, seamen and miners into a Triple Alliance.

e) In order to consolidate and strengthen the working class struggle for power, we must advocate the centralisation of the national labor movement and combat the intrigues of anarcho-syndicalists to break up the labor organizations by their demands for independence and autonomy. At the forthcoming Second National Labor Conference to be held May 1st. 1923, we must submit resolutions on the centralisation of the national labor movement and decide upon the common tasks confronting the working class of the whole country. This conference must also set up a central bureau of the National Federation of Labor Unions whose tasks it should be to plan and direct the tactics necessary for the realisation of a national united working class front. This would avoid the danger of the wave of the Western capitalist offensive surging into China.

The Peasant Problems

The working class movement in the economically backward countries of the East cannot achieve its revolutionary tasks unless it is assisted by the poor peasant masses.

Agriculture is the basis of Chinese national economy. The peasants comprise at least 60% of the population. The most poverty-stricken of the peasants are the landless tenant-farmers who comprise more than half of the peasant population, viz. 120 millions. This class of landless tenant-farmers are oppressed by the upper strata of society and are naturally a friendly army of the working class which the CCP cannot afford to ignore. If it remains isolated from the peasantry, the CCP can never become a great mass party.

The burdens from which the Chinese peasants suffer are the following:

1) Owing to the importation of manufactured goods the cost of living increases more rapidly than the increase of prices of agricultural produce. The formerly self-sufficient peasants are compelled now to sell their land and are reduced to the position of tenants. The former tenant-farmers in their turn are reduced to the position of agricultural laborers, or become bandits or mercenary soldiers, or else go into the cities to work in the factories. The consequences of this are: a) The poor peasants are hostile to the invasion of foreign powers and b) the number of bandits increases and forms an inexhaustible reservoir from which the militarists draw their forces and perpetuate the state of disturbance in the country.

2) Owing to the corruption of the administrative officials, floods and drought cause untold suffering to the peasants.

3) The famine and the civil war cause a constant migration of the peasantry from one place to another. This causes the supply of tenant-farmers and agricultural laborers in various localities to exceed the demand and the resulting competition tends to intensify the exploitation of the tenant-farmers and laborers on the part of the landlords and employers.

4) As a result of the above-mentioned causes the peasants are compelled to borrow money for their sustenance. This leads to the prevalence of usury in the country which mostly affects the tenant-farmers.

To remove the sufferings the following measures are indispensable:

a) Limitations of size of holdings. The amount of land owned by a single person must be limited to a certain number of mows [*mu*, equivalent to $\frac{1}{6}$ of an acre]. All land exceeding the amount fixed i.e. the land of the big and middle landowners, must be divided among the local tenants.

b) Organization of peasant cooperatives. The custom has long prevailed in the villages for the peasants to collect money to make collective purchases in the cities. This custom must be extended to form cooperatives.

c) The organization of peasant banks. In Chinese villages there are usually clan and religious institutions which collect funds for the purpose of famine relief. These funds and the investments of the rich peasants should be utilized to form peasant banks for the issue of loans to the peasants at a minimum of interest.

d) The limitation of rent. Farmers' councils should be formed in all villages which shall fix the rent for the district for the ensuing year in accordance with the harvest.

e) State supply of land to the peasants. The State, out of funds raised through

land taxation, should set aside a sum to be devoted to enabling the surplus rural population to cultivate the hitherto untilled State lands.

f) Irrigation of the important river basins. The State shall grant a sum from the national or local revenues for the purpose of dredging rivers, the most important of which are the Yellow River [Huanghe] and the Hwai River [Huaihe]. This irrigation work will not only benefit the peasants but also improve the transport facilities for industry and commerce.

A.19 Comrade Chen Duxiu's Report to the Third Party Congress on Behalf of the CCP CEC (June 1923)⁸⁴

On behalf of the CEC, I am delivering the work report on the period since the Second Congress. CEC members are too few and cannot collect many materials. Also, because of persecution, many materials have been lost, and perhaps therefore the view is incomplete.

The CEC had only five members, so after the Party Congress the Hangzhou Plenum proposed enlarging the CEC by adding two members. However, Shanghai and Beijing opposed this proposal.⁸⁵ When persecution increased in Shanghai, the Beijing political situation was such that we could still go there for work, and thus the CEC moved to Beijing [end of November 1922]. The organization began to improve. Yet there was still not time to set about implementing our plans before the rampant reactionary clique, after the strike on the Beijing-Hankou railway, forced us to leave Beijing and return to Shanghai.⁸⁶ The plan to improve the organization could not be realized. Because persecution in Shanghai was extremely severe and because we wanted to prepare the Party Congress, the CEC moved to Canton [late April 1923]. Because the political situation was also not stable, we still cannot improve central organization.

The Shanghai and Canton small groups are formed from the local groups of these two cities. Many local small groups in Beijing, Hankou, and Changsha (Hunan) have already linked up to form regional small groups. The Zhengzhou small group collapsed during the Beijing-Hankou railway strike.

Party finances—practically all is received from the Comintern; party membership dues amount to very little. This year expenses received from the Comintern are 15,000 [yuan]. Of this 1,600 has been used for the Congress. These expenses are divided between each small group, but at the same time they are used for CEC work, liaison, and publishing the weekly.⁸⁷ We can only offer a detailed report for the last few months because the remaining materials fell into the hands of the French Concession police in Shanghai, and, moreover, owing to the arrest of one comrade, all usable material was lost.

At present the party has 420 members of whom 44 are abroad, 164 are workers,

37 are women, and a further 10 comrades are still in prison.

Last year we only had 200 party members; this year approximately 200 have joined, of whom 130 are workers.

After the Hangzhou Plenum, with interruptions, we published a paper; this kind of interruption was brought about by the strike. The paper has appeared a total of twenty-eight times, with each edition having an average printing of five to six thousand. But our daily paper encountered criticism in the early period and only now have we reached accord.⁸⁸ Beijing, Hubei, Canton, Shanghai, etc., published weeklies.

With respect to the incident of the Beijing-Hankou railway strike, we published a pamphlet and published declarations about many different situations. Formerly the journal *New Youth* [Xin qingnian] was published every month but now it has been changed into a quarterly. The monthly *Vanguard*⁸⁹ is published carrying articles of a general nature on China's political and economic conditions and on problems of the international political situation.

At the Second Congress we approved the "Resolution Concerning the Question of Cooperation Between Communist Parties and Democratic Revolutionary Elements" passed by the Congress of the Toilers of the East [held in Moscow in January 1922]. The development of events makes it clear that a united front has defects. After the Second Party Congress when we received the directive of the Comintern on joining the GMD,⁹⁰ we could not very quickly reconvene a Party Congress to discuss this question. Therefore, the CEC and the ECCI representative [Maring] discussed this question together.

Originally, the vast majority were all opposed to joining the GMD, but the ECCI representative persuaded the participants and we decided to advise all party members to join the GMD. From this time, our political position underwent a major change. Formerly, our party's policy was idealistic and contrived, but afterward we began to pay even more attention to the actual situation of Chinese society and participated in the current movement.

As decided by the Second Congress with respect to the "Movement to Strive for People's Rights," "Alliances to Strive for People's Rights" have been set up in Beijing, Canton, Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangxi, etc. In Beijing the majority of people joining this new organization are students; in Shandong and Canton the majority are workers.

Throughout we have opposed the warlords. When organizing the personnel of the Beijing-Hankou railway, we only wanted to struggle against the "Communications Clique" [*jiaotong xi*], which is why at that time we did not oppose Wu Peifu. But from the time of the strike, we did vigorously oppose Wu Peifu. However, it was not necessary for the CEC to have had relations with Wu Peifu.

We worked with the slogan "Down With Imperialism and Warlords." The slogan of "Down With the Warlords" already had an influence on the vast majority of Chinese society, but the slogan "Down With Imperialism" still has not had a very great influence. Party members should take more notice of the slogan "Down With Imperialism."

Now I would like to discuss union and propaganda work. With respect to Shanghai, its industry is the most developed, the most advanced, but workers' organizations are very backward. It needs a great effort to develop the movement. Many workers' organizations are empty, bearing just a name. We have connections with a small metallurgy workers' group. The GMD has connections with the sailors and tobacco workers. We must pay more attention to Shanghai.

Among the railway workers in the north, we had the best organization on the Beijing-Hankou line, but it collapsed at the time of the strike. The organization on the Beijing-Tianjin-Pukou line is only an empty shell; in reality it does not even exist. The organization on the Beijing-Fengtian line is secret. On the Tianjin-Pukou line, the workers are divided into many local associations. Until now, it has been very difficult to unite workers from different departments on the Beijing-Fengtian line.

The federations of Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong have relations with us. The unions of the Hubei iron-smelting, tobacco, and textile industrial departments as well as the rickshaw organization all have connections with us. The Han-Shen labor union has good prospects and is China's largest labor union and can become a model. The strength of the Pingxiang miners' union was lost at the time of the February strike, but the organization was still preserved.

Almost all of the over 30,000 people of the Hunan union are under our control. The Pingxiang miners have also joined this federation. The Canton-Hankou railway organization also participated in this federation. The other organizations were set up by handicraft workers. The majority of labor organizations in Guangdong are handicraft industry workers' federations. The construction workers' organization is also under our control.

We only have thirteen female party members (should be thirty-seven).⁹¹ The women's movement in China is still not very developed. We have a bit of influence with the Canton and Hubei "Women's Rights Federation." This kind of federation has also been set up in Beijing and Shanghai.

Now I would like to raise some critical ideas about the work of the last year. First, we neglected educational work for party members; many difficulties encountered can be attributed to this. Many intellectuals cherishing a revolutionary spirit entered the party but do not understand our principles. Workers exhibit a tendency of being divorced from intellectuals, frequently lacking the desire for knowledge.

Propaganda work has been conducted with insufficient urgency. We pay very little attention to the peasant and youth movements, and we have not conducted work among the soldiers. We must carry out work among women; the number of female party members is far too small. With respect to propaganda work with the labor unions, we have not advocated any slogans. At present, for the workers we can only advocate the slogan of setting up a China General Labor Federation. Moreover, we cannot advocate the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, we must propagate support in their midst for the democratic revolution.

In our party there exist serious tendencies of individualism. Party members frequently do not have complete faith in the party. Even if the party has a few faults, still it is not necessary to leave the party. We must correct our mistakes. In addition, relations between comrades in the party are not very close; they are very suspicious of each other.

Now I would like to discuss the mistakes of the CEC. In reality, internally the CEC is not organized; the five committee members often do not agree, and in this way work encounters losses.

The knowledge of the CEC is also insufficient; this was the cause of the defeat of the strike. Our political position is unclear. Everyone acknowledges that China needs to carry out a democratic revolution, but our views differ on how we should serve the democratic revolution. Some comrades still oppose joining the GMD. One reason is that our political viewpoint is not sufficiently clear.

Often we changed the location of the central authorities, and this brought about very great losses for work.

Now I would like to raise some critical ideas about individual CEC members. Chen Duxiu, because his view of the current political situation was unclear, made many mistakes. In addition, he is very easily stirred up.

Comrade Zhang Guotao is undoubtedly faithful to the party, but his thought is extremely narrow and thus he commits a great many mistakes. He organized a small group within the party organization, and this was a great mistake.

Comrade Deng [probably Deng Pei] during the Tangshan and Shuikou miners' strike made a very serious mistake and, moreover, in Canton created a great many difficulties. With respect to the regions, we can say that the Shanghai comrades have done too little party work. Beijing comrades, because they do not understand party organization, created a great many problems. Hubei comrades did not promptly guard against conflicts, and the workers' strength could not be increased. Only the Hunan comrades have done a very good job.

Canton comrades created a serious problem in handling Chen Jiongming, a mistake that has only just now been corrected.⁹²

A.20 Discussion on the Relation Between the CPC and Kuomintang [GMD]. *H. Maring* (June 1923)⁹³

I) Wanting to understand the mind of the Chinese comrades I put the question to Tschue Tsze Bo [Qu Qiubai]: please tell me in which way I must develop the viewpoint of the theses of Comintern and my interpretation of these theses in the conference? Must I give an analysis of the Chinese conditions and make a comparison with other oriental countries? "His answer was: Not in this way, it is necessary to be very concrete, to see the small facts which are dominating the mind of these

comrades who are inclined to make the relation with the GMD as loose as possible.”

I cannot follow totally this advice though I will not start with a deep theoretical analysis and though I will give as much attention as possible to the smaller arguments.

II) First of all I must oppose strongly the idea that for example comr. Chen [Duxiu] or I should want to dissolve our party. This is not said in the conference but such ideas are nevertheless developed. I am here as representative of IKKI [ECCI]. I understand something of the discipline towards IKKI. Not for a single moment I was inclined to finish with the CCP. For which reason I work here in China? I think that it is only foolish to believe in my intention to cut out the life of the party.

On the other side worshipping GMD—absolutely false.

III) Second I must warn seriously against the division of the comrades in left and right. This has been done at the end of Chang Ko Tao's [Zhang Guotao] speech and though it is very easy to state this comrade is left and that one is right I have to state the fact that in the young organization very few comrades can explain why they regard the one left the other right.

IV) Something is wrong in the proceedings of whole this discussion after the speech of Tschen Tu Siu [Chen Duxiu]. The these of IKKI have to be the base of the discussion. IKKI is the general staff of the international movement. IKKI gives its instructions as orders which have to be followed by the party. The discussions of Chang Ko Tao and Tsai [Cai Hesen] prove that they try to find possibilities of partywork forgetting these instructions too much.

The interpretation of Chang Ko Tao where he states that IKKI ordered those who are in GMD to stay there is absolutely *wrong*. When we remember that in August of last year already IKKI gave the order to the members of the party—not only for the south—to enter GMD—the order of January this year which says “it will be expedient for the members of the CP of China to remain in the GMD” confirms the order of August.⁹⁴ IKKI means that its orders are followed in China by the members of the party. IKKI cannot count with possibilities of this kind that members of the old Central Committee, who decided to accept the order of August last year are doing their utmost to make general orders of IKKI useless for the members of the party in general, like IKKI cannot count with opinions of such comrades who in the same time that they help in the establishment of a new GMD organization in Beijing propose that in the North where GMD has no branches our members should not try to develop branches. IKKI supposes that even in the CP of China there is something like discipline and cannot make its resolutions for China in such a way that some or other ingenious inventor manufactures arguments to make passive resistance and sabotage on the decisions of IKKI possible.

V) In the speeches of Tsai and Chang Ko T. carefully is left out to speak about the second part of the IKKI Theses where it is said that the central task in China is the nationalist revolution, that therefore the activities of the GMD and the young CP must be coordinated. Whereas IKKI states “that the working class is not yet differ-

entiated as a completely independent social force" Ho Sen proposes to establish an independent labour party. I prefer the marxian conclusion of IKKI to the illusionism of Ho Sen.

VI) The task of this conference is only to outline its tactics for the next party year on the base of the IKKI theses. The questions on which we should try to find answers are not: must we enter GMD or not? Must our members fulfill the central task of the CP by joining this GMD or must we concentrate us to establish an independent labourparty for a labourclass which is not differentiated as a completely independent force? No the matter of entering GMD is settled in two decisions of IKKI and I should advice the conference to follow the order which was given like Chang KT said after much discussion in IKKI and with the most important leaders of the international movement.

VII) Before us are very concrete and practical questions: how must we work in GMD. Which kind of help can we give them? By which means we must make sure the acceptance of the same practice by the comrades? How must we divide our few forces over the labourunionwork and the political work? How must we make sure that also the educational work of the leaders of our party is not neglected?

VIII) Before I will give my ideas about this practical questions I must make some other remarks to the speeches of CH. K. T. and Ho Sen. I depend on the translation which I get so I must state beforehand that mistakes in my answer are possible.

Ho Sen who defends the idea of a Labourparty tries to prove that the big bourgeoisie of China has no value for the nationalist revolution. Ho Sen sees yesterday and even today but he does not see tomorrow. His method of thinking is static not dynamic. Though the Chinese bourgeoisie partly finds its origin in the feudal elements, officials and militarists, though they have often close connections with the foreign capitalists in the process of growing this Chinese bourgeoisie gets its own national interests antagonistic towards the foreign capitalists. In the internal politics the demands of the Chambers of Commerce are pure revolutionary demands, they want to finish with the feudal power which is not broken in the first revolution. Abolishment Tuchunate [the system of military governors] and the want for the constitution are proves. They have not developed systematic fight for these demands, they try to arrive to realisation by compromises. But nevertheless their demands are revolutionary, and when it is true what Marx stated long ago: "democracy, the republic is the most favorable form of government for the proletariat to gather the revolutionary forces of the labourmovement," we cannot state that the bourgeoisie of China is valueless for the national revolution. Characteristic for the wrong way of thinking of comr. Ho Sen, who cannot analyse the conditions dialectically, is that he comes with the proposal of the independent workersparty (because only proletariat revolutionary) in China whereas he should know that the development of labour as a political force depends on the development of the bourgeoisie.

IX) Wonderful is the explanation of Chang KT that we can make now only an antijapanese movement but not anglosaxon. It is not difficult for us to understand

that the nationalist movement demonstrates itself mostly as an antijapanese movement. Chinese Bourgeoisie is competing much more with the products of Japanese than other industry. The methods of Japanese imperialism are more open and more hurting nationalist feeling. But that the nationalist movement in China can only be antijapanese till the anglosaxons are defeated is new for me. When Chinese industry enters the field of production where they find Anglosaxons as their antagonists they will take stand against them as they take stand against Japan. We have to state the fact that the demand to increase the customtariff goes against all foreign capitalists and that the French demand to pay the boxers indemnity in goldfrances, the treatment of the houseboy in Schanghai by british police awake the same kind of antiimperialistfeelings against Britain and France as exists against the Japanese.

The fact that the nationalist propaganda has been poor and onesided, that the nationalist propaganda forgets too much the crimes of anglosaxon imperialism does not mean that with a good propaganda a clear understanding of imperialism cannot be spreaded and cannot result in a general antiimperialistic movement.

X) Both of them Hosen and Chang K T will base the tactic of our party on illusions and dreams.

The Great importance of Lenin is his close touch with the reality in Russia, his commonsense in application of his revolutionary tactics. Radek about this point Lenin and the opposition in the Brestlitovs[k]negotiations.

Marx about the task of the revolutionists.

XI) The exageration of our results in labourwork is ridiculous. How is it with the workers with whom we came in touch?

I am sorry to say that I came not much in touch with them. I have only investigated our methods of work and the ideas of comrades who have much touch. I state the fact that these informations of comrades Mau [Mao Zedong], Wang [Wang Hebo], Teng Pe [Deng Pei], and Wang Yung Tchang [Wang Yongzhang]⁹⁵ are all the same in this point: the workers are interested in the question of improving their conditions, their understanding of politic and classstruggle poor.

Wang who has a keen eye finds among the Pukow [Pukou] workers monarchist tendencies, the worker in the interior still means that politics are not on the world for him. The same Wang states that the Hongkongworkers are the most advanced in China—their political feeling is nationalist.

Mau explained to me: dominating interest for questions of daily life, not much political interest.

The same impressions I got from the informations of Teng Pe and *Wang Yung Tchang*. (Shan[dong])—

Even about the results in Hupeh we should not mislead ourselves. How we organized the railwayunion? What were these comrades appointed by the Communication department who could quietly organize. Why we went to workers under the flag of the "Laboursecretariate" and not of the Communist party?

What are the results of the work in *Shanghai* and *Tientsin*, where so many thousands industrial workers live?

We may say that we got the experience that we can farther develop unionwork but we should not make the mistake of mixing the idea of a workersparty and workersunion.

When ChangKT dreams of the power of labour he likes to work with millions. Comrade Mau told me that Hunan has 30 millions population and 30 till 40 thousand modern workers. He is at the end of his latin with labourorganization and was so pessimistic that he saw the only salvation of China in the intervention by Russia.

How scattered these 1.4 million workers are, how many of them are women and children in the textile and tobaccoindustry? How many of them where the foreign powers control the industry which means that nationalist feeling will develop itself in the workers?

The political interest of these modern workers will be before all interest in the nationalist movement.

XII) We only some months with a small weekly paper [*The Guide Weekly*] are trying to develop revolutionary character of the nationalist movement. When we seriously take up the task we must succeed. I am not like Mau so pessimistic that the Chinese nationalist movement can only succeed after the worldrevolution. Anyhow we have not to make speculations what will come first but in any case we have to act in the same way.

XIII) Development of Labourunions possible. Soon the time will come that the Laboursecreatariate will be substituted by real federation of unions. In these unions we continue our work to develop revolutionary spirit and take stand against all reformist tendencies the same from where they come.

We are also in the labourwork in a difficult position. After the first aggressive moves defeats have come in many strikes. YMCA is bringing systematically reformist tendencies in labour.

We will fight against this proving to the workers that only by revolutionary struggle they can develop their power.

This revolutionary struggle will in this period mainly have revolutionary nationalist character.

XIV) When with the theses in hands there can be no doubt that we have to join GMD and that we have to make our central task the nationalist movement on the other side that we have to develop labourunions and the revolutionary spirit which is useful for the execution of our central task the question comes how work in GMD?

The answer has been given in the theses of ChenTS [Chen Duxiu]. Taking stand against the pure military activities of GMD against the cooperation with imperialist powers and their feudal agents we push to revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary activities. We push GMD to take leading of the nationalist movement. The comrades want to be sure that they will succeed and some very careful men will wait with our help till GMD is good. These comrades are in this way cutting of the possibility of fullfilling our headtask. Never revolutionists can adopt such a practice and never they can in their decisions depend on speculation.

XV) We heard that there is fear that we bringing the workers in GMD kill their revolutionary spirit. When communists are going in GMD they go there because they mean that the interests of the working class are best of all promoted by this tactic. Our spiritual power is strong has been said by KOTao [Zhang Guotao]. For this reason I don't fear the contact of Chinese communists inside GMD with other tendencies (when commu[nists] can go there why workers, tradeunionmen should not be inside GMD). I believe in our spiritual power, I believe that we can only win by this tactic. When we will create a strong left wing in GMD we must be consequent and not so careful that we will prevent GMD to become nationwide revolutionary party.

XVI) The discussions proving how poor is the marxian knowledge in our own group we publish our own propagandamaterial to enlarge the marxian knowledge. Our task is in this way threefold: the spiritual force of the members of our party we enlarge by educational work, the labourunions we develop by our strong efforts in the most important labourcentres of China and *last but not least* by giving our strong support for the development of the revolutionary nationalist movement, by developing the GMD as a revolutionary nationalist party we mobilize the force in China which will contribute powerfully in the international struggle against worldimperialism.

We give in this work our special attention to the mobilisation of the peasants. Doing this work we maintain our name as a communist party. We are not so opportunistic to think about changes of name. Our name can do for the task we have. The comrades who are so anxious to liquidate the communist party as such in order to make a "massparty of workers" or workers and peasants in their dreams stated that more than one party can combine their efforts in the nationalist movement. We think the same and for this reason the communist party of China, the pushing power in the nat.rev.movement, will live and grow.

XV) Necessary is a good majority for Chen's theses. Their character is absolutely in agreement with the these of IKKI, the comm. Party as a good centralized organization with a strong spirit or discipline has the duty to show to the International that its spiritualpower can develop a strong nationalist movement with a strong nationalist party.

A.21 Letter from Zhang Guotao to G. Voitinsky and Musin (16 November 1923)⁹⁶

Beijing Nov. 16th, 1923.

Dear com. Voitinsky and Mussin,

Your both personal favors reached to me one after the other. I am very thankful of you both friendly reminding me how I should work in our party. At the same

time I am very sorry that I did not write you on the Chinese situation frequently and fully. So it is quite possible that my friends in Moscow may misunderstand me.

In answering you all the questions which were put down by your both letters, of course by my personal views, in a completed way, it seems too difficult for me, as my language is so poor. But I shall do my best in a brief way.

I) Our relation with the Koumintang [GMD]

When the question of our relation with GMD arrived to the last party conference, Many of our comrades did not make their ideas very clear. in order to show the differences of opinions between me and the comrades who stood opposite to me, we may compare the ideas between Maring and me.

Com. Maring's opinion was as following:—

The labor movement in China is too weak and it practically means nothing. The CCP was organized in an artificial way and was born too early. At present only the nationalist movement can be developed in China. *GMD represents the nationalist movement* but it must be reorganized. *Now we have the opportunity to reorganize GMD and also there is such possibility.* Comintern regards that the central task of CCP in this time is nationalist movement and *Soviet Russia should support GMD.* So the Chinese communists must concentrate their efforts to reorganize GMD and work inside of GMD and develop GMD. All the political propaganda work of the CCP shall be done inside of GMD except the marxian educational propaganda work. *Labor movement should be carried on inside of GMD and workers all over China must be brought into GMD.* Only after the class consciousness of the workers inside of GMD should be developed, a left-wing of GMD will grow out. *Only at that time a real CCP can be formed. This is the only process of the Chinese revolutionary movement.*

Yes, we agreed that the Chinese Labor movement and C.C.P. is too young and too weak, only the nationalist movement can be developed in China at present and the central task of CCP in this time is the nationalist movement. But, is GMD representing the nationalist movement? is there possibility to reorganize GMD? and is this the only process of the Chinese revolutionary movement? Those are the points which we were in doubt.

When we were going to discuss this question, the comrades who stood opposite me cried: "Be honest to the nationalist movement and "Don't be afraid of GMD, labor movement will not loss itself inside of GMD." Instead of proving the correctness of their ideas by objective analysis, much such subjective terms were expressed by them. Even such simple mistakes, as "there is no labor movement in China and the so-called labor movement are really nationalist movement" and "to talk about class struggle means to destroy the unity of the nationalist movement," were made by some leading comrades. From this mistakes you shall see how this tactics was misinterpreted.

The main points of my remarks made in the last party conference were as following:—

1) The Chinese nationalist movement which is confined by its complex political and economical situation is something not the same as that in other colonies, such as in India and in Egypt. Up till now it is hardy to say that we have a pure nationalist movement. We have only a nationalist movement set against Japanese imperialists and which at the same time more or less utilized by the American imperialists. Instead of a nationalist movement against America and British Empire, there is a tendency, created by them, to pro-them. GMD which always only engaged in making government and carrying on military action compelled to compromise with this or that foreign imperialist and domestic militarist and therefore has ceased to be a nationalist party.

2) The Chinese bourgeoisie (That is, industrial capitalists bankers, and merchants) still very much depend upon the foreign capitalists in every direction, especially economically. Even there are some contradictions rising between the foreign imperialists and domestic bourgeoisie, but the domestic bourgeoisie is still far off as a conscious force set against the foreign oppression. (Except against Japanese oppression)

3) The force of the working class even is very young and weak but it has shown in their struggle that it already something. This force cannot be totally neglected. This is a labor movement and cannot be explained as a nationalist movement.

4) We cannot expect that a nationalist movement which means a movement against all the strong powers in the world will come very easy. It needs some years. And a real nationalist party will not come out so easy as what you think. At the same time labor force is already something and it will be one of the strong factors of the coming nationalist movement.

5) GMD is now not representing the nationalist movement and must be reorganized. The question is that we need a force to compell GMD starting to reorganize itself. As long as we have no force to compel GMD, I see the possibility of reorganization of GMD is too uncertain.

6) Therefore in the present time we, communist, shall at first continue to propagate the nationalist ideas in general, and especially do our large part to organize the workers and peasants and bring them into the nationalist movement. Then in next step we shall use our forces to reorganize GMD or in any other form to set us in the combined nationalist movement.

7) At the same time we shall remain in GMD, organize branches for it and try to reorganize it. It means we work inside of GMD for the purpose to creat the possibility of reorganizing GMD or in general it means to find the new life of nationalist movement. This work do not mean the predominant one but as same important as work mentioned above (in paragraph 6). The idea that is to reorganize GMD right now and if not successful then leave GMD even within a short time cannot be agreed by us. We should remain in GMD for some years, because we must get something from GMD.

8) As the reorganization of GMD has not been achieved and it still concentrate its efforts for military action and to creat government, we, communists, in one side, must remain as an unit to propagate independently our own political ideas with

regard to the present Chinese situation and in the other side, the trade union movement must not pass from our hands to the GMD's hands.

9) We must not forget that to organize workers and to develop their consciousness is our special task. At the same time the process of the Chinese revolutionary movement is still not clear to us and it may be from the very beginning that the labor force will be the left wing of the combined nationalist movement. Therefore, in this time only in such labor centers where the communists has a strong hold we ourselves shall organize the GMD branches, but in such labor centers where the communists are still very weak and at the same time GMD has no any influence there, we shall not let GMD to organize branches and shall also not let their influence flows in. Only in Guanzhou and Hong Kong our work in the labor field is compelled to be carried on inside of GMD.

There were some more points which I want to point out for you.

1) At that time our comrades too much expect for the unity of nationalist movement. But GMD not only is not a real nationalist party but it is still not an organized party. It is too early to talk about unity of nationalist movement. Now we can only talk about creating some basis of the nationalist movement and thus opening a new life of nationalist movement and then combine the different factors into one combined nationalist movement.

2) The facts tell us that the coming of a real Chinese nationalist party needs some years. Many preliminary propaganda works must be done first. The Chinese people, even the revolutionists, up till now, don't feel the necessity to organize a party and revolutionary work means to them so narrow that it is only military action. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, himself, always strongly holds his old idea that the revolutionary process is first seize the political power by military force and then come to the period of education and propaganda. He and his followers also thinks first they must be in power and then organize a party.

If GMD will be a hopeful party, its leaders must first give up totally the ideas of organizing government and military action and sincerely accept the ideas of organizing a party first. When the GMD leaders have not give up their old ideas and their old ways of action, it would be no wise for Soviet Russia to support their struggling. Because GMD will never be successful in its struggle against the northern army and Chen Chien Ming [Chen Jiongming], Sun Yat Sen may soon be thrown away by his own generals *and the Canton government may soon be broken into pieces. To support the Canton government means not only useless but also means to delay the nationalist movement going to the right way of process.* Only after GMD was defeated and already gave up its old ideas and got accept the new ways, support can be given.

3) After the last party conference, attempts to reorganize GMD were maken by the new central committe of CCP but unfortunately it was not successful. After this so the new central committe of CCP said "It is hopeless to reorganize GMD from the top and we must reorganize it from the bottom." And it seems to me that now the EC [Executive Committee] of CCP concentrates its ideas to organize a young nationalist league. A personal letter of Com. Chen Too Su [Chen Duxiu] reached to

me recently and stated that he feels now the political theses (that is, the theses of our relation with GMD) adopted by the last party conference is somehow unpracticable. It proved quite clear that the plan of com Chen Too Su and Maring met difficulties and cannot carry out into life at present. And the difficulties were not set by the opponents of our party but by the actual situation.

4) When the Declaration of CCP for proposing a national congress [National Assembly] reached to Shanghai, at that time I was in Shanghai, a city communist conference of Shanghai was called to discuss on this declaration.⁹⁷ Some remarks was made by me as following:—"A national congress as planned in this declaration cannot be organized immediately. In one side we must propagate the idea of such a national congress and constantly demand it but, at the other side, we must hurry up to organize workers and peasants and go to the local nationalist organizations so that we can fulfil the plan given by this declaration." Though a few comrades spoke that the national congress must carry into life immediately and regard my ideas mean "sabotage" (The word "sabotage" was much used in the last party conference). But after a short discussion my ideas were accepted by that city conference. It shows clear that when we come to try to start some political movement then every Chinese comrade will understand how it is important to organize the workers and peasants. It is important as to organize or reorganize "a nationalist party," and we cannot wait that the real nationalist party comes out first and then to start to organize the workers and peasants.

5. Some one may say how young and weak is the CCP and how the CCP is incapable to organize the workers and peasants. Yes, we know quite well how CCP is. But as the nationalist mass party still lives in our heads, so we now can only push the poor CCP to bear the both tasks, that is to form a nationalist party and to organize the workers and peasants.

But now the situation is some changible and we have some new facts to discuss this question. The above lines only show how was this question in the last conference of the CCP There is such news which was appeared since last week that GMD will call a national party congress in Jan 15th 1924.⁹⁸ Therefore now we must concentrate our attention to the coming GMD Congress. In my last letter I preferred to write an article about this question for you but I shall postpone to write that article and turned to discuss this coming GMD Congress with you.

The news tells that every province should send six representatives to the GMD congress held at Canton in Jan 15th 1924 and three representatives of each province should be appointed by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and three will be elected by the provincial branches.

In the city communist conference of Beijing held at last Monday I made a report on the coming GMD congress. I prefer to write you the main points of my report which will show my ideas towards the coming Congress. The main points of my report was as following:—

A national GMD Congress which we have demanded since a year ago will come after two months. Though we have still not received any informations and instruc-

tions about this event from EC of CCP we must hurry up to discuss it and to prepare it.

Whether the congress can be held in time or not it depends on the war situation in Canton. But in Beijing now no one can tell how the war situation in Canton is and how it will be.

Whether this congress will be successful or not, I cannot tell exactly. But as the news tells that only 6 representatives sent from each province, then the representatives may be mostly the representatives of GMD generals and then very few representatives representing the ideas of the common GMD members. Thus the Congress will bring poor results.

First, we must demand the increasing of representatives especially such province like Kwantung [Guangdong] must largely increasing its representatives. We must propose that the prominent members of GMD, the revolutionists who are friends of GMD but are not members of it and the representatives of different nationalist and revolutionary organizations should be invited to the Congress. So the result will mean increasing of mass influences in this congress.

Second, we must demand the GMD members of different places hold their meetings to discuss the coming Congress. All the GMD presses should be mobilized to discuss and propagate about the coming Congress. And especially our presses should start to discuss this question right now.

Third, the EC of CCP should invite some progressive elements in GMD and non-GMD revolutionists to draft together a program for the coming congress and prefer it to the congress. *The coming congress will show how our relation with GMD ought to be.* If our program will be accepted by the congress, then it is very good and if not, this group of revolutionists who draft the same program with us shall stand with us as the left wing inside of GMD.

In this congress at least we must try to change the idea of seizing a province by military force first and then to fight for provinces and then to develop the GMD and turn into the idea first to organize a strong centralized party and then to carry on revolution. This is our main demand in that congress.

My report was accepted by this city conference, and decided to report it to the EC of the CCP and at the same time I was elected to draft the outlines of the said program as the basis for discussing in the next local party conference and then to send to EC of CCP for final decision.

Here I shall only tell one more fact about this question. In Shanghai some of GMD members developed a sentiment against our remaining in GMD since last month. Com. Li Sui-chang [Li Dazhao] went to Shanghai for this sake. It seems to me different opinions of GMD members with regard to our entering to GMD is developing and become gradually acute. But I did not get any information recently, so I cannot tell exactly.

II) The present situation of our party

In the concluding session of last canton conference of CCP when Maring greeted the success of last conference, he expressed that, at one side, the conference has

moved away the "obstacles" in solving the party organization question and, at other side, that he hope we, the comrades who do not satisfy the results of that conference, will not be "non-cooperation" and "sabotage." Fortunately the "obstacles" not only did not go to "non-cooperation" and "sabotage," but they are still as active as before. If those "obstacles" had really been moved away from CCP by Maring, I don't know how maring will greet the success of that conference.

As soon as the conference was closed, the mistakes of that conference were shown out. The atmosphere of opposing the theses of our relation with GMD was developed in the branches of CCP and the opponents may be in majority. Moreover, such big branches like Changsha, Hankow [Hankou] and Beijing were trying to demand a party conference soon called once more to settle this question of our relation with GMD. At that time we not only did not utilize these opportunity to set against last conference and the new EC of CCP but also by our help such atmosphere was put down because we know quite well that our poor party was hardly to bear such blows.

In last party conference when the question of our relation with koumintang was hotly discussed some comrades did not proceed purely along the objective observations of the actual Chinese situation and, moreover, instead of avoiding the difficulties in that hot discussion, even utilized the troubles of our party organization question inside or outside of the conference to attack on me. I don't know now that how I has been talked in Moscow. I shall answer openly: "yes, we are young, it is quite nature that we all together have maken many mistakes, even very simple mistakes, but some mistakes did not and shall never make."

You both remind me that I must stand for the integrity of the young and still weak CCP and Com Mussin even expressed that he believes that I shall not try to create any new difficulties and dissensions in the party. Surely I have been and am being stand for the unity of our poor party. Communism which I regard as my life and the young Chinese communist movement in which from the very beginning I took part will never be harmed by my own hands.

In general speaking now our party has no trouble coming from last conference. Even some small troubles often come out in this or that branch of CCP, it is only because our party is not well organized and the members are too young and individualistic. Our party work make no progress recently largely because we meet the actual difficulties such as lack of means. Some decisions did not carry out by the new EC but it never means that the comrades prevented their carrying out. I shall now prefer to write a few lines about party work by my own views.

Since our conference decided the tactics with regard to GMD, it seems to me that the party organs now make no intensive propaganda or demand on GMD question. Even the declaration for a national congress published by our party, but no propaganda was maken on this proposal. Our party presses cannot published in time.

One of the best branches is the branch in Changsha which influenced by the war situation, together with the trade unions in Changsha are now in a position hardly to be active. The headquarter of that branch in Changsha was suppressed by general

Tao-Hen-Ti [Zhao Hengti, the military governor of Hunan]. The Supporting Diplomacy Society in Hankow [Hankou] which was a nationalist organization against Japan and recently set itself begin to attack British imperialists and upon which we based more or less to carry on nationalist movement in Hankow was also suppressed by the Tuchun of Hupei [Hubei]. The trade union movement in some places shows itself progress. As I did not get the whole information now I cannot tell exactly But at the same time there is also some crisis shown. There are some labor leaders in Shanghai who are more or less opposing to us plan to call national labor congress, national railway workers' congress and the workers conference of Beijing-Hankow line. Of course, there are some politicians stand to support the plans of these labor leaders. We have also the plan to call those conferences. Whether we can cooperate with them in a smooth way or not, it is still unknown. Politicians of Communication clique [*Jiaotongxi*] and Marshall Chang-Tso-Lin [Zhang Zuolin] and others are trying to utilize the workers for their struggle against Chili [Zhili] clique. Some workers' leaders seek for support from this or that politician. Chang-Tso-Lin's 10,000 dollars for the Beijing-Hankow Railway union were much spreaded among the workers. Too much hope for Chang Tso Lin's victory has been expressed by the railway workers. That a worker communist in the Beijing-Hankow Railway union in Hankow ran away with 2,000 dollars causes the loss of the communist confidence among the workers and the workers thus went to some other labor leaders who are more or less opposing to us. If those leaders would, in one side, get close relation with some politicians or Chang Tso Lin and, in other side, get confidence from the workers, In future it may be the main cause to split labor movement in central and northern China. Before these leaders have no any connection with any politicians, it is that we sending comrades to Mukden [i.e. to Zhang Zuolin's headquarters, Shenyang] opened their attempts. We have done the mistake of sending comrades to Mukden so now we may suffer the losses.

In conclusion, we must not neglect the good side of CCP While we saw the comrades who attended the last conference took an active part in discussing the political questions in a practical way. It show the growth of our party. I was very glad for this fact and mentioned this fact a few times in that conference. The CCP, the only one we have, organized by a group of young sincere revolutionists who want to act along the marxist line will have its future. I hope Comintern and Profintern will give us more support, especially for the trade union movement, so that the Chinese movement can be progressive more rapidly.

A few words shall be written on my personal conditions now. I am now working in Beijing. My task is to editor the Labor [Workers'] Weekly [*Laodong zhoukan*] in Beijing which distributed 2500 copies every week. At the same time I am in charge of the political committee of the Beijing branch CCP and work for the Committee for Organization of National Federation of Chinese Railway Workers. I also constantly write some articles of our party presses and GMD presses. But now I am not a pure worker for the party, so I must spend some time to work for myself. I myself spent one part of the money which given by the eastern department of Comintern

for buying the Chinese publications, but, of course, I must return this money within short time and send more publications to you. The publications which sent to you every two weeks one time, I think, have been received by you.

Hoping that you will send some publications to me and write me something about moscow and that you will answer promptly and give full criticism on what I write above.

Yours fraternally
K.T.Chang

A.22 Manifesto of the Third National Congress of the CCP (June 1923)⁹⁹

The Chinese people are doubly oppressed both by foreign powers and by warlords, and the nation's existence as well as the freedom of its people are in an extremely precarious state. Not only the workers, peasants, and students, but also the peaceful and moderate merchants feel oppressed.

The farcical confusion of the present Beijing regime; the increasing oppression and destruction of trade unions and students' federations by the northern warlords' regime; the unruliness of soldiers and bandits in Shandong and Henan; the threats by foreign powers to retract, on various pretexts, benefits granted by the Washington Conference; the atrocities committed by the Japanese sailors at Shashi and Changsha; the powers' forced cotton exports from China; the Guangdong fighting engineered by Wu Peifu and Qi Xieyuan; disorders in Sichuan fostered by Wu Peifu and Xiao Yaonan; civil war looming between the Zhili and Fengtian factions; and imbroglios among the various cliques within the Zhili faction: all these show how internal and external troubles have again beset the people. There is no salvation unless the people muster up their own strength in a national movement for self-determination. [All] this also demonstrates that the national revolutionary movement led by our party with the slogans "down with the warlords" and "down with international imperialism" is on the right path.

The GMD should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership. Unfortunately, however, the GMD often suffers from two erroneous notions. First, it relies on foreign powers for help in the Chinese national revolution. Such requests for help from the enemy not only cause the [GMD] to lose the leadership of the national revolution but also make the people depend on foreign power, thus destroying their confidence and spirit of national independence. Second, [the GMD] concentrates all its efforts on military action, neglecting propaganda work among the people. Consequently, the GMD loses its political leadership because a national revolutionary party can never succeed by relying solely on military action without winning nationwide popular sympathy.

We still hope that all the revolutionary elements in our society will rally to the GMD, speeding the completion of the national revolutionary movement. At the same time, [we also] hope that the GMD will resolutely discard its two old notions of reliance on foreign powers and concentration on military action, and that it will pay attention to political propaganda among the people—never missing an opportunity for [such] propaganda in order to create a true central force for the national welfare and a true leadership for the national revolution.

Considering economic and political conditions at home and abroad, and the sufferings and needs of [those] classes of Chinese society (workers, peasants, industrialists, and merchants) which urgently need a national revolution, the CCP never forgets for one moment to support the interests of the workers and peasants. It is our special task to conduct propaganda and organizational work among the workers and peasants. Still more central is our task to lead the workers and peasants into joining the national revolution. Our mission is to liberate the oppressed Chinese nation by a national revolution, and to advance to the world revolution, liberating the oppressed peoples and oppressed classes of the whole world.

Long live the Chinese national revolution!

Long live the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world!

Long live the liberation of the oppressed classes of the world!

A.23. Resolution on the Nationalist Movement and the Question of the GMD (June 1923)¹⁰⁰

(1) In colonial and semicolonial countries oppressed by international imperialism, it is possible to carry out the national revolution only by striking forcefully at the imperialists. This is the task such countries must accomplish in the world revolution.

(2) The current rulers of China are feudal warlords, not the bourgeoisie. The warlord government calls itself independent, but in reality it takes orders from the international imperialist powers. They do well as their managers running the finance, communications, and industry that are in the hands of the international imperialists. The Chinese bourgeoisie controls just an extremely small part of the daily production. The imperialists make use of their political power in China to obstruct the free development of Chinese industry. Therefore, semicolonial China must make the democratic national movement its central task in order to remove internal and external oppression.

(3) In accordance with China's social situation, there should be a powerful centralized party to act as the supreme headquarters of the democratic nationalist movement. China currently has a party. Only the GMD is a relatively democratic revolutionary party. At this time, because of the conditions of each class in society,

it is very difficult to create a bigger and more revolutionary party. Even if one could be created, it would only cause disunity and fragmentation of democratic revolutionary power.

(4) Because of the backwardness of industry, the Chinese working class is still in its infancy. The consciousness of the majority of the laboring masses is stuck in the patriarchal society. The tendency toward being apolitical is extremely strong. Only a minority of industrial workers have already realized the need for a democratic movement. Those who can really understand communism and CP organization represent an even smaller minority. Consequently, the workers' movement cannot yet powerfully rise up to create an independent social force that is needed for China's current revolution.

(5) Since the working class has not become powerful, naturally a strong CP, a great mass party, cannot be developed to meet the demands of the current revolution. Therefore, the ECCI passed a resolution that the CCP must cooperate with the Chinese GMD. CP members must join the GMD. The CCP CEC also feels this need and decided to enforce this resolution. The resolution has also been adopted by this Congress.¹⁰¹

(6) In joining the GMD, we must maintain our own organization and strive to absorb the truly class-conscious, revolutionary elements from the workers' organizations and from the left wing of the GMD in order gradually to expand our organization, tighten our discipline, and build among the masses a strong foundation for the CP.

(7) In the GMD we should pay attention to the following: (a) In political propaganda, we must uphold our true identity of noncompromise with any imperialist or warlord. (b) We must prevent the GMD from concentrating all its force on military activities while neglecting propaganda among the people; we must also prevent the GMD tendency toward compromise in the political movement and toward reformism in the labor movement. (c) Members of the CP and the SYL must unite and work in unison by words and deeds. (d) We must force the GMD toward Soviet Russia; always alert the GMD to the danger of being fooled by the arrogant and greedy foreign powers.

(8) We must strive to extend the GMD organization throughout the whole of China and to rally all Chinese revolutionary elements to the GMD to meet the requirements of the present Chinese national revolution. At the same time, our special work is to strive to promote an independent organization for the National Labor Federation and conduct both economic and political struggle. We must strive to lead the laboring masses from a struggle for daily livelihood to a political one. The current political struggle is naturally a nationalist movement—one to eliminate foreign influences and warlords. Thus, a large-scale national propaganda campaign should be launched among the laboring masses so as to expand the national revolution and the GMD. At the same time, it is also necessary to bring into our organization those revolutionary elements who are fully aware of the necessity of the national revolution and who have, furthermore, class consciousness. Widespread

propaganda on the “necessity of supporting the interests of the laboring class in the national revolution” should be carried out among the masses.

A.24 The First Revised Constitution of the CCP (June 1923)¹⁰²

Chapter One: Party Membership

1. Members of our party are not differentiated on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party’s program and constitution and are willing to serve our party loyally can become members of our party.

2. To be granted probationary membership of the party, one must be sponsored by two people who have held party membership for over half a year, [the application] must be passed by a meeting of the cell [*xiaozu*], examined by the district committee [*difang weiyuanhui*], and approved by the area committee [*qu weiyuanhui*]. The probation period is three months for laborers and six months for nonlaborers; this period may be extended or shortened at the discretion of the district committee. A probationary member may only participate in cell meetings and enjoys the right to speak and to vote. Other duties are identical to those of a regular party member.

3. Party members accepted by the CEC must also go through a probationary period after their district committees have been notified. Those who hold membership in CPs recognized by the Comintern may become regular members of our party after having been checked by the Party Center [*zhongyang*].

4. When a party member voluntarily applies for withdrawal from the party, his or her application must be approved by the area [committee], the party membership card and other important documents must be returned, sponsors must guarantee that he or she will strictly keep all party secrets, and, in the event of violation of this commitment, the area executive committee will take appropriate measures to deal with him or her.

Chapter Two: Organization

5. In the countryside, in factories, railways, mines, barracks, schools, and other organizations and their surroundings, a party cell may be formed as long as there are between five and ten members. A cell head should be appointed by general acclaim. The cell will come under the district branch [or local *difang zhibu*]. Where there are less than five members, they should also have an organization, appoint a secretary by general acclaim, and be placed under the nearest area [committee] or be placed directly under the CEC. (If there is a district branch where there is no cell, it should be placed directly under the area executive committee; if there is

no area executive committee, it should be placed directly under the Party Center.)

6. If there are ten members in one locality and if approval is granted by the CEC, the area executive committee may send a person there to convene a full members' or delegates' congress. This congress is to elect three persons to form the district executive committee; it is also to elect three alternate members—when committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be replaced temporarily by alternate members. In localities where there is no area executive committee, the CEC is to send personnel down to organize a district executive committee. It will come under the Party Center. On the formation of the area executive committee, the area executive committee will take over responsibility and powers of the district executive committee.

7. If an area has more than two district executive committees and when the CEC deems it necessary to organize an area executive committee, it will send personnel to the area in question to convene a delegates' congress. The congress is to elect five people to form the area executive committee as well as three alternate members; if committee members have to leave their post for any reason, they are to be temporarily replaced by alternate members. When the CEC deems it necessary, it may entrust a district executive committee to take over temporarily the responsibilities and powers of the area executive committee. The jurisdiction of an area is determined by the CEC and is subject to constant change.

8. The CEC is to be composed of nine persons elected by the National Congress; five alternate members are also elected by the Congress; when members leave their posts, they must be replaced temporarily by alternate members.

9. The term of office for CEC members is one year; for area and district committee members it is six months. There is no set limit on the tenure of heads of cells, but they must be subject to reelection.

10. The CEC implements all resolutions passed by the Congress and deliberates and decides on our party's policies and all the methods of implementation; area and district executive committees implement resolutions passed by superior organs and, within their jurisdiction and authority, deliberate and decide on all methods of execution. Every committee is to elect a committee chair to take overall charge of party affairs; other committee members shall be responsible for separate duties but shall work together.

11. The resolutions passed by the National Congress or the CEC and special problems that arise unexpectedly are to be handled by special commissions made up of several party members who are appointed by area and district executive committees; when such special commissions convene meetings, the chair of such meetings must be a member of an area or district executive committee.

Chapter Three: Meetings

12. Each cell must meet at least once a week as convened by the cell head. All districts [*difang*] must convene a full members' meeting at least once a month (in

exceptional circumstances the full members' meeting may be changed to one of cell heads, but the full members' meeting must be held at least once every two months). In each area, the executive committee should call a delegates' congress once every three months; every five members shall have one vote. The National Congress is to be convened by the CEC on a fixed date once a year. The CEC shall meet in full session every four months.

13. When the CEC deems it necessary, it may convene an unscheduled [*linshi*] National Congress. It must also call an unscheduled National Congress when one-third of the area representatives or one-third of party members make such a request.

14. Regarding the number of delegates to the National Congress or to an unscheduled congress, each district may send one representative; if it has over forty members it may send two delegates, three if it has over sixty members, and one more delegate for each additional forty members. Each district has one vote for every ten members. Where a district [organization] has not yet been [formally] set up, it may send one representative if the CEC deems it necessary, but its right to vote is a matter that will be determined by the Congress.

15. Should a problem arise, a superior executive committee may order a subordinate executive committee to convene various kinds of *ad hoc* meetings.

16. The CEC must always send personnel to all places to convene various forms of *ad hoc* meetings. They are to be chaired by the special commissioners sent by the CEC.

17. The meetings of the central, area, and district executive committees may be called by the committee chair at any time.

Chapter Four: Discipline

[[The chapter on discipline is identical to that in the Constitution adopted by the Second Party Congress. Articles 18 to 26 here correspond to Articles 17 to 25 in the previous Constitution. See above **Doc. A.15.**]]

Chapter Five: Funding

27. The revenues of our party come from the following sources:

a) Party dues. Party members whose monthly salary [*yuexin*] is under 30 *yuan* pay 20 cents per month; those whose monthly salary is between 30 and 60 *yuan* pay one *yuan*; those whose monthly salary is between 60 and 100 *yuan* pay 5 percent of their salary; and those whose monthly salary is above 100 *yuan* pay 10 percent. Party dues are waived for unemployed workers and imprisoned party members.

b) Contributions from within the party. These shall be determined by the district (executive) committees taking into consideration the state of local finances and the economic strength of party members.

c) Support sources from outside the party.

28. All revenues and expenditures of our party are to be disposed of by the CEC.

Chapter Six: Appendix

29. The power to revise this Constitution belongs to the National Congress, and the right to interpret it belongs to the CEC.

30. This Constitution has been adopted by the Third Party Congress (10–20 July [should be June] 1923) and is effective from the day it is issued by the CEC.

A.25 Organizational Code of the CCP CEC (June 1923)¹⁰³

1) The CEC is elected by the annual Party Congress. It is responsible to the Congress for all its actions; is the highest leading organ of our party between two congresses; supervises the activities of all areas and districts; distributes publications published in the name of our party; and dispatches and directs personnel to work with youths, women, labor, peasants, etc.

2) The CEC comprises nine people. In the event that one member is absent, the vacancy should be filled by an alternate member. At the first meeting of the CEC after the Congress, work should be divided and five persons should be elected to form the Central Bureau. The other four persons should be assigned to various localities to assist and work with the local committee members and make weekly reports concerning local conditions to the Central Bureau.

3) The Central Bureau exercises its powers in the name of the CEC, which elects its committee chair, secretary, and treasurer, whose duties are as follows:

The committee chair presides over all meetings of the Central Bureau and the CEC; in the absence of the chair, members of the Central Bureau should elect one of their number to carry out the powers of the chair.

The secretary is responsible for documents in and outside of the party, correspondence, and minutes of meetings; the secretary is also in charge of the party archives. All party correspondence must be signed by the chair and the secretary.

The treasurer, under the supervision of the CEC, shall take charge of the party's financial affairs and administration, as well as be responsible for the financial affairs and administration of the various areas, districts, and all party organs.

4) Regular meetings of the CEC shall be held once every four months, the Central Bureau meets every week. The Central Bureau itself can call for the convening of an extraordinary meeting or do so at the request of four CEC members. The request must state the subjects to be discussed and the reasons.

5) All meetings of the Executive Committee shall be called by the chair and the secretary and an agenda shall be attached.

6) All resolutions of the CEC and the Central Bureau must be passed by a majority, but resolutions of unscheduled National Party Congresses must be passed by a two-thirds majority.

7) The CEC shall issue notifications regarding the convening of congresses at least two months in advance, attach a draft agenda, and request local organs to submit all proposals within a month after being notified. All local proposals shall be circulated.

8) Reports by the CEC must be mailed to the localities one month in advance of meetings.

9) The financial report of the CEC must be audited by an auditing committee appointed by the Congress (CEC members are not eligible for appointment).

10) In the event that one-third of our party's areas representing one-third of our party's membership request the convening of an unscheduled party congress, the Executive Committee must do so within one month after receipt of the request. The request must state the reason for convening the congress.

A.26 Letter from Members of the CCP CEC to Sun Yat-sen (25 June 1923)¹⁰⁴

Letter from Comrades Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Hesun, Tan Pingshan, and Mao Zedong to Sun Yat-sen:

The political crisis in the north is in a phase of increasing confusion. Public opinion shows increasing activity; this gives our party a golden opportunity for development; we must not lose it.¹⁰⁵ We as members of the party ask for your decision on the following two questions. (1) The organization of a strong executive in Shanghai or Canton to develop the actions of party members in a uniform way and to unfold propaganda on a large scale. For this, special attention is to be paid to Beijing, Hubei, Hunan, Shanghai, and Canton. If these centers are not well organized, all the work will be superficial and dispersed. (2) The current crisis in Beijing is not the result of developments in the last few days. Cao Kun's attempt to gain power had already started before Li Yuanhong became president in Beijing. The Anfu clique (Duan Qirui) cannot come to an agreement with the Zhili party. Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang's relations with Cao Kun are of the same quality as Li Yuanhong and Zhang Zuolin's relations with Duan. Even if there are changes in the groupings, it remains a struggle between the leaders of the Beiyang militarists Cao and Duan. This struggle has nothing to do with the well-being of the Republic. It is clear that the Zhili party is the enemy of our party, but we cannot subordinate ourselves to Duan and Li Yuanhong. Further, we cannot follow the same course as the feudalistic warlords to conquer political power and territory with military strength. That would give people the impression that we are no different from the militarists. To build a new China with old methods and old forces not only is incompatible with logic, but cannot be realized in practice. The old force has means that are ten times stronger than ours. We can only use new means, take new

directions, and create a new force. With respect to the people, we must unite merchants, students, peasants, and workers and lead them under the banner of the party. The new force that will arise from the people themselves will defend the Republic with new means and with a new comradely spirit. In the beginning our strength will be weak, but it will develop very strongly. The Great Powers make plans every day to exploit us and look for the strongman who will be their agent. To beg for their recognition with empty words in order to become powerful ourselves is not only to the detriment of our movement but also a degradation of the revolutionary spirit. We cannot take these measures. Parliament is seen to be cheap by the whole people. Cao and Wu feed the parliament in the north. If we try to bring members of parliament to Canton, how can the people see us as being any better than the way they judge Wu and Cao Kun?

The crime of the generals in the southern provinces who enlarge their armies and oppress the people is no smaller than the crime of the militarists in the north. Even if we were to burn these elements, one would not find a trace of democratic-revolutionary inclination in the ashes. Even if we could unite these generals in the south, the struggle would remain one between south and north and by no means one between feudalism and democracy. Can we let hundreds of soldiers be killed for this and place a heavy burden on the people? There is also the danger that we shall slow down the nationalist revolution because of our localism in this corner of China. The current main task of our party is to bring the war in Canton to a close so that we can be equal to our task in the dangerous political situation in which our country finds itself. We must no longer work locally and neglect work in the whole nation. We ask you to leave Canton and go to Shanghai, the center of public opinion, and to convene a National Assembly there (as you developed in your theory of the "Five Powers Constitution" and not simply a mass demonstration). In this way a central force will be created for the solution of national problems as well as a central force for the national revolution. If we do this we will not lose our leading position in the revolutionary nationalist movement. This is a major and important thing that only you can do, just as the constitution movement was led by you two years ago. We see the necessity for the speedy deliverance of China and the development of our party. In writing this letter to you we hope that you will adopt our proposal. We await your reply.

A.27 Report of the Central Bureau (November 1923)¹⁰⁶

1. *Politics*: The Beijing coup [the removal of Li Yuanhong as president of the Republic] took place soon after the Congress. The Central Bureau immediately published its statement concerning the situation (6,000 Chinese characters, 300

English words),¹⁰⁷ which proposed the convocation of a National Assembly. Only Hong Kong's English-language newspapers reacted negatively; otherwise, there was no impact on domestic media. At the same time, [the Central Bureau] invited, by mail, Sun Yat-sen to go to Shanghai to convene the National Assembly, but it was to no avail [see **Doc. A.26**].

2. *Propaganda*: Because the publishing house of the Central Bureau was moved, only one issue of *New Youth* [Xin qingnian] was published, although there should have been two issues. There should have been five issues of *Vanguard* [Qianfeng] but only one came out. *The Guide Weekly* [Xiangdao zhoubao] should have reached issue 49, but only forty-six issues have been completed and there were no pamphlets. Among the three periodicals, *The Guide Weekly* is moderately influential in society; thus the anti-imperialist atmosphere gradually grew stronger after the Congress.

3. *Relations with the GMD*: The Congress Resolution [**Doc. A.23**] has not been fully implemented. [The reasons are]: (a) There is some doubt among comrades about the resolution; (b) The GMD itself is not handling things fast and resolutely; (c) There are mutual suspicions between comrades and members of the GMD, and there are differences in political beliefs; and (d) Our party has economic difficulties. For these four reasons, the original plan to establish important branches respectively in north and central China as quickly as possible has not been realized. Currently, only Beijing already has an organization; efforts are under way in Tianjin, Harbin, and Hunan; consultations with the GMD are taking place in Hubei and Nanjing; in Shandong and Sichuan, because there are already party organizations within the GMD, our comrades are trusted when they join [the GMD]. The Anhui GMD has two factions, neither enjoying society's support, and therefore capable personnel are needed to go there and organize another. Currently, there is one faction within the GMD that plans to go ahead with the reforms and has decided to convene the Congress on 15 January in Canton.¹⁰⁸ This plan is opposed by another faction, and probably there will be important changes in the future.

4. *Labor movement*: The labor movement, directly led by the Central Bureau, is confined to workers on the railways and based on the report of the railway committee; we can now report the following:

a) Zhengzhou-Taiyuan railway: The situation on the Zhengzhou-Taiyuan [railway] is the best, because there are nine comrades of the C.P. [*sic*, in original] and more than twenty comrades of the SYL. All of them are very good comrades, courageous and diligent, and they are working on the potential of the labor union and the executive committee meets regularly.

b) Beijing-Fengtian railway: The situation on the Beijing-Fengtian railway is also very good. Labor unions in Tangshan, Shanhaiguan, Tianjin, and Fengtai still function secretly. Of these four places, the situation in Tangshan and Shanhaiguan is especially good.

c) Beijing-Hankou railway: The situation in Jiang'an and Zhengzhou on the Beijing-Hankou railway is relatively good, with small groups existing secretly in

both places. Someone from Jiang'an is put in charge of Xinyang. The situation in [Chang] Xindian is not very good, but [we have found] some labor friends there, and they come to Beijing frequently to talk [to us]. We have repeatedly instructed them to organize small groups, but they are very frightened. Although they organized about ten people two or three weeks ago, now they have disappeared. Nevertheless, most people still have faith in the labor union but they are too afraid to stick out their necks. Today another labor friend from Xindian arrived, and he has agreed to our instruction to go back there and to organize small groups. From now on, [at least] Xindian will have a headquarters.

d) Tianjin-Pukou railway: Pukou at the south of the Tianjin-Pukou railway already has a small group of some thirty people, and they meet frequently. There has been contact with people from the northern end, but for the time being nobody dares to come forward [to organize]. There are a few very good activists there, but they dare not do much because the scab, Cui, keeps a close watch on them.

e) Jiaozhou-Jinan railway: A union with 1,670 members has been organized on this railway. We have developed contacts with them and send them 200 copies of each issue of the union publication.

f) Beijing-Suiyuan railway: The union of the vehicle maintenance department on this railway is okay, and it communicates frequently with us by mail.

g) Daokou-Qinghua railway: The situation there is relatively bad because soon after the workers got the union organized, the February 7 [1923] Incident occurred, making our labor friends there especially fearful. But we have a comrade there, conducting substantial activities and propaganda work.

h) Longhai railway: Lin Zhiying and Wei are still in control of the union on this route. Comrade Wang [Hebo?] has not written for a while, and [we are] not too clear about the situation there.

5. *Peasant movement*: The new peasant movements are in two places. One is in Huizhou, Guangdong Province, and the other is in Hengshan, Hunan Province. In Huizhou, there are organizations with over 10,000 people in each one of them, and Hengshan too has mass movements numbering some 10,000 people. In these two places, the peasant movements were led by comrades from the SYL, and they have all failed. The reasons for their failure are: (a) Our comrades have yet to develop a solid base in the countryside. [Their] economic agitation drew opposition from the majority of the middle peasants, who collaborated with warlords and bureaucrats, suppressing peasants forcefully. (b) Politics is also a factor, because Huizhou is controlled by the counterrevolutionary army of Chen [Jiongming], and Hengshan is controlled by the counterrevolutionary army of Zhao [Hengti].

6. *Party affairs*: Since the Congress, party membership has increased by only one hundred. There are a few places where the party is growing. One is in Jinan, where a district committee was established. Another place is Harbin, where a group [cell? zu] was set up. The work is effective in only two places. Hubei is the most lax, which is owing to both government suppression and the comrades' lack of active efforts. Growth can be expected in Nanjing, Hangzhou, Sichuan, Jiangxi, and Fujian.

A.28 Reports of the Area Executive Committees to the CEC (November 1923)¹⁰⁹

1. *Beijing Area*

a) *National movement*: There have been no quick results. Originally, this was because of the doubts among our comrades about the policy and subsequently because of the disputes with the democratic fraternal associations. In addition, within the GMD some people use the fraternal association to create obstacles. Now the plan is to send capable comrades to join the fraternal association in question, and the obstacles can thus be made to disappear. Comrades will have doubts about us, and this is also related to the fact that our comrades were entrusted to run periodicals in Beijing and Shanghai. But now this has been explained [to them]. Before, when Comrade Wang [Zhongyi] and Comrade An [Ticheng]¹¹⁰ were in Beijing, the spirit was high within [the organization]. Now although Fan [Hongjie] and Gao [Junyu] work fairly hard,¹¹¹ there are many obstacles because of internal disagreements. Now it is necessary to send additional new comrades to do the work. In Tianjin, there are a number of comrades who are taking care of speeches and the GMD.

b) *Labor movement*: The labor movement does not have sufficient personnel and financial power. Now the most difficult thing is to cope with unemployed workers and imprisoned comrades and their family members.

c) *Student movement*: Since Wei Qingyun was bought off by Wang Zhengting he has created rumors to damage the reputation of Comrades Fan and Gao at the Student Council and used this to break up the student alliance. I [Li Dazhao] should dispatch capable people as soon as possible to handle this matter. . . .

3. *Shanghai Area*

After the Congress, we concentrated our work on revamping the internal organization in Shanghai. This was because previously organization was so loose [that it seemed] as if there was none at all. Now some order has been reinstated within the organization, and more than half of all the party dues can be collected. Shanghai is the biggest city in China but our work has yet to produce any results. As far as the national movement is concerned, because most of our comrades come from other provinces, have no profession, and are very isolated from the local society, it is not easy to carry it out. As far as the labor movement is concerned, although Shanghai tops the country in terms of the number of workers, the labor movement is not developed. The reasons are: (a) because of convenient transportation, labor supply is larger than labor demand and there is a fierce competition for jobs within the same profession, and hence workers dare not fight with employers; (b) the number of female workers, who work in the silk, yarn, and cigarette factories, is more than half of the city's workers and this, too, is a reason why it is not easy to develop Shanghai's labor movement; (c) workers come from many different places, so

regionalism is also a factor that hinders workers' unity; and (d) the Green and Red Gangs, which were there before, not only create intangible obstacles to workers' unity but also, on their own initiative, lead police and civil detectives to spy on workers' activities. The club we run for the machine operators has quietly disintegrated because the members have lives and interests that are too different, and they live too far apart from each other. How can such diverse elements as these be unified? [For this reason] organizations for machine operators in Shanghai have collapsed several times before. The postal workers' movement was pretty good last time, but now the oppression has forced it to stop. Now [we are] setting about organizing movements in Wusong and Gaochangmiao. A workers' school has been set up in Wusong, and they have already held a preparatory union meeting; in Gaochangmiao, a workers' night school is also being planned. We have already made contacts about setting up a shop clerks' organization, so it can be established in one or two months.

There is some improvement in party affairs in Nanjing, and it is being planned to set up a district committee in Pukou. There are too few comrades in Hangzhou to have a district committee.

The railway workers on the Shanghai-Nanjing and Shanghai and Hangzhou lines all have Moral Endeavor Societies, but their members are skilled workers and small bureaucrats or foremen, etc., which is an obstacle to the labor movement.

4. Hunan Area

a) *Politics*: [[A lengthy account is given of the fighting by military governor Zhao Hengti to gain control over the whole province. The people of Changsha bore the financial brunt of the struggles—three to four months of housing tax and fourteen years of land tax was collected. River traffic was disrupted, causing business to suffer with factories laying off workers.]]

b) *Party affairs*: In the past four months, the number of comrades who joined the party is as follows: in Changsha, fourteen people; in Anyuan, twenty or so; and in Shuikoushan, ten or so. In terms of education, Changsha is the best; people there are interested in discussions on political and other issues. Anyuan is next, and Shuikoushan is behind. The people in Zhangde are too naive, and currently there is nothing that can be done. The people in Hengyang are also too naive.

c) *Labor movement*: Because Changsha's factories have all closed down and workers are impoverished and most of them are scattered around, the textile, mint, lead, and other professional clubs have all stopped doing anything. The only thing to do is to reorganize the SYL. As far as other handicraft unions are concerned, we could only maintain the status quo. For four months, the situation in Anyuan has been pretty good. Workers can govern themselves under the supervision of the labor union, and the local military police has lost its functions. Also the labor union is not as isolated from society as it was before. Cooperatives are also gradually beginning to do well. Although the workers' extension school has yet to find an appropriate person to head it, workers occupy the leadership positions. There is also a special

class specializing in ideology and politics. There are seven schools for the children of workers, but the two schools in Zhu and Li are difficult to run because of the war. The thing to worry about at Anyuan is that the three companies there (Han, Ye, and Ping) all depend on the Japanese for their capital, and since the earthquake, this source has been cut off. Anyuan's unpaid wages have accumulated for over two months now, and whether there is going to be a work stoppage is not known. But the mines in Anyuan can be independent of each other: if Han and Ye close down, it is possible that Ping can remain open. But now it is not clear how to do this. It is possible to maintain the status quo of Shuikoushan's union. A cooperative has been set up but because of the traffic breakdown, it has not opened yet. Hengyang's Baiguo organized a peasant association with two or three thousand members, but because of traffic breakdowns both on the road and on the river, [we] cannot dispatch capable people to supervise it. The Jinjiazhuang mine, 45 *li* [about 15 miles] from Changsha, has several thousand workers. [We] already sent people to investigate and develop contacts. Once the war stops, [we] can proceed with it. . . .

7. Guangdong District

a) *National movement*: Since our delegate arrived in Guangdong in October,¹¹² the reorganization of the GMD has been progressing. As soon as our delegate got to Guangdong, he summoned the Executive Committee members and Central Bureau members stationed in Guangdong to discuss ways of GMD reorganization and vigorously to persuade Sun Yat-sen to convene the reorganization meeting. Sun Yat-sen convened this meeting [25 October], and five comrades attended it. The result of the meeting was that the majority did not oppose reorganization and hence the provisional executive committee of the GMD was formally set up on 28 October. Sun Yat-sen specially appointed nine committee members (one was our comrade [Tan Pingshan]) and five alternative members (one was our comrade [Li Dazhao]). On that day the first meeting was held, and the following were proposed for discussion: (1) the issue of district organizations within metropolitan Canton (now there are twelve districts, and our comrades have influence in four of them), (2) the issue of convening the national congress (scheduled for next January with six people from each province and one delegate from [each] overseas Chinese branch), (3) preparing for the publication of the GMD's weekly (already published), (4) the drafting of the party's Constitution (the draft version written by Liao Zhongkai appeared in the weekly), and (5) the issue of funds. In addition, an executive branch of the provisional committee was set up in Shanghai, and Wang Jingwei, Zhang Ji, Dai Jitao, Hu Hanmin, and Ye Chucang were elected to be members. Liao Zhongkai was dispatched to Shanghai to set a deadline for the founding meeting.¹¹³ The future task of the national movement in Guangdong is to regain sovereignty over the customs office, and now the GMD and the Canton government are so inclined. If there really is some development, this will be the first step toward conflict between the GMD and the imperialists.

b) *Labor movement*: Guangdong's labor movement has been gradually regressing

to its original state. For three years almost all economic activities have been tried, and slogans such as “Wage increases” and “Reduce working hours” are hardly appropriate any more. Currently, the only thing left to do is with the internal organization, but the organizational forms of the labor unions when they were founded were too loose or too archaic, and also members do not want unions any more. The majority of them cannot lead their members, and their anarchic conditions are no different from the time before the unions were set up. The unions of those smaller and less important professions have disintegrated on their own or exist in name only. Only the Construction Union, Oil Industry Union, Machine Industry Union, and the Canton-Hankou Railway Machine, and Materials Workers’ Association are relatively organized.

c) *Student movement*: [[It has been extremely difficult to gain influence among the student organizations in Canton. Further, despite getting the students to pledge support for various activities, it was difficult to get them actively involved in concrete support activities.]]

A.29 Resolution Concerning Implementation of the Plans for the Nationalist Movement (November 1923)¹¹⁴

The nationalist movement is the focus of our present work. This is because, at the present time, the labor, peasant, student, and women’s movements are all a part of the nationalist movement. Thus, in accordance with the resolution of the Congress [**Doc. A.23**], we have made the following plan for the nationalist movement:

1) The nationalist movement will concentrate on enlarging the membership of the GMD and rectifying its political tendencies since the nationalist movement needs a strong party to guide it.

a) Enlarging the organization: (i) In places where the GMD has a branch, our comrades join it, such as in Guangdong, Shanghai, and Sichuan. (ii) In places where the GMD has no branch, such as in Harbin, Fengtian, Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Zhejiang, and Fujian, our comrades should help them to set up branches. (iii) The newly set up branches should follow the program and constitution of the GMD’s Central Bureau and distribute party identification cards. As for branch names, the branch may make its own decision.

b) We should rectify the GMD’s political tendencies and, in accordance with the principle of nationalism as embodied in the Three Principles of the People, get them to oppose imperialism and conduct propaganda against it. In the nationalist movement, the movement to oppose imperialism is more important than the antiwarlord movement. Whenever there is conflict between the warlords and the imperialists, we should support the warlords.

c) Our relations with the GMD: (i) Our comrades have their own secret organi-

zations within the GMD party branches. Our comrades must follow our party's directions under all circumstances. (ii) We should try to occupy a central position in the GMD, but where this is not possible, we should not force the issue. (iii) In GMD branches where our comrades already occupy a central position, if the budget comes from the GMD, we should merely report expenditures to the GMD; if the budget comes from our own party, then we should only report to our own party.

2) The GMD is most certainly the central force in the nationalist movement. Its strength is built on the support of different people's organizations. We must establish or join the progressive organizations in the name of the GMD:

a) The peasantry. The peasantry is the strongest force in the nationalist movement. Thus, the GMD should use the nation's peasantry as its base and set up subbranches in the rural areas of every province. The movement's strategy will be to begin by educating the peasants, using the slogan "For the benefit of all peasants," and working on irrigation projects, protection against robbers, boycotting foreign goods, and resisting heavy taxes. At the present stage, we should begin with a struggle to improve the economic situation of the tenant farmers even if it causes resentment on the part of the middle peasants.

b) Workers. Labor unions deserve the same attention as we pay to party organization. We should nurse the workers' class consciousness.

c) Merchants. We should find out those, in the business association of the localities and big cities, who are against the bureaucratic elements.

d) Shop assistants. It is urgent that we set up shop-assistant associations in big cities such as Shanghai, Hankou, and Tianjin.

e) Government employees. As with the shop-assistant associations, associations of the lower-ranking government employees have a great influence in the cities.

f) Students. Students provide a key link between the different organizations. Students in junior high school have played an important role in the peasant movement.

A.30 Resolution Concerning Implementation of the Policies for the Labor Movement (November 1923)¹¹⁵

Since the February 7 Strike, most of the workers' organizations in north China have been destroyed. The workers are scared, and morale is low; some of them have been corrupted. In Shanghai, the industrial center of China, for various reasons the labor movement is still at a low ebb. In the south—Guangdong—most of the workers are actually artisans. Propaganda and organization among the sailors is in a bad way: members do not trust union leaders; there is confusion with finances, and conflicts among members are increasing. In light of this, we think that it would be unwise to go ahead with the National Labor Union. First, we should focus on rectifying and strengthening the industrial workers such as the railway workers, sailors, and

miners. When workers in these organizations have formed national organizations, they can form an alliance of the three groups of industrial workers. Only then will it be possible to form the National Labor Union. We must pay all our attention to making the alliance of these three groups of industrial workers the focus, and overcome laxness.

The current plan for organizing and strengthening these three groups of industrial workers is as follows:

1) Railways. The present railway committee will send comrades to the various railway lines or, as an alternative, the lines will select their own representatives to take charge of local meetings and to plan open or secret workers' organizations on these lines. Before the meetings, comrades in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Shandong, and Canton should speed up their efforts among the workers.

2) Sailors. (a) Comrades in Shanghai and among the Chinese students in France should carry out liaison and propaganda among the Ningbo sailors. (b) Comrades in Shanghai, Hankou, and Tianjin should make efforts to organize crews working along the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong and on the Yangtze river. (c) Comrades in Canton will make use of the strength to reform the National Union of Seamen and set up a GMD sailors' branch in Hong Kong to begin propaganda work and to reform the organizations there. An important part of the work in the sailors' movement is to circulate documents among Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

3) Miners. The miners' movement covers Fengtian, Zhili, Shandong, Henan, and Hunan (including Hubei and Jiangxi). The miners in Hunan have already been organized. With respect to Tangshan in Zhili, our comrades in Beijing and Tangshan should select some comrades to take charge of the organizational work. The comrades in Shandong should pay equal attention to the miners' movement in Fangzi, Boshan, Yixian, etc., and the railway workers' movement on the Beijing-Pukou and Jiaozhou-Jinan lines. We should set up party branches in Fengtian and restore the party branch in Zhangde, Hunan, to give us a point of departure for our work.

Notes to Commentary A

1. For an account of Li's influence see M. Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, and for Chen's see L. Feigon, *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party*. Beginning with the reevaluation of history that began in the PRC in the late 1970s, Li Da's importance in the founding of the party has been recognized by Chinese communist historians, as have his important theoretical contributions during the early phase. Indeed, he published and edited the party's first official organ, *The Communist*. See for example, Li Qiju et al., "Gongchandang yuekan yu Li Da tongzhi" and "Jiandang qianhou de Li Da tongzhi." For an assessment of his early ideas on the party and its role see H.J. van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Search for a New Political Order, 1920-1927*, pp. 62-65. On his contribution to the dissemination of Marxist ideas see V. Burov, "Li Da and the Dissemination of Marxist Ideas in China," pp. 102-13.

2. This is based on T. Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Henk Sneevliet (Alias Maring)*, vol. 1, pp. 41-44.

3. The visit was decided on with the agreement of the Comintern. K. Shevelyov, "On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China," p. 129. For an account of the origins of the CCP that lays special stress on the role of the Russians, see A. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*. For a contrasting view that stresses much more the indigenous roots of the Chinese communist movement, see van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*.

4. Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism*, p. 253.

5. It would appear that Voitinsky had no specific brief to establish a CP but that he suggested it after observing the situation in China. See Li Da, "Zhongguo gongchandang de faqi he diyici, dierci daibiao dahui jingguo de huiyi," p. 7, and Luo Zhanglong, "Huiyi dangde chengli shiqi de jige wenti," pp. 197-99.

6. For an interesting discussion of the study societies and their politicization, see van de Ven, *The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 84-120.

7. Formerly it was suggested that this group was founded in May, but this is more likely the founding date of the Marxist Research Society.

8. See T. Saich, "Through the Past Darkly: Some New Sources on the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party," pp. 167-76, for details concerning the founding of these organizations.

9. The Congress was attended by Li Da, Li Hanjun, Zhang Guotao (who acted as chair), Liu Renjing, Mao Zedong, He Shuheng, Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqiu, Wang Jinmei, Deng Enming, Zhou Fuhai, Chen Gongbo, and Bao Huiseng. With the exception of the last session, which was held on a boat at South Lake, Jiaying, for security reasons, Maring (Sneevliet) attended on behalf of the Comintern and Nikolsky on behalf of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. It is important to note that neither of the two key figures in the communist movement, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, attended the Congress.

10. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, p. 2.

11. "A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party," in C. M. Wilbur and J. How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927*, pp. 49-50.

12. In December 1920, Chen had left for Canton to take up the post of commissioner of education in Guangdong Province. The fact that Chen left Shanghai at such a vital time may indicate that he did not see the development of the party as his main priority at this time. According to Maring, it was the "representatives of the International" who called for Chen's return. This is contradicted by Zhang Guotao, who claimed that it was a decision made by the provisional Party Center. For Maring's view see below, "Report of Comrade H. Maring to the Executive," **Doc. A.8**; for Zhang's view see Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, p. 154.

13. Maring was an apt choice because he had worked for a number of years in the Dutch East Indies. There he had pioneered the cooperation between the communist movement and the loosely based party, Sarekat Islam. See Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 1, pp. 6-11.

14. Dalin had been in Canton during the months of April to June to help with arrangements for the Congress of the SYL. During this period he engaged in discussions about the feasibility of a united front with the GMD.

15. The Congress was attended by 12 delegates: Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Li Da, Xiang Ying, Cai Hesen, Deng Zhongxia, Gao Junyu, Shi Cuntong, Li Zhenying, Yang Mingzhai, Wang Jinmei, and Chen Wangdao. They represented some 195 party members. The Congress was also attended by a number of other party members including Deng Pei, Xiang Jingyu, Zhang Tailei, Deng Enming, and Lin Yunan. Wang Jianying, (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 8.

16. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Gao Junyu, and Deng Zhongxia were elected to full membership of the CEC with Li Hanjun, Li Dazhao, and Xiang Jingyu as alternates.

Chen was chair of the Central Bureau, Zhang the head of organization, Cai Hesen head of propaganda, and Xiang Jingyu head of the Women's Department.

17. *Protokoll des Vierten Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale*, p. 141.

18. Exact attendance at the Congress is unclear from documentary evidence, and the memoirs are contradictory. Most reliably it seems that some 30 delegates represented 420 members. A list of representatives contained among materials concerning the CCP Sixth Congress (1928) named the following: Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen, Qu Qiubai, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong, Wang Jun, Luo Zhanglong, He Mengxiong, Liu Renjing, Wang Zhongyi, Wang Yongchang, Xu Meikun, Tan Pingshan, Feng Jupao, Liu Ersong, Chen Tian, Zhang Dehui, Lin Yunan, Liu Tianguo, Chen Weiren, Zhang Tailei, and Li Dazhao. See Guangdong Museum of Revolutionary History (ed.), *Zhonggong "sanda" ziliao*, p. 98. In addition, the following probably attended: Xiang Jingyu, Xiang Ying, Zhu Shaolian, Zhang Lianguang, Wang Hebo, Chen Tanqiu, Deng Pei, Sun Yunpeng, Yun Daiying, Shi Wenbin, and Yu Shude.

19. In late November 1922, the Central Bureau of the party moved to Beijing to take advantage of Wu Peifu's patronage. Wu was seen by the Narkomindel as a "democrat" and a progressive force that could be worked with in the national movement. He had supported the labor movement and allowed the dissemination of communist propaganda in return for its support against opponents such as Zhang Zuolin. However, on 1 February 1923, troops broke up the meeting to establish a union for the Beijing-Hankou Railway. The resulting strike was brutally put down by soldiers under Wu Peifu's command.

20. For these reports see Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 603–19, 631–57, and 674–91.

21. For Cai's views see "Notes on Delegates' Comments at the Third Party Congress on the Question of Cooperation with the Kuomintang [Guomindang]," Sneevliet Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, nos. 275 and 276, in Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 577–85.

22. However, the fact that the crucial vote was carried by only 21 to 16 shows the persistence of deep opposition.

23. It is interesting to note that Zhang Guotao in his memoirs ignores the "Resolution" and only refers to the "Manifesto." This enables him to comment that while the CCP accepted the leading position of the GMD and expressed the hope that all revolutionary elements would rally around it, none of Maring's "high-sounding phrases" were adopted. Chang Kuot'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, p. 312.

24. The new full CEC members (with the number of votes received in parentheses) were as follows: Chen Duxiu (40), Cai Hesen (37), Li Dazhao (37), Wang Hebo (34), Mao Zedong (34), Zhu Shaolian (32), Tan Pingshan (30), Xiang Ying (27), and Luo Zhanglong (25). The alternate members were Deng Pei, Zhang Lianguang, Xu Meikun, Li Hanjun, and Deng Zhongxia. The Central Bureau was composed of Chen Duxiu, Mao Zedong, Cai Hesen, Tan Pingshan, and Luo Zhanglong. However, when the Central Bureau moved to Shanghai in late July 1923, Tan remained in Canton, and in September Wang Hebo took his place. Chen Duxiu was elected chair, Mao Zedong secretary, and Luo Zhanglong accountant. See Letter from Maring to the ECCI, Profintern, and the Vladivostok Bureau, 25 June 1923, Sneevliet Archives, no. 298, in Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 640–44.

25. To keep up the pressure, the CCP also issued a public statement to the same effect drafted by Chen Duxiu. "Zhongguo gongchandang duiyu shiju de zhuzhang" (Statement of the CCP on the Current Situation)—usually referred to as the Second Statement of the CCP the Current Situation), in *Xianqu* (The Pioneer), no. 24, 1 August 1923. *Xianqu* was the fortnightly journal of the SYL. It began publication on 15 January 1922 and ceased publication on 15 August 1923. A copy of the printed English version can be found in the Sneevliet Archives, no. 281.

26. Letter from Maring to J. Davtian and A. Joffe, 13 July 1923, in Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 2, pp. 674–81.

27. The meeting was attended by four of the five members of the Central Bureau (Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen, Wang Hebo, and Luo Zhanglong), one representative from the Beijing Committee (Li Dazhao) and the Hubei Committee (Xiang Ying), one representative of the SYL, and one "special visitor." See "Diyici zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui kaihui jiyao," in *Dangbao* (The Party Paper), 13 November 1923, pp. 1-2.

28. "Zhongguo gongchandang xuanyan," in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 1, pp. 1-5, translated back into Chinese from an English-language version that was kept in the archives in the Soviet Union of the CCP delegation to the Comintern. The fact that this version is in English suggests that one of the Comintern delegates, most probably Maring, sent it to Moscow.

29. The Congress of the Toilers of the Far East held in Moscow (21 January-2 February 1922). The Congress was conceived to counter the Washington Conference convened by the major powers to try to find a *modus vivendi* in the Far East.

30. There were two Zhangs in the delegation to the Congress, Zhang Tailei and Zhang Guotao. It is more likely that Zhang Tailei wrote this note as he was not only responsible for organizing Chinese participation, together with Maring, in this Congress, but was also the English translator at the Congress.

31. "Zhongguo gongchandang diyici daibiao dahui," in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 1, pp. 20-23. This report on the Congress lay in the archives of the Comintern until a copy of it was returned to China in 1957 along with a number of other documents. The status of the document as official or unofficial is unclear, as is its authorship. Dong Biwu, one of the participants at the Congress, attested to its authenticity on at least three occasions. The report appears to have been written by one of the participants at the Congress shortly after it was concluded.

The documents of the First Party Congress were never formally published. According to Dong Biwu, Maring took the copies of the documents away with him and sent them to the Comintern. (Dong Biwu, "Dong Biwu tan Zhongguo gongchandang diyici quanguo daibiao dahui he Hubei gongchanzhuyi xiaozu," pp. 366-67.) If this is correct, it would explain the presence of the documents in the Comintern Archives.

The Russian text from which the Chinese was translated can be found in E.F. Kovalev, "Novye materialy opervom s'ezde kommunisticheskoi partii Kitaia," *Narody Azii i Afriki: Istoria, ekonomika, kul'tura*, no. 6 (1972), 150-58.

32. Six "small groups" had been set up in China. In order of founding they were in Shanghai, Beijing, Hubei (Wuhan), Hunan, Canton, and Shandong (Jinan). "Small groups" had also been set up in Paris and Tokyo. It is unclear which groups are meant here. The reference could be to the six groups formed in China, or it may refer to the six mentioned in the text. In the latter case Shanghai would be excluded from the list, perhaps indicating that it saw itself as the Party Center rather than as a group. In addition to these groups, a quite independent group calling itself communist existed in Sichuan.

33. Although this account mentions twelve representatives, it is certain that thirteen people attended the Congress from Chinese organizations. The person around whom the confusion revolves is Bao Huiseng. While it is certain that he attended, his status is unclear. The line-up at the Congress was as follows:

<i>Locality or Organization</i>	<i>Name</i>
Shanghai	Li Da, Li Hanjun
Beijing	Zhang Guotao, Liu Renjing
Wuhan	Dong Biwu, Chen Tanqiu
Hunan	Mao Zedong, He Shuheng
Canton	Chen Gongbo
Shandong	Wang Jinmei, Deng Enming
Tokyo	Zhou Fuhai
Unattached	Bao Huiseng
Comintern	Maring
Far Eastern Secretariat, at Irkutsk	Nikolsky

34. The text actually uses Maring's real name—Sneevliet—rather than the name he adopted for Comintern work.

35. The Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern in Irkutsk was established following a January 1921 decision of the ECCI and began functioning in late February or early March.

36. This was Li Hanjun's home. It was the night of 30 July 1921.

37. The final session was convened on a boat on South Lake, Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province. For details about the convening of this session see Wang Huiwu, "Yida zai Nanhu kaihui de qingkuang," pp. 56–57. Wang, the wife of Li Hanjun, made the arrangements for the final session.

38. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and Li Da. Chen was elected secretary, Zhang head of the Organization Department, and Li head of the Propaganda Department.

39. This document is taken from the original English-language version in Ch'en Kung-po [Chen Gongbo], *The Communist Movement in China: An Essay Written in 1924 by Ch'en Kung-po*, pp. 102–3, published by Octagon Books, a division of Hippocrene Books, Inc. I would like to thank them for permission to reprint it here. This essay was Chen's M.A. thesis at Columbia University and was edited for publication by Professor C.M. Wilbur. The program appears as appendix one. A Russian-language version of this document was returned to the CCP archives by the Soviets in 1957 together with copies of the documents included here as A.2 and A.4. A translation of the Russian version of the program can be found in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 1, pp. 6–8. Interestingly, in both the English and Russian versions, clause 11 is missing.

40. This is taken from the original English version published as appendix two of Chen Gongbo's thesis, Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, published by Octagon Books, a division of Hippocrene Books, Inc. I would like to thank them for permission to reprint it here. A translation of a Russian version of the same document that was returned to China in 1957 can be found in *Yida qianhou*, pp. 12–14. The two versions are effectively identical.

41. "Beijing gongchanzhuyi xiaozu de baogao," in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 3, pp. 1–9. The report was presented by Zhang Guotao to the First Party Congress in his capacity as the senior Beijing delegate. The first two days of the Congress were taken up by listening to reports by the local small groups. This report is translated back into Chinese from Russian. It was returned to China from the Archives of the Chinese Delegation to the Comintern held in Moscow.

42. *Baihua* refers to the common form of speech. Previously, literature had been written in the classical style, thus making it inaccessible to the ordinary people. A strong component of the radical movement that developed during the second decade of the twentieth century was the conscious adoption of popular patterns of speech in written works.

43. As a result of the Paris Peace Conference, convened in January 1919, the decision was made at Versailles in April to give the former German concession in Shandong to Japan rather than return it to China. Anger at this decision sparked the May Fourth Incident when patriotic Chinese demonstrated in Beijing to protest the situation. The Incident gave its name to the broader social movement of the years 1915–19. For the fullest account of the Movement and its context see Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*.

44. "Guangzhou gongchandang de baogao," in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 3, pp. 10–14. This report was delivered to the First Party Congress by Chen Gongbo. The report was translated back into Chinese from Russian. A copy of the report was returned to China from the Archives of the Chinese Delegation to the Comintern that are kept in Moscow.

45. This is puzzling as the paper edited by Chen was *Qunbao* (The Masses). Perhaps the name has been changed in the process of translation from Chinese to Russian and back again to Chinese.

46. This is probably *Laodongzhe* (The Worker), which began publication on 3 October 1920 and continued publication until 2 January 1921. It is unclear which journal is referred to below under this name.

47. Huang himself was one of the leading anarchists in Canton.

48. The transliterations in the Chinese text are Bie Si-lin and Mi Nuo-er. The Soviet historian Professor Shevelyov identifies these two as Stoyanovich and Perlin. Shevelyov, "On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China," p. 130. It is not clear whether person "B" referred to above is also Stoyanovich.

49. Chen left Shanghai on 16 December 1920 to take up the post of commissioner of education for Guangdong Province.

50. This presumably refers to the Shanghai-based *Gongchandang* monthly that began in November 1920 and ceased publication in July 1921. It was edited by the Shanghai communist group.

51. Chen was the governor of Guangdong and had invited Chen Duxiu to become the province's education commissioner.

52. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyangju tonggao—guanyu jianli yu fazhan dang, tuan, gonghui zuzhi ji xuanchuan gongzuo deng," in *Yida qianhou*, vol. 1, pp. 24–25.

53. According to the "Program," either when membership exceeded 500 or when five local executive committees had been set up, the CEC would be organized. See above, "The First Program of the CCP," **Doc. A.3**.

54. "Bericht des Genossen H. Maring für die Executive." The original copy of this document in German is in the van Ravesteyn Archives, at the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. This is the report Sneevliet delivered to the ECCI in Moscow on 11 July 1922. It sums up his work during his first year for the Comintern in China. The extracts translated here only concern his trip to visit Sun Yat-sen's headquarters in South China. In the first part, the report deals with work in Shanghai from June until December 1921. The full report also deals with his work related to Korea, Japan, Java, Indochina, and the Philippines. A full English translation can be found in Saich, *The Origins of the First United Front in China*, vol. 1, pp. 305–25.

55. This was the Hong Kong Sailors' Strike, which lasted from 12 January to 5 May 1922. The strike ended in a significant victory for the seamen, who won a 15 to 30 percent wage increase.

56. This refers to the strike at the Hua Shi Spinning Company that began on 13 January 1922. Although an agreement was reached on 16 January, it did not prevent the provincial governor from ordering the execution of the two leaders, Huang Ai and Pang Renquan.

57. Maring is clearly referring to the GMD and not the CCP.

58. The pejorative meaning of the term *dujun* used by Maring was warlord. Its literal meaning was military governor.

59. This was not true. The strike was led by Su Zhaozheng and Li Weimin who, at the time, were not members of any political party.

60. Sun Yat-sen, *The International Development of China*.

61. This was in 1913 during the "second revolution." The dismissal, by Yuan Shikai, of the GMD governors of Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces caused a military uprising against Yuan. The uprising had collapsed by September, and most of its supporters were driven into hiding. In November 1913, following his election to the presidency, Yuan ordered the GMD to be dissolved.

62. On 1 September 1917, Sun Yat-sen was elected grand marshal of the military government in Canton. Sun resigned from the government in April 1918.

63. Sun Yat-sen was driven out by Chen Jiongming in June 1922. He remained on a gunboat in Canton waters until leaving for Shanghai on 9 August.

64. Maring was appointed representative for the Comintern and Profintern in Canton.

65. This letter has been translated from a copy of the original kept in the Central Archives of the PRC (formerly, the Central Party Archives), Beijing. A copy of the Chinese original can be found in the Sneevliet Archives, Amsterdam.

66. "Zhongguo gongchandang duiyu shiju de zhuzhang," originally published in *Xianqu*, 20 June 1922. This document is more often referred to as "The First Statement of the CCP

on the Current Situation" to avoid confusion with later statements. A reprint of the statement can be found in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 37–48.

67. The Beiyang militarists derived their name from the new imperial army trained by Yuan Shikai from 1895. The army formed the basis of the Beiyang clique. Five early officers, apart from Yuan, became president or premier of the Republic.

68. In June 1922 Xu was forced to resign as president by Wu Peifu.

69. The system of provincial transit taxes on domestic trade.

70. "Guanyu 'minzhu de lianhe zhanxian' de yijuean," in *Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui jueyian*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1922. It is reprinted in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 66–68. The text is virtually identical with that published in Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, pp. 119–21. Minor discrepancies can be accounted for in the process of translation. The main difference is the translation of the term *minzhu*. Chen uses "nationalist" for this term, whereas in this document "democratic" is preferred. However, the two do seem to have been used interchangeably at the time, and the resolution implies that the democratic elements who are referred to are primarily those of the GMD.

71. "Revolutionary" is used here although the Chinese term *gexin* literally means "innovative."

72. "Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui xuanyan," originally published in 1926 in *Zhongguo gongchandang wunianlai zhi zhengzhi zhuzhang*. A reprint of this version can be found in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 92–107.

73. The provinces of Liaoning (formerly Fengtian), Jilin, and Heilongjiang that were under the control of Zhang Zuolin.

74. "Guanyu yihui xingdong jueyian," in *Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui jueyian*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1922. Reprinted in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 73–75.

75. "Guanyu gongchandang de zuzhi zhangcheng jueyian," in *Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui jueyian*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1922. Reprinted in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 85–86.

76. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng," in *Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui jueyian*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1922. Reprinted in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 86–91.

77. "Guanyu 'gonghui yundong yu gongchandang' de yijuean," in *Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo dahui jueyian*, published by the CEC CCP, July 1922. Reprinted in "Erda" he "sanda," pp. 75–80.

78. This is the instruction which Maring took back to China and which formed the basis of discussions at Hangzhou about communist entry into the GMD. According to Maring, the instruction was written by Radek on the basis of Maring's statements about China. See letter from H. Maring to G. Zinoviev, N. Bukharin, and K. Radek, 20 June 1923, Sneevliet Archives, no. 231.

This version is handwritten in English by Maring and is held in the Sneevliet Archives, no. 224. Misspellings have been retained from the original.

A slightly different version of this document was published in Moscow in 1969. Importantly, this version does not include points five and six. See *Komintern i vostok: bor'ba za Leninskuiu strategiiu i taktika v natsionalno osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii*, pp. 252 and 302. This version is probably the official version written by Radek.

79. The Russian version begins, "Based on Maring's report."

80. The Theses on the National and Colonial Question adopted at the Comintern's Second Congress (July–August 1920).

81. The following sentence is missing from the Russian version.

82. The previous sentence is missing from the Russian version.

83. This document was written by Chen Duxiu in November 1922, when he was in

Moscow to attend the Comintern's Fourth Congress. The original is a typed document in English and is in the Sneevliet Archives, no. 271. A Chinese version of this document can be found in "*Erda*" he "*sanda*," pp. 140–45. However, it is dated January 1923 and is not attributed to Chen Duxiu.

84. "Chen Duxiu tongzhi daibiao Zhonggong zhongyang xiang disanci daibiao huiyi de baogao," in Guangdong Museum of Revolutionary History (ed.), *Zhonggong "sanda" ziliao*, pp. 56–62. The Chinese version of this report is a translation from the Russian. It is dated 18 August but, as the Chinese editors have pointed out, this is a mistake.

85. The Hangzhou Plenum (28–30 August 1922) called by Maring to discuss the united front with the GMD. The suggestion to enlarge the CEC was made by Maring.

86. The strike was brutally put down by Wu Peifu's supporters on 7 February 1923, and the CEC moved back to Shanghai in the second half of the month.

87. *Xiangdao zhoubao* (The Guide Weekly) that began publication in September 1922.

88. At the Hangzhou Plenum it was proposed to set up the *Yuandong ribao* (Far East Daily) but the idea was opposed by Maring.

89. *Qianfeng*, the first issue of which was published on 15 July 1923. It was not a success. It published only three issues before ceasing publication in early 1924.

90. This refers to the August 1922 "Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South China." For the text of the "Instructions" see **Doc. A.17**.

91. It seems that the number 13 is a mistake in the original that has been corrected.

92. This refers to the Canton party branch's support for Chen Jiongming even after he had driven Sun Yat-sen out of office in June 1922.

93. This is Maring's speech to the Third Party Congress on the question of cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. The original typed English version is in the Sneevliet Archives, no. 277. Misspellings have been left as in the original.

94. For the August Instructions see **Doc. A.17**. The ECCI January Resolution can be found in X.J. Eudin and R.C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey*, pp. 343–44.

95. Mao Zedong, Wang Hebo, Deng Pei, and Wang Yongzhang.

96. Zhang Guotao wrote this letter in English. We are grateful to the relevant Chinese authorities for providing a copy of the original. The original is in the Central Archives, Beijing; a copy can be found in the Sneevliet Archives. Misspellings have been left as in the original.

97. The convocation of a National Assembly in Shanghai was a demand of the Communists that was presented to Sun Yat-sen. In June 1923 in a letter to Sun, five members of the CEC called on him to leave Canton for Shanghai to convene a National Assembly. See **Doc. A.26**. In July, they made a public appeal for a National Assembly in their "Statement on the Current Political Situation."

98. The First National Congress of the GMD convened in Canton from 20 to 30 January 1924. It confirmed the reorganization of the GMD on the basis of a plan worked out by the provisional CEC following the advice of the Comintern representative, Borodin.

99. "Zhongguo gongchandang disanci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan," in *The Guide Weekly*, no. 30 (20 June 1923): 228.

100. "Guanyu guomin yundong ji Guomindang wenti de yijuean," in *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci quanguo daibiao dahui jueyian ji xuanyan*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1923. Reprinted in "*Erda*" he "*sanda*," pp. 181–82.

101. This refers to the January Resolution of the ECCI. It is important to note that the May Directive of the ECCI to the CCP did not arrive in Shanghai until 18 July 1923, after the Congress had ended.

102. "Zhongguo gongchandang diyici xiuzheng zhangcheng," in *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci quanguo dahui jueyian ji xuanyan*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1923. Reprinted in "*Erda*" he "*sanda*," pp. 188–92.

103. “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui zuzhi fa,” in *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci quanguo dahui jueyian ji xuanyan*, published by the CCP CEC, July 1923. Reprinted in “*Erda*” he “*sanda*,” pp. 187–88.

104. This letter was sent by Maring from Canton with a covering letter to G. Zinoviev, N. Bukharin, A. Joffe, and J. Davtian. Maring translated the letter into German from English. The letter here is translated from the German version that is in the Sneeveliet Archives, no. 280. All the Chinese signatories were members of the GMD.

105. Clearly they are referring to the GMD and not the CCP.

106. “Zhongju baogao,” in *Dangbao*, no. 1 (30 November 1923): 2–3. This is the report of the Central Bureau to the first meeting of the CEC elected by the Third Party Congress. The meeting was held on 24–25 November 1923 in Shanghai. It was attended by Central Bureau members Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen, Wang Hebo, and Luo Zhanglong. Li Dazhao attended on behalf of the Beijing committee and Xiang Ying on behalf of the Hubei committee. Also, a representative of the SYL was present, as was a “special guest.”

107. This was “Zhongguo gongchandang duiyu shiju de zhuzhang,” in *Xianqu*, no. 24 (1 August 1923). A copy of the printed English version can be found in the Sneeveliet Archives, No. 281.

108. The conference for the reorganization of the GMD was held between 20 and 30 January 1924 with a break to mourn the death of Lenin.

109. A total of eight reports were made to the November CEC meeting. Included here are the Beijing, Shanghai, Hunan, and Guangdong reports. Excluded are the Hubei, Shandong, Harbin, and SYL reports. All the reports can be found in *Dangbao*, no. 1 (30 November 1923): 3–5.

110. Wang had taken over as head of the Beijing area executive committee in January 1923. An was a member of the committee.

111. Fan was chair of the Beijing area executive committee after the Third Party Congress until March 1924, when he was replaced by Li Dazhao. Gao was secretary until he was replaced by Cai Hesen, also in March.

112. Presumably, this is referring to Borodin, who had been sent by Soviet Russia to oversee the work of cooperation with the GMD.

113. Liao and Borodin actually left for Shanghai from Canton on 28 November. I am grateful to Professor Wilbur for this information.

114. “Guomin yundong jinxing jihua jueyian,” in *Dangbao*, no. 1 (30 November 1923): 7–8. This resolution was adopted at the first meeting of the CEC elected by the Third Party Congress held in Shanghai on 24–25 November.

115. “Laodong yundong jinxing fangzhen jueyian,” in *Dangbao*, no. 1 (30 November 1923): 8. This resolution was adopted at the first meeting of the CEC elected by the Third Party Congress, 24–25 November.

Commentary B

Cooperation and Conflict with the Nationalists: The United Front in Action, 1924–July 1927

The Comintern directives of January and May 1923 and the relevant decisions adopted at the CCP's Third Congress sketched the strategy and tactics to be followed in cooperating with the GMD during the national revolution. The main targets of the revolution were imperialism and its Chinese supporters. While fighting these enemies, the CCP was to strengthen its position within the GMD and more broadly within the nationalist movement through CCP control of the peasant and labor movements. To use Stalin's metaphor, the GMD-right would be squeezed like a lemon and flung aside. All acknowledged that a time would come when the interests of the bourgeoisie at the head of the nationalist movement would clash with those of the proletariat. At this point, the representatives of the proletariat were to cease the temporary cooperation and take over leadership. Deciding when this time had come proved difficult, and it was Chiang Kai-shek who acted first, putting down the CCP-led workers' movement in Shanghai in April 1927.

Initially, the United Front had proved very successful for the small group of Communists. Between January 1924 and May 1926, communist influence in the GMD grew steadily. Communist influence in the urban areas received a boost from the nationalist demonstrations of the May 30 Movement (1925). The protection of the nationalist armies in the south helped the CCP to develop its influence among the peasantry. CCP membership rose from just under 1,000 in January 1925 to almost 58,000 by April 1927.

The CCP's success was one major reason for its undoing. Some GMD leaders came to see it as a significant threat to their leadership of the revolution. The increasing revolutionary activity in the countryside unsettled those GMD leaders who did not favor a complete breakup of the traditional power structure. In fact, the CCP was caught between the consequences of conflicting objectives. On the one hand, it was trying to promote the national revolution in cooperation with the GMD while on the other it was also pursuing a social revolution that brought it into conflict with powerful elements within the GMD. As the CCP tried to restructure the GMD in order to attain its own goals, opposition within the GMD to CCP membership strengthened. This conflict with the CCP and a reassessment of cooperation were accompanied by a growing rift between the left and right wings of the GMD and the concentration of military power in the hands of

the emerging leader of the GMD-right—Chiang Kai-shek.

The CCP was also divided on the policy of cooperation with the GMD. The situation looked quite different to Chen Duxiu, Voitinsky, and the Party Center working illegally among the proletariat in Shanghai than it did to Borodin and the Communists working openly in Canton under GMD protection and developing the peasant movement. Borodin spoke of this conflict in Moscow in 1930 during his self-defense against accusations of counterrevolutionary behavior. He remarked that there had been “two lines in the Chinese revolution,” one in Shanghai and one in Canton.¹ Friction between these two rival centers undermined the party’s capacity to act coherently when threatened by opponents in the GMD. While Chen Duxiu, on a number of occasions, called for the withdrawal of CCP members from the GMD and the creation of an open GMD-CCP alliance, the Canton party organization called for the takeover of the GMD leadership. The situation was complicated by the Comintern’s repeated insistence that the CCP remain within the GMD while, at the same time, strengthening its independent position among the mass movements.

Communist influence within the GMD was helped by the aid Soviet Russia was willing to donate and by the reorganization of the GMD into a Leninist-style party. Borodin had been sent to monitor this work. Unlike Maring, he was not merely a Comintern representative but was sent by the Soviet government and also represented the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).² Arriving in Canton early in October 1923, Borodin immediately set to work. His first task was to bring about the reorganization of the GMD, and in this endeavor he found Sun Yat-sen’s willing support. Borodin acted as adviser to the Provisional CEC set up in late October by Sun Yat-sen to draw up plans for party reorganization and to prepare for the national GMD congress. It was Borodin who provided the draft of the GMD Constitution.³

GMD reorganization reached its fruition at its First National Congress (January 1924). The Congress shifted the GMD to the left with a Manifesto that stressed the themes of anti-imperialism and antiwarlordism and appealed for far-reaching political, economic, and social reforms. The Communists were reasonably represented in the GMD’s leading bodies. Three were elected to the twenty-four-person CEC and seven to the sixteen alternates.⁴ Communists headed two of the GMD’s eight central bureaus—organization (Tan Pingshan) and peasantry (Lin Boqu).

(a) The CCP CEC Tries to Separate Right from Left Within the GMD (May 1924)

Despite this progress, the CCP was aware that the “rightist majority” in the GMD was opposed to its members being in the GMD. As a result, the first enlarged meeting of the CCP’s CEC (14–16 May 1924) decided on an important shift in the tactic of working within the GMD.⁵ Previously, the GMD had been treated as a homogeneous organization. Now, it was divided into a friendly left wing and a hostile right wing (**Doc. B.1**). CCP members were defined as the backbone of the

left, thus making the clash, in reality, one between the CCP and the GMD-right. However, caution was urged in dealing with the right. Open struggle was to be avoided but criticism within the GMD and in the CCP press was to be used to push the GMD back onto the road of the anti-imperialist struggle. All means were to be used to strengthen the GMD-left. Shortly after entering the GMD, the CCP had formed secret organizations to maintain discipline. This is confirmed by the report to the meeting of the Anyang party organization. The report cautioned, however, that "comrades" in leading positions in the GMD were to avoid creating the suspicion of monopolizing power and of manipulation.⁶ The new policy position dividing the GMD into a left and a right wing was disseminated throughout the party in the latter part of July 1924 (**Doc. B.2**). This secret circular stressed the need to strengthen the left of the GMD at the expense of the right and even hinted at the creation of a new GMD. The CCP sought constantly for signs of the development of a GMD-left that it could support.

The meeting also addressed the question of how to revitalize the labor movement. The resolution on the labor movement reaffirmed concentration of work on the triumvirate of railway workers, miners, and sailors and called for the creation of large organizations based on ten-person organizational units (**Doc. B.3**). The party was to pay particular attention to these small groups as they would determine the character of the whole union. Interestingly, since the proletariat was defined as the basis of the CCP, the party was not to help the GMD to penetrate the industrial proletariat organizationally. However, the GMD could be helped to organize unions for shop assistants and handicraft workers. The report of the Shanghai party organization shows the difficulties the party was encountering in practice when trying to organize the proletariat in China's main industrial center (**Doc. B.4**).

The expansion of party work led to the proposal that specialized departments for organization, propaganda, and the worker and peasant movement be set up under the Central Bureau. These departments were also to be set up at the area level. In addition, an editorial committee was to be established that would report to the full CEC. It was to be in charge of all newspapers, etc., of the Party Center.⁷

In the latter part of 1924, a major power shift in Beijing appeared to offer a favorable opportunity for the nationalist movement in general and for Sun Yat-sen in particular to exert influence on the national stage. In October 1924 a subordinate of Wu Peifu, Feng Yuxiang, disobeyed orders to march against Zhang Zuolin, the head of the Fengtian clique. Instead, Feng formed an alliance with Zhang and together they seized power in Beijing. This resulted in the fall of Wu and the collapse of the Zhili clique in north China. Sun Yat-sen, invited to the capital to participate in discussions on China's reunification, arrived on 31 December 1924 with the intention to establish a National Assembly composed of delegates from mass organizations, chambers of commerce, and armies opposed to Wu Peifu. This, it will be remembered, was something that the CCP had tried, to no avail, to impress on Sun in June 1923. However, the negotiations did not go well. On 24 November 1924, Duan Qirui took over the government, replacing Cao Kun. Instead of the

National Assembly, Duan favored convening a “National Rehabilitation Conference.” Sun opposed this because it would exclude representatives from the mass organizations and would favor the militarists.⁸ On 1 February 1925, the Conference was convened and led to a break between Duan and the GMD.

Despite previous support for a National Assembly, Sun’s trip to Beijing created divisions in the CCP. Chen Duxiu and the Party Center opposed the trip, feeling that Sun should remain in Canton to consolidate the achievements of the revolution. Borodin and the Canton Communists thought that by going to Beijing Sun would expand the movement’s influence.⁹ Borodin’s view prevailed and the CCP began publicly to support the calls for a National Assembly.

(b) The CCP Fourth Party Congress (January 1925) Prepares for a Rising Tide of Revolution

Under these circumstances, CCP delegates to the Fourth Party Congress gathered in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925.¹⁰ The tone of the Congress was optimistic. Both the Manifesto and the Resolution on the CEC Report adopted by the Congress predicted that the divisions among the militarists and the conflicts between the imperialist nations in China would provide the mass movement with an excellent chance for expansion (the Resolution is included here as **Doc. B.5**). The Congress Manifesto, in particular, stressed the desire of the urban masses to convene the National Assembly.¹¹

The Congress tried to prepare the party for dealing with the new high tide of revolutionary activity which it predicted would occur. In particular, the Congress sought to clarify the relationship of the CCP to the national revolutionary movement, to define more clearly labor and peasant policies, and to adjust the party’s organizational structure.

The Congress reviewed the national revolutionary movement to date and tried to outline the correct policy for the CCP with respect to the GMD (**Doc. B.6**). Many CCP members were finding it difficult to strike a balance between developing the GMD in the nationalist movement while not ignoring the CCP’s own agenda. This tension persisted until the two parties split in 1927. The resolution reflects Chen Duxiu’s caution about CCP involvement with the GMD. While “leftist” mistakes included continuing to promote the proletarian revolution and opposing entry into the GMD and the nationalist revolution for fear that the CCP would become a “yellow” party, “rightist” mistakes were defined as being more dangerous. The tendency among members to think that concentration on the nationalist movement and the GMD meant ignoring the CCP’s own work was criticized, as was the belief that a policy of compromise between capital and labor should be pursued.

In contrast to the May 1924 division of the GMD into a left and a right (**Doc. B.2**), a center was now discovered. The left comprised the workers, peasants, and radical intellectuals; the right comprised the military, bureaucrats, politicians, and capitalists; and the center consisted of the revolutionary elements in the “petty

bourgeois intellectual class.” This center was deemed important because although numerically weak, its members occupied leading positions in the GMD. The CCP’s task was to expand the GMD-left. However, this was not to lead to the neglect of opposition to imperialism and the economic struggles of the peasantry and the working class.

Communist strength was still seen to be in the labor movement. The movement was said to be entering a new phase that would offer opportunities for expansion (**Doc. B.7**). Although the labor movement was seen as the key component in the nationalist revolution, the resolution adopted made it clear that preservation of its independence was most important. In fact, the Canton Communists were criticized for allowing the labor movement to lose its independence, a problem that was claimed to have been corrected at the May 1924 enlarged CEC meeting.

The creation of a strong, independent labor organization would ensure CCP dominance of the nationalist movement, as it was, by self-definition, “the leader of the working class.” Thus the CCP’s first task was to organize labor unions and promote class-based propaganda. The use of party branches at the workplace was stressed. They were to ensure that party policy was carried out and to guide work in the labor unions and the small groups in the factories. In the future, all factories, etc., in which there were three or more members would be able to form a party branch.

The development of the peasant movement in areas under GMD control in south China caused the Congress to adopt the party’s most extensive resolution on the peasantry to date (**Doc. B.8**). However, it still did not provide a concrete plan of action. The special place of the peasantry in the Chinese revolutionary movement was acknowledged, and its participation was seen as vital for success. While expressing support for GMD policy in the south, the resolution criticized the GMD for using the peasantry for its own ends. It claimed that the GMD organized peasant associations in areas where it needed their support but did not force landlords to give way to the peasantry; nor did the GMD sufficiently protect the economic and political rights of the peasantry. The resolution provides a good example of the ambiguity concerning work within the United Front. At one moment it is calling for the use of the GMD’s organization; the next it is chiding the GMD and then calls for independent action. It is not surprising that some comrades were confused about the exact relationship of their work to that of the GMD. The resolution also criticized the policy of the Canton Communists. It claimed that their stress on the role of the GMD had caused the peasantry to doubt its own strength and to fail to understand its own class position. This had caused the peasantry to become disappointed with the CCP.

The Congress also adopted a new Constitution to tighten up organization and to ratify changes adopted at the May 1924 meeting (**Doc. B.9**). Indeed, the resolution on organization adopted by the Congress defined it as the most important question concerning the party’s “survival and development.” Improvements in organization would enable the party to break out from being merely a collection of “small

propaganda groups.” In particular, the resolution stressed the role of the branch as the basic unit of party organization.¹² To recruit more workers and peasants, membership procedures were to be relaxed. In the future, it would not be necessary for prospective members to pass through the SYL, and “class-conscious elements” would be able to join the party directly. The party was to be enlarged at the local level by changing the requirement that five members were necessary to form a cell (*xiaozu*) to only three being needed to form a branch (*zhibu*). This emphasis on the branch marked an attempt to change the party from being area-based to being occupation-based. To control party activities in other organizations such as the GMD, the formation of party fractions (*dangtuan*) was confirmed.

In line with the new Constitution, the Congress elected a new CEC of nine members with five alternates. Chen Duxiu was elected general secretary by the CEC, the post replacing that of chair of the Central Bureau.¹³

The Congress provided a set of resolutions and organizational changes which it hoped would help the party cope with the expected upsurge in the revolutionary movement. Despite the collapse of the talks in Beijing and Sun Yat-sen’s death (12 March 1925), events took an even more radical turn than expected. The May 30 Movement (1925) witnessed a massive upsurge in nationalist sentiment and provided the party with a chance for rapid expansion, particularly in urban Shanghai. However, the movement brought with it new headaches as the Party Center tried to grapple with the new situation and the influx of members.

In February 1925 a strike began against the Japanese-owned textile mills in Shanghai. After simmering for a few months, it exploded on 15 May when a factory guard killed one of the strikers and wounded others. Incidents spread as did injuries and arrests, and on 28 May the CCP together with other organizations called for coordinated demonstrations to take place on 30 May. International Settlement police opened fire on the demonstrators, killing ten and wounding and arresting many others. In an attempt to gain control of the movement, the CCP set up the Shanghai General Labor Union.¹⁴ The movement in Shanghai continued until July when it began to wind down, and by mid-September the General Labor Union had been forcibly closed down and the CCP leadership had gone underground. The movement spread to other cities and caused the Hong Kong–Canton strike that lasted from June 1925 until October 1926. Communist influence spread as a result of the movement, and party membership increased from 994 at the time of the Congress to some 3,000 in October 1925.¹⁵

(c) The CCP CEC in October 1925 Moves to Expand Party Membership

In October 1925, an enlarged CEC meeting convened to consider the implications for the party of the May 30 Movement.¹⁶ The resolution on the current situation adopted by the meeting decided that events had provided an excellent opportunity for expanding the national revolutionary movement and concluded that the working

class had clearly proved its leading role (**Doc. B.10**). The resolution also suggested that young workers be organized into armed groups of ten or 100 with a military committee set up under the CEC.

In light of developments, the party's main task was to expand its ranks and transform itself from a "small group" into a "central mass political party" (**Doc. B.11**). This transformation was to be completed in the shortest possible time. To help expand membership, procedures for joining the party were to be relaxed further than at the Fourth Party Congress. Complicated membership procedures were to be waived for revolutionary workers, students, and peasants. To encourage more workers and peasants to join the party, their probation period was reduced to one month, while intellectuals had to wait for three months (previously three and six months). The idea of some party members that all new recruits should have an understanding of Marxism was criticized; workers in large-scale industries were said to be natural CP members. As long as they had class consciousness and loyalty to the revolution, they could join the party without having to satisfy other criteria.

This stress on expanding its own membership did not mean, however, that the CCP was to sever relations with the GMD. Expansion of the CCP apparatus was seen as conducive to the policy of allying with the left against the right of the GMD (**Doc. B.12**). Clearly, many party members were still confused by the policy, and the meeting again tried to clarify the divisions in the GMD. The Fourth Party Congress (January 1925) analysis dividing the GMD into left, center, and right was said to be erroneous both theoretically and strategically. GMD members had interpreted the distinction as meaning that the CCP was the left of the GMD and thus they saw themselves as the center. On the other hand, "genuine rightists" considered themselves to belong to the center. Now the GMD was defined as having only a left and a right with many on the right having become reactionaries.¹⁷ To make the distinction clear to party members, the resolution provided them with a simple guide to policy positions of the three groups. However, the Party Center had not resolved its own confusion—in its proclamation to the peasantry, it referred to landlords and businessmen who colluded with *the center and the right* of the GMD.

The question of the peasantry was addressed at some length at the meeting (**Doc. B.13**). The proclamation for the peasantry stated that the fundamental solution to the problems they faced was land confiscation. However, only the land of big landlords, warlords, bureaucrats, and the churches was to be taken. An eight-point program for the peasantry's minimum demands was outlined. It was based on experience in the south and developed the ideas put forward by Chen Duxiu in November 1922 (see **Doc. A.18**). It called for recognition of peasant associations and the establishment of elected self-governing bodies in the countryside, the setting of maximum rents and minimal grain prices by the associations and self-governing bodies, the provision of interest-free loans to the peasantry, special funding for river control, and the creation of armed peasant self-defense corps. Despite this stress on the peasantry, the main revolutionary force was still the working class.

The proclamation for the peasantry made it clear that to achieve its aims it must ally with the working class.

Tensions between the Canton party apparatus and the Party Center rose to the surface at the meeting. Naturally, Canton was acknowledged as an important place for the nationalist revolution, but the meeting was critical of various aspects of the comrades' work there. The Guangdong area was criticized for not consolidating and expanding the party during the revolutionary upsurge. Party members were said to work individually in labor unions, in peasant associations, and among troops under the control of the GMD (**Doc. B.10**). As a result, a critical resolution on the Guangdong area's report was adopted by the meeting. The problems with work in Guangdong meant that the masses did not see CCP members as being distinct from the GMD, and the CCP appeared to the people as a "shadow" wearing the mask of the GMD. The most important task for the area organization was to rapidly expand the number of party members. To ensure that the wishes of the Party Center were being carried out, it would send a "capable comrade" to help the area improve its organizational work.¹⁸

Organizationally, the meeting recognized the importance of the peasant movement by splitting the workers and peasants' committee into two. It also decided that a military committee would be formed (**Doc. B.11**). In fact, the Fourth Party Congress had already decided to establish a labor movement committee, although the precise date of its separation from the joint workers and peasants' department is unclear. Both the old department and the new committee were headed by Zhang Guotao. The peasant committee was not formed until November 1926; Mao Zedong acted as its secretary. The military department was founded at the end of 1925, with Zhang Guotao as its head; it was changed to the military committee in November 1926 under the secretaryship of Zhou Enlai.¹⁹ The increased workload meant that a clearer division of tasks had to be made, and it was suggested that the secretaries of the CEC and of the areas should avoid assuming positions in the other committees and departments.

While the force of the labor movement began to decline in Shanghai during the latter part of 1925, the GMD began to tighten its control over the Canton area. Furthermore, it appeared that the GMD-left was asserting its superiority over the right. In late September/early October 1925, the Second Eastern Expedition was launched against the troops of Chen Jiongmeng, which had been threatening the nationalist government. The expedition was under the military command of Chiang Kai-shek with Zhou Enlai as head of the political department. It was very successful, and by mid-December, with the exception of Hainan, southern Guangdong had been brought under control.

The form of cooperation with the CCP caused considerable unrest among many GMD members. In the initial period after the death of Sun Yat-sen (12 March 1925), the left strengthened its control over the party apparatus, but as time went on, opposition to the Communists grew. In August 1925, Liao Zhongkai, an ardent supporter of communist participation in the GMD and the alliance with Soviet

Russia, was assassinated. In late November 1925, a group of GMD members met in the Western Hills outside Beijing and called for the expulsion of Communists from the GMD and the expulsion of Borodin from Canton. In addition, there was the opposition of Dai Jitao, who in August 1925 had published a pamphlet criticizing the admittance of CCP members into the GMD. Dai felt that the Communists were using the GMD to expand their own influence. He wanted the GMD to tighten its organization to resist Communist infiltration. His views were criticized at the October 1925 CCP CEC meeting and in an article by Chen Duxiu published in August. Chen accused Dai of seeing the need only for national struggle but not class struggle and of seeing communist participation as destroying the GMD rather than helping it.²⁰

Despite these problems, the GMD's Second National Congress (4-19 January 1926) marked a significant victory for the GMD-left and the policy of collaboration with the CCP. The Communists occupied seven (possibly eight) of the thirty-six places on the CEC and one-third of the nine positions on its Standing Committee. Furthermore, Communists and the GMD-left made up a majority of delegates to the Congress.

(d) Problems Within the CCP and with the GMD (February-July 1926)

Thus, when a special meeting of the CCP CEC convened in Beijing from 21 to 24 February 1926, left-wing control of the GMD seemed to be a reality.²¹ The meeting adopted a major shift in strategy that favored the policies of the party apparatus in Canton over the urban-based policy favored by the Party Center. This shift was aided by the fact that Chen Duxiu could not attend the meeting because of illness. The resolution adopted on the current political situation noted the increasing isolation of the proletariat after the May 30 Movement (**Doc. B.14**). The bourgeoisie had been shown in its true colors, and it was clear that the main ally was the peasantry. The peasants' struggle was of vital importance, and only an alliance with the proletariat could bring about the final victory of the nationalist revolution. The most important task for the party in the future was to prepare for the extension of the power of the Canton revolutionary government during the Northern Expedition.²² During the Northern Expedition, work among the peasantry was to be intensified, while the alliance of workers and peasants was to be strengthened to bring national victory.

Shanghai was no longer seen as the revolutionary center, and thus it was suggested that the seat of the CEC be moved to either Beijing or Canton. Only a liaison bureau would remain in Shanghai. Because Canton was not convenient for promoting the revolution on a national scale, Beijing was seen as the best place to move to. This was dependent on the *Guomin jun* maintaining control in the area.²³

However, confidence in the GMD was soon shaken by the "Zhongshan Incident" of 20 March 1926. Chiang Kai-shek imposed martial law claiming that Communists in command of a gunboat, the *Zhongshan*, were planning to kidnap him. Whether the plot was real or not, it provided Chiang with the chance to clip the wings of the Communists. He placed some fifty together with the Soviet advisors

under house arrest. On his return to Canton, Borodin negotiated their release but at a price. Chiang made a number of proposals to restrict CCP activity in the GMD, and these were accepted with minor revisions at a GMD CEC meeting in May. In the future, apart from curtailing its activities within the GMD, the CCP was to supply a list of all its members in the GMD and abandon its separate organizations in the GMD, and CCP members could no longer serve as bureau head in nationalist organizations. This last point meant that the Communist Tan Pingshan had to give up the powerful post of head of the organization department to Chiang Kai-shek. Further, the GMD CEC decided to restrict communist membership on executive committees to no more than one-third of the seats. Borodin was also forced to support the Northern Expedition to which he had previously been opposed in return for Chiang's promises to curb the GMD-right.²⁴ Chiang, of course, was still dependent on Soviet arms and aid for the Northern Expedition and made it clear that his original actions had not been against the alliance with Soviet Russia as such. The Northern Expedition was officially launched at the beginning of July 1926 even though some units had gone north earlier.

These events caused the Communists further confusion. Publicly, they accepted the new regulations passed by the GMD CEC in May, but privately there were conflicts about the way forward. It appears that the Canton area proposed an immediate counterattack against Chiang and the takeover of the GMD from within; Chen Duxiu, on the other hand, proposed withdrawal. In June, a compromise was suggested: cooperation would continue but as a bloc without rather than a bloc within.²⁵ However, this alternative was blocked by the Comintern.

From 12 to 18 July 1926, the CCP CEC met in Shanghai to discuss the situation and the question of the Northern Expedition.²⁶ In contrast to former comments, the expedition was now defined as a "defensive war" against the penetration of hostile forces in Hunan and Guangdong rather than as a "real revolutionary" action (**Doc. B.15**). Unlike the February meeting, attention was centered on continuing cooperation with the bourgeoisie rather than the seizure of power. The policy agenda was notably more moderate, and flexibility was encouraged when dealing with mass organizations.

The political resolution adopted argued that the bourgeoisie could not be ignored as a force in society, pointing out that since the May 30 Movement the bourgeoisie had become an important part of the nationalist movement and, especially in Shanghai, had demonstrated a capacity for leadership.²⁷ The tricky relationship with the GMD was yet again laid out for party members. The resolution dealing with relations between the two parties rejected both a policy of "mere cooperation" as in a "bloc without" and the idea that the CCP should take over the GMD from within. Events in Guangdong, the resolution said, had proved the latter to be an incorrect policy (**Doc. B.16**). In fact, it was suggested that the reason that the GMD-right and even the center were able to attack the Communists was because of mistaken CCP policies toward work in the GMD—a clear criticism of the Guangdong approach. Previous policy was criticized and a call was made for a return to the October 1925

policy position. However, there were differences. The GMD was now seen to consist of four blocs: the reactionary right, the new right comprising the reform movement of the bourgeoisie (including Chiang Kai-shek and Dai Jitao), the left comprising the resistance movement of the middle and small merchants, and the workers and peasants represented by the Communists.

Inevitably, the relaxation of regulations concerning party membership and the flood of new members had created problems. Now the party leadership complained that the quality of party members had decreased, with members lacking theoretical and practical experience and a “definite revolutionary philosophy of life.” As a result, propaganda and organizational work was to be tightened up to try to come to terms with the problems of running a mass party. Organizationally, four major problems were identified (**Doc. B.17**). First, the importance of organizational work was not recognized in the party; it was considered a technical matter, not a political one. This idea was rejected, and it was pointed out that without organization the mass movement could not be expanded. Second, the work of creating party branches in factories, etc., had still not gotten off the ground properly. Members had to realize that the branch was the core of the party. Third, the work of party bodies in other organizations such as the unions was also said to be very bad. Indeed, it seems that some members confused these organizations with the branches. Fourth, party organs were not sufficiently consolidated. To handle routine administrative work, a Central Secretariat was to be set up with Wang Ruofei as its head.

With respect to work among the masses, the watchwords were moderation and flexibility. In the peasant movement, “left deviation” was criticized; slogans were deemed to have been too extreme and actions too leftist. This had caused a backlash damaging rather than improving the peasants’ situation. The resolution concerning the peasantry adopted at the meeting provided a detailed economic and political program, although a complete political platform had to wait until the Fifth Party Congress.²⁸ The program was more moderate than that adopted in October 1925. Land confiscation was no longer central; the resolution called for only the most reactionary landlords to be attacked. Similarly, while criticism of the church was acceptable, any actual conflict was to be avoided. While the peasants could arm themselves for self-defense, the limits of self-defense were not to be exceeded. To keep the peasants in check, political training was deemed to be more important than military training. A bureaucratic approach to organization was criticized, and flexibility in organization was called for.

The experiences of the peasant movement in Guangdong were important in shaping the resolution, although it is clear that the CEC of the CCP favored a more cautious position. The meeting adopted a long resolution on the report on the peasant movement in Guangdong (**Doc. B.18**). Despite acknowledging progress, the resolution was critical of the work by the Guangdong comrades. They had not made their own clear proposals, and those they had raised were impractical and too general, thus disappointing the peasant masses. Work was described as superficial. Further, the success of the peasant movement had left the local party in no state to

deal with the movement. It was estimated that some 800,000 peasants were members of peasant associations in sixty counties, while there were only 600 party members spread over fewer than twenty counties.

To resolve these problems, the party was to focus its energies on building a foundation within the township peasant associations. To prevent “local tyrants and evil gentry” from controlling the associations, a two-tier membership system was to be adopted. Those who worked the land themselves were counted as formal members, while all others were classified as special members without voting rights. The party apparatus in the countryside was to be expanded through a system of training courses. Some thirty peasants were to be recruited from the ten counties close to Canton, and they would undergo a one-month training program. There were to be six such courses. All participants were to be recruited into the party, thus providing it with 1,800 new rural members. This formed an important part of the concerted drive to raise the political consciousness of the peasantry.

A bureaucratic approach toward work in the labor movement was also criticized. According to the resolution on the labor movement, past practice had failed to adapt organizational forms to the needs of the workers and the situation at hand.²⁹ Excesses in the labor movement were criticized because they could lead to a break with the GMD. The resolution pointed out shortcomings in work in Canton such as the persistence of the guild tradition and the influence of reactionary leaders among some workers.

The meeting restored Shanghai to pride of place in the revolutionary movement, defining it as the “heart of the country’s anti-imperialist movement” (**Doc. B.19**). In Shanghai, it was stated, a “genuine CP” could be created. The local party committee was instructed to concentrate on local political movements in order to win over the middle and petty bourgeois masses.

In the second half of 1926, while Chiang Kai-shek was engaged in the war effort, the Communists were able to strengthen their position. Within the GMD, the left appeared to be in ascendancy once again, and the movement to bring back the recognized leader of the left, Wang Jingwei, was gaining momentum.³⁰ In October 1926, the city of Wuhan was taken by the GMD with the help of strikes in the city led by the Communists.

The labor and peasant movements underwent an upsurge with the advance of the Northern Expedition. The peasant movement gained rapidly in strength in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan. The power of the peasant movement had placed the Party Center, which was under Comintern pressure, in a dilemma: how to allow the movement to develop without endangering the alliance with the GMD.

**(e) Mao Zedong Backs the Peasant Movement;
Chen Duxiu Backs the GMD-Left
(November 1926–April 1927)**

No such dilemma existed for Mao Zedong. In March 1927 he wrote his report on the Hunan peasant movement, a document that heralded a significant break with

party policy (**Doc. B.20**). In contrast to the Party Center, Mao saw the “excesses” in the peasant movement as being necessary to overcome the counterrevolutionaries and the power of the gentry in the countryside. Mao even went so far as to criticize erroneous decisions taken by the nationalist government in Wuhan. However, Mao’s criticism went beyond the level of tactics to criticize the whole strategy of revolution in China. While CEC policy upheld the Comintern’s view that the revolutionary vanguard remained the proletariat, Mao gave pride of place to the poor peasantry. The proletariat is relegated to a place of virtual insignificance in Mao’s report. This marks a crucial stage in Mao’s approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution. Yet, while he now recognized the need to focus revolutionary activity on the accelerating peasant movement, he had not combined peasant organization with military power (the formula that would ultimately result in success for the communist movement).

Within the CCP, there were still major differences of opinion concerning the question of cooperation with the GMD. At the end of 1926, the Party Center convened two important meetings to exert its authority. On 4–5 November 1926, a meeting of the party’s leadership was convened at which Chen Duxiu delivered a report highly critical of the views of the Canton party and “some foreign Communists.” This was in response to a report by the Canton party (**Doc. B.21**). He attacked their view that the nationalist revolution had almost succeeded and that the proletarian revolution was about to start (**Doc. B.22**). He pointed out that two-thirds of China was still under the control of the Fengtian or Zhili warlords. The fact that the tasks of the nationalist revolution were not yet completed meant that it was necessary to remain in the GMD and unite with its left wing. Withdrawal from the GMD would allow the new right to ally with the GMD-left and take over leadership of the revolution. Importantly, Chen put forward what was to become the standard CCP interpretation of Sun Yat-sen’s legacy, namely, his “three fundamental policies of allying with Soviet Russia, allying with the CP, and supporting the workers and peasants.” While Sun was willing to let CP members join the GMD, there is no evidence to suggest that he favored an alliance with the CCP as such.³¹ Now that the CCP had become a “mass party,” Chen was interpreting Sun’s legacy in such a way as not only to call for an alliance between the two parties but to legitimize the call by tracing the idea back to Sun’s own intentions.

The Canton party organization denied that there was a left wing in the GMD leadership; there was only a group of people who could not get along with the center and right of the party. They had no political program and no political base. It referred to this group as a quasi-left, which under certain circumstances, and at certain times, should be supported (**Doc. B.21**). This meant that the real left among the masses was without leadership. As a result, the CCP was to put itself at the head of the masses in the struggle.

Chen Duxiu returned to the attack in his political report to the special meeting of the Party Center on 13 December 1926 (**Doc. B.23**).³² He suggested that some members, particularly Borodin and those in Canton, were suffering from a “left

sickness.” The disease had a number of symptoms, such as disrespect for the GMD and the attempt to monopolize all work within it for the peasant movement. Indeed, the Canton comrades were said to think that the GMD had died after the 20 March incident (1926). Naturally, if the GMD had died it could not have a left wing. Also, Chen criticized the Beijing and Hubei comrades for misunderstanding the notion of party independence by taking it to mean that all political struggle should be conducted independently.

The “Resolution on the Question of the GMD-Left” adopted at the meeting shows the victory of Chen’s views (**Doc. B.24**). Denial of a left in the GMD would leave the CCP with only two choices, both of which were deemed to be wrong. Either the CCP could cooperate with the right and join them in oppressing the masses or it could lead the masses, in a direct struggle against the right. If the existence of the left in the GMD were denied, all that would remain was a struggle between the CCP and the GMD. This latter path was the one the Canton comrades were said to be following. The Party Center resolved to oppose their views, to develop the strength of the GMD-left and help it gain leadership positions in party and government, and to help them extend their influence over the urban revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, and the peasantry.

This policy was in line with Comintern views. The “Theses on the Chinese Question” adopted at the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI (November–December 1926) called for continued CCP cooperation with the GMD-left to bring about the success of the nationalist revolution.³³ The GMD-right was not to be allowed to turn the GMD into a bourgeois party. At the same time, the “Theses” called for the CCP to take control of the social revolution. The agrarian revolution was defined as the central component in the revolutionary struggle, and the Communists were to gain “real power” in the rural areas through the peasant associations. According to the “Theses,” the fear that intensification of class struggle in the village would weaken the united anti-imperialist front was unfounded.

This approach may have seemed feasible for those situated in Moscow but the CCP was unable to act on these conflicting demands. The CCP alienated the radical peasant leaders by trying to check the “excesses,” but at the same time it still aroused the hostility and suspicion of the GMD-left. The documents from the December 1926 meeting acknowledged the weakness of the GMD-left, while a January 1927 political report noted that the right was becoming aroused precisely because of communist control of the labor and peasant movements.³⁴

Despite these tensions, in the latter part of 1926 and early 1927, the move to strengthen the left and shore up the cooperation did show positive results. At the GMD CEC meeting in December, the Communists won a victory when it was decided to move the seat of government to Wuhan rather than to Nanchang as Chiang Kai-shek wished (Chiang’s headquarters were in Nanchang). In March 1927 the Third Plenum of the GMD CEC moved to undermine Chiang’s military power by reestablishing the military council and thus subordinating him to its command. Also, it cut his political power by abolishing the post of chair of the CEC (held by

Chiang) and establishing a seven-person Presidium of the Political Council. The left took the key positions in elections with Wang Jingwei, who like Chiang was not present, emerging as the key figure. Further, communist collaboration in the national government was called for, and Communists took over as heads of the ministries of labor and agriculture.

Cooperation reached a high point on 5 April 1927 when Chen Duxiu and Wang Jingwei issued their joint statement.³⁵ Shanghai had already been taken by Chiang Kai-shek with the help of communist-led insurrections inside the city. The joint statement confirmed the leading role of the GMD in the nationalist revolution and stated that the CCP had never entertained the idea of overthrowing it. It acknowledged that proletarian revolution was not on the agenda. In words that would come back to haunt the authors, the statement said that “the military leaders in Shanghai have announced their obedience to the GMD central authorities.”³⁶

On 12 April, Chiang began to eliminate the Communists in those areas under his control. He was expelled from the GMD by the GMD-left based in Wuhan, and on 18 April Chiang set up his own government at Nanjing. Despite earlier warning signs, the CCP was completely unprepared for the attacks. The split in the GMD was now a reality. CCP organization in areas under Chiang’s control was broken. In Canton, the repression was similarly brutal: martial law was proclaimed on 15 April, and a purge was begun with orders for the immediate arrest of all CP members in the area.³⁷ By 27 April, some 2,000 suspected Communists had been captured, and many CCP members were executed. The repression also extended to Shantou, Xiamen, and Ningbo, while “leftists” were purged from GMD organizations in other cities in Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu.³⁸

(f) The CCP Fifth Party Congress (April–May 1927) Tries (But Fails) to Preserve Its Alliance with the GMD-Left

It was in this atmosphere that delegates came together for the Fifth Party Congress in Hankou (27 April–9 May 1927).³⁹ The party had to deal with the issue of the “betrayal” of Chiang Kai-shek and how to proceed with the revolutionary movement. Far from ordering a break with the GMD, delegates argued about how to push ahead with the peasant movement without upsetting cooperation. Chiang’s “betrayal” was met head on and treated as a positive sign for the revolution. In a long and interesting review of party work since the Fourth Congress, Chen Duxiu said that Chiang’s betrayal had brought the Chinese revolution to a new stage (**Doc. B.25**). According to Chen, the bourgeoisie had now deserted the revolutionary front, reducing its numbers but improving its quality. The four-class bloc had been reduced to a “united front of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie.” Thus, the future task was to strengthen these three classes and CCP work in the military. The small number of bourgeois elements who remained could be expelled if they displayed “counterrevolutionary tendencies.”

Future party policy was to concentrate on creating a “revolutionary democratic regime” in the areas held by the GMD, although it was acknowledged that this objective was still far off. According to Chen, the party was to discuss preparations for seizing power, and he described it as “no longer an opposition party” but one that was really going to lead the revolution.

Despite such bold words, however, the CCP was still going to have to work through its cooperation with the GMD. This meant that its policy toward the peasantry still erred to the side of caution, and ideas of confiscation of all land were rejected. Chen commented that while policy toward the peasant movement had been “too rightist” in the past, it would be wrong to adopt radical proposals now to confiscate the land of all landlords. This approach was reflected in the “Resolution on the Land Question” (**Doc. B.26**). While the resolution confirmed the switch in policy from rent reduction campaigns to land confiscation, it noted that the land of small landlords must not be confiscated.⁴⁰ Politically, all authority was to be placed in the village self-governing organizations, which were to be dominated by the oppressed classes. The peasants were to be armed to protect the gains of the revolution.

While much attention was paid to the peasant question, the labor movement was not forgotten. Chen Duxiu stated that the first priority of the Congress was to have a “unified policy and work plan for the labor unions.” Work for the labor movement was spelled out in a separate resolution (**Doc. B.27**). The last two years were described as representing a revival of the labor movement, and this revival had caused the bourgeoisie to betray the revolution. The resolution proposed an all-out attack on the bourgeoisie through a program of nationalization and workers’ participation in management. Workers’ commitment to this political struggle was to be supported by campaigns to improve their economic and social situation.

The growth of the CCP and its increasingly complex organization had put the CEC under great pressure, and it was unable to cope with the amount of work. According to Chen Duxiu, organizational affairs had been the worst aspect of the party’s work. The party was composed of individual groups, and unless something were done there would be nothing more than provincial parties. To tighten central control, the CC, formerly the CEC, was to be expanded and a Politburo created. To train party members, Chen suggested that a Central Party School be established.

The Congress did not amend the Constitution to accommodate these changes but instructed the Politburo to undertake the task.⁴¹ On 1 June 1927, a Politburo meeting adopted the new party Constitution (**Doc. B.28**). It was a much fuller document than the previous Constitution; it contained 81 articles in 12 chapters (as compared with 31 and 6 in the January 1925 Constitution). For the first time, democratic centralism was included in a Constitution as the guiding principle of the party. The Constitution spelled out in detail the organizational structure of the party and outlined two new central organs: the Central Supervisory Committee and the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The former organ was to tighten up party discipline, while the latter was to look after the party’s day-to-day business.

The Congress elected a CC of twenty-nine members with ten alternates. The new Politburo had seven members with four alternates. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Qu Qiubai, and Li Wei-han formed the Standing Committee of the Politburo.⁴² Chen Duxiu remained general secretary.

The redefinition of the revolutionary forces and the moderate land policy did not help pull the party out of its dilemma. Despite the restrictions placed on the peasant movement, "excesses" continued to occur. The CCP ended up pleasing no one; the GMD government in Wuhan blamed the Communists for the excesses, and the peasant leaders blamed them for not supporting their radical actions and leaving them prey to the military force of warlords and GMD troops. Suppression of the Communists continued, and the events of summer 1927 seemed to make a mockery of the CCP leadership's decision to continue the alliance with the GMD. The Communists suffered blow after blow as one group after another of nationalist generals and politicians "betrayed the revolution."

The possibility of breaking with the GMD-left was reduced further by the messages coming from Moscow. Given his struggles with Trotsky, it was impossible for Stalin to acknowledge the folly of continued cooperation with the GMD. In May 1927, the ECCI also interpreted the break with Chiang Kai-shek in a positive light. It reemphasized the need to place the rural revolution at the center of the stage but only within the context of the continued alliance with the GMD.⁴³

The problem of continued cooperation was shown in disasters such as the "Horse Day" (21 May) massacre in Changsha, with the military suppression of communist-led mass organizations. The lengths to which the Communists were willing to go to preserve the alliance were shown by the fact that the joint GMD-CCP investigation into the incident declared that the peasants, under misguided leaders, had broken loose from control and precipitated a reign of terror over the people. The high point in CCP compromise came with the adoption by an enlarged CC meeting on 30 June of an eleven-point resolution on relations between the two parties. The resolution acknowledged that the GMD was the leader of the national revolution. Communists in government roles were to work only as GMD members. To minimize conflict, Communists holding government positions would give up their posts.⁴⁴ Further, mass organizations were instructed to submit to the leadership and control of the GMD authorities.⁴⁵ At a late stage, the party was stumbling toward the formation of a "bloc without" rather than a "bloc within," something that had been suggested by Chen Duxiu on a number of occasions.

Submissive gestures did not resolve the conflicts with the GMD-left in Wuhan. Wang Jingwei's suspicions of the Communists had been aroused further in early June when the Comintern delegate, M.N. Roy, had shown him the contents of a telegram from Stalin. It called for the Communists to reorganize the left and expel "reactionary leaders" and to prepare concrete steps for a revolutionary army, albeit still under nationalist leadership.⁴⁶

An uneasy truce prevailed until mid-July, and then events moved rapidly. Under pressure from the Comintern, Chen Duxiu resigned his position as general secretary.⁴⁷

On 12 July, a new five-person temporary Standing Committee of the Politburo was chosen,⁴⁸ and the following day it issued an open statement critical of the Wuhan government. On 15 July, the Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announced the end of cooperation; on 1 August the CCP's Nanchang Uprising was launched; and on 5 August, Wang Jingwei began a large-scale purge of communist activists. Cooperation was ending in tragedy, and it was clear that the CCP had to develop a new strategy.

While the massacre of many Communists was the most visible legacy of the cooperation with the GMD, it had allowed the CCP to develop its organization on a much wider scale, especially in the south, than would otherwise have been the case. Further, it had been a valuable learning experience for the CCP. With expanded membership, it had begun to pay serious attention to its organizational structure. It gained influence in the southern labor and peasant movements and had trained a body of cadres and a number of military officers. These would all be useful in the future.

DOCUMENTS 1924–JULY 1927

B.1 Resolution Concerning the Problem of CP Work in the GMD (May 1924)⁴⁹

Since its first congress, the GMD has gradually matured both ideologically and organizationally, primarily because of the active participation of our party members. However, as a result, it has become more difficult to maintain an element of class struggle in the national revolutionary movement. In the past year or so since the failure of the strike by the workers on the Beijing-Hankou railway [February 1923], China's industrial workers, especially those on the railways and in the mines, have begun to think again about class organization and are going to restore labor unions on a much larger scale than before. Yet, for a long time, a large number of GMD members have clearly shown their affinity with the possessing classes in industry and agriculture. Also, they have avoided the struggle against imperialism and, in the future, their class interests are certainly not going to be the same as those of ordinary laboring people. Their class nature inclines them toward compromise, and it is unlikely that they will be able to struggle to the end for the complete independence of the Chinese nation.

Therefore, on the questions of anti-imperialism, democracy,⁵⁰ reform policies for the peasantry, and concessions for the workers, two factions can be identified within the GMD. Naturally, the CP belongs to Sun Yat-sen's faction and those who are willing to implement the political agenda of the "Manifesto."⁵¹ In light of the present situation, the leftists in the GMD are Sun Yat-sen, his followers, and our comrades. In fact, our comrades are the basic force of this faction. Therefore, the so-called conflict between the leftists and rightists in the GMD is actually one between our party and the GMD-right. Thus, if we now adopt a policy to reconcile the leftists with the rightists in order to consolidate and expand the GMD, it would be a mistake.

This should not be taken to mean that we demand an immediate, mechanical purge of the rightists; nor should we launch personal attacks against or cause conflicts with the rightists. Our demand is for freedom of criticism within the GMD. Then we will be able use our party's papers, those of the GMD, and various meetings to criticize the rightists' policy mistakes concerning the fundamental issue of the nationalist movement (the most important mistake is avoiding the struggle against imperialism).

At the same time, we should use every means to consolidate the left wing both ideologically and organizationally.

To realize these goals, we should understand the following and use them as guidelines in our work:

1) The GMD, in terms of its social background (class elements) and party history, in reality is incapable of strict centralization or of having a distinct organizational form. Since it is made up of elements from every class, it can never represent equally the interests of each part. Only anti-imperialism and democracy can become the common political program of the majority of the ordinary masses. However, precisely because of this common ground (nationalism and democracy—please see *The Party Paper* [Dangbao], appendix to no. 2, “The Significance of the Three Principles of the People”), it is impossible to unite its party members to the fullest extent and make them always feel that the party is the protector of their special interests. Although this common ground is not limited to the nature of one class only and can influence the majority of the masses in China, it will not be an easy task to assimilate them into the party organization.

Such is the character of the GMD. Therefore, the CP’s responsibility is to make the GMD unceasingly propagandize the principles of opposing imperialists and warlords and demanding democracy as proclaimed in the “Manifesto” [of January 1924]. We must never merely strive for expansion of the GMD’s numbers, treating it as secondary propaganda against imperialists and warlords. Mechanical organization must not be considered as important as propaganda and agitation. The GMD must be shown that the expansion of a political party is only possible in a regular, continuous, and nationwide process of propagandizing and acting against imperialists and warlords. Moreover, there should be no empty words but practical implementation of reform policies for the peasantry and support for workers’ organizations in areas within GMD jurisdiction. If we carry out our work inside the GMD in the way outlined above, it will also be the best method for securing the GMD’s left wing while reducing and destroying the forces of the right. To achieve this objective, we must, in practice, be able to join the GMD propaganda department. We must never miss a chance for anti-imperialist propaganda and must make the GMD into a party that truly represents the National Congress (the Congress that issued the “Manifesto”). No system of organization, however good, can substitute for this kind of propaganda.

Of course, we should assist the GMD to set up good organizations and admit people whose thinking is close to that of the GMD. However, this should not become our own main task inside the GMD. Our propaganda and organizational work should not have equal importance in the south, where the GMD is in the middle of a civil war, and in the north, where the GMD has gained the sympathy [of the people who] are ready to respond to the south’s liberation. Propaganda is more important than organization.

2) Industrial workers in north and central China, especially railway workers and miners, are to be directed to support the left wing of the GMD. Our policy should be to assimilate them into economic, class-based organizations (labor unions) and guide them to help the GMD oppose imperialism. Such assistance must even extend to strikes staged to help the military efforts of the GMD. At the same time, we should oppose the influence of the thought of the GMD rightists on workers. This is

similar to our opposition to the petty bourgeoisie and all the parties that oppose the ideology of the working class. On the other hand, we should demand that the GMD support labor unions in its struggle against the ill treatment of workers by foreign and domestic capitalists.

3) To help the GMD win the people's sympathy in central and north China, we should make the GMD abandon its propaganda policy, the only importance of which is opposition to the government in the north. In reality, the result of this policy is to play into the imperialists' hands, and it further exacerbates the grievances of the south and the regionalism of the north. We should make the GMD's propaganda policy emphasize anti-imperialism and the fact that the Beijing government is the tool of the imperialists.

4) We should make the GMD pay special attention to propaganda inside the military, both among our own and the enemy's troops, with particular attention to the troops of Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin, and Feng Yuxiang.

5) To expand the front line of the revolution, we should make the GMD pay attention to the investigation and study of the potential problem presented by the allegation in imperialist newspapers that GMD forces have allied with and propagandized on behalf of bandit groups in north and central China.

6) To deepen the national revolutionary movement and support the Guangdong government, we should mobilize the peasants in the south to join the civil war and demand that the GMD abolish extra taxes and forbid large landlords from over-exploiting poor and tenant peasants. In addition, we should arm the peasants on the front-line, those peasants in direct contact with the northern troops. The first proposal can be implemented, while, effectively, the second method will lead peasants to directly join the liberation movement in the south.

B.2 Circular Number 15 of the CEC (21 July 1924)⁵²

To all comrades in all area and district committees and heads of independent organizations:

Our work inside the GMD is both very important and extremely difficult. Our comrades in all localities should continue unceasingly to pay attention and exert efforts!

Since our party's enlarged executive meeting [May 1924], the majority of GMD members have been attacking us either overtly or covertly, in order to purge our radical members and alleviate the pressures exerted on the GMD by the imperialist powers and the warlords. At present, only a very few GMD leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and Liao Zhongkai, do not intend to break with us. However, they are not willing to offend the rightists in any way. They are planning to call a CEC plenum [of the GMD] this fall to resolve the issue of their relationship with us.⁵³ For the

sake of the unity of the revolutionary forces, we will not permit either divisive words or deeds by our side. Instead, we will do our best to endure and continue to cooperate with them. For the sake of the GMD's revolutionary mission, however, we will not endure silently, or refuse to correct, its nonrevolutionary rightist policies. We should do the following:

1) All groups, organizations, and branches of the GMD under our leadership should express their dissatisfaction with the rightists to the GMD CEC. The rightists' major mistakes are:

- a) unwillingness to oppose the imperialist powers;
- b) opposing the Sino-Soviet Treaty and fundamentally opposing the Soviet Union, which they regard as an enemy of the GMD;
- c) preventing workers in the munitions factory from organizing unions and obstructing boycotts by students at Trinity College;
- d) instigating the chambers of commerce in Jiangmen and Foshan to treat workers and peasants with utmost cruelty;
- e) repulsing communist forces.

2) At GMD branch meetings at various levels, our comrades should raise the issue that leftists and rightists have fundamentally different political viewpoints.

3) From now on our comrades should not introduce into the GMD elements who do not express leftist views.

4) We should try to get, or keep, in our hands the "real power to command the groups of workers, peasants, students, and urban residents" to consolidate our forces within the GMD's left wing, while doing our best to prevent the rightist forces from breaking into these groups.

5) All districts should immediately organize "Citizens' Councils on Foreign Relations." These will construct the nucleus of a united front against imperialism while forming a link with the GMD left wing or with a new GMD. Only individuals on their own should join this kind of organization. On joining they must complete "voluntarily joining" forms. No groups may join. At the moment, there is no need to drastically increase the number of new members. But their quality deserves our attention, with the important criterion being dissatisfaction with the policies of the rightists in the GMD. Such councils are to form independent groups in the social movement. They must never be mixed up with the GMD; nor may they come under the command of the GMD. Only in those places where the GMD cannot operate openly, and thus where its branches have been built entirely by us, can the name of the councils be used openly. However, no elements possessing rightist views are to be allowed to stay in this council.

On receiving this circular, all area and district committees and heads of independent organizations should discuss and implement it in detail in accordance with the local situation, and report the results of discussion and implementation in detail to the Central Bureau. This circular is to be kept a top secret from the outside.

Committee Chairman: T.S. Chen [Chen Duxiu]
Secretary: T.T. Mao [Mao Zedong]

B.3 Resolution on the Question of the Union Movement (May 1924)⁵⁴

1) Even now, the Chinese proletariat accounts for a very small percentage of the Chinese people. However, the speed of industrialization in China during the last twenty years has increased noticeably during the European War [World War I] and the first few years after the war. Thus, in a number of large cities and a few industries, the number of workers has increased. However, because of the vastness of our land and lack of transportation, the workers' strength cannot be concentrated. Numerically, there are at least 600,000 workers in the textile, mining, railway, river, and ocean transportation industries alone. These workers are the foundation of our party. Only through allying with these workers can our party be developed into a political force.

2) The economic and political strength of the proletariat in the manufacturing industries has to increase simultaneously with its organizational strength, so the most important mission of the party is to organize labor unions with careful planning among the industrial workers. Therefore, the main task is to pay special attention to railway workers, miners, and sailors.

a) The strength of foreign capital is greatest in the shipbuilding, railway, river, and ocean transportation industries. Organizing these workers is the most practical and powerful means of opposing the forces of foreign capital and imperialism.

b) In the future struggle against imperialism, the forces of the workers in the railway, river, and ocean transportation and coal industries are sure to have crucial and even decisive significance. Organization of these workers will guarantee future victories.

Apart from these political reasons, the proletariat in the manufacturing industries—concentrated around the modern advanced technologies of mass production and having a common interest and suffering equally from the oppression of big capitalists, especially big foreign capitalists—is the best material for the union movement. We should try to work hard among these workers. This kind of work is our party's cause.

3) Forms of organization

a) If possible, our comrades everywhere should endeavor to organize large labor unions, the basic unit of which is the union's small group [*gonghui xiaozu*]. Such a small group should be organized according to the internal divisions of every factory (there is no set number of members, and when there are too many to have meetings, each group must be divided into a subgroup of ten, but the subgroup should not be mistaken for the basic unit). The congress of small group representatives [*quan-chang ge xiaozu daibiao dahui*] (every ten workers elect one representative; each small group with less than ten workers also elects one representative) is a superior institution. All factory committees [*chang weiyuanhui*] are to be elected by the factory's congress of small group representatives. Each enterprise's supreme institu-

tion should be the general committee [*zonghui*] elected by the representatives' plenary congress [*daibiao quanti zhi dahui*]. Our party should pay special attention to the subordinate small groups, the character of which is sufficient to determine the fighting strength of the entire union. If possible, wherever workers in an enterprise (workshops or railway factories) have not joined, they should be persuaded to attend the small group meetings. This is the best method of propagandizing the organization of labor unions. Even in places under heavy military and police oppression, workers should be taught to call meetings attended by many people. Even if the meeting only lasts a few minutes, that will suffice. Before the factory owners or the government have discovered [the meeting], or have had time to crack down, such meetings should break up. To call such gatherings, many obvious facts of oppression should be used—such as the beating, unreasonable treatment, and dismissal of a worker. Such treatment would be sufficient reason to call a meeting whether the worker was a union member or not. For these gatherings, the executive committee of the small group [*xiaozu de ganshihui*] should prepare beforehand resolutions that can be explained in a few minutes. If the resolution can be passed by the gathering, then more extensive propaganda about the labor union and agitation may be undertaken. These union small groups should gradually build their bases, be aware of the masses' psychology, and take no great risks that will throw away the achievements to date. When necessary, concessions must be made. However, all kinds of minor opportunities should be used to make progress. In this way, small groups will gradually grow and be mobilized to fight back for the indignities suffered by every worker in the factory. The influence of the small group must not be limited to the workers in the group, but must be extended throughout the entire factory.

b) Where labor unions cannot be organized, mutual assistance groups, clubs, cooperatives, general education schools, or technical schools should be established first. In these institutions, the union's small groups can be organized only when there is the possibility for success. The first victory of the union's small group in every enterprise (mine, workshop, railway factory, and shipping company) will come when it supports the interest of the workers in that enterprise. This will certainly provide the opportunity to expand the organization and attract the majority of workers to the labor union movement.

4) Workers' economic organizations: the labor union is independent, that is, anyone can become a member of the miners, sailors, or railway workers' union as long as they are a miner, sailor, or railway worker—as long as they work in an industrial company. Questions of party membership, citizenship, and group affiliation should not affect admission into the union or one's position in the union (the party and the union should destroy the concepts of regional and group affiliation among the workers). The union's responsibility is to develop class consciousness among workers, expand their vision, and link the question of daily struggle with the workers' most valued self-interests, such as wages, working-hours (hours per day, days per week and month), rest-time per week, humanitarian treatment, etc. Such

daily struggle should and will develop into a general nationalist and class struggle.

5) Like other political parties, the GMD wants to seize political power. It certainly wants to influence the union movement of the railway workers and miners in north and central China. Whether the GMD succeeds in this endeavor depends on our party's actions. We need not help the GMD in all ways possible to infiltrate the industrial proletariat organizationally. On the contrary, this would be a very big mistake. This would not only mix impure seeds in the heart of the advanced proletariat—the industrial proletariat is the basis of our party—but also would cause great difficulties for the proletarian class struggle itself. There are many precedents in other countries. This is not all. In light of China's situation, it would reduce workers' power in the national revolutionary movement.

As far as the union movement is concerned, the best help our party can give the GMD is not to help them organize GMD railway unions and miners' unions, or have all the established labor unions collectively join the GMD. This will only trap the labor unions deep inside the GMD, and they will lose their class character. The best help our party can give to the GMD is, first, to organize labor unions exclusively devoted to class struggle and, when it is useful, to direct these unions to support the national revolutionary movement led by the GMD.

Moreover, the GMD has many proletarians among the workers in the assembly factories, the handicraft workers, and the clerks in business and commerce who can form the basis for extensive activities. At present, our party's capabilities are very limited, and [we] have great difficulty carrying out large-scale work among these types of people. Moreover, most of these people are appropriate targets for GMD propaganda. On the one hand, class struggle is not hampered and, on the other, helping the GMD organize unions of shop assistants and handicraft workers is of great significance for consolidation of the national revolutionary movement.

As for the form of these unions, generally speaking, organizations of handicraft workers should be based on individual professions: shop assistants can be organized by area. If and when necessary, various divisions can be organized under the league of shop clerks' unions (tobacco, apparel, footwear, etc.).

6) Our party should conduct work among the sailors' unions—they are one of the most important sectors of the transportation industry. Through the GMD, we should consolidate the sailors' unions into an organized mass union. At the same time, we should develop our party's small groups [*dang de xiaozu*] among the sailors. The sailors' unions can become proletarian organizations only when the CP's work has achieved considerable success.

7) Organizing textile workers cannot be postponed again. These are the most numerous among the industrial workers and are particularly concentrated in Shanghai. Our party once attempted but failed to organize textile workers. Certainly, many difficult factors have prevented us from developing labor unions [among them]. The most important is that the majority of them are women. However, in the several textile industry strikes, as a rule, there were intense and concerted actions. It can be seen that the basis for our mission already exists.

8) To carry out the union movement's mission, our party should follow these methods:

a) The workers and peasants' department of the CEC should establish a special committee for the union movement to direct all the activities described above and take responsibility for carefully investigating and summarizing the labor situation in the form of statistics.⁵⁵

b) The workers and peasants' department of every district committee is to establish a special committee to take charge of the union movement and implement orders from the central workers and peasants' department. The district committee member in charge of the union movement should establish regular contacts with the party's small groups in all the unions in that locality, provide them with regular publications and leaflets, and give them direction.

c) Because of the vastness of China and the dispersion of railway workers and miners, special personnel must be dispatched to travel to every railway station and mine to familiarize the central organs with all information and at the same time become leaders of the union movement. The committee members in charge of the labor union movement and the Party Center's emissaries should report the results after every month or each mission to the Party Center. When necessary, the Party Center must bring together national or area committee members in charge of the union movement and the Party Center's traveling leaders to discuss the labor movement, to examine past results, and to plan future working methods.

d) In the papers of the central organs, the union movement should have pride of place.

e) Propaganda departments in all localities should always pay attention to the needs of the local labor movement.

f) Our party should do its best to introduce comrades to work in the GMD workers' department. This will enable us to use the GMD workers' department to influence the development of class struggle and build a unified front line of workers.

B.4 Report of the Shanghai Locality (May 1924)⁵⁶

A) Intraparty Situation

[[Membership: fluctuates because so many are migrant workers; for example, not too long ago there were fifty-six members, now only forty-seven. Recruitment has been extremely slow. Among the present forty-seven members, there are thirteen students, eight workers, three businessmen, and twenty-three teachers, editors, or those in other occupations. Lack of real increase in membership is because (a) we are now paying most attention to work within the GMD; (b) recruitment of mem-

bers must be handled with utmost caution; and (c) our comrades' propaganda has not been energetic.

Cells [*xiaozu*]: party members are divided among five cells—sixteen members at Shanghai University; ten in Zhabei; six in Ximen; seven in the French Concession; and five in Hongkou. In the last month, only cell one convened three meetings, cell two and three met once, while cells four and five did not meet at all.

Membership dues: every month the locality should receive 130 *yuan*. Last month only 30 *yuan* was collected.]]

B) Nationalist Movement

[[A brief overview is presented of activities in the GMD, groups organized, and events participated in.]]

C) Labor Movement

Shanghai has the largest number of workers in the country; the number of workers laboring at modern machines greatly exceeds that in other places. As a matter of course the labor movement in Shanghai should be very significant. In reality, however, there are many labor unions that exist in name only, with the exception of a few guilds covering several types of handicraft workers. In addition, there may be one or two labor unions, but even they espouse so-called compromise between labor and capital.

Why has such a situation come about? Shanghai's industrial and commercial development owed its success to the intrusion of foreign imperialists. Shanghai has simply become an internationally governed common ground and therefore is subject to the most severe oppression by the imperialists. At the same time, Shanghai has more thugs than anywhere else (the Red and Green Gangs controlled by "old men" alone number over 100,000), and they are in close collusion with the detectives from the police stations set up by imperialists. All this forms the greatest obstacle for the labor movement. In comparison with other places (Guangdong, Hunan, etc.), this means that Shanghai's workers are less organized.

Our party (the secretariat and the two localities) has organized what can be considered several labor movements. However, when all is said and done, this does not amount to much. Also, the labor movements we organized did not penetrate deeply among the workers, and contact remained superficial. Therefore, we failed every time we tried. Until now our results are nil. We have to admit that is a very big failure.

The current situation:

1) Postal workers

Two years ago the postal workers organized a union (not our organization) in their demand for higher pay, but it disappeared soon afterward. Last June and July our comrades reinstituted the labor movement there. After three to four months

nearly seventy to eighty people had joined the union. However, as soon as our movement achieved a few results, the post office authorities were alerted and imposed a tight surveillance. At the same time, they investigated our comrades involved in the movement. Under such circumstances the movement had to stop. Until now we have not resumed our activities there. Now we have only five or six SY[L] comrades among the postal workers. They can form the starting point for our future activities.

2) Machinery workers

Once we organized a machinery workers' club through the efforts of the [Chinese Labor] Secretariat. That was two years ago. After more than a year's work, between 400 and 500 workers joined the club. However, the organization was very loose and only a few dozen members attended meetings and paid dues. We realize it is really impossible to properly organize such professional groups with divergent interests. Moreover, all its members were from Guangdong. Although there are quite a few people from Guangdong in various industries, they are a minority among all the workers. Because of the problem of their dialect, it is difficult for people from Guangdong to get close to workers from other places. At the same time, we did not have personnel to train them, with the result that we have recruited only four or five party members. However, even these four or five people have failed to attend meetings or pay dues.

What must be done in the near future:

1) Education

We realize that previous labor movements did not succeed in making the workers [class] conscious and, therefore, their knowledge remained superficial. We are now aware that these movements are in fact useless. However, because of the educational level of the majority of Chinese workers, it is impossible to raise their consciousness. To do so we will naturally have to expend a lot more energy on educational efforts. Now let's first work hard on the workers' evening schools (evening schools for ordinary people) set up by the GMD.

Schools already established are:

a) Yangshupu: sixty to seventy students, to be divided into two classes. More students can be added. This school's students are all new, strong, modern industrial workers.

b) Wusong: forty to fifty students. Most of the students in this school are from the Zhonghua Iron Factory. There are several railway workers, a few sugar factory workers, and miscellaneous laborers.

c) Within the Ximen area in Nanshi District (not set up by the GMD): fifty to sixty students, mostly handicraft workers and a few rickshaw pullers.

d) Shanghai University: about 200 students, 20 percent of them child laborers.

To be implemented:

a) Hongkou: there are many workers from Guangdong living there, mostly working in shipyards, dry docks, and the department of public works. There is a great need for workers' evening schools there.

b) Pudong: there are over 20,000 workers in the Japanese Cotton Mill and the British and American Tobacco Factory. We once organized labor unions in these two factories, but both were destroyed after the failure of the strikes.⁵⁷ In addition, there are many stevedores in Pudong who need evening schools for remedial study.

2) Reform of the Federation of Labor Organizations⁵⁸

Although the Shanghai Federation of Labor Organizations comprises several pro forma unions and has little to do with real workers, it has enormous influence on the propaganda for and organization of workers. Furthermore, because of the importance of Shanghai, this Federation also influences the entire country. So we must do our utmost to reform it. The Shanghai locality has decided to organize or restore about ten unions to join the Federation in order to reform it within the next two or three months.

Shanghai occupies the most important position in the country, with at least 400,000 to 500,000 workers. Of these there are between 200,000 and 300,000 new industrial workers. However, that the workers' movement has not achieved much is one thing of which we Shanghai comrades are most ashamed. At the same time, we want to make it clear that our comrades had very little experience in the labor movement. Under the present circumstances, even if every Shanghai comrade were to work very hard, there would still not be enough personnel to fulfill every task. Shanghai suffers from the greatest imperialist oppression; the numbers of workers are so massive that naturally the work (in the labor movement) here is beyond the capabilities of a few inexperienced comrades. We hope that the Party Center will transfer here several experienced comrades from other places, or give special training to ordinary comrades to work in the Shanghai labor movement. At the same time, those of us in Shanghai must also find some comrades to learn to do such work. This is the urgent request of the Shanghai locality. It is a request that has to be made!

B.5 Resolution on the Report of the CEC (January 1925)⁵⁹

The Fourth Congress completely agrees with the CEC's analysis of China's political situation: We are now in a period of increasingly rapid collapse of the nation's warlord-dominated politics, a period of collapse of the old ruling warlords and the inability of the new ruling warlords to consolidate their power. The latest war has just ended.⁶⁰ Although the warlords of the Zhili clique disintegrated from top to bottom, none of the victorious warlord forces that opposed the Zhili clique was able to replace it and rule China. Moreover, conflicts between them are becoming more dangerous daily! The imminent breakout of a second war is very likely.

The result of the last war brought advantages to the Japanese imperialists in China, while delivering a heavy blow to the British and American imperialist forces

in Shanghai.⁶¹ This has intensified the conflicts in the Far East between the Japanese, British, and American imperialists. Recently, Britain, America, and Japan have been increasingly active in preparing for war. This kind of intensification of the conflict between Britain, America, and Japan will induce them to make use of wars among Chinese warlords to expand their own forces in China, thus further aggravating the wars among rival warlords.

Amid the turmoil among the domestic warlord forces and the intense conflicts among the imperialist countries in China, the movement of the oppressed people in China has an even greater opportunity for expansion. The movement for a National Assembly has spread all over the country like a surging wave. The Chinese people have already demonstrated their demand for political power and China's independence. This kind of popular movement will be the beginning of an even greater nationalist movement in the future.

At the present time, during the collapse of warlord-dominated politics in China, how this kind of popular movement can guarantee that warlords will not once again consolidate their power and prolong the process of their collapse, how it can prevent the implementation by the international imperialists of their reactionary policies in China—all this depends entirely on the correct policies of our party that leads the oppressed people, on the correct policies of the leftists in the GMD, and on our efforts to carry out extensive propaganda and organizational work among the people.

We know that the nationalist movement in China has now gained an opportunity for a period of expansion, but there are other important reasons giving rise to this opportunity. Since 1923, the international capitalist class has launched waves of attacks against the international proletariat and, in China, since the "February 7 Incident" [1923], imperialists and their agents, the Chinese warlords and the big capitalist class, have begun to adopt an aggressive policy against the revolutionary forces in China. The Chinese nationalist movement, however, instead of declining under the pressure of these attacks, has been flourishing daily. This gradually rising Chinese nationalist movement will have the opportunity for dramatic expansion when the reactionary restraints imposed since the Beijing coup are relaxed a little.

The labor movement is the foundation of the Chinese nationalist movement. In fact, since the "February 7 Incident," the Chinese labor movement has suffered the heaviest oppression, but it has continued to thrive to become the core of the development of the nationalist movement. The development of the labor movement has a positive relationship to the development of the nationalist movement: class struggle promotes the nationalist movement, while the nationalist movement intensifies class struggle. This can be proved by experiences in Guangdong during the past year. It is also being proved to us now. With the nationalist movement currently flourishing, the struggle between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class is intensifying. Traitorous workers are being discovered everywhere in the labor movement and, moreover, "yellow" labor unions are beginning to emerge. This shows that the Chinese bourgeoisie is using stronger methods against the working

class. Therefore, it is dangerous unionism to regard union organization as the sum total of the labor movement while neglecting other routine political activities of the party (in fact these party activities are designed to expand the labor movement and to help the working class attain political consciousness; workers' economic organizations can be expanded). This is not to say, however, that our party emphasizes only political activities but not the labor movement. Rather, this is to say that these two activities should both receive attention and be carried out in tandem, because they influence each other and promote the organization and development of the working class.

The Congress is satisfied with the CEC's leadership in directing our party's activities in the nationalist movement, thus enabling our party to keep in close touch with real political life and, at the same time, pointing the way for the Chinese nationalist movement. Although, during a certain period, the CEC was unable to prevent opportunistic tendencies among our party members who were working inside the GMD, the enlarged executive committee meeting [May 1924] immediately corrected this mistake by our comrades and since then has gradually guided our party's policies toward the nationalist movement and, in particular, the GMD, onto the right track.

The old CEC made some organizational mistakes, such as deficiencies in the technical aspects of organization and the delay in implementing the resolutions of the enlarged executive committee meeting.⁶² Although this was caused partly by practical circumstances, the Congress has to regard it as a shortcoming. Therefore, the Fourth Congress advises the new CEC to pay attention to the organization's guidance. All area and district committees especially should adhere to this.

The Congress hopes that the new CEC will establish a closer relationship with the Comintern to enable the CCP to receive more theoretical and policy guidance from the supreme commander of the world revolution.

B.6 Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement (January 1925)⁶³

1) The relationship between the national revolution and the world revolution

[[The world revolution comprises a social revolutionary movement by the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries and a multiclass national revolutionary movement in colonial and semicolonial countries.]]

2) The character and goals of the proletariat in the national revolutionary movement—world character and class character

[[The proletariat joins the nationalist movement to overthrow all capitalists in all nations and to overthrow the oppression by capitalist imperialists throughout the whole world. The nationalist movement pursued by the feudal and bourgeois classes

is based on the interests of a single nation and a single country; it really represents their own class interests. Thus, the proletariat participates in the national revolution not as a follower of the bourgeoisie but in its independent class position and for its independent goals.]]

3. The tendencies of all Chinese social classes in the nationalist movement—the leading position of the proletariat

[[The invasion of China by the capitalist imperialists has caused a progressive deterioration of Chinese agriculture and the handicraft industry. But the domestic class of big compradores profits from importing manufacturing goods and exporting raw materials for the capitalists. These compradores will collude with capitalist imperialists and represent a greater danger than the current warlords. Experience in Guangdong shows not only that they are tools of the imperialists but also that they have no conflict of interest with the landlord class. The bourgeoisie in the new manufacturing industries needs a nationalist revolution precisely because foreign imperialists obstruct the development of its industries. However, at the present time it is unable to participate in it. Because of its interests, the peasantry is the natural ally of the working class. The higher the class the more prone it is to compromise. The most oppressed and easily mobilized proletariat is the most revolutionary class. Guangdong has become the most important area of action for the proletariat because the struggles between peasants and landlords, workers and the big business and compradore classes, and small merchants and warlords have become very obvious.]]

4) The progress of the CCP's policies for the national revolutionary movement and rightist mistakes

At its Second National Congress (1922), the CCP decided that the Chinese proletariat should participate in the national revolutionary movement and support the Chinese GMD [see **Doc. A.11**]; it agreed on the slogans “democratic united front” and “overthrow imperialists and warlords.” After the Congress, the Comintern representative [Maring] suggested the following to the CCP: you Chinese comrades should individually join the GMD to further realize the democratic revolutionary united front and speed up the Chinese national revolutionary movement. Although at that time the Party Center respected the Comintern's suggestion, the majority of our comrades only supported the democratic revolutionary united front, but were highly suspicious of joining the GMD's organization. In practice, the Comintern's proposal was not implemented.

At the Third National Congress (1923), it was again decided that it was necessary for our party's comrades to join the GMD [see **Doc. A.23**]. It was also decided to expand the GMD's organization nationwide and to penetrate the laboring masses. At the time, no one in the party opposed joining the GMD and expanding its organization. However, the majority of the comrades did oppose developing the GMD's organization among the laboring masses and proposed instead that workers should participate in the national revolution under the flag of their own political party. Joining the organization of the bourgeois GMD would inevitably create the

danger of confusing the thoughts of the proletariat. After the Third National Congress, because of our comrades' vigorous participation, the GMD convened a reorganization congress and made obvious ideological and organizational progress. After the reorganization congress (January 1924), the majority of our comrades joined the GMD. This gave us many real opportunities to work among peasants and workers and in the military, and we were able to engage openly in the anti-imperialist movement. However, involvement in practical work also exposed our party's naïveté. Most comrades neglected the decisions of the Third National Congress that "we regard the nationalist movement as the focus of our efforts and at the same time develop our party's organization and propagate support for the interests of the laboring class in the process of the nationalist movement" and "prevent the GMD's policy of compromise." There were both leftist and rightist mistakes. The leftist mistakes were to propose continuous propaganda about the proletarian revolutionary movement and the dictatorship of the proletariat, oppose joining the GMD, and even oppose participating in the nationalist revolution, regarding it as a compromise with the bourgeoisie and as changing our party's color to yellow. The rightist mistakes were more dangerous and widespread than the leftist ones: (1) Believing that because we regarded the nationalist movement to be the focus of our efforts, we should expend even more energy on the GMD's work and need not carry out our party's work at the same time. This kind of mistake is committed mostly by capable comrades engaged in practical work. (2) Believing that because we were joining the multiclass GMD to implement the nationalist movement we would have to adopt a policy of compromise between labor and capital and give up instigating class struggle. Only a few GMD comrades who joined our party espouse this kind of mistaken view. (3) Believing that we should help the entire GMD and need not encourage the division between the left and the right. Our party's enlarged executive committee meeting (May 1924) pointed out these mistakes and warned of the danger that "we are helping the GMD to infiltrate organizationally the industrial proletariat." Not only might these mistakes and dangers exist at present but also they can occur in the future even if they do not exist now. Therefore, pointing out our erroneous tendencies in the nationalist movement and determining the position and goals of the proletariat in the nationalist movement are the important tasks of this national congress.

Participation in the nationalist movement is for the liberation of the entire nation, as well as for the self-interest of the proletariat, but never for the bourgeoisie's interests. If we forget the proletariat's economic organization and the party's tasks, if we forget the proletariat's economic struggle during the nationalist movement, if we forget the proletariat's preparation for its own class revolution in the nationalist revolution, if we are naively involved in the bourgeois national democratic movement, we will do irreparable harm to the proletariat and reduce the revolutionary character of the nationalist movement. Our comrades should be constantly vigilant about the dangers of such rightist tendencies.

On the other hand, we should also beware of leftist mistakes, such as opposing

the proletariat's participation in the nationalist movement. This mistake is obvious. Another mistake is to decide that only the proletariat can carry out the Chinese nationalist revolution and that there is no possibility for participation by other classes; the success of the nationalist revolution is then the proletarian revolution or it is to be followed by the proletarian revolution. First, the Chinese nationalist revolution has two characteristics. It is the continuation or fulfillment of the "Xinhai [1911] Revolution." The substance of the nationalist revolution is opposition to feudal economic relations and feudal warlords' politics (such as the institutions of military governorship in provinces, hiring of troops, division of political power, peasants' submission to bureaucrats and the gentry, and no legal protection for the people). At the same time, the Chinese nationalist movement is also directed against international imperialism because the latter is the principal cause that prevents the Chinese revolution from succeeding. It continues to enslave China politically and economically (by forcing the implementation of unequal treaties, controlling China's foreign trade, effectively administering China's transportation, exploiting Chinese labor, granting special rights to foreigners, stationing troops and warships in China to support its diplomacy, establishing educational and religious institutions, and deceiving the Chinese people via the media). The character of the Chinese nationalist revolution is thus determined by the above two features. Historically speaking, this is a bourgeois democratic revolution and, in political terms, contains the seeds of social revolution. Since one of the characteristics of the Chinese nationalist revolution is anti-world imperialism, its revolutionary movement is connected with the proletarian revolutionary movement of the world—the movement to overthrow world capitalism and build communism. From this point of view, the Chinese national revolutionary movement is part of a great world revolution that has followed the "October [Bolshevik] Revolution." Second, whether the victory of the nationalist revolution is to be followed by the proletarian revolution, or whether one has to go through the bourgeois democratic system must be decided by the proletariat's level of preparedness for its own class revolution during the nationalist revolution, as well as the practical social circumstances. At that time, the world political situation will also have a great influence. Third, if the national revolutionary movement is to achieve a relatively thorough victory, the most revolutionary proletariat must occupy the leading position. This leading class should also be able to seize the forces of all the oppressed social classes and fight the common enemy—the imperialists and their tools (domestic warlords, landlords, and the compradore class)—to avoid being isolated. This is an important question.

5) Our relations with the GMD and other parties and groups

Since the GMD's reorganization congress [January 1924], the split between the left and the right has become a fact. On the issues of the strike in Shamian,⁶⁴ the Chamber of Commerce incident,⁶⁵ and the wars in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the two factions have had intense conflicts. The left is composed of workers, peasants, and radical elements in the intellectual class; the right is composed of the military, bureaucrats, politicians, and capitalists. In Guangdong they have already cooperated

with big businessmen, the compradore class, and the landlord class in oppressing peasants and workers. Not only are they against us and the GMD-left, but they also oppose the center that stands between us and them. They openly charge that the anti-imperialist policies of ours, of the left, and of the center of the GMD are ill-conceived, and they spread rumors about communism to pressure the left and the center. The center in the GMD comprises those revolutionary elements among the petty bourgeois intellectual class. Though unimportant numerically, they occupy leading positions in the GMD. They are always between us and the right and manipulate and profit [from our conflicts]. After our party's enlarged meeting [May 1924], we began to expose the mistakes of the right and defend against their attacks, while simultaneously accusing the center of oscillating. Since then, not only have the rightists maligned us but they have even used the imperialists to harm us and have connived with all our social enemies to oppose us. They admit that the imperialists and warlords are not yet their enemies; only the CCP is their enemy. Because of our criticisms, the leaders of the center very much want to use the right to purge us, but they know themselves that their strength is inferior to that of the rightists. Thus, self-interest causes them to maintain unity with us in order to expand the strength of their own faction. Our experience of recent cooperation with the GMD and our positions and goals as decided by this resolution show that work in the GMD has entered a new era. Thus, the following decisions have been made concerning our working methods:

- 1) The GMD elements include the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, workers, and peasants. This has created the danger that they foster an image of class reconciliation among the masses. Therefore, our work inside the GMD should try to retain the element of class struggle in all movements.

- 2) Of course we recognize that the GMD is an important weapon in the Chinese nationalist movement; but it is only an important weapon and does not represent the entirety of the Chinese nationalist movement. Therefore, in GMD branches at all levels and in all the social groups outside of the GMD, we must propagandize anti-imperialism, opposition to warlord politics, opposition to the tool of the imperialists—the compradore class—and support for the interests of workers, peasants, and all laboring people. We should criticize the rightists in the GMD and the nationalist movement who want to compromise with imperialists, reactionary warlords, the compradore class, and the landlord class, as well as expose every counter-revolutionary act of [the rightists] oppressing peasants, workers, and all laboring people. We should also unmask the vacillating attitude of the GMD-center.

- 3) We should expand the GMD-left ideologically, organizationally, and especially in terms of popular propaganda. As for the leaders of the GMD-center and all the oscillating elements on the left or in the center, we should correct the mistakes of their rightist policies and make them understand that this rightist behavior violates the essence of the revolution. We should also make them break away from the rightists and engage in uncompromising struggle. When the center allies itself with the left in an uncompromising revolution, we should support them, together with

peasants. However, at the same time, we should explain to peasants and workers the difference between nationalist struggle and class struggle.

4) Of course we will help the GMD develop its organization in the course of the actual movement; but at the same time we should not forget the conflicts within the GMD: political conflicts about anti-imperialism, and economic conflicts about the peasant and worker classes. It is wrong to obstruct its development and avoid conflicts. We should actively help it to develop and intensify our struggle in this process of development and make the GMD march toward the revolution. Our party should engage in open activities in every place that is under the influence of the GMD regime. Whenever a political issue arises, we must first disseminate our party's proposals among the people. We must expose the GMD's mistake with its policy of political compromise that is especially disadvantageous to the actions of workers and peasants. We should call on workers and peasants to rise up and resist [these mistakes].

5) Of course we should ask the GMD to support the organizations of workers and peasants, as well as their interests. At the same time, however, we should make the GMD understand that the professional organizations of workers and peasants themselves should be independent and not be mixed up with the organizations of political parties. We should make the GMD realize that workers and peasants can more vigorously help the GMD's revolutionary movement when they have strong organizations. Participation in the revolutionary movement by the entire force of workers and peasants is much more important than the individual workers and peasants joining the GMD organization. From now on our party members and the nonpartisan industrial workers under our direction should join the GMD only when work necessitates it.

6) GMD branches at various levels that are completely under our comrades' control should work hard to propagandize among the party members and masses to make sure that they all will have leftist views—this represents a real unification of all leftists. It is not sufficient to rely only on emotional ties or branch leaders who are leftists.

In every practical campaign, as long as they have a political program for activities in the nationalist movement, we should give considerable cooperation to other political parties of the petty bourgeoisie. At the same time, however, we must expose their reactionary or reformist behavior and recruit the radical elements among them.

B.7 Resolution on the Labor Movement (January 1925)⁶⁶

1) The history of the Chinese labor movement and its current tendencies

[[In semicolonial China, the working class not only fights for its own class

interest but also participates in the national revolutionary movement. It must gain the leading position in the movement but never forget its own independent tasks in the labor movement. From its very beginning, the Chinese labor movement has been under the CCP's direction. The movement is in its third stage since the 7 February 1923 strike. Stage one: 7 February 1923 to February 1924, the first railway workers' congress. Oppression of the labor movement in the north and reliance on the nationalist movement in the south. Stage two: February 1924 until the October 1924 Beijing coup. The movement in the north still suffered from oppression, but in the south there was considerable progress. In this period the labor movement truly shifted from the defensive to the offensive. Stage three: since October 1924. It is now becoming increasingly possible to organize labor unions openly even in places beyond the control of the GMD. However, this will alert the imperialists and they will step up their attempts to destroy the unions.]]

2) The relationship between the labor movement and the nationalist movement

In line with the history and recent trends in the labor movement outlined above, the most important mission of the Chinese working class at present is not only to emphasize, theoretically, its own independent labor movement but also to participate in the nationalist revolution in order to gain the leading position. In practice, moreover, this is to adapt to the fact that it is easier to develop the labor movement as the nationalist movement unfolds. At the same time, however, because the labor movement tends to be used by the nationalists, we should fight for the independence and progress of the labor movement and fully revolutionize the nationalist movement.

The labor movement carried out during the national revolutionary movement often tends to confuse ideas about classes and cause all kinds of defects. Before the CP's enlarged CEC meeting last May, the labor movement was almost submerged into the nationalist movement. In some places, for example in Guangdong, leadership of the labor movement had been given over entirely to the GMD, and it lost its independence. The results were that the independent work of our own party was damaged, and it was discovered that a small number of workers (those who joined the GMD) had thus become bureaucratized. At the same time, during the early period of the labor movement, the CP originally organized labor unions using just a few special workers. When contacts with the GMD began, based on discussions with a few special workers, we simply allowed the labor movement to follow the GMD's policies, while the masses of real workers could not help but be suspicious of CP members. Therefore, during the national revolutionary period, and especially during the period of cooperation with the GMD, the CP should pay special attention to the following points in handling the labor movement.

A) The CCP is the only leader of the Chinese working class. To enable the working class to gain the leading position in the nationalist revolution, special attention must be paid to the labor movement. The working class must have strong independent organizations based on class and composed of the masses. Then, it will become an independent political force in the nationalist movement. Then, its lead-

ing position in the nationalist movement can be secure. Efforts must be made to ensure that all industrial workers are organized, under the leadership of the Communist Party, in independent organizations of a pure class character. We should also do our best to develop our party's organization and penetrate the masses.

B) In order to develop the leftist forces of the laboring masses in the GMD, in certain areas and as necessary, we should lead the laboring masses in major industries to join the GMD to revolutionize it further. However, in areas where the GMD has not reached the workers or when it is not necessary, there is no need to hurry to organize party branches for the GMD. The danger for the working class in the nationalist movement does not lie in workers' joining the GMD but in the absence of the CP's forces inside the masses of real workers and the absence of an independent labor movement. Therefore, the first priority should be to organize solid labor unions and class propaganda in these areas. However, when we encounter the GMD's efforts to organize [unions], on the one hand, we should intensify our work among the laboring masses to establish our strength and, on the other hand, send grass-roots workers to join GMD branches in case the GMD links up with a small number of the upper strata of workers and deceives the mass of workers.

C) As for workers' organizations already established in the GMD's name, we should also do our best to work from the inside to gain leadership power, recruit class-conscious elements, and organize our party's branches. We must also organize small groups (or union small groups) in factories to win the masses' trust and prepare to reorganize thoroughly such [GMD] unions. Especially when economic conflicts between workers and factory owners arise, we should use such conflicts to raise the workers' class consciousness, show the true character of the GMD, and change the GMD into a party inclined toward the political party of our own class—the CP.

D) With respect to the labor movement during the period of the national revolutionary movement, especially as there is now the possibility for unions to operate openly, we should watch carefully our relations with the GMD, as it is easy to find all kinds of reactionaries even in very ordinary labor unions: spies for warlords and bureaucrats, foremen, and others—the GMD-right is now plotting to recruit these anticommunist elements. In places controlled by the GMD regime, reactionaries are often used by the warlords and bureaucrats in the GMD to implement policies to deceive the masses and control the unions. Frantically, they purge the communist elements and thus tend to split the unions (they use ideas or organizations based on regionalism or societies). Our tactics should be: (i) Actively to seek union legalization, especially to encourage the masses to fight for it spontaneously. We should not make the masses feel that the restoration of unions is merely a favor granted by the GMD or the “progressive” warlords. In those places under reactionary rule, propaganda for legal unions should be pursued with equal vigor. In general, the initial political rights of the working class—demands for the right to mass gatherings, association, and freedom of speech—are the slogans that we think should be raised urgently. (ii) To propose the unification of labor unions—we will never establish

communist labor unions where there are already unions established by the masses of other groups. Instead, we should join and work inside these unions to fight for all kinds of practical interests of the masses so that we may win the trust of the masses while exposing the true nature of the reactionaries. (iii) In the course of the labor movement, when we give direction to the actions of the masses, we should pay attention to raising slogans [demands] that are appropriate to the organizational strength, needs, and emotions of the masses in those places, so as to induce the masses to engage in practical and deeper struggles. Overambitious slogans not only fail to arouse proper spontaneous struggle by the masses but also tend to be attacked by the reactionaries. The subsequent defeat will be blamed on us. (iv) Naturally, the working class may support the bourgeois national revolutionary movement. However, it does not matter whether the capitalist is a foreigner or a Chinese, a private individual or the state, a progressive or a reactionary; the relationship between them and workers is the same as far as economic struggle is concerned—the confrontation between labor and capital. Therefore, when the labor movement encounters such nationalist officials, warlords, and capitalists, we should direct workers to struggle against them without yielding any concessions. They can only make concessions to gain the workers' support. Workers should never be influenced by them into destroying their own offensive in the class struggle. Moreover, we should use the nationalists' connections with workers to attack the capitalists step by step. Implementation of this kind of class struggle is sure to bring down all kinds of reactionaries who are against the labor unions, especially the forces of the GMD-right because, in these circumstances, they will surely expose their true nature, a nature that is incapable of representing the interests of the masses of workers. . . .

4) The CP's political education and organization in the labor movement

The CCP should take the leading position in the labor movement but, as a rule, our work tends to concern purely technical aspects such as the solely administrative work of the union secretary. Now we should begin immediately the party's practical work: political education and the party's organization among the mass of workers. Political education through propaganda has now become very important. We must explain the Chinese political situation and the significance of changes in the current situation to workers (along the lines of political newspapers run by our party's agencies and the resolutions by party branches in all areas). We should explain in detail what the GMD and the nationalist revolution mean, the character of the right, center, and left of the GMD, and their relationship to the working class. We should highlight the mutual relations between class struggle and nationalist struggle, as well as the class nature of the labor movement. In every economic struggle we should point out its relationship to political struggle; we should explain that the working class must have its own class political party—the CP. We should propagandize the CCP Constitution and its strategies and use concrete facts to demonstrate that only the CP supports the interests of the working class. We should explain, in simple terms, the international character of the working-class and labor movement, as well as the relationship between the Chinese working class and the world

social revolution. A regular agency and plans must be devised for this kind of propaganda. As for the party's organization, it has become an extremely urgent task to recruit party members from among the workers because we can never unite with the masses if we do not have organization among the mass of workers as our backbone. Therefore, we should organize immediately CP branches in factories and on the railways and so on. These branches are to be responsible for the guidance of work in labor unions or for organizing small groups in factories, for political education among ordinary people, and for the training of party members who are workers. There should be both sufficient propaganda for the tasks outlined above in the labor movement, and then it will truly be the CP's labor movement. The danger of unions thus losing control of the labor movement can be averted.

5) The organizational question in the labor movement

Since the February 7 Incident the labor movement has shown signs of revival. Although our party's enlarged CEC meeting last May pointed out imperfections in previous methods of organizing labor unions and decided to work through factory small groups [**Doc. B.3**], the results have been meager. The situation now offers a greater chance for the labor movement to operate legally; we should increase our efforts with the factory small groups. This will enable us to really penetrate the masses and guarantee us our triumph over the reactionaries who oppose labor unions, thus laying the foundation of our labor movement.

In reactionary circumstances mutual-aid groups, clubs, and other gray organizations may, of course, be formed among workers to carry out the labor movement. However, whenever possible, every area should try to organize unions using the form of factory small groups. Although now there is the possibility for labor unions to become legal, all unions must still be organized on the basis of factory small groups. Only this kind of union will be able to establish deep relations and secure foundations among the masses. They would differ from the previous ones that completely disintegrated as soon as they encountered reactionary waves.

The small group may be organized in a factory or workshop as long as there are more than three persons. Once it expands, several small groups may be organized along the lines of the working divisions within the factory. There is no set limit on the number of small group members (the only limit is that they must come from the same place of work). If the number of people [in the group] is too large to have meetings, they can be grouped in tens. Each small group has a secretariat of three people elected by the representatives from the ten-person subgroups [*shirentuan*] (where there are fewer members, one group leader is sufficient). The congress of small-group representatives is the supreme institution in each factory and elects several people (the exact number is to be determined by circumstances) to form the factory committee. Then representatives from each factory elect several people to form the general union in a company or an area. Where they are not allowed to operate legally, however, small groups are to operate in absolute secrecy. Moreover, this type of organization is most suitable for operation inside the labor unions controlled by reactionaries.

The small group is the basic unit because workers in the same factory workshop tend to share the same interests. The ten-person subgroup can never replace the small group, nor is it the basic unit of organization, because the basic unit of a factory is the workshop (for example, the spun yarn, fluffer, packing, and weighing workshops in a textile factory; the lathe, grinding, casting, furnace, and forging workshops in an iron mill, etc.—all of them are the basic units in factories). If we overlook their significance, we will tend to treat the ten-person subgroup as the basic organization or the small group as the ten-person subgroup.

As a secret organization amid severe oppression, the small group is the original force driving the development of our labor movement. Its functions are as follows: (i) The small group is an organization hidden in a workshop not only to escape repression by the factory owner but also one that the owner will not be able to eliminate even if he discovers it; only by firing every worker in the factory can he eradicate the organization completely. (ii) Prior to the organization of the factory committee, the small group is the nucleus in a workshop and the nucleus of the factory. It is in charge of organizing the factory committee and extensively propagandizing and agitating for union organization. It should use facts about the factory's oppression of workers to arouse them throughout the factory to rebellion and thus unite the masses and expand the organization. (iii) In the case of unexpected conflicts in the factory or other incidents, when there is no factory committee, the small group should actively involve itself in them and lead the entire factory's workers to fight. Where a small group comes under the jurisdiction of a factory committee, however, it must obey its orders. (iv) In the factory, the small group can win victory and develop organizationally only by guiding some or all workers to fight. This can also bring most of the workers into the union movement. (v) When there are two or more small groups in a factory, they must proceed to organize the factory committee.

The small group is not only a unit that trains workers but also a place to nurture the fighting strength of the working class. Its training methods are: (i) Call a meeting once a week or every other week. (ii) Announce the form of the meeting and the means of convening the meeting so that every small group member can attend the meeting in the factory. It can also call on other workers to attend the meeting or an improvised meeting during a conflict. (iii) Use incidents in its own factory as materials for discussion, and teach workers methods of operation and resistance. (iv) During meetings, each member of the small group should make a report, which is to be criticized or discussed as a means of training group members to become perfect members. (v) Teach basic knowledge about labor (pay attention to the meaning of class and methods of class struggle; ideally, use immediate events as examples and avoid abstract theories). (vi) A critical report on current affairs is to be made at each group meeting in order to indoctrinate political knowledge and arouse the interest of the workers in current politics.

6) Concrete plans for the labor movement

After the Fourth Congress, our party's important work inside the labor movement is as follows:

i) The labor movement of industrial workers

In economically backward China, the largest industries, apart from the railways, mines, ocean transportation, and textiles, are in their infancy. These industrial workers are the foundation of our party and must receive our special attention.

The union movement on the railways has been in a state of depression since the defeat of "February 7." Under these circumstances, only a general railway union was established but, in practice, it has no real mass basis. The responsibilities of the general railway union in the future are: (a) to dispatch personnel to all lines to organize the lower levels; (b) to use all opportunities to revive the original unions on all lines that have been closed down; (c) to immediately organize unions on the Shanghai-Hangzhou, Shanghai-Nanjing, East China, and South Manchuria lines where unions were never organized before; (d) to work hard to develop our party's organization on all railway lines to become the center of the unions on all lines; (v) to regularly send personnel to travel to and inspect all lines, as well as to direct work there, in order to establish closer relations between the general union and all lines.

The miners' movement was developed in Shandong after the enlarged meeting, but because of the wrong working methods used by the comrades there, there was not much progress; for example, the movement was not launched in several major mining areas such as Tangshan, Hubei, Fengtian, Shanxi, and Hunan. Of course, there were limitations imposed by finances and personnel, but our party should not abandon at will several hundreds of thousands of industrial workers. This work should be implemented after the Fourth Congress.

The sailors' movement has not penetrated deep into the masses of sailors, although we can say that a beginning has been made in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Our previous policy of relying entirely on the GMD to consolidate the sailors' union has not been successful. Now we should become involved directly. Our methods of action are: (a) to set up our party's organization inside the sailors' union in order to reform the union from above; (b) to establish labor small groups and our party's organization in aid associations, dormitories, and clubs under the sailors' union; (c) to ally with groups like the sailors' clubs that have not joined the sailors' union and its aid associations; (d) to send personnel to work on oceangoing ships. When the above tasks are implemented to a certain degree, an alliance must be formed to reorganize the sailors' union now and turn it into a fighting union in industry.

Textile workers also occupy an important position in industry. They cannot be neglected for the sake of numbers alone. Recently our party has gradually emphasized the organization of these workers and begun work in all areas. When the organizational efforts have reached a certain point, an alliance must be formed to organize a national union for industry.

ii) Our work in all industrial areas

Shanghai, Hankou, and Tianjin are the areas where new industries are most developed. If we are able to organize and bring the workers in these areas completely under our command, our party's base in the labor movement will be more secure. In future, special attention must be paid to the labor movement in these areas. Next, we should also take note of Qingdao, Wuxi, Nantong, and Dalian.

iii) Labor movement of handicraft workers in major cities

In industrially backward China, handicraft workers comprise the majority of the nation's workers. Especially the handicraft workers in major cities are closely linked to the labor movement. Therefore, in the future, we should devote considerable resources to organizing and propagandizing among the handicraft workers in big cities.

iv) Female labor and young workers

Although China lags behind in new industries, the tendency toward the increasing employment of women among workers here is almost identical with the situation in Europe. However, Chinese women are still trapped inside a religious and traditional society; there are really great obstacles to the development of the [women's] labor movement. We have to cooperate with the women's department to solve these difficulties.

Young workers also occupy an important position in the labor movement and, moreover, are the bravest and most revolutionary. In the previous labor movement in China, young workers occupied almost all the central positions. In the future, we should not only pay special attention to young workers but help the [S]YL to carry out the labor movement for young workers within the labor movement under the command of our party.

v) Cooperatives

The cooperative (producer, consumer, and financial) is the most important task in the labor movement. It is a means of uniting workers around economic interests and guiding them in carrying out economic struggles. Our comrades should expend more effort to launch this movement in every major industrial area and region where there are handicraft workers. The work of our cooperatives is based on the view of class struggle and should avoid contamination from the reformist views of the petty bourgeoisie. This deserves our attention.

In order to implement the above tasks in the labor movement, our party should use the following methods:

1) A labor movement committee should be established within the central workers' and peasants' department to direct the above movements and be responsible for investigating the labor situation and making summaries.⁶⁷

2) All the workers and peasants' departments in the localities should set up a labor movement committee to take charge of the movement and to carry out orders from the central workers and peasants' department. The district committee member in charge of the labor movement should establish regular communication with CP branches in all the unions of that district, not only regularly giving them published materials and leaflets to guide them, but also taking part

in meetings of the branches or small groups and carrying out practical training.

3) China's territory is vast. To know the real situation throughout the whole country, the Party Center will dispatch special traveling inspectors at any time to direct the labor movement. The local workers and peasants' departments must report each month's or mission's results to the Party Center. When necessary, the Party Center should convene national or local meetings, attended by labor movement committee members from various levels, to discuss the movement, examine past results, and plan the methods for future implementation.

4) The labor movement is to occupy the primary position in the papers of the Party Center's organs.

5) The central workers and peasants' department and local workers and peasants' departments should edit all kinds of pamphlets that are easily understandable.

6) All local propaganda departments should pay attention to the needs of the local labor movement.

7) We should try hard to go and work inside the GMD's labor department so that a unified labor movement may be built by changing the GMD's labor unions into unions for class struggle.

B.8 Resolution on the Peasant Movement (January 1925)⁶⁸

1) The peasant question occupies an important place in the world revolution led by the proletariat, and especially in the national revolutionary movement in the East. One of Lenin's great successes was that he found an ally for the proletariat in the peasantry. This is the crucial difference between Leninists and all the opportunistic Mensheviks because the latter neglect the "slumbering" peasants, whom they consider incapable of becoming a crucial element in the revolution.

In economically backward China, although the basis of the rural economy collapsed after a long period of foreign aggression by international (capitalist) imperialists, the peasant class is still an important element in Chinese society and accounts for 80 percent of the country's population. Therefore, the peasant question is particularly important in China, and especially in a China in the era of nationalist revolution. If the CCP and the working class want to lead the Chinese revolution to success, they will have to do their best to systematically inspire and organize peasants everywhere to become involved in economic and political struggles. Without these efforts, we cannot hope that the Chinese revolution will succeed or take the leading position in the nationalist movement.

2) Since international (capitalist) imperialists use force to make China import and consume foreign manufactured goods, the rate of bankruptcy and unemployment for the peasantry has increased drastically. The Boxer Movement of 1900 that

shook the country was the first, large-scale resistance by the peasantry against international (capitalist) imperialism. After the Xinhai [1911] Revolution, the warlords' civil wars, supported by foreign imperialists, never stopped. The despotic tax collection and plundering by corrupt bureaucrats and perverse officials, together with the exploitation by landlords and the evil gentry, have made the peasants' life even harder. As [peasant] unemployment has become more widespread, banditry has emerged evcrywhere. Banditry is a peasant resistance movement in disguise. Thus, the Chinese peasants have long been driven to the road of rebellion by (capitalist) imperialism, warlord politics, heavy rents, unjust taxes, high interest rates, etc. It is the responsibility of the CCP to guide the peasants' latent natural rebellion toward spontaneously organized economic and political struggles.

3) At present, the propaganda that peasants should organize themselves should aim to solve practical problems. The following decisions on the peasant question were adopted at the last enlarged meeting:⁶⁹

Our party's propaganda among the peasantry should focus attention on the issue of the local governments' levying of land taxes. We must demand that the tax level be determined and authorized by a meeting of rural residents (meeting of peasants). At the same time, early collection of money and grain⁷⁰ must be opposed. Extortionate demands and all other illegitimate collections must be rejected.

Similarly, we should instigate the majority of peasants who are small property owners to resist local tyrants and the evil gentry . . . most of these are surviving bureaucrats of the previous Qing dynasty and are the real power in the villages. To solve all the local economic administrative problems, we should propagandize among the peasants the suggestion for the election of an agency that represents the peasantry (village self-governing council).

Among tenant peasants and peasants who till their own land as well as lease others' land, we should call for resistance to unjust taxes. On the issues of tenant peasants and opposition to the evil gentry, proposals may be raised to form tenant peasant associations and farmhand associations.

The organization of village militias (this should be changed to peasant self-defense corps) should be propagandized among peasants and tenant peasants so as to arm peasants against the scourge of banditry.

Within GMD territories, in addition to the above propaganda work, we should also ask the government to conduct irrigation work and establish a credit bank for peasants—to eliminate the hardship imposed by high interest rates.

Of course, the above methods are extremely appropriate for the future, but consideration must be given to each method with respect to time and place. For example, when it is possible to organize tenant peasants, semi-self-tilling peasants, and farmhands together to oppose big landlords, we should use the means of a joint organization of peasant associations. In each war between the warlords, we should use the pains peasants suffer from the armed conflicts to implement the above propaganda and organizational tasks. In addition, in places where there are Catholic and other Christian forces, we should especially instigate peasants to oppose the

Church's seizure of land and estates and the Church's collusion with local hoodlums in ill-treating honest peasants. This slogan should be treated as the fuse to light anti-imperialism among peasants.

4) In the past year, peasants have been inducted into the national liberation movement in the GMD territories in the south. This is the result of the GMD's policies. Because of objective conditions, from now on it will become increasingly possible to lead peasants in struggles against warlords and landlords not only in the south, but also in the north. We have been working with the GMD since its reorganization, and now we should take responsibility for the GMD's peasant policies. We should oppose the wrong policies of the GMD leaders in the south:

a) They only want to use peasants while, in practice, they do not protect peasants' economic and political interests. They want peasants to back the GMD. This policy will never receive support from the peasants.

b) The GMD wants to win the peasants' support in the areas of their military operations. They organize peasant associations and ask peasants to make sacrifices for the national liberation movement. However, they do not put pressure on big landlords to make concessions to the peasants; nor do they protect peasants' political rights. Even when soldiers and local despots mistreat peasants and endanger peasants' lives, the GMD leaders are incapable of helping them. For example, peasant associations have often been destroyed and repressed by the landlord class in collusion with the right, warlords, and bureaucrats. In the recent election for the mayor of Canton, over 200,000 suburban peasants, who pay for the cost of the city's administration, were excluded from voting.

Yet in the past year, the peasants in Guangdong have gradually gained class consciousness and organized themselves to fight back against landlords and the evil gentry. The peasant association movement has become a new force in political life under the GMD government in Guangdong. However, the GMD does not know how to use this new force to take part in the nationalist revolution, so it often allows peasant associations to be destroyed by the bureaucrats of the right, warlords, and landlords. The experiences of the past year also help us discover our own mistakes: (i) In terms of propaganda, sometimes we let peasants rely too much on the forces in the GMD government, with the result that the peasants do not believe that they have their own force or understand that the peasant association is the organization of their own class. Thus, peasants lose their faith in us when they are beyond the protection of the political forces. (ii) Sometimes our slogans for the peasantry are too ambitious and extensive; or the slogans are raised before the opportunity to exploit them has arrived. Instead this disease of naïveté causes the reactionary forces to unite to attack us. This makes us less able to support such struggles. (iii) On occasion, we place complete responsibility for conducting the peasants' economic struggles on the shoulders of a few of our comrades who are in charge of peasant associations. This puts the peasant masses in the position of a "third person" and renders the peasant association as a skeleton that is not based on the strength of the masses.

5) Of course, in the name of the GMD, we can use the organization of the peasant association to unite peasants. At the same time, however, we should try to use each opportunity of concrete struggle to resist repression by the GMD-right and warlords in accordance with the GMD's political programs that support the interests of workers and peasants. We should make peasants realize that the GMD and its political forces can be used to protect peasant interests. But real protection can be gained only when peasants unite and ally with urban workers. Thus, the worker and peasant forces can influence the GMD—making it march forward under their influence. Peasants will gain genuine liberation only after the overthrow of the oppression and restraints imposed by imperialists and warlords, the success of the revolution of the proletariat with the precondition of socialism. Therefore, we should remain outside the GMD and, at the same time, independently carry out our party's open propaganda and the work of our party's branches. Our branches in peasant associations everywhere will be the center for this kind of work. Moreover, in all areas, special emissaries for the peasant movement are to be placed under the command of our party's district committees. In the peasants' struggle against the right, bureaucrats, warlords, and landlords, our party's district committees should engage in appropriate propaganda or make announcements to let peasants know that our party is the party that really fights for their interests.

In the peasant movement we should pay constant attention to raising the peasants' class consciousness. When peasants have doubts about the GMD, we should explain to them the relations among the factions within the GMD and use real examples to show them what rightists, centrists, and leftists are. We should also explain to them the nature of the CP, its constitution and strategy. This kind of propaganda is particularly necessary after the alliance between the big landlords and the defeated reactionary compradore class in Guangdong has started to stir up anticommunist agitation in the countryside.

6) In addition, we should pay more attention to the following: (a) The slogans to be raised must meet the practical demands of the peasants in that area and at that time; before action is taken, there should be sufficient propaganda and preparation; meetings of peasant associations should not rashly decide to launch a rent-reduction campaign. (b) In the peasants' political struggles, we should ally middle, tenant, and poor peasants and farmhands to oppose big landlords (in our experiences with the peasant movement in Guangdong, because of inappropriate tactics, we often force middle peasants to take the side of big landlords). In particular, we should protect the special interests of the poor peasants and farmhands in this kind of alliance. (c) We should make specific propaganda for the abolition of unjust taxes and levies, and raise the slogan of increasing the income tax of the wealthy, because this slogan has great effect. First, it can win over the sympathy and support of small landowners; second, it will isolate and deliver a blow against big wealthy landlords; third, it will make the GMD's policies shift to the left; fourth, if the GMD government fails to satisfy this demand of the peasants, they will be given a deeper understanding of the GMD. (d) We should encourage peasants to ask the GMD government to distribute

the government-owned land to poor peasants. In addition, peasant associations should do more in the public interest, first to increase their stature and second to prevent local hoodlums and evil gentry from collecting levies in the name of public-interest enterprises. [The peasant associations] should also raise the cultural level of villages (but at the beginning of the movement they should beware of overstepping too much the boundaries imposed by religious and feudal psychology in the countryside), establish evening schools and reading classes, give lectures, perform new plays, put up wall posters, etc. Material help should be sought from the GMD to do these things.

7) During the continuous wars among the warlords of the past several years, the landlord class has established its own civil defense corps and village militia of armed peasants. Such organizations in Guangdong nowadays have become armed reactionary forces used by the landlord class to oppress peasants. From now on, we should use the levies collected from peasants to oppose the landlords' efforts to establish civil defense corps and call for a civil defense corps founded by peasants themselves. In addition, we should propagandize and expand the organization of the peasant self-defense corps and persuade those peasants who have joined the civil defense corps and the village militia to break away from local tyrants and landlords and enlist instead in the peasant self-defense corps. This type of peasant self-defense corps should be under our command.

The relationship between the bandits and peasants is an important issue. Based on the situation in Guangdong we are making the following instructions: (a) Establish appropriate connections with those bandits who help peasants resist oppression. (b) Use the slogan of opposing landlord oppression to deal with those bandits who are used by landlords to oppress peasants. However, we should not single them out for attack and thus cause mutual slaughter and hatred between peasants and unemployed peasants (bandits), thus falling into the trap of local tyrants. What is more important is that when bandits are being used [by landlords] to attack peasants, we should use force to deal with them and do our best to spread propaganda and expose the landlords' conspiracy. (c) Train peasant self-defense corps to deal with those bandits who support local despots and live off the peasants.

8) We use the experience of the rapidly developing peasant movement in the south for our work everywhere. From now on, in places reached by our party's organization, the GMD's organization, and our labor union movement (for example, along the railways, in mines, and in the suburbs of all major cities), and particularly where land is concentrated, we should use the experiences gained in Guangdong and all the methods in this resolution to carry out [the peasant movement] to the fullest possible extent. We must do our best to win over the largest possible majority of peasants as allies of the working-class revolution in this anti-imperialist, antiwarlord national revolutionary era.

9) The real liberation of peasants all over the world is related to the liberation of the working class in the world. Therefore, within the realms of the possible, we should lead organized Chinese peasants to join the international

peasant organizations to develop the world character [of the Chinese peasantry] and contribute to the progress of the world revolution.

B.9 Second Revised Constitution of the CCP (January 1925)⁷¹

Chapter One: Membership

1. Members of our party are not differentiated on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party's program and Constitution and are willing to serve our party loyally can become members of our party.

2. To be granted probationary membership in the party one must be sponsored by two people who have held party membership for over half a year; [the application] must be passed by a meeting of the party branch [*zhibu*],⁷² and examined and approved by the district committee. The probation period is three months for laborers and six months for nonlaborers; this period may be extended or shortened at the discretion of the district committee. A probationary member participates in branch meetings (if necessary, a probationary member may be authorized by the district executive committee to attend the district congress but will not have the right to vote) and enjoys the right to speak but not to vote. Other duties are identical to those of the regular party member.

3. Party members accepted by the CEC must also go through a probationary period after their district committees have been notified. Those who hold membership in CPs recognized by the Comintern may become regular members of our party after having been checked by the Party Center [*zhongyang*].

4. When a party member voluntarily applies for withdrawal from the party, his or her application must be approved by the district, party card and other important documents must be returned, sponsors must guarantee that he or she will strictly keep all party secrets, and, in the event of violation of this commitment, the district executive committee⁷³ will take appropriate measures to deal with him or her.

Chapter Two: Organization

5. In the countryside, in factories, on railways, in mines, in barracks, in schools, and in other organizations and their surroundings, a party branch may be formed as long as there are three or more members [five or ten in 1923 Constitution]. Each branch elects one secretary and three members to form a secretariat and will come under the command of the district executive committee. Where there are fewer than three party members, a courier [*tongxinyuan*] is appointed and will come under the

jurisdiction of the district [committee] or directly under the Party Center. When the number of members in a branch is too large, several cells [*xiaozu*] may be formed according to the situation; each cell has a group head who is to be appointed by the branch secretariat [*zhibu ganshihui*]. In places where there are branches but no district executive committee, the branches will come directly under the area executive committee; in places without area executive committees, the branches will come directly under the Party Center.

6. If an area has more than three branches, the area executive committee may send, with the authorization of the CEC, a person there to convene a full members' or delegates' congress. This congress is to elect three persons to form the district executive committee; it is also to elect two alternate members—when committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be replaced temporarily by alternate members. In localities where there is no area executive committee, the CEC is to send personnel down to organize a district executive committee. It will come under the Party Center. Once formed, the area executive committee will take over the responsibility and powers of the district executive committee.

7. If an area has more than two district executive committees and when the CEC deems it necessary to organize an area executive committee, it will send personnel to the area in question to convene a delegates' congress. The congress is to elect five people to form the area executive committee as well as three alternate members; if committee members have to leave their posts for any reason, they are to be temporarily replaced by alternate members. When the CEC deems it necessary, it may entrust a district executive committee to take over temporarily the responsibilities and powers of the area executive committee. The jurisdiction of the district is determined by the CEC and is subject to constant change.

8. The CEC is to be composed of nine persons elected by the National Congress; five alternate members are also elected by the Congress; when members leave their posts for any reason, they must be replaced temporarily by alternate members.

9. The term of office for CEC members is one year; for area and district executive committee members, six months; for branch chief or secretary, three months. The resignation of members of area and district executive committees and of branch chiefs and secretaries has to be approved by the superior organ.

10. The CEC implements all resolutions passed by the Congress and deliberates and decides on our party's policies and all the methods of implementation; area and district executive committees implement resolutions by superior organs and, within their jurisdiction and authority, deliberate and decide on all methods of execution. The CEC is to elect a general secretary from among its number to be in charge of party affairs for the whole country. Executive committees and secretariats at other levels must elect one secretary to manage party affairs at that level; other committee members assist the general secretary or secretaries at all levels in administering party affairs.

11. The resolutions passed by the National Congress or the CEC and special problems that arise unexpectedly are to be handled by special commissions made up of several party members who are appointed by area and district executive committees; when such special commissions convene meetings, the chair of such meetings must be a member of an area or district executive committee.

Chapter Three: Meetings

12. Each branch must meet at least once a week as convened by the branch secretary. In branches that have already been divided into cells, the cells must meet at least once a week as convened by the cell head. The meeting of the entire branch must be convened at least once a month. All districts must convene a full members' meeting at least once a month (in exceptional circumstances the full members' meeting may be changed to one of branch secretaries or a joint meeting of secretaries, but the full members' meeting must be held at least once every two months). In each area, the executive committee should call a delegates' congress once every six months. The National Congress is to be convened by the CEC on a fixed date once a year. The voting power of each delegate is determined by the number of party members he or she represents. The CEC shall meet in full session every four months.

13. When the CEC deems it necessary, it may convene an unscheduled [*linshi*] National Congress or an enlarged CEC meeting. It must also call an unscheduled National Congress when one-third of the area representatives or one-third of party members make such a request.

14. Regarding the number of delegates to the National Congress or to an unscheduled congress, each district may send one representative; if it has over 100 members it may send two delegates, three if it has over 200, and one more delegate for each additional 100 members. Where a district [organization] has not yet been [formally] set up, it may send one representative if the CEC deems it necessary.

15. Should a problem arise, a superior executive committee may order a subordinate executive committee to convene various kinds of *ad hoc* meetings.

16. The CEC must always send personnel to all places to convene various forms of *ad hoc* meetings. They are to be chaired by the special commissioners sent by the CEC.

17. The meetings of the central, area, and district executive committees and branch secretariat meetings may be called at any time by the general secretary or the secretary at the relevant level.

Chapter Four: Discipline

[[Articles 18 to 25 are almost identical to those in the Constitutions adopted by the Second and Third Party Congresses. The only change is in Article 22, where branch is substituted for cell. See Articles 17 to 25 in the Constitution adopted by the Second Party Congress, **Doc. A.15.**]]

26. On leaving a locality, party members must receive permission from the local party branch and they must report to the party branch in the locality they are moving to, if a branch exists.

[[Article 27 is almost identical to Articles 26 and 25 respectively of the Constitutions adopted by the Second and Third Party Congresses. See **Doc. A.15**. The only change is in point b), where the stipulation that a party member should be expelled if he or she fails to attend two consecutive meetings without any reason is changed to three consecutive meetings.]]

Chapter Five: Funding

28. The revenues of our party come from the following sources:

a) Party dues. Party members whose monthly income [*yue shouru*] is under 30 *yuan* pay 20 cents per month; those without income or whose monthly income is below 20 *yuan* may have their dues reduced by the district committee according to circumstances; those whose income is between 30 and 60 *yuan* pay one *yuan*; those whose monthly income is between 60 and 80 *yuan* a month pay 3 percent of their income; between 80 and 100 *yuan*, 5 percent; between 100 and 200 *yuan*, 10 percent; special levies are collected from those whose income is above 200 *yuan*. Party dues are waived for unemployed workers, imprisoned party members, or members who are still in the SYL.

b) Contributions from within the party. These shall be determined by the district executive committees taking into consideration the state of local finances and the economic strength of party members.

c) Support sources from outside the party

29. All revenues and expenditures of our party are to be disposed of by the CEC.

Chapter Six: Appendix

30. The power to revise this Constitution belongs to the National Congress, and the right to interpret it belongs to the CEC.

31. This Constitution has been adopted by the Fourth Party Congress (11–22 January 1925) and is effective the day it is issued by the CEC.

B.10 Resolution on the Current Political Situation in China and the Tasks of the CP (October 1925)⁷⁴

1) The National Revolutionary Movement Since “May 30”

The situation since the “May 30” [1925] slaughter has offered a truly excellent opportunity for developing and expanding the national revolutionary movement.

The exploding revolutionary tide of the past four months has spread over almost the entire country.

The first characteristic of this movement is that it is a genuine movement of ordinary people. From the very beginning, the "May 30" anti-imperialist movement had a huge following among the urban masses: the proletariat, handicraft workers, small merchants, students, guilds in various areas, and even the intellectual class in churches and church-run schools, who originally were subject to the direct influence of imperialist institutions.

The second characteristic of this movement is that it has caused a part of the domestic military forces to lean toward the side of popular movement, for example the National People's Army.⁷⁵ On the other hand, the Fengtian clique of warlords have displayed their counterrevolutionary nature all the more clearly in this national revolutionary movement by blatantly supporting the imperialists.

Of course, these characteristics show even more clearly the changes in China's social and economic conditions that continue to unfold in the wake of the Xinhai [1911] Revolution and that move us nearer to completing this nationalist revolution.

Guangdong occupies a special place in the nationalist revolution. The strikes and boycott of goods that were supported fully this time by the revolutionary government truly assumed a nationwide character.

Political power in Guangdong is now in the hands of the GMD-left. Of course, the [left wing] is the most revolutionary vanguard in this revolutionary battlefield. The workers, peasants, and masses of the south go all out to encourage this revolutionary government to resist imperialism and domestic counterrevolutionaries. However, these enemies of the Chinese people also launch the fiercest attacks because the British imperialists in the south have a monopoly of despotic power and can oppress China without anybody preventing them.

It is the development of the mass revolutionary movement in north and central China and the conflicts between imperialist powers nationwide that have prevented the British imperialists from quashing the revolutionary movement in south China.

2) The Working Class and the National Revolutionary Movement

In the current struggle against imperialism, the working class has clearly demonstrated its leading role in the revolutionary movement for national liberation. The enormous scale of the strikes in Hong Kong and Shanghai is unprecedented in Chinese history, and all the democratic classes and ordinary people who are oppressed by imperialists have rallied together under the flag of the struggle by the working class. Most urban residents support the victory of the anti-British strikes. This confirms that the Chinese proletariat is the vanguard and main force for liberating the whole nation.

In addition, the cruel slaughter and suppression of workers by the Fengtian clique of warlords in Shanghai, Nanjing, Qingdao, and Tianjin prove that the Chinese working class spearheads the fight for civil rights. At the peak of the strikes, its movement was really very close to causing a national general strike, daily guiding more and more people from all classes in urban and rural areas to join the liberation

movement and constituting a serious threat of a national popular uprising against the imperialists and warlords.

The proletariat is mobilized to fight for our nation's general interests: yet, at the same time, it must struggle to improve its own economic and legal position. The strikes in Hong Kong and Shanghai are the main fighting force in the nation's working-class movement. In the last couple of months, the masses of workers have risen up to fight for improvements in their economic positions: pay increases, reduction in working hours, and recognition of labor unions—this movement has acquired a scope and force hitherto never seen in China.

The experiences of the past several months in China obviously prove that the Chinese bourgeoisie is the same as the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries in the past. If they want to seize political power and oppose the foreign and domestic forces that oppress them, they must join forces with the workers—however, this will only be to pursue their own class interests. As soon as the proletariat, in its common cause with the bourgeoisie, begins to make demands on the bourgeoisie for its economic interests and legal rights, the domestic bourgeoisie will immediately start to oppress workers. It will even be willing to compromise with enemies at the expense of the national interest.

The division within the Chinese bourgeoisie is being exposed every day because of the development in the proletarian economic struggle. As a result of such divisions, the most reactionary bourgeoisie not only opposes the proletariat but also betrays the national revolution. However, the several million members of the urban petty bourgeoisie, who have been drawn into this movement of anti-imperialism and fighting for citizens' political power in concert with the struggles of the proletariat, are still allies of the working class.

The Chinese proletariat must conserve and concentrate its forces with extreme care. It can deliver a heavy blow against the imperialists and warlords only by forming a united front with ordinary people among the urban democrats and organizing the peasant masses to join in the revolutionary movement.

3) The Peasantry and the National Revolutionary Movement

The peasant movement in China has gradually developed in the southern and central provinces. The CP's demands for the peasantry should be synthesized into a political program on the peasant question. Its ultimate objective should be the confiscation of the land of big landlords, warlords, bureaucrats, and churches. The land should be given to the peasants. The CP should make ordinary democrats realize that the confiscation of land is an inevitable policy, as well as an important mission in completing the Xinhai Revolution. Now we should let ordinary workers and peasants know that when the time comes to establish a national revolutionary government, the confiscation of land will be an important issue of the revolution. If no land is confiscated and given to the peasants, if several hundred million peasants are thus unable to join the revolution, the government will surely fail to consolidate its power and suppress the warlords' counterrevolution.

Our party should realize that the peasants' demands we are now raising during

the transition period are aimed at revolutionizing and organizing the peasants. These demands include rent reduction, improvement of irrigation, tax reduction, abolition of extortion, return of the power to administer salt tariffs, reduction of salt tariffs, peasants' self-government of their villages, and organization of peasant associations and self-defense corps. However, if the peasants are unable to satisfy their most important demand—land to the tiller—in the last analysis, they will not become supporters of the revolution.

However, our tasks should not be limited only to declaring openly the peasants' demands and the future of the peasant movement. We should also pay attention, in the course of the peasant movement, to the development of the organization that leads the peasants—our party. The CCP is the representative of the Chinese proletariat. Only through establishing a secure alliance with the peasants can we fulfill our historic mission. Therefore, when the peasant movement is thriving as now, our fundamental responsibility is not only to organize peasants and guide their thinking but also to consolidate our party's organization inside the peasant associations, cooperatives, and peasant self-defense corps.

4) The Struggle Between the Warlords and the Revolutionary People's Regime

[[The current revolutionary movement not only opposes imperialism but also strives for the realization of a revolutionary people's regime. The revolutionary forces comprise not only the proletariat but also the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and military opponents of the Fengtian clique such as Feng Yuxiang's National People's Army. These forces must be tightly united to defeat Zhang Zuolin and his Fengtian clique.]]

5) Conflict Among the Imperialists and the National Revolutionary Movement

[[The imperialists' attempts to suppress the national revolutionary movement are hampered not only by the Chinese people but also by divisions between the imperialists themselves and the intense class struggle in their own countries. Further, the presence of Soviet Russia undermines the militarists' capacity to use force in China. Despite these factors, however, the possibility still exists that the imperialists will use force to crush China and thus cause international chaos in the Pacific region.]]

6) The Chinese Revolutionary Movement and the World Proletariat

[[The Chinese people's struggle has opened a new front of anti-imperialism and has strengthened the revolutionary forces of the world proletariat and the oppressed nations of the east. The recent movement in China has shown that the relationship between the world proletariat and the national revolutionary movement in colonial countries is a much more important issue than ever before.]]

7) The Tasks of the CCP

a) The current period of the Chinese people's revolution has presented the CCP with tasks of great historic significance. The CCP directs the proletariat and the leaders of the national liberation movement. It must point the way forward to the masses, devise and declare its political program to enable the working class and its allies—the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and revolutionary intellectuals—to struggle forward, in accordance with the program, and to fight for the realization

of a revolutionary people's regime in China, and the unification and independence after ridding China of imperialist oppression.

During this period of revolutionary struggle, the CCP should not only outline the movement's future and the political program for the people's struggle, but also explain very clearly to the people the significance of the following concepts: the revolutionary people's regime; the unification of China; the national assembly of the representatives of workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers; and the organization of a revolutionary nationalist army.

b) It is one of the fundamental tasks of the CCP to organize for the workers, in accordance with the above concepts, labor unions, factory committees, and labor union federations and to convene a national labor congress to concentrate the proletarian forces. At the same time, it is the most urgent task to recruit into our party the revolutionary elements in the Chinese proletariat. At present, a very important task for the CCP is to unite the class-conscious proletariat, organize it under the CP's banner and instruct it in class struggle according to communism. If the CP fails to develop and consolidate itself inside the revolutionary proletariat, then it is unimaginable that the Chinese proletariat's struggle and the national liberation movement will progress.

c) In the shift from strikes aimed directly at imperialists to strikes for the right to organize unions for economic reasons, there is the recent danger that the working class has neglected political struggle. However, there is also a danger in reducing the workers' economic demands in order to strengthen their political struggle. The CCP must be aware of both dangers. They are sufficient proof that the Chinese working class, in the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the whole nation, does not have a very clear conception of the struggle's future. To eliminate these two dangers, we should encourage the masses to participate more in various political movements, such as demonstrations, rallies, and other verbal or written propaganda. At the same time, there is a need to expand the workers' important economic struggles. These are important tasks for us at the moment and have crucial implications for our party's development.

d) In the working-class struggle of recent months, although many brave elements have been lost owing to the repeated repression by imperialists and warlords, an unprecedented revolutionary psychological state has been created among the masses of workers. The CCP should make use of this revolutionary psychology to prepare, in an organized manner, the arming of the bravest and most loyal elements among the working class. This kind of endeavor should be pursued not only on the railways and in the mines. In factories of reasonable size, young workers should be organized into armed groups of ten or 100. Therefore, a military committee must be set up under the C[E]C.⁷⁶

e) The GMD represents part of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The CCP should continue its policy of cooperation with the GMD and do all it can to guide and push the latter to carry on with the revolutionary movement. Dai Jitao's recent pamphlet, *The Nationalist Revolution and the Chinese GMD*,⁷⁷ repre-

sents the thinking of the rightists in the GMD, and it can be seen as the direct result of the revolutionization of the people in the past four months. The recent position of the Chinese proletariat and the CCP in the national revolutionary movement, especially in central and north China, has aroused considerable reactionary opposition from the bourgeois representatives in the GMD. They have felt the revolutionary force of the proletariat and have hastily cobbled together slogans of class compromise. If we regard this phenomenon as signaling the time for the CCP to sever its relations with the GMD, it would be a big mistake.⁷⁸ However, it would be a dangerous mistake not to pay attention to the significance of the class compromise championed by these rightists. Thus, we should seek a good method of alliance with the GMD which, ideally, will not hamper the alliance of the proletariat with the urban petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, but will, instead, expand this alliance.

Politically, efforts to turn our party into a legitimate, open organization are also one of the important means to achieve the above objective. Organizing our own comrades to develop and consolidate our party's organization and guiding every movement and mission with our own distinct views on thinking and tactics act as safeguards for undermining the rightists and openly uniting with the leftists in the GMD.

d) The CCP and the [S]YL should guide the majority of students to join the revolutionary movement while, at the same time, trying to recruit revolutionary elements into the CCP and the [S]YL. In the past, students in the national liberation movement have played many revolutionary roles. Especially in the recent anti-imperialist movement, almost all students in every major city cooperated with the working class at the forefront of the anti-imperialist [struggle] and also guided the petty bourgeois masses to participate. Right now, when the revolutionary tide is continuing to surge forward, undoubtedly students will play an even bigger role. Because the daily polarization of the bourgeoisie in the national revolutionary movement has evidently also manifested itself among the student masses, however, a section of the reformists among students are now being controlled by the GMD-rightists. Thus, they are not actively fighting the imperialists but instead concentrate their energy on opposing the CP and all leftists in the national revolutionary movement.

The present responsibility of the CCP and the [S]YL in the student movement is to try to form a unified student organization and breach the reformist policy of the rightists among the students. On the whole, students should become leftists in the national liberation movement. To bring about a unified students' organization, it is necessary to conduct extensive propaganda among the students so that the masses among the rightists may pressure their leaders to cooperate and negotiate with us openly.

To lead the student masses to join the national revolutionary movement, it is also necessary to pay attention to the problem of the students' daily work and through leading them in this induce them to accept our beliefs and form a centralized organization to raise their own demands in the national revolutionary movement:

demands such as the right to organize self-governing associations in all universities and colleges.

B.11 Resolution on the Question of Organization (October 1925)⁷⁹

1) Hundreds of thousands in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Canton have joined in the national revolutionary movement by means of strikes. The most backward part of the proletariat in north and central China was mobilized to join the struggle, thus helping millions of workers attain consciousness through the political and economic struggles. This is an unprecedented period and compels the CCP to emphasize the proletariat's leading role in the struggle and guide it into the national liberation movement.

2) The high tide of this nationalist revolution and the enthusiasm with which the immature proletariat joined this movement have meant that the CCP's role has greatly increased. It must mobilize and organize the proletariat and, through political training and education, search for ways to ally with the peasantry and with other advocates of democracy. To fulfill this mission of great historic significance, the CCP must first expand its own organization by absorbing the proletariat and the most revolutionary elements among the radical intellectuals.

The current period for the CCP and the national revolutionary movement is marked by the daily rising revolutionary tide among the masses. This is beyond doubt.

The future destiny of China's revolutionary movement depends entirely on whether the CCP is able to organize and guide the masses.

3) However, whether the CCP will be able to lead and organize the revolutionary workers, handicraft workers, and intellectuals depends not only on recruiting them into our party but also on whether our party has a just and good organization. It is essential to have centralized organization of active members, from the top to bottom, from branches [*zhibu*] to the Party Center. The lower-level organizations must have very clearly defined and close relations with the higher levels.

Now that the number of party members has increased, the CC will be enlarged accordingly at the next congress. Unambiguous organizational definition must be made for the Party Center's different departments such as organization, propaganda, women's, distribution, and publication. The relationships between these departments must also be clearly defined. CC and area secretaries should, if possible, avoid assuming positions in these departments. Committees for the labor, peasant, and military movements should be established under the Party Center.⁸⁰ They should be responsible for implementing their own tasks. The number of special

commissioners [*tepai xunxing de zhidaoyuan*] sent by the Party Center should be increased to direct all work at the area and district levels. The experiences of the past few months show that in many places, especially in the north, there is too little guidance from the Party Center and an unequal distribution of personnel over the various areas. Our party's expansion is even more important following the high tide of the revolution. Special attention should be paid to the north, because workers there did not participate fully in the last movement. In particular, the setbacks in Tianjin and Tangshan have prevented us from immediately expanding the party in these two areas. Thus, in the north, the Beijing area organization must be consolidated to govern Zhili, Shanxi, and the three northeastern provinces. The Beijing district committee is an independent organization and is not subordinate to the Beijing area committee.

4) Area and district committees should, on the one hand, genuinely implement commands from the Party Center to the fullest extent and report to the Center for instruction on all questions concerning policies and tactics; on the other hand, they should direct the tasks in their areas (branches, party fractions [*dangtuan*], clubs [*julebu*], workers' study societies [*gongren yanjiuhui*], etc.) and dispatch personnel to monitor the party's daily work in all localities under their jurisdiction. Our party has expanded so much in places such as Shanghai that different geographical areas under the area committee [*quwei*] have to be divided into several "departments" [*bu*], and "departmental committees" [*bu weiyuanhui*] have to be organized. This organizational innovation is very necessary, first because it is convenient for directing work, and second because it makes the expansion of the party's organization easier.

The task of each branch, particularly in factories, is to consolidate our forces organizationally regularly and to recruit revolutionary workers.

5) At present, the most important organizational question is the consolidation of our party's influence among the masses. Now the revolutionary movement is riding high. The willingness of the masses to accept our proposals is not sufficient proof that we have a genuine following among the masses and can actually lead them. We must make use of this revolutionary wave in the following ways:

a) Complicated party entry procedures for revolutionary workers, students, and peasants are to be waived. The probation period will be one month for workers and peasants and three months for intellectuals.

b) Our party's branches and groups [fractions] should be organized in all workers' organizations, peasant associations, and intellectual groups.

Only after joining the party will all revolutionary elements in society have the opportunity to receive the party's training and really understand its doctrines. We should never dream of recruiting many ready-made party members from Chinese society. The industrial worker in major industries is a natural CP member. As long as he or she has class consciousness and loyalty to the revolution, he or she can join the party without having to satisfy other criteria, especially now in the middle of this revolutionary era. At present, most leading comrades in all localities have the

mistaken view that every CP member should understand Marxism and possess a great capacity for work. They think that if party membership improves only in quantity and not in terms of quality, there will be no benefit and the party's organization would be weakened further. Thus, many such leaders propose that the quantitative development of the party is to be limited by the party's capacity for educating its members. This mistaken view is the only obstacle to making the party a truly mass party.

During the high tide of the revolutionary movement, when the Hong Kong workers' struggle was at its peak, the Guangdong area even failed to use the opportunity to consolidate and expand our party. Although the Guangdong area was able to influence the thinking of the masses of workers and peasants, it was unable to consolidate these forces in organizational terms by recruiting workers and peasants into our party and organizing our party groups [fractions] among the various social groups. This was a mistake. Our comrades in Guangdong only worked individually inside the labor unions, peasant associations, and troops under the GMD. They did not resemble a powerful political party with its own interests and properly organized so as to lead the proletariat in the national revolutionary movement.

6) Our comrades and committee members at all levels (central and local) have always worked individually inside labor unions, the GMD, and the student masses, and limit themselves to certain specific tasks. Then, toward the party, they behave as if they represented that particular movement while failing completely to pursue the party's overall tasks. This is a bad habit and should be corrected immediately.

This habit is a manifestation of transition from a small group [*xiao tuanti*] to a centralized mass political party. Now this transitional period should be ended in the shortest possible time. The whole party should be close to the masses of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intellectuals.

7) The question of a united front of the working class, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and all those who advocate democracy is, in large part, a question of the relationship between the CCP and the GMD. Therefore, in organizational terms, we should particularly emphasize building our party's organization where the GMD has great strength (such as in Guangdong); this is the only way of expanding this united front and consolidating our cooperation with the GMD-left.

8) The reactionary high-pressure policy of the warlords and capitalists in the industrial areas is, on the one hand, the inevitable result of the development of economic struggles and, on the other, the result of the fact that the majority of the masses of workers did not participate fully in the revolutionary movement. Now that such reaction has come, we should move underground in certain places. However, this is not to say that we should return to the previous situation. This is only to carry out secret tasks among sections of the working class and intellectuals.

We should prepare secret organs [*mimi jiguan*] while simultaneously doing our best to carry out open political movements. We should remember that by engaging in secret work, the party cannot become a mass party.

9) In addition to developing the organization and tasks of the party, the organi-

zational expansion of the CYL⁸¹ to penetrate young workers, peasants, and students has great significance for the realization of a mass party and the work of the national revolutionary movement. Hence, the enlarged meeting considers that one of the most important tasks at present is to assist the CYL to develop and consolidate its organization, as well as with the education and training of its members.

In the past, the party did not give guidance and help in the work of the CYL. Several localities transferred comrades with important responsibilities in the CYL as they pleased without permission from the CYL central authorities. This is a mistake that hinders the organizational development of the CYL. From now on, all localities should try to correct this shortcoming and, whenever possible, not transfer or use comrades responsible for CYL work. The localities should also consolidate relations between the party and the league in all respects in accordance with the decisions on the relationship between the CP and the CYL adopted in the resolution on the question of organization adopted at the league's Third National Congress [January 1925].

B.12 Resolution on the Relations Between the CCP and the GMD (October 1925)⁸²

[[1) Since Sun Yat-sen's death [12 March 1925], bureaucratic and compradore classes in the GMD have been forming groups. They intend to overthrow the Canton government and compete with the CC of the GMD.

2) The proletariat is an autonomous social force and the formation of the bourgeoisie as a political force is speeding up. The GMD and the petty bourgeoisie are doing their utmost to define their thought and consolidate organizationally.]]

3) However, the recent developments in the revolutionary movement not only have caused further differentiation within the GMD but also have expanded its organization and, in particular, have truly made it the mass political party of nationalist revolution in the south. Tens of thousands of new party members from the urban petty bourgeoisie, peasants, and workers have joined.

4) The CP's current task is to continue, more firmly than ever, with its policy of cooperation with the GMD in order to bring it close to the majority of the masses, give assistance to the left, and enable it to carry out the tasks of expanding the revolutionary movement. At the same time, we should do our utmost to oppose the slogans and strategies of the rightists. All party members should realize that our current policy toward the GMD is to oppose the rightists but form a close alliance with the left, doing all we can to help the left and fight the right.

5) An important method of executing this strategy is to expand and consolidate our party everywhere, especially in the places dominated by GMD. Our party should actively enter the political stage and carry out our own ideological struggle

Leftists	Rightists	Reactionaries
1) oppose all imperialists to the end	oppose one set of imperialists, but compromise with others because of the workers and peasants' struggle	collude with imperialists
2) support labor and peasant movements for the sake of the revolution	propose compromise between labor and capital	cruelly oppress the labor and peasant movements
3) oppose warlords for the sake of democratic politics	oppose warlords for the sake of own interests	collude with warlords
4) ally with Soviet Russia and the CP	ally with Soviet Russia but exclude the CP	oppose both Soviet Russia and the CP
5) eliminate all reactionary forces	save the reactionary forces to resist the left	they are the reactionaries

and strategy everywhere. This is the second method for realizing our objectives. More specifically, we should use the following methods:

a) The CCP's propaganda and organization should be independent and must be expanded, especially in Guangdong.

b) We must win over the masses of workers and peasants.

c) Unless absolutely necessary, our new comrades should not join the GMD or do any work for the GMD, particularly in its highest branches (those branches completely under the control of our forces are exceptions).⁸³

d) Where the GMD-left exists (especially in Guangdong), we should sincerely cooperate with it and force it to participate in the nationalist movement to the best of its ability. We must not intentionally avoid it and let it stand by as an apathetic spectator. At the same time, however, we must make no concessions on the issues of the theory and practice of class struggle in all movements.

6)⁸⁴ Previously, among our comrades, GMD members were analyzed in terms of three factions: left, center, and right, classifying all GMD leaders as the center. Not only is this incorrect theoretically, but also it is strategically inappropriate. Its first defect is that our comrades unwittingly neglected our own positions and thus became purely members of the GMD-left. Its second defect is that it gave the false impression to the leftist elements in the GMD that "leftist" was synonymous with "communist." All who have not joined the CP or youth league consider themselves to be the "center" and regard all the policies that should be those of the GMD-left as policies of the CP, and thus refuse to endorse them. Its third defect is that this classification made the genuine rightists in the GMD (such as Dai Jitao, Zou Lu, Shao Yuanchong, and others) regard the reactionaries as the rightists and themselves as the center. Moreover, the former so-called rightists have now become open reactionaries and have publicly split from the GMD. Members of the former so-called center have now joined either the left or the new right. Thus, at present, the GMD has only two factions: the left and the right. However, for the left, it is not

enough simply to mouth leftist views. By their deeds, members must not violate the Manifesto of the First GMD Congress. Their concrete political standpoint must be different not only from the reactionaries but also from the rightists. In this period, the attitude toward the question of whether to unite closely with the communists is a distinguishing character of the GMD-leftists. In our propaganda, we should classify the left and right in the GMD and the reactionaries according to the political views listed [in the table] above.

B.13 Proclamation for the Peasantry (10 October 1925)⁸⁵

[[Since ancient times our people have been divided into four classes: the intellectual class, the bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the workers. The peasants suffer oppression from four sources: the landlords, through rent, usury, etc.; the foreign capitalists because their goods and industry have destroyed traditional handicraft work and because of their control of such things as the salt tax; the warlords with their indirect taxes and extortion of moneys needed to wage their wars; corrupt officials and evil gentry who collect in bribe money at least twice as much as the state levies—the tax on land deeds is 9 percent of the value of the land but only 3 percent goes to the state treasury, 3 percent goes to the county governor, and the other 3 percent is divided between the police and the local bureaucrats. The suffering caused means many peasants have to give up farming and enlist in the army, become bandits, or drift to the cities.]]

The peasants have an important job growing food and account for the majority of the population, but now they are so miserable that they have to wander about the country. This is not a misfortune for the peasants alone, but is a danger and loss for the whole country. The fundamental solution to eliminating the peasants' misery lies with the implementation of the policy of "land to the tiller." This means that peasants till the land they own and do not have to pay rent to the landlord. In addition, abolition of the salt tax and high interest rates would also have a great impact on peasant livelihood. However, in order to realize the goal of abolishing the salt tax and high interest rates, and implementing "land to the tiller," the peasantry must be allied with the workers to make revolution and overthrow the warlords' government, since this government will never be willing to abolish the salt tax and high interest rates. As for "land to the tiller," it will have to wait for the workers, peasants, and other people to seize political power; only then can the land of warlords, bureaucrats, churches, and big landlords be confiscated and be owned by the peasants who farm the land. As a temporary strategy of self-help, our party suggests that the nation's peasants should make the following minimum demands:

- 1) That the government must recognize peasant associations organized by the

peasants to replace the peasant societies that are thoroughly controlled by the non-peasant, evil gentry.

2) That rural self-governing bodies be directly elected according to the law of popular election, and never be manipulated by the gentry.

3) That peasant associations and rural self-governing bodies should have the power to determine the highest rent and the lowest price for grain.

4) That every rural self-governing body should be allowed to use local public funds to set up an office to make interest-free loans to peasants.

5) That every village should ban private individuals from stockpiling grain for speculation.

6) That all kinds of exorbitant taxes and levies and land taxes demanded in advance should be resisted. Necessary land taxes, regardless of whether they are calculated on population or grain, should be paid in accordance with market prices. Objectionable levies should be resisted.

7) That central and local governments set up special bureaus for river management and improvement. Special government budget funds for river management and improvement must not be diverted for other purposes.

8) That peasants be authorized to organize self-defense corps, armed by the government, to defend themselves against bandits and roving soldiers.

These are the peasants' current urgent demands. However, to satisfy these demands, peasants will have to organize themselves into groups and contribute their energy to the struggle.

How should peasants organize groups? The answer is to organize peasant associations. Perhaps some people think that peasants are, as a rule, always loosely knit and will have difficulty in organizing themselves into groups. The truth is just the opposite. According to our experience in Guangdong, peasant groups can be organized successfully. Only after our party's Third Congress in July [June] 1923 did we begin to help peasants organize groups in Guangdong. In under two years, peasants in over twenty counties organized peasant associations, with a total membership of over 400,000 people. Moreover, the thousands of self-defense corps have fought many battles with the landlords. The peasant association representatives in these twenty-plus counties met in Guangdong's provincial capital on May Day this year (every 1 May is labor day throughout the world) and founded the Guangdong Provincial Peasant Association. It so happened that on the same day (1 May), representatives of the nation's labor unions also met in Guangdong's provincial capital for the Second National Labor Congress.⁸⁶ The 278 labor congress representatives and the 125 representatives from the Guangdong Peasant Association held a joint conference and raised the call for an alliance between workers and peasants. Relations were very close and friendly. From these meetings, we can see, first, that peasants are just as capable of organizing associations as workers are of organizing unions. Second, we can see that peasants and workers belong to the same laboring class that uses its labor to make a living and has a real need for mutual assistance. Most workers are concentrated in metropolitan cities, such as Shanghai, Tianjin,

Hankou, and Canton, and occupy important positions in the political struggle. Since the "May 30" Movement, the Shanghai and Canton localities especially have organized labor unions, and now they have over 200,000 members. Their continuous economic and political struggles have frightened the Chinese and foreign capitalists out of their wits. This shows more clearly that the peasantry now have urban workers as their powerful leaders. Third, we can see that workers and peasants, who have long been regarded by factory owners and landlords as cattle and horses and looked down on by the gentry, have now all organized themselves into groups and have bright prospects for gaining their dignity one of these days.

Perhaps some people think that the peasants in Guangdong were helped by the GMD government and thus were able to organize themselves but that this may not be possible for other provinces. This view is half right and half wrong. Of course the GMD government in Guangdong is willing to help the peasantry but, at the same time, there are many instances of landlords and chambers of commerce in Guangdong colluding with the GMD-center and right (the bureaucratic elements inside the GMD), as well as with the military and county magistrates, to sabotage the peasant associations and maltreat the peasants. Sometimes the GMD government could do nothing about it. In the last analysis, the peasants have to rely on their own forces to succeed. In addition to Guangdong, the peasants in Hunan and Hubei are gradually organizing peasant associations. Here, it is clear that peasants are capable of uniting themselves without the help of the government.

Dear peasants! If you want to get rid of poverty and oppression, all of you have to organize groups, form peasant associations, and then let the associations organize peasant self-defense corps. All existing associations in every province and county were organized by the landlords and gentry. Their interests are directly opposed to the interests of the real peasants. Unless the real peasants who till the land organize their separate associations, peasant interests cannot be protected. Our party is a party that fights for the interests of workers and peasants. There is no doubt that we will help you. Even the leftists in the GMD (the revolutionary elements in the GMD) also should help you, because their national revolutionary movement will not succeed without your participation.

How should peasant associations be organized? The constitutions of peasant associations in various places have, naturally, slight differences according to the local situation. However, their chief methods should be the same, and they are as follows:

- 1) Members of peasant associations must be sixteen years old or older, tenant peasants, farmhands, self-tilling peasants and manual laborers in handicrafts in the countryside. All landlords who do not till their own land, money lenders charging high interest, church personnel who do not till their land—such as fathers, priests, monks, Taoist priests, nuns, and witches—are not to be admitted.
- 2) All members must pay the entry fee and some monthly dues.
- 3) Every province's peasant association is to be divided into four levels:
- a) The village peasant association comprises one or several villages; its members

must number more than twenty; a three-member village executive committee is elected by the members.

b) The township [*xiang*] or area [*qu*] peasant association comprises peasant associations from more than three villages within its area. A five-member township or area executive committee is elected by a general congress (or representatives' congress) of members of the entire township or area.

c) The county [*xian*] peasant association comprises peasant associations from over three townships or areas in the same county. A seven-member county executive committee is elected by the county congress of peasant association representatives.

d) The provincial [*sheng*] peasant association comprises peasant associations from over five counties. A nine-member provincial executive committee is elected by the provincial congress of peasant association representatives.

4) Sixty percent of membership dues collected by each village should be spent on the village peasant association, the remaining 40 percent on higher-level peasant associations.

5) Nonmembers are not allowed to join the peasant self-defense corps.

6) Each year, the province's executive committee calls a provincial congress of peasant association representatives and elects new executive committee members and alternate members. County, township, or area congresses are to be called once every six months by the county, township, or area executive committee to elect new executive committee members and alternate members. Village meetings of members are called every month by the village executive committee to elect new executive committee members.

7) The village executive committee meets three times a week. The township or area and county executive committees meet twice a week. The provincial executive committee meets once a week.

8) Executive committees at all levels have one committee chair and one vice-chair as standing members to work for the association.

9) All executive committee members at all levels should appoint association members to organize specialized groups, such as self-defense corps, consumer co-operatives, education councils, irrigation bureaus, and other enterprises in the public interest.

10) Executive committees at all levels should appoint nonpeasant advisers and other technical personnel to assist in various administrative matters.

B.14 Resolution on the Current Political Situation and the Main Tasks of the CCP (February 1926)⁸⁷

The anti-imperialist and nationalist "May 30" Movement originally formed the widest possible united front of all classes, but this united front soon split. On the

one hand, the Chinese bourgeoisie was frightened by the unprecedented mass movement of the proletariat while, on the other, it was bought off by the false friendliness of the imperialists. Gradually, it left the movement and caused the working class to fight the imperialists and warlords alone at the cost of its own blood. After the split in the nationalist movement, class differentiation began among the students, who had always been prone to revolution. The workers' movement became a mass movement, but it did not make the students more united; indeed it caused even greater divisions among them. The [students'] contradictory nature was fully revealed. Now among the students there are Communists and statist, each reflecting the thinking of different classes in Chinese society. Communists represent the working class; statist represent the compradore class that oscillates between the national and the imperialists' interests.

However, the Chinese proletariat does not believe that the Chinese bourgeoisie and a minority of students have already gained real concessions from the imperialists. In fact, the splitting off of the bourgeoisie from the nationalist movement and from the vanguard of the nationalist revolution, the proletariat, is premature even when seen from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie's interests. This split has only occurred because the bourgeoisie wants to sell out the mass movement so that it can gain concessions from the imperialists. However, the bourgeoisie has completely deluded itself. All it has gotten are empty promises about China having sovereign control over customs by 1929⁸⁸ and a deceptive trick about calling a meeting on the issue of extraterritorial rights. Under these circumstances, it is not possible, in the short term, for the bourgeoisie to reach a genuine compromise with the imperialists. Therefore, the bourgeoisie's resistance to imperialism is inevitable.

However, if the anti-imperialist nationalist movement really attains a stage of genuine struggle, the working class will immediately be isolated. Even now we can already see that a small genuine concession from the imperialists would be enough to split the Chinese nationalist movement even further. Under these circumstances, if our party fails to convince itself and our own class of the significance of the peasant question, then our party will fail in its divine mission. It will not have the ability to become the conscious vanguard and leader of the working class. Because peasants are the most consistent allies of the working class in the national revolution, they also want complete success for the national revolution. The current general political situation and the future of the revolution have made this a very problematic issue. The isolation and segregation of the working class in the national revolution since the "May 30" Movement further proves that the rise of the peasant struggle is an indispensable condition for the success of the national revolution. The [peasants] are the most necessary and reliable allies of the working class. The imperialist plunder of China results in the unlimited exploitation of peasants and workers. The main objective of the peasants and workers' anti-imperialist struggle is to avoid such exploitation. Thus, only the alliance between the workers and peasants will be enough to lead the national revolution to its final victory.

At our last congress [January 1925] and the recent enlarged meeting of the CC

[October 1925], our party discussed the peasant question and took general decisions [see **Docs. B.8** and **B.10**]. Now we should make a summary of the situation and the results of our work. We can say that these decisions can be implemented and become effective only in those areas under the political power of the GMD or the National People's Army. With respect to developing the peasant movement, the political power of the National People's Army and the GMD has special significance. Therefore, the CCP should work particularly hard on all fronts to extend this kind of regime to every province and thus expand the basis of the peasant movement, making it possible to establish a united front of workers and peasants. Under the present political circumstances, the working-class struggle against imperialism is taking place almost in isolation. Our party's most important task is to expand the base of the peasant movement. Thus, the Northern Expedition of the Guangdong nationalist government is a question of the utmost importance.

The popular anti-imperialist "May 30" Movement dealt the reactionary warlords a powerful blow and caused their internal disintegration and conflicts that led to gradual political and military defeats. Very quickly, however, the British and Japanese imperialists established a united front with Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin to counterattack the National People's Army. Although the National People's Army in the north has been dispersed and no longer has a center, it is on the side of the anti-imperialist front and performs the role of undermining and overthrowing the imperialists and warlords. The anti-National People's Army united front of the British, the Japanese, Zhang, and Wu represses all national revolutionary movements. If the united front of the British, the Japanese, Zhang, and Wu wins, a very reactionary situation will be created as the imperialists further divide the nationalist movement. Moreover, they exert great force to maintain this reactionary situation, and thus it will certainly be a very long period. At the same time, this victory of the imperialists' counterattack will certainly continue in order to overthrow the national revolutionary government in Canton, the source of the Chinese revolution. The current situation is indeed crucial, and the life and death of the Chinese revolution depends on it. Of course, we should do our best to concentrate all the revolutionary strength in the north to resist the imperialists' counterattack. The fundamental solution, however, lies in the victory of the Northern Expedition of the Canton national government, which is the indispensable guarantee for our nation's people. This will also broaden the struggle against imperialism and win final liberation.

The Canton national government was established [1 July 1925] in the course of the "May 30" Movement. It was not only helped by hundreds of thousands of workers who rose up to support the struggle in the south but was also aided by hundreds of thousands of organized peasants. This government relies on the workers and peasants' revolutionary struggle as its pillars of support and thus sweeps away all counterrevolutionary warlords. It has unified civil, financial, and military powers in Guangdong; abolished unjust taxes and numerous levies; and in so doing has won the sympathy and support of ordinary people. However, if the forces of the Canton national revolution fail to expand across the country, they will be-

come isolated. At the same time, they suffer oppression from the British imperialists, even to the extent of having to compromise and become a purely bourgeois government. At present, it is the only revolutionary center and source of the revolutionary movement. Only by expanding and developing the national revolutionary movement from Canton can we create great political significance and success later on.

At present, the National People's Army in the north is fighting Zhang [Zuolin] and Wu [Peifu]; peasants everywhere are agitating spontaneously; the working class is expanding and developing its organization and struggle; the Guangdong national government—a revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants—is indeed the most important vital force. However, the imperialists are doing their best to exterminate these forces. Amid the direct and indirect struggles between these revolutionary forces and the alliance of British and Japanese imperialist forces and Zhang and Wu, our party should clearly realize that an important historic opportunity now exists. This is the starting point for the revolution's victory. However, during these revolutionary times, if our party's political forces fail to develop in response to this opportunity, we will not consolidate or expand our political leadership of the ordinary people. Mere organizational expansion of the party will certainly not guarantee that we will be able to fulfill our historic mission. For all these reasons, this special meeting of the CC deems that the foremost current tasks of our party are to prepare the northern expansion of the Canton national revolutionary forces and to intensify our work among the peasantry, especially during the Northern Expedition, in order to build the basis of the revolutionary alliance between workers and peasants and achieve the victory of the national revolution across the entire country.

B.15 Political Report of the CC.

Chen Duxiu (July 1926)⁸⁹

1) Changes in the political situation since last year's enlarged meeting and our party's policies at each stage.

The political changes in the nine months since the enlarged meeting last October can be divided into three periods. In each period we pursued different policies. The three periods are: the first, between the Fengtian-Zhili war and Guo Songling's rebellion [22 November 1925]⁹⁰; the second, between the defeat of Guo Songling [23 December 1925] and the retreat of the National People's Army from Beijing [15 April 1926]; the third, between the National People's Army's retreat and the meeting between Zhang [Zuolin] and Wu [Peifu] [28 June 1926].

The first period is marked by the instability of the warlords' regime. During this period, the Fengtian clique disintegrated; the Anhui clique was weak; the Zhili clique had not yet revived; and the imperialists had lost control over all the warlord

cliques and were in panic. The Duan [Qirui] government did its best to connive with the National People's Army, and Wu Peifu made friendly overtures toward the national government. It looked as if the southern national government and the northern National People's Army might unite, take over the national political power of the country, and establish a relatively red government.

During this period, our party's strategy was to use Sun Chuanfang's military actions against the Fengtian clique. We immediately raised the slogan "expand the nature of the war" and explained that the anti-Fengtian war was to be "fought for the freedom of the people," and that all revolutionary forces should gather under the anti-Fengtian flag. This propaganda had an enormous impact on the people and penetrated the warlords' troops. Thus, there was Guo Songling's uprising. Our party also raised slogans opposing the Zhili clique's movement to defend the constitution and to prevent an alliance between the Fengtian and Zhili cliques, as we expected that once the Zhili clique gained the upper hand it would certainly defend the constitution, and that if the Fengtian clique were defeated it would do its best to reach a compromise with the Zhili clique in order to secure the warlords' power.⁹¹

The second period is marked by the imperialists' attempts to suppress this revolutionary high tide by promoting, on the one hand, the military anti-red united front of the British, the Japanese, Wu, and Zhang and, on the other, making extensive anti-red propaganda among the people to thwart the revolution's victory.

During this period, our policy was to divide the anti-red united front. Thus, we proposed establishing a temporary gray government in Beijing, which would include both the Anhui and Zhili cliques so that forces could be concentrated against the Fengtian clique. This policy was never implemented, however, as Wu Peifu had already allied with the Fengtian clique in Hankou and begun to attack the National People's Army. Then, we proposed that the Guangdong government send an expeditionary force to crush Wu and rescue the National People's Army from its danger. In the end, this policy was not workable because our party did not possess sufficiently strong political forces. Even if the policy had been workable, we would not have been able to influence the GMD and the National People's Army to bring it to fruition.

The important phenomena of the third period were that the warlords' regime stabilized again and the behind-the-scenes conflicts between the British, the Japanese, Wu, and Zhang intensified. At the same time, the Guangdong national government actually began the Northern Expedition.

Although the conflicts among the British, the Japanese, Wu, and Zhang were very serious, the Fengtian and Zhili cliques did not let them escalate into the open because of the strength of the National People's Army.

During this period, our policy in the north was to unite the National People's Army with the Fengtian clique to oppose the Zhili clique and, in the south, the national government was to aid Hunan against Wu Peifu. If the anti-red military forces in the north (the Fengtian, Zhili, and Shanxi cliques) attacked the National People's Army together, it would be difficult for the National People's Army to

survive. However, because of lack of sincere cooperation—each had its own selfish motives—the National People's Army was not defeated. As long as the relationship between the Fengtian and Zhili cliques did not change, the National People's Army could only defend and was unable to go on the offensive. When the southern national government dispatched its troops, it could only fight a defensive battle to prevent the anti-red forces from breaking into Hunan and Guangdong, but could not launch a thorough revolutionary Northern Expedition.

The current stabilization of the warlords' regime will be short-lived and can only be maintained through reluctant cooperation among the British, the Japanese, Wu, and Zhang. This stability will not last long.

2) Imperialist policy toward China.

[[Britain and Japan are the two most powerful imperialist nations in China. While Japan concerns itself only with Zhang Zuolin in the north, Britain wants to suppress the nationalist movement in central and south China. It wants Wu Peifu to capture Guangdong and challenge Zhang in the north. The United States seeks to win over the Chinese bourgeoisie with its calls for the Chinese to resist British and Japanese imperialism. Thus, we propose opposition to Britain first, Japan second, and the United States third.]]

3) The attitude of various social forces with regard to the nationalist revolution.

[[There are four types of social forces in China. First, the anti-red movement of warlords, compradores, bureaucrats, and new and old gentry. These are semifeudal forces. The warlords will collapse soon, the compradores are still very strong, bureaucrats are appendages to the warlords, the new lackeys (university professors educated abroad) are lackeys of the compradores, and the old gentry exploit the peasantry on behalf of the warlords. Second, the revolutionary movement of the masses of workers, peasants, and radical intellectuals. Third, the resistance movement among medium and small merchants. Fourth, the reform movement of the bourgeoisie. Unlike the compradore class, its cooperation with the imperialists is conditional. Under certain circumstances this inclines them toward the revolution.]]

Of the above four types, which should we use to further the revolution? Of course, only the second type, the workers and peasants, are the basic force of the revolution. The medium and small merchants of the third category have suffered from economic oppression by the imperialists through brutal levies and excessive taxes. Thus, they feel the need for revolution and do not oppose it. The workers and peasants should ally with them to avoid isolation. The fourth type, the bourgeoisie, also occupies an extremely important position in the national democratic revolutionary movement. In terms of the current political situation in the world, the Chinese nationalist revolution would face enormous difficulties or even danger without the vigorous participation of the bourgeoisie. We should understand that the Chinese revolution now is undoubtedly a bourgeois national democratic revolution. Therefore, when estimating the social forces in the revolutionary movement, it is not a question of whether we desire the participation of the bourgeoisie, but rather a question of whether the bourgeoisie wants to participate in it and to

participate to the end. In fact, since the “May 30” Movement, the Chinese bourgeoisie has gradually become an important part of the nationalist movement and has demonstrated a tendency toward leadership of the movement, especially in Shanghai.⁹² The internal divisions of the warlords have clearly shown that the new military forces belong to the national bourgeoisie both in terms of thought and action. This is a new phenomenon in the Chinese nationalist movement that we must never overlook. However, a special characteristic of the bourgeoisie is that once it wins some small victories and satisfies slightly the demands of its class, it will immediately tend toward compromise, desert the people, betray the revolution, and cooperate with the enemies. Undoubtedly, it is incapable of staying with the revolution to the end. Therefore, our current attitude toward the bourgeoisie should be to do our best to retain the petty bourgeoisie and make it move closer to the people, so that it will not be completely dominated by the political thinking of the bourgeoisie. We then can compete with the bourgeoisie for the leading position in the revolutionary movement and prevent it from making future compromises. On the other hand, we should do our best to strengthen the united front of all classes and promote the revolutionization of the bourgeoisie, even though we know clearly that it will become our future enemy, probably within one to three years. However, at present we have to regard it as our ally; we must treat it as a powerful ally with whom we can overthrow foreign enemies (imperialists) and domestic enemies (semifeudal forces). If we foolishly believe that the bourgeoisie will stay with the revolution to the end, and do nothing to defend ourselves against future dangers, fail to win over the petty bourgeoisie from the bourgeoisie, and allow it to be ruled completely by the bourgeoisie, this will be a rightist mistake. At the same time, if now we deny the role of the bourgeoisie in the nationalist movement, fail to win over the Chinese bourgeoisie from the imperialists, treat the bourgeoisie with premature hostility and force it to be used by the imperialists, this will be a leftist mistake.

4) The internal divisions in the GMD and our attitude.

The internal divisions in the GMD reflect the four types of social forces described above. The reactionary right (Li Fuling, Feng Ziyou, Ma Su, and Gu Yingfen) represent the first; the Communists represent the second; the left (Wang Jingwei and Gan Naiguang) represent the third; the new right (that is, the center, people such as Dai Jitao and Chiang Kai-shek) represent the fourth. Our attitude toward the GMD should be identical to that vis-à-vis all social forces in the country—we must ally with the left and the center to attack the reactionary right. We can only support the left but not replace it; we can only ally with the left and control the center to make it lean toward the left. However, we cannot hope to wipe out the center. Especially, at the moment, we do not treat the bourgeoisie as an enemy. Sometimes we need to support those in the center. If we dream of making the GMD, which represents many classes, into a homogeneous party, if we wish the GMD to be monopolized by the pure left and not cooperate with other forces, this is to commit the same mistake as Dai Jitao with his idea of eliminating both the left and the right simultaneously.

5) The future of the nationalist movement.

There are two foreseeable paths for the future of the Chinese nationalist movement: (a) The activation of the bourgeoisie by the petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the workers and peasants and the use of revolutionary means to build national capitalism; b) The control of the petty bourgeoisie by the compradore-bourgeoisie, which will compromise with the imperialists to crush the revolutionary movement and realize the Dawes plan⁹³ for capitalist aggression. Our task is to unite with the masses of workers and peasants, ally with the petty bourgeoisie to pressure the bourgeoisie to propel and consolidate the concerted development of the nationalist movement. Then, the Chinese nationalist movement may move in the direction of the first path. If we fail to win over the Chinese bourgeoisie from the imperialists and the revolution is aborted, or if we fail to win over the petty bourgeoisie from the bourgeoisie, the workers and peasants will not gain the leading position in the revolutionary movement. This will cause the revolutionary movement to expire in mid-life. The course of the second path will then be inevitable. If the Chinese workers and peasants want to lead this revolution in practice, the most important condition is to make our party, which represents the interests of workers and peasants, into a mass party with an excellent organization. This will enable us to expand the organization of workers and peasants as well as to unite with the GMD-left to keep the petty bourgeoisie in our alliance and lead the revolution through to its end.

As for the current condition of our party, we do exert a very strong influence on the nation's general propaganda. Our strength and concrete actions are still characteristic of the transition between a small group and a mass party. We need to make much greater efforts in order to gain the leading position in the revolution.

6) The development and work of the party in the last nine months.

On the positive side, we can say the following about the party's development during the last nine months: (a) party membership has tripled; (b) although we are unable to influence the petty bourgeoisie in terms of organization, we have more or less managed to lead the popular movement in the country, especially in Beijing, Shanghai, Hunan, and Guangdong; (c) we have great influence on political agitation in the country; our slogans and policies for each major political incident have all influenced the people; (d) the labor movement in Shanghai, Tianjin, Tangshan, and Hunan enjoys a firmer foundation than before. The labor movement in Shanghai has been gradually strengthened. Although Tangshan and Tianjin have suffered severe repression from the reactionary forces, the foundation of the labor movement has not yet been destroyed; (e) in general, the peasants in Guangdong and Hunan have their own mass organizations.

It is clear from this description that our party has expanded, but there are many shortcomings.

a) Although party membership has increased, the quality has decreased. This can be seen in several respects:

i) Our comrades are deficient in theory and lack a precise revolutionary outlook

on life. In particular, few can creatively apply theory to actual work.

ii) Responsible comrades have tended to behave like hired labor and thus lack the previous spirit of hard work and spontaneous revolutionary passion. Thus, even if they maintain discipline, they cannot avoid the problems of formalism and bureaucracy.

iii) Some of the comrades have become corrupt (their finances are confused and they appropriate the party's assets).

b) On the whole, from the CC down to the party branches, there is insufficient capacity for leadership and training.

c) Branch [*zhibu*] organization exists in name only, but not in substance.

d) There is a serious lack of theoretical propaganda. Agitation work mostly fails to suit reality or penetrate the masses.

e) The labor movement has become institutionalized and lacks mass substance.

f) Everywhere, the peasant movement has developed the disease of leftism. Either slogans are too extreme or actions too leftist. As a result, we fail to attack our enemies while suffering heavy losses ourselves.

B.16 Resolution on the Question of Relations Between the CCP and the GMD (July 1926)⁹⁴

1) Events such as the March 20 coup in Canton, the meeting of the GMD C[E]C on 15 May, and the measures for dealing with the Communists proposed by the Whampoa [Huangpu] Military Academy are part of the usual attack on the CP. The armed center is now in power in Guangdong, but the rightist anti-red movement prevails throughout the country. Now, they are attacking the CP. Such attacks have been made possible by great changes in the actual political situation (the defeat and retreat of the National People's Army, the counterrevolutionary victory of the imperialists and warlords in the north, Wu Peifu's reappearance on the political scene and his collusion with the British, the Japanese support for Zhang Zuolin and their anti-Soviet campaign on the pretext of the Chinese Eastern Railway Incident, etc.). However, our party has also committed several mistakes.

Thus, from the Party Center down to the branches, we should launch propaganda to explain that the attacks against us by the right and part of the center of the GMD are in harmony with, and in response to, the anti-red movement of the imperialists and warlords and are counterrevolutionary actions. Moreover, we should study the reasons why the rightists and the centrists easily took advantage of the recent political situation to launch their attack. We should try to eliminate these causes.

2) One of the main reasons the right and even the center were able to attack us so easily and demand that we withdraw from the GMD is the mistake in our previous formula for leading the GMD. This formula simply forced the left not to

participate in party affairs or the struggle against the right. We ourselves have created the situation of direct confrontation between the GMD and the CP, but have obscured the nature of this struggle—the struggle between the left and the right. Also, we failed to make the left organize itself both politically and organizationally. Of course, this meant that the GMD's development encountered obstacles and could not fully absorb the revolutionary intellectuals and the urban petty bourgeoisie. However, the right and center seized on this opportunity to influence the people. We did not implement the decisions of last October's enlarged CEC meeting that called on our party branches everywhere to act more independently and ally with the left to fight the right both ideologically and organizationally. This meant that we failed to establish sufficiently secure bases among the masses (labor unions, peasant associations, and student unions). We failed even more drastically in using the strength of the revolutionized masses to beat back the attacks from the right and the armed center after the political situation in the north deteriorated.

3) The decisions on the question of the GMD adopted by the enlarged CEC meeting last year were: (a) remain in the GMD to form a close alliance with the left and help it expand the GMD and oppose the right. We cannot substitute ourselves for the left. (b) Our party should be more politically independent. The reasons behind these decisions were that we perceived the GMD to be a political alliance of various social forces (revolutionary intellectuals, the national bourgeoisie in medium industries and businesses, the petty bourgeoisie of artisans and small merchants, peasants, and workers). Moreover, we still believed that the expansion of the GMD and our joining the GMD's leadership were preconditions for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

We should define more clearly our policies for the national revolution. On the one hand, our party should further demonstrate its political independence and establish its own forces among the workers and the majority of peasants in order to gain political influence among the revolutionized ordinary people. On the other hand, we should organize the revolutionary movement of the petty bourgeoisie and unite it with the GMD to strengthen the GMD-left. In addition, the revolutionary forces of the proletariat and the masses of peasants should be mobilized to influence the GMD. This will establish a powerful alliance with the GMD and will be able to compete with the bourgeoisie for leadership of the nationalist movement. The success of our efforts to gain the leading position in the nationalist movement can be guaranteed only in this fashion. Therefore, our current policies with respect to the GMD should be: expand the left, unite more closely with the left with whom we can jointly deal with the center, and openly counterattack the right.

If some comrades believe that the CP should completely sever organizational relations with the GMD and annihilate this party composed of a multiclass alliance in the belief that the CP can independently lead the proletariat and encourage other oppressed people to follow it to complete the national revolution left unfinished by the bourgeoisie, then they are completely wrong. They have completely misinterpreted the long-term future of the Chinese revolution for national liberation. The

suggestion that we sever organizational ties with the GMD and merely cooperate with it has the same rationale as that used by the GMD-right and new right (the center) in demanding that the Communists withdraw from the GMD. This tendency reflects the bourgeoisie's desire to seize the leadership of the national movement because of its growth during the last year.

If some comrades still believe that the Communists should completely monopolize GMD organs and the GMD's organization and branch work, then, our experiences in Guangdong have proved them wrong. The GMD's current organizational form and social bases are not suited to it. Our occupation [of important positions in the GMD] would naturally create small parochial groups because of the concentration of power. The result would be to dissipate the strength of the majority of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie because of dispersion and confusion.

Although these two views are opposed to one another, they commit the same policy mistake and pose identical dangers to the Chinese liberation movement, with the end result being the separation of the CP and the proletariat from the majority of the urban petty bourgeoisie who would, in reality, hand leadership over these masses to the big bourgeoisie.

4) These mistaken tendencies exist in our party because recent events have been very complex. The crystallization of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the past year is naturally reflected in the GMD in terms of the competition between the Communists and the right for influence over the center and the left. Therefore, at present, it is more important than ever that our party should have a clear long-term view of the future of the national revolution and a definite policy for dealing with the GMD. The CEC's views on relations between the CCP and the GMD must be clearly understood by party members and the masses so that they can form their own correct ideas.

Although this (July 1926) enlarged meeting of the CEC feels that the solving of the problem of an appropriate organizational relationship between us and the GMD is a question for the next party congress, it is necessary to make the following decisions:

a) Implement the resolutions of last October's enlarged meeting for independent action by our branches in Guangdong and elsewhere.

b) Actively expand the GMD-left and correct the previous policy mistake of restricting the left, thus not allowing the left to manage party affairs or participate in the struggle against the right.

c) Actively develop the left's mass organization outside of the party, especially among the urban petty bourgeoisie (political clubs, etc.), and use these social groups to expand the basis of the GMD.

d) Make the GMD-left understand that the GMD cannot be a party where power is concentrated in one class. The GMD cannot have regulations or a constitution that are too rigid. The GMD's organizational form should be informal and relaxed because of the need to recruit more of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. For example, the lower-level branches of the GMD should assume the character of a

political club to bring them closer to the masses. It is not necessary to emphasize rigid regulations and thus restrict ourselves. For example, revolutionary social organizations should not be denied collective admission. In this way, the GMD will become a very large mass party.

e) Work together with the left for more frequent and practical struggles against the right to expose their crimes of compromise and betrayal of the country and the people. Only in this way can the center be separated from the right.

5) Our current urgent task in dealing with the GMD is to give priority to the antiright struggle. Even though they are led by the center, we should give all our support to the National Government and the GMD CC against the counterrevolutionary forces within and outside Guangdong. At the same time, we should maintain our own policies that support the interests of the working people and take these policies as the fundamental criteria for our support of the GMD and the national government.

B.17 Resolution on the Question of Organization (July 1926)⁹⁵

The Experience and Shortcomings in Party Development

1) Since the last enlarged meeting [October 1925], our party organization has expanded threefold. In the past eight months, despite the gradual ebbing of the tide of the May 30 Movement, our party's organizations across the country have managed to lead the popular movement in one form or another. In terms of the national revolutionary movement, our party has truly become a political nucleus. In terms of the substance of the mass movement everywhere, our party has gradually begun to assume the leading position.

2) We have gained the following experiences from past organizational work:

a) Through all kinds of political movements, we can come into close contact with the majority of the people and develop both mass organizations and the party itself.

b) The emphasis on expanding our work has won over the masses to our party, and we have been able to build basic organizations among them where the revolutionary tide is relatively high and the popular movement advanced.

c) Because we have begun to emphasize the results of branch [*zhibu*] work, we have given our party a better social composition, recruited progressive elements, and penetrated deep into the proletarian masses. Thus, we have secretly built a preliminary foundation.

3) While these are some of the better results derived from practical work, our party remains very naive in terms of organization and has many major flaws. Four

flaws are the most important: first, our party departments [*dangbu*] at all levels have not appreciated the political significance of organizational work; second, the work of branches has not really begun and, in the past, they existed in name only. Our party departments at all levels do not understand the significance of branch work; nor do they know about work methods for the branch; third, the work of party fractions [*dangtuan*] is extremely bad; fourth, party organs are not perfect.

The Significance of Organizational Work

4) The significance of organizational work is never purely technical; it is also political. In other words, organizational work is the nerve center through which the party directs the mass movement. Without good organization, we cannot direct the mass movement or implement party policies; a good policy can be implemented only through good organization. The greatest characteristic of the Bolsheviks is organizational work. A young party must rely on good organization to become bolshevized, to change from a small group into a mass party, to change from a group bound by thoughts to one bound by deeds, and to organize mass action through the basic work of the party branches.

5) However, a recurrent danger in our party is weak leadership. Our subjective strength fails to match objective needs, thus wasting many opportunities for action. In particular, when mass political actions suffer from weak leadership, the losses will be huge. This is the most serious organizational problem. The revolutionary movement progresses day by day. Our party's biggest task in terms of organization is to advance the revolutionary movement further, hold the center of the movement, and command all within the largest possible scope. This is the responsibility not only of the Central Organization Department but also of organization sections in party departments at all levels. Therefore, the enlarged meeting has decided that from now on the Party Center will send special commissioners to inspect and implement organizational work in all areas, and the areas will send commissioners to all districts. If an unexpected event occurs in a certain place, such commissioners must be sent.

6) What is the biggest obstacle to organizational work? This is the suspicious mentality about developing our organization. Despite the temporary reign of a reactionary military regime, the revolutionary movement still continues unabated. Many workers, peasants, and intellectuals have become revolutionary because of the reactionary political situation. The problem is that they must be brought into close contact with the proletarian party or they will fall into the traps set by the compradore and bourgeois classes. Since the May 30 Movement, the main question has been who controls the largest number of masses in the United Front. The implication is that if our party is incapable of expanding or leading the masses, we will only enable the bourgeoisie and the reactionary forces to increase their strength day by day. Therefore, this enlarged meeting has focused serious attention on this problem and has again raised the slogan "Expand the party." It is imperative to develop our

party further and to recruit even more revolutionary workers, peasants, and intellectuals.

7) One of the party's organizational tasks is to work among the nonpartisan and unorganized masses. It is a most important task at the present time to develop under many different forms and organizations masses sympathetic to our party. For example, we have achieved a great deal through work in the disaster relief associations, although our party's organs in various areas have not paid enough attention to this method. From now on, we must pay attention to, and operate within, organizations such as disaster relief associations and recreational, sports, education, and cultural groups.

The Significance and Working Methods of Branches

8) The branch is not a division, but the nucleus of the party in each factory, mine, school, or area. These many nuclei are joined together into one party according to Bolshevik principles. Branch organization is precisely determined by the nature of social life. However, most of our party's existing branches have lost this meaning; they are merely divisions of our party organized on the basis of revolutionary elements gathered from various social organizations or areas, and to whom party training is given. But these branches fail to perform their role as the nuclei of these social organizations or geographical locations. Without such a role, the party branch can never establish close contacts with the masses or lead them. This most serious flaw should be corrected immediately.

9) There are five methods to correct this flaw in order to build real branches:

a) At present, the real foundation of our party is not the branch, but the district committee. It is in the district committees rather than the branches that our party's activists are to be found. In the future, the real foundation of our party must be built on individual branches, and each branch must be held accountable for the party's basic work. We must establish each branch's work and activities, and divide each up so that every comrade has work to do. We should implement the slogan of "all work to the branch," thus allocating to the branches various kinds of work (such as the labor movement, peasant movement, cooperatives, disaster relief associations, women's movement, youth movement, sale of books and newspapers, party recruitment, reporting information, transportation and communication, etc. Such tasks are to be determined in light of the actual situation in each branch . . . which are to be determined by the practical situation of each branch, its number of members, and its needs). When operating in secret, large branches may find it difficult to call frequent meetings. For collecting party dues, relaying orders, and other affairs, the branch may be divided into cells [*xiaozu*]. However, we must not forget that the existence of cells is predicated on the circumstances described above; it is not the party's basic organization. The party's basic organization is the entire branch in each factory, mine, and school.

b) Strong and effective secretariats [*ganshihui*] should be established in the

branches to direct branch work. For example, when a large branch divides itself into cells, in addition to the expansion of the branch's secretariat, regular meetings of the cell heads must be called. The branch secretariat must work actively in a planned, orderly manner, executing the resolutions and directives of the party and allocating each comrade's workload.

c) The nature of the branch should be changed so that there are only two kinds: (i) in a factory, a village, or a school, and ii) in a neighborhood or a geographical area (determined in accordance with place of residence). In defining the nature of the branch, first the branch's work must be established, and then it must not be confused with the cell.

d) In big industrial areas (such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Wuhan, and Tianjin) and large villages, where the organization is developed and the number of branches has increased, departmental committees [*buwei*] defined by area should be set up under area or district committees. Several neighboring cells can set up a departmental committee to administer the work of all the branches within that area.

e) The organic system of the party extends from the Party Center to the area and district committees, from area and district committees to departmental committees, from departmental committees to branch secretariats or even meetings of cell heads. Internal relations within this system should be very close. The following organizational work must be strictly implemented starting from the mass branches or cells: (i) political action, (ii) expansion work, (iii) sale of books and newspapers, and (iv) collection of party dues and other work.

10) When the party is still in the process of expansion, lack of discipline, delay, and imprecision in organizational work will make it impossible for the party to launch any actions. An all-out effort must be made to convene all types of meetings no matter under what circumstances. As long as each member is prepared for the meeting beforehand, any meeting, even one lasting ten or twenty minutes, is beneficial and effective. Branch and cell meetings are even more important. All comrades have the responsibility to prepare their own reports and views before the meeting. Cell heads and branch secretaries or heads are responsible for convening meetings, and they must summarize the reports, make conclusions, and execute resolutions and directives. Each area, district, or departmental committee should call as many "meetings of activists" and "meetings of responsible comrades" as possible.

The Work of Party Fractions

11) Party fractions implement party policies and increase party influence in all kinds of nonpartisan groups, such as labor unions, peasant associations, student unions, and various social groups. Their functions and organization are different from those of the branch. Party fractions are not independent units; nor do they form a separate system. Rather they are part of the party organization and are set up under and administered by the party's organs at various levels. From the Party Center down to the branch secretariat, there are all kinds and levels of party frac-

tions. Usually, they are temporary. They change often and depend for their existence on the decisions of party departments at each level. When the number of party members in a fraction becomes too large, it will be instructed to form a secretariat.

12) The work of the party fractions is to represent collectively the view of the party in implementing party policy. Individual members do not have independent views. When a party organ issues a directive to the party fraction, it must follow the directive. All members of the party fraction should be mobilized [to implement] the directive. All members should be mobilized to implement majority decisions of the party fraction with the exception of those that must be reported to higher level party organs for approval. Within certain limits, the party fractions can determine their own work. When there is a difference of opinion between the views of the party fraction and a party agency (for example, between the party fractions in a factory and that factory's branch secretariat), the difference must be reported to a superior party organ for resolution.

13) Many flaws have appeared in the past work of the party fraction. Some did not even understand what the party fraction was and tended to turn it into a rival organization to the party. These shortcomings must be corrected. Party organizations at all levels must not neglect this problem. Comrades in the party fractions can never afford to be separated from the basic organization of the party (the branch).

Party Organs

14) Political parties cannot be without organs; of course the CP must have organs. Our party organs are what Lenin termed organizations of "professional revolutionaries." The role of the party organs is to develop party organization and implement the party's political and technical tasks. Especially as our party is developing, it needs very good organs—the scientific organization of the proletariat.

15) The full establishment of party organs depends on two conditions: (a) the perfection of the organization and its adaptation to actual needs, and (b) sufficient and responsible working personnel. Organizations in the past often existed only in form, and sometimes even in name only, doing no actual work. For example, the organizations in every department and committee all have this problem. Although the source of this problem lies in insufficient labor, sometimes it stems from [the organizations'] inability to adapt to actual needs. To correct this problem, we should examine and reform organizational structures while starting work on replenishing and appropriately distributing labor in order to increase the number of responsible comrades. According to the report of the Central Organization Department, based on current needs, the number of working personnel needed for the nation's work is at least 35 for area committees, 160 for district or departmental committees, and 160 for special branches—altogether 355. In reality, however, the number of personnel working in the party is about 120 at most. From this figure, we can see the huge discrepancy between our labor power and actual needs. We should do our best to train personnel to aid our organization.

16) At the last enlarged meeting [October 1925], it was decided that each department of the Party Center should have a distinct organization and that secretaries of the CC and area committees should not take on concurrent positions [Doc. B.11]. It was also decided that the CC should have committees for the labor and peasant movement, as well as a military department. They should implement their own work. These decisions have only been partly carried out; the majority have yet to be implemented. For example, no comrade has been appointed exclusively to take charge of the Central Organization Department [Chen Duxiu was also general secretary]. The leading comrade in the committee on the labor movement [Zhang Guotao] is often dispatched to work temporarily in other places. The committee on the peasant movement has not yet been formed [set up in November 1926]. All the decisions must be implemented gradually after this enlarged meeting so that we can do our best to correct the past mistakes in our work. We should also add a secretariat [*mishuchu*] to the CC to take over all the technical work [set up in September 1926 with Wang Ruofei as head]. Party organization at all levels should be consolidated in the same fashion.

The mass revolutionary movement can be advanced only after the party organization is perfected. Close mutual relations must be established between the CC, all branches, and all organs at all levels. Regular reports must be made by the higher party organs to lower party organs, and vice versa.

B.18 Resolution on the Peasant Movement in Guangdong (July 1926)⁹⁶

[[While the peasants have a warm sympathy toward us, they do not understand our party's political program for them because we have not defined it clearly. A minimum program is necessary and is outlined in part I below. The temporary measures outlined in part II will give direction to the comrades in Guangdong who work directly with the peasant movement as well as giving guidance to the peasants.]]

Part I: A Minimum Political Program for the Present

- 1) The minimum political program for the present time
 - a) Economic:
 - i) The average tenant peasant demands rent reduction. There have been several rent-reduction campaigns in Guangdong, but they must have viable slogans with universal appeal. Hence, we suggest a 25 percent reduction in original rent, in accordance with methods used in tax payments.

ii) The self-tilling peasants and small landlords suffer great hardships from harsh levies and multiple taxes. To satisfy the demands of the self-tilling peasants and small landlords, we should propose the following: “abolish all miscellaneous levies and added taxes (no matter whether they are levied by the state or local government) and illegal extractions (the civil corps⁹⁷ fees and other non-governmental collectors), and establish a unified single income tax.”

iii) Stipulate that interest rates on loans must not exceed 2 percent. Violators will be penalized by law.

iv) The state is to found a bank for peasants that will offer low-interest loans to poor peasants.

v) The government must support rural cooperatives and ban evil merchants from monopolizing prices and stockpiling scarce goods for speculation.

vi) Improve the irrigation system and give relief to disaster-stricken areas.

vii) Unify measurements.

viii) Abolish unequal contracts between the landlord and the tenant, such as iron rent, rent deposit, rent for previous periods, etc., and other harsh provisions, such as the practice of the *tianxinji* rent. The government should devise regulations to govern farming. If landlords refuse to obey these regulations, peasants may take legal action at the village residents' arbitration office.

ix) Improve the economic position of farmhands and pay attention to female and child labor in the countryside.

b) Political:

i) All members of the civil corps must be local property-owning residents. The head must be elected by the township residents' meeting. The budget is determined by the township residents' meeting.

ii) The township head must be elected by the township residents' meeting.

iii) Township and village [government] financing must be completely open. Financial administrators must be elected by the township residents' meeting.

iv) The township judge must be elected by the township residents' meeting. Duties must be executed fairly.

v) A county committee should be established (with five members); the county magistrate will be elected by the people. During this transitional period, however, county magistrates appointed by the government are acceptable, although the people have the right to ask the government to remove them.

vi) The people's armed self-defense corps in each county may set up county federations for self-defense and a “county corps headquarters” that will not come under the control of the county magistrate. A department for self-defense corps affairs should be set up under the provincial government, and it will direct all county corps.

c) Education:

i) Popularize compulsory education in the countryside.

ii) Fifty percent of local funds are to be spent on schools for compulsory education in the countryside.

2. Methods of implementation

[[Lengthy propaganda will be required to enable the peasants to understand the above measures. However, the propaganda should not incite the peasants to spontaneous riots. Once they see them as their own demands, we should ask the national government to implement the program.]]

Part II: Temporary Measures for Dealing with the Present

1) How to Develop Party Organization in the Countryside

a) The need for party development.

This need can be explained with the following points. First, in the past our party's organization developed from Canton down to each village, and thus the peasant movement evolved in its wake. At present, the situation is precisely the opposite. Now, the peasant movement in each village has developed a great deal, while the party has not expanded significantly. This is why now the party is incapable of commanding the peasants. Many flaws have emerged. Second, there are 800,000 organized peasants in Guangdong, dispersed over more than sixty counties. However, there are less than twenty counties where we have branch organizations, and they have less than 600 members. This is why under the present circumstances the peasants have revealed their weaknesses and our party has been unable to lead them. If this situation continues, the peasant movement will be in grave danger. Ultimately, this danger will affect the party itself. Third, our party has been leading the Chinese peasantry to achieve economic liberation and then to gain its political liberation. If our party does not expand and becomes incapable of leading the peasant masses, the party will have failed in its mission. Therefore, now there is the need to develop our party in the countryside both in terms of theory and in practice.

b) Past mistakes and methods for correcting them.

Previously, when implementing our party's work in the countryside, we made many mistakes. First, the party's branch organization was placed inside each county's peasant association, with the result that [the peasant movement] became the movement of the executive committee of the county peasant association, instead of a mass movement. Second, previous criteria for admitting comrades into the party were far too harsh, even to the extent that comrades were admitted only on the condition that they must be ready to sacrifice the lives of their entire family. This is why ordinary comrades have become "unemployed" and had to become executive committee members in the county peasant associations, while peasants were afraid to join the party because, after hearing such harsh conditions, they thought they would have to put down their plows in order to join. Third, the branches did not call meetings; they hoped to hold meetings under the secret agency of the Communist Party. Unless they had a secret place, they would not hold a meeting. Thus, our comrades did not have the opportunity to receive party training which, in turn, hindered the party's development. Fourth, our inability to make use of good oppor-

tunities prevented us from linking up with our comrades scattered over the countryside.

If we want to correct these mistakes, we must:

i) Build our party's foundation on the township [*xiang*] peasant association. The township peasant association is the place where the peasants' efforts are most concentrated. This means that we should develop our party's organization among the township peasant associations.

ii) Convene regular full members' meetings of township peasant associations. This kind of meeting provides an excellent opportunity to train peasants; we can also recruit comrades during meetings.

iii) Learn to use opportunities provided by current events and recruit comrades when peasants conflict with landlords and during the high tide of the revolution. If necessary, we may appoint special personnel to organize special committees to take charge of such work.

iv) In the township or district [*qu*],⁹⁸ peasant associations or peasant clubs should be established. At times when farm work is slack, we should select peasants with whom we have close relations to attend lectures or discussions. This is also a way to recruit members.

v) When possible, each county peasant association may open training courses especially to train the progressive elements among the peasants. However, the number [of trainees] should not be too large; nor should the duration of the course be too long. We would rather run more courses, so as to find new comrades.

vi) When possible, each county peasant association should select its better members and, together with our capable comrades, organize visits to Canton. In this way, we can use the opportunity to assemble them in Canton for training. Such groups should be organized by county, but the area committee must be notified so that we can prepare for the training program.

vii) Peasant training classes, as decided on by the central committee for the peasant movement, should be established in the name of the provincial peasant association.

c) Responsibilities of the area committee.

In the past, as we did not have the personnel to train peasants, the scope of our party's activities was too large, local committees did not make any reports, and organization was very slack. Thus, the area committee was unable to give detailed directions. This greatly affected the party. In the future, the area committee must pay attention to this problem.

i) The area committee is to assemble capable comrades in each county in the provincial capital to organize training classes to nurture personnel to act as branch secretaries.

ii) The area committee is to dispatch on a regular basis seven capable comrades to inspect the peasant movement in the following seven big areas: the first comrade is to cover: Mei County, Chao, and Hailufeng; the second, Huizhou; the third, Xijiang; the fourth, Beijiang; the fifth, the south; the sixth, the center; the seventh,

Hainan Island. In addition, they should inspect peasant strength and urge comrades to work hard and improve party affairs.

iii) Within a certain period, the area committee should regulate the number of new comrades to be recruited by each county. It should urge recruitment while providing [the counties] with good methods for doing so. Those who fail to fulfill their tasks should be penalized.

iv) Leadership to be provided by area committees. On the one hand, the area committee should make plans for recruitment among our peasant comrades and, on the other, make plans for recruiting from among rural artisans, students, and women, thus avoiding adversely affecting the comprehensive expansion of the party in the countryside and concentrating too much on peasants.

2) How Our Comrades Should Work in the Peasant Movement

a) Specifying the work for our comrades.

i) The special-assignment comrades who are sent by the GMD and are in exclusive charge of the peasant movement and comrades in our party's organizations in each locality who also work in the peasant movement should always publicly use the name of the GMD party departments at each level. Also, on occasion they may use the position of special propagandist in the peasant association while concurrently being CP or CYL members. They are frequently confused and make many mistakes. Some use the authority of the special officials sent by the GMD's central peasant department to command everything. The special officials treat the peasant associations as their appendages and agencies. Of course, sometimes our comrades have to use the name of the GMD Center to crush reactionary elements. However, this has gradually become a custom, and the peasants only look to the special officials and neglect their own peasant associations. Sometimes peasant associations are also administered by comrades from individual levels of the GMD's party departments, and thus the work of the peasant associations naturally merges with that of the GMD party departments. Obviously this confuses the GMD party departments with the peasant associations. This renders the peasants unable to distinguish their own associations from the GMD—this is incomprehensible. Some special officials are also employees of the peasant associations and never distinguish their affinities or functions. They use the title of special official or that of the peasant associations at will to issue commands to the peasantry. Thus, the peasants see one person doing two functions and they are left completely at a loss. Some comrades get so excited that they publicly make speeches as CP or youth league representatives regardless of their surroundings. By doing this, they sometimes provide the reactionaries with materials that they can use to agitate. Sometimes, because of certain mistakes or lack of verbal skills, they make peasants suspicious or even make fools of themselves. The most obvious and mistaken instance is the Shunzhi incident in which comrades used the name of the GMD county department to order the peasant self-defense corps to beat to death the local despot, Tan Shier. This caused great problems both in terms of organization and practical work. From now

on we should make all comrades who work in the peasant movement understand: (1) the fundamental difference between our party and league's organizations and those of the GMD and the peasant associations; (2) the respective roles of the party organization and people's organizations; (3) the political tasks of individual parties and the responsibilities of the peasant associations; (4) the significance of the peasant movement within which our comrades are working. In persuading our comrades, they must understand the relationship between the individual and the group. In particular, we must make it clear to our comrades that without permission from superior agencies of the party or league, no one is allowed to make a speech as a party or league representative.

ii) In reality, previous work by our comrades has been cursory and superficial. They were unable to get into close contact with the masses, let alone lead them. The best example was the intentional disturbances created by the representatives from the Qujiang County Peasant Association at the second provincial conference of peasant representatives. In the future, we should pay special attention to work at lower levels and underground work. Our comrades should rely on the township peasant associations as their base. If there is insufficient personnel, our base should be at least the district [*qu*]. Township and district associations should be asked to convene regular meetings of all peasants or their representatives. These meetings are very important. They are extremely useful practical training courses. The responsible comrades in each county must at all costs attend these meetings. We must do our best to turn the associations into mass organizations and prevent the infiltration of illegal, corrupt, and reactionary elements. Also, we should make sure that peasants represent the dominant force in these associations and let them take charge of them, thus avoiding the risk of the peasant movement coming under the total control of one leader and thus destroying it.

iii) In addition, we have carried out too little investigation. For a variety of reasons, we need to find out about the peasants' living conditions and of those who have contacts with the peasantry such as students, workers, and ordinary people. We need to find out the relationship of the local garrisons, government officials and employees, the gentry, local tyrants, landlords, and the civil corps with the peasantry in economic, political, and educational terms. We only have the very vaguest idea about the relationship between secret societies such as the Big Sword Society, bandits, the Triads, and the peasantry, as well as the customs, languages, and habits of the peasants. If we fail to investigate thoroughly the above questions, it is likely that (a) sometimes our propaganda will be irrelevant to the real situation with the result that the peasants will not know how to organize themselves; (b) sometimes our propaganda will raise overly ambitious slogans that provoke attacks from our enemy, or push those who are not yet reactionaries into becoming reactionaries; (c) sometimes our propaganda will evoke taboos of this feudal society and cause unnecessary hostility to us, thus obstructing our work. In the future, we should direct our comrades to pay attention to investigative work in the countryside and devise survey forms so that our comrades may systematically carry out such work. At a

minimum, we must carry out an investigation on one particular subject.

iv) In the past, our comrades treated the organization of peasant associations with too much rigidity and only wanted to establish township or district peasant associations in accordance with the constitution [of the peasant association] and the number of peasants. Although initially they performed necessary procedures such as the opening speech, lectures, presentation of the flag and the seal, and a report on the process of establishing the association, within a few days of the association's coming into existence, there were internal conflicts or, because of the small number of members, they were prone to external oppression, which the new association was unable to resist, thus collapsing immediately. On occasion, before our propaganda began to take effect, we ordered [peasants] to form peasant associations and thus turned the association's opening day into the eve of its collapse. This is why, in the future, we must tell our comrades to be creative in using the constitution [of peasant associations], adapt to the countryside's reality, and continue to follow organizational procedures issued by our organizational agencies and the Guangdong Peasant Association.

v) Previous work by our comrades focused on the peasant association movement and certainly not the Chinese peasant movement, which is characterized by class [struggle] and national [struggle]. This is why: (a) our comrades did not know about the current living conditions of the peasantry or their needs that must be satisfied. In general, they failed to pay attention to how to fight for these demands. Thus, the peasants were just asked to do something for us while getting nothing in return. This caused them disappointment. On occasion, our comrades instigated peasants to make demands for things that could not be obtained at present, thus causing much trouble, or even defeat. (b) Our comrades had no political common sense; nor did they understand the meaning of the revolution or class struggle. Often, they provoked peasants to fight against landlords even when they should not have done so. They just knew about overthrowing landlords, local despots, and the evil gentry, and even encouraged peasants to carry out assassinations, and knew nothing about the process and application of class struggle. (c) Our comrades did not understand the trends in the peasant movement or the tendencies in the nationalist movement. When Guangdong was unified, they did not know how to link up the peasant movement with the nationalist movement or how to make the peasant movement march together with the nationalist movement. In the future, we must make our comrades understand the Chinese peasant movement and its trends. They should try to cut out the negative elements and carry out propaganda for the peasants to avoid unnecessary struggles against the landlord class. On the one hand, they should pay attention to the life and needs of the peasants at present, and lead them to fight for their own interests while, on the other, they should expand and train peasant organizations and lead the peasants to participate in the nationalist movement to overthrow imperialists and warlords and to struggle for the Chinese revolution. We should show them the methods of revolution and the stages of the revolution. At the same time, to attain the above objectives, we should pay more attention to the role

and significance of the united front of all classes, as well as to the means for its realization. During preparations for all kinds of commemorative meetings and demonstrations, the peasant associations should organize these events jointly with other social groups. They should not act alone. In all kinds of movements, our comrades must not show themselves as exceptionally capable or as seeking the limelight for themselves. They must look for the common interest of all social groups and form a united front of all classes based on such common interest. An example of this type of united front is the joint efforts by all social groups to exterminate banditry in Guangning. The peasant self-defense corps supplied labor power, merchants the money, workers the scouts, and students the propaganda. In each type of united front, the demands raised by peasants should not be too simplistic and should take into account the interests of other classes. At present, we still need to pay attention to the reform movement, such as positive enterprises in education and charity in the countryside. In general, the united front of all classes is not simply shouting a few slogans, but involves some real work among and alliance with artisans, small merchants, students, and women in villages. We must not lapse into our previous naïveté and shout the slogan of “down with capitalism” as soon as we see a small merchant. Only in this way, can we win the sympathy of other classes and give ourselves a good opportunity to expand. Similarly, only this will enable us to use the people’s organized strength in each social group to reform rural [social] organizations and destroy all types of feudal bases that obstruct the popular movement.

b) Training and leadership:

i) We may use changes in the political situation and unexpected incidents that happen among peasants to teach our comrades work methods so that they will get training through real actions.

ii) We should try to have personal talks with individual comrades. When comrades come to report to the peasant committee, we should ask them to report on the conditions of the peasant movement in their area, as well as giving them instructions on work methods.

iii) When individual comrades make mistakes, we must point out the source of the mistakes and the effect of such mistakes on the peasant movement. Also, we should educate them in party discipline and correct the mistakes they have committed, pointing out ways to remedy such mistakes. Such instances of educating our comrades should be used for reports and discussions in the branches, so that ordinary comrades can also receive party education.

iv) Short-term special training courses should be opened to provide party education. This would include giving reports on the political and economic situation in the world, China, and Guangdong, as well as on the trends in the peasant movement and the methods of handling it.

3) How to Deal with the Political Environment

[[a) Now we think the peasant movement is in great political danger and we must gain the understanding of the GMD-left and rally the peasants under the left’s flag.

(b) Many weaknesses have emerged in the peasant organizations, and even after Guangdong's unification, feudal organizations in the villages have not changed at all. We should make great efforts to establish a united front of all classes in the countryside. (c) The peasant self-defense corps was originally founded for defense against attacks by the landlords' armed forces, but their function is to support the existence of peasant associations rather than to attack landlords. (d) The civil corps is an armed force used by the landlord class to protect its own interests. We should disarm it and retrieve the public money that funds it.]]

e) In the past, we had three different sets of attitudes toward bandits: (i) adopt a cooperative attitude to those bandits who suffer oppression and who express sympathy with the peasant associations; (ii) try to establish links with bandits who have little to do with the peasant organizations so that they will not be used by landlords; (iii) attack well-established bandits and those who are connected with imperialists or any counterrevolutionary force. However, in our practical work, the bandits who cooperate with us are those who want to join the peasant associations, or who somehow have already joined the associations without anybody's knowledge. This is how peasant associations have bandits within, thus inviting attacks from those outside. The second type of bandit is interested only in profit. Even though we will do all we can to establish some ties with them, we cannot beat the money offered by the landlords. Frequently, such bandits are used by the landlords to attack peasant associations. The third type has been used by the reactionaries and has become the peasants' enemy. The reactionaries want to use bandits to destroy the people's organizations, thus creating political confusion. As a matter of principle, in dealing with the three types of bandit, on occasion we should restrain them while at other times we should improve their livelihood to convert them into good people. In reality, however, they all obstruct revolutionary actions and the development of peasant associations. Indeed, the peasant associations will not gain anything from them. Therefore, we deem it necessary to eliminate the bandits, especially those who have links with the imperialists and reactionaries. In every county, we should expand the people's security committees and occupy important positions in these committees. We should call for the organization of these committees so as to provide the GMD with a good method in its bandit-eradication campaign. This will prevent the peasants from incurring heavy losses during the bandit-eradication campaign. At the present time, we must pay attention to this.

4) How to Consolidate the Organization of Peasant Associations

The Guangdong Provincial Peasant Association is now in grave danger.

Since the 20 March coup [1926], the political environment has greatly deteriorated. The GMD-right has intensified its attacks on the peasant associations. Now, the reactionaries have taken control of the GMD CC and, in the future, will certainly attack the peasant movement.

Although the number of our association members has increased enormously, mere increase in control of territory will boost numbers without increasing the

associations' work. This phenomenon can be said to be good, or very bad. The Provincial Peasant Association has now lost control over its subordinate associations, such as county peasant associations. Not only do they act independently but also they never submit a single report. Relations between the Provincial Peasant Association and the county associations have almost collapsed. The organization of individual county peasant associations is very insecure. If attacked they will be severely affected. There are no leaders in the counties; we cannot command the local masses.

Under these circumstances, it is extremely important to determine how to bring the peasant associations under our independent leadership, how we can lead them, and how we can secure their organizations and come to their rescue during a crisis. We resolve the following:

a) We must assume the leadership position among the peasants. All our deeds and thoughts should become examples for the peasants. We should become the [revolutionary] core among the masses. In any incident, we should stand at the forefront of the masses.

b) We must use the resolutions of the second peasants' congress [May 1926] to call on the peasantry to join peasant associations in order to expand the associations' organization and increase both the quantity and quality of the members.

c) Abide by the regulations of the associations to strengthen their internal unity.

d) Pay attention to the members' political training and hold more meetings. At each meeting, we should make a political report, read and explain the announcements of the superior associations and the articles in *The Plow* [Litou].⁹⁹ We should also discuss the content of the reports. The provincial association must be informed after each meeting.

e) Without relying on other political forces, the peasant associations must unify their organizations and strategies for long-term struggle. We must tell the peasants to get rid of their temporary fears, and we must stimulate their self-confidence.

f) There must be close communication between each level of the peasant associations.

g) We should make efforts to reform the peasants' thinking. Under feudalism, peasants have many natural weaknesses: regionalism, individualism, clanism, superstition, and inability to unite. None of these is a revolutionary trait; all of them must be reformed. The current situation in Guangdong provides the opportunity for such reform. However, we must still pay attention to technical aspects in case we arouse unnecessary opposition on this account.

h) Pay attention to women and youths in the countryside and gather them under the leadership of the peasant associations.

i) All reports must be absolutely true.

j) The strength of the local garrisons and the county magistrates must not be underestimated. They are capable of making trouble for us, and thus we should avoid unnecessary conflict and use some of the skills of diplomacy.

k) Try to divide the enemies and unite ourselves.

l) Peasants often lack self-confidence and have a blind faith in the gentry. We should take advantage of all kinds of opportunity to unmask the gentry and destroy its authority.

m) The peasant associations should be financially independent and cannot impose levies as the civil corps does. Such a practice is not allowed under the unified public finances of Guangdong.

n) Methods of preventing local tyrants and evil gentry from controlling the associations. Peasant associations should establish the difference between formal members and special members, as well as other rights and duties. (i) Those who use their own labor to till the land are formal members; the remainder are special members. (ii) Special members do not have voting rights; they are only representatives. (iii) The dues for special members are twice as much as those for formal members. (iv) The peasant association cannot protect the interests of special members when they are outside the association. (v) Those special members who have worked in the association for many years and achieved good results may be authorized by the provincial association to become formal members. This will make local tyrants and evil gentry see that joining the peasant association will not bring any benefits, but will cost them more in membership dues. Of course, they will not join. This strategy has to be passed by the third peasant congress. At present, we should propagate this among the peasants in order to prepare them.

o) Methods for persuading members to pay monthly dues. On the one hand, we should estimate expenses, make a budget, and announce new plans while, on the other, the provincial association should issue a simple pamphlet for members on what they should know about joining the association.

p) Methods to prevent employees of the association from becoming jobless. Those who work in the county and area peasant association executive committees should not work on the land at the same time. After being defeated in elections, they do not want to return to work on the land and often become unemployed and then join the bandits. To avoid unemployment, we must sternly order them to return to work on the land.

q) Methods for monitoring members. The provincial peasant association should have identical membership cards with serial numbers for members in the province. Special members and formal members should have different membership cards.

r) Propaganda should be done so that peasant resistance against landlords does not interfere in administration. Heavy attacks on peasant association interference in administration [of the government] have come from forces outside. Of course, the peasant associations must challenge the landlords on many issues; such conflicts are not sanctioned by law. However, many things done by landlords are not allowed by the government. Imposition of all kinds of levies on peasants is not sanctioned by law. Landlords often use their political forces within the village to oppress the peasants; they arrest, lynch, torture, parade them, and even bring them to trial and punish them. All these things are also interference in [government] administration. This kind of propaganda can be carried out by printing small pamphlets within the party and distribut-

ing them outside. This will also raise the peasants' class consciousness. On the other hand, this will let the outsiders know that such events are the inevitable result of conflicts between peasants and landlords. It is something which the peasants are forced to do to resist the landlords.

5) Education and Propaganda

a) We have only about 400 party members among the peasant masses, yet the peasant association members number more than 600,000. It seems that we are faced with a crisis. Moreover, there are only about ten people directing the work. This presents a great problem in terms of labor power. Therefore, it is urgent that we now train dozens of leading personnel. We should select twenty to thirty people from the countryside, who are both capable and trusted by the peasants, to undergo intensive training for a month or two in the essential knowledge and work methods a party member must know. On graduation, they should be distributed over the counties to take charge of the party's internal work and to train and recruit party members in each individual area.

b) "Peasant hostels" should be established by the peasant associations to accommodate peasants coming to the provincial capital from distant counties. Opportunities should be taken to promote them. Apart from providing room and board, they should have clubs, reading rooms, and other recreational equipment to attract interest.

6) Publishing

[[At present, there are three publications for the peasantry. *The Plow*, published by the provincial peasant association; *The Chinese Peasant* [Zhongguo nongmin]¹⁰⁰ and *Peasant Friends* [Nongyou], both published by the central peasant department of the GMD.]]

Now let us describe separately the reasons for, and methods of, opening peasant training courses:

Reasons: the area covered by peasant association organizations in Guangdong includes sixty-six counties and no fewer than 800,000 people. If our comrades responsible for the activities in this area are divided into seven separate groups in seven large regions (or seven missions), each mission, on average, will have five people. Thus, the total number will only be thirty-five. However, the peasant associations have over 50,000 basic organizations. Therefore, these thirty-five leading figures cannot deal with the different kinds of incidents that may crop up unexpectedly. As for the lower-level cadres, the danger is even greater. Even if we add up all the peasant comrades who are now working in the countryside, the number is no more than 800, which is insufficient to cover the area peasant associations that serve as the basic unit. Thus, to recruit more rural comrades in order to expand the party's organization and train cadres for the district [*qu*] peasant associations, there is an urgent need to establish peasant training courses. This resolution was passed by the Guangdong area within the last six months and is considered an excellent resolution. Unfortunately, it could not be implemented because of lack of financial resources.

Methods: first, select important or problem counties. The first class should enroll students from the ten counties close to Canton, thirty peasants from each county. Each course should last one month. Six months of courses are planned (or six separate courses). Calculated on the basis of the number of counties which have peasant associations now, 1,800 personnel can be trained within six months.

Three to five [party] comrades will be appointed to divide the thirty people from each county into small groups and to provide them with training. It has been decided that all thirty must be recruited into the party within one month. Even if not all of them can become members of our party, at least one-third must [join]. In this way, we can recruit 1,800 comrades within six months; they will be distributed almost all over the province. The results will be amazing indeed. If these 1,800 comrades are spread over all sixty-six counties and begin work there [in expanding the party in a similar way], party organizations in each county will be more consolidated, and the results will be even more surprising.

Training methods should resemble those used in the Peasant Movement Training Institute,¹⁰¹ although the subjects should be easier and more practical. Only our comrades with work experience will be appointed as teachers, although we may ask the leftists in the GMD to be teachers. This should be done when it is considered diplomatically necessary.

B.19 Resolution on Shanghai's Work Plan (July 1926)¹⁰²

Shanghai is the economic headquarters of the imperialist aggression against China. It is also China's major industrial center. Shanghai is the heart of the country's anti-imperialist movement within the national liberation movement. In terms of our party, a genuine CP can be created here.

Since the May 30 Movement, Shanghai has indeed been a revolutionary city. Although the imperialists' police departments, the Chinese official security forces, and the class of big businessmen and compradores have either jointly or individually attacked the Shanghai people, the Shanghai people continue to be increasingly revolutionized. This point is proved by the medium and small merchants' movement against the harsh levies and multiple taxes that have been imposed during the last few months in Shanghai, the primitive uprisings against inflation by ordinary citizens, and the massive economic strikes by Shanghai workers.

Now class divisions in Shanghai are clearly visible. The class of big merchants and compradores is counterrevolutionary; workers, artisans, students, and ordinary citizens are revolutionary. Although medium and small merchants have expressed

revolutionary sentiments, they have not been able to escape the influence of the class of big businessmen and compradores and join the mainstream of the revolution. This fact shows that the bourgeoisie has gradually revealed its concern with and actions for national independence.

Although the Shanghai area committee paid attention to local political struggles in the past, these struggles failed to penetrate society. At present, it is difficult to say whether they can influence the medium and small merchants as well as ordinary citizens in Shanghai. From now on, the Shanghai area committee should pay special attention to the local political movement. It must realize that we—a proletarian political party—must lead the revolutionary movement in Shanghai and increasingly revolutionize the city. Only by winning over the masses of the middle and petty bourgeoisie (particularly the petty bourgeois masses) can we prevent Shanghai from falling into the hands of the imperialists.

The Shanghai area committee should raise the common demands of the Shanghai people—the political program of the Shanghai citizens' movement—so that ordinary citizens in Shanghai will not consider us a mortal danger. Instead, we hope that they will regard us as representing the interests of workers and other oppressed people. In line with the spirit of this political program, we should establish a united front of the revolutionary masses. First, we must bring them under the influence of our ideas and then ensure that their actions take place under our leadership. Our area committee's political actions should rely on the proletarian forces as their core on every local issue when guiding ordinary citizens in the struggles against the local Shanghai government (the works department, the harbor police, and the Nanjing government). We should strike at them continuously and expose the crimes of betraying our country committed by the compradores and evil gentry who control the so-called people-mandated institutions. We must also point out that it is daydreaming to hope that compromise with bourgeois politicians will bring about peace.

The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce should become an organization for medium and small merchants; it should not come under the influence of the big bourgeoisie; nor should it allow ordinary shop clerks (except shop clerks in big companies) to join because the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce is an agency which will attract and gradually revolutionize medium and small merchants. Our party should influence the medium and small merchants in Shanghai through the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce and other organizations.

At present, work inside the GMD is particularly important. In reality, medium and small merchants, the progressive gentry, university professors, students, artisans, and free professionals are all GMD masses. In the past, because the Shanghai special party department [of the GMD] was run entirely by us, and also because ordinary comrades did not understand GMD work in Shanghai, it meant that not only has the GMD failed to develop but also that the impression has been created among ordinary people that the Shanghai special party department equals the CP. This has caused a great loss to the revolutionary movement in Shanghai. In the

future, we must turn the GMD into a mass party; work in the GMD should be turned over to the GMD-left. Before the left has been formed in the GMD, the Shanghai area committee should come up with all kinds of methods to help its formation (for example, we may occupy a minority position in the executive committee of the Shanghai special party department, thus enabling the left to join the department). Since the end of the May 30 Movement last year, the Shanghai student movement has remained divided because of the fear-mongering by the statists and the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism [Yat-senism].¹⁰³ The Shanghai area committee was able to lead itself and the masses of the GMD-left and avoid internal division. This was the result of applying united front methods. From now on the Shanghai area committee should particularly emphasize continual use of the united front and call for the unification of the student movement, as well as raising the slogan that students should fight for freedom, etc., so that the student movement will not split internally. The chief enemies inside the Shanghai student movement are, of course, the Shanghai Federation of Comrades from All Universities and the Shanghai Union of Comrades for All College Students, which are controlled by Guo Renyuan and Zhu Jingnong. Their thinking and slogans—"study to save our country," "cooperation between teachers and students"—suit the psychology of the average backward and reactionary intellectuals, with the result that they comprise the general assembly of reactionary intellectuals from all factions. In the future, the Shanghai area committee should guide the student masses in Shanghai to compete with them for the leading position in the Shanghai student movement.

Although the organizational work of the Shanghai area committee has become quite strict lately, it remains slack. In the future, we must make each party member take part in the life of the party, and party publications must find their way to the masses both in and outside the party. In the various levels of party departments in Shanghai, such as divisional committees [*buwei*] and branches [*zhibu*], they may experiment with an initial kind of democracy. This is to say that of the members of divisional committees, some may be appointed by the area committee and some elected by representatives of the divisional committees; branch secretaries are still to be appointed by the divisional or area committees, while the executive secretary of the branch is elected by the full meeting of the branch or the meeting of branch representatives. In terms of the expansion of party members, in big branches attention should be paid to improving the quality of party members; in smaller branches attention should be paid to expansion of numbers. At the same time, in factories attention should be paid to the development of cells in each workshop. Perfecting the branch secretariat [*zhibu de ganshihui*] will make the branch the nucleus of the masses in the factory. Concerning organization, this is the most important work for the Shanghai area committee. From now on, the Shanghai area committee should directly train branch secretaries [*zhibu de shuji*] and then branch executive secretaries [*zhibu de ganshi*].

It is also an urgent matter to develop branches in the city, because only after

neighborhood branches have been developed can we claim to have a nucleus among the petty bourgeois masses.

Although the workers' movement in Shanghai has achieved excellent results recently, and although the Shanghai General Labor Union has insuperable authority among all the workers, workers' organizations in each industry and those of the artisans have not truly become mass organizations. Moreover, because of connections with the secret societies, it was discovered recently that the danger exists that the party and labor unions cannot command the workers. In the future, the workers' movement in Shanghai should: (1) turn the workers' organizations in each industry and the artisans' organizations into true mass groups and make the Shanghai General Labor Union the true leader of the masses; (2) consolidate the labor union organizations that already have some basis so as to prevent workers from starting premature unguided uprisings, and correct the mistake of total control of labor unions by a few leaders without mass following; (3) pay attention to the development and expansion of the organizations of sailors, railway workers, postmen, trolley and telephone workers, and dock workers; (4) raise general demands based on the economic miseries of the Shanghai workers in order to make society at large really understand the workers' hardships and then express sympathy with various actions by the workers, such as strikes; (5) use all kinds of opportunities to work openly in the labor union movement to gain a *fait-accompli* social status for the labor union; (6) do our best to prevent the emergence of the secret societies [in labor unions] from causing internal splits among workers; we should regularly send people to all kinds of secret societies (Green and Red Gangs, etc.) to use their connections to secure our organizations and defend them against outsiders who want to sabotage our forces; (7) pay attention to consolidating the workers' picket groups in each district in order to deter harassment by hoodlums and traitors; (8) pay attention to the organizations of artisans and shop clerks and eliminate the forces and influence of the yellow labor unions in the handicrafts industry; and (9) pay attention to training personnel to become lower-level cadres.

Propaganda work in Shanghai is particularly important. It is true to say that, in the past, the Shanghai area committee did not regularly engage in propaganda work. It only carried out occasional political agitation. In the future, we must strengthen the Shanghai area committee's propaganda department. The Shanghai area committee should also publish a weekly magazine to strike at, and respond to, all kinds of reactionary thinking. It should also demonstrate to the Shanghai people revolutionary solutions based on the actual circumstances of the people in Shanghai. It is not necessary to issue regular leaflets and pamphlets on particular political issues or ideological struggles.

The Shanghai comrades have such a low level of party culture that from now on, the area committee should pay attention to raising their level of party culture. The area committee should establish party schools and publications; each divisional committee should set up senior or junior training courses and call more meetings of active elements and establish various kinds of temporary committees. These are all methods we should adopt.

B.20 Report on an Investigation of the Peasant
Movement in Hunan. *Mao Zedong*
(28 March 1927)¹⁰⁴

I. Rural Revolution

1) The Seriousness of the Peasant Problem

On a thirty-two-day (4 January to 5 February 1927) inspection tour of the five counties [*xian*] of Hunan—Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, Liling, and Changsha—I have collected a considerable amount of materials by listening carefully to reports made by experienced peasants and comrades in the peasant movement at fact-finding meetings held both in county seats and villages. Many aspects of the peasant movement directly contradict what we have learned from the gentry in Hankou and Changsha. Some unique incidents have never been seen or heard before. I think that such conditions also prevail in other provinces; thus various arguments against the peasant movement must be controverted immediately, and the erroneous decisions of the revolutionary regime [the Wuhan government] concerning the peasant movement must be quickly corrected. Only thus can the revolution benefit in the future. The further development of the peasant movement is a tremendous problem. Within a short time, hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in central, south, and north China with the fury of a hurricane; no force, no matter how strong, can restrain them. They will break all the shackles that bind them and rush toward the road of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants. All revolutionary parties and comrades will be judged by them. Are we to get in front of them and lead them or criticize them behind their backs or fight them from the opposite camp? Among these three alternatives every Chinese can choose freely, but the current situation demands a quick decision. The following are the results of my investigations, and my opinions are presented in detail for reference by revolutionary comrades.

2) Let's Organize!

[[The development of the Hunan peasant movement is divided into two phases. January–September 1926 was a phase of organization, membership of peasant associations did not exceed 300,000 or 400,000, and the masses under their direct command totaled just over one million. October 1926–January 1927 was a phase of revolution. Association membership jumped to 2 million with 10 million directly under their influence. About half of Hunan's peasants had been organized. After organizing themselves extensively, the peasants began to take action; within four months, an unprecedented rural revolution broke out.]]

3) Down with the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry! All Power Belongs to the Peasant Associations!

After the peasants organized themselves, action ensued. The major targets of their attack were the local tyrants, the evil gentry, and the lawless landlords, as well as the old patriarchal ideology, corruption of city officials, and undesirable village customs. This attack was like a hurricane: only those who bent to this force could survive. As a result, privileges of the feudal landlord class, thousands of years old, were totally swept away. Their prestige and prerogatives were altogether abolished. After the overthrow of the gentry's power, the peasant associations became the only organs of power, and [the slogan] "all power to the peasant associations" became literally true. Even such trifles as quarrels between married couples were referred to the peasant associations for settlement. No problem could be solved independently of peasant association membership, whose every word passed for a command. In the villages the peasant associations became the authority for everything, [seeing to it that] "whatever was promised was done." Outsiders could only comment favorably, not critically, on the peasant associations. Local tyrants, evil gentry, and lawless landlords were deprived of their right to speak, and none dared to voice objections. Under the peasant association regime, the top local tyrants fled to Shanghai; the second layer fled to Hankou; the third layer to Changsha, and the fourth layer to the county seats, while the small fry of the fifth layer and below surrendered to the peasant associations in the villages.

[[Many of the middle and small landlords and rich and middle peasants who had previously vehemently opposed the peasant associations now tried everything in their power to become members.]]

4) Very Bad or Very Good

The peasant revolt in the countryside awakened the gentry from its sweet dreams. When the news reached the cities from the countryside, the urban gentry protested tumultuously. After arriving in Changsha, I met people from different backgrounds and heard much gossip. From the middle social strata up to the GMD-right, the general comment was "very bad." Even some revolutionary[-minded] people did not object to this comment, especially when they used their imagination as to the conditions in the countryside. Some progressive elements only remarked apologetically: "Though this is bad, it is inevitable during the process of revolution." All in all, nobody entirely denied the epithet "bad." But as pointed out previously, it is actually the rising up of the vast peasant masses to accomplish their historic mission; it is the rising up of the democratic forces in the countryside to overthrow the feudal forces in the villages, which is the true goal of the national revolution. Sun Yat-sen devoted forty years to the national revolution; what he wanted but failed to achieve has been accomplished by the peasants in a few months. The patriarchal, feudal local tyrants and evil gentry, together with the lawless landlords, were not

only the foundation of the dictatorial regime of the past several thousand years, [but also] the tools of the imperialists, warlords, and corrupt officials. This is a great achievement unprecedented in the past forty years or several thousand years. This is “very good”—not in the least “bad,” and not at all “very bad.” To give credit where it is due, if we allot ten points to the accomplishments of the democratic revolution, then the achievements of the urban dwellers and the military units rate only three points, while the remaining seven points should go to the peasants in their rural revolution. The comment “very bad” is obviously an argument to serve the interests of the landlords and crush the peasants: it is obviously an argument of the landlord class, which tries to preserve the old feudal order by obstructing the establishment of a new democratic order: it is obviously a counterrevolutionary argument. No revolutionary comrade should blindly repeat such remarks. If you are a person of firm revolutionary ideology and visit the countryside, you will experience a satisfaction never experienced before; tens of thousands of slaves—the peasants—are overthrowing their rapacious enemy. The reaction of the peasants is entirely correct; their action is “very good!” “Very good” is a slogan of the peasants and other revolutionary groups. All revolutionary comrades should realize that the national revolution requires a tremendous change in the villages. The 1911 Revolution did not bring about such a change, and thus it failed; now there is such a change, and it is one of the major factors in the accomplishment of the revolution. Every revolutionary comrade should support this movement; otherwise he or she is against the revolution.

5) The Problem of “Excesses”

Another group of people say: “Peasant associations should be organized, but their actions are excessive.” This is the argument of the middle-of-the-road group. But what is the actual situation? The peasants in the villages have indeed been “disorderly.” The power of the peasant associations being supreme, the landlords have been prohibited from speaking up, and their prestige is wiped out. This is like stepping on the landlord after striking him down. The phrase “All landowners are tyrants and all gentry are bad” is coined. In some places those who owned fifty *mu* of land or more were immediately called local tyrants, and those who wore long gowns were all branded as evil gentry. Their “names being recorded in the subsidiary census,” local tyrants and evil gentry were fined, required to make contributions, and had their sedan chairs smashed. Some people forced their way into the homes of local tyrants and evil gentry who were hostile to the peasant association and killed their pigs and commandeered their grain. The ivory beds of the daughters and daughters-in-law of the local tyrants and evil gentry were stepped on by the dirty feet of the peasants. On the slightest provocation men were paraded down the streets, wearing tall paper hats. “Vile gentry! Now comes our day!” Actions were unrestrained; things were turned upside down, and terror swept some of the villages. This is what some people called “excesses,” “going to the other extreme,” or “un-

speakable.” This kind of comment appears superficially correct, but it is erroneous.

First, the above-mentioned incidents were the results of oppression by the local tyrants, evil gentry, and lawless landlords, who bore down on the peasants with their power and privileges. Thus, [the peasants’] tumultuous resistance is only a reaction. Their resistance is more intensive and disorderly where local tyrants, evil gentry, and lawless landlords have wreaked the worst damage. The peasants’ eyes see clearly. Who is bad and who is not bad; who should be punished most severely and who should be punished lightly: the peasants judge this most clearly; only very seldom do they hand out undeserved verdicts. So even Mr. Tang Mengxiao¹⁰⁵ once said: “When the peasants attacked the local tyrants and evil gentry in the villages, they were right in nine out of ten cases.”

Second, revolution is not a dinner party, or literary composition, or painting, or embroidering. It cannot be done so delicately, so gentlemanly, and so “gently, kindly, politely, plainly, and modestly.”¹⁰⁶ Revolution is insurrection, the violent action of one class overthrowing the power of another. A rural revolution is a revolution by the peasantry to overthrow the power of the feudal landlord class. If the peasants do not apply great force, the power of the landlords, consolidated over thousands of years, can never be uprooted. There must be a revolutionary tidal wave in the countryside in order to mobilize tens of thousands of peasants and weld them into this great force. The excesses described above result from the tremendous revolutionary enthusiasm of the peasants. In the second [revolutionary] stage of the peasant movement, such acts are very necessary. In this second stage, an absolute peasant power must be established, and no criticism of the peasant association should be allowed; the gentry’s power must be totally liquidated, the gentry knocked down, even trampled on. All excesses in the second stage have a revolutionary significance. Every village should be in a state of terror for a brief period; otherwise, counterrevolutionary activities in the villages cannot be suppressed, and the gentry’s power cannot be overthrown. To correct wrongs one must go to the other extreme, without which they cannot be righted. The argument of this group [against peasant “excesses”] appears superficially different from that of the former group; but in reality it is based on the same viewpoint, being an argument for the interests of the privileged landlord class. This kind of argument retards the development of the peasant movement and serves to sabotage the revolution. We must oppose it firmly.

II. The Vanguard of the Revolution

1) The Movement of the “Riffraff”

The GMD-right claims: “The peasant movement is a movement of riffraff, a movement of peasant loafers.” This argument was widely circulated in Changsha. When I visited the villages, the gentry told me: “Peasant associations are all right, but their present leadership is unacceptable and should be replaced.” This comment has the

same meaning as that of the [GMD-]right, namely, that the peasant movement is all right (it being already in existence, no one dares to say otherwise), but that the present leaders of the peasant movement are not all right, especially those in the lower units, all of whom are allegedly riffraff who used to go around in worn-out shoes, carry broken umbrellas, wear blue gowns, and gamble. In brief, all those who used to be despised and trodden down by the gentry, who had no social standing, and were deprived of their right to speak are now raising their heads. They are not only raising their heads, but are holding power in their hands. They have become kings of the village peasant associations (the lowest unit of the peasant associations), which they have turned into deadly weapons. They put their muscular, sun-burned hands on the heads of the gentry. They bind the gentry with ropes, put tall paper hats on them, and parade them through the villages. Their crude curses are heard every day by the gentry. They give orders to all, standing above all, where previously they stood below. Hence this is called “abnormal.”

2) Revolutionary Vanguard or Revolutionary Heroes

[[The peasants have fulfilled the major task in the national revolution, but the peasantry itself is divided into three: the rich, the middle, and the poor peasants. They have different perceptions of the revolution. Rich peasants have cash and grain surpluses. Initially they were not interested in joining the peasant associations, and it was only when they began to feel perturbed that they sought to join. Yet even after joining, they did not work enthusiastically for the associations but remained passive. Middle peasants have no surplus cash or grain, or debts, but barely maintain a living. They adopted a wavering attitude, thinking that they would not benefit much from the revolution. As peasant association members, they are better than the rich peasants, but rarely become active.]]

Only one group in the countryside has fought hard and relentlessly from the very start: the poor peasants. Out of the secret stage into the open stage, it was they who fought, who organized, and who did the revolutionary work. They alone were the deadly enemies of the local tyrants and evil gentry, whose bastions they attacked unreservedly. They alone were capable of doing the destructive work. They asked the rich and middle peasants: “We joined the peasant association long ago; why do you hesitate?” The rich and middle peasants answered sarcastically: “You have not a single tile above you, nor a needle-sized [strip of] land beneath you—naturally you joined the peasant association!”

It is true that the poor peasants have nothing to lose. They are the outcasts or semioutcasts of the village, and some of them are literally “without a single tile above and without a strip of land below.” Why shouldn’t they join the peasant association? According to an investigation made at Changsha, poor peasants constituted 70 percent, middle peasants 20 percent, and rich peasants 10 percent of the peasantry. Poor peasants can be further classified as very poor and poor. The very poor—20 out of the total 70 percent—are entirely without occupation, having nei-

ther land nor capital; with nothing to live on, they have to become soldiers, or hired hands, or beggars, or bandits. The remaining 50 percent constitute the poor [peasants] who are partially without occupation, but who, although they have a little land or capital, it is not enough to meet their expenses. Thus, they suffer all year long—handicraft workers, tenants (except rich tenants), and owner-tenants. (The percentage of poor peasants may be less in other counties than Changsha, but the difference is slight.)

This multitudinous mass of poor peasants is the core of the peasant associations, the vanguard in the overthrowing of feudal forces, accomplishing the not-yet-accomplished revolutionary mission. Without the poor peasant class (in the words of the gentry: without the riffraff), no revolutionary conditions would exist as they do now in rural areas; and the local tyrants and evil gentry could never be overthrown to complete the democratic revolution. The poor peasants (especially the very poor) secured the leadership of the peasant associations because they were the most revolutionary. During the first and second stages [of the peasant movement], the chairs and committee members in the lowest units of the peasant associations (village associations) were almost entirely poor peasants. (In the village peasant associations of Hengshan, 50 percent of the cadres came from the very poor peasant class, 40 percent from the poor peasant class, and 10 percent from poor educated elements.) This leadership by the poor peasants is very essential. Without the poor peasants, there will be no revolution. To reject them is to reject the revolution; a blow at them is a blow at the revolution. Their revolutionary course is faultless from beginning to end. They have cost the local tyrants and evil gentry “face.” They have thrown the big and small local tyrants and bad gentry to the ground and trampled on them. Many “excesses” of theirs during the revolutionary period have been a revolutionary necessity.

Some county magistrates, county party [GMD] headquarters, and the peasant associations of certain counties in Hunan have already committed a number of errors. Some even dispatched soldiers to arrest the lower cadres of the peasant associations at the request of landlords. In the prisons of Hengshan and Xiangxiang counties, many chairs and committee members of the village peasant associations are imprisoned. This error is extremely grave. Unintentionally, it strengthens the position of the reactionaries. The mere fact that the lawless landlords rejoiced and that the reactionary atmosphere thickened when the chairs and committee members of the village peasant associations were arrested is sufficient to expose the mistaken nature [of the arrests]. We should oppose such counterrevolutionary slogans as “movement of riffraff” and “movement of peasant loafers,” while taking special care not to help the local tyrants and evil gentry (even unintentionally) by attacks on the leading class of the poor peasants. As a matter of fact, though some of the poor peasants have indeed been “gamblers without gainful occupation,” the majority of them have since reformed. They themselves now prohibit gambling and clean up banditry. Where the power of the peasant associations is strong, local gambling is completely prohibited and banditry disappears. In some localities, it is safe to leave articles unattended on the roadside and doors unlocked at night. According to [my]

investigation in Hengshan, 85 percent of the poor peasant leaders are now reformed. Only 15 percent still retain some of their bad habits. These can only be called “a few undesirable elements,” but one should never imitate the slander of the local tyrants and evil gentry by branding them as “riffraff.” As regards these “few undesirable elements,” peasant association discipline should be improved by mass propaganda and individual training among them, under the slogan “strengthen the discipline of the peasant associations!” Indiscriminate arrests by soldiers, which cost the faith of the poor peasant class and strengthen the position of the local tyrants and evil gentry, should definitely be avoided. This point deserves the utmost attention.

III. The Peasantry and the Peasant Associations

[[In all, the peasantry under the leadership of the peasant associations have the fourteen following great achievements to their credit:

1) Organizing the Peasantry into Peasant Associations.

According to figures compiled by the provincial peasant association last November, in thirty-seven of the provinces' seventy-five counties, organizations had been set up with a total membership of 1,367,727. By the end of January, membership must have reached at least 2 million.

2) Dealing Political Blows to the Landlords

Once the peasants are organized, their first activity must be to smash the political prestige of the landlord class, especially of the local tyrants and evil gentry. This is the main struggle during the second period, the period of revolution. Without this, there can be no victory in the economic struggle. The following methods should be used to deal political blows to the landlords.

(a) **Auditing of accounts** to expose corrupt local tyrants and evil gentry; (b) **imposing fines**; (c) **levying contributions**; (d) **minor protests** against those who commit minor offenses against the peasant associations—the offender should write a pledge to desist from further criticism of the associations; (e) **major demonstrations** against enemies of the associations including demonstrating at their homes and slaughtering their pigs; (f) **parading [landlords] through the villages in tall paper hats**; (g) **imprisonment in the county jail**; (h) **banishment**; (i) **shooting** should be confined to the worst of the local tyrants and evil gentry and should be carried out by the peasants jointly with other segments of the people.

3) Dealing Economic Blows to the Landlords

a) Prohibition on sending grain out of the area, forcing up grain prices, or hoarding and cornering; (b) Prohibition on increasing rents and deposits, agitation for re-

duced rents and deposits; (c) prohibition on tenancy cancellation; (d) reduction of interest on loans.

4) Overthrowing the Feudal Politics of the Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry in the Countryside by Smashing the Old Organs of Rural Administration

5) Overthrowing the Armed Forces of the Landlords and Establishing Those of the Peasantry]]

6) Overthrowing the Political Power of the County Magistrate and His Bailiffs

Events in Haifeng, Guangdong Province, showed some time ago that a county government can only be cleaned up after the peasants rise up. Hunan has now provided additional proof. In a county ruled by local tyrants and evil gentry, the magistrate, no matter who he is, will invariably be corrupt. In a county where the peasantry has risen up, the government is invariably clean, whoever the magistrate may be. In the counties I visited, the magistrates had to consult the peasants on everything in advance. In counties where the peasant movement was very strong, the word of the peasant association worked miracles. If it demanded the arrest of a local tyrant or of a member of the evil gentry in the morning, the magistrate dared not delay till noon; if it demanded [arrest] by noon, he dared not delay till the afternoon. When the power of the peasantry was just beginning to make itself felt in the countryside, the magistrate allied himself with the local tyrants and evil gentry. When the peasantry's power matched that of the landlords, the magistrate tried to accommodate both sides, accepting some of the peasant associations' suggestions and rejecting others. The remark that "the word of the peasant association worked miracles" applied only when the power of the landlords had been completely destroyed by the peasantry. At present, the political situation in counties such as Xiangxiang, Xiangtan, Liling, and Hengshan is as follows:

i) All decisions are made by a joint council consisting of the magistrate and [representatives of] the revolutionary mass organizations. The council is convened by the magistrate and meets in his office. In some counties, it is called the "joint council of public bodies and the local government" [*gong fa tuan lianxi huiyi*], and in others the "council of county affairs" [*xianwu huiyi*]. Besides the magistrate himself, the people attending are representatives from the county peasant association, trade union council, merchant association, women's federation, school staff federation, county federation of students, and GMD county headquarters. At such council meetings the magistrate is influenced by the views of the public organizations and invariably "does their bidding." Thus, in Hunan, there is not the slightest problem in adopting a democratic committee system of county government; the present county governments are already quite democratic in both form and substance. This situation has been brought about only in the last two or three months,

that is, since the peasantry has risen all over the countryside and overthrown the power of the local tyrants and evil gentry. Only after the magistrates saw their old props collapse and realized that they needed other props to retain their posts did they begin to curry favor with the mass organizations and did the situation change to that described above.

ii) The judicial assistant has no cases to handle. The judicial system in Hunan remains one in which the county magistrate is concurrently in charge of judicial affairs with an assistant to help him in handling cases. To get rich, the magistrate and his underlings used to rely entirely on “collecting taxes and levies, procuring men and provisions for the armed forces,” and “extorting money in civil and criminal lawsuits by confounding right and wrong,” this last being the most reliable source of income. In the last few months, with the downfall of the local tyrants and evil gentry, all the legal obfuscators have disappeared. What is more, peasant problems, big and small, now are all settled in the peasant associations at the various levels. Thus, the county judicial assistant simply has nothing to do. The [assistant] in Xiangxiang told me: “When there were no peasant associations, a daily average of sixty civil or criminal suits were brought to the county government; now with the arrival of the peasant associations it receives an average of only four or five a day.” Thus, the purses of the magistrates and their underlings remain empty.

iii) The armed guards, the police, and the bailiffs all keep out of the way and dare not go near the villages to carry out their extortions. In the past, the villagers feared the town dwellers; now the town dwellers and, in particular, the vicious curs kept by the county government—the police, the armed guards, and the bailiffs—fear the villagers. The latter are afraid to go to the villages, and if they do so, they no longer dare to engage in extortion. The mere sight of peasant spears makes them tremble.

7) Overthrowing the Clan Authority of the Elders and Ancestral Temples, the Religious Authority of Town and Village Gods, and the Masculine Authority of Husbands

A man in China is usually subjected to the domination of three systems of authority: (a) the state system (political authority), ranging from the national, provincial, and county government down to that of the township [*xiang*]; (b) the clan system (clan authority), ranging from the central and branch ancestral temples down to the household head; and (c) the system of gods and spirits (religious authority), ranging from the King of Hell down to the town and village gods, and from the Emperor of Heaven down to all kinds of gods and spirits. As to women, in addition to being subject to these three types of domination, they are subject also to male domination (the authority of the husband). These four types of authority—political, religious, clan, and male—are the embodiment of the whole feudal patriarchal system and ideology; they are the four great bonds that have bound the Chinese people, espe-

cially the peasantry. The way in which the peasantry has overthrown the political authority of the landlords in the countryside has been described above. The political authority of the landlords is the backbone of all the other systems of authority. Once this has been overthrown, clan authority, religious authority, and the authority of the husband all begin to waver. Where the peasant association is powerful, clan elders and administrators of temple funds no longer dare oppress those lower in the clan hierarchy or embezzle clan funds. The evil clan elders and administrators have been overthrown together with the local tyrants and evil gentry. No one dares practice any longer such corporal and capital punishments as flogging, drowning, and burying alive that used to be carried out in the ancestral temples. The old practice of barring women and poor people from the banquets in the ancestral temples has also been smashed. The women of Baiguo in Hengshan County gathered in force and flooded into the ancestral temple, planted their backsides in the seats, and joined in the eating and drinking, while the venerable clan bigwigs had no choice but to let them do as they pleased. At another place, where poor peasants had been banned from temple banquets, a group of them flocked in and ate and drank their fill, while the local tyrants and evil gentry and other long-gowned gentlemen all took to their heels in fright.

As the peasant movement develops, so religious authority everywhere totters. In many places, peasant associations have taken over the temples of the gods as their offices. Everywhere, the associations advocate the appropriation of temple property to maintain peasant schools and to defray association expenses, calling it "public revenue from superstition." Forbidding superstition and smashing idols have become quite the vogue in Liling County; in the northern districts the peasants have prohibited the incense-burning processions designed to propitiate the god of plagues. There were many idols in the temple at Fuboling in Lukou, but when the [GMD] district headquarters needed extra room, they were all piled up in a corner, big and small together, and not one peasant raised any objection. Since then, sacrifices to the gods, the performance of Daoist rites, and the offering of sacred lamps on the occasion of a death in the family have become infrequent. Because the initiative in this matter was taken by the chair of the peasant association, Sun Xiaoshan, he is very much hated by the local Daoist priests. In the Longfeng Nunnery in the North Third District, the peasants and primary school teachers chopped up the wooden idols to cook meat. Over thirty in the Dongfu Monastery in the South District were burned by students and peasants acting together, and only two small images of Lord Bao were snatched up by an old peasant who said: "Do not commit a sin!"

Everywhere, it has been the case that only the older peasants and the women believed in the gods; the youths and middle-aged peasants did not. As it is these latter who control the peasant associations, the overthrow of religious authority and the eradication of superstition are happening everywhere. As to the authority of the husband, this has always been weaker among the poor peasants because, out of economic necessity, their women have to do more manual labor than the women of

the more prosperous classes. Therefore, they have more say and greater decision-making power in family matters. Sexually, they also enjoy relative freedom. In the countryside, triangular and even more complicated relationships are almost universal among the poor peasant class. With the increasing bankruptcy of the rural economy in recent years, the basis for male domination has already been weakened. Now, with the recent rise of the peasant movement, in many places, women have begun to organize rural women's federations. They now have the opportunity to raise their heads, and the husband's authority is getting shakier day by day. Essentially, the whole feudal patriarchal ideological system is wavering with the growth of the peasantry's power. However, up to and including the present time, the peasantry has concentrated on destroying the political authority of the landlords. Wherever this authority has been completely destroyed, the peasants are beginning to press the attack in the other three domains of clan, religious, and male domination. But these attacks are only just beginning, and the thorough overthrow of all three must await a complete victory by the peasants in the economic struggle. Therefore, our present task is to lead the peasants to put their greatest efforts into the political struggle, so that the landlords' authority can be entirely overthrown. The economic struggle should then follow immediately, so that economic problems of the peasantry can be fundamentally solved. As for the destruction of the clan system, superstition, and a one-sided concept of chastity and fidelity, this will follow as a natural consequence of the political and economic struggle. If too much of an effort is made, stubbornly and hardheadedly, to destroy these things, then the local tyrants and evil gentry will certainly seize on the pretext to put forth such slogans as "the peasant association has no piety toward ancestors," "the peasant association is blasphemous and destroys religion," and "the peasant association stands for the communitization of wives." Recent events in Xiangxiang, Hunan, and in Yangxin, Hubei, where the landlords exploited peasant opposition to the smashing of idols, are cases in point. It is the peasants who made the idols, and when the time comes they will cast the idols aside with their own hands; there is no need for anyone else to do it for them prematurely. Our propaganda policy in these matters is "Draw the bow without shooting, just indicate the motions." It is for the peasants themselves to cast aside the idols, smash the ancestral tablets, and pull down the temples to martyred virgins and the arches to chaste and faithful widows.

While in the countryside, I did some propaganda against peasant superstition. I said: "If you believe in the eight characters, you hope for good luck; if you believe in geomancy, you hope to benefit from the location of your ancestral graves."¹⁰⁷ This year, within a few months, the local tyrants, evil gentry, and corrupt officials have all been toppled from their pedestals. You don't mean to say that until a few months ago they all had good luck and benefited from well-situated ancestral graves, while suddenly in the last few months their luck has turned and their ancestral graves have ceased to exert a beneficial influence? The local tyrants and evil gentry jeer at your peasant association and say: 'How strange! Today the world is a world of committeemen. Look, you can't even piss without bumping into a committeeman!' Quite

true, the towns and the villages, the peasant associations and the trade unions, the GMD and the CCP, all without exception have their executive committee members—it is indeed a world of committeemen. But is this due to the eight characters and ancestral graves? How strange! The eight characters of all the poor wretches in the countryside have suddenly turned auspicious! And their ancestral graves have suddenly started exerting beneficial influences! The gods? They are worthy of all respect and worship. But if you only had Lord Guan and the Goddess of Mercy and no peasant association, could you have overthrown the local tyrants and evil gentry? These ‘gods’ and ‘goddesses’ are indeed miserable objects. You’ve worshiped them for thousands of years, and they’ve never yet overthrown a single one of the local tyrants or evil gentry for you! Now you want to have your rent reduced. Let me ask, how will you go about it? Will you believe in the gods or in the peasant association?”

My words made the peasants roar with laughter; and in their laughter I thought I could discern the figures of the gods fleeing into nothingness.

[[8) Dissemination of Political Propaganda

9) Peasant Bans and Prohibitions

The three things most strictly forbidden are gaming, gambling, and opium-smoking.

10) Eliminating Banditry

11) Abolishing Exorbitant Levies

12) The Movement for Education]]

13) The Cooperative Movement

The peasants really need cooperatives, and especially purchasing, marketing, and credit cooperatives. When the peasants buy goods, the merchants exploit them; when they sell their farm produce, the merchants force the prices down; and when they borrow money or rice, they are fleeced by the usurers; they desperately need to find a solution to these three problems. During the fighting in the Yangtze valley last winter, when trade routes were cut and the price of salt went up in Hunan, many peasants organized cooperatives to purchase salt. When the landlords deliberately stopped lending, there were attempts by the peasants to organize credit agencies, because they needed to borrow money. The major problem is the absence of detailed, standard rules of organization. As these spontaneously organized peasant cooperatives often fail to conform to cooperative principles, comrades working among the peasants are always eagerly inquiring about “rules and regulations.” Given proper guidance, the cooperative movement can spread everywhere along

with the growth of the peasant associations. As the term *hezuo* is too unfamiliar for the peasantry, instead we could call such cooperatives *hehuopu*.¹⁰⁸

[[14] Building Roads and Repairing Dikes]]

All fourteen aspects enumerated above have been accomplished by the peasantry under the leadership of the peasant associations. Let the reader recount them; which of them is bad? Only the local tyrants and evil gentry, I think, will call them bad. Curiously enough, it is reported from Nanchang that Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Renjie [a mentor and supporter of Chiang Kai-shek], and other such gentlemen do not entirely approve of the activities of the Hunan peasantry. This opinion is shared by Liu Yuezhi¹⁰⁹ and other such right-wing leaders in Hunan; all of them say: "They have simply gone red." I wonder where the so-called national revolution would be without this red. Day after day to talk about arousing the masses and then to be scared to death when they do rise—what difference is there between this and She Gong's love of dragons?¹¹⁰

B.21 Discussion on the Question of the Left by the Guangdong Area (October 1926)¹¹¹

The party group had two discussions on the question of the left: Comrade Borodin made two reports. The party group decided unanimously: "Comrade Borodin said that only the ordinary oppressed workers, peasants, shopkeepers, students, and people in other walks of life are the real left. They will become the genuine leftist forces in the everyday struggle for the interests of the people. At the present time, one person or another at the top is referred to as leftist; this is laughable and unreliable." These words of Comrade Borodin are fundamentally correct. However, the tone downgrades the role of the present left in the top leadership and creates many difficulties for practical work. At the last meeting of the party group, all the comrades drew up the following views for the Party Center concerning the question of the left. We hope that the Party Center will make a final decision after deliberation and instruct all areas to use [the following] as criteria for their work in the GMD.

1) The current left at the top (this is referred to as the quasi-left below so as to distinguish it from the genuine left) comprises the people inside the GMD who cannot cooperate with the center and right and is an organization that defends itself against the attacks of the right in order to protect the position [of its members]. They are not supporters of the leftists' political program, so its members are constantly wavering and unable to make a firm leftist stand. In addition, they are weak and not brave enough to step forward and fight for the views of the left. Internally, they

cannot reach a common viewpoint. However, one cannot say that we grudgingly patch up this kind of left. For reasons of sentiment and self-interest, they cannot cooperate with the right. Since they act differently from the right on certain issues or at a certain time, we regard them as left.

2) The fact that this quasi-left is weak and wavering does not necessarily make us pessimistic. Without the masses, of course there can only be this kind of left. When newly formed, it can only be this kind of creature. However, this kind of quasi-left has a considerable role to play in the national revolution. The division between the left and the right after the GMD's reorganization has contributed much to the development of the national revolution. Because of the conflict between the quasi-left and the right, it [the quasi-left] has to move toward us, yet it cannot afford to hold views different from those of the right. Sometimes, it needs the strength of the masses to resist the right and thus it must take some kind of a stand on the side of the masses. Therefore, even though this kind of quasi-left has many weaknesses, we must watch out for one particular point in our handling of it: we cannot treat it in the way we treat the center or the right. For example, when this quasi-left is in conflict with the right, we must accord it considerable respect and offer assistance. When this quasi-left has wrong proposals and engages in incorrect actions, we can only correct it in a spirit of friendship but not attack it as if it were the right.

3) The organization of this quasi-left will inevitably produce some turncoats or internal squabbling in the future, but we should assist this kind of organization and use such organizations wherever the necessity of fighting the right arises. Moreover, we should help set up links between them and the reliable left in Canton. We should lead this kind of quasi-left to work among the masses and get close to the real left among the rising masses. This will encourage some within the quasi-left to become more steadfastly left, so that genuine leftist leaders may emerge from within. If, in the future, no genuine leftist leaders emerge from within (a possibility), the current cooperation with them will still be beneficial because with them as our ally, we can, at least, boost leftist tendencies and deal a blow to rightist tendencies. This will be of great assistance to us in our work among the real leftists in the masses.

4) In the conflict between the GMD-left and right, we should encourage the quasi-left to become involved. We should only use such methods as voting and so on to help them; we should not say much and interfere in other people's affairs. We should adopt the above attitude toward the struggle for power between the GMD-left and right. However, we must expose and attack their crimes of leftist¹¹² political tendencies. We must occupy the position of leading the left, and should not always hand over such responsibilities to the quasi-left. Such a quasi-left without mass following will never have the strength or courage to shoulder such responsibilities.

5) At the same time, we should pay attention to the organizations of such a quasi-left. [This] is limited only to areas where there is a practical need to deal with the right (referring to the right that makes trouble in the party organizations); no organizations should be set up beforehand in places without this need. Therefore, the organizations of this quasi-left tend to exclude us in one way or another (for

example, the organizations of the right [left, presumably] are unwilling to admit anybody suspected of being a CP member). In places where the right launches its attacks, the quasi-left has to cooperate closely with us in order to deal with the right. We also need it to reduce the number of our direct confrontations with the right. In places where there is no need to deal with the right, we should not be in a hurry to establish such quasi-left organizations. Also, the relatively genuine leftist members in the quasi-left have made no demands for organization. Therefore, those who demand such organizations are those who are relatively rightist and hate the CP (in fact, these people are lazy, weak, narrow-minded, jealous rightists or Dai Jitao-ists; we must not recognize their demands as the demands of the left). If we organize such quasi-left organizations beforehand, they are sure to demonstrate this kind of anticommunist spirit and in fact become organizations of the center or the right. We must not limit ourselves to organizing such a quasi-left everywhere. If there is no undertaking against the right in a particular area, and the work there is against the right in the GMD CC, we should allow our people to have unlimited cooperation with the quasi-left but not leave them to organizing themselves independently.

6) We should correct our mistake of overemphasizing these quasi-leftists and neglecting the center and the right. Of course, there is a huge ideological gap between us, but in reality, the behavior of the quasi-left, who are often either afraid or unwilling, is no different from that of the center and right. If we really want to place the responsibility for the revolution on the shoulders of the quasi-left, we will get into big trouble. If, on behalf of such a quasi-left, we completely offend the so-called center and the right, the consequences will be much more serious than if we offend the quasi-left. This is an example of getting into trouble. Within the framework of not worsening our relationship with the quasi-left, we should treat the center and the right in the same way as we do the quasi-left. Sometimes we can also obtain their assistance.

7) Only the genuine leftists are really capable of shouldering the responsibility of the national revolution. These are the ordinary oppressed students, shopkeepers, peasants, urban residents, and artisans. We cannot produce genuine leftists here by simply establishing relations with a handful of top GMD leaders or by talking and negotiating in secluded rooms. They have to be produced in the everyday struggles for the interests of the people. At present, the national revolution is in urgent need of such genuine leftists. No matter where, we should make great efforts to promote the leftists to lead the people to struggle for their own interests. The organizations of ordinary leftists which we need should not be the organizations of the quasi-left, but the organizations of the masses of the genuine leftists.

8) The masses of the genuine leftists need leaders in their everyday struggle, while the quasi-leftist elements often do not dare to become leaders. Only our comrades can easily become their leaders because our comrades have the masses of the party behind them. The quasi-leftist has only himself but, since the majority of the masses are under our leadership and not that of the quasi-left, any comrade [of ours] will more easily and courageously stand in front of the masses and lead their

struggles. Although the quasi-left is the real left in the GMD, others and even the quasi-left regard themselves as followers of the CP, and not as the GMD-left. We must make it [the quasi-left] look like the GMD-left and establish regular ties with it [the GMD-left]. If the quasi-leftists get as close to the masses as possible, sometimes they will have more courageous and resolute leftist tendencies.

9) The quasi-leftists are not necessarily genuine leftists. Sometimes, their thinking is fundamentally rightist or Dai Jitao-ist; before the rise of the masses of the genuine leftists, certainly some of them may be more leftist while others (or even all of them) may retreat or lag behind, just like Dai Jitao during the era of the May 30 Movement. Therefore, the revolutionary position of the quasi-left is not a sure one. However, no matter what, for their own protection and to undermine the center and the right, it is easier for people at the present time to work on the leftist masses and thus easier to be considered by others as the GMD-left. We must do something for the quasi-leftists today and turn them into temporary shadows of the GMD-left.

10) On the surface, we should respect the independent position of the quasi-leftists because the quasi-left demands this kind of status and does not want to be an appendage of the CP. However, in reality, we must gain leadership over them; otherwise such a quasi-left will become rightist or slack in its work. As for the alliance between the masses of the genuine leftists and the quasi-leftists, on the surface, we should respect their independence while, in reality, trying to gain the actual power of leadership over the leftist masses. This will enable the masses under our command to influence the quasi-left. If we allow the leftists to be led entirely by the quasi-left and break away from our influence, the quasi-leftists may, on the contrary, exert rightist influence on the leftist masses. In general, if we say that the national revolution needs the leadership of the GMD-left, such words will be too rigid and we will not be able to gain the real power of leadership. This will endanger the national revolution.

B.22 Comrade Chen Duxiu's Report on the Question of the GMD (4 November 1926)¹¹³

On the question of the GMD, the first point to be made is whether the Chinese national revolution is passé. Some foreign comrades think this is so. Some Chinese comrades also believe that the Chinese national revolution has succeeded or is about to succeed and that the proletarian revolution is now on the way. These views are obviously wrong, because two-thirds of China are still under the rule of the Zhili and Fengtian warlords. In terms of international relations, [China] is still a semi-colonial country; politically even the Guangdong national government has certain

aspects of compromise of a semicolonial nature. Economically, national finances, financial administration, customs, transportation, and major industries (particularly coal and iron) are controlled by the imperialists. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Chinese national revolution is passé or near its end. We can only say that it has just begun. If our observations are correct, China still needs a national revolution.

However, then the second question arises: do we need a national revolutionary party? Some comrades think that the national revolution can be carried out by the CP; a national revolutionary party is not necessary. On the surface, people who say such things appear very leftist, but in fact they have aided the imperialists and warlords. This is because first, without a national revolutionary party, we cannot directly command the petty bourgeoisie in the cities and, second, communist regimes cannot survive under the present international circumstances (recently a Japanese viscount asked the GMD commissar in Beijing whether Guangdong had a communist government). This is why we still need a national revolutionary party at the present time.

There is yet another view that recognizes the need for a national revolutionary party but asks whether we should select another national revolutionary party besides the GMD. Many comrades in our party hold this view. At present, it seems that this view is also incorrect. We must understand the social conditions of the whole of China. The mentalities and abilities of the petty bourgeoisie are almost identical; if we do not want this GMD, and opt for another GMD, it will hardly make any difference. Moreover, the new party might not have as long a history of revolution as the current GMD. In practice, we have seen many people, for similar reasons, attempt to organize new parties, but all have failed. For example, the New China Party [*Xin Zhongguo dang*], and the statistes [*guojia zhuyi pai*]¹¹⁴ both had ambitions to organize another nationalist party outside of the GMD. But one has failed completely while the other has gradually declined. Therefore, viewed both from a theoretical and a factual perspective, it is impossible to organize another national revolutionary party.

In the present social conditions in China, not only is it difficult to have a second petty bourgeois party, but the emergence of a party of the big bourgeoisie is unlikely. Since the strength of the compradore class is still enormous, while the national bourgeoisie has not yet formed completely, the progressive bourgeoisie can only go over to the side of the GMD. Particularly after the victory of the Northern Expedition, the bourgeoisie has tended even more toward the GMD. Only the compradore class still remains in the camps of the Research and Communications cliques. We are not saying that the Chinese national revolution needs only one nationalist party; CP participation in the national revolution is a fact. Nor are we saying that there should not be a second nationalist party in addition to the GMD. We are saying that at the moment China only has the GMD—a national revolutionary party—and that, in reality, it is very difficult to create another nationalist party.

According to the above analysis, we can positively say that China now is still in the era of the national revolution. In this era, we need a national revolutionary party

to cooperate with. The GMD is the only national revolutionary party in China now. What is the substance of the GMD? Its left wing is already on the road of national revolution. During reorganization at the First National Congress [January 1924], two factions were formed: the left and the right. At that time, the right included Feng Ziyou, Ma Su, and others. They represented landlords, compradores, and warlords and opposed the inclusion of communist elements. Now these rightists have left the GMD. Around the time of the Second Party Congress [January 1926], new rightists emerged, such as Dai [Jitao] and Chiang [Kai-shek]. At the time, the right and the left were in the process of formation. If the bourgeoisie joined the GMD, the right would become stronger. Its current strength alone is not as great as that of the old right, relying only on Chiang's armed forces to control the power of the party and government. Indeed, the new right oppose the old right. The strength of the new right will expand increasingly (the Chinese bourgeoisie will develop as will the GMD-right that represents them), even if it is not led by Dai or Chiang in the future.

The left represents the petty bourgeoisie. The right now represents the bourgeoisie; the right that has already left the GMD represents the compradores, landlords, and warlords. Roughly, we can say this; it is not farfetched. Under these circumstances, it is clear that our party should remain inside the GMD and form a close alliance with the left in order to help the left resist the infiltration of the ideas and forces of the right, and to prevent the new right from making rightist compromises. Our policies of the two enlarged meetings last year and this [October 1925 and July 1926] now seem to be very correct.

Since the March 20 coup [1926], the new right of Dai and Chiang splintered off from the left. Wang [Jingwei] also departed. The rest of the leaders on the left appear to waver very much. Therefore, comrades in the Guangdong area began to suspect the GMD and doubt whether the GMD could still carry out the revolution. Can the GMD make a firm stand? Is our party's policy on the GMD correct?

Not only in Guangdong, but also comrades in the northern area have similar thoughts. Some even believe that the GMD has abandoned the revolution; after all, the revolution needs the CP. In fact, there are many things that make us suspicious. After 20 March, the left was almost blown to pieces; no matter what, the left consulted with the CP first and did not dare to do anything if the CP did not express its views. Even the joint meeting of the GMD CC and provincial party departments was completely run by the CP. Without the CP's management they could not run it. The above is the situation in Guangdong. In Shanghai, [everything] depends even more on the CP's total management. The leader of the left, Liu Yazi, refused to take over the responsibility despite the many efforts we made to persuade him. All work is done by the CP. This situation makes the bourgeoisie in Shanghai also willing to cooperate with the Shanghai General Labor Union, which is controlled by the CP, and feel that the GMD is not much use. The bourgeoisie in Guangdong sometimes pays more attention to the CP than to the GMD. In Beijing, despite the depression of both the left and the right, everything is managed by Comrade Shouchang [Li Dazhao]. Almost the entire GMD there is merely Li Shouchang. In Hunan, at the

recent provincial congress [of the GMD; 6–9 August 1926], communist elements accounted for more than 40 percent of the delegates, the leftists, over 10 percent, neutrals, more than 20 percent, and the rightists, over 10 percent. At first the Hunan area adopted a hands-off attitude; all resolutions were drafted by the left, lest, first, we be accused of completely controlling the congress and, second, the ability and theory of the left be tested. But a week into the congress, discussions mounted—without any results. The CP members had to come out and take over. The result was that the resolutions and the outcome of the election were all approved according to our recommendations. At the beginning of the congress, our comrades seldom spoke; so on some minor issues the views expressed by various comrades were at odds with each other. The right thought that the CP was not unanimous. However, when the passage of the final resolution and the outcome of the election were effected entirely in line with our predictions, all factions expressed surprise and admiration for CP organization, on the one hand, and panic, on the other.

Recently, Dai Jitao complained that the GMD can no longer do anything and that the revolution is now the CP's. Tan Yankai and his subordinates say that the GMD has no strength and that the CP's strength is greater. Tang Shengzhi also holds similar views.¹¹⁵

I do not cite these facts to prove that the GMD is no longer useful and must rely on the CP to continue the revolution alone. These facts prove two things: (1) alliance between the CP and the left is possible, and (2) although the left cannot be controlled and managed by us, it still needs our help and leadership; we cannot abandon this responsibility for the moment. If we give up this responsibility or even withdraw from the GMD, we will allow the new right that completely represents the bourgeoisie to ally with the left that represents the petty bourgeoisie and leads the revolution.

The most important question here is whether there is a left in the GMD that can ally with us. We can say positively that there is. Not only within, but also outside of, the GMD there are huge masses of the left. Moreover, the organizations of the left are in the process of continuous expansion. Let us look at the evidence from Canton alone: (1) In the Whampoa Military Academy, since the withdrawal of more than 160 of our comrades, the leftist students have been organized under our leadership; their organization has expanded into the masses and is attempting to expand across the country. Their political program is to welcome Wang [Jingwei]'s restoration to his position [chair of the national government] and continue the premier's [Sun Yat-sen] three fundamental policies of allying with Soviet Russia, allying with the CP, and supporting the workers and peasants. (2) The head of the Department of Peasant Affairs in the GMD CC, Gan Naiguang, has begun work on the peasant movement in Guangdong as well as throughout the whole country; he often assembles leftist youths for secret meetings and published a pamphlet attempting to propound a leftist theory that the GMD should seek out the peasantry as its basis. I hear that the pamphlet has sold 50,000 copies. The comrades in the Guangdong area have noticed many similar instances and written in their letter, "We believe that

there must be a left wing to lead the Chinese national revolutionary movement.” They have acknowledged the instruction of the CC [of the CCP] that “we should not completely manage the revolution; we must help the left and enable the left itself to take over the responsibility and feel the power of the masses, so that they can make their own stand.” This principle is correct. But the comrades in the Guangdong area raised another important practical question: how can we help the left, and what kind of left should we help? The answer of the comrades in the Guangdong area was that there must be a political program of the left; according to this program we can develop the party organizations of the masses on the left in various areas and mass associations of the people, so that the CP may have a correct relationship with the masses on the left and advance the revolution; this is not helping only a few leftist leaders. The comrades in the Guangdong area said: “We do not have to talk about leaders because we do not have much difficulty in dealing with and helping leaders.” This view is only half correct. In helping the left, needless to say the most important thing to do is to use the masses on the left to give substance to the party organizations; but if we overlook the question of the leftist leaders and abandon them, so that the leaders are isolated from the masses, this is another mistake. Of course, leaders without masses are useless, but can masses without leaders be organized to fight? The inclinations of the masses, of course, will influence the leaders; but the leaders’ inclinations also have great influence over the entire party; it is the same in any political party of any class. The leftist leaders in the GMD are very complex and irresolute. When we deal with them, it is often difficult even to help them; the strategies we use in dealing with and helping them are not appropriate and have given rise to the March 20 coup; this is one very obvious example.

The GMD-left now has three flaws: first, it does not have a concrete political program; second, it has no central leaders; and third, the leaders of the left are isolated from the masses. These are the three things we must help the left with: help the left devise a political program; help the left find central leaders; and help the leaders of the left come into contact with the masses. Why do the comrades in the Guangdong area only pay attention to the masses of the left while neglecting the leaders of the left? We can see their views in their annual report. They think that if one claims that the GMD has a left, then there are only the masses on the left but no leaders; the leaders of the left often oscillate both in thoughts and deeds and are therefore seldom reliable; thus, there is no left [in the GMD] to speak of. The comrades in the Guangdong area once heard Wang Jingwei say: “If the peasants only care for class struggle, then we don’t want them.” They also heard Liao Zhongkai say, “The Guangning Incident occurred because the members of the peasant association were influenced by Old Borodin and the CP.”¹¹⁶ They have also witnessed the transformation of Dai Jitao, Chiang Kai-shek, and Ding Weifeng into the new right; even Gu Mengyu also accused the peasant associations of harboring bandits; at the political meeting, even Gan Naiguang did not say a word for the peasants in Hua County on the massacre there.¹¹⁷ All these facts have made the

comrades in the Guangdong area doubt whether there is really a left in the GMD. They say: "The GMD-left knows that it is more important to protect its own interest," and also, "The GMD-left uses the peasantry's strength to protect its own position and once it achieves this goal, it will naturally neglect the peasant movement." Thus, if we overlook the leaders of the left in the GMD and say that they are not the real left, this observation is very dangerous. The comrades in the Guangdong area insist: "We the CP should have a correct type of relationship with the masses of the left." This is correct. However, we should not therefore start doubting whether there are the so-called leaders of the left aside from the masses of the left. Before the birth of the new leaders of the left, we must not neglect the current leaders of the left in our cooperative relationship with the GMD. The comrades of the Guangdong area suspect the leaders of the left in the GMD; this mistake is to overevaluate the left and treat it no differently from the CP. The distinct character of the left and the right in the GMD and that of the CP is that the right destroys the interests of the workers and peasants, while the CP fights for the interests of the workers and peasants; but the left uses the workers and peasants to fight for the interests of the left. If we view the GMD-left from the perspective of the CP and demand that they also fight for the interests of the workers and peasants, then it is not necessary for the CP to exist in China; at the same time, the GMD-left has to become a workers and peasants' party without being able to recruit the huge masses of the urban petty bourgeoisie, since the urban petty bourgeoisie can only support the workers and peasants out of the need of the revolution, but will never fight for the workers and peasants in the latter's interest.

We also know that the Chinese national revolution has achieved considerable success. If political power should fall into the hands of the current leaders of the left, there will be no conflict between their political program and ours over the workers' demand for reduction in working hours, wage increases, freedom of labor unions, improvement in benefits, etc. As for the political program for the peasantry, such as their demands for arms, land, and rural political power, the left may not fully allow this. In the future, our alliance with the left will split over these issues because we cannot lose the peasantry, and because we want to maintain our alliance with the left. At that time, perhaps the revolutionary situation in the world will have undergone new changes; perhaps the Chinese national revolution will have entered a new era; perhaps the political parties in China will have become divided anew along class lines. All this may happen in the distant future. At present and in the near future, in the difficult struggles against imperialists and warlords, the longer we keep our alliance with the GMD-left, the more beneficial it will be for the Chinese revolution. Therefore, in our relationship with the GMD-left, we are not to downgrade our political program for the peasantry in order to maintain this alliance; rather, we must define our political program for the peasantry and, both subjectively and objectively, try to influence and educate the GMD-left, so that not too great a distance will emerge between the political partners over the question of the program for the peasantry. This would cause a premature split even though

the stand of both sides on the issue of the peasant movement is completely different.

Now my conclusion: according to our recent experiences, our current policy toward the GMD and the decisions of the last two enlarged meetings do not need to be changed at all. However, what needs our attention is that for the sake of the progress in the revolutionary movement in China we must have a political program for the peasantry that meets their demands. Also, we must use our political program for the peasantry to influence the GMD-left and make their leaders adopt a political program that is advantageous to the peasantry and avoid a split in our alliance with the GMD-left over the issue of the peasantry.

B.23 Political Report. *Chen Duxiu* (13 December 1926)¹¹⁸

[[The main point of the political report concerns relations with the GMD and, most particularly, the role of the United Front in the national revolution. The first part of the report comprises a review of the history of the United Front. After the conquest of Jiujiang and Nanchang,¹¹⁹ the red United Front again developed dangerous tendencies.

1) The imperialists' policy of creating divisions. Military victory and the rising popular movement have forced the imperialists to realize that violence alone will not be enough and that they must attempt co-option. They will offer compromise in order to retain most of the unequal treaties, create a rupture with Soviet Russia, and ban the labor movement.]]

2) The GMD-right. It has been frightened by the sudden rise in the workers and peasants' movement and thus display rightist tendencies. The Northern Expedition has increased the strength of the CCP because the popular forces are under the control of the party. Thus, it [the right] feels that the CCP must be restricted in its activities. Now most of the GMD's political and military strength is in the hands of the right. The right has not openly obstructed the anti-imperialist movement but, in reality, it desperately wants to calm down the workers and peasants' movement to gain imperialist recognition of the nationalist government.

[[3) The panic of merchants. The flourishing of workers' organizations and the outbreak of economic strikes has caused many middle and small merchants to take the side of the big merchants and compradores and oppose the workers.]]

4) The disease of "left" naïveté in our party—among our comrades, there are several symptoms of the disease of "left" naïveté:

a) Looking down on the GMD. This can be said to be a traditional mentality, particularly among the comrades in the Guangdong area. Somebody once said: "The GMD has been dead since 20 March [1926], and rotting since 15 May;¹²⁰ why are

we still holding this stinking corpse in our arms?" However, the impetus to the flourishing of the popular movement given by the victories of the Northern Expedition prove that the GMD is not yet a stinking corpse.

b) Completely dominating and controlling the GMD. Many decent members of the GMD say: "We are not against the policies of the CP, but we oppose the CP's dominating and controlling the work of the GMD everywhere." This is the response to total domination by our comrades. This kind of total domination is not necessarily intentional, but the result is that there is neither the GMD nor the CP.

c) Completely dominating and controlling the popular movement. Not only do we want to dominate and control the popular movement completely, but we want to do the same for all popular movements. Before 20 March and 15 May, we totally managed the GMD within; now we are doing the same thing outside the GMD. The result of this total domination is that the GMD is now without the masses and that the masses of the left are separated from the leaders of the left. This has meant that there has been no strong formation of the left. Without a strong left to cooperate with us in fighting the right, the result will naturally be that we will lead the masses alone and directly confront the military and political forces of the right—in the form of direct conflict between the CP and the GMD. At the moment, this kind of conflict is just what the imperialists need, but not what the United Front for National Liberation wants.

d) Denying the existence of the left. This kind of mentality that completely negates the left is strongest among the comrades of the Guangdong area. In their report to the CC they said: "As for the left, there is no such thing as the left." Moreover, Comrade Borodin thinks that the real solution of the peasant problem lies in solving the land problem. Thus, he said: "Those who support the solution of the land problem are the real left; now there is no real left in the GMD." This is a curious kind of logic! As a consequence of denying [the existence of] the left, we have only two courses of action: first, cooperate with the right and, second, withdraw from the GMD and lead the masses in conflicts with the GMD. We must adopt neither of these courses of action. Our only way out is to remain inside the GMD and ally with the left to fight the right. The reasons for Comrade Borodin's mistaken view are, first, setting too high standards for the left and, second, overlooking the dispute concerning the struggles in China at the present time. This dispute revolves around whether to continue the nationalist movement against imperialism and the democratic movement against warlords, landlords, the evil gentry, and local tyrants. Whoever inside the GMD supports these two movements are leftists; if not, they are rightists. Therefore, the GMD-left must be democrats; if they only support opposition to imperialism but not warlords, landlords, local tyrants, and the evil gentry, they are feudalists and, of course, rightists. Rightists like this are numerous among the important personages of the GMD. Of course, the solution of the land problem deals the final blow to the landlords and local tyrants. The majority of the peasantry in the Chinese countryside, however, is struggling for such issues as rent-reduction, interest-reduction, freedom of association, armed self-defense, resistance to local

tyrants and the evil gentry, resistance to harsh levies and multiple taxes—but not the fundamental question of land. They themselves have not even understood this fundamental problem. Certainly, our propaganda can proceed from the current issues in our struggle to the fundamental question of land. If we immediately raise the land issue, which the peasant masses do not yet understand as the slogan for our struggle, then we cause our struggle to stop. If we use the criterion of whether one supports solution of the land problem as defining the GMD-left, there is, of course, no left. The current struggles over rent- and interest-reduction are more pressing for the peasantry than solving the land problem. The GMD-left that supports these demands exists already; this is more realistic than hoping for the emergence of a left that supports the peasantry in solving the land problem, because negating the current left as a result of imagining a future radical left is equivalent to thinking that eating bean curd and vegetables today is unnecessary because next week one might get fish and meat to eat.

e) Misunderstanding party independence. Independence of our party refers to its independent political propaganda and the independent organization of the party; it does not mean that we should act independently in every current, practical political struggle and not cooperate with the GMD. Some comrades interpret party independence this way and thus often dream of organizing workers, peasants, merchants, students, and all the masses directly under the leadership of our party, completely dominating and managing every popular movement without cooperating with the GMD. The comrades in Beijing and Hubei all have this mentality; in particular, the comrades in Guangdong deny the existence of the left even more fervently. Naturally, this gives rise to the following mistaken view: “Of course, we stand on the side of the people in resisting the government . . . the conflict between the people and the government also reflects the general conflict between the CP and the GMD.” This leftist error of breaking away from the GMD is as dangerous to the party as the previous rightist error of not wanting to develop party [CCP] organization and submerging ourselves in the GMD.

f) Poor policies for dealing with the middle and small merchants. Neither in Changsha nor in Wuhan have we built up a good relationship with artisans, shop clerks, middle and small merchants through the GMD. Particularly in Wuhan, the excessively high demands of some artisans and shop clerks have forced the middle and small merchants to cooperate with the chamber of commerce in opposing the labor unions. As for our inability to stop [workers’] pickets from threatening and humiliating merchants, this is a phenomenon that must not continue. This is the fourth dangerous tendency in the red United Front.

When the above four dangerous tendencies link up at any time and in any place, they can cause the United Front to split. Now the possibility of this split is extraordinarily serious. We must urgently implement the following tactics to save the situation:

a) Prevent rightist tendencies outside of the party and, at the same time, oppose “leftist” tendencies within the party in order to strengthen the red United Front. The

increasing distance between these “leftist” and rightist tendencies is the major factor dividing the United Front, in general, and the relationship between the GMD and the CP, in particular. The secondary causes are the new policies of the imperialists and the panic of the merchants. Of course, we do not dream of reducing totally the distance between these “leftist” and rightist tendencies, but we must pay attention to the fact that the degree of solidarity in the United Front is positively related to the distance between the “leftist” and rightist tendencies.

b) Pressure the GMD and the nationalist government to adopt the slogan “Armed forces unite with the people.” Internally, we should continue our joint democratic struggles—the struggle to overthrow the feudal warlord regimes in metropolitan cities and the rural feudal regimes of landlords, local tyrants, and the evil gentry; externally, we should continue the struggle for independence and equality. According to past experiences, each time the GMD won a military victory, it immediately compromised with the enemy and thus became rightist and was defeated. The majority of the rightists now also wants to seek compromise with the enemies (the imperialists and the domestic feudal forces). The only way to save the rightists now is to continue our struggle and pressure them to unite the armed forces with the people and continue the struggle against the enemies. Only this can salvage the present situation of the increasing “leftism” of the people and the increasing rightist tendencies of the military regime.

c) Maintain a balance of power among the military leaders of the GMD. Some comrades advocate the concentration of the GMD military forces. This is an illusion. It is both impossible and unnecessary to concentrate the GMD military forces. There is a positive relationship between the concentration of the GMD military forces and the promotion of the reactionary situation. The more concentrated the military forces, the greater the forces of reaction; the faster the concentration, the faster the reaction; he in whose hands such military forces are concentrated reacts first. This is the logical consequence of the inability of the GMD authorities to discipline their military leaders. We can also say that this is the certain fate of the countries where democracy is underdeveloped.

d) Expand democratic propaganda. Previous propaganda focused exclusively on the single aspect of nationalism. This kind of simplistic propaganda movement is often used by military dictators. Now, in order to prevent the situation of military dictatorship from becoming more aggravated and rightist, we must start propaganda and a movement for democratic politics. It is not enough to propagandize democracy abstractly. We must point out that the concrete manifestations of democratic politics are the establishment of a national parliament, provincial assemblies, city and village councils, and the return of political power in cities and villages to the people. We must explain that any democratic government must stand on the left—on the side of the people—and give the people sufficient freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication, strike, and rent strikes. It must not stand on the right—the side of the imperialists, big merchants, compradores, landlords, local tyrants, and the evil gentry who wish to suppress the movement of workers and

peasants. In particular, we must stress that the peasant movement is helping the democratic government to attack the feudal landlords, local tyrants, and the evil gentry, eradicating their enemies for the democratic government, strengthening the basis of the government, and not harming it. The democratic government should not help its own enemies (feudal landlords, local tyrants, and the evil gentry) to oppress its own supporters (the peasantry).

e) Improve our relations with the GMD. All mass organizations and movements should cooperate with the GMD as much as possible and, in particular, support the development of the left's strength to enable the leaders of the left to win over the masses. They should also work hard to develop the organization of the left in the GMD among the masses of the petty bourgeoisie (peasants, artisans, shop clerks, students, small merchants) and do as much as they can to help the left to achieve victory at the Third National Congress [of the GMD]. From today, we must start implementing this policy initiative. The right began its activities long ago, sending its own people everywhere to gather together its forces and even recruiting into its party the people from the Western Hills Conference,¹²¹ traitors to the workers, and all reactionaries, as preparations to compete with the left at the Third National Congress. If victory at the Third National Congress goes to the right, there will be great changes in the GMD's policies with respect to its alliance with Soviet Russia and the CP and its attitude toward the movement of workers and peasants. We must pay special attention to this.

f) Help the left establish a civilian government headed by Wang Jingwei. Military commanders should not be standing committee members of the government; the military commission must be under the administration of the government to reduce the nature and form of the military dictatorship of the nationalist government.

g) Define our policies toward the middle and small merchants. At present, our policies toward the middle and small merchants are experiencing great difficulties. Because the strikes waged everywhere by artisans and shop clerks against factory owners and shopkeepers are essentially conflicts of interest among the petty bourgeoisie themselves, and because both sides are needed in the United Front, we should not favor one particular side; yet neither can we remain neutral. We have to adopt the following policy: negatively speaking, we should try to explain to shop clerks and workers that they should not raise excessively high demands beyond the economic capabilities of the factory owners and shopkeepers; nor should they resort to strikes at will, particularly in stores selling daily necessities (rice and coal stores, grocery stores selling cooking oil and salt, etc.). Positively speaking, we should step up our propaganda about the necessity of the United Front and about workers' support for merchants in their struggles against harsh levies and numerous taxes and for citizen's self-government, so that they may try to seek economic assistance to deal with the drying up of the economy and financial panic in the cities. Only these methods will, one way or another, moderate our conflicts with the petty bourgeoisie and thus strengthen the United Front.

B.24 Resolution on the Question of the GMD-Left (December 1926)¹²²

There are three different views in our party concerning the GMD-left:

(1) The Party Center thinks that there is indeed a distinction between the left and right in the GMD. There are still many elements who represent the interests of landlords, the evil gentry, local tyrants, and other feudal forces—they are certainly the right. The idealists who represent bourgeois nationalism are still vacillating between the interests of the compradores and landlords and those of the workers and peasants, and sometimes they are prejudiced in favor of the former; although their verbal support of the nationalist movement is relatively loud, they have always openly or otherwise advocated military dictatorship and disapproved of the people's government. In terms of the national revolution, these people can only be classified as rightists. Only those who are on the side of democracy, represent the interests and mentalities of the majority of peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and oppose the feudal forces are genuine leftists. The Party Center thinks that these two different factions do exist. This is an undeniable fact.

2) However, the comrades in Guangdong deny that there is a GMD-left. They say: "Only ordinary oppressed workers, peasants, merchants, students, and people in other walks of life are the genuine left; only through fighting for the interests of the people in everyday life and through struggle can anyone become part of the genuine left. Such persons at the top who are considered leftist are, in fact, inactive and unreliable." They also say: "Only those who support the solution of the land problem can form the left in the future. There is no left at the present time." They believe that since there is no real left at the present time, we will blunder into trouble by helping some comical and unreliable leftists and thus offend the right.

3) The view of the joint meeting in October [1926] of party groups in the GMD seems to be shared by those of the Party Center and the comrades in Guangdong. They deny that there are real leftists in the GMD, a view similar to that of the Guangdong comrades. At the same time, however, they admit that there are so-called "quasi-leftists." They say: "Neglecting too much the role of the current left at high levels will cause many difficulties in practical work." "The fact that this quasi-left is weak and wavering does not necessarily make us pessimistic. Without the masses, of course there can only be this kind of left. When newly formed it can only be this kind of creature. However, this kind of quasi-left has a considerable role to play in the national revolution. The division between left and right after the GMD's reorganization has contributed much to the development of the national revolution. Because of the conflict between the quasi-left and the right, it [the quasi-left] has to move toward us, yet it cannot afford to have different views from those of the right. Sometimes, it needs the strength of the masses to resist the right, and thus it must take some kind of a stand on the side of the masses." [See above, **Doc. B.21**, section 2.] These views are indeed different from those of the comrades

in the Guangdong area. But they also say: "Only the genuine leftists are really capable of shouldering the responsibility of the national revolution. These are the ordinary oppressed students, shopkeepers, peasants, urban residents, and artisans." [See above, **Doc. B.21**, section 7.] Such words are identical with those of the Guangdong area comrades, but they do not use as their criterion for the genuine left whether one supports the solution of the land problem. These mistaken views of theirs are easily perceived. At present, we cannot use support for the solution of the land problem as a criterion for being genuine left because land has not yet become a problem. At present, the problems for the peasantry are their urgent demands for rent- and interest-reduction, freedom of association, armed self-defense, resistance to local tyrants and the evil gentry, and resistance to harsh levies and numerous taxes. If we guide the peasantry from the practical struggles for these demands to the land problem that exists in the research office, this will stop their struggles. If we hope for the immediate emergence of a left that supports the solution of the land problem, this will be more naive than hoping that the current left can really support the current peasant struggles. Our concept of the GMD-left applies only to those GMD members who are relatively leftist. It is not a faction that has high standards. If we say that only the ordinary oppressed workers, peasants, merchants, students, and people from other walks of life are the genuine leftists, this is to confuse the difference between the left in society with the left in the GMD—this is even more laughable.

We must remember that since its foundation as the Society for the Revival of China [*Xingzhonghui*],¹²³ the GMD's evolution has been limited by time. The so-called left and right are relative terms and do not have definite boundaries between them. Since the left and right in society cannot be confused with the left and right in a political party, and since a GMD-left that supports a solution to the land problem has not emerged, we have to acknowledge that those elements who support continuation of the three policies made by Sun Yat-sen and Liao Zhongkai—allying with Soviet Russia, allying with the CP, and supporting workers and peasants—are leftists. Those who are against these policies are rightists. It is not necessary to distinguish the genuine left, the quasi-left, etc., in the way one might distinguish separate makes of famous scissors.

Why say they do not count as genuine leftists? Is it because they do not have a concrete political program? Yet, since the October joint meeting, they have had one. Is it because they have not formed a faction that has a definite policy? Yet, if we make this fundamental criticism, the entire GMD has yet to become a political party with a definite policy. Is it because they often vacillate and lack consistency? The nature of the petty bourgeoisie is vacillation and inconsistency. Is it because they have no central leaders? Wang Jingwei is not dead yet. Is it because they do not have armed forces? (According to Mao Renzhi's [Zedong] report, some comrades in Guangdong said, the right has troops, the left has none; even with a platoon of soldiers the right is stronger than the left.) This is even more absurd. Moreover, the reality is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Is it because they have no

masses? It is not that they do not have masses, but the masses are isolated from the leaders. Is it because they are only a tendency and not a group? They also have leaders and masses just like the right, and will have even more masses than the right; as soon as Wang Jingwei returns, they will form a larger group than the right. Is it because the left's current political program cannot satisfy the demands of the peasantry? This is obviously not true. Peasant associations, rent reduction, interest reduction, armed resistance against local tyrants, the evil gentry, and other leftist political proposals are precisely the urgent demands of the peasants. Is it because they are only leftists in words and incapable of practicing what they preach? This is certainly the left's weakness at the moment, but we cannot say that there have never been any leftist activities. Even their leftist tendencies in words and thoughts are of great significance in terms of their influence on the revolutionary movement and our cooperation with the GMD.

Why do we want to recognize the left? Not only because the left's existence is a fact, but also because it is the key to our cooperation with the GMD. Of course, we should not superstitiously believe that there is already a strong and responsible left. However, even if there are only some leftists who are different from the rightists and cannot cooperate with the right, thus becoming a buffer zone between us and the right, they will have a great role to play. The consequence of denying the existence of the left will leave us only two courses of action. One is to cooperate with the right and follow the right in their oppression of the masses of workers and peasants. The second is to lead the masses ourselves to confront the right directly. If there is no difference between the left and the right, when we come into conflict with the right, it manifests itself as a conflict between the CP and the entire GMD. The imperialists and all domestic reactionaries are eager that we follow this route. The comrades in the Guangdong area are now traveling along this road. They deny the existence of the left. They fear that giving them special help will offend the right, and thus they feel that it is unnecessary to have special, close cooperation with them [the left]. The left will then feel that we have deserted them; they are afraid of being taken advantage of and thus becoming isolated. Naturally, they will take the side of the right and oppose us. This is the logical objective outcome. This fallacious theory of negating the left has already produced egregious results. If the comrades in the Guangdong area do not correct this mistake before it is too late, and if other local party organizations fail to defend against this mistake, irreparable losses will be incurred.

Therefore, the CC meeting is firmly against the mistaken view among our comrades that denies the existence of the GMD-left. It resolutely insists on the existence of the GMD-left even though it is weak, vacillating, and inconsistent. It strongly advocates that great efforts be made to strengthen and develop the forces of the GMD-left and help it gain (but not monopolize) the leading positions in the party and the government as well as among their own masses (revolutionary urban petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and peasants).

We must adopt the method of helping it [the left] at three levels—the top,

middle, and bottom. First, we must never neglect helping their leaders at the top. We should help the leaders of the left at the top gain, both in their Party Center and local organizations, unity, win over the masses, and gain strength, political power, and power within the party. If we have only leftist masses but no leaders, they will remain the masses of the CP, and not the masses of the GMD. When there are conflicts between the masses and the right, they will appear as conflicts between the CP and the GMD, instead of as conflicts between the left and the right. As a condition of our help and cooperation with the leaders of the left, naturally they must continue the three revolutionary policies of Sun Yat-sen and Liao Zhongkai. We must also take into consideration their stand as the petty bourgeoisie and make concessions to them. In particular, in actual struggles of the peasant and workers' movement, we must not dream that they can adopt the same attitude as ours. After all, we can make fewer concessions to them than we give the right. Therefore, if they have strength, we can reduce conflicts [with the right] in the period of our cooperation with the GMD. Second, we must develop GMD organizations in the lower strata of society, such as among artisans, shop clerks, and the peasant masses, so that the leaders of the left can have leftist masses within the party. Moreover, we must help the people in the lower strata of society to get close to the leaders of the left in the GMD, so that they can have leftist masses outside of the party. The leaders of the left must have their own mass following; only then will they have enough strength of their own to rise to the challenge of the right; only then will they cool down their jealousy, suspicion, and fear of the CP because they feel that the latter is going to seize their power immediately. Moreover, when there are leftist masses, especially leftist masses within the party, the leaders of the left will be swayed to the left and become less weak and vacillating.

Third, we must help the left create a middle force as a link between the leaders of the left at the top and the leftist masses at the bottom. This is to help the left to found party schools, training schools for propagandists, political education schools, and the labor and peasant movements; to train their personnel who are able to get close to mass organizations and break down the barrier between the leaders of the left and their masses. If we can properly provide the left with assistance at these three levels, the left will certainly become stronger than now and will ally with us to resist the right.

In terms of helping the left form organizations, we should adopt the following policies: (1) We do not approve of an independent political program and constitution of leftist organizations. (2) Where the division between the left and the right has not led to obvious conflicts or where the right does not have any strength, only a small number of comparatively reliable leaders of the left should be united. We will help these leaders take control of all the party organizations and implement leftist policies under the leadership of the leftist leaders in the party center. It is unnecessary to organize the left masses among the party members. (3) Where the left is engaged in conflicts with the right, it is better to use such methods as schools, schools for political education, news agencies, scholarly associations, research

associations, and clubs to organize numerous small groups among the masses of leftist party members under the command of the leaders of the left. There should not be an integrated form of union, let alone a concentrated organization. However, the leaders of the left may often call meetings of the representatives from these small groups, and the CP can also send formal representatives to attend these joint meetings. Members of the CP need not join these small groups.

The left now has several organizations. The first was formed by Gan Naiguang and others after the joint meeting in October. Most of its members were representatives from individual provinces who attended the joint meeting and, after the meeting, returned to their provinces and became couriers. They now have the four policies of allying with the CP and with Soviet Russia, opposing the Western Hills group, supporting Sun Yat-sen's and Liao Zhongkai's policies toward workers and peasants, and supporting Wang Jingwei to become the leader. However, they still have no name or constitution for their organization. Another organization is the "Left Society" [*Zuoshe*] founded by the students at the Whampoa Military Academy. They have an independent constitution and keep secrets from nonsociety members; but they do not have an independent political program. The recent political program devised by the joint meeting in October is also their political program. This "Left Society" has begun to develop in Hunan and Hubei; many out-of-favor politicians have joined it. This organization has a strong parochial color. The members of the "Left Society" in Hunan have become anticommunists because they are against Tang Shengzhi. We should not recognize this "Left Society" as entirely a union of leftist elements. We should warn members of the "Left Society" in all areas who have not yet become anticommunists not to have independent constitutions, not to hurriedly form complete organizations, and not to recruit nonleftist elements or out-of-favor politicians. We should ally with leftist elements who have not joined the "Left Society" and strike at those "Left Societies" in individual areas that have become anticommunist.

B.25 Chen Duxiu's Report to the CCP's Fifth National Congress (29 April 1927)¹²⁴

1. The Situation and Development of the Revolution and the Party's Strategy

[[The past two years can be divided into four periods:

a) From the Fourth Party Congress to the Shanghai incident and Guo Songling's uprising. This was the embryonic stage of the revolution when the proletariat began to lead the revolution. The Shanghai incident was openly against imperialism, and it made the nation's people realize the role and strength of the proletariat. The revolu-

tionary tide also influenced the military with Feng Yuxiang's coup, Guo Songling's actions against Zhang Zuolin, and Tang Shengzhi declaring his support for the Canton government. This caused the reactionary united front of warlords to disintegrate.

b) From the defeat of Guo Songling to the retreat from Nankou by the First Corps of the National Army. This is the period of the decline of the revolution and the rise of counterrevolution. After the defeat of Guo Songling, the revolutionary tide began to ebb. At this time, the right wing of the bourgeoisie, the statist, and the GMD-right formed a united front to attack the revolution.

c) From the start of the Northern Expedition to the occupation of Shanghai by the National Army. The key feature of this period is the rise of the revolutionary movement. The progress of the revolutionary movement by the time of the occupation of Shanghai had so strengthened the forces of the proletariat that the bourgeoisie could not continue to cooperate with the proletariat and went over to the side of the counterrevolutionaries.

d) From the occupation of Shanghai to Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal. Incidents in this period are different because the bourgeoisie has withdrawn from the revolutionary front. Although the number of the revolutionary forces has decreased, the quality of the revolutionary masses has increased. The united front of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie has been greatly consolidated.]]

Party Strategy in These Periods

In the first period, or the preparatory stage for the May 30 Incident, we staged economic strikes. Then, we were isolated and thus had to use the petty bourgeoisie and allow them to join the workers in the economic struggle. This, in turn, launched the political struggle against the imperialists. This was the strategy before the May 30 Incident. The second part of the strategy for this period was to demand convocation of the National Assembly. When Sun Yat-sen went north, there were different views within the party on this question. The comrades in Canton and some Russian comrades thought it necessary for Sun Yat-sen to go north, but the Party Center opposed this. The comrades in Canton thought that Sun Yat-sen's northern trip would expand the revolutionary movement beyond Guangdong. The view of the Party Center was that if Sun Yat-sen remained in Guangdong, the achievements of the revolution might be consolidated and the counterrevolutionary forces eliminated. The difference between these views was that some people wanted to expand the revolutionary movement while others proposed its consolidation. In recalling these controversies, we feel that the strategy of the Party Center at that time was not entirely correct.

Sun Yat-sen's trip north expanded the movement for the convocation of the National Assembly. This achievement is very important because if Sun Yat-sen had remained in Canton, he would have accomplished nothing. At that time, the military in Canton were all counterrevolutionaries, and none of the work to consolidate the revolutionary forces could be carried out.

The movement for the convocation of the National Assembly has two advantages: (a) it spreads the movement across the whole country, and (b) propaganda for the abolition of the unequal treaties has been spread over the whole country. At the time, the strategic mistake of the Party Center was not that it lacked initiative, but that it did not understand the significance of Sun Yat-sen's northern trip: nor did it perceive the influence of his northern trip on the development of the revolutionary forces across the country. The Party Center only saw the danger of a meeting between Sun Yat-sen and Tang Shengzhi.¹²⁵

Initially, the party's strategy during the May 30 Movement was to attract all classes to join this movement even though, at that time, the party did not believe in the possibility of a revolution participated in by all the people. In fact, that is what happened. The GMD-left joined this movement to protect its own interests; similarly, the right in the bourgeoisie very much wanted to use this movement for its own sake, but it did not actively participate in the struggle. On the one hand, the bourgeoisie was oppressed by the imperialists while, on the other, it was threatened by the proletariat. It was sure to drop out of the movement. The petty bourgeoisie adopted a middle-of-the-road attitude. As a result, the proletariat was fighting alone with the possibility that the warlords would crush the proletariat. However, although this was not caused by the strategic mistake of the party, it was something that was bound to happen. Not only was the bourgeoisie unwilling to be led by us, but also it was unwilling to cooperate with us.

There were many unique phenomena in the May 30 Movement. The nationwide May 30 Movement affected our work in the military. At that time, the party had already paid attention to the leadership of the military and decided to start working on progressive units within the military. We should never treat the military as a counterrevolutionary entity, but should divide the military into two parts: the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary. The revolutionary part of the military should be included in the ranks of the revolution. Our enemies say that we want to use this tactic to cover up our collusion with the warlords, but we realized that, at that time, this was one way to the revolution and that this tactic was a necessary one. In the past, because of the implementation of this tactic, we gained many beneficial results. There is no mistake in this regard. We should further strengthen our work in the military.

During the May 30 Movement, the middle bourgeoisie had already begun to act independently. Dai Jitao pointed out these facts in his pamphlet. His pamphlet was not published by accident; nor did it represent his own individual views. He wrote in his pamphlet that the bourgeoisie had become a conscious class. This pamphlet must be read.

This kind of theory later crystallized. We know that the bourgeoisie did not stay for long in the revolutionary ranks. Because the strength of the imperialists is very great, the bourgeoisie is certain to compromise with the imperialists. Thus, all the counterrevolutionaries soon betrayed the revolution. At that time, we had already very resolutely opposed Dai Jitao's theory. We began this work as early as July

1925. At the Second Plenum in September [October] 1925 in Beijing, we determined that the proletariat had sufficient strength. The May 30 Movement proved this. The bourgeoisie had felt the danger of the proletariat and joined the ranks of the enemies of the proletariat. Dai Jitao's antiproletarian pamphlet reflected the panic in the ranks of the bourgeoisie. In the plenum's resolution, we pointed out that we should oppose Dai Jitao's theory and ally with the GMD-left to oppose the right [see above, **Doc. B.10**, section 7, point e]. At the same time, we should also work independently so that we will be prepared once the GMD leaves us. The resolution was drafted with this spirit in mind. When we examine this resolution now, we can see that it contains correct, as well as incorrect, elements. Developing and consolidating the GMD-left to oppose the right was correct; but planning to withdraw from the GMD was an incorrect strategy.¹²⁶ No doubt, as we had no reason to withdraw from the GMD, we should stay in the GMD to continue our work. I myself made a mistake on this issue. The attitude of the Comintern representative on this issue was also vague. Only Comrade Cai Hesen resolutely opposed withdrawal. This resolution made our strategy very ambiguous. As to the question of preparing to withdraw from the GMD, the resolution did not discuss it very clearly.¹²⁷ Such a handling of the question only confused our thoughts. What is being discussed here is the question of preparing for the sake of preparing.

On the question of whether the bourgeoisie moved to compromise, we can see it has by looking at a series of events that occurred during the May 30 Incident in Shanghai. Not only the big bourgeoisie, but also the petty bourgeoisie, has deserted the United Front.

At our party's Fourth Congress we already paid attention to the question of the peasantry. The majority of the peasantry are not landlords or average peasants, but poor peasants and landless peasants [see **Doc. B.8**]. If there is no alliance between the proletariat and the small landlords, there will be the danger that small landlords will oppose the proletariat. Even the petty bourgeoisie may ally with the small landlords. We have understood the importance of the peasant question as well as the necessity of launching the peasant movement. The facts have proved that without the peasantry, the proletariat will lose its capacity for action. Since the Fourth Party Congress passed the resolution on the peasant question, we have achieved great results not only in Canton but also in the provinces of Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi. Especially in Hubei, our comrades have paid much attention to work among the peasantry and the peasant movement. The peasant movement in Hunan has developed enormously and, under our party's leadership, has organized nearly 10 million peasants.¹²⁸ There is nothing wrong with this strategy, and we must continue to follow it. Peasants now account for 18 percent of the party membership. The majority of the Chinese population are peasants. In my view, in the future, the number of peasants in the party should equal that of workers. In the near future, peasants should account for 30 percent of party membership. Not only should we continue to implement our peasant policies, but also we should continue to recruit peasants into the party.

During the May 30 Movement, there was also the issue of the Hong Kong strike. The strike (and boycott) so damaged Hong Kong that it has not yet recovered. This strike has great significance and actively supported the GMD in terms of eliminating reactionary forces and elements. The strike lasted for over a year, which is an unusual achievement. There were two different views in the party concerning the strike. Some people proposed that the strike should end as soon as possible; others thought this was impossible, because the imperialists themselves were unwilling to end the strike. In terms of principle, the strike should have been ended as soon as possible to overcome these difficulties. Fortunately, our comrades and the GMD-left have done a great job, and international economic assistance also helped. Because of these three conditions, there was no danger. Without these three conditions very serious mistakes would have been committed should the strike have been prolonged. We would have lost the trust of the workers. Now Li Jishen has undermined the Strike Committee in Canton and Hong Kong, but this responsibility does not lie with us.¹²⁹

The second period is from the defeat of Guo Songling to the fall of Nankou; this is a reactionary period.

When Guo Songling came over to our side, the revolution seemed still to be rising. In fact, however, the imperialists had begun their intervention. At that time, the Beijing comrades wanted to organize the "capital revolution." This was a brave but mistaken wish. First, they did not have a clear or correct calculation of the domestic political situation. Second, they forgot the danger of a colonial revolution that is divorced from the armed forces. They did not cooperate with the National Army [*Guomin jun*]¹³⁰ and wanted to fight independently. Now we can see that such action is naive and, though brave, reckless. This dangerous policy was made by the comrades in the north without permission from the Party Center.

Now let us evaluate the policies during the entire period of the May 30 Movement.

[[The assassination conspiracy that resulted in the death of Liao Zhongkai was the work of reactionary feudal elements after their military defeat. The Party Center felt that the Canton government did not properly explain the circumstances surrounding the crime and the need to punish Hu Hanmin, Xu Chongzhi, and Xiong Kewu. Because no political propaganda was carried out, this incident lost its political significance. The most important incident during this reactionary period was the March 20 coup in Canton.]]

There are many reasons for the March 20 coup, but the most important one is class conflict. The fundamental objective of Dai Jitao-ism is to repress the proletariat and the alliance between the proletariat and the GMD-left. In this period, our party's strategy was not internally consistent. First, the view of our party comrades working in Guangdong and Comrade Borodin was that we should adopt an offensive strategy at that time. They said: "Attacking the GMD-right could consolidate

our alliance with the left; not only should we not tolerate the March 20 coup, but we should launch our own March 20 coup.”

At that time, however, the party’s view was that not only was there the thinking of Dai Jitao-ism, but also the armed forces of Chiang Kai-shek, while behind them was the entire bourgeoisie. We did not have sufficient forces to crush Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, the Party Center resolutely decided on the strategy of retreat and concession. This is to say that we allowed the forces of the bourgeoisie to remain inside the United Front. My view was that the forces of the CP and the GMD-left were not sufficient to crush Chiang Kai-shek, let alone when Chiang Kai-shek had not yet revealed his true reactionary character. At the time, public opinion would not allow us to crush him. Therefore, I think the Party Center’s decision was correct. However, the Chinese personnel working in Guangdong and Comrade Borodin thought that if we did not suppress the GMD-right we would not be able to consolidate our alliance with the left. This view was also correct. Yet before the March 20 coup, neither Borodin nor our Chinese comrades talked to the Party Center about whether we could crush Chiang Kai-shek and assist the left.

Comrade Borodin persisted in believing that members of the CP should withdraw from the Whampoa Military Academy and that, in the future, we should not work inside the military any more. However, previously he made no suggestions about this to the Party Center.

This is to say that he never thought of this problem beforehand and only raised it after the March 20 coup. Crushing Chiang Kai-shek would secure our alliance with the left. This was theoretically correct, but not so in practice, because our political and military forces were insufficient.

This is a very important issue because it involves not only the question of the strategy for dealing with the March 20 coup but also the entire question of the alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This comprises specific questions such as how the proletariat should withdraw from the nationalist United Front with the bourgeoisie, when we will not need the bourgeoisie’s assistance and can make revolution independently, and when we can openly attack the bourgeoisie. Now our party is faced with all these questions.

After the defeat of the First Corps of the National Army in Nankou, the Northern Expedition of the Canton troops began, and the revolutionary tide began to rise again. From the occupation of Hunan to the occupation of Shanghai, the peasant movement began to develop in some provinces. After recovering the British concessions in Hankou, the Chinese revolution not only spread all over the country but also threatened the capitalist world.

On the Question of the Northern Expedition

The February 1926 CC meeting in Beijing decided on the issue of the Northern Expedition. However, the Northern Expedition forces did not march north until

May. While the Beijing meeting was in session, Wu Peifu had already prepared an attack on Canton.

A Comintern representative came to Shanghai and gave us an analytical report on the political situation in China. At that time, I did not know of the Beijing CC meeting's decisions, but I advocated support of the Northern Expedition because if the Northwest Army suffered a defeat in Nankou the Canton government could hardly continue to exist. The Comintern representative did not agree with me. He said that it was a risky action because the Canton government did not have a powerful army or excellent equipment.¹³¹

At that time, I cabled Beijing, saying: first, we must solve the problem of the Northern Expedition and, second, the Party Center should remain in Beijing.

The Comintern representative went to Canton to investigate the situation there and thus chanced upon the March 20 coup. I cabled Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek that the Northern Expedition must begin. They agreed with me. After comprehending the situation in Canton, the Comintern representative also thought we must support the Northern Expedition. If the troops did not march north, there would be internal conflicts. To obey Moscow's decision, however, he had to oppose the Northern Expedition.

The Comintern representative also feared that Chiang Kai-shek would exploit and suppress people more severely during the Northern Expedition. If Chiang Kai-shek used the Northern Expedition to suppress and exploit the people, then the first to suffer this scourge would be the people in Guangdong and Guangxi. Therefore, the party's strategy on the Northern Expedition was as follows:

- a) support the Northern Expedition;
- b) the Northern Expedition should be defensive in nature;
- c) the party's strategy is to oppose anybody who attempts to use the Northern Expedition to exploit the people.

Now let us analyze our strategy and mistakes in this period.

a) Although in principle we supported the Northern Expedition, in reality we never used concrete actions resolutely to support it.

b) We treated the Northern Expedition as a defensive measure, which is to say, as a measure to defend Guangdong. Our attitude to the Northern Expedition was negative, so our achievements were small. In the future, we must implement whatever decisions are made in principle; otherwise, there will forever be contradictions between decision and practice.

I add the following to the report:

First, in the reactionary period I am talking about now, the pivotal incident was the March 20 coup, which was the period between the GMD's Second National Congress and the GMD's resolution of 15 May [1926].

Second, I want to talk about our party's anti-imperialist strategies. In the struggle against foreign imperialists, we mainly emphasize struggle against England. The most powerful imperialist countries [present] in China are England, the United States, France, and Japan. Of these, England and Japan possess the greatest strength.

However, there is a great deal of conflict between these two countries. In China, Japan is almost overwhelmed economically by England; but, on the other hand, Japanese troops can be dispatched to China very quickly, so our anti-Japanese struggle is characterized by moderation.

2. On the Role of the Bourgeoisie

[[The roles of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are identical in each country. The bourgeoisie betrays the revolution at all times and in all places in the process of the struggle. After 20 March we saw that the bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution. When Chiang Kai-shek staged the reactionary military coup in Shanghai, all the bourgeoisie was overjoyed. We cannot say for certain whether the entire bourgeoisie has deserted the revolution, but one thing is certain: since 12 April most of the bourgeoisie has betrayed the revolution.]]

3. Attitude to the Petty Bourgeoisie

[[Although the petty bourgeoisie will probably participate in the democratic dictatorship, they remain wavering elements who sometimes accept the leadership of the bourgeoisie and sometimes that of the proletariat. We always have the need to establish an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, so we must make some concessions to them and let them accept our leadership.]]

4. The Question of Land

[[Since the second half of last year, the peasant movement has moved on from issues of organization and rent-reduction to the land question.]]

The Question of Strategy in the Peasant Movement

Because the land question has been raised, class conflict in the countryside has become more profound. In a fundamental sense, this has smashed the designs of the landlords. The land issue was raised by the peasant movement as early as last year in the peaceful form of reducing rent and interest. The struggle last year was aimed at big landlords, using the slogan "down with the evil gentry." At that time, the struggle was only against big landlords.

The struggle in Hunan has made great strides forward; at that time the movement was launched to distribute land equally. There the peasants oppose not only big landlords but also those who rent out land and even rich peasants. This movement originated spontaneously. In the past, our party restricted the peasant movement. Now, we must confiscate the land of big and medium landlords. However, we must not confiscate at will the land of small landlords. In the national revolu-

tion we need the petty bourgeoisie. Small landlords are part of the petty bourgeoisie, and thus we must make concessions to them.

According to our political program, we should confiscate the land of every landlord, but now we need to establish an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie. So even though I feel that we have been too rightist on this issue in the past, it is still too radical now to confiscate the land of all landlords. For a long period of time, or perhaps for a short period of time, we must maintain a middle road. Certainly, for the next month or so, we must maintain our alliance with the petty bourgeoisie. Class struggle in the countryside is developing, but has not reached its extreme stage, and [we] should not start exploiting small landlords—not yet. Are we to attack big and middle landlords or expand the peasant movement and increase military actions? The question now is: Are we to intensify the peasant revolution right now, or wait to deepen the peasant revolution through the continual progress of the Northern Expedition and the expansion of the peasant movement? I believe that the second course of action is more reliable because the old warlords still exist and there are so-called new warlords, like Chiang Kai-shek. The basis can only be secured after further expansion [of the peasant revolution].

5. The Proletariat's Right of Leadership

[[We should not be pessimistic about the proletariat, as it has exerted great influence over the revolutionary movement. It is wrong to say that the proletariat has not gained the right of leadership. Rather, the proletariat has not yet gained political power.]]

First, the proletariat does not have armed forces with which to seize political power. Second, there is a question as to whether the proletariat possesses enough strength to lead the petty bourgeoisie. If it does not possess such strength, then it will have to act together with the petty bourgeoisie.

Up to now only the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the peasantry do not have armed forces. The counterrevolutionary acts of Chiang Kai-shek began with betrayal by the bourgeoisie, which is proof that the bourgeoisie has divorced itself from the revolution. Ninety-nine percent of the bourgeoisie has deserted the revolution. Thus, the proletariat must resolutely win over the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry in order to continue the revolution.

Here I want to talk about Shanghai. The Shanghai incident is about the relationship with the petty bourgeoisie. The Shanghai proletariat and its political party have done a great deal of work, but still must increase their efforts to attract the petty bourgeoisie to the proletarian enterprise. The proletariat has fought vigorous struggles, a fact acknowledged by both our enemies and us. However, who is the stronger in these struggles, the petty bourgeoisie or the big bourgeoisie? In numerical terms, they may be considered equals but the petty bourgeoisie constantly wavers while the big bourgeoisie is very resolute. Why don't the Shanghai proletariat act together with the petty bourgeoisie and also recruit some big bourgeois ele-

ments? This is a question directly related to the GMD. In my opinion, Shanghai is the greatest proletarian center, but also it is simultaneously the largest center of the bourgeoisie and imperialists. Do the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in Shanghai have enough strength to act independently? Or do they have to absorb some bourgeois elements?

The right wing of the bourgeoisie and the General Chamber of Commerce did not participate in the May 30 Movement, but the leftists in the General Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Street Merchants' Associations [*Malu shangjie lianhehui*] did. Borodin's opinion is: Shanghai cannot become a revolutionary base; we must establish bases elsewhere and from there strike at the imperialists; in Shanghai, if we are not to conflict with the imperialists, we must compromise with them. In his view, Shanghai can only engage in struggles for improvement in the material conditions of the working class and for the right of association and assembly. He thinks that it is wrong to wage a struggle to seize power in Shanghai because the ruler of Shanghai is not Sun Chuanfang or Li Baozhang, but the imperialists. Borodin's conception of destiny is a mechanical one. However, we should not sneeze at this point, because the view of the ECCI seems to be the same as Borodin's. Previously, I did not think that this view was incorrect, so I did not raise it as an issue for discussion. The Shanghai incident is not only a question of the past, but also of the present and the future. Although now I do not think Borodin's view is entirely wrong, I think we should discuss this question seriously. The Shanghai bourgeoisie has deserted the revolution; Chiang Kai-shek, the bankers, and the industrial bourgeoisie have all divorced themselves from the revolution. There are three points here that need discussion: first, whether the liberal bourgeoisie has not yet completely left the revolution; second, whether the defeat in Shanghai was caused by the participation of the bourgeoisie; third, the view of Borodin, or his northwest theory.

6. Military Force and the Force of Revolutionary Society

This is a very complex problem. I cannot give a detailed summary in this report. At present, the military forces are not from the revolutionary masses, but from the rank and file of the old warlords. At present, we do not have a military force of the masses. We are talking about the old military forces. The source of soldiers is first the honest peasant (there are many peasants in the National Army) and then the urban unemployed. Soldiers come from different classes, and thus their fighting ability differs. Most of the generals are from the landlord class, so they must undergo very effective reforms. If we want to revolutionize the military, we must reduce the number of vagrant proletariat and landlords in the military. If our troops waver, this is not because our political work in the military is not done well, but because of the complex class relations. The military is incapable of fighting for the interests of the workers and peasants. It is liable to accept patriotic theories of a bourgeois nature. The vacillation of the military is a reflection of its social composi-

tion. Therefore, from now on, we need to increase greatly our efforts to use proletarian elements in supplementing our work in the military.

7. The Base of Revolution and the Northwest Theory

This theoretical approach is Borodin's. He believes that the southeast is an imperialists' fortress. He uses the Taiping movement as an example to validate his theory.

He says that the Taiping movement failed because it wanted to occupy Shanghai. The Chinese revolution should develop in the northwest, first, because the imperialists' influence there is relatively weak and, second, because a closer relationship can be established there with Soviet Russia. Now, we should discuss this issue. Yesterday a representative¹³² of the ECCI said: we insist on neither the northwest nor the southeast approach; where the GMD regime exists, there we will stay and strengthen our work. This is wrong. The result is that we have no guiding principle on this question. The result is that we have almost become the GMD's tail. The representative thinks that the revolution is the GMD's revolution, and not ours. The Chinese revolution is now our revolution. At least we should work jointly with the GMD. This view [of the representative] is incorrect.

8. The Question of the GMD

Several points should be raised on this question in my report. We must answer the question of what the GMD is. If we do not understand what the GMD is, we cannot explain the many mistakes we have made. At the beginning when we joined the GMD, many comrades said: the GMD is a bourgeois party; if the proletariat joins the GMD, it will betray the working class. Now these comrades are saying: the GMD is a party of the petty bourgeoisie. In fact, the GMD is a multiclass party; it has workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie as well as landlords and warlords. The petty bourgeoisie, particularly intellectuals, comprises the majority of the GMD. Most of its theories are those of the bourgeoisie. Many GMD members interpret Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles in line with the theories of the bourgeoisie. In fact, what they see is only part, not the whole, of the problem. In fact, they do not understand the Chinese revolution. The GMD is a revolutionary alliance of all classes. If the GMD were a party of the pure bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, we would not have joined. In Dai Jitao's view, we should have cooperated with the GMD from outside.

Because the GMD is not a party of the bourgeoisie, or a party of the petty bourgeoisie, but a revolutionary alliance of all classes, we should join the GMD as a member of this alliance. It was precisely on the basis of this theory that we joined the GMD. Now we should ask the questions of what the GMD is and whether it is a revolutionary alliance of all classes. We answer positively: the GMD is a revolutionary alliance of the proletariat, peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie, even though

it has a small number of bourgeois elements. If the part that is composed of the bourgeoisie is counterrevolutionary, we should expel it from the party. Since the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie have united in an alliance of revolutionary classes, how can this alliance exist if the proletariat refuses to join the GMD? Previously, we thought that the GMD was a party of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, but now we think it is a joint party of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie. If the bourgeoisie headed by Chiang Kai-shek remains in the ranks of the GMD, this alliance cannot be a secure one. Whether this alliance will be solid in the future depends on the following conditions: (a) whether the GMD is willing to let the bourgeoisie remain among its ranks; (b) whether the GMD will gain the support of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie can become allies of the GMD; the bourgeoisie cannot; (c) the GMD cannot become a secure party if no peasants join it and it is composed only of the petty bourgeoisie. This is because under the flag of the Nationalist government and the GMD Party Center, there is only a small group of businessmen, while the majority of workers and peasants are under our control. Such a union cannot be consolidated.

9. The Question of Reforming the Military

[[We must change the social composition of the military to revolutionize it. More workers and peasants must join and officers should not be selected from the officer class.]]

10. Establish a Revolutionary Democratic Regime

[[A revolutionary democratic regime must be set up in areas occupied by the national government. If imperialist and warlord interference declines, we should set up such a regime in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. Within the territories governed by warlords, we must first start the revolution and then consider setting up a revolutionary democratic regime. Only after Wang Jingwei's return to this country did the government begin to become an alliance between the proletariat and the GMD-left. It would be a mistake to consider this government a democratic dictatorship of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie. It merely tends in that direction.]]

11. Financial and Economic Policies

[[We need a new financial and economic policy to replace the feudal warlord system. Without this, we will not be able to seize and hold political power. If we cannot correctly solve the problem of economic policy, we will lose every revolutionary center.]]

Report on the Inner-Party Situation

Since the Fourth Party Congress, our party has expanded together with the revolutionary movement, and party work has made progress. The number of party members has also increased. Before the Fourth Party Congress, there were only 494

party members; now the number has risen to 57,967. According to March statistics, the social composition of party membership is as follows: workers, 53.8 percent; peasants, 18.7; intellectuals, 19.1; military personnel, 3.1; middle and small merchants, 0.5; and other social categories, 4.2 percent. Women account for 20 percent of the party. The number of party members in each area is as follows: Hunan, 13,000; Hubei, 13,000; Jiangsu (including Shanghai), 13,000; Guangdong, 9,027; the northern district, 3,109; Jiangxi, 3,000; Shangan, 388; Shandong, 1,925; Fujian, 168; Manchuria (including Shenyang), 380; Northern Manchuria, 137; Anhui, 233; Sichuan, 200; the total of the above comes to 57,967 [57,567]. In various districts, there are eight area committees [*quwei*] directly under the leadership of the Party Center: (a) the Hunan area committee, including Hengyang; (b) the Hubei area committee, including Xiangyang; (c) the Jiang[su]-Zhe[jiang] area committee, including the areas along the railway in Anhui Province; (d) the Guangdong area committee, including Guangxi, Yunnan, Fujian, and Nanyang [the South China Sea]; (e) the Northern area committee, which includes the following provinces: Jilin, Shanxi, Chahar, Jehol, and Suiyuan; (f) the Jiangxi area committee; (g) the Henan area committee; (h) the Shangan area committee. There are six district committees [*diwei*]: (a) Shandong, (b) Fujian, (c) South Manchuria, (d) North Manchuria, (e) Anhui, and (f) Sichuan. There are four couriers who are stationed in Moscow, Vladivostok, Paris, and Japan. There are an estimated 2.8 million labor union members in the mass organizations led by the party. At the time of the Fourth Party Congress, only a minority of railway workers and miners in Tangshan and Shanghai were under our leadership. Now we have 9.72 million members in peasant associations. At the time of the Fourth Party Congress, only 200,000 organized peasants in Guangdong were under our leadership. There are nearly 420 student unions. At the time of the Fourth Party Congress, the number of student unions led by the CYL was only sixty. Now we have 35,000 CYL members; at the time of the Fourth Party Congress, the number was only 2,365.

Now let me talk about the political situation of individual areas. (a) The areas under the rule of the GMD-left are: Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Shanxi (in the north-west), and Gansu. In these areas, the workers' and peasant movement can develop freely. (b) The areas under the rule of the GMD-right are: Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, and Sichuan. In these provinces, the mass movement has been extinguished, and fascism reigns. (c) The areas controlled by the Fengtian clique are the north, Henan, and Shandong, as well as north and south Manchuria. In these areas, the mass movement has met with repression. Our work is still continuing, and nine CC members are not enough. What makes the work of the Party Center even more difficult is that the nine CC members are often unable to work together. Only two or three CC members work together in the Party Center, and sometimes there is only one. Thus the phenomenon of one-person rule has occurred at the Party Center. The best work the Party Center has done is in propaganda; the worst is in organization. Representatives to the Fourth Party Congress criticized the work of the Organization Department. After the Fourth Party Congress, I took charge of the

Organization Department. Later, the Organization Department ceased to exist in reality, because neither I nor anybody else worked inside the Organization Department. Not too long ago the Party Center appointed Zhou Enlai to take over the Organization Department, but then the Shanghai incident happened, so Comrade Zhou took over military responsibility. As a result, organization work stopped again. Comrade Li Lisan can be counted as one of the members of the workers' committee, but in fact he did not participate in any work. Mao Zedong and other members of the peasant committee divided up their own areas but, at first, they did no work. However, now they are all concentrated in Wuhan and have begun to work. They have discussed the land program. Propaganda work is done relatively well, but in practice, they have mainly worked on publications. The CC newspaper is published on time, and over ten books have been published. The military committee only did technical work. The women's committee only increased the number of announcements, which is not bad. The workers' committee and the peasant committee did not even issue a single announcement. In general, the Party Center is not very complete. At present, our party does not have a perfect organization, but rather is composed of individual communist groups. Local organizations are better than the Party Center. If this situation does not change, we will have only provincial parties. At this Party Congress we must appoint many more comrades to work in the Party Center; otherwise, we will face dangers. In terms of organizational work, it is most important to make the Party Center strong and effective. If the situation continues like this, which is to say that the leading organ of the party cannot become a stronger and more effective institution, the situation in lower-level organizations will be very bad.

If we only rely on district and area committees to lead all work, our party's situation will resemble that of the Korean party. Now, the role played by the branches is not great. In factories and schools, the branch is not the center of our work; it only calls meetings and organizes reports. Therefore, the branch is an organization that only relays views and commands of superior agencies, but is not a working institution. At this Party Congress, we must decide to strengthen the Party Center and turn the branch into a real working organization. In our party's work, we must raise these two issues. Work by the Propaganda Department over the past two years cannot be called propaganda work. In reality, it only carried out publishing work. Thus, our party's newspaper, the *Guide Weekly*, is published on time no matter what, and its number [published] is gradually increasing. At the time of the Fourth Party Congress, the number published was only 7,000. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition, it increased to 50,000.

[[*New Youth* was published five times, and sixteen books have been translated.]]

As can be seen, the main work of the Propaganda Department has been publishing, not propaganda and agitation. The Propaganda Department does not have a work plan; nor does it give notices to local committees; nor does it report to the Party Center about its work. Very few propaganda materials have been published, but there are many materials for agitation. For example, in Jiangsu, Hunan,

Guangdong, and Zhejiang Provinces, we have published many pamphlets; the number has increased from 90,000 to 400,000. However, these printed materials were not well distributed. For example, we have 100,000 copies of appeals, but people read fewer than 50,000 copies. Numerically speaking, there are many materials for agitation, but they are not well utilized. Sometimes in Shanghai books are piled up without anybody reading them. The distribution of materials and printed matter is very bad, with the result that propaganda and agitation work has not been fulfilled properly. Internal education in the party has fallen behind the development of the party. From now on, the Propaganda Department should do the following: (a) strengthen the central Propaganda Department and make it more effective; (b) establish close relations between local propaganda committees and the central Propaganda Department; (c) expand our translation work; (d) improve the distribution of books and materials; (e) [resolve] the question of the party school. Now our party needs to establish a party school. There are two views on this issue: first, the Party Center wants to establish a party school and, second, all localities also want to establish party schools. If the Party Center founds a party school, its lecturers will be better; if all localities establish party schools, that will be more convenient. In my opinion, the first view is better. The Party Center has a plan to found a party school with two departments and 500 people. In general, this work now is very important. If we can defend Wuhan resolutely and remain there, we will establish our party school there. We must publish a party daily newspaper. After the Party Congress, we will start publishing this type of newspaper.

Now let me talk about the labor movement in China. Although the Party Center's workers' committee is not strong, several localities have paid a great deal of attention to this kind of work. The best achievement is the general strike in Hong Kong. Further, we also gained great results in Shanghai, Hubei, and Hunan, especially in Hunan. The shortcoming is that the Party Center's workers' committee lacks a unified leadership, so that the national labor movement has no unified plan. After the Party Congress, we should correct our mistakes. No matter whether it is in the Center's workers' committee or the party and league groups in labor unions, they should all have unified leadership. At the First National Labor Congress, we had 290,000 organized workers. At the Second National Labor Congress, we had 540,000. When the Third Congress convened on May Day last year, we had 1.25 million organized workers. The current number of organized workers in various areas is given below: Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 1.3 million; Hubei, 400,000; Hunan, 393,791; Canton, 520,000; north, 10,000; Shandong, 5,000; Jiangxi, 130,000; sailors, 80,000. Altogether there are 2,838,791 workers.

This year the number of organized workers has increased 100 percent over last year. The labor movement has also been growing gradually and becoming stronger. This is the result of strengthening this work by our party's organizations everywhere. Now we need a unified policy and work plan for the labor unions. This is the first priority of our Party Congress. Our comrades worked in the labor movement long before our party was founded. Our own labor movement has a history of five years.

The Peasant Movement

Our comrades were already working among the peasantry a long time ago. For example, Comrade Peng Pai worked among the peasant masses in Guangdong many years ago. The party's work directed at the peasantry has been going on for two years. According to available statistics, the number of organized peasants is as follows: Hunan, 5,204,112; Hubei, 1,714,000; Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 230,000; Guangdong, 1.2 million; north, 20,000; Jiangxi, 300,000; Henan, 1 million; Shangan, 116,000; Anhui, 8,300; Sichuan, 37,000. This totals 9,829,412. The number of organized peasants is larger than that of organized workers. From now on, we should expand the peasant movement and increase the number of members in peasant associations.

The Youth Movement

At the time of the Fourth Party Congress, there were more members of the Youth League than party members; but now there are more party than League members. There are fewer organized young people than organized people in the older generation because, first, the Center of the CYL is not very strong and, second, we have removed many personnel from the CYL to do party work. This reduced the number of cadres in the League. At present, not all the people in the league are young. Even some of the Young Pioneers are over the age limit. Thus, the youth league should work among the young. The Youth League must become younger, as must the Young Pioneers. If all League members are young, it will be impossible for the party to snatch away personnel from them. However, in the past the party paid little attention to the League. The party is to blame for this. Both the party and the League are afraid that the other will steal the other's personnel.

B.26 Resolution on the Land Question (May 1927)¹³³

1. The Significance of the Land Question

a) Economic life in the Chinese countryside is based primarily on feudal relationships. Most of the land (about 66 percent) is owned by large rentier landlords. Tenants and semitenants farm the land, but do not enjoy landownership. The form of rent is not definitive; even tenancy rights cannot be enjoyed forever. The rent accounts for almost 50 percent of the peasants' total income. Moreover, peasants also have to pay all kinds of taxes and levies to the landlord class and warlord rulers who control political power.

Only 34 percent of the land in China belongs to the peasantry. Large-scale capitalist agriculture is virtually nonexistent except in some northern provinces such as Shandong and Manchuria. However, the arable land owned by monasteries and temples is quite considerable. The system of public land disappeared a long time ago, but the system of management of public land still remains in the countryside as the basis for the traditional clan-based political power. Ownership rights of such land have already been usurped by the gentry: the tiller has lost the rights of ownership, while the gentry-turned-landlords use such rights to exercise the traditional authority and rule of a clan-based society.

Warlord rule is also built on such land relations, since the power of the landlord class really enables the feudal political system to maintain the crucial characteristics of its economic and political organizations as well as its administrative system.

b) At the same time, capitalist exploitation in its early stage has already penetrated the rural economy. Therefore, the Chinese peasantry suffers two kinds of exploitation simultaneously: one is precapitalist (feudal) exploitation; the other is capitalist exploitation. As a result, the Chinese peasants are increasingly impoverished, and the national economic system is particularly backward.

Rent extracted by the landlord class is particularly high, so high that the tillers do not have a surplus after the harvest. What they get is not enough to meet their daily needs. This is exploitation by capitalism in its early stage. With such exploitation, the peasantry cannot improve its production methods, with the result that Chinese agriculture has remained in its primitive state. In fact, it is equivalent to the slave system. The peasants produced only for consumption, with the rest going into the landlord's pocket.

Capitalist exploitation is built on this feudal relationship. The rents collected by the landlords mostly consist of grains (also a legacy of the feudal system); most of the surplus of agricultural products ends up in the hands of the landlords. The landlords thus become commercial capitalists, although the primitive nature of feudalism hampers the tendency toward full-fledged capitalism. The assets accumulated through the primitive methods of exploitation fail to be converted into productive capital, and instead are mainly used to buy land and for speculative activities such as usury.

Economic backwardness obstructs the construction of new transportation mechanisms. Economic fragmentation exists throughout the entire country; it divides the country into many isolated markets, which are controlled by the landlords who plunder surplus agricultural goods. In this situation, the landlord class can use coercion to raise prices. Not only the peasantry, but also the urban petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat are victims of plunder. The proletariat, earning the lowest wages, has to pay the highest price for food; even small merchants have become victims of the monopoly and speculation of the landlord class.

The usury system developed quickly under such complex and primitive forms of exploitation. This is the only trading system and the only capitalist method of accumulation. However, the capital of the usurers cannot promote commerce or

industry, but is consistently used for land speculation. This cruel collection of land rent and other forms of feudal oppression, capitalist exploitation through high interest rates, and the extraction by the warlord administrations have trapped the peasantry in a situation of perpetual starvation.

Warlords control supreme power in most provinces. Their ruling organs exploit ordinary peasants via a variety of forms. The most effective are as follows:

- i) Formal taxes and cruel taxes (collection of money and grain ahead of time).
- ii) Military supplies (rice, food, shoes, boots, horses, etc.).
- iii) Cruel requisition during wartime.
- iv) Corvée labor (to transport military supplies).
- v) Irresponsible printing of worthless paper currency (military coupons).
- vi) Collection of levies.

c) Imperialist rule obstructs the development of the Chinese economy. Consequently, Chinese manufacturing industries are particularly backward, which in turn results in excess population in the countryside. Moreover, the phenomenon of excess rural population is sufficient to prolong the survival of the system of exploitation by feudal warlords. It is clear that imperialist aggression is closely connected with the problem of the peasantry in China.

The imperialists pursue colonial expansion to look for cheap raw materials for the industries in their countries, and to find markets for their goods. Labor is the most valuable material. Colonial and semicolonial countries are full of armies of reserve labor who certainly form the basis for manufacturing industries in the imperialist countries. As a result, imperialist rule has caused the industries in colonial countries to become backward. Thus, the colonial countries remain in a permanent state of primitive agricultural production. Therefore, modern industrial development is thwarted and rural labor cannot move into the cities. Such a regressive phenomenon has caused an excessive surplus of rural residents and perpetuated feudal economic life. If this were not the case, the development of modern industry would have smashed them [feudal lords] a long time ago.

The excessive surplus of rural population caused by the imperialists prolongs the feudal system and its exploitation. The continuous increase in bankrupt peasants swells the ranks of the troops, forcing laborers' wages down to the minimum. The foundation of imperialism is thus much strengthened. The combination of these factors causes extreme poverty and desolation among the peasantry. Unemployed peasants, a labor force that cannot find an outlet for its productive capacity, become bandits and mercenary soldiers. The Chinese warlords are indeed a unique social phenomenon. Their origins lie in the incompleteness and fragmentation of the national economy. Warlords are a violent manifestation of feudal forces and tools of the imperialists. These warlords will ally with compradores, landlords, the gentry, and usurers to form a huge machine to forge the reactionary feudal exploitation and primitive capitalist exploitation into steel that is used to squeeze the peasantry. This machine sucks out the blood and sweat of the peasantry. On this basis, the imperialists can perfect their capitalist plunder.

Economic bankruptcy forces the peasantry into the iron grip of the usurers; the rising interest rates forever trap the peasantry in debt and finally compel them to sell or pawn their land. Gradually, land is concentrated in the hands of the usurers. Moreover, the imperialists, compradores, and local tyrants seize this advantage to monopolize raw materials. For example, they make loans to the peasantry and force them to pay with raw materials at a very cheap price. This is also a form of very cruel exploitation. At the same time, the imperialists, like the Christian Church and agricultural companies, purchase land directly at very cheap prices. Moreover, this form of exploitation is a manifestation of the imperialists' colonial policy.

d) The Chinese warlords suck out the nation's lifeblood. Foreign imperialists obstruct the development of Chinese politics and the economy. Both have their base in the feudal organizations in the countryside. Therefore, for the Chinese people to overthrow the warlords and imperialists, the fundamental condition is to get rid of the remnant feudal forces and traditional political regimes in the countryside. The only principle of the national revolution is to change the system of landownership drastically. Otherwise, the war of freedom fought for the genuine rights of the people will stagnate. In order to eliminate the organizations of the warlords and imperialists at the top, one must first destroy their foundations.

e) The Chinese peasantry accounts for the absolute majority of China's population. Without its spontaneous and conscious participation, the national revolution will not succeed. The energies of the peasantry will certainly contribute to the national revolution—if the extractive mechanisms oppressing the peasantry can be thoroughly removed. The peasant revolution—with the destruction of the feudal system—is inseparable from a revolution that establishes a system of democracy. In the conventional development of society, the bourgeoisie can help the peasantry to smash the chains of feudalism. However, such conventional social evolution has been disrupted by imperialist aggression in China. The Chinese bourgeoisie has not yet become an antifeudal element. Since the bourgeoisie emerged from the landlord class, it still maintains close connections with the landlord class and even becomes the imperialists' tool for dominating the Chinese people (such as compradores). Under these two circumstances, the Chinese bourgeoisie has intimate ties with the forces that exploit the peasantry. Therefore, it is incapable of becoming a fighter in the peasant revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie is hostile to the peasant revolution. It is not only incapable of fighting for democracy, but has become the enemy of democracy and freedom (the splintering of Chiang Kai-shek from the revolution is one example).

Peasants will be supported by the proletariat (they will also have the petty bourgeoisie as their assistants) in participating in this historic war to destroy the feudal forces and their followers.

The Chinese national bourgeoisie objectively opposes the imperialists' attempts to attain economic monopoly in China. The imperialists' monopoly is the primary

cause maintaining feudal relations in the countryside. However, the national bourgeoisie maintains a close relationship with the feudal forces. Even though it benefits the class, it is incapable of fulfilling the land revolution in order to promote the struggle against imperialism.

f) The ways in which an economy is affected by feudal forms of exploitation during the early stage of capitalism include rising food prices and stagnation in commerce. These two effects are felt both by the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, these two classes oppose exploitation of the peasantry. Drastic reform in the countryside returns the land to the tiller; not only peasants benefit; all the people benefit. The rise in the standard of living for the masses of peasants will boost the development of commerce enormously. If the tillers can enjoy the surplus of their products, the iron grip of the creditors will be weakened. Peasants can use the capital accumulated from [the sale of] agricultural products to improve farming methods and tools. Consequently, the nation's total agricultural output will certainly result in a free market and lower retail prices. Finally, thanks to the abolition of the system of feudal rent, state taxes can open up new sources.

g) Only by returning land to the tiller unconditionally can the abolition of feudal exploitation be accomplished. The gentry's right to manage the land of the so-called public temples and churches must be annulled in order to destroy the political power of rural traditional society. To guarantee the implementation of the drastic rural reforms, peasants must control political power in the villages; the armed forces in the countryside must be transferred back to the peasantry from the control of the gentry. After the unemployed peasants obtain land or engage in productive work, the disease of warlords will no longer exist in China. The phenomenon of usury will also be eliminated because of the destruction of its economic foundation. The establishment of the state agricultural bank and credit unions will certainly deprive usurers of any effectiveness. This kind of struggle to overthrow exploitation through high interest rates is also an important revolutionary enterprise in the countryside. All these efforts are mutually related and cannot be separated. Only by engaging in these efforts to liberate the masses of peasants from the exploitation of feudal tradition can the success of the revolution be guaranteed.

The CCP's Fifth Congress believes that the land problem can only be solved through a thorough redistribution of land under the principle of equal rights of land usage. In order to attain this goal, land must be nationalized. The CCP will lead the peasantry in struggles for equal land rights and work hard toward the nationalization of land and abolition of the system of private ownership of land. On the land question, nationalization is the fundamental principle of the CCP's political program.

2. The Tendencies in the Chinese Peasant Movement

a) According to the experiences in Guangdong, Hunan, and Jiangxi, the backbone of the Chinese peasant movement is primarily poor peasants (tenants, semi-

tenants, hired hands, and self-tilling peasants owning a little land). This social basis of the peasant movement clearly indicates that the future of the peasant movement will certainly be a land revolution. At present, the most pressing tendency of the movement is to abolish the political power of traditional feudalism and replace it with the political power of the peasantry. Naturally, the question of an armed peasant force in this struggle is a very important one. In line with this general tendency, several areas have already progressed to the point of beginning to solve the land problem.

b) There are now many differences in the stage of development of the peasant movement in various provinces. In the northern provinces, under the warlords' ruthless oppression and exploitation, peasant associations are still being organized secretly, and have not expanded greatly. In Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Fujian, the peasant movement is still in the embryonic stage; the struggles to reduce rent, resist taxes, oppose exploitation through usurious interests, and fight local tyrants and the gentry have begun. However, it has encountered Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary oppression. The peasant movement in Guangdong was the first to develop. However, although objectively the peasants have progressed long ago from the slogan of rent-reduction to demands for political power and an armed force, or even land, our party did not have a definitive and consistent policy to lead the Guangdong peasants during their two years of fierce struggle. The reaction by Li Jishen has now placed the Guangdong peasantry under enormous oppression; the counterattack by local tyrants and the evil gentry has become more vicious. Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei are under the revolutionary national government. Although the peasants in Jiangxi have already begun the initial struggles for rent reduction, generally speaking, they are still in the stage of organization and concentration of power. This is because Jiangxi was under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek's forces for a long time and experienced two struggles of power transition between leftist and rightist regimes. At the moment, the stage of the development of the peasant movement can be said to be at its highest in Hunan and Hubei, particularly in Hunan. In Hunan, not only have the peasants virtually overthrown the political control of local tyrants and the gentry, but they have also shaken their power. Moreover, they are going to establish their own political power; in some places, peasants have even joined the county government. In addition, the struggle by the Hunan and Hubei peasants has begun to solve the land problem—by confiscating the land of local tyrants and the evil gentry, as well as through the movement for land redistribution.

c) The peasant movement in China is mostly under the guidance of the proletariat; without the leadership of the proletariat, it cannot develop in the correct revolutionary direction. However, the Red Spear Society, Hard Belly Society, and others are also another form of the peasant movement. These are medieval organizations and forms of struggle. In places where class lines are not distinct enough, as in Henan, they often have landlords and local tyrants as their leaders; some are even used by the counterrevolutionaries. However, when they resist warlords, resist lev-

ies and taxes, and oppose county governors in the interest of the small peasantry, these [societies] are truly revolutionary.

d) When the peasant movement is developing, naturally the reactionary political power of traditional feudalism (the so-called local tyrants, the evil gentry, and corrupt officials) does all it can to oppress it. They connive with warlords and use their own armed forces (like the local police and militia) and bandits to attack and slaughter the peasants in an attempt to repress the peasant movement. However, under the revolutionary regime of the national government, the peasant movement can gain considerable freedom. Therefore, when, under certain conditions, the peasant movement develops quickly and becomes a major force, the forces of the local tyrants and the gentry are weakened enormously. As a result, they put up passive resistance and conspired to undermine the movement, such as transporting rice out of the local areas, refusing to make loans, or pretending to be peasants and organizing false peasant associations. Under the reactionary forces of the Chiang Kai-shek clique, only this kind of so-called peasant association organized by the local tyrants and gentry can exist. Even under the national government, local tyrants and the gentry ally with the feudal elements among the military and conspire to counterattack the peasants. Therefore, at present, the struggle in the country is indeed very fierce.

e) Initially, the peasant struggle generally consists of rent-reduction, tax strikes, reduction of interest, and other forms of struggle against the gentry's oppression. However, the subsequent development of the peasant movement often immediately progresses to the point of overthrowing the political power of the local tyrants and gentry and seizing armed forces, and even to the point of armed conflict. During wartime, from the very beginning, the peasant struggle becomes a political force for the overthrow of the local tyrants and gentry. This is because the peasantry must have its own armed forces and political power in order to gain land and enforce rent-reduction. Therefore, the peasantry's struggle must pass through a period of fierce attack on traditional feudal forces. In the course of such violent revolutionary struggles, the poor peasants are always the backbone. In fact, the peasants' revolutionary regime must have poor peasants as leaders. This kind of movement to overthrow feudal political power and establish the peasants' own political power, objectively speaking, begins with solution of the land problem as its goal. The Chinese peasants, particularly poor peasants, feel deeply the scarcity of land and exploitation in the form of rent and levies. Their goal in carrying out revolutionary struggles is to control political power themselves and to take back the larger share of their income expropriated by the landlords—from reducing rent to giving the land to the tiller and equal landownership.

f) During the current stage of the revolution, the peasant movement—the class struggle by the rural peasants against the local tyrants and gentry—experiences great disparity in terms of its development nationwide. However, the general tendency now is that it is the period for the destruction of traditional feudal political power and the beginning of the solution to the land problem. This is the principal

characteristic of the new stage of the Chinese Revolution. Now, the expansion of class struggle in the countryside and the deepening of the peasant revolution will not only completely exterminate the tools of imperialist rule, but also severely undermine the economic basis of the reactionary feudal elements and the big bourgeoisie, thus depriving the imperialists of the basis on which to organize a counter-revolutionary movement. This is to say that the current tendency of the revolutionary movement is to overthrow the political power of the local tyrants and gentry, confiscate the land of the big landlords and counterrevolutionaries, use the poor peasants as the backbone to establish the political power of the peasantry, improve the economic status of the peasantry, and redistribute the land.

3. The Peasant Program in the National Revolution

Following the above analysis, the objective conditions for the peasant movement and its subjective strength can be discerned. The CCP's Fifth Congress resolves that during the current stage of the revolution, the following strategies are needed [to solve] the peasant question:

a) Confiscate all so-called public land, buildings, schools, temples, foreign churches, and the land of agricultural corporations; give the land to the peasants; management of the confiscated land should be turned over to the land commission [*tudi weiyuanhui*]. The land commission determines the form of management of such land—whether to establish state ownership or redistribute it to the peasants.

b) (i) Confiscate, with no compensation, the land rented to peasants by the landlord; authorize the land commission to give the land to the peasants who farm it. (ii) Do not confiscate the land of small landlords. (iii) Do not confiscate the land now owned by revolutionary soldiers. (iv) Landless revolutionary soldiers may receive land to till after the completion of the revolutionary battles.

c) Peasants who till confiscated land do not pay any taxes except for progressive land taxes to the government. The rate of rent on land not yet confiscated should be reduced to the equivalent level of the progressive land tax. Peasants who till land not yet confiscated pay only the determined rent, but no other taxes; they enjoy permanent tenancy rights.

d) Abolish all political power and rights of the landlords and gentry. Establish peasant township and village autonomous governments [*nongmin de xiangcun zizhi zhengfu*] accountable to all meetings of rural residents organized by all the oppressed classes in the countryside. Peasant associations participate in the creation of democratic county governments.

e) Disband the armed forces of the rural reactionary forces. Organize peasant self-defense corps to safeguard the victory of the autonomous governments and the revolution.

f) Establish a state agricultural bank and peasant consumption, production, and credit cooperatives; improve irrigation.

g) Annul interest on usurious debts. Limit exploitation through high interest rates. Set maximum interest rates.

B.27 Resolution on the Labor Movement (May 1927)¹³⁴

1) The development of the labor movement in the past two years and its current situation

[[The last two years have witnessed a recovery in the labor movement. Economically, working conditions have improved very visibly. The move to participating in politics fully demonstrates the leading role of the proletariat. The dramatic progress of the labor movement has greatly frightened the bourgeoisie, and it has begun to betray the revolution.]]

2) The new policies for the labor movement

The party's political resolution has pointed out that the "Chinese bourgeoisie" has already committed treason and that the Chinese revolution will develop in a non-capitalist future under the coalition political power of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie.¹³⁵ Under the party's general policy, the labor movement should naturally have new policies. Their chief characteristics are:

First, launch fierce political and economic attacks against the bourgeoisie, including demands for the confiscation of all banks, mines, railways, ships, large enterprises, and large factories, and their nationalization.

Second, demand [workers'] participation in the management and supervision of production in state-owned industries, so that state-owned industries may develop in a noncapitalist direction and avoid bureaucratization.

Third, demand that the government implement a policy favorable to labor, issue laws protecting labor and factory laws, lay down a system of an eight-hour workday and a minimum wage, so that the workers' standard of living will rise. These should be primary objectives of the labor department. Supervisory agencies should be set up to oversee the implementation of these laws.

Fourth, demand a social insurance system—relief for unemployed workers—and construct workers' housing and public cafeterias.

Fifth, demand the establishment of state-owned stores and sell all staple goods (food and fuel) through them; develop cooperatives and other organizations.

Sixth, local labor union federations in all areas should propose general programs for action by workers as the goals for the working-class struggle.

Seventh, develop a nationally consistent political and economic struggle; all

national labor unions in different industrial sectors should raise overall economic demands.

The above seven principles constitute the backbone of the labor movement. Within the areas governed by the Nationalist government, we should step up our struggle to speed up their materialization. [In areas] under the Chiang Kai-shek regime (bourgeois regime) and under warlord regimes in the north, [we] should do all we can to propagandize them. Whenever possible, [we] should raise the demands contained in the general programs proposed by labor unions at different levels. (Naturally, [we] should pay special attention to the most pressing needs of the working class at the present time.) Only this can boost the revolutionary courage of the working class and resist the infection of bourgeois reformism. Only this can safeguard the economic development of noncapitalism.

3) Economic struggles

In the past, some places (such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan during the anti-Fengtian war) overemphasized political struggles and neglected the workers' economic struggles. As a result, this diminished the workers' understanding of and courage for political struggle, as well as negatively affecting organizational development. This is our valuable experience. Therefore, as noted in the Fourth Congress resolution, only by raising the workers' economic demands can we stimulate the workers' courage for political struggle. This is extremely correct. Because economic struggles form the daily life of labor unions, only they can attract the majority of the masses and strengthen the organizations of the masses. In future operations, this deserves our special attention. Under Chiang Kai-shek's rule, there is a tendency to organize yellow labor unions to implement reformism. We should do our best to raise the economic demands of the workers and develop economic struggles to attack these yellow labor unions, so that the workers will not be deceived by reformism and our influence among the masses may be increased. Under warlord rule in the north, of course, there is no possibility of organizing [the workers] openly and struggling. Yet we should pay attention to the pressing miseries of the daily life of the workers and develop isolated struggles by the workers. Whenever possible, we still need to launch large-scale struggles to enable the workers to unite during these movements. In terms of propaganda, however, we still must raise general economic demands to attract the masses. The worker masses in Wuhan have been through one economic struggle; but the capitalists continually raise prices, so that the workers' lives have improved very little. There has even been starvation, with the result that some people have developed a negative attitude toward political struggle. This is a huge crisis in the labor movement. The methods for overcoming this crisis are, on the one hand, raise the workers' economic demands and continue the struggle and, on the other hand, demand that the government regulate prices and set up state stores to sell all staple goods. Another crisis is the use of the threat of revolutionary danger to limit the workers' struggle. This will turn the working class

into a tool of the other classes. We should do all we can to fight this view.

Since the development of economic strikes, the bourgeoisie and their representatives propose the view of "the strike cycle," with the hope of undermining the working class. Even some of the GMD-left have been swayed by this argument. One must know that inflation is not caused by strikes but has its own fundamental causes—the relationship between supply and demand as well as the effect of politics and war. Therefore, we should carry out extensive propaganda based on facts to fight such views.

The workers' struggles in handicraft factories and shops have become a very important issue today. Many people believe that in order to maintain our alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, such struggles must be stopped. This may overcorrect the problem. The workers' alliance with the petty bourgeoisie and their leadership of the latter can never be achieved through unilateral passive concessions, but through positive measures such as increasing the anti-imperialist movement, by struggling against the big bourgeoisie, and by continuously promoting the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and expanding the demands of ordinary urban residents. Therefore, our attitude toward the workers' struggles in handicraft factories and shops [artisans] is still positive support, so that we can win over these masses. First, the number of the industrial proletariat in China is too small; [our] strength can only be increased by completely uniting artisans and shop clerks around the industrial proletariat. Second, the life of artisans and most shop clerks is extremely miserable. They can be organized only through developing economic struggles. Third, the working relationship of artisans and most of the shop clerks is generally a feudal one of a slave nature. Without struggle, the shackles of feudalism cannot be smashed. In particular, in the nonindustrial areas (counties, municipalities, and towns), although artisans and shop clerks are representatives of the proletariat and should be the leading force in local politics there, they are restrained by the petty bourgeoisie through the use of feudal mentalities and power. We should organize them to become a leading force in the political struggle. Of course, in the struggles of artisans and shop clerks, we should pay attention to the economic ability of the capitalists, and the demands raised should not exceed their ability. In the struggles for collective contracts, considerable concessions are to be made according to objective conditions.

In state-owned industries where labor unions participate in management, there will be a tendency against economic struggle. The origin of this tendency lies in the fact that the elements in the government who represent the bourgeoisie want to develop these state-owned industries according to their interests while restricting the interests of the working class. Also, some people mistakenly think that these state-owned industries are already part of a socialist economy (the working class's own industry). This tendency not only attempts to lower the standard of living of the working class, but will also affect the development of the future of the noncapitalist economy. We should do our utmost to fight this tendency. Only when the standard of living for the working class rises with the development of the state-owned indus-

tries can the future of the noncapitalist economy be guaranteed. Therefore, in the labor unions within these state-owned industries, we should pay attention to the development of these industries and work hard to raise the economic demands of the progressive workers.

After the publication of the Labor Protection Law [*Laodong baohu fa*], monitoring of the enforcement of this law will become one of the main responsibilities of the labor union. The union should beware of the capitalists' deception aimed at the workers and lodge protests, on the workers' behalf, to the supervisory agencies at any time, so that the life of the working class may be truly protected and improved by such laws.

4) Organizational questions

At present, labor union organization has several critical weaknesses: first, it is dispersed and disorganized both vertically (industry-wide unions) and horizontally (local unions). Until now, there are only some nationwide general sectoral unions such as for sailors, railway workers, and postal workers, and they have no strength. The Chinese Federation of Labor Unions has completely failed in its responsibility of leading the subordinate unions; it even has no relations with them. Although power is relatively centralized in local federations of labor unions in various areas, the organization of these unions is also extremely loose. Therefore, the first organizational responsibility of the labor movement is to strengthen the Chinese Federation of Labor Unions and to consolidate and establish all kinds of general sectoral labor unions by merging many small unions into powerful sectoral unions. Second, many unions have strong guild characteristics; some have merely replaced the guild organization with the sign of a labor union. Thus, we should work hard to fight such guild-tainted unions. We should restrict applications from owners of handicraft factories, shop owners, and foremen to join the union. Third, in order to prepare for participation in the management of production, we must organize and strengthen factory committees. In the past, although labor unions in many places had organizations similar to factory committees (one committee for every factory), in reality they only did routine labor union work. The future factory committees, in addition to routine labor union work, should pay attention to the investigation and accounting of all economic conditions in the factory. Only this can fulfill responsibility for supervising production in the future. Fourth, in Guangdong, Shanghai, etc., yellow labor unions have already emerged. We should unite these unions. We can develop our influence and raise the workers' economic demands only among the masses under these unions. We must never exclusively deal with the few leaders of these unions in the hope of forming an upper-level unification. Fifth, in many areas, the organizations of artisans and shop clerks (particularly in counties and municipalities) are formed by using the same method as used in organizing industrial sectors. This is impossible. We should organize these workers according to the principle of their professions and previous organizational habits. The Chinese Federation of

Labor Unions should immediately issue a general outline on organizing artisans and shop clerks as the criteria for all areas. Sixth, railway workers were the first to work for the party and have fought great battles. However, because of extremism in party policies over the past few years and our neglect of this movement, [they] have been almost entirely abandoned. This is an immense mistake by our party. From now on, we should pay special attention to railway workers, strengthen the General Railway Union, organize secret labor unions on different railway routes, and dispatch special officials from the General Railway Union to work on different routes, so as to establish the systematic character of the railway labor unions and, at the same time, establish close relations between the party and the unions under the leadership of the party branches in all areas. Seventh, after the Fourth Congress, the sailors came under the guidance of our party; this is a great achievement. Our party should continue to step up our work among the sailors. In working on the union movement among the sailors, [we] gradually set up branch organizations on each ship, with the organizations on Guangdong and Hong Kong ships being the most successful. However, the sailors from Ningbo have not yet been completely organized under the sailors' union. The union of river ships tends to ignore modern ships and turns to organizing only wooden ships and junks. This should be corrected. Eighth, in the past two years, the miners' movement developed only once in Tangshan, and the party has been quite indifferent to the miners. For example, the north and Manchuria have most of the mines, but we have paid attention only to the labor movement in the cities and have not given much attention to the miners. In the future, our party should actively work among the miners in Wushun, Kailuan, Shanxi, Shandong, and Jiaozuo, in order to build the basis for the miners' movement. Ninth, previously we paid very little attention to workers in heavy industries. For example, we have several thousand comrades in Shanghai's light industries, but [only a small number] in heavy industries, just a few comrades in a shipyard. It can be shown that this is an enormous weakness. The workers in heavy industries should occupy an important position in the labor movement; they are also very numerous. If we do not have a plan to step up our efforts among the miners, the heavy industrial workers, influenced by the Guangdong Machinists Union, will be easily won over by the yellow unions.

The danger of bureaucratization of the workers' leaders is a serious issue at the moment because the majority of workers lack complete organization and sufficient training. There are too few talented cadres in the labor unions; our party's expansion fails to catch up with the development of the labor movement, so that labor unions are controlled by a minority of leaders, who are separated from the supervision of the masses or the guidance of the party. Thus, they develop a tendency toward bureaucratization. To mitigate this danger, [we] should genuinely carry out the work of "democratization of labor unions," and the work of labor unions should, and must, be determined by the meetings of workers, their representatives, and executive committees. Through such efforts, the organization of labor unions should be improved, masses of workers should be trained, skills for working in the labor movement should be taught, and leaders for the labor move-

ment should be produced. We must do this to mitigate the danger of bureaucratization.

The GMD should be a political alliance between workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie, with the proletariat as the leading political party. Therefore, guiding countless workers to join the GMD and strengthen it internally can fulfill the role of leading it.

5) The problem of unemployment

[[The number of unemployed workers is growing rapidly, 100,000 in Wuhan alone. The Wuhan government should set up a social insurance system immediately and nationalization should be speeded up.]

6) Child laborers and women employees

Although this problem has been addressed in great detail before, as a rule, labor unions seldom pay attention to the interests of child laborers and women employees. In the future, labor unions should actively support their interests. This will encourage them to join the unions. In the future, all labor unions must establish committees for child labor.

7) Propaganda and education

Propaganda is very important, but little attention has been paid to it. Propaganda teams in all unions must be promoted. Greater attention should be paid to publications. Educational efforts must concentrate on raising the cultural level of the working class.]]

8) Workers' picket teams and armed forces

Workers' picket teams should be widely developed in areas where labor unions operate either publicly or secretly. Initially, workers were armed only to defend themselves (against traitors and hoodlums) and maintain order. Now we should regard the workers' picket teams as one of the armed forces to protect workers, peasants, and the democratic regime of the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, in areas where there are labor unions, whether secret or open, there should be such organizations. What should be noted is: (a) they should be genuine workers' organizations; no hoodlums are allowed to infiltrate them; nor should there be too many unemployed workers. (b) Picket teams should adopt conscription so that all workers have an opportunity to receive military training. (c) Picket teams should have sizable reserves. (d) The Chinese Federation of Labor Unions should publish a unified organizational system of workers' picket teams and set up a department to administer [the teams].

[[More workers must serve in the military to revolutionize it.]]

9) The relationship between workers and peasants

[[Capitalists use the pretext of rises in workers' wages to raise prices, thus turning the peasantry against the workers. To improve the relationship, the causes of inflation and the miseries inflicted on the workers by the capitalists should be explained. This passive propaganda must be supported by help in organizing the peasantry.

10) Establish close relations with labor unions in other countries

The completion of the Chinese revolution must be accomplished with the help of the international proletariat.]]

11) The relationship between the party and the labor unions

The party and the labor unions did not have a correct relationship in the past; either the labor union became an appendage of the party, or the labor union was completely separated from the party's guidance. In fact, the labor union's struggle should be completely guided by the party, while, at the same time, the labor union should not lose its independence. Specifically, in terms of the party's guidance of the labor unions, first, party branches should play their role among the masses so that they are completely influenced by the party; second, there should be party and youth league organizations in labor union administrations so that the will of the party may be used to influence all the operations of the labor union. Naturally, this will place the administrations and the masses of the labor union completely under the party's guidance. At the same time, the party's policies in each period (such as declarations and proposals) should be discussed as openly as possible within labor unions to increase the masses' understanding of the party.

The CC's labor committee was almost completely inoperative in the past, so that the party was thoroughly devoid of leadership in terms of guiding principles and strategies for the labor movement throughout the entire country. In the future, we should do our best to strengthen the labor committee and enable it to function fully. Previously, many district labor committees were both very weak and timid; [in some places] there were even no such organizations as labor committees (for example, in the north); this is also a big mistake which should be corrected.

At present, in labor unions in various areas, there is a huge shortage of personnel for both upper-level leaders and lower-level cadres; this too can obstruct the development of the labor movement. In training personnel, first, [we] should encourage workers to participate in the work of the labor unions more frequently, so that their experience and capability may be increased. In particular, [we] should pay attention to the establishment and education of the meetings of the workers' representatives. Second, local federations of labor unions should establish short-term training classes for the labor movement. The party should select excellent comrades from among the workers to set up an advance training school for the labor movement in order to train senior personnel.

B.28 Resolution on the Third Revised Constitution of the CCP (1 June 1927)¹³⁶

Chapter One: Membership

1. Members of our party are not distinguished on the basis of nationality or sex. Those who acknowledge our party's programs and Constitution, accept the party resolutions, join and work in certain party organizations, and pay party dues are eligible to become members of our party.

2. To join the party, the applicant must be sponsored by one full member of the party. The applicant may become a probationary or full party member after investigation by the branch secretariat [*zhibu ganshihui*] and after approval by the branch meeting and by the city [*shi*] or county committee [*xian weiyuanhui*].

3. There is no probationary period for laborers (workers, peasants, artisans, shop clerks, soldiers, etc.); nonlaborers (intellectuals and free professionals) have a three-month probationary period¹³⁷; but city and county committees can either lengthen or shorten this period.

4. Probationary members at branch meetings only have the right to speak but not the right to vote, although their duties are the same as those of full members. When necessary, city or county committees can allow them to attend party meetings in the city or county, although they do not have the right to vote.

5. Party members accepted directly by the CC or provincial committees [become members] when the city or county committees in their areas are notified; nonlaborers must also go through the probationary period.

6. To go abroad, party members must receive permission from the Party Center and must have an introduction from the Comintern to become members of the CP of the country to which they go.

7. Those who hold membership of CPs in other countries recognized by the Comintern may become full members of our party after having been investigated by the Party Center.

8. Members must be eighteen years of age or older; all those under twenty years of age who are willing to join the party must pass through the Youth League, though young soldiers are exempt.

9. When a member moves from one party organization [*dangbu*] in one locality to another party organization in another locality, he or she must register at the new party organization in order to become a party member in that locality. Members who move within a province must receive permission from the provincial committee; those who move to other provinces must receive permission from the Party Center; however, under special circumstances (such as when secret operations are involved), flexible arrangements may be made.

10. A member's request to withdraw from the party must be approved by the relevant city or county committees; party card and other important documents must

be returned. Moreover, sponsors must guarantee that he or she will strictly keep all party secrets and, in the event of violation of this commitment, the city or county committee will take appropriate measures.

11. The expulsion of party members must be approved by the resolution of a branch meeting and the provincial supervisory committee, as well as by the provincial committee. The reasons for expulsion must be published in the party's publications; the rights and work of members [being expelled] must be suspended before approval by the provincial committee.

Chapter Two: Party Construction

12. The party's guiding principle is democratic centralism.

13. Based on the principle of democratic centralism, the supreme administration of the party within a certain geographical area is established to manage the relevant party organizations.

In principle, the executive agencies of the party organizations [*dangbu zhi zhi-xing weiyuanhui*] are elected by party members' meetings or by meetings of representatives of party members, and approved by superior organs. Under special circumstances, however, superior organs may appoint them.

14. Local party organizations have the authority to solve local problems on their own.

15. The supreme local party organ at all levels is: the plenary meeting of all party members and meetings of their representatives.

16. The plenary meeting of all party members and meetings of their representatives at each level select committees at that level. When the plenum is not in session, the committees act as the supreme agency of party power at that level and execute and manage affairs and policies of the party.

17. The organizational system of the party is:

National—National Party Congress—CC

Province—provincial congress—provincial committee

City or county—city or county congress—city or county committee

Area—area congress—area committee

Production unit—plenary meeting of all party branch members—branch secretariat

18. Subordinate organs should adhere to the procedures of the party's organizational structure in reporting and making proposals to superior organs as well as in commanding and guiding subordinate organs.

19. To meet the needs of all kinds of specialized party operations, party organizations at each level should establish special departments to run these operations (such as the organization department, propaganda department, women's department, etc.); individual departments under party organizations are accountable to the organization at that level. The organizational structure of these individual departments under party organizations at each level must be ordered or approved by the Party Center.

20. Party organizations under area committees must be approved by the area committees or retroactively approved by city or county committees; party organizations under city or county committees must be approved by the city or county committee; party organizations under provincial committees must be approved by the provincial committee; the composition of provincial committees must be approved by the CC.

The selection and dismissal of executive bodies of party organizations at each level (from provincial committee to branch secretariats or secretary) must be approved by superior organs.

Chapter Three: Central Organization of the Party

21. The party's supreme organ is the National Party Congress. The National Party Congress is convened by the CC once a year. When the CC deems it necessary, or at the request of one-third of the party members and party organizations in one-third of the provinces, an unscheduled National Party Congress may be convened. When the CC decides, or when one-third of the party members and party organizations in one-third of the provinces request the convocation of an unscheduled congress, the CC must convene it within two months. The convocation of the National Party Congress and its agenda must be announced by the CC a month and a half before the congress convenes. The congress is legitimate only when over half of the total party members are represented. The percentage of total representatives is determined by the CC.

22. The work of the National Party Congress is to:

- a) Discuss and approve the reports on the work of the CC, the Central Supervisory Committee [*zhongyang jiancha weiyuanhui*], and the other CC departments.
- b) Study and revise the party programs and constitution.
- c) Make decisions on the guiding principles for all the important issues and policies.
- d) Reelect the CC, the Supervisory Committee, and other committees.

23. The congress decides on the size of the CC and the Central Supervisory Committee. When members of the CEC [*zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui*] or the Central Supervisory Committee leave their positions, alternate members fill the vacancies in order of ranking.

24. The CC must represent the party in developing contacts with other political parties and agencies. It should organize all the party organs and guide their actions; it should guide and supervise the CC newspaper and appoint the editor of the CC newspaper; it should allocate the personnel and distribute the party funds.

25. Through party factions [*dangtuan*], the CC guides the work of the government and other social organizations.

26. The CC must meet in plenary session once every three months; when necessary, unscheduled meetings of the CC or enlarged CC meetings may be convened. Alternate CC members may attend the CC meetings, but they have only the right to

speak, not the right to vote. However, when CC members are absent, alternate members may take their place and have the right to vote.

27. The CC elects one full member to be general secretary and several full members to form the Politburo to guide all political work throughout the country. It also elects several members of the CEC to be alternate members of the Politburo. When alternate Politburo members attend Politburo meetings, they have only the right to speak, not the right to vote. When full Politburo members leave their positions, alternate Politburo members may fill the vacancies in order of ranking. The CC plenary meeting may reorganize the Politburo; the Politburo selects several people to form the Central Standing Committee [*zhongyang changwu weiyuanhui*]¹³⁸ to handle the party's daily affairs.

28. At least once every two months, the CC must provide the provincial committees with written reports on the work of the CEC.

Chapter Four: Provincial Organization

29. If a province has more than two city or county committees and when the CC deems it necessary to organize a provincial committee, it will send personnel to the province to convene a delegates' congress. The congress is to elect the provincial committee.

30. The number of the full and alternate members of the provincial committee is determined by the provincial delegates' congress. However, it must be also approved by the CC. For example, when full members are absent, they may be replaced by alternate members.

31. The jurisdiction of the province is determined by the CC and is subject to constant change.

32. When necessary, the CC may entrust a city committee to exercise temporarily the powers of the provincial committee.

33. For those party organizations unable to form a provincial committee, the CC may assign them to neighboring provincial committees or place them directly under the CC.

34. Provincial committees may select several members to form a standing committee [*changwu weiyuanhui*] to handle daily affairs.

35. Provincial committees govern all organs under the provincial committee; it guides and supervises the provincial committee's newspaper and appoints its director. It allocates personnel and distributes the provincial committee's funds; through party fractions, it guides the work of the provincial government and other social organizations.

36. Every six months, provincial committees convene a delegates' meeting to report on the work of the provincial committee and reelect the provincial committee.

37. At least once every two months, provincial committees must provide the CC and city or county committees with a written work report.

Chapter Five: City and County Organization

38. If a city or county has more than two district committees or more than five branches, and after recognition by the provincial committee, the provincial committee will send personnel to the city or county to call a delegates' meeting. The meeting elects the city or county committee.

39. City or county committees are under the jurisdiction of the provincial committee.

40. In the city where the provincial committee is located, no separate city committee will be formed. The city's area committees [*qu weiyuanhui*] answer directly to the provincial committee.

41. The number of full and alternate members of city or county committees are determined by city or county delegates' meetings. The number must be approved by the provincial committee. When full members are absent, they are replaced by alternate members.

42. In places where city or county committees cannot be formed, the organizations of the city or county, on the decision of the provincial committee, are placed under the jurisdiction of neighboring city or county committees or directly under the provincial committee.

43. City or county committees may select three to five members to form a standing committee to handle unexpected matters.

44. City and county committees must guide all organs under the city or county executive committees; they must guide and supervise city or county committee's newspapers; they must appoint editors of the newspapers of city or county committees. Through party fractions, they should guide the work of city or county governments and social organizations; they should allocate personnel and distribute the funds of city or county committees.

45. City or county committees convene a meeting of city or county delegates or a meeting of all party members every three months to report on the work of the city or county committee or reelect the city or county committee.

46. The division of cities or counties is decided by the provincial executive committee.

Chapter Six: Area Organization

47. If an area has more than two branches, city or county committees, when necessary, can send personnel to the area to call a party members' meeting to elect the area committee.

48. The number of members of the area committee is determined by the party members' meeting, and must be approved by the city or county committee.

49. In localities where area committees cannot be formed, party branches may be turned over to the jurisdiction of neighboring area committees depending on the decision of the area, city, or county committee, or they may answer directly to the city or county committee.

50. The division of the area is determined by the city or county committee.

51. Area committees are reelected once every three months.

Chapter Seven: Party Branches

52. Branches are the party's basic organization. In each factory; on every railway; in every mine, village, barracks, school, neighborhood; or organ, a branch may be formed when there are more than three party members, contingent on approval by the district or county committees.

53. Branches are the party organizations in direct contact with the masses. The responsibilities of the branch are:

- a) to work actively in factories and lead the masses there to wage daily struggles to expand the influence of the party;
- b) to implement the party's slogans among the masses;
- c) to recruit new party members;
- d) to obey local party organizations and engage in organizational and propaganda work;
- e) to participate actively in local political and economic struggles;
- f) to discuss the important issues of the party as much as possible.

54. Each branch elects one secretary or three persons to form the branch secretariat; it comes under the jurisdiction of the district committee; in places without a district committee, branches answer directly to the county or city committees.

55. In industrial production units with many party members, subbranches [*zhifenbu*] may be organized; subbranches may also form secretariats; in branches with many party members which cannot form subbranches, cells [*xiaozu*] may be formed; cells may also be formed under subbranches; each cell elects one head who is responsible to the branch secretariat or the subbranch secretariat.

56. When the number of party members is less than three, a correspondent [*tongxunyuan*] may be chosen to be responsible to the nearest area committee or city or county committee.

57. At least once a fortnight, the branch secretariat should convene a meeting of members to report on secretariat work and discuss all issues of practical political and economic struggles in the organs or areas in which the branch is located.

58. The branch secretariat is reelected every three months.

59. Branches in the military are managed by the Military Affairs Department; the work on political propaganda, education, and training is done by the Propaganda Department and the Organization Department through the Military Affairs Department.

60. The dismissal of a branch secretary must be approved by a meeting of all the branch party members and by the district or county and city committees.

Chapter Eight: The Central Supervisory Committee

61. To consolidate party unity and authority, the national and provincial congresses elect a central and provincial supervisory committees respectively.

62. Central and provincial supervisory committee members should not con-

currently serve as CC or provincial committee members.

63. Central and provincial supervisory committee members should attend CC or provincial committee meetings, but they only have the right of speech but not the right to vote. When necessary, they should participate in all kinds of meetings of party organizations at the same level.

64. The CC and provincial committees must not cancel central or provincial supervisory committee decisions, but decisions of the central and provincial supervisory committees must be approved by the CC or provincial committee, and then they become effective for implementation. When the opinions of the central or provincial supervisory committee are different from those of the CC or the provincial committee, the issue in dispute should be turned over to a joint meeting of the central or provincial supervisory committee and the CC or provincial committee. If the joint meeting is still unable to resolve the issue, it should be turned over to the National Congress or the highest-level supervisory committee for resolution.

Chapter Nine: Discipline

65. Strict party discipline is the first and most important duty of all party members and organizations. Decisions by organs of party organizations must be quickly and correctly implemented. However, with respect to differences within the party before a decision has been made, there can be completely free discussion.

66. Nonimplementation of decisions by higher party organs and other actions to disrupt the party go against the party's common will and are punishable. Formal punishments are as follows:

- a) If it concerns an entire party organization, a warning may be issued, it can be reformed, or a new general registration may be held (disband the organization).
- b) If it concerns an individual party member, a warning or a public warning inside the party may be issued; his or her work in the party, the GMD, the national government, and other tasks should be temporarily suspended. He or she can remain in the party and be closely monitored or expelled.

67. Party decisions are made by the majority; the minority must resolutely obey the majority. If a party member or a subordinate organ does not agree with the decision of a superior organ, with the support of a simple majority of party members from the relevant organization, a protest can be lodged with the superior organ. However, during the period between the time the protest is lodged and when a decision is made, the orders of the superior organ must be implemented.

68. Without permission from the party, members may not join political groups. When somebody joins our party who formally came under the jurisdiction of another political group, he will be formally considered to have left that group if no permission is given by the party.

69. Without the party's agreement, party members cannot carry out any duties in government organs.

70. Actions that violate party discipline must be investigated in accordance with

legal procedures by the party committee, by a meeting of party members, or by the supervisory committee.

Chapter Ten: Party Fractions

71. In all nonparty mass organizations or executive organs (such as the Workers' Committee of the Peasant Association of the GMD national government), where there are more than three party members, a party fraction should be organized. The objective of the party fraction is to intensify the party's influence in all aspects and to implement party policy among the nonparty masses.

72. When questions related to the party fractions are being discussed in a party executive committee, the fraction should send a representative to participate in the discussion. However, the representative will only have the right of speech, not the right to vote.

73. To carry out the daily work of the party fraction, a party fraction executive committee or secretariat should be appointed.

74. Party fractions at all levels come under the jurisdiction of the party committees at the relevant level. Party fractions should strictly and correctly implement resolutions made by the party on all problems. Party committees may add or withdraw members from the party fractions, but should give an explanation to the party fractions.

75. Party fractions may solve, on their own, their daily problems. When there is a difference of opinion between the party fraction and the party committee, the party committee should call a full meeting of the party fraction to rediscuss [the issue] and reach a final decision. Party fractions must implement the final decision swiftly.

76. Candidates for important positions in the agencies or organizations in which party fractions are located should be determined jointly by the party fractions and their superior party organizations. The transfer of positions should also be handled in accordance with the above method.

77. Superior party organizations must send representatives to participate in the discussion of political issues by the party fractions.

78. Whenever an important issue needs to be resolved among the nonparty masses and organizations, the party fraction must discuss it beforehand at the party fraction meeting or at a meeting of the secretariat of the party fraction and come to a decision.

79. When decisions are put to vote in meetings of nonparty organizations, all party members present (or elements of the party fraction) must be penalized according to party discipline if they violate party resolutions.

Chapter Eleven: Funding

80. The revenues of our party come from the following sources:

a) Party dues. Party members whose monthly income is under 30 *yuan* pay 20

cents per month; those without income or whose monthly income is less than 20 *yuan* may have their dues reduced or exempted according to circumstances by the city or county committee; those whose monthly income is between 30 and 60 *yuan* pay one *yuan*; those whose monthly income is between 60 and 80 *yuan* pay three percent of their income; special levies are imposed on those whose income is above 80 *yuan*. Party dues are waived for unemployed workers, imprisoned party members, and members working in the youth league.

b) Contributions from within the party. These shall be determined by the local party committees, taking into account local finances and the party's economic conditions.

c) Support sources from outside the party.

81. The dues of the party members in the military are collected by the military departments in the areas where they are stationed and turned over to the accounting department of the party organization.

82. All the revenues and expenditures of the party are to be disposed of by the CC.

Chapter Twelve: Relations with the Youth League

83. The CC of the Youth League should send representatives to meetings of the Politburo of the CC; League organizations at all levels should also send representatives to attend standing committee meetings of the organs of the party organizations at the relevant levels; representatives of the Youth League have voting rights.

84. The party's CC should appoint one of its members to the CEC of the Youth League; secretaries of Youth League executive committees at all levels should be members of the party committee in the same area.

85. Organs of party organizations should send representatives to attend the meetings of organs of the League organizations at all levels.

Notes to Commentary B

1. "Istoricheskie korni chentusiizma" (Historical Roots of Chen Duxiu-ism), *Problemy Kitaia* (Problems of China), no. 3 (1930): 210, quoted in L. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923–1925*, pp. 376a–377.

2. Holubnychy, *Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution*, pp. 254–56.

3. "Sun Zhongshan dui tanhe gongchandang chengwen zhi pishi" (Sun Yat-sen's Comments on a Petition to Impeach the Communist Party), in *Tanhe gongchandang liangda yaoan*, p. 2.

4. These were Li Dazhao, Tan Pingshan, and Yu Shude; and Shen Xuanlu, Lin Boqu, Mao Zedong, Yu Fangzhou, Qu Qiubai, Han Linfu, and Zhang Guotao. Tan Pingshan was a member of the eight-person Standing Committee of the CEC. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, p. 28.

5. This meeting was attended by, among others, Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesun, Xiang Ying, Mao Zedong, Deng Zhongxia, Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai, and Shen Xuanlu. There are different dates given for this meeting. For example, in the Research Department on Party

History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, the dates 10 to 15 May (pp. 30–31) are given, whereas Zhao Shenghui in *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao* (pp. 24–25) gives the dates 14 to 16 May. This latter date is used here. The report of the Party Center was delivered on 14 May, and this would normally be the first item on the agenda. For this report see “Zhongyangju baogao” (Report of the Central Bureau), *Dangbao* (The Party Paper), no. 4 (1 June 1924): 1–2.

6. The report of the Anyuan party organization was published as an appendix to the Hunan regional report. See *Dangbao*, no. 4 (1 June 1924): 7–8.

7. For the proposed changes see “Dangnei zuzhi ji xuanchuan jiaoyu wenti yijuean” (Resolution on the Questions of Inner-Party Organization and Propaganda Education), in *Dangbao*, no. 3 (20 May 1924): 6–7. These changes were not implemented until August 1924. When the departments were eventually founded, organization was headed by Mao Zedong, propaganda by Luo Zhanglong, and workers and peasants by Wang Hebo. Around the same time, a women’s movement committee was founded under Xiang Jingyu. The editorial committee was headed by Cai Hesen.

8. C.M. Wilbur and J.L.Y. How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927*, p. 319.

9. See below, the report of Chen Duxiu to the Fifth Party Congress (April 1927), **Doc. B.25**.

10. Twenty delegates attended the Congress representing 994 members. Among those attending were: Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen, Qu Qiubai, Zhang Tailei, Zhou Enlai, Chen Tanqiu, Zhu Mianchang, Peng Shuzhi, Li Lisan, Li Qihan, Li Weiham, Luo Zhanglong, Wang Hebo, Xiang Ying, Xiang Jingyu. Voitinsky attended on behalf of the Comintern.

11. See “Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan” (Manifesto of the CCP’s Fourth National Congress), 22 January 1925, published in *Xiangdao zhoubao* (The Guide Weekly), no. 100 (28 January 1925).

12. “Duiyu zuzhi wenti zhi yijuean” (Resolution on the Organization Question), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 379–82.

13. The nine CEC members were Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Hesen, Zhang Guotao, Xiang Ying, Qu Qiubai, Peng Shuzhi, Tan Pingshan, and Li Weiham. The five alternates were Deng Pei, Wang Hebo, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Tailei, and Zhu Miantang. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 30–31.

14. This was set up on 1 June and was chaired by Li Lisan.

15. “Zhongyangju baogao yijuean” (Resolution on the Report of the Central Bureau), October 1925, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, p. 495.

16. This meeting was held in Beijing, and its precise date is unclear. The documents concerning the meeting included in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 459–508, give the date of October. This is the same date as used in Wilbur and How, *Documents on Communism*, p. 92 and passim. Two recent party histories published in the PRC give a date of September but do not indicate any sources for this change. Research Department on Party History of the CCP, *Zhonggong dangshi*, p. 39, and Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao*, pp. 37–38. One probable source is Chen Duxiu’s report to the Fifth Party Congress in April 1927. Here, Chen mentions the “second plenum” held in September 1925. See **Doc. B.25**, section 1, subsection “Party strategy in these periods.”

17. This was in line with the analysis adopted by the May 1924 meeting of the CCP CEC (**Doc. B.2**).

18. This was part of a general process of tightening up on the work of the localities by the Party Center. It announced that it would send a number of commissioners to the districts and area committees. See “The Resolution on the Question of Organization,” **Doc. B.11**. For the

resolution on the Guangdong report, see “Yuequ baogao yijuean,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, p. 498.

19. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 31–32.

20. See Dai Jitao, *Guomin geming yu Zhongguo guomindang*, and Chen Duxiu, “Gei Dai Jitao de yifengxin,” in *Xiangdao zhoubao*, nos. 129 and 130 (11 September 1925): 1196–97.

21. Among those attending were Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubai, Xiang Ying, Zhang Guotao, Peng Shuzhi, Tan Pingshan, Ren Bishi, Chen Yannian, Luo Yinong, Zhao Shiyan, and Chen Qiaonian. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 34. Chen Yannian and Chen Qiaonian were sons of Chen Duxiu. Information about the special meeting was disseminated throughout the party in Central Circular Number 79 (14 March). For the text of this circular see the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 80–84.

22. Initially, the question of the Northern Expedition had been a cause of differences between Chen Duxiu and Borodin. While Chen supported it, Borodin was opposed. According to Chen, Borodin opposed the expedition to support Moscow's line. See below, Chen Duxiu, “Report to the Fifth Party Congress,” **Doc. B.25**.

23. See “Zhongyang dizhi wenti” (The Question of the Location of the Party Center), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 58–59. The *Guomin jun* (National People's Army) was under Feng Yuxiang's command. In October 1924, Feng had acted in concert with Zhili clique members to oust Cao Kun from power in Beijing. In April 1925 Feng was forced out of Beijing and he formed an alliance with the Northern Expedition forces.

24. Wilbur and How, *Documents on Communism*, p. 228.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 225–27.

26. The meeting was attended by, among others, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubai, Zhang Guotao, Peng Shuzhi, Tan Pingshan, Xiang Ying, Li Weiham, Wang Hebo, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Tailei, Chen Yannian, Luo Yinong, and Zhao Shiyan.

27. In the version of this report translated by Wilbur and How, the comment is made that, in the later stages, the movement in Shanghai was led by the Chamber of Commerce and not the General Labor Union. C.M. Wilbur and J.L.Y. How, *Missionaries of Revolution. Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920–1927*, p. 724.

28. See “Resolutions on the Peasant Movement,” translated in Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 745–49.

29. See “Resolutions on the Labor Movement,” translated in Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 739–44.

30. Wang Jingwei had declared his retirement from politics in late March 1926 and a couple of months later left for Europe.

31. I am grateful to Professor Wilbur for pointing out the significance of this to me.

32. This was a joint meeting of the Central Bureau and the representatives of the Comintern attended by, among others, Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Qu Qiubai, Peng Shuzhi, Borodin, and Voitinsky. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo Gongchandang*, p. 34.

33. The “Theses” can be found in J. Degras (ed.), *The Communist International, 1919–1943: Documents*, vol. 2, pp. 336–48.

34. See, “Political Report of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, January 26, 1927,” translated in Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 806–9.

35. Wang had returned to Shanghai from Germany on 1 April.

36. The joint statement was published in the *National News Weekly*, vol. 4, no. 16 (May 1, 1927), and can be found in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, book 1, pp. 307–9.

37. These details are taken from C.M. Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923–1928*, pp. 110–12.

38. The party organization had also been broken in Beijing. On 6 April, forces of Zhang Zuolin broke into the Soviet Embassy compound seizing many documents and arresting thirty-eight people. On 28 April, twenty of them were executed including Li Dazhao.

39. Eighty delegates attended, representing 57,967 party members. The most important of the Comintern representatives attending the Congress was the Indian communist M.N. Roy.

40. Apart from this view, which won the day, two other policies for the peasant movement were put forward at the Congress. The most radical suggestion was that all land, without exception, be confiscated, while a more moderate view was presented that only land belonging to the enemies of the GMD should be confiscated. See J.P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power*, p. 107.

41. Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 56.

42. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 60. On 30 June, it appears that Qu Qiubai and Li Wei-han were replaced on the Standing Committee by Tan Pingshan and Deng Zhongxia. Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 57. The additional members of the Politburo were Li Lisan and Tan Pingshan; Su Zhaozheng, Zhang Tailei, Chen Yannian, and Zhou Enlai were elected alternate members of the Politburo.

43. See "Resolution of the Eighth ECCI Plenum on the China Question," in Degras (ed.), *The Communist International*, vol. 2, pp. 384-90.

44. As a result, Tan Pingshan and Su Zhaozheng gave up their posts as ministers of agriculture and labor respectively.

45. See "Guogong liangdang guanxi jueyan" (CCP Resolution on Relations Between the Two Parties); the most important measures are contained in "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui gao quandang dangyuan shu" (Letter from the CCP CEC to All Party Members), below, **Doc. C.2**.

46. X.J. Eudin and R.C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey*, p. 304, and R.C. North and X.J. Eudin, *M.N. Roy's Mission to China*, p. 107.

47. According to Zhang Guotao, Chen handed in a letter of resignation on 15 July 1927. His reason for withdrawing was said to be that the Comintern's insistence that the CCP develop its own policies combined with its insistence that the CCP not withdraw from the GMD made work impossible. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, vol. 1, pp. 655 and 715. However, this is not quite accurate as, in accordance with Comintern instructions, the CCP central authorities were reorganized and Chen's leadership stopped on 12 July 1927. See Research Department on Party History, *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, pp. 57-58.

48. The members were Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Li Wei-han, Li Lisan, and Zhang Tailei. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 67, and Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 61.

49. "Gongchandang zai guomindang nei de gongzuo wenti yijuean," in *Dangbao*, no. 3 (20 May 1924): 1-3. This resolution was adopted by the Enlarged Meeting of the CCP CEC held from 14 to 16 May 1924 in Shanghai.

50. *Minquan zhuyi*—the principle of the people's rights or democracy—was one of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People.

51. This manifesto was adopted by the GMD's First National Congress (January 1924) and pledged the party to fight against imperialism and feudalism as its main tasks. It was based on the ECCI resolution of 28 November 1923, which Borodin had first seen in Shanghai and which was translated into Chinese by Zhang Tailei. Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 94 and 98.

52. "Zhongyang tonggao di shiwuhao," in the Party Central Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 223-24. It is subtitled "The Struggle Against the GMD-Right."

53. In August 1924 the Second Plenum of the GMD CEC met. The decisions made reflected the views of the left wing of the party. In particular, the CCP was recognized as having a special responsibility for the proletariat and called on all GMD members to cooper-

ate to achieve the goals of the national revolution. For details see *Geming wenxian* [Documents of the Revolution], vol. 16: 2773–76.

54. “Gonghui yundong wenti yijuean,” in *Dangbao*, no. 3 (20 May 1924): 3–5. This resolution was adopted at the Enlarged CCP CEC meeting held in Shanghai from 14 to 16 May 1924.

55. This was set up following a decision made at the Fourth Party Congress on 22 January 1925. Its secretary was Zhang Guotao, and Li Lisan and Liu Shaoqi acted as deputy secretaries.

56. “Shanghai difang baogao,” in *Dangbao*, no. 4 (1 June 1924): 2–4. This report was delivered to the Enlarged Meeting of the CCP CEC held in Shanghai from 14 to 16 May 1924. The report consists of three parts, but only the third part concerning the labor movement is translated here in full.

57. This probably refers to the strikes of November 1922 at the Japanese cotton mills, the British and American Tobacco Company, and in the goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ workshops. They were crushed by the Chinese authorities in Shanghai led by General He Fenglin.

58. This Federation was founded in Shanghai in 1924. It drew in some thirty semi-working-class associations and societies for industrial advance as well as regional societies, trade associations for skilled workers, and clubs run by companies. It had good relations with both foreign and Chinese employers in Shanghai. See J. Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927*, pp. 223–24.

59. “Duiyu zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui baogao zhi yijuean.” This translation is taken from the version of the resolution republished in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 326–28. The resolution was passed by the CCP’s Fourth Congress held in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925. It was originally published in *Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo dahui yijuean ji xuanyan* (The Resolutions and Manifesto of the CCP’s Fourth Congress), February 1925.

60. In October 1924, Feng Yuxiang refused to obey Wu Peifu’s orders to march against the northeastern warlord Zhang Zuolin. He formed an alliance together with Zhang and they seized power in Beijing, thus bringing to an end the rule of the Zhili clique.

61. This was because the Japanese were interpreted as supporters of Zhang Zuolin while the Americans and British were seen as supporters of Wu Peifu.

62. Organizational changes adopted at the May 1924 CEC meeting were not implemented until August, and the CEC was slow in acting on new policies for the workers’ and peasants’ movements.

63. “Guanyu minzu geming yundong zhi yijuean.” This translation is taken from the version of the resolution republished in The Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 329–41. The resolution was passed by the CCP’s Fourth Congress held in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925. It was originally published in *Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo dahui yijuean ji xuanyuan*.

64. The Shamian strike. The island of Shamian is in the center of Canton. Following the attempted assassination of Governor-General M. Merlin by a Vietnamese revolutionary, police regulations were introduced to control all Chinese entering or leaving the island. On 16 June all Chinese working on the island went on strike to demand that the regulations be repealed and that an apology be made. The strike quickly adopted an anti-imperialist tone, and on 13 August the authorities were forced to agree to reinstate all the dismissed strikers and abolish the regulations introduced in June.

65. Presumably this refers to the incident with the “Merchant Volunteers.” In 1923, the Canton Chamber of Commerce set up a “Merchant Volunteer” corps that was opposed to Sun Yat-sen and that sought to maintain order for the purpose of trade. Conflict between Sun and the GMD-left, on the one hand, and the corps, on the other, came to a head in August 1924 when the Canton government seized a shipment of arms intended for the corps. To help

protect Sun's government, a "Labor Organizations' Army" was set up. On 9 October, the corps demanded that Sun hand over all the confiscated arms, but the corps was defeated by regular troops and some Whampoa cadets with the "Labor Organizations' Army" in clashes that followed the National Day demonstrations (10 October). This was rightly seen as a victory for the GMD-left. For an incomplete account that exaggerates the role of the "Labor Organization Army," see Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement*, pp. 249–50.

66. "Duiyu zhigong yundong zhi yijuean," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 342–57. This resolution was passed by the CCP's Fourth Congress held in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925. It was originally published in *Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo dahui yijuean ji xuanyan*.

67. The labor committee was set up following the Congress and was headed by Zhang Guotao.

68. "Guanyu nongmin yundong zhi yijuean," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 358–64. This resolution was passed by the CCP's Fourth Congress held in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925. It was originally published in *Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo dahui yijuean ji xuanyan*.

69. The following points are taken from "Nongmin bingshi jian de gongzuo wenti yijuean" (Resolution on the Question of Work Among the Peasantry and Soldiers), in *Dangbao*, no. 3 (20 May 1924): 7–8. The resolution was adopted at the enlarged CEC meeting of May 1924.

70. This refers to the common practice of collecting taxes and rent in advance.

71. "Zhongguo gongchandang dierci xiuzheng zhangcheng," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 383–89. The revisions to the Constitution were passed by the CCP's Fourth Congress held in Shanghai from 11 to 22 January 1925. It was originally published in *Zhongguo gongchandang disici quanguo dahui yijuean ji xuanyan*.

72. The June 1923 Constitution used the term cell [*xiaozu*]. See **Doc. A.24**, article 5.

73. This power was with the area executive committee in the June 1923 Constitution. See **Doc. A.24**, article 4.

74. "Zhongguo xianshi de zhengju yu gongchandang de zhiren yijuean," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 459–71. This resolution was adopted at the enlarged meeting of the CEC held in Beijing in October 1925.

75. The National People's Army was under the command of the Christian General, Feng Yuxiang. In October 1924, Feng had acted in concert with Zhili clique members to oust Cao Kun from the Beijing government. The National People's Army was set up with Feng as its head. In April 1925, Feng was forced to retreat to the northwest. He united with the GMD and CCP forces of the Northern Expedition in September 1926.

76. A military department was set up under the CEC at the end of 1925 led by Zhang Guotao, and in November 1926 it was reorganized into the military committee with Zhou Enlai as its secretary.

77. *Guomin geming yu Zhongguo guomindang* was published in Shanghai in August 1925. It was completed on 23 July and created a stir in communist circles. Dai attacked the presence of CCP members within the GMD and called for stronger GMD unity as a way of resisting communist infiltration. The CCP launched an immediate attack with articles by Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, and Yun Daiying. Chen Duxiu accused Dai of only seeing the need for the nationalist struggle and not class struggle. According to Chen, CCP participation in the GMD was a source of great help rather than a hindrance. Chen Duxiu, "Gei Dai Jitao de yifengxin" (A Letter to Dai Jitao), written on 30 August and published in *Xiangdao zhoubao*, nos. 129, 130 (11 September 1925): 1196–97.

78. Chen Duxiu had proposed to the meeting that the CCP prepare to withdraw from the GMD and become independent. This was resisted by the Comintern representative and other

CEC members. See “A Letter to All Comrades of the Party,” Shanghai, 10 December 1929, in *Chinese Studies in History* (spring 1970): 227–28.

79. “Zuzhi wenti yijuean,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 472–77. This resolution was adopted by the enlarged CEC meeting held in Beijing in October 1925. The text is essentially identical to that translated by Wilbur and How with the exception of the last paragraph in section 9, which is missing from their translation. The Wilbur and How translation is based on a copy of the original Chinese text made by the Japanese in Beijing and sent with a covering letter to the Japanese vice minister of war on 26 May 1927. See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 530–32.

80. The labor committee had been decided on by the Fourth Party Congress in January 1925; the peasant committee was formally set up in November 1926 with Mao Zedong as its secretary; and the military department was set up at the end of 1925 headed by Zhang Guotao. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 31–32.

81. The SYL changed its name to CYL at its third congress held in Shanghai from 26 to 30 January 1925.

82. “Zhongguo gongchandang yu Zhongguo guomindang guanxi yijuean,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 487–91. This resolution was adopted by the enlarged CEC meeting held in Beijing in October 1925. This version is virtually identical with that translated in Wilbur and How. The most important difference is that the version in Wilbur and How has an extra subsection under section 5. The Wilbur and How translation is taken from a copy of an original Chinese document sent by the Japanese military attaché in Beijing to Tokyo on 26 May 1927. See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 533–35.

83. The version of this document translated by Wilbur and How has an extra subsection here that states, “Where we do not have any masses, we should not help the KMT [GMD] to establish or develop its organization, particularly in Central and South China.” As Wilbur and How note, this subsection is crossed out in pencil, but they remark that it is unclear whether the mark was made by the Japanese or was in the original. Its absence in this version suggests that it was removed from the resolution by the CCP meeting.

84. In the version translated by Wilbur and How this section is subsection f of section 5.

85. “Gao nongmin shu,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 1, pp. 432–39. This proclamation was passed by the CCP CEC at the October 1925 enlarged meeting.

86. The Second National Labor Congress and the First Congress of the Guangdong Peasant Representatives were held in Canton from 1 to 9 May 1925.

87. “Guanyu xianshi zhengju yu gongchandang de zhuyao zhiren yijuean,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 53–57. This resolution was adopted by the special meeting of the CEC held in Beijing from 21 to 24 February 1926.

88. In 1921–22 the Washington Conference treaties and resolutions called for conferences on tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality. It is not clear what is meant here, and there may be a misprint in the original Chinese text. In any case, China recovered full autonomy with respect to customs only in 1933.

89. “Zhongyang zhengzhi baogao” was originally published in a mimeographed pamphlet issued by the CEC CCP in September 1926, *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci zhongyang kuangda zhixing weiyuanhui yijuean* (Resolutions of the Third Enlarged Meeting of the CCP CEC), and is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 163–73. With the exception of section 3, this version is virtually identical to that translated by Wilbur and How from the collection of documents seized during the raid of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing in 1927. The section 3 translated here differs substantially. See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 723–29. The

report was delivered by Chen Duxiu to the enlarged CEC meeting held in Shanghai between 12 and 18 July 1926.

90. This was the attempt to overthrow the head of the Fengtian clique, Zhang Zuolin.

91. The version translated by Wilbur and How contains the sentence “As we look back now, there was not a single mistake in our past policy.”

92. The version translated by Wilbur and How contains a much stronger comment concerning the bourgeoisie and the May 30 Movement. It states, “The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai was in reality led by the General Chamber of Commerce and not the General Labor Union (with reference to the later stage).” Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, p. 724. It may be that when the report was disseminated in the party, this assessment was considered too sensitive and was thus rewritten for the party at large.

93. The Dawes plan of April 1924 tried to facilitate German payment of war reparations.

94. “Zhongguo gongchandang yu guomindang guanxi wenti yijuean” was originally published in a mimeographed publication issued by the CCP CEC in September 1926, *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci zhongyang kuangda zhixing weiyuanhui yijuean*. It is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 174–78. It is the same as the version translated in Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 727–29.

95. “Zuzhi wenti yijuean” was originally published in a mimeographed pamphlet issued by the CCP CEC in September 1926, *Zhongguo gongchandang disanci zhongyang kuangda zhixing weiyuanhui yijuean*. It is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 179–87. This version is the same as that translated in Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 730–34.

96. “Duiyu Guangdong nongmin yundong yijuean” was originally published in a pamphlet, *Guangdong nongmin yundong baogao* (Report on the Peasant Movement in Guangdong), in Canton in October 1926. It had the original title of “Resolution of the Second Enlarged Meeting of the CEC on the Movement in Guangdong.” The pamphlet also contains the long and interesting report on the Guangdong peasant movement delivered to the Second Guangdong Provincial Congress of Peasant Representatives (May 1926). The resolution on the Guangdong report is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 163–79. It was adopted at the July 1926 CEC meeting.

97. The civil corps [*mintuan*] were local armed forces organized primarily by the landlords.

98. This was an administrative unit larger than a township but smaller than a county.

99. *The Plow* began publication in Canton on 25 January 1926 as the organ of the Guangdong Peasant Association. Initially, it was published every ten days but was changed to a weekly. Its last issue (no. 23) appeared on 7 January 1927. Its general orientation was pro-CCP.

100. The central peasant department of the GMD began publishing *The Chinese Peasant* in Canton on 1 January 1926 as a monthly. Its general editor was CCP member Mao Zedong. In December 1926, it temporarily ceased publication but it began again briefly in Hankou in July 1927.

101. Month-long courses were given at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in Canton. The institute was founded on 3 July 1924 following a decision by the GMD’s CEC on 30 June. This was the first government-sponsored training institute for rural political activists. Its first director was CCP member Peng Pai. For an interesting collection of materials on the institute see *Guangzhou nongmin yundong jiangxi suo ziliao xuanbian* [Selected Materials on the Canton Peasant Movement Training Institute]. For an account of its founding see F. Galbiati, *P’eng P’ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, pp. 176–82.

102. “Shanghai gongzuo jihua jueyan,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 259–63. This resolution was adopted by the enlarged CCP CEC meeting held in Shanghai in July 1926. It was originally published in *Jiaoyu zazhi* (Education Magazine), no. 1 (5 October 1926). It was published by the Shanghai area committee of the CCP.

103. The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism was a conservative organization set up by GMD members opposed to cooperation with the CCP. The original organization was formally founded in Canton on 29 December 1925, and through the winter, branches were set up in other major centers including Shanghai. See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 166 and 192–93. There is some evidence to suggest that the Society originated in the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton as early as April 1925. The organization was disbanded in April 1926. Li Yutian, Li Gong, and Xu Jianguo (eds.), *Zhongguo gemingshi jianming cidian*, pp. 158–59.

104. “Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao.” The first two sections of this report are based on the translation in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J.K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 80–89. These two sections have been checked against the version in *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 1, pp. 207–49. Section three is based on the excellent translation made by M.H. Day from the same source. The Chinese text used in *Mao Zedong ji* was taken from *Mao Zedong xuanji xubian* (Sequel to the Selected Works of Mao Zedong), published in 1947. In turn the editors of this 1947 work took the version of Mao’s report published in the weekly supplement of the GMD organ *Zhongyang fukan* (Central Committee Periodical), no. 7 (28 March 1927).

105. General Tang Shengzhi, who was a militarist supporter of the Wuhan government.

106. These are the qualities of Confucius as quoted by one of his disciples in the *Analects*.

107. The eight characters refer to the cyclical characters for the year, month, day, and hour of one’s birth. These were said to determine one’s fate.

108. *Hezuo* is a normal term for cooperation and is used in the word for cooperative, *hezuoshe*. *Hehuo* means to form a partnership in some enterprise and thus had a more immediate meaning for those in the countryside.

109. Liu was the head of the peasant department of the GMD Hunan provincial headquarters. In February 1927 he was expelled from the GMD, only to return later.

110. She Gong loved all dragons except real ones.

111. “Yue qu duiyu zuopai wenti zhi taolun.” This document was appended to Chen Duxiu’s speech to the Politburo meeting of 4–5 November 1926 (**Doc. B.22**). The dating of the document is approximate. Clearly, it preceded the meeting and formed the basis of Chen’s comments, and thus the date of October is given. The Chinese text is taken from the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 2, pp. 284–88.

112. Clearly, this should read “rightist political tendencies.”

113. “C tongzhi guanyu G.M.D. wenti baogao.” This document was included in the mimeographed collection *Guomindang wenti taolunji* (Discussions on the Question of the GMD), vol. 3. The Chinese text translated here is from the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 422–30. This was a report delivered by Chen Duxiu to a meeting of the Politburo held on 4 and 5 November 1926.

114. The statista take their name from the Chinese Statist Youth League (*Zhongguo guojia zhuyi qingnian tuan*), also referred to as the Chinese Youth Party (*Zhongguo qingnian dang*). The party was set up in December 1923 in Paris and transferred its main activities to China in the autumn of 1924. It had a strong anticommunist sentiment and in 1929 declared its support of the GMD’s anticommunist suppression campaigns. It participated in the 1946 meeting of the GMD’s National Assembly, and in 1949 the organization fled to Taiwan.

115. In Wang Jingwei’s absence, Tan Yankai had taken over as chair of the national government in Canton. Tan was one of the most powerful military figures in the GMD. Tang Shengzhi headed the Eighth Corps of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition.

116. Guangning was an isolated county in the northwest of Guangdong Province. Under Peng Pai, the CP had achieved major successes in organizing the peasantry in struggles to reduce rent, etc. The local peasant associations were set up amid much opposition from the

local landlords and became models for other areas. By the spring of 1927, however, most of the associations had been suppressed.

117. Hua County was on a fertile plain some 50 kilometers outside of Canton. From spring 1926 there had been bitter fighting there, with numerous attacks on peasant association members. This culminated in August–September 1926 when GMD troops reasserted control over the area.

118. “Zhengzhi baogao” was a report delivered by Chen Duxiu on 13 December 1926 to a Special Meeting of the Party Center also attended by Comintern representatives Borodin and Voitinsky. The meeting was held in Hankou. The text translated here is taken from the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 559–68.

119. During the Northern Expedition, Jiujiang was captured on 5 November and Nanchang on 8 November 1926.

120. This refers to the plenary meeting of the GMD CEC that was held between 15 and 22 May 1926 in Canton. At the meeting, severe restrictions on CCP activities within the GMD were approved.

121. In November 1925 a group of GMD right-wing members met at the Western Hills near Beijing. They were worried about the rise in influence of CCP members in the GMD and proposed their expulsion.

122. “Guanyu guomindang zuopai wenti yijuean,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 2, pp. 571–77. This resolution was adopted at a special meeting of the Party Center held in mid-December 1926.

123. The Society was founded in Hawaii in November 1894 and was the first of a series of organizations that were the forerunners of the GMD. Shortly after its founding, it transferred its operations to China. The Society was not successful in meeting its goal of overthrowing the dynasty and creating a republican government.

124. “Chen Duxiu zai Zhongguo gongchandang diwuci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao” is translated from the Chinese text in *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* (Materials on CCP History), no. 3, pp. 26–59. The complete report consists of eleven numbered sections and one section on the inner-party situation. The Chinese version is translated from a Russian translation made in the twenties. The Russian translation was found among the documents of the Chinese Mission to the Comintern.

125. This is probably a mistake in the Russian, as Sun went to Beijing to meet with Duan Qirui.

126. In fact, the resolution adopted in October 1925 specifically warns against severing relations with the GMD (see **Doc. B.10**, section 7, point e).

127. In fact, the “Resolution on the Current Political Situation and the Tasks of the CP,” adopted in October 1925, counseled against withdrawing from the GMD and called for a suitable form of alliance to be found. See above, **Doc. B.10**. The “Resolution on the Relations Between the CCP and the GMD” stated that current policy was opposition to the GMD-right while forming a close alliance with the left. See above, **Doc. B.12**.

128. This figure is drawn from Mao Zedong’s March 1927 report on the peasant movement in Hunan. Here, Mao mentions that peasant association membership had risen to 2 million and he calculates that as a result some 10 million peasants were directly under the influence of the associations. See above, **Doc. B.20**, section 2. In June 1927, membership had risen to 4.5 million with 9.15 million in associations nationwide.

129. General Li Jishen favored placing tighter restrictions on the labor movement, and in January 1927 he took over as head of the labor department of the Guangdong branch of the GMD. Almost immediately, he undertook actions to defend employers’ traditional practices. On 15 April 1927, he moved against the left-wing unions and their leaders in Canton.

130. *Guomin jun*. This refers to the coalition of armies under Feng Yuxiang.

131. The Comintern representative was A.S. Bubnov, who had arrived in Beijing in early

February 1926. He met Chen Duxiu in Shanghai on 2 March and was in Canton on 13 and 14 March. See Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution*, pp. 216–17, 238, 252, and 255–56. I am grateful to Professor Wilbur for pointing this out to me.

132. This may have been M.N. Roy.

133. “Tudi wenti yijuean” was adopted at the Fifth Party Congress in May 1927. The translation is taken from the version in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 60–71.

134. “Zhigong yundong yijuean” was adopted by the Fifth Party Congress in May 1927. The resolution is translated from the version in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 72–85.

135. See “Zhengzhi xingshi yu dang de renwu yijuean” (Resolution on the Political Situation and the Party’s Tasks), the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 48–59.

136. “Zhongguo gongchandang disanci xiuzheng zhangcheng juean” is translated from the version in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 142–55. The resolution was passed by a meeting of the Politburo on 1 June 1927.

137. In the second revised Constitution adopted in January 1925, the probationary period was three months for laborers and six months for nonlaborers. See above, **Doc. B.9**, section 2.

138. The Chinese text puts the English word “Secretariat” in brackets after the Chinese term. However, “Standing Committee” is preferred here not just because this has become the standard translation but also to avoid confusion with the *zhongyang mishuchu* (or *mishuting*) (Central Secretariat) that had been headed by Wang Ruofei.

Commentary C

The Sixth Party Congress and the Upsurge of Communist Rebellions, July 1927–1930

The events of summer 1927 seemed to make a mockery of the CCP leadership and its policy of a united front with the GMD. The Communists suffered one blow after another as group after group of Nationalist generals and politicians “betrayed the revolution.” With the breakdown in the united front, it was clear that a new strategy was needed. The initial period after this breakdown was marked by a number of armed insurrections organized by the CCP in response to GMD suppression. These insurrections were seen by Qu Qiubai and the Party Center as an attempt to regain the initiative for the Communists by sparking off a nationwide revolution. In this they failed. The bankruptcy of this “putschist” approach was finally shown with the failure of the Canton Commune in December 1927 and the destruction of the Haifeng and Lufeng Soviets in February 1928. However, these failed attempts did contain the seeds of a new strategy. First, there was the formation of military forces led directly by the CCP. Second, as the vanquished troops retreated from the failed uprisings, a number of territorial base areas were established in remote regions. Finally, there was an increasing recognition of the important role that the peasantry would play in the revolution.

(a) 7 August 1927 Emergency Conference— The Policy of Insurrection

The first policy initiative that followed Chen Duxiu’s dismissal was a radicalization of policy toward the peasantry. Recognition of the important role of the peasantry was reflected in the CC’s announcement of 20 July (**Doc. C.1**). The announcement claimed that the Chinese revolution had entered a new phase: the phase of the land revolution. It acknowledged that the organizational capacity of the proletariat was insufficient for it to lead the “revolutionary alliance of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie.” Yet despite all signs to the contrary, the revolution was not in decline but was “actually continuing to rise.” This tendency to ignore reality and to see a new revolutionary tide on every horizon was a feature throughout this period.

On 7 August 1927, an Emergency Conference of the CCP CC was held in Hankou.¹ The intention of the Conference was to evaluate past policy, put forward a new strategy, and elect the new party leadership. The newly arrived Comintern representative, Lominadze, had called for the meeting and together with Qu Qiubai, Li Weiham, and Zhang Tailei set about the preparatory work.² Yet the emergency

was already over as far as general political direction and party leadership were concerned. The Conference marked the formal transition from a strategy of cooperation with the GMD to one of opposition. The “Circular Letter” (**Doc. C.2**) blamed the past disasters on the ideological errors of the former leadership. It denounced the “opportunist” mistakes made in attitude toward the GMD and the mass movement. In line with the circular of 20 July (see **Doc. C.1**), the letter particularly stressed the failure to support fully the rural revolution. On future strategy it had little to say, emphasizing the sole leadership of the CCP yet still calling for collaboration with GMD leftists. This appeal for continued cooperation derived not only from Stalin’s need to show infallibility in his political struggles with Trotsky³ but also from the situation within China. Significant members of the GMD still supported the CCP, and it was hoped that they could be rallied to the communist cause. In the GMD central leadership there was Song Qingling (Sun Yat-sen’s widow) and Deng Yanda; in the military, He Long and Ye Ting. A number of grass-roots GMD branches and troops also favored the Communists.⁴

The Comintern’s need to place the blame on the CCP leadership is apparent in Lominadze’s speech to the Conference (**Doc. C.3**). According to Lominadze, far from having been given bad advice, the CCP was at fault for having failed to carry out Comintern instructions among the masses.⁵

Qu Qiubai’s speech on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (**Doc. C.4**) outlined the new strategy of rebellions, inciting army mutinies, and initiating peasant uprisings. The former referred to the recent Nanchang Uprising and the latter to the Autumn Harvest Uprising that was in preparation. Mao Zedong’s comments (**Doc. C.5**) are interesting not because of any startling insights revealed but because of the way in which their vivid tone reflected Mao’s unique personality and political approach. Mao compared the past relationship with the GMD to that of a shy bride being carried into a new house without the determination to become the mistress. Significantly, in stressing the importance of military affairs, Mao noted that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

Organizationally, the party prepared itself for work underground. The resolution on the organizational question stated that the main task was to “forge strong, secret” organizations.⁶ The need for secrecy also meant that discipline had to be tightened, as infringements could lead to destruction of the organization. While working underground, the maintenance of party organizations in labor unions was given the highest priority. However, the need for secrecy was not to stifle inner-party democracy, as this had contributed to the recent mistakes of “opportunism.”

Finally, the meeting adjusted the party’s central leadership. A new nine-person temporary Politburo was elected to direct party affairs pending the convocation, within six months, of a national congress (in fact, it was not convened until June 1928, and then in Moscow).⁷ This temporary Politburo held its first meeting on 9 August and elected a three-person Standing Committee of Qu Qiubai, Li Wei-han, and Su Zhaozheng. In addition, Qu Qiubai was made responsible for Peasant Affairs, the Propaganda Department, and the editing of the party’s newspaper, *Dang-*

bao. Li Weihan was put in charge of the Organization Department and the Secretariat, and Su Zhaozheng was placed in charge of the Labor Committee. Further, Zhou Enlai was placed in charge of Military Affairs with Wang Ruofei temporarily his deputy, and Yang Zhihua was placed in charge of the Women's Department.

The insurrectionary policy began with the Autumn Harvest Uprising, which had already been decided on in early August by the three-person Standing Committee (**Doc. C.6**). The intention was for it to begin simultaneously in the four southern provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. It was here that the Communists had developed strong ties with the peasantry before and during the Northern Expedition. The general strategy was to use the peasant associations as the basis for revolutionary power in the countryside. The associations were to set up a land committee to distribute land, but no land of middle peasants was to be confiscated. Rent was to be abolished for temple land, etc., and for the land of landlords who owned over 50 *mu*. Mao Zedong⁸ together with Peng Gongda left Wuhan for Hunan to take charge of the uprising. At the temporary Politburo meeting of 9 August, it was decided that with Peng Gongda Mao was to consult with the Hunan provincial committee about forming a new committee and to report the results to the CC.⁹ Peng was appointed secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee (**Doc. C.7**).

Peng Gongda's report (**Doc. C.8**) provides the most detailed and reliable account of the uprising by one of the Chinese leaders.¹⁰ The uprising was a failure. Only in east Hunan, where Mao Zedong was active, did it get off the ground. However, even there it was quickly defeated. On 12 September, worker and peasant troops took over Liling, but on 15 September the majority of the troops defected or abandoned their positions. The remaining troops were defeated by 17 September. Following these setbacks, at a meeting on 19 September, Mao and the Hunan Front Committee decided to abandon the CC's orders to attack Changsha. The meeting proposed a march east and then south to the Jinggang Mountains on the Hunan-Jiangxi border.¹¹

Peng's report analyzes the reasons for the failure of the uprising. According to Peng, the major fault lay in the fact that the peasantry were not mobilized sufficiently. The uprisings in the different areas relied too heavily on the military, thus failing to arouse the interest of the peasantry. Second, he accuses the party leadership and ordinary members of not having the stomach for a real fight, thus displaying their continued petty bourgeois mentality. Peng's complaints notwithstanding, the main legacy of the uprising was that it had sought to involve the local peasantry. To some extent, it was successful.

The failure of the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings did not dampen the enthusiasm of the party central authorities. Far from it. Under Qu Qiubai's leadership an even more radical position was adopted. The Enlarged Conference of the Temporary Politburo (9-10 November 1927) decided to sever all relations with the GMD no matter whether left or right (**Doc. C.9**).¹² Policy for the rural and urban areas was also radicalized. Landlords, big and small, were to be shown no leniency, and workers were to take power in the factories into their own hands. A strategy of

nationwide insurrections was proposed, and the leaders of the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings, Mao included, were criticized for their rightism.

The November conference actually reflected the weakness of the central party leadership. Although the exhortations were to apply to the whole country, in reality they only applied to the situation in Canton. In fact, on 17 November 1927, the Standing Committee of the temporary Politburo called for an uprising throughout the whole province. Initially the uprising in Canton (December 1927) was a great success but ended quickly in total failure. The latter months of 1927 witnessed a number of uprisings. They were only successful in the sense that they led to the creation of communist armed forces and the establishment of communist-held territorial bases, thus offering a new alternative for the future. In terms of Qu Qiubai's strategy, they were a failure. They had failed to regain the initiative for the Communists by leading to a nationwide revolutionary movement. The defeat of the Canton Commune so swiftly after the defeats of the Communists in the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings made it clear that a shift in tactics was necessary. It was impossible for the Party Center under Qu Qiubai to continue with its "putschism." The party had lost contact with the working class in major centers such as Shanghai, Wuhan, and Canton. The insurrectionary policy, even where the peasantry had been mobilized, had been intended to restore the initiative to the proletariat under the CCP's leadership by seizing major urban centers. The failure of this approach signaled the effective end of the proletariat as the main force of the revolution.

(b) The Sixth Party Congress—Reassessment of Strategy

A National Congress was needed to reassess the past and sanction a shift in policy direction. Thus, preparations began for the Sixth Congress, and for reasons of security it was held in Moscow (18 June to 11 July 1928).¹³ In April 1928, the Comintern suggested that Qu Qiubai, Luo Yinong, Ren Bishi, Zhou Enlai, and Huang Pingying should go immediately to Moscow to begin preparations. While this group was in Moscow it was decided that Li Weiham, Ren Bishi, and Luo Dengxian would preside over work in China.¹⁴

The Congress had two points of departure. First, that while the policy of military confrontation with the GMD was now inevitable, second, the reckless "putschism" pursued by Qu Qiubai had not shown any tangible success. The Congress adopted seven resolutions, of which the "Political Resolution" was the most important, and a revised Constitution.¹⁵

The "Political Resolution" adopted by the Congress defined the revolution as bourgeois democratic under the leadership of the proletariat with its vanguard the CCP (**Doc. C.10**). It depicted China as being in a trough between two waves. The first revolutionary wave had receded because of "repeated failures," and the new wave had not yet arrived. This notion allowed "putschism" to be attacked while supporting future insurrections. Judging the waves was a difficult business, and it is

not surprising that the new Chinese leadership would seize on any sign of heightened activity as the arrival of a new crest.

The notion of the movement developing in waves was not an innovation of the Congress but had been put forward by the ECCI in February 1928. While criticizing the previous "excesses," in particular the Canton Commune, the ECCI maintained that a further revolutionary upsurge was possible. However, such upsurges would be irregular, and thus the party must take care not to allow the movement to run out of control. Instead the mass organizations were to be built up to ensure coordination.¹⁶

The "Political Resolution" stated that since the national bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution, the workers and peasants were to form the core of future activities. The party was to reorganize the masses into labor unions and peasant associations. Despite objective reasons for the failure of the revolution, the "Political Resolution" stated that "the principal reason for the failure of the revolution was the opportunist policy" pursued by the CCP. The conciliatory policy of the CCP and the failure to develop the rural revolution and class struggle were identified as the causes. While criticizing Chen Duxiu's policies as opportunist right-deviation, Qu Qiubai's policies were criticized as a putschist left-deviation. Both rightist and leftist trends were to be resisted, but now "leftism" was identified as the greater danger.

A unique contribution of the Congress to communist strategy was its designation of the soviet as a governmental system to be established in the wake of armed uprisings to replace the old political regime (**Doc. C.11**). Leaving many questions aside, the introduction of the soviet did lay down the formula of a basic trinity of the CCP, the soviet government, and the Red Army as the basis for communist revolution in the following decade. While it is clear that the resolution on the soviet treated it as the ideal form of mass democracy applicable throughout the whole country, in practice the soviet came to stand for the buildup of military base areas in the countryside from which the Communists would proceed to encircle the cities and take over state power.

While the Sixth Congress made it clear that the intention was to recapture a hold on the urban bases, the situation led to a greater emphasis being placed on the revolutionary role of the peasantry.¹⁷ This is reflected in the "Resolution on the Peasant Question" (**Doc. C.12**). The party was to form a united front with as many of the peasantry as possible.¹⁸ Alliances were to be formed with middle peasants, rich peasants were to be neutralized, and poor peasants were to be put in charge of the peasant associations. The importance of guerrilla warfare conducted by the peasantry was stressed. While excesses were to be avoided, careful planning and leadership by the party was expected to ensure that such warfare would lead to the extension of rural reform and the buildup of a worker-peasant revolutionary Red Army. Yet this increased emphasis on the role of the peasantry by no means meant that it had become the leading class. The peasantry was to be under the hegemony of the proletariat.

The Congress also adopted a new Constitution to address the various organizational changes that had taken place (**Doc. C.13**). In particular, amendments were made to the section on membership, and the principle of democratic centralism was emphasized. To ensure collective leadership, it stipulated that party congresses be held annually as had been the case previously. In fact, the next party congress was not held until 1945!

Finally, the Congress elected a new CC with twenty-three members and thirteen alternates and a new Central Control Commission with three members and two alternates. On 19 July, the CC met in plenary session and elected members of the new leadership. The Politburo had seven full members: Su Zhaozheng (twenty-two votes), Xiang Ying (twenty-two), Xiang Zhongfa (twenty-one), Zhou Enlai (twenty-one), Qu Qiubai (sixteen), Cai Hesen (sixteen), and Zhang Guotao (ten); and seven alternates: Li Lisan (twenty-two), Guan Xiangying (twenty-two), Luó Dengxian (eighteen), Peng Pai (seventeen), Yang Yin (seventeen), Lu Futan (fourteen), Xu Xigen (fourteen). A Standing Committee comprising Xiang Zhongfa, Zhou Enlai, Su Zhaozheng, Xiang Ying, and Cai Hesen was elected with Li Lisan, Xu Xigen, and Yang Yin as alternates.¹⁹ The following day, the Politburo met for the first time and elected Xiang Zhongfa as chair of the Politburo and CC.²⁰

On the surface, the Sixth Congress appeared to have produced an appropriate long-term program. In reality, it presented the CCP with an intractable problem. The central issue of the revolution was to be the rural question, while it was of paramount importance that the CCP recapture its proletarian base in the urban areas. The chance of fulfilling these objectives was further complicated by the more radical turn of events in both China and the Soviet Union shortly after the Congress.

The central party leadership returned to China to find a more favorable situation than they had left. In the cities, the CCP was beginning to recover from the shock waves caused by the GMD suppression and the failed uprisings. In the rural areas, the latter months of 1928 witnessed a steady growth of the Red Army and the soviet areas. Particularly important were the bases on the Jiangxi-Hunan border under Mao Zedong and Zhu De, on the Hunan-Hubei border under He Long and Zhou Yiqun, on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border under Xu Xiangqian, in east Hunan under Peng Dehuai, and in northwest Jiangxi under Fang Zhimin. The Red Army and the soviets were beginning to emerge as dynamic new forces in the communist movement.

Of greater immediate direct influence on the new party leadership was the factional struggle between Stalin and Bukharin. Although rumors of differences had circulated at the Sixth Party Congress, Bukharin supervised the Congress on behalf of the Comintern. Indeed, the "Political Resolution" was based on the nine-hour (*sic!*) speech that he delivered to the Congress, and the new Politburo was put together on his instructions. By the end of 1928, Bukharin had become the main target of Stalin's attacks for his "rightist" or "rich peasant line."

(c) The Second Plenum—June 1929— The Emergence of the Li Lisan Leadership

An increasingly leftward trend was first noticeable when the more radical Li Lisan replaced the more cautious Cai Hesen in the Politburo in November 1928. Li also took over as head of propaganda, giving him a prominent position in the party. Cai was transferred to Moscow, thus marginalizing his impact in the leadership in China. Gradually, Li Lisan moved to challenge the more cautious Zhou Enlai.²¹ Zhou was able to keep the upper hand, maintaining the moderate line of the Sixth Congress until the Second Plenum (June 1929). However, party practice was radicalizing again as party organizations were reformed and the workers' movement was expanded.

On 8 February 1929, the ECCI issued a letter to the CCP CC claiming that signs of a new revolutionary wave were clearly visible in China. As a result the ECCI warned that at the present time, the "rightist trend" was particularly dangerous.²² Shortly after the letter arrived, the Politburo drafted a formal resolution on how the party should apply the Comintern line in its practical work.²³ Indeed, the period until April 1930 marks a distinct phase in the shift of party policy.

The Second Plenum of the Sixth Congress (25–30 June 1929) marked a further step in the leftward trend of party policy, although neither Li Lisan nor Zhou Enlai was able to dominate the other totally.²⁴ The "Political Resolution" (**Doc. C.14**) passed by the Plenum attempted to reaffirm the correctness of the policies of the Sixth Congress while at the same time hailing the recent Comintern directive. On the current situation, the "Political Resolution" tried to play it safe by stating that it was incorrect to think either that the new revolutionary wave was far away or that its arrival was imminent. While calling for a fight against "rightism" and "leftism," it copied the ECCI February letter in judging that "rightism" was the particularly dangerous trend in the party at the present time.

The antirightist drive in Moscow continued to affect the Party Center in Shanghai. On 26 October 1929, the ECCI sent another letter to the CCP CC (**Doc. C.15**), this time announcing the beginning of "the revolutionary high tide."²⁵ The party was to take over the leadership of this new revolutionary wave by overcoming its "petty bourgeois vacillations." Once again the Comintern reinforced the view that at the present time "rightism" was the most dangerous trend in the party. The Politburo responded to this letter by adopting resolutions on 20 December 1929 and 11 January 1930 that fully accepted the Comintern's position and that heralded a stronger criticism of "rightism."²⁶ Unfortunately the revolutionary tide did not exist, at least in the urban areas. The Comintern's insistence on political strikes and preparation for armed insurrection served to alienate the proletariat rather than to rally it to the communist cause. The CCP leadership decided to use the rising soviet movement in the countryside as a means of recapturing its influence in the cities.

This attack on "rightism" was seen in the Politburo decision of 5 October 1929 attacking Chen Duxiu for his "Trotskyite" and "liquidationist tendencies" (**Doc. C.16**).²⁷ While

Chen was in power before July 1927, he had no particular association with Trotsky and had adhered to the position of accommodation with the GMD approved by Stalin but opposed by Trotsky. The argumentation in the decision was tortuous. The decision claimed that Trotsky's request that the CCP break away from the GMD meant leaving the leadership of the Chinese revolution to the bourgeoisie alone, thus renouncing proletarian leadership. Yet, Chen Duxiu's persistence in cooperating with the GMD meant subordination of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie, thus also giving up leadership by the proletariat. In reply, Chen and his followers criticized not only the military adventurism of the Party Center but also the bureaucratic corruption of Stalin in the Soviet Union (**Doc. C.17**).²⁸ Chen Duxiu was indeed moving closer to Trotsky! The letter lays the blame for the failure of the Chinese revolution and the continued "opportunist" and "putchist" policies of the CCP squarely on the shoulders of the Comintern and Stalin and Bukharin. While criticizing these policies, the letter called for a reappraisal of the use of the parliament and the democratic movement while awaiting a future revolutionary high tide.

The conflict between Li Lisan and Zhou Enlai caused the latter to leave China for Moscow in April 1930.²⁹ This gave Li Lisan complete control over the central party leadership, and his radical line shifted into top gear. In addition to encouragement from the Comintern and the further development of the red armies and soviets (albeit still extremely tenuous), the outbreak of civil war within the GMD seemed to provide Li with the chance to launch his strategy. On 5 April 1930, a major conflict broke out between the Nanjing government of Chiang Kai-shek and the combined forces of Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang.³⁰ As a result, most regular GMD troops were transferred to the north, leaving just local troops and the police to guard the southern cities. The Communists took this clash in the GMD ranks as a sufficient condition for a revolutionary insurrection.

In May 1930, Li Lisan convened two conferences in Shanghai: the National Conference of Delegates from the Red Armies and the National Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas. While the latter Conference drew more attention because of its call for the establishment of a national soviet regime, the former was of more immediate and practical significance. The red armies were ordered to combine together into four army corps, with each being assigned a certain strategic locality for offense. The former guerrilla tactic was replaced by that of mobile warfare, thus paving the way for the adoption of the policy of attack on the large cities and main communication lines.³¹

The strategy was spelled out by the Politburo on 11 June 1930 in its new resolution (**Doc. C.18**).³² The current stage was seen as one of revolutionary upsurge, and it proposed that Wuhan be seized as a part of the takeover of one or more provinces. The resolution sought to implement the Comintern's wishes in China, but the failure of the strategy caused it to become the focus of critical attention in the Soviet Union some months later.

The resolution was sent to the Comintern for approval but the Comintern delayed making a formal reply possibly because of the link made by Li Lisan between the

Chinese and world revolutions.³³ Later the Comintern was to criticize the efforts made in the resolution to show the interdependence of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution. The 11 June resolution claimed that because China was the weakest link in the ruling chain of world imperialism, the Chinese revolution could occur first, setting off the world revolution and the final class war. While such an analysis could be justified in terms of the Comintern's view that the stability of world capitalism would soon erode, though at an uneven pace, depending on place, the Comintern may not have been too happy to have Li Lisan lecturing it on the world revolution. The resolution also hinted at the need for Soviet aid, something that Li Lisan would soon openly ask for. This was ignored by the Comintern. It was not in a position to call on Soviet Russia to support the Chinese revolution. This appeal was later denounced as an error of "semi-Trotskyism." The prediction that a successful bourgeois-democratic revolution would soon be transformed into a socialist one was also cited later as proof of Li's Trotskyite tendencies. However, this too had been a prediction in line with Comintern analysis at the time.

On 16 July 1930, the Party Center sent another letter to the Presidium of the ECCI calling for approval of the strategy outlined in the resolution of 11 June. Two days later, the National Conference of CCP Organizations opened in Shanghai (18-22 July). The Conference announced that the party's general task was to organize armed uprisings to seize political power and that the party was preparing to take power. Further, it called for action committees to be established at the central and local levels. In the "red areas," workers and peasants' revolutionary committees were to be established. These would be the sole leading organs.³⁴

A reply was eventually made by the Comintern, whose letter of June 1930 to the CCP CC has produced different interpretations (**Doc. C.19**).³⁵ The letter contained no substantial disagreement with Li Lisan either in terms of general policy or even with respect to practical strategy. What was indicated between the lines, however, was worry over Li Lisan's operations and shirking of responsibility, which fully accorded with the position of the Comintern leaders in the early 1930s. The Comintern leaders were not so foolhardy as Li to claim world revolution was imminent; nor did they dare to exclude the possibility of a successful revolution in China. The letter did not oppose the idea of taking over Wuhan and one or more provinces, but it seemed to oppose Li's notion of an "immediate nationwide revolution."

It is a moot point as to when Li Lisan and the Party Center knew of the Comintern's views. Letters could take up to one or two months to arrive, and the full text probably did not arrive until early September. However, CCP leaders were already informed of its contents by late July from telegraphic messages received by the ECCI Far East Office in Shanghai.³⁶

On 27 July, Peng Dehuai's Third Army Corps³⁷ took the city of Changsha, but was only able to hold it for seven days before retreating. The collapse of the attack and the worldwide attention it drew undermined Li Lisan's position. Ironically, Li Lisan knew little of the Changsha attack. Communications were slow, and it seems that no direct orders were sent. Indeed, Li came to learn of the capture of Changsha

through GMD broadcasts and newspapers.³⁸ It did lead Li to call two Politburo meetings on 1 and 3 August, at which he rejected Comintern concern and announced the arrival of a nationwide revolutionary upsurge.³⁹ On 6 August, Li Lisan chaired the first meeting of the Central Action Committee, calling on the whole party to mobilize for immediate revolution.

By August 1930 the Comintern was more clearly of the opinion that Li had gone too far. Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai were sent back to China to moderate Li's excesses but not yet to repudiate his policy wholesale.⁴⁰ This is not surprising, given that it would be difficult to extricate the Comintern from sharing the blame. Although it is not clear that the Comintern gave an instruction for another attack on Changsha, clearly Zhou was not given an instruction to prevent a further attack. Both Zhou and Qu were in China when the second attack took place (24 August–12 September). Also a few articles were published in *Red Flag* encouraging the operation, presumably at Li's instigation.

Apart from Comintern vacillation, other factors probably contributed to Zhou and Qu's unwillingness to take a tougher line at the Third Plenum (24–28 September 1930).⁴¹ Qu himself had pursued a "leftist" line only two years before, and Zhou Enlai's previous involvement with Li Lisan and his conciliatory personality also contributed. The "Political Resolution" adopted by the Plenum noted the basic concordance between Li Lisan's policy and that of the Comintern and only criticized Li for his tactical errors, particularly concerning the speed and development of the revolution (**Doc. C.20**). This mild approach to criticism was reflected in the fact that no basic changes were made in the Politburo that was elected. Indeed, Li Lisan supporter Li Weiham was added as an alternate member of the Politburo.⁴²

(d) The Fourth Plenum—January 1931— The Rise of Wang Ming's Leadership

Although the Comintern refrained from criticism of Li Lisan while the strategy was in operation, as soon as it failed, harsh condemnation followed.⁴³ Between the Third and Fourth Plenums (September 1930–January 1931), factional conflicts and power struggles within the CCP increased. Li Lisan's strongest opponents were Wang Ming and the "returned students" group. They had as their principal supporter Pavel Mif, the Comintern representative in China.⁴⁴ Yet, opposition had little to do with current or future policy and was not based on opposition to a "leftist" line. Wang Ming, in an article published four days after the 11 June resolution, only differed from Li in his assessment that the Chinese revolution could occur immediately without depending on world revolution as its precondition.⁴⁵

Also, the Comintern began to toughen its stance as Pavel Mif and his supporters in the Comintern became dissatisfied with the decisions of the Third Plenum. In October 1930, the ECCI sent members of the CC a letter stating that Li Lisan's mistakes were ones of line.⁴⁶ It labeled Li Lisan "anti-Comintern" and a "semi-Trotskyite." Mif himself arrived in China in mid-December 1930 and proposed that

the Fourth Plenum be convened as soon as possible. The Plenum was held in Shanghai on 7 January and was dominated by Mif and his protégé, Wang Ming.⁴⁷ Indeed, the summary speech was made by Mif.

The resolution of the Fourth Plenum (**Doc. C.21**), drafted under Mif's guidance, was harsh in its condemnation of Li Lisan. Li was accused of betraying the correct instructions of the Comintern and bringing havoc to the party. Li's "line" was summed up as being contradictory to that of the Comintern and was essentially an opportunist viewpoint camouflaged by "leftist" words. Its attitude toward the revolutionary task of organizing the masses was one of "opportunistic passivism." Betraying the Comintern line was true to the extent that the Comintern itself had abandoned the idea of using the Red Army to seize the urban areas.

For its new leadership in China, the Comintern did not turn to the soviet areas but to Wang Ming and the "returned students." There were substantial changes in the Politburo with Wang Ming becoming a full member. Wang had not even been a CC member previously. Qu Qiubai, Li Weiham, and Li Lisan were dismissed from their Politburo positions, while, in addition to Wang Ming, Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi, and Wang Kequan were elected. Although Xiang Zhongfa remained general secretary, real power lay with Wang Ming.⁴⁸ Several months after the Plenum, the strength of the "returned students" was increased with the promotion of Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian.

Excluded from the new party leadership was the group gathered around He Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong, who had opposed Li Lisan's adventurism from a practical point of view. From the beginning, they had been closely linked to the communist labor movement and saw that Li's policies were destroying it. However, lacking the support of Pavel Mif, they were labeled as "right opportunists."⁴⁹ They opposed the decisions of the Fourth Plenum and began to organize opposition to it. Indeed, He Mengxiong had opposed convening the Plenum, calling for an emergency conference similar to that of 7 August 1927. On 17 January 1931, He, Luo, and their supporters decided to bring their opposition out into the open. They organized a second Jiangsu party committee to rival the one headed by Wang Ming, and they demanded that an emergency party congress be convened and that Mif be recalled.

The following day, however, He, Lin Yunan, and other supporters were arrested by the British police and handed over to the Nationalists. They were executed on 7 February. Luo and the remaining supporters charged that the "returned students" had betrayed them. Not surprisingly, Wang Ming denied this, claiming that one of their own number had betrayed them. Whichever of these two versions is correct, it was very convenient for Wang Ming and his supporters.⁵⁰

Following the arrest, the Party Center launched a drive to break the influence of Luo Zhanglong and the group's remaining supporters. From 20 January onward, various critical resolutions were published culminating with the one expelling Luo from the party on 27 January 1931. This resolution accused Luo of heading a rightist group. It used the simple defense that because the Fourth Plenum was

convened by the Comintern, anyone who opposed its decision was anti-Comintern and antiparty.⁵¹ Luo continued his oppositional politics (see, for example, **Doc. C.22**) and set up a rival CC with branches in some six provinces.⁵² The opposition collapsed when Luo was arrested by the GMD in April 1933.

(e) Mao Zedong and Li Lisan

The relationship of Mao Zedong to the Li Lisan line is an interesting and controversial topic. In assessing this question, the background of the more radical and moderate positions represented by Li and Zhou within the Party Center and the increasingly leftward drift in the party's general line need to be borne in mind. As evidence of conflict between Li and Mao, the exchange of two letters between the Party Center and the Front Committee in early 1929 have been quoted.⁵³ The 7 February 1929 letter from the Party Center to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army was most probably written by Zhou Enlai as head of the Organization Department and the Central General Office. The letter adjudged the situation to be a stalemate and suggested that Mao and Zhu De leave the Fourth Red Army and that it be broken up into small squads (**Doc. C.23**). The reply on 5 April was drafted by Mao. He pointed out that the central leadership's evaluations of both the objective conditions and the subjective strength of the revolution were too pessimistic. He expressed his confidence that his troops would take over the whole of Jiangxi within one year (**Doc. C.24**). Thus Mao was critical of Zhou's moderate stand while lending support, intentionally or not, to Li Lisan's more radical position. However, Mao's main concern was the operations of his own troops and not the differences within the party's central leadership. It should be noted that the Party Center's letter of February was written immediately after the Fourth Red Army's loss of the Jinggang Mountains base, while the reply in April came after the army's rehabilitation in south Jiangxi and west Fujian. These immediate military situations strongly influenced the pessimistic and optimistic views expressed in the respective letters.

Mao's "Single Spark" letter of 5 January 1930 to Lin Biao (**Doc. C.25**) has usually been taken to show his opposition to the Li Lisan leadership. Mao was countering what he saw as the pessimistic tendencies within the party, putting forward his independent position against the Party Center as a whole. In fact, he tacitly supported the aggressive posture favored by Li Lisan and still seemed to reject Zhou Enlai's more cautious position.

It was not until the central leadership under Li Lisan began to gain control over the red armies that Mao and Li came into conflict. Li Lisan wanted to bring all the Red Army troops under a more centralized leadership, using them to launch a concerted attack on the large cities. Mao supported the first action, and thus a joint headquarters was formed to be in charge of all the Red Army forces in Jiangxi with Mao as its leader. Mao did not support the second action. Instead of directing his troops to the north, he moved them to the south and east. Mao used as an excuse the three GMD brigades blocking the route to the north. Furthermore, Mao drafted a

three-month plan for spreading all his troops into the countryside of south Jiangxi and west Fujian.

Contradictions between Mao and the Party Center increased. In April 1930 the Party Center sent Mao a letter warning him that the Fourth Red Army was very slow in its buildup of forces and that results were extremely unsatisfactory.⁵⁴ This letter claimed that this was because of Mao's conservative position and his deployment of the troops in the countryside. Instead Mao was called on to do his best to expand the Red Army. This seems to have spurred Mao. His Fourth Army had not expanded as vigorously as some others, such as Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army. Between February 1930 and June 1930, Peng had tripled the number of his troops and captured a number of medium and even large cities.

On 15 June 1930, Mao was criticized even more harshly for his inertia and instructed to take his troops north. In July, the Third Army Corps under Peng Dehuai⁵⁵ took over Yuezhou and Changsha. As a result, Mao changed tactics and quickly moved his troops north to join in the assault on the big cities. Mao's troops and Peng's forces, which had just withdrawn from Changsha, were merged into the First Front Army, and Mao was appointed general political commissar. Another assault was made on Changsha, but after two weeks, Mao pulled all the troops back to his Jiangxi base. Despite this failure in the eyes of the Party Center, Mao retained his position as general political commissar. The fact that he then guided his troops to take over the prefectural city of Ji'an (on 3 October 1930), claiming it the initial phase in capturing the whole of Jiangxi, suggests that Mao had not yet realized that Li's line was erroneous.

As the Joint Resolution of the Front Committee of the First Front Army and the Action Committee of Jiangxi Province of 26 October 1930 shows (**Doc. C.26**), Mao was still ignorant of the Comintern's criticism of the Li Lisan line at that time. The resolution continues to use phrases such as "the necessity of carrying out decisive class struggle" and "striving to win an initial victory" in Jiangxi. However, as far as practical issues were concerned, the resolution shows that Mao depended on his control of Red Army troops and his judgment of the actual situation rather than on the slogans of the Party Center.

A deep concern with the military forces under his command and the real situation rather than general party affairs and Marxist doctrine dictated Mao's position and strategy. In this sense Mao appeared as an opponent of the Li Lisan leadership; probably he would have opposed any central party authority at the time. However, the only period of direct confrontation was from April to June 1930 when Li tried to command Mao's troops directly. Apart from this period, Mao had acted, wittingly or not, in line with the radical impulses of the central leadership under Li Lisan. Furthermore, it was through the Li Lisan adventure that Mao rose rapidly through the ranks of the military command structure. In less than half a year, he had moved up to head a front army. Mao thus ended his three-year exclusion from the top leadership.

The beginning of 1931 saw a generally satisfactory situation for the CCP. At one point in 1927, party membership had dipped as low as ten thousand. Despite the

two “leftist lines” of Qu Qiubai and Li Lisan, the party grew roughly tenfold by the end of 1930. Yet it was clear that the momentum of the movement had shifted from the urban to the rural areas. The Li Lisan line and the ensuing factional clashes had sharply reduced communist influence in the cities, and the central authorities in Shanghai functioned as a group of underground agents. The strategy of armed insurrections based on the potential that the Communists had built up during the Northern Expedition had been played out. It was replaced by an emphasis on the solid expansion of soviet bases and the Red Army. Important bases had been developed under Mao in Jiangxi, He Long in west Hunan-Hubei, and Xu Xiangqian in Hubei-Henan-Anhui. Despite the failure to take over a major city or to win a victory in one or more provinces, the military capacity of the Red Army had generally increased. The period of rebellions was replaced by one of civil war with the Nationalists, while the Communists developed their base areas and built up their armies.

DOCUMENTS JULY 1927–1930

C.1 CC Circular No. 9 on the Peasantry—The General Strategy for the Peasant Movement at the Present Time (20 July 1927)⁵⁶

1) In recent years, the progress of the peasant movement in China has demonstrated that the Chinese revolution has entered a new phase—the phase of the land revolution. The land revolution is merely a process. The evolution of this process requires a democratic regime of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie led by the proletariat and the armed forces of the workers and peasants. At present this revolution has suffered a setback in China. The causes are: (a) the leadership of the proletariat is not yet strong; in other words, the subjective organizational capacity of the proletariat is insufficient, at the moment, to lead the revolutionary alliance of workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie. (b) The armed forces of the workers and peasants were not built up. (c) Our party committed the mistake of carrying out irresolute and vacillating policies. (d) The GMD CC in Wuhan, the nationalist government, and the so-called Revolutionary Army are, in their class nature, representatives of the landlord class and incapable of fulfilling the new historic mission—the land revolution. They have shifted from limiting the workers and peasants' movement to launching a full-scale counterrevolution to oppose and massacre the workers and peasants. This betrayal was a historical certainty and proves that the deepening of the revolution was to be expected. Our party's only responsibility is to fight resolutely these new counterrevolutionaries, gather together all the revolutionary forces, and open up this new revolutionary phase—the land revolution. This is the objective situation of the revolution at the present time, and it demands a new tactical response from us.

2) Peasants across the country now live in misery under the rule of the new and old warlords. The burden imposed by decades of war between new and old warlords and the economic aggression of the imperialists rests mostly on the shoulders of the poor peasants. In the north, the weight of harsh levies and taxes has already forced most peasants to abandon their land and lose their livelihood. In the various southern provinces, the miseries of the peasantry are hardly any different from those in the north. The little freedom that had been gained after repeated struggles has been snatched away again. Whether in the south or north, the majority of the poor peasants who have suffered excessive oppression (tenant peasants, semi-self-tilling peasants, farmhands, unemployed peasants, and most of the self-tilling peasants) have already been awakened and are fighting their enemies. In particular, in the south since the massacres by Li Jishen and Tang Shengzhi,⁵⁷ the peasants' resistance and struggles have become more heroic and resolute. At the same time, because of their conflicts and internal contradictions, the new and old warlords are unable to form a unified reactionary regime. One by one they are rapidly collapsing.

Therefore, while superficially the revolutionary tide throughout the country appears to be declining, it is actually continuing to rise. The current reactionary situation is only a reflection of the class conflicts that occur as the revolution evolves to the stage of solving the land problem. Only by taking a firm stand in support of this land revolution can our party lead the revolutionary tide forward. How can we create a movement for the land revolution? We can attain this objective only by quickly mastering the objective situation, seizing every opportunity, raising appropriate slogans, and leading the majority of the masses to wage continuous struggles. At present the following slogans should be used to launch the land revolution: "Do not pay harsh levies and multiple taxes"; "Do not pay precollected money and grains"; "Reduce rent by 25 percent"; "Eliminate high-interest loans"; "Confiscate the land of big landlords, local tyrants, evil gentry, and counterrevolutionaries"; "Confiscate the land of churches, temples, and all public land"; "Land to the tiller"; "Down with corrupt officials and government employees"; "Down with the local tyrants and evil gentry"; "Down with new and old warlords"; "Realize revolutionary democratic power"; "Establish the political power of the peasant associations in the countryside"; "Popular election of the county government"; "Dismantle the counterrevolutionary armed forces"; "Restore the peasant associations"; "Arm the peasants"; "Peasants must have freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication, rent strikes, and tax resistance."

3) In northern provinces, such as Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan, self-tilling and semi-self-tilling peasants make up the majority [of the rural population]. The heavy taxes and levies drive them to bankruptcy, thus forcing them into banditry or causing them to seek refuge in other provinces. Here we should rely on the self-tilling peasants, poor peasants, and tenant peasants as the core to unite into a fighting alliance all the poor masses and small landlords in the countryside to resist all harsh levies, taxes, and the early collection of money and grains, all war requisitions; and to enforce a 25 percent rent reduction. At the same time, through these struggles we can seize political power in the countryside, take over the armed forces, and even confiscate the land of the village bosses, the gentry, the big landlords, the counterrevolutionaries, and all the churches and temples and distribute it freely among the peasants and tenants.

In southern provinces, such as Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong, tenant peasants make up the majority, followed by self-tilling and semi-self-tilling peasants. Tenant peasants are exploited by the landlords through heavy rents. At the same time, self-tilling peasants and small landlords are exploited by unusually heavy taxes and levies imposed by the warlords. We should start immediately to enforce a rent reduction of 25 percent and stage rent and tax strikes using the slogan "resist harsh levies and taxes and the early collection of money and grains." This is also intended to expose the hypocrisy of the Wuhan and Nanjing governments on the issue of rent and tax reduction. In addition, we can rely on the tenant peasants, self-tilling peasants, and poor peasants as the core to unite all poor people and even small landlords in the countryside, crush local tyrants, evil gentry, corrupt officials,

and government employees and seize political power and place the armed forces in the countryside under the control of the peasant associations. We can even confiscate the land of local tyrants, the gentry, big landlords, counterrevolutionaries, and all the churches and temples to launch the land revolution. This is the slogan we must do our best to propagate now in order to gather together the forces of the peasant masses for its realization.

No matter where, the struggle against annual interest higher than 20 percent should be thoroughly fought because this is the demand of the common oppressed people.

4) The land revolution is merely a process, the main characteristic of which is the struggle for political power. The struggle for political power is necessary to overthrow the rule in the countryside by feudal landlords, to induce the explosion of the land issue, and to provide a mechanism for its resolution. In southern provinces, such as Guangdong and Hunan, although the chief characteristic of the peasant movement has become confiscation of [land owned by] big landlords, it is impossible to solve the land problem alone if the peasants have not gained political power. The experiences of Hunan and Guangdong show that there is nothing wrong with this analysis.

The struggle for political power is to build the peasants' revolutionary popular power or, in other words, the peasant associations. In the process of the Chinese peasant movement, the peasant association has been transformed from a professional organization into a rural political alliance with the poor peasants as its backbone. Not only has the peasant association united ordinary peasants (those who till the land or are unemployed) and incorporated artisans, primary school teachers, and small merchants, but also has drawn in some small landlords who have broken away from the influence of the big landlords and who express sympathy with the peasant association. Currently, therefore, the peasant association is a revolutionary political alliance of the rural poor peasants and other petty bourgeois elements—the peasant association as political power. This is a correct form of rural political power and should be established in all areas from now on.

5) In line with experiences gained through the peasant movement in Hunan, several points concerning the organization of peasant associations should be raised which deserve our special attention:

a) The peasant movement in each province should concentrate our human and material resources in areas of political and military importance and with important communications in order to establish a central base that can lead the peasant movement throughout the province. We should seek to deepen our work in these areas and temporarily postpone our expansion. We should never seek expansion while ignoring work inside the central base.

b) Since the peasant association unites ordinary peasants, artisans, primary school teachers, small merchants, and, under certain conditions, small landlords as well, we should pay attention to the composition of its leadership at each level. Perhaps small landlords, as a whole, should not be assimilated into the leading organs. In addition, tenant peasants, self-tilling peasants, and unemployed peasants

should each account for at least one-fifth of the area executive committee [*qufen zhiwei*]. The election of primary school teachers to area executive committees is necessary.

c) Peasant associations at each level should set up women's and youth departments. The children's movement and organizations in the countryside come entirely under the jurisdiction of the youth department. Female peasants are to join the peasant association; no separate women's groups will be organized.

6) The peasant associations' struggle for political power and the land revolution require a revolutionary armed force to ensure victory. However, the so-called Revolutionary Army is now under the command of those reactionary officers who represent the landlord class. Everywhere, they murder peasants. Armed conflict has become a very widespread phenomenon in the peasant movement. Now this is the most serious and pressing problem. If every peasant movement organizer fails to pay 120 percent attention to this problem and does not seek the correct solution, this will leave us ill-prepared for victory in the peasant revolution. In all places, our party organizations should use all methods to make peasants accept military training and take up arms. Some general methods are listed below:

a) Use all means to seize weapons from the landlord class and all counterrevolutionaries, and arm the peasants.

b) Organize and send brave peasant association members to the military for training; use all methods to carry out sabotage against its [the military's] organization and prepare to seize its weapons.

c) The above methods are also to be applied to the civil police bureau and self-defense corps whose weapons cannot be seized immediately.

d) It is not possible for the peasant armed forces to function openly under names such as "Peasant Self-Defense Army" or "Peasant Army." They can function only in the following three forms: (i) they can use the legitimate name of "Household Regiment," "Defense Regiment," "Village Association," etc.; (ii) they can be dispersed in ordinary times, receive secret training, and be assembled as soon as fighting breaks out; (iii) they can "go up to the mountains" [*shang shan*—become outlaws] when the above two forms are impossible.

7) The party should send appropriate comrades to penetrate the masses of such armed groups as the Red Spear and Sword Societies in the north and lead them to fight for their interests. This will win their trust, and gradually they will break away from their reactionary leaders and become the armed forces of the revolution. We must never attack their reactionary leaders at the outset or propose to change their organizational forms and get rid of superstition. Such mechanical and hasty means will not win mass support. Also, if we use the previous tactics of only keeping in touch with their leaders or using the names of military leaders to mobilize them, we will not produce any results.

The bandits in the south who usually use the slogan "plunder the rich to help the poor" have also adopted the slogans of "down with local tyrants and the evil gentry" and "down with corrupt officials and government employees." At the same time, in terms of practical actions, they are moving closer to the peasant associations and

sometimes even unite with the peasant associations. As a rule, the majority of them are unemployed peasants or virtually bankrupt peasants. Their economic slogans such as "plunder the rich to help the poor" are similar to "confiscate the land of the big landlords." They are natural enemies of the landlord class and rivals of the reactionary military in the cities (before they are sold out by their reactionary leaders). If we can help them to embark on the right revolutionary track, they will certainly become powerful assistants in the land revolution. However, their lives and environment are especially miserable, and their leaders are mostly of the candidate warlord type. This is why they are unable to receive correct political leadership, embark on the right revolutionary track, or fight for definite goals but rather make a regular living out of "plunder and robbery." Their thoughts and deeds follow the example of their leaders totally. Therefore, we should understand the positive role of secret society bandits in the peasant movement. On the other hand, we should also be aware of the possibility that they will become reactionary. Our objective is to improve their revolutionary qualities and provide them with revolutionary training so that they will become strong supporters of the land revolution under the leadership of the peasant associations. The methods to be employed are similar to those outlined above.

8) In the past, the party's organizations among the peasantry failed to fulfill fully their leadership responsibilities. Although in many areas tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of peasants have joined in the struggle, we have only a handful of comrades who can operate in these areas, and there are no party organizations to take over leadership responsibility. Although there are party organizations in some areas, they have not penetrated the masses (these organizations are only inside the area peasant associations but not inside the township peasant associations). Where there are organizations, they are useless. On occasion, the comrades responsible for the peasant movement have neglected the party's collective leadership and are accustomed to acting individually. This is why we believe that in party work in the countryside "with our comrades, our political enterprise will thrive; without our comrades, it will perish." Since the party cannot fulfill its active organizational responsibility in ordinary times, [when the battle breaks out] we cannot hope that it will be the only center leading the mass struggle. If our party's leadership is able to establish itself properly among the peasantry, then, first, it must ensure that party branches penetrate the township peasant associations and truly become the nuclei of the mass struggle. Second, the party's leadership of the peasantry must pass through our party groups [*dangtuan*] (correcting the past mistake of relying on the leaders alone); the party groups must absolutely obey the party leadership. Third, each province's party organizations should establish a peasant department [*nongmin bu*] and make monthly or bimonthly plans for the peasant movement. The departments should enforce the faithful execution of these plans by individual party organizations at each level.

C.2 Circular Letter of the CCP CEC to All Party Members (7 August 1927)⁵⁹

1) Introduction

[[The revolution has been in a critical stage since April 1927. Workers and peasants' organizations have suffered suppression by the Nanjing GMD under Chiang Kai-shek and the Wuhan GMD under Wang Jingwei. It is generally expected that the white terror will increase in intensity. We call on the masses to resist. We must once more point out that the counterrevolutionary forces of the GMD have actually betrayed the true principles of the GMD, which, as founded by Sun Yat-sen, was itself revolutionary. As the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat, the CCP now has a great mission to fulfill.]]

In the recent resolution of the ECCI it was pointed out that the leadership of our party had committed grave errors of opportunism.⁶⁰ The ECCI called on the entire party to criticize itself thoroughly and to correct such mistakes. The mistakes mentioned here are neither individual nor incidental but rather result from the grievously erroneous opportunist line carried out by our party's leadership. If this opportunist line is not abandoned and if the past mistakes remain uncorrected, then of course the party's future tasks cannot be correctly formulated and there will be even less chance of carrying on the revolutionary struggle and meeting the stupendous duties now facing us. In order to correct these mistakes, however, we must know how these errors were committed so that every party member will learn the lessons of the past. If the party does not correct the mistakes of the leading cadres it will be impossible to advance even one step along the revolutionary path.

[[The party of the working class must be able to correct its mistakes, and only if it publicly criticizes these mistakes will it be able to ensure that all party members join in.]]

Our strength is derived not only from our party's characteristics, but also is guaranteed by the struggle of the masses and the poor peasants who form the foundation of our party. As the ECCI's resolution states, "The CCP is carrying on a heroic struggle. The broad masses of the CCP are carrying on a truly revolutionary struggle among the lower social strata of workers, peasants, and urban poor." However, errors of opportunism have been committed by the party's leading cadres. Their constant vacillation, their irresolution at critical moments, their false, unrevolutionary theories which were contradictory to communism, and their unrevolutionary conduct are not only in complete contradiction to the resolutions and instructions of the Comintern, but also in total conflict with the revolutionary activities of the party masses.

[[Recent strikes in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Hunan attest to the glorious tradition of struggle by the masses.]]

Another glorious page in the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement was written by the comrades who led the peasant movement in Hunan. A political regime of peasant associations was set up by the peasant masses and led by CCP

members. Land that belonged to the big landlords was confiscated by spontaneous action on the part of the peasants and redistributed among peasants in the villages; the local militia of the gentry were disarmed; peasant armed groups were organized; and the feudal reactionary forces were thoroughly suppressed. The peasant movement developed on a large scale, permitting the conclusion of a revolutionary—but not opportunist—alliance with the lower masses of the GMD to organize peasant revolts against the reactionary regime at Changsha. (If the party's central organ had not retreated so shamelessly at the critical stage, such revolts would undoubtedly have been victorious.) These are the achievements of the party members in Hunan. These are the best methods for solving the land problem.

[[The efforts of the party rank and file and the masses are lauded while leading party cadres are attacked as rightist, opportunist, and vacillating.]]

2) The National Revolution and Class Struggle

[(i) The party's leading organ at that time did not understand correctly the nature of the Chinese revolution, and failed to abide by the Leninist theory and practice of the Comintern. (ii) The Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution with its major inclination toward socialism. To maintain that, during this stage, the national anti-imperialist revolution forms a separate element in conflict with the class struggle and social revolution is erroneous and unbolshevik. The Comintern has always rejected this kind of interpretation as undesirable opportunism. (iii) The national bourgeoisie in China, unlike the compradore class in the big cities, is being hard-pressed by foreign capital and therefore has to fight an economic battle against the imperialists. The national bourgeoisie, however, stunned by the large-scale revolutionary movement of the working class, finally came to ally itself—like the landlord and compradore classes—with the ruling power of foreign capital. (iv) The class struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie, and of the peasant masses against the feudal landlords, is not only compatible with, but necessary to, the anti-imperialist national revolution. The wavering petty bourgeoisie should be won over by the resolute revolutionary actions of the proletariat and of the CCP.]]

Here we have an evaluation of the various dynamic forces of the Chinese revolution, which should have determined the revolutionary strategy of the CCP. However, the party's leading cadres, in theory and especially in practice, had an opposite viewpoint in evaluating the strength of the various classes in the Chinese revolution. This (erroneous evaluation) caused the vacillating and hesitant opportunism of the party leadership. In the Menshevik manner, the CC separated out the national liberation movement and the class struggle as conflicting elements and seemed to think that development of the class struggle would be detrimental to the national revolution. The CC wanted the party, the working class, and the peasantry to limit their class demands and refrain from staging revolutionary struggles against the Chinese bourgeoisie and the landlords. The directive letter of 19 June [1927] sent by the CC to the Shanghai party committee declares that "one of the major characteristics of the Chinese revolution is its anti-imperialist nature. . . . In recent months we have neglected anti-imperialist activities." The CC seemed to imply that the emphasis on

attacking feudalism had led to unfavorable consequences. The CC upbraided CCP members for going too far and instructed the revolutionary peasants led by our party to retreat. The same directive added that “on the one hand, the anti-imperialist movement has declined and, on the other, the workers and peasants’ movement, at least from the point of view of the petty bourgeoisie, has reached its climax. [Our party’s] activity in arming the workers and peasants, confiscating land, and calling for noncapitalist development has aroused the distrust of the petty bourgeoisie, who think that the CCP is about to turn against the GMD and carry out a class revolution instead of a national revolution.” Thus, the CC at that time deemed class struggle to be one thing and the national revolution another. The directive also stated that “the petty bourgeoisie does not realize that land confiscation is a prerequisite to the national revolution but seems to think that the CCP’s confiscation of land is aimed at a revolution like the [Bolshevik] October Revolution to expand the power of the workers and peasants. The petty bourgeoisie, as a result, must raise this issue and call for a check on the workers and peasants’ movement or a break with the CCP. Under these conditions, can [the CCP] accept the policy of the petty bourgeoisie? If we did, we would destroy our own strength, forfeit the leadership of the proletariat, and surrender to Chiang Kai-shek and it would mean a capitalist future. Can we then insist on the confiscation of land and the arming of workers and peasants? The result of such insistence would be an immediate split [with the GMD-left], leading to the immediate destruction of the revolutionary bases. If we cannot successfully cope with this difficult situation by using appropriate methods, it will mean the victory of the bourgeoisie. Should we give up the policy of arming the workers and peasants and the confiscation of land? This, of course, is undesirable. For example, in the fight against Xu Kexiang⁶¹ we have already decided on a policy of land confiscation and arming the peasants. This is an independent policy but a dangerous one. If we carry on independently, then there will be a split with the GMD. And though this would be a defeat with glory, the split would still be disadvantageous to us. We should seek a new path through which the impasse in which we now find ourselves can be overcome, thus expanding and deepening the revolution and leading it to final victory.” This directive concluded with instructions to the party members in Shanghai “not to regard the national revolutionary movement solely as a workers’ problem, but to carry on anti-imperialist propaganda among all classes,” which would mean to carry on propaganda on behalf of the Shanghai bourgeoisie. This is indeed an unheard-of, unrevolutionary, uncommunist course and clearly shows that the views of the [party’s] leading organ regarding the basic problems of the revolution, as well as on the nature of the revolution for national liberation, are entirely erroneous.

The opportunism of the CC regarding this problem reflects the influence of the bourgeoisie on Communists. The whole revolutionary policy has been turned upside down. The CC’s policy had nothing in common with the directives and resolutions of the Comintern, or with the struggle of the working class and the revolutionary peasantry.

Whoever insists on defending those opportunists or stands for a continuation of such opportunism will sever himself forever from communism.

3) The CCP and the Workers' Movement

The CCP is the vanguard of the proletariat, the most advanced, most revolutionary, and most class-conscious element of the proletariat. The work of the CCP should always be based on the basic interests of the working class and should aim at a change of the entire social structure by revolutionary methods. Since the CCP takes the welfare of the working class as its point of departure, it should raise demands which are objectively tenable in the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution before [the revolution] reaches its socialist stage. One of the major tasks of the CCP is to organize the working masses, lead their struggle, and fight resolutely for the elevation of the living standards of the working class, for wage increases, for the establishment of an eight-hour workday, for complete freedom in organizing workers and class unions, for an unlimited right to strike, and for the elimination of the conditions of enslavement among workers who possess no rights or privileges whatsoever.

The workers can raise those demands in the course of the democratic revolution, but [they] must do so by means of an independent struggle of the proletarian masses. The CCP should spread and encourage the class struggle of the proletariat and help every workers' struggle against the bourgeoisie. The Comintern has repeatedly instructed the CCP to fight for the improvement of the material conditions of the working masses and for the improvement of living conditions in the factories and in society, for the immediate abolition of the laws which oppress the workers, and for the realization of such rights as the eight-hour workday, the increase of wages, and the recognition of workers' rights to organize unions and to strike. At the same time, the Comintern points out that it is necessary to arm the workers speedily, boldly, and resolutely, especially those elements which are most class conscious and best organized. This course is considered absolutely essential by the Comintern. Such directives of the Comintern are in keeping with the struggle of the workers themselves in the industrial areas and the actions of the rank-and-file party members. But the leading organ of our party has developed a different course. It has simply hindered and minimized the class struggle and the revolutionary actions of the workers. Instead of spreading and promoting strike movements, the CC, together with the leaders of the GMD, decided on an arbitrary method of mediation and ruled that the final authority belonged to the government. Under the government of a coalition of classes, led during this first stage by the bourgeoisie, this kind of policy actually served merely to protect the interests of the bourgeoisie and greatly obstructed the workers' movement. Our CC did not protest against the resolution of the GMD CEC that prohibited strikes in enterprises without the permission of the government, and it demanded that the unions stop fighting for the demands of the workers but rather undertake the responsibility for maintaining labor discipline. The CC seemed to think that the restriction of the workers' movement would preserve the alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, but did not understand that

the irresolution shown in protecting the interests of the working class would only hasten the petty bourgeoisie's turn to the right. The CC used every method possible to restrain the workers' economic struggle and to prevent them from struggling for their direct welfare, [but failed to realize that] if these demands were not met, the leadership of the working class in the revolutionary movement would never be secured. The CC decided on such a policy at that time because its evaluation of the alliance with the petty bourgeoisie was erroneous. Also erroneous was its concept of the interest of the national revolution.

The spontaneously developing workers' movement has established powerful labor unions with a mass foundation and is entirely under the influence of CCP members. Armed workers' pickets, extensive labor organization, the youth corps, etc. have been brought into existence. The working class, discovering its own strength, rose in direct struggle against the bourgeoisie, which had become counter-revolutionary and retarded production, deliberately inviting industrial recession and financial chaos. When the unions arrested a few factory and shopowners, the whole bourgeoisie came out and shouted [about the workers'] "excesses." Joining in this cry were not only the intellectual elements of the petty bourgeoisie, but also the CC of our party. In some documents, the CC criticized severely such "excesses." The CC did its best to prevent the workers from taking over factories even when their owners deliberately closed them down. [The CC instructed them] not to close any shops even when their proprietors raised prices deliberately and to refrain from arresting people even if they were discovered to be counterrevolutionary.

The working class was surging toward the realization of a true democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, but the CC used every means possible to prevent the workers' movement from progressing along the revolutionary path.

Not only did the CC fail to take measures to arm the workers, but, encountering the active opposition of the bourgeoisie, it disarmed [itself] voluntarily and dissolved the workers' pickets at Hankou. It also voluntarily disbanded the labor youth corps in order to preserve the alliance with the petty bourgeoisie.

The GMD leadership instructed the labor unions to assume responsibility for the maintenance of strict workers' discipline. Anyone disobeying the regulation was to be handed over to the government for punishment. The unions could only administer punishment to the workers. Yet our party's CC did not raise a single word of objection to all this, and when the Hubei Labor Federation accepted these instructions, the CC [of the CCP] acquiesced. Every independent expression of the working class was branded by the CC as "excessive" and "infantile," and it was not aware that its own remarks were those of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie.

The party's leading organ adopted an entirely erroneous policy, not only with regard to the workers' economic struggle, but also with regard to political activities. The workers in Hankou played an historic role when they retrieved the British concession there. Yet this action was not only not led by the party's leading organ, it was even criticized by the CC after the event. Recently, the CC showed an inclination to disband voluntarily the secret unions in Shanghai and make the work-

ers join the "yellow unions" of Chiang Kai-shek. Fear of the masses and distrust of their strength were reflected in intraparty affairs. The majority of the leading cadres of the party are composed of representatives of the intellectual elements and the petty bourgeoisie. Only on the insistence of the ECCI were a few workers admitted to the leading organs [of the party]. In many unions, the leading party members are not workers but students and intellectuals. When the party school was about to be established, the CC insisted on reducing the number of workers [on the candidates list], maintaining that the cultural level of the workers was too low and their political consciousness undeveloped and unawakened. As a matter of fact, the political consciousness of the workers in Shanghai is higher than that of the party leadership. Our party should cut itself off once and for all from such unproletarian, unrevolutionary, thorough opportunism.

4) The CCP and the Rural Revolution

The question of rural revolution is the crux of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The Comintern has repeatedly explained itself on this question. The Comintern gave clear and definite instructions to our Chinese party indicating ways of solving the land problem. The resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI [May 1927] also reiterated the previous directives. This resolution pointed out: "Only by relying on the rural revolution in the countryside and by satisfying the needs of the urban working class and guaranteeing their political rights can the masses be brought into the struggle. Demands such as those for the abolition of rental payments to the gentry; redistribution of land; confiscation of the land of the landlords, temples, and bureaucrats; cancellation of usurious debts of the poor peasants; prohibition of exploitative contracts; drastic reductions in taxes; and the shifting of the tax burdens to the shoulders of the rich should be carried out on a nationwide scale, particularly in areas under the rule of the Wuhan government. These demands should succeed in arousing the masses to oppose the landlords, the bourgeoisie who have betrayed the revolution, and the warlords of north China." The rural revolution consists of confiscation and nationalization of land—this is the major content of the domestic social economy in the new stage of the Chinese revolution. The main thing at present is to employ the "mass-type" revolutionary methods to solve the land problem [and allow] the tens of millions of peasants to solve this problem by rising up from below. The CC should be the vanguard of this movement and direct it. In the government, the CCP should carry out such a policy so that the government itself will act to support the rural revolution. Only thus can the present government be turned into the center of political organization of the workers and peasants' movement and the organ of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

However, the work of the leading party organ ran directly counter to this revolutionary course. The peasant movement in Hunan that had turned into a powerful rural revolution and the revolts of the peasant masses in other provinces against the landlords and gentry were neither directed nor guided by the CC, but were carried out against its orders and directives. In general, these movements were only initiated by the lower strata of the masses themselves. The peasant movement in various

areas was led only by the lower party cadres and party members, and the CC often obstructed or even reversed the revolutionary movement of the peasants. The party's leading organ did not pay any attention to the significance of the land problem in the Chinese revolution. Before the Fifth National Congress [of the CCP; April–May 1927], the party's leading organ paid only the minimum possible attention to the land question. At the Hankou Special Conference in December 1926, which was an important conference [convened] to decide the tasks of the party after the success of the Northern Expedition, not a single word was mentioned on the stand to be adopted by the party vis-à-vis the land question. At the various provincial conferences of the peasant associations (such as those held in Hunan in December 1926 and in Jiangxi in January 1927), the party did not define its stand on the land question. Only in the provincial conference of the peasant associations in Hubei in March of this year [1927] did the party touch on this issue.

At the CCP's Fifth National Congress, a resolution on the peasant question was passed [see **Doc. B.26**], but the party leaders, Comrades Chen Duxiu and Tan Pingshan, stated that the current task was to extend but not to deepen the revolution, and that consequently land confiscation should be postponed until some future date.

The Land Committee of the GMD CEC convened for three weeks [19 April–6 May 1927], and the communist members, headed by Tan Pingshan, changed their stand on the land question twice, on both occasions acting according to the opinion of the GMD representatives. Finally [the CCP members] drafted a proposal which laid down some principles for the solution of the land problem but which did not call for immediate action. When the CEC [of the GMD] refused to make this resolution public, not a single CCP member on the committee protested.

The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the CCP [March 1927] even decided that rent-reduction should only be demanded when the rent exceeded 50 percent [of the principal crops]. This was at a time when the peasant associations in Hunan had already begun their active struggle and even carried out, in practice, a redistribution of land. The leading organ of our party verbally admitted some of its mistakes, but the policy of obstructing the rural revolution was maintained to the very end. Our party actually followed in the footsteps of the petty bourgeois leadership of the GMD and vigorously opposed the "excesses" of the peasant movement.

The course adopted by the leading organ of the party was, in reality, opposed to rural revolution. Thus, the circular of the Propaganda Bureau of the CC on 1 June [1927] declared that "we must remember that the party's peasant policy is to check firmly any excesses [committed] against the small landlords, revolutionary militarists, and petty bourgeoisie." Another circular, dated 4 June, also stated that "the failure to check the unorganized actions on the part of the peasants to solve the land problem by themselves has led to many excesses. Such a condition must be corrected."⁶² There was even one school of opinion which maintained that the excesses in the Wuhan area were fomented by the agents of Chiang Kai-shek. This is simply an imitation of the Wuhan [government] militarists, because they too have stated

that the excesses were instigated by Chiang Kai-shek's agents. Thus, the CCP leaders would even defend the oppressors of the peasant movement. One directive of the National Peasant Federation declared: "Chiang Kai-shek, bad gentry, and village bosses are utilizing a few peasants to harm the welfare of the families of officers, to spread rumors, and to manufacture an internal split. They deliberately carry out leftist agitation in order to suppress the peasant movement later." One of the responsible leaders of the CCP announced on one occasion that "irresponsible arrests cause anxiety to the petty bourgeoisie, who get the impression that the GMD government has become the prisoner of the CCP. This impression must be eradicated."

In this manner, the great peasant revolt in Hunan not only frightened the bourgeoisie, landlords, and warlords, but also the leadership of the CCP. At a time when CCP members and the masses in various areas fought relentlessly for the development of the [peasant] movement, with an admirably brave spirit of sacrifice, the CC, frightened by the intimidation and wavering of the leaders of the GMD, failed to produce a revolutionary platform for the solution of the land question. [The CC] also took an extremely opportunist position regarding the question of attainment of political power by the peasantry. The CC did not take into consideration the revolutionary fighting experience of the peasant masses in drawing their conclusions, but willfully relied on a system of village self-government which was rigid, impractical, and harmful to the revolution. In fact, the spontaneous upsurge [of the peasants] has given revolutionary political power to the peasant associations, which have confiscated the land of the big landlords, reduced rent, disarmed the civil corps and the gentry, and punished the counterrevolutionary elements in rural areas.

The CC did not aid and develop this form of revolutionary political regime, but agreed to the rigid organization of rural self-government as proposed by the CEC of the GMD. What is the real meaning of this rural self-government? The answer can be found in the directive of the National Peasant Federation, which states: "Establish self-governing bodies in the rural areas in order to consolidate the victory secured by the peasants and eliminate the anarchic conditions prevailing in the villages."

The CC strongly opposed the redistribution of property, the imposition of fines [on the landlords], and the arrest of village bosses. As early as 25 May 1927, the CC announced that "infantile acts of the poor peasants are estranging us from the petty bourgeoisie."⁶³ Although the CC did not dare to oppose openly the slogan of land confiscation, all its actions were predicated on the abandonment of such a fine. The 25 May resolution stated that "naturally, we cannot abandon the platform passed by the Fifth National Congress, but we should realize that the land problem in China should pass through a propaganda phase. We must solve the most urgent question concerning the land question, namely, the question of village administration. Consequently, we must: (i) spread propaganda regarding the land problem, especially among the soldiers, and (ii) organize self-governing bodies in the villages, as well as in the counties [*xian*]." If this resolution is taken together with the fact that the CC did not raise the slogan of land confiscation but, on the contrary, resolutely

opposed land redistribution, it becomes clear that the CC had adopted a policy of opposition toward the confiscation of the land of the big landlords.

This policy produced very undesirable effects on the activities of the party during the Hunan coup. After the counterrevolutionary coup at Changsha,⁶⁴ peasant forces which had mobilized at the suggestion of the CCP members in Hunan began to attack the counterrevolutionaries in Changsha. Had the armed attack of the peasants not been obstructed by the cowardly and irresolute leading organ of the party, Changsha, surrounded as it was by 100,000 armed peasants, would have been easily captured. At the last moment, on the eve of the attack (by the peasant army) on Changsha, the leader of the Hunan party headquarters, a member of the Politburo, ordered the cancellation of the attack on the grounds that military action against Changsha would lead to a national political imbroglio and that instructions from the CC should be awaited. On the next day a letter from the CC arrived stating that the attack should be postponed and that the peasant forces should undergo further consolidation pending solution of the incident by the national government [at Wuhan]. When the order for the cancellation of the attack was dispatched to all units of the peasant armies, the majority of them withdrew, but two units which, by some accident, had not received the order, stormed the city and attacked the counterrevolutionary forces. Outnumbered, they too had to withdraw after a vigorous struggle. The general retreat (of the peasant armies) resulted in the victory of the counterrevolutionaries and led to several days of counterrevolutionary persecutions throughout Hunan Province. The hesitation on the part of the CC during the peasant revolt was tantamount to the betrayal of the revolution and entirely inexcusable. It is indeed a black spot in the annals of our party.

Why did the CC obstruct the insurrection? The reasons can be found in the resolution of 25 May [1927]: "The task that confronts the party at present is neither to overthrow the enemy nor to surrender completely. There is still a middle way which must be found. At present it is undesirable [for our party] to have any direct armed conflict [with the GMD]. Our duty is to wait for opportunities and to consolidate our strength and be ready for the unavoidable attack." Such an attitude of shameful hesitation did not help the peasant movement by waiting for future opportunities but actually helped to provide the counterrevolutionary elements at Changsha with such opportunities. The degree to which the CC had yielded to a policy of capitulation at the time of the Changsha incident can be seen from its decision to support the circular telegram of Tang Shengzhi.⁶⁵ The CC showered Tang Shengzhi with praise, thus creating illusions and spreading the impression that the Changsha incident occurred against the wishes of Tang. Although the CC sometimes protested to the national government about the suppression of peasants and workers' organizations by the Changsha authorities and demanded punishment for the counterrevolutionary traitors, its actual vacillation and hesitation helped the counterrevolutionary elements in the Hunan coup to consolidate their power.

This moribund policy [of the CC] should have taught us a bitter lesson. The opportunist line of the CC on the peasant problem was pushed so far that its

instructions, adopted at a critical moment, smacked of downright betrayal of the mass movement.

The actions of Tan Pingshan, CCP representative in the government,⁶⁶ were equally shameful. The Peasant Department stubbornly refused to support the rural revolution and attempted to harness the peasant movement as a branch of bourgeois reformism. A directive issued by the Peasant Department in May stated that "infantile acts of the peasants must be corrected, particularly acts of elements which have deviated from the correct policy and endangered the welfare of the great majority of peasants; such acts must be punished. As regards the struggle against counterrevolutionary elements and the punishment of evil gentry and village bosses, they must be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the law. They must be handed over to the authorities in accordance with party and government instructions, and no spontaneous action should be taken against them." This directive as well as all other activities of the Peasant Department were a concrete manifestation of the unrevolutionary and conciliatory line of our party on the land question at that time. If the entire party proceeds in the spirit of this line, then our party will never be communist or revolutionary. Fortunately, the activities of the masses and the lower party cadres are in striking contrast to this policy of the CC. Thus, even though hamstrung by the leading organ, our party can still furnish the peasant masses with correct leadership.

5) The CCP and the GMD

[[The "submissive and opportunist" line of the party leadership toward the GMD-left at Wuhan is contrary to the directives of the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI [20-26 May 1927]. The CC, like the GMD hierarchy, has been full of petty bourgeois prejudices and illusions. As a result, it was not the CCP that led the GMD at Wuhan but the upper strata of the GMD-left that dominated the leaders of the CCP, both politically and ideologically. The party and youth organizations of the CCP in the GMD, as well as other communist leading groups in the GMD, were unwisely dissolved by the leading organ of the CCP.

The erroneous policy of the CC was based on the theory that at that time it was necessary to retreat temporarily in order to retain the alliance with the GMD-left. One of the eleven points in the resolution on relations between the CCP and the GMD adopted at the Enlarged CC Meeting on 3 July [1927] declared that "since the GMD is an anti-imperialist coalition party of the petty bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants, the leadership of the national revolution naturally belongs to the GMD." Other resolutions yielded to the GMD the authority to control workers' and peasants' organizations, the mass movement, and workers' pickets and prohibited any excessive actions. This was no longer a compromise with opportunism but total liquidationism. It not only abandoned the independent policy of the CCP, but liquidated the entire revolutionary movement of the masses.

The party should learn its lesson from the mistakes of the party's leadership. The party must remember that all its strength and its future lie with the masses of workers and peasants and in their confidence, strength, and organization. The party

must keep in mind that in the future the alliance with the GMD should be an alliance with the leftist and revolutionary GMD, i.e., an alliance with its masses and its lower organs. There should be no more illusions about the traitorous GMD leaders in the Wuhan government.]]

6) The Participation of CCP Members in the National Government

[[The resolution of the Eighth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI [May 1927] pointed out that “the CCP should continue to work in the central and local organizations of the GMD but must criticize its ally and insist on a correct governmental policy.” The CCP members in the Wuhan government, especially Tan Pingshan, were guilty of yielding to the reactionary Wuhan government and of abandoning the struggle of the masses of workers and peasants.

“The stand taken by the CC contradicted both the policy of the Comintern and the basic requirements of the communist program, which has as its aim a resolute revolutionary struggle to turn the Wuhan government into a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. Our ties with the masses must be strengthened and maintained. Only in this way can the CCP work through the GMD.”]]

7) The Questions of Supplying Arms and Relations with the Army

[[The leading organ of the party tried to deal with the generals and officers in the GMD army instead of engaging in agitation among the men and the junior officers. The leading cadres of the party did nothing about the urgent task of arming the workers and peasants, but adopted a conciliatory attitude toward reactionary generals like Tang Shengzhi and Zhu Peide.⁶⁷]]

8) The Problems Within the Party and Relations with the Comintern

One of the reasons why the CC was so deeply caught in its opportunist line was the irregular conditions existing within the party. The CC was not supervised by, or responsible to, the masses. Nor did it present the party's policy to the rank and file for discussion. The party's organization was entirely based on a patriarchal system, and all policies were decided by the top leadership, which considered its opinion binding, indisputable, and infallible. Under these conditions, intraparty democracy became an empty phrase. Even in places where the party could perform a very great public function, the so-called intraparty democracy was entirely a formality. Within the party there was neither group life nor public opinion. The party masses did not have any supervisory or persuasive functions vis-à-vis the party leadership. Under these conditions within the party, the CC naturally carried out its instructions by dictatorial means, and it did not really wish to realize intraparty democracy.

The relationship between the party and the Comintern was also not in accordance with accepted organizational procedure. There has never been a case in the history of the Comintern where the instructions and resolutions were actually rejected in such a critical situation. This was no longer merely a simple breach of discipline, but a criminal act against the Chinese and the international communist movement. The Chinese revolution does not merely have a national significance, but also forms a major element of the world revolution. The fate of the world revolution will be decided by the fate of the Chinese revolution. The CCP not only carried out an

erroneous policy, a policy that brought the revolution to defeat, that voluntarily liquidated the revolution and capitulated to the enemy, but also would not admit its errors or obey the instructions of the Comintern. Not only that, but it also deliberately ignored its obligations to and the discipline of the Comintern, even maintaining that it was not necessary to transmit to the whole party the resolutions of the Comintern, [thus depriving] the members of the opportunity to express their views after studying those resolutions.

Therefore, the Comintern recently had to criticize openly the policy of our CC and had to expose it to the entire CCP membership and other branches of the Comintern in the various countries.

9) Conclusion

The Comintern has severely criticized the CC's opportunist line, which has in reality betrayed the revolution. We agree that this criticism is entirely just and that the policy of the ECCI regarding the Chinese problem is entirely correct. We welcome the recent instructions of the Comintern, which have made possible the unmasking of the past mistakes of the [party] leadership and have saved our party [from destruction]. We positively agree that, in the past, the leadership of the CC carried out an opportunist, unrevolutionary policy and that it is necessary to carry out a thorough revision of our policy on the basis of the lessons of the past. In this letter, we have analyzed past mistakes from a correct communist viewpoint, and the analysis is based firmly on Leninism and the views of the Comintern. The entire party and all party members should give the utmost attention to an examination of these problems and be instructed to discuss in detail the past policy of the party. The resolutions of the ECCI on the Chinese question [July 1927] and this letter should form the basis of discussion. If party members do not learn from the lessons of the past, they cannot progress or correctly lead the Chinese revolution.

Certain conclusions should be drawn from the discussions: [We] should not only criticize the past party leadership and expel the opportunist elements from the leading organs of the party, but also reexamine all party work from a communist and revolutionary viewpoint, examine the actual direction of mass work, and prove in action that the CCP is truly the vanguard of the Chinese laboring class, capable of leading it, and that it will guide it to victory.

The party should establish close ties with the unions and the peasant associations and guide them, and it should shift the center of party work in this direction. The party should establish a close relationship with the CYL and give more assistance to its work. The delegates of the CYL CC have proved themselves recently to be politically stronger than the CCP CC. The CYL CC fully supported our proletarian stand and entrusted the CC to carry it out, but the leaders of the CCP CC, fearing that their opportunist policy might be shaken, tried to silence the voice of the CYL and deprive it of its right to pass political resolutions. This failed because the CYL CC stood firmly on the policy of the Comintern from beginning to end. The party should recognize the political significance of the work of the CYL and [establish] close liaison with it. Finally, the party should, in spite of [the present] severe

political oppression, effect real intraparty democracy in order to encourage the discussion of party policies among the party masses. Collective activities in party headquarters at all levels should be inaugurated by secretaries of lower party organs in order to realize collective guidance. Also, every precaution should be taken to preserve party organs from the reactionaries. Strictly secret organs must be established, but at the same time they should be combative, underground units of the party.

Under [the present] trying circumstances and in a revolutionary crisis we should undertake to reorganize our forces, correct the serious mistakes of the past, and find a new path. We are firmly convinced, however, that our party possesses adequate strength to effect such reforms in a resolute and revolutionary manner. We should call on all party members to lend all their energies to help the party to realize these reforms. We are firmly convinced that the fighting determination of our comrades and their devotion to the revolution will enable us to overcome all difficulties and resolutely set the party on the correct course. Our party under the direction of the Comintern will assuredly win the final victory.

C.3 Report by the Comintern Representative. *Lominadze (7 August 1927)*⁶⁸

Before I begin the report, on behalf of the Comintern, I would like to extend my greetings to all of you. These greetings are unusual. The reason the Comintern has asked the CCP to convene this conference is that the CCP leadership has wandered too far astray. Without this meeting to correct its mistakes, the Chinese party could no longer be called a CP. However, the past mistakes were made only by the party's leading organ. With respect to the broad masses of the people, the Comintern is satisfied with their heroic struggle. It is very strange to discover such a large gap between the party's leadership and the Comintern's guidance as well as the requirements of the masses.

The Comintern has realized that it is extremely difficult to hold such a conference in China under the present circumstances. Had the reactionary GMD regime known we were meeting here, it would have surely come and caught all of us in a dragnet. However, without holding such a conference, we cannot correct the previous mistakes. So we have made up our minds to call together some leading comrades who are close to the masses. We will analyze past wrongdoings so that all of us can understand how they occur. This is important because the mistakes were made not only by the CC but also by the local leaders. It would be very dangerous if only a few top leaders rather than everyone realized the mistakes.

The Comintern's resolution states that this emergency conference should not only discuss the previous mistakes but also reorganize the leading organ. Now we

face the question of whether we have the right to reorganize the leading body (the CC). Because of communication difficulties between the CC and the local organizations, we could only manage to get representatives from two places to come to today's conference. Because of the secret circumstances, we may call this conference an "emergency conference." Although it does not have the right to reorganize the CC, it has the authority to elect a temporary Politburo for the CC. This temporary Politburo will be authorized to announce to the whole party our previous mistakes and the future policies. It also has the right to convene a party congress, or an interim one. This temporary Politburo cannot be considered officially established until it is approved by the Comintern.

During today's discussion, we will make an evaluation about our past work. The Standing Committee [*changwu*] has already prepared a very detailed report for all party members. However, pressures of time mean that we can only analyze a few major mistakes in today's discussion.

First of all, I want to point out that the present situation would have been completely different if the party leadership in the past had followed the majorityism [*duoshu zhuyi*, i.e., Bolshevism] and the Comintern's resolution. This is by no means an overestimation of our strength, but a reality. Of course, we cannot deny the fact that the Chinese proletariat is numerically small and lacks experience, yet there is no other class in China more powerful than the proletariat. The Chinese bourgeoisie is so weak that it would have collapsed long ago if the foreign capitalists had not assisted it. Most Chinese capital is controlled by foreigners, and it is foreign capital that has created the Chinese proletariat. As a result, the Chinese bourgeoisie is not as strong as the proletariat. There are more peasants and petty bourgeois elements in China, but it has been proved that they cannot lead the revolution. They can follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. In the present class struggle, the Chinese proletariat is gathering together all its class strength to fight against both Chinese and foreign capitalists. None of the other classes could be as powerful as the proletariat.

Now China has entered the period of the rural revolution. This will take the Chinese revolution into a new stage although we have to point out that the Chinese peasants are still unable to establish an independent class policy. They will follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie in China has now become reactionary despite the fact that it had been revolutionary during a certain period. Only the proletariat can guide the peasantry, and only led by the proletariat can the peasantry achieve its own emancipation. The CCP has gained much experience from the proletarian struggle of the last two years. If the CC had correctly and resolutely led the proletariat, class relationships in China today would have been very different, and the reactionary situation in Wuhan and other places would not have occurred.

It is of great significance to examine the party's past leadership. From April to the end of July [1927], the party's leading body continually pursued reformism when deciding strategy. It made concessions not only to the petty bourgeoisie,

including the reactionary petty bourgeoisie, but also to the GMD, and it gave up completely our party's own independence. Now the GMD has turned against us and is murdering us in the streets. Our party restrained the peasant movement, with the result that the movement has suffered a huge setback and many peasants were killed. Our party asked the workers to make concessions, with the result that the labor movement suffered a great defeat. In fact, as a result of the concessions, our party today cannot even operate openly. Not until the Nanchang Uprising at the beginning of August [1927] was there a clear turning point. Thus, we can conclude that the future situation will be different from the past because we have made up our minds to adopt a revolutionary line, and through the Uprising we have gained control of some armed forces. If we resolutely carry out the revolutionary strategy, our position will surely be different from that in the past.

In light of their theory and practice, we can see that leading CC members are simply the minority [*shaoshupai*, i.e., Mensheviks], nonrevolutionaries, and social democrats, rather than revolutionaries. This conclusion is based on the CCP's decisions on various issues. There is no power basis for Menshevism [*shaoshu zhuyi*] in China because Menshevism is built on the labor aristocracy. If the CC's line were still in operation, there would have been no CP in China. Fortunately, there is no power basis among the Chinese working class for the labor aristocracy; hence there is no such crisis. This is reflected in the struggles in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Hubei, and it is proved by the revolutionary enthusiasm of the workers at Wuhan. They did not follow the CC's instructions but acted according to their own consciousness. This was good luck for the Chinese revolution at a time when the CC did not have the authority to direct the mass movement. Our present conference will not have any significance if it is held casually or if the masses and the CC leadership hold the same view. Because the broad masses of the people hold a different view from that of the CC, we feel confident that the mistakes of the party's leadership can be corrected quickly.

In the report [the circular letter to all party members, see **Doc. C.2**], we have concentrated on the nature of the Chinese revolution and the role each class plays in it. The leading organ of the CC used to have a purely Menshevik viewpoint on this issue. It thought that it was necessary to have the bourgeoisie in the national front against imperialism, but it did not know that the bourgeoisie would inevitably withdraw from this front once the labor movement developed. The Enlarged Seventh Plenum of the Comintern [ECCI, 29 November–16 December 1926] has pointed out clearly this phenomenon. Now there are two roads in front of us: one is to maintain the national United Front to oppose the interests of the workers and peasants; the other is to oppose the national United Front in the interests of the workers and peasants. We have to choose one of them. We should firmly oppose not only the remnants of imperialism and feudalism but also the bourgeoisie. In the past the CCP CC adhered to some Menshevik theories which held that class struggle would conflict with the national revolution. We can find this theory in the June letter of the CC to the Shanghai party committee, which claimed that in order to

develop the anti-imperialist movement we should not wage resolute class struggle. It also called for a second "May 30 Movement." This would undoubtedly have sacrificed the workers. In fact, the more vigorously the labor movement develops, the more fiercely we attack the bourgeoisie; and the more intensified the class struggle becomes, the more heavily we strike at imperialism.

This issue is of vital importance for our work both in the past and in the future. Now we should ask ourselves: should we continue to support the bourgeoisie to oppose imperialism? The Chinese bourgeoisie always wants to wear a mask. For example, on the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek collaborates with Japan and America, while, on the other hand, he pretends to wage an anti-Japanese movement. The Wuhan regime has not yet become a puppet of imperialism, but we know clearly that it will turn into a tool of imperialism sooner or later. Therefore, now we should ask whether we should support the Wuhan regime to oppose imperialism. As a matter of fact, Communists will lose their identity if they help the bourgeoisie to oppose imperialism. Although the national bourgeoisie cannot agree among themselves on economic issues, politically they are unanimous. Now they are arguing with the imperialists, but these disputes will disappear gradually because they fear the working class much more than the imperialists. They will compromise with the imperialists at all costs in order to suppress the proletariat. In light of this background, we must not support the bourgeoisie against the imperialists. On the contrary, we should make use of the bourgeoisie's anti-imperialist movement to expose their intrigue so as to realize our purpose of opposing the bourgeoisie. We must understand that only by defeating the bourgeoisie first can we get rid of imperialism.

We will carry on the struggle for national liberation, and the proletariat will continue to shoulder the task. Slogans such as "Abolish the unequal treaties" and "Recover the concessions" are helpful because they can be used to oppose the bourgeoisie.

It is a shame that our party adopted an antilabor, antipeasant strategy. For example, the CC asked the workers not to demand too much in their struggle and asked them to make sacrifices for the anti-imperialist movement. It even planned to work with the GMD to stop strikes through arbitration. The strategy toward the peasant movement was a capitulationist one, and the leadership of the movement in Hunan was reformist.

Now let's talk about our policy toward the GMD. The GMD is different from the other political parties in that it is a multiclass federation. Before April, the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek's GMD was in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Our task at that time was to seize the leadership from the bourgeoisie and drive it out of the GMD. This work was done well by our comrades working at the grass-roots levels of the GMD. However, the CC, instead of consolidating the achievement, abandoned our independence and the right to criticize the GMD. For example, it agreed with the resolution of the Joint Conference [of the CCP and GMD], which declared that resolutions must not be publicized in the name of the Joint Conference but only

by the GMD. The CC also advocated that the national revolution ought to be led by the GMD and asked our comrades working in the press not to write articles containing our doctrines. Moreover, it even wanted to hand over the leadership of the worker-peasant movement to the GMD. Such a policy is absolutely wrong. It is necessary for us to maintain an independent position and have complete freedom of criticism within the United Front. What the CC thought, however, was just the opposite. Only in Hunan were things different. There, resolutions could be publicized in the name of the Joint Conference. Lenin taught us that being unable to act independently or not having the freedom of criticism in the United Front was a betrayal of class interests. In the past, we used to form the United Front by relying only on a few top leaders of the GMD. It is indeed a good policy, but a good policy to abolish our party and the GMD as well.

Talking about our erroneous attitude toward the GMD, some comrades argue that if we want to ally with it, we cannot freely engage in revolution. Well, now we have launched the Nanchang Uprising, and we can, according to this logic, make the revolution independently and freely. This conclusion is not correct either. Those who advocate withdrawal from the GMD include the Russian opposition faction and the CCP's Tan Pingshan, who plans to organize a third party to eliminate both the GMD and the CP.⁶⁹ The so-called third party is in fact Menshevik. Even Comrade [Chen] Duxiu has claimed that if we want to stay in the GMD we would have to give up independence, and if we want to work freely, we must withdraw from the GMD. These ideas are all wrong, at least at this time.

The strategy of the Nanchang Uprising is correct.⁷⁰ Instead of trusting a few GMD leaders, we should rely on its ordinary members. Now is not the time for us to withdraw from the GMD. Not until we win the victory of the national revolution and begin the socialist revolution can we break up with the GMD. At present, we have formed a new United Front. Based on the experiences learned from the past, we should carry out resolute criticism. We must resolutely follow the revolutionary line and not fear the vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie. Only in this way can we consolidate the revolution.

Next, I will talk about the attitude of the CCP CC toward the Comintern and about who should be blamed for the mistakes made in the past. It is the opinion of some comrades that the Comintern should be held responsible for the mistakes. Concerning this, we must first ask whether the Comintern has issued any instructions which conflict with the present situation. No matter how one looks at it, I can assure you that the Comintern has tried continuously to lead the CCP along the correct path. I think the most serious mistake made in the past is that the CC did not pass on the Comintern's directions to the masses. For example, the major resolution on the Chinese question approved by the Eighth Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI [20–26 May 1927] has not yet been translated into Chinese, and many CC members have not even heard of it. Even the resolution of the Seventh Plenum [29 November–12 December 1926] has not been relayed to the masses. On the other hand, although some CC members knew of the resolutions, they accepted them formally

but rejected them as far as their work was concerned. Therefore, the Comintern wants to call on branches in all countries and the whole CCP to criticize such a mistake. Of course, the Comintern sometimes makes mistakes. But we must believe that it has accumulated a rich experience of struggle, and we should accept its direction sincerely. Otherwise, we will surely meet with failure. The past experiences of some West European parties prove this. Since the Comintern is much more experienced, we should trust it and accept its leadership. Otherwise, we will stray onto a noncommunist road.

With respect to the question of who should be blamed for past mistakes, Comrade Chen Duxiu, the leader of the CC, ought to take the responsibility. He changed resolutions on various issues according to his own ideas even though these resolutions were made by the CC. However, I think that the Politburo as a whole should be blamed. For example, it thought it was not worthwhile to listen to the opinions of the labor and peasant leaders at the grass-roots level, and there are very few workers and peasants in the leading body of the party. Consequently, many odd theories have surfaced in the party. In fact, we can say that the consciousness of the labor leaders in Shanghai is much higher than that of the CC, and their theory much wiser. As far as the economic struggle is concerned, no one can lead it better than those who come from among the workers.

From now on, our party's leadership should abolish the patriarchal type of leadership and adopt the collective model. The broad mass of party members should be informed about what has happened in the party. Of course, there is always someone who thinks he or she is above the party and might even deliberately make things difficult for the temporary Politburo we have elected today. In such cases, we should apply party discipline and wage a resolute struggle. Only by so doing can our party's leadership be consolidated. Owing to a lack of time, I have to stop here although there are more issues I want to talk about.

C.4 Report of the Representative of the CC Standing Committee. *Qu Qiubai* (7 August 1927)⁷¹

Before my report, there are two issues which I would like to raise: first, does the Chinese bourgeoisie fight against the feudal class in the Chinese revolution? This is of vital importance. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek and his followers took power with the support of not only imperialism but also the feudal class clearly proves that there is little conflict between the bourgeoisie and the feudal class in China. With this idea in mind, we can rid ourselves of the illusion that the Chinese revolution can be divided into two stages. This illusion had lured us to cooperate with the bourgeoisie, but in fact it is totally wrong. The Chinese bourgeoisie has no demo-

cratic essence. Now we have only two choices: either we eliminate the GMD or they destroy us. Second, the leadership of the revolution made pedantic errors, and our party lacks the spirit of the broad masses.

At present, it is obvious that the GMD has broken with us. We can no longer expect to gain power by making concessions. We can win it only through the revolution. Once, in the Politburo, we discussed whether we should bargain with the GMD or withdraw from it. In the past, when we were capable of dominating the GMD, the CC did not allow us to do so; now that we want to do this, we are too weak. In the past, we thought we could gain some power by making use of the conflicts between different forces. The method used to be effective, but now it is no longer appropriate. The 13 July statement of our party marks the beginning of our new policy.⁷² The Politburo's anti-GMD statement is resolute. The reason why Wang [Jingwei] suddenly turned against us is not because Roy had shown him the telegram.⁷³ Of course it was incorrect for Roy to show the telegram to Wang since it provided Wang with an excuse to turn against us. When Wang received the telegram saying Feng [Yuxiang] had decided not to oppose Chiang [Kai-shek], he flew into a rage. Thus, he tried even harder to make anti-Chiang propaganda. However, at the same time Tang [Shengzhi] put pressure on him and asked him to turn against the Communists. At the last meeting of the Joint Conference, Wang claimed that he had been "raped" and could not hold on in Wuhan. Just at that moment, Roy showed him the telegram, and he found a new way out. Therefore, he used the telegram as an excuse to join Tang in turning against us and openly declared the anticommunist policy. After that, the Communists in Zhang Fakui's army became Wang's major enemy.⁷⁴ At that moment Zhang also wavered somewhat, and Ye [Ting]⁷⁵ expressed the desire to withdraw temporarily from the CP. Some of us felt the same. Nevertheless, this did not happen. Our party is quite resolute concerning the statement because Song [Qingling] and Deng [Yanda]⁷⁶ also publicized their declarations. The recent action we took in Nanchang [August 1927] indicates that at least we have unconsciously adopted a new strategy. Before 15 July when we participated in the government, we could create conditions from the top to help develop our work at the grass-roots level. Now, because the whole country is controlled by the reactionaries, our most important task is to create a new force from the rural revolution. Our army should do all they can to support the rural revolution.

Zhang [Fakui] was scared and was outraged by the Ye [Ting]-He [Long] uprising [Nanchang Uprising]. Zhang immediately took a few hundred guards with him by train to stop the Ye-He troops. Thinking that he was working for the party, he thought that the army, his old troops, would certainly obey his orders. However, he was totally wrong. As a result, even his own gun was captured by us. It should be pointed out that we treated him fairly mildly. During his second "punitive expedition," his orders were quite moderate, and he acted only as he saw fit. This reveals that Zhang is now unable to launch an offensive. Zhu Peide's army is also very weak. Neither of his two divisions is good at fighting. According to today's newspa-

pers, our troops have left Nanchang. I presume that they must have won at the front. The Front Committee must have followed the CC's order sent to them not long ago. Right now our major enemy forces are the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth Armies. But Tang [Shengzhi] would never use these two armies to assist Zhang because he intends to use them to take over Jiangsu. Prior to this incident, the third force had already planned that Bai Chongxi and Li Zhongren would ask Nanjing to call a truce, and Zhu Peide would guarantee that Wuhan would do the same. Wang [Jingwei] would become the leader, and Bai and Li would force Chiang [Kai-shek] to resign. There are conflicts between the third force and Tang, but at present neither would provoke a fight since they have to work together against the communist forces.

In the future, the situation will be different. There used to be big warlords such as Zhang [Zuolin] in Liaoning, Chiang in Nanjing, as well as Wu Peifu. In the future, they will be replaced by many small warlords, and a very confusing situation will develop. It shows that the feudal class has declined and the bourgeoisie is weak. The conflicts among the counterrevolutionaries are very sharp, so their regime will be unstable. This is a good thing for the revolution in the future.

The climax of the rural revolution has arrived. We should mobilize our troops to promote it. Ye Ting has already done that. Zhang Zhaofeng⁷⁷ in the north should also act in the same way when conditions there ripen. There is a definite chance for the revolution to succeed.

Now the peasants want to launch an uprising and we control many armed forces in various areas. With such a good opportunity and such great strength, we must light the fuse and set off the rural revolution.

Under these circumstances, our strategy is independently to wage the worker-peasant class struggle and use it, without any hesitation, to replace the GMD and the national revolution. First, we will make every effort to seize the leadership from the bourgeoisie, which is wearing a democratic mask. Since Wang is the representative of this faction, we should aim at Wang as our major enemy at the moment. Lenin used to strike particularly hard at this kind of person. This is our major strategy at present, and we will tell the masses that they represent the pseudo-GMD. Second, we should correct our previous mistakes, keep in close touch with the masses and listen to the opinions from below. Whoever supports us is a leftist. Third, our purpose now is not to sever links with the government. We have undergone three stages in our policy toward the government: (a) We refused to take part in the government. (b) We participated in the government but failed to play a role because of our errors. (c) We will organize a provisional revolutionary government during the uprising. The government will still use the name of the GMD, but we should become the dominant force in it so as to turn it into the political power of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. Political power in the countryside should belong to the peasant association. We must act firmly and tell the masses that the regimes in Wuhan, in Nanjing, and in Beijing are all counterrevolutionary. Although it is difficult to defeat Wang Jingwei, we will do our very best. This is our main policy.

In order to fulfill various requirements, the Standing Committee and the Comintern representative have drafted three resolutions for our discussion today. There are a few more issues: (a) How to deal with the GMD and how to unite its leftists. We have issued a letter to all the GMD members, and it should be considered our political program for its leftists.⁷⁸ (b) Our work in the army and among the soldiers. This has also become very important now. I have discussed it with [Wang] Ruofei, and I think the temporary Politburo should take it into consideration. (c) We must recognize the political program of the GMD leftists.

C.5 Comments on the Report of the Comintern Representative. *Mao Zedong* (7 August 1927)⁷⁹

The report by the Comintern's representative is very important [**Doc. C.3**]. First, the issue of the GMD is a very old problem for our party, and so far it has not yet been solved. At first, the problem was whether we should join the GMD, next it became who should join it, i.e., whether the industrial workers should join it. In fact, our party placed restrictions on joining the GMD, not only on industrial workers but even on the peasantry. Essentially, at that time, we all thought the GMD was a party of the others. What we did not know was that it was an empty house waiting for people to move in. Afterward, we reluctantly moved into that empty house, just like a bride who is forced into a wedding sedan. Even so, we never made up our minds to be the mistress of the house. In my opinion, this was a great mistake. Some of us later insisted that industrial workers should also join the GMD. It was said that our comrades in Hubei had made such a decision, but it turned out to be only empty talk because the decision was not put into practice. There were a few comrades at the grass-roots level who did not follow the CC's instructions. They took over the leadership of the local GMD organizations and became the master of the house there. But these were isolated cases and were against the will of the CC. Not until recently has the policy changed and have we begun to allow the workers and peasants to join the GMD and become the master of the house. Second, the peasant issue. The peasants want to make revolution; so do the local party organizations who are close to the peasants. But the party's leading body is different. Before I went to Changsha, I did not have any facts which I could use to oppose the party's resolution that favors the landlords. Even after arriving in Changsha, I did not know how to answer the question either. But I changed my attitude completely after I stayed in Hunan for over thirty days. I put my ideas in a report I made in Hunan and sent the report to the CC at the same time.⁸⁰ Although the report was quite successful in Hunan, it failed to receive any response from the CC. I cannot help wondering if the leadership of our party was counterrevolutionary because while the broad masses both in and out of the party wanted to make revolution, the leaders did not.

The peasantry caused me to draw this conclusion. Eventually, however, I gave up my view because I always thought the ideas of the leading comrades were correct. My suggestion was rejected since they thought it did not make any sense. Instead, under our leaders' instructions, the party followed Xu Kexiang. It was really strange that even though Tang [Shengzhi]'s army admitted that there were only eight officers' homes destroyed by the peasants, our party discovered that many officers' homes were ruined.⁸¹ In short, the opinions of the masses did not have much impact on the party leadership. Third, the military issue. We used to criticize [Sun] Yat-sen for being interested only in military affairs. We were just the opposite: paying no attention to the military issue and concentrating only on the mass movement. Both Chiang [Kai-shek] and Tang [Shengzhi] gained power by using the armed forces. We entirely neglected the issue. Now we have changed our attitude somewhat but still lack clear understanding of its significance. Take the Autumn Harvest Uprising for example. We cannot expect to win without arms. We must emphasize the importance of this issue at this conference, and the members of the Standing Committee of the new Politburo should bear this in mind and pay particular attention to it. Our failure in Hunan this time was caused entirely by this erroneously pedantic orientation. From now on, we ought to concentrate on the military problem. We must understand fully that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Fourth, the organizational issue. In the future, the leading party organs should lend a willing ear to the comrades working at the grass-roots level. Only in that way can they turn a nonrevolutionary standpoint into a revolutionary one.

C.6 Outline of the CCP CC on the Peasant Autumn Harvest Uprising in the Four Provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangxi (3 August 1927)⁸²

I) This program of action is made on the basis of the CC's recent resolution about peasant struggle and is to be carried out in the four provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, Hubei, and Jiangxi.

II) The Chinese revolution is taking a new direction—the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship [*gongnong demokelaxi ducai*], in which the rural revolution will play a most important role. At present, party policy needs to be modified, and the revolutionary social forces need to be rallied anew and receive new training. To date, the reactionaries have not been able to consolidate their control. Longing for the autumn harvest, the peasants, after having suffered a setback, are looking for a new strategy [to fight with]. The “Autumn Harvest Uprising” is a suitable answer to such a situation. This antirent and antitax uprising is a new stage of the rapid development of rural revolution. It can at least shake the reactionary regime of the

new and old warlords and may pave the way for the establishment of a new revolutionary government in Hunan and Guangdong.

III) Previously our party's policy for the peasant revolution was mistaken. This restrained the peasants and protected the interests of small landlords. Specifically, the policy forced the peasants to ally with small landlords to build up village autonomy. After the Fifth Congress [27 April–9 May 1927], instead of resisting the GMD's various orders to restrain the peasant revolution, we directed party organizations at the grass roots to carry out those reactionary orders. This mistake was the result of our party's overall policy toward the petty bourgeoisie. Recently, at its Eighth Enlarged Conference [20–26 May 1927], the Comintern pointed out that the future of the Chinese revolution should be the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship in alliance with the petty bourgeoisie. This new instruction has proved that in the past the peasants in Hunan were correct in exercising the dictatorship of the peasant association against village autonomy and that we need not be worried about their inevitable attacks on the small landlords—the phenomena of the so-called infantile excesses. Rather, we should provide them with positive leadership. Only by understanding this truth, can we avoid getting lost in narrow-minded confusion and go ahead bravely to direct the Autumn Harvest Uprising.

IV) The strategy for the uprising:

1) Use the peasant association as the core to rally all social forces close to the peasants (such as bandits and secret societies) and set the uprising in action. The peasant association is to be proclaimed as the local government.

In addition to the political power in a village, peasants should also seize, if possible, that of a county. They should unite the workers and the urban poor (peddlers in the city) to form a revolutionary committee [*geming weiyuanhui*] and make it the local revolutionary center, which must try its best to rally various nearby uprisings and revolutionary governments to wage attacks on the counterrevolutionary forces.

2) The peasant association will be authorized to issue orders that there shall be no rent for the land of temples, all clan halls, public fields, and any landlords owning fifty *mu* of land. For small landlords with less than fifty *mu*, there will be a reduction. The peasant association will decide the rent rate: approximately 7:3 between tenants and landlords.

3) All political power belongs to the peasant association. Wipe out local tyrants and evil gentry as well as all reactionaries and confiscate all their property.

4) Refuse payment of any tax to the reactionary regime and implement an economic blockade against the counterrevolutionary forces, such as blocking any business activities with them and banning the sale of rice to their troops.

5) The land of the middle peasantry is not to be confiscated. They and the tenants allotted land from the big landlords will pay a land tax to the revolutionary government (the peasant association). The amount of the tax will be decided by the peasant association.

6) The peasant association will organize a land committee to decide on land distribution.

The following are the instructions regarding the specific tasks for each of the four provinces during the peasant Autumn Harvest Uprising:

Hubei. The major task of the Uprising in Hubei should aim at causing a political disturbance to the present regime so as to destabilize their rule in Hubei and weaken their control over Jiangxi. Economically, it should cover four resistances (against rent, taxation, levies of duties, and grain). Specific plans may be decided based on the major task.

Hunan. A revolutionary government will be set up in south Hunan before too long, and all manner of revolutionary organizations will be established. The government will be under the leadership of the Guangdong Revolutionary Committee.

A South Hunan Special Committee [*Xiangnan tebie weiyuanhui*] led by the provincial [party] committee should be set up right away, so that it can independently direct local work where traffic and communications problems occur. The special committee comprises four members: Xia Xi, Guo Liang, [Mao] Zedong, and [Ren] Zuoxuan; [Mao] Zedong will be secretary.

Jiangxi. (a) Seize political power at district and county levels immediately; (b) implement the CC's program for the rural revolution; (c) kill as many local tyrants, evil gentry, and counterrevolutionaries as possible; (d) take an active part in the battles of the revolutionary troops against the counterrevolutionary army.

Guangdong. In areas controlled by the revolutionary troops, adopt policies basically the same as those in Jiangxi; in areas not yet occupied by the revolutionary troops, start uprisings immediately as a response to the situation. Seize political power in villages, establish the authority of the peasant association, and carry out the program of the rural revolution. If possible, seize political power at the county level immediately in order to establish a revolutionary government to take control of the whole province.

An Zhongyuan [CC of the CCP]

C.7 A Letter from the CC to the Hunan Provincial Committee—Resolutions Adopted by the Temporary Politburo of the CC on the Work Plan for Hunan Province (9 August 1927)⁸³

Hunan Provincial Committee:

The first session of the Temporary Politburo of the CC has adopted the following resolutions on the work plan for Hunan Province. Please take appropriate actions on the basis of the resolutions:

The CC has already passed a decision for the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong [Doc. C.6]. Our purpose is to enable our party to assume leadership over the revolutionary upsurge of the peasantry in these four provinces and begin uprisings for the rural revolution to overthrow the reactionary regime in the four provinces and establish the political power of the worker-peasant revolutionary democratic dictatorship (in the countryside, all powers should belong to the peasant association: the peasant association will be the political power; in the cities, all powers should belong to the revolutionary committee. Comprising comrades appointed by our party and a few genuine leftist nationalists [i.e., members of the GMD-left], the revolutionary committee is the leading organ directing an uprising before it begins and should function as a provisional revolutionary government after victory. As we have agreed on slogans such as "Establish a Revolutionary Government Elected by the People" and "Create a Truly Democratic Power for Ordinary Citizens," for the sake of propaganda, we can declare: "After winning victory, the revolutionary committee should immediately hold a conference of representatives from trade unions, peasant associations, and revolutionary small merchants to elect a formal people's government." In practice, however, such a people's government should not be organized until the local revolutionary committee has firm control over the situation.) The Nanchang Uprising was planned in advance by the CC and was aimed at providing the insurrections to be launched in the four provinces with military strength so as to assure their success. Otherwise, the significance of the Nanchang Uprising will be lost. If one considers the uprisings in the four provinces as a mere effect of the military force of the Nanchang Uprising, then this is definitely putting the cart before the horse and negating the CC's decision.

According to Mayer's⁸⁴ and also your report, there are two plans for the Nanchang Uprising troops: one is to transfer the troops from Fujian to Guangdong; the other is to organize a division in south Hunan and join the Nanchang Uprising troops to take over Guangdong. The first amounts to calling on the Nanchang troops to avoid fighting and abandon the forthcoming insurrections in the four provinces; the second underestimates the military significance of the insurrection in Hunan Province. Planning to move the troops back to Guangdong is obviously to mistake the branch for the root. The CC considers neither plan to be correct. In practice, if you spare no effort in launching a great insurrection in Hunan Province, you will provide significant support to the Nanchang Uprising. You must understand that the Nanchang Uprising is part of the strategy to respond to the Autumn Harvest Uprising in the four provinces. You must draw up your work plan on the basis of this principle.

The CC has also decided to transfer one or two regiments of the Nanchang Uprising troops to be under the direction of the South Hunan Special Committee and to gather all the forces of the worker-peasant army now in south Hunan to take over Chen, Yi, and Ru.⁸⁵ A revolutionary committee should be organized to help launch a provincewide peasant uprising to restore the revolutionary government in

Hunan Province. The South Hunan Special Committee comprises Mao Zedong, Ren Zhuoxuan, Guo Liang,⁸⁶ and several local workers and peasants. Zedong will be the secretary, and it will come under the leadership of the Hunan Provincial Committee. It must be made clear here that the south Hunan uprising is only part of the provincial plan for insurrection. Only by linking its launch to the provincial uprising can the south Hunan operation be realized and have significance. You must remember this point and must not put the incidental before the fundamental.

Since the Horse Day incident [21 May 1927 massacre in Changsha], most of the former trade union and peasant association leaders in south Hunan have either disappeared or been executed. Now, you must rapidly and resolutely promote those “ruffians” [*baotu fenzi*] who have taken an active part in the struggle during recent months and appoint them as leaders of various trade unions and peasant associations. Also, without hesitation, you must quickly admit them into our party in order to establish a close relationship between our party and the masses of workers and peasants. As long as they have participated in the revolutionary struggle, even members of the various secret societies should be recruited into the party. Only in this way can the party’s new line, as decided by the Comintern, be implemented and can the Autumn Harvest Uprising succeed. This policy must be carried out without any wavering.

In Hunan, the local organization of the GMD-left is more powerful than in any other province. About 150,000 to 200,000 GMD-left members and their organizations have been fighting until now under our guidance. Our party should more firmly win them over organizationally and lead them politically so that they can become an important force in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. We cannot rely solely on the leadership of the Secret Committee headed by Linbin and Xie Juezai over these GMD-left members. This committee can only make an appeal to them but cannot lead them in any actual struggle. Now, we must rely on our party organizations at the grass roots to unite a number of organizations of the GMD-left members to wage a joint struggle and recruit all the activists into our party. The CC has decided to reorganize the Hunan Provincial Committee since it has no worker and peasant members. The new provincial committee should be organized in the following way:

a) Zedong and [Peng] Gongda are entrusted to compile, together with the current Hunan Provincial Committee, a list of members for the new committee and report it to the CC.

b) The new provincial committee should consist of nine members. They do not all have to be in Changsha. Of the nine, at least three must be workers or peasants, and three should be placed in charge of the workers and peasants’ movement.

c) It is hereby announced that Gongda has been appointed the new provincial party secretary by the CC.

C.8 Report on the Progress of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan (Extract). *Peng Gongda* (9 October 1927)⁸⁸

I) The Process of Reorganizing the Hunan Provincial Party Committee

After the CC's Emergency Session [7 August 1927], the Politburo held its first meeting for a general discussion of the work plans for various areas [9 August 1927]. Two proposals from the Hunan Provincial Committee were analyzed at the meeting.

First, the Hunan Provincial Committee claimed that the Comintern lacked the courage to admit its opportunist errors concerning China policy and argued that although it was the CCP that had made erroneous decisions, the Comintern should share the blame for some of the mistakes.

Second, concerning the peasant issue—the land question—Comrade Yi (Lirong), secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee, had opposed confiscating the land of small landlords. He insisted that we should confiscate only the land of the big landlords and even suggested that we only consider political factors when confiscating land.

The newly elected Politburo thought that these two propositions contradicted the essence of CC policies. Therefore, it made the resolute decision to reorganize the Hunan Provincial Committee to choose some comrades who had experienced the mass struggle to lead the party organizations in Hunan and to implement resolutely the new policies of the CC. Reorganization was carried out in the following manner:

First, Comrade Peng Gongda was appointed secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee.

Second, a new nine-person Provincial Committee was chosen: three workers and peasants, three worker and peasant leaders, and three comrades who have been really courageous and skillful during the revolutionary struggle.

Third, Mao Zedong and Peng Gongda were authorized to bring together the leaders of the former Provincial Committee to explain the spirit of the CC's new policies and to reorganize the Provincial Committee.

Gongda returned to Hunan on 11 August, and Zedong left Wuhan on 12 August. They intended to arrive in Changsha on 13 August and to hold the meeting on 15 August. However, the meeting was postponed to 16 August because Comrade Zedong did not arrive on 13 August. On 16 August, all the participants were present except Zedong. Initially, we planned to postpone the meeting again to wait for Zedong. However, the situation was so dangerous that it would have been very difficult to find an opportunity for another meeting. The participants decided to hold the meeting that day and pass on the results of the election to Zedong. With his approval, we then reported the election to the CC. At the meeting, we first discussed the resolution of the CC's Emergency Session and then elected the Provincial Committee.

The new Provincial Committee held its first meeting on 18 August and elected the Standing Committee and discussed the plan of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The details of the discussion are reported below.

II) The Different Views of the Provincial Committee Members

A) The Peasant Question—The Land Question

1) Zedong's View:

(i) To confiscate the land, we must have targets. Since most landlords in China are small (there are only a few big landlords in this country), if we confiscate the land of only the big landlords, there will not be much land to confiscate. However, the poor peasants are asking for a large amount of land. Thus, to meet their demands and win them over, we must confiscate the land of all landlords. (ii) Concerning the method for confiscating land, our party's revolutionary committee should formulate a land program so that the peasant association or revolutionary committee can carry it out. (iii) This land program should find a correct way to arrange the landlords' livelihood after their land has been confiscated. The peasant association can collect a certain amount of grain as part of the agricultural tax and distribute the grain equally to the landlords who are old, weak, or unable to work. (iv) Abolish all forms of extravagant levies and taxes imposed on the peasants by the old regime; and collect the agricultural tax.

2) Lirong's View:

(i) The majority of the landlords in China are small landlords. If we confiscate their land at the present time, they will certainly join the big landlords in the counterrevolutionary camp. Thus, now is not the time to confiscate the land of the small landlords. (ii) At the present time, when dealing with the land question, we must give priority to political considerations; for example, only the land of the big landlords and of the counterrevolutionaries should be confiscated. (iii) We need to formulate a political program that suits the peasants and enables them to act simultaneously in line with the program. Only in this way can we set people's minds at rest and avoid social upheaval in the countryside. (iv) The peasants might get lazy after receiving their distribution of land. If so, there will be a decrease in grain production. I am afraid that this will become a problem.

3) [Xia] Minghan's View:

(i) The Chinese revolution has entered the stage where all land must be confiscated and placed under state control. We must confiscate all land now and declare the principle of state ownership of land. (ii) If we confiscate only the land of landlords

and do nothing about the land of the yeomen, the peasants will feel dissatisfied. As the revolution develops, sooner or later we will have to confiscate the land of the yeomen. Therefore, I think it is better to take over all the land right now. (iii) The method of confiscation should be decided by the peasant association.

4) The Views of He Erkang, Mao Fuxuan, and Other Comrades Are the Same as Those of Zedong.

B) The Question of the Uprising

1) The Views of Zedong and Lirong:

(i) The purpose of the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan is to solve the land problem for the peasants. This is an obvious fact that no one can deny. However, in order to organize the uprising, we must have the support of the armed forces because the strength of the peasants alone is far from adequate. If we could control one or two regiments of troops, we would gain victory. Otherwise, the uprising will inevitably be defeated. (ii) The ultimate aim of the uprising is to seize political power. However, it is simply self-deception to do this without control over the military forces. The party's mistake previously was to neglect military affairs and seize and establish political power with guns.

2) Minghan's View:

(i) The Hunan uprising can be organized, but its success depends on whether we can control military forces. Peasants cannot be the backbone of the uprising because unlike workers, they lack the courage to fight. What they want is to get help from a good regime or the military. They have little desire to use their own strength to establish a government. (ii) This time, the Hunan uprising should be based on both the armed forces and the peasants. We ought to concentrate our efforts equally on military and peasant issues.

In line with these differing views on the land and insurrection issues, we can draw a simple conclusion.

1. The solution to the land question is not to encourage the peasants to rise up and seize land; rather, it is to call on them first to participate in the uprising and only to confiscate land after the uprising's victory. This is a revolutionary lawful act rather than a revolutionary method.
2. Concerning the land question, all the views suggested we provide a livelihood for the landlords who are old, weak, or unable to work so as to reassure the public and win over the people.
3. No one believed we could rely on the peasants alone in organizing the rural uprising. In order to launch the uprising, it was thought that we must control

an army with at least 1,000 guns. During the uprising, it was felt that the strength of the military was equally as important as that of the peasants.

In essence, the three points all reflected the attitude of revolutionary pacifism. On the one hand, they advocate revolution while, on the other, they fear that once the revolution began, it would cause too much damage and social upheaval. Thus, it was necessary to set people's minds at rest. The method was to pursue the revolution from above and to extend it from the military to the peasants rather than the other way around, building up the worker-peasant armed forces from the masses of laboring people.

III) The Differences Between the Hunan Provincial Committee and the CC on Certain Questions

A) The Question of the GMD

For the following reasons, the Hunan Provincial Committee holds that using the GMD as a signboard is no longer useful and that we should get rid of it.

1. The GMD CC at Wuhan was unable to suppress Xu Kexiang's atrocity during the 21 May Incident in Hunan. The GMD could not exercise its power beyond Wuhan, and not even outside the headquarters of its CC. Its policy was decided entirely by a few warlords, and it lost its position—in reality it is already dead. When Wang Jingwei betrayed the revolution on 15 July,⁸⁹ the GMD had not only died but had begun to rot. Its rotten smell had spread over the country. The GMD was seized by the warlords and became their tool in competing for power and spheres of interests. From Tang Shengzhi to Chiang Kai-shek, to Wang Jingwei, and even to Zhang Zhuling, they all used the GMD as a tool to suppress and slaughter the masses. In short, it had completely degenerated into a party of the warlords.

2. The death and deterioration of the GMD was caused not only by the betrayal of Tang and Wang, but also was an outcome of the awakening of the broad masses of people. The GMD used to acknowledge many legal rights of the people. However, when people asked it to put these laws into practice, it started to suppress the people. In this way, the masses all realized that the GMD was a hypocritical party and they could never trust it again. This is the common feeling of the people. They have denounced the GMD and abandoned it.

3. There is a view that claims that although the GMD is dead, there remain in it some leftists who can continue to play a positive role. Who are these so-called leftists? Most of them are members of the petty bourgeoisie. They only have sympathy for the revolution, but will never make revolution themselves. In addition, their attitude largely depends on political trends. If the revolutionary movement is powerful, they will stand with the proletariat and support the revolution; but if the bourgeoisie is on the rise, they will act accordingly. It will not

be a problem for us to get rid of the GMD, since as long as the proletariat remains powerful, the leftist petty bourgeoisie will continue to participate in the revolution. Therefore, the Hunan Provincial Committee decided, during this Autumn Harvest Uprising, to arouse the people in the name of the CP. The GMD only banged the drum behind the CP. In the future, we had better let the GMD gradually fade away.

B) The Question of Political Power

Based on the above conclusion that we should get rid of the GMD, we have drawn up the following principles concerning political power:

1. The situation in China at present is similar to that in Russia in October 1917. However, the Chinese revolution must undergo the significant stage of rural revolution. During this period political power is not purely that of the proletariat but one of the workers and peasants. Now we must expand propaganda to establish Soviet-style political power.
2. We must set up a Soviet-style government in the areas where the forces of our uprising are most powerful.
3. The slogans to establish a democratic revolutionary government have turned sour. (Both Wu Peifu and Zhao Hengti claimed their regimes to be democratic.) We should no longer use the slogan. At present, we ought to spare no effort to advocate the idea of, and to establish, the political power of the workers and peasants.

C) The Peasant Question

The Enlarged Session's resolution on the peasant question has decided to confiscate the land of big landlords and give it to the peasants. It is our opinion that in areas where the revolution has developed rapidly, if the peasants themselves confiscate the land of small landlords, we had better not interfere. The Hunan Provincial Committee holds that, at present, the rural revolution has reached the point where it can abolish entirely the tenant system and overthrow the landlord regime. Our party's policy toward the peasants should be the rural revolution, letting the poor lead the middle peasants, controlling the rich peasants, and overthrowing the whole landlord system. We should not make any concessions to the landlord class when we confiscate their land. What we ought to do is to help them after their land has been confiscated and they have become ordinary people. At that time, if they are able to farm, we will distribute to them the same amount of land as that given the peasants. This is the way to eliminate the landlord class.

IV) The Plan for the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan⁹⁰

A) The Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan was originally intended to launch a provincewide peasant uprising, develop the forces of the uprising to implement the party's land program, and seize political power. The uprising was divided into the following four areas: (1) central Hunan with Changsha as the center; (2) south Hunan with Hengyang as the center; (3) west Hunan with Changde as the center; (4) the Baojing area between the west and the south with Baojing as the center.

Having made this arrangement, we found it was very difficult to organize the uprising in all four areas because of the shortage of labor power and money. After several discussions, we realized that our party's strength and economic situation could only allow us to organize the uprising in the counties of central Hunan. Thus, we gave up the original plan and concentrated our efforts only on central Hunan with Changsha as the center. The uprising was to be launched simultaneously in the seven counties of Xiangtan, Ningxiang, Liling, Liuyang, Pingjiang, Anyuan, and Yuezhou.

B) The schedule of the uprising—as soon as the plan of the first Changsha Uprising was approved by the CC we started immediately to prepare the uprising in central Hunan. In principle, it was to be launched at the same time as the uprising in south Hubei. We took the decision on 30 August. The Standing Committee then sent Gongda to the Party Center to report the plan, Zedong to the Liu[yang]-Ping[jiang] area to be the division commander of the peasant army and to set up the Front Committee there, and Zisheng to Yuezhou to direct our work in Hubei and to coordinate the peasant uprising with that under the Command Committee of South Hubei. Gongda went to Wuhan on 1 September and convened a Standing Committee meeting (immediately on his return to Changsha on 5 September) to discuss with all department leaders of the Provincial Committee the schedule of the uprising. The same day, Zedong sent a letter back from Anyuan—the Anyuan Executive Committee sent a similar letter back—in which they agreed to launch an uprising at Anyuan on 11 September and attack Changsha on 18 September. He also mentioned in the letter that the uprising at Changsha should cooperate with the army at the front; otherwise, it would be defeated. At the Standing Committee meeting, Gongda suggested that we begin to sabotage the railways on 9 September and start the uprising in various counties on 10 September and in Changsha on 13 September. He argued that in launching the uprising our forces in different places should not wait too long for each other, because that would allow the enemy to prepare to wipe us out. After a one-hour discussion, however, his suggestion was rejected by the department leaders. The final arrangement was to sabotage railways on 9 September and start the uprising in various counties on 11 September and at Changsha on 15 September. Once the decision was made, we immediately notified the local party organizations and ordered them to implement it.

C) Things to be done during the uprising: The Provincial Committee thought that we must encourage the peasants to decide to do the following things both before and after the uprising:

1. Distribute the land equally.
2. Restore the peasant associations and declare that all political power in the countryside belongs to the peasant association.
3. Execute local tyrants, evil gentry, and reactionaries.
4. Confiscate the property of local tyrants, evil gentry, reactionaries, and big landlords.
5. Burn down the houses of local tyrants, evil gentry, and big landlords.
6. Boycott and refuse to pay rent and taxes; distribute equally to the people the rent and taxes that have been collected.
7. Refuse to pay taxes and levies, and destroy all kinds of governmental tax offices.
8. Establish revolutionary committees.
9. Destroy traffic and communications services.

[[D] Slogans for the uprising.]]

[[E] Propaganda work during the uprising.]]

V) The Progress of the Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising

[[A] The uprising began with sabotage by sixty people on the Changsha-Yuezhou and Changsha-Zhuzhou railways. But lack of technical preparation meant that little damage was done. The Changsha-Yuezhou railway was open again on 15 September, and the Changsha-Zhuzhou railway on 12 September.

B) The Anyuan Uprising began on 10 September with an attack on Pingxiang. A second attack was attempted on 12 September but we had to withdraw. Attacks on Liling and Liuyang also failed. In Liling the peasants failed to add their support, and at Liuyang the worker-peasant army was defeated too quickly.

C) The Liuyang-Pingjiang peasant army attacked Changshoujie from three sides on 11 September but was defeated because of a regiment's defection. They retreated to the Hunan-Jiangxi border, where they were planning to launch another offensive. They have been instructed by the Provincial Committee to begin land redistribution.

D) On 11 September, the uprising began to the east and west of the Changsha River. In the east, five local regiments were destroyed. The peasants did not rise up, as their leaders lacked determination. Once the military operations were completed,

political influence over the peasantry was ended and party organizations disappeared.]]

E) The peasants in the outskirts of Changsha were better organized than their counterparts in various counties. Last year, they waged a struggle to reduce rent and realized that the peasant association was an organization working for their interests. Thus, they trusted the peasant association. At the beginning of the uprising, about 10,000 peasants in the outskirts of Changsha joined in, and they provided the main force. Unfortunately, after being defeated by the local regiments at Jiufeng, they lost courage and even refused to allow Comrade Tan, who was claimed to be their leader, to stay with them. Three-fifths of the strength of the Changsha Uprising was wiped out. Although the labor forces managed to survive, most labor leaders were arrested because the reactionary regime had adopted a harsh policy to execute and suppress the workers and peasants. Now, after suffering numerous setbacks, the labor movement has lost much of its courage for the uprising. The failure to sabotage the railways was a heavy blow to the development of the Changsha Uprising and forced it to stop.

F) Had we started the Changsha Uprising on 13 September, it would have been a good opportunity because both the reactionary regime and society were frightened on that day. In addition, the uprising in the Liu-Ping area was developing rapidly. Had we taken the opportunity to launch the uprising at Changsha, we might have succeeded in taking over the city, or at least we could have provided effective assistance for our forces in the Liu-Ping area and south Hubei. In this way, the uprising in those two areas would not have failed. By 16 September, the reactionary regime and society had gradually recovered from the panic, and the reactionary forces had completed their military deployment. If we had continued the uprising, we would have certainly suffered heavy casualties under the harsh suppression of the enemy troops. In light of this background, the Provincial Committee decided to halt the uprising.

VI) Conclusion—Comments on the Failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising

In our opinion, the decision made by the Provincial Committee to halt the Changsha Uprising on 16 September was not a serious mistake. The genuine major mistakes made by the Provincial Committee were as follows:

1. The purpose of the Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising was to mobilize the peasants for rural revolution. The main force of the uprising thus had to be the peasants. We must urge the whole party to work hard among the peasantry to organize it for the uprising. Unfortunately, the party leadership in Hunan neither committed themselves to this task nor concentrated on the peasant movement. Instead, the uprisings in various areas all simply aimed at carrying out military operations. Therefore, they failed to arouse peasant interest in the uprising, even less their enthusiasm for the rural revolution. This is the fundamental error that caused the uprising's failure.

2. The party's leading organs—both the Provincial Committee and the various county committees—did not really understand the true significance and aim of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. They failed to grasp the essence of party policy and did not treat the uprising as the focus of the struggle and the party's central task. As a result, the broad body of party members did not feel a strong need for the uprising. The party's leadership as well as ordinary party members had neither the determination for the uprising nor the resolute will to implement the various policies of the uprising among the peasantry. This fact fully reveals that our party is still an organ of the petty bourgeoisie rather than an organization for the proletarian struggle.

3. The Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising should have been launched throughout the province, as circumstances were favorable at that time. However, the Provincial Committee decided subjectively to concentrate on a few counties in the central Hunan area and organize the uprising in only a few counties. We exerted no effort in the south and north Hunan areas. Hence, the uprising in the central Hunan area became isolated, and our forces in south and west Hunan could neither pin down the enemy nor launch any important diversionary attacks. This is also one of the reasons for our defeat.

VII) Suggestions for Future Work—Draft for the Second Hunan Uprising

1) Although the Hunan Autumn Harvest Uprising has failed because of mistakes by the party leadership, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the peasants in Hunan is continuously developing and surging ahead. Having experienced the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the revolutionary struggle in Hunan has entered a new stage. Its mission now is to complete the rural revolution and to establish the political power of the worker-peasant-soldier soviet.

2) As the revolutionary enthusiasm of the proletariat and the peasantry in Hunan continues to rise, we must make use of this good opportunity to launch the second uprising. We should keep in mind the precious lessons learned from the Autumn Harvest Uprising, that is, we must not rely only on the military while neglecting the strength of the peasants. We must avoid making the same mistake during the second uprising. This time we must use the peasants as the major force in the uprising and mobilize the whole party to work hard among the peasantry, encourage them to rise up spontaneously to seize land, and complete the rural revolution.

3) The revolutionary courage and determination of the proletariat in Hunan—the miners of Anyuan and the railway workers—were reflected in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Therefore, we ought to make particular efforts to enhance our work among the miners of Anyuan, Shuikoushan, and the tin mine; the rickshaw pullers, longshoremen, streetcar workers, iron workers, and textile workers in Changsha, as well as the workers of the ordnance factory in Hengyang to encourage them to rise up in arms.

4) We must employ all kinds of methods in the uprising areas to advocate the significance and aim of the uprising in order to arouse the enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers and peasants.

5) With respect to the military aspect of the uprising, we should not rely on the military as the major strength but only as one of the forces in the uprising. The main purpose of military work is to sabotage the enemy's military organizations. Thus, we must speed up our work among the enemy's soldiers and establish party organizations and party branches among them. With the establishment of these organizations, we can cause more serious damage to the enemy troops. We used to carry out military work in the old and erroneous style. This must be completely corrected in the future.

[[6) List of areas for the second uprising.]]

7) We must encourage the peasants to organize themselves both before and after the uprising to carry out the following work: (i) Distribute land. (ii) Confiscate the property of local tyrants, evil gentry, reactionaries, and big landlords. (iii) Execute local tyrants, evil gentry, landlords, and rich and powerful people in cities. (iv) Capture the weapons of the local regiments to arm the worker-peasant revolutionary army. (v) Burn down the houses of local tyrants, evil gentry, and big landlords. (vi) Boycott taxes and rent and destroy all manner of tax offices of the reactionary regime. (vii) Sabotage as much as possible the communications of the reactionary regime. (viii) Restore the peasant associations; and exercise the dictatorship of the peasant association. (ix) Establish revolutionary committees.

[[8) Slogans for the insurrection.]]

C.9 Resolution on the Current Situation in China and the Mission of the CP (November 1927)⁹¹

I) Recent Strategy of the CC and the Revolutionary Situation

[[The main contents of the Circular Letter drafted by the 7 August 1927 Emergency Conference of the CC are outlined [see above, **Doc. C.2**]: because of the warlords' counterrevolutionary activities, a general crisis would develop rapidly. Despite the setbacks in Shanghai and Canton [April 1927] and in Wuhan [July 1927], the revolution would not remain at a low ebb for long. Pessimism was completely wrong.]]

The political situation since then has fully shown that the CC's conclusion is correct, as is its general political strategy. Of course, the Nanchang Uprising and the Southern Expedition of the Revolutionary Army in Guangdong failed at Chaoshan. Neither did the peasant uprisings in Guangdong, Hunan, and Hubei win any decisive victories. However, despite these new failures of the revolution, the general experience of our struggle during the recent three months has proved further that our party's strategy is entirely correct. Recently, the labor movement and the peasant struggle have broken out forcefully and the general political conditions as well

as the relations between different classes have undergone drastic changes. Hence it is the CCP's task to analyze the current situation and decide on a strategy that suits the circumstances.

II) The General Crisis in Chinese Society and the Economic Situation in Agriculture

[[The general crisis will bring about a new climax of the revolutionary struggle waged by the proletariat, the urban poor, and particularly the broad masses of the peasants. The badly stricken and declining rural economy is set to erupt like a volcano. Now 50 to 70 percent of the peasants throughout the country are unable to survive because of the extreme exploitation by the ruling class. War damage has affected irrigation, etc. The financial system is in chaos, leading to a drop in price of most farm products in the cities. Only a complete victory of the worker-peasant revolution and a drastic change in landownership can prevent the crisis.]]

III) The Industrial and Commercial Crisis

[[The industrial, commercial, and financial crisis in China is even more serious. One of the major missions of the Chinese revolution is to create a unified nationwide domestic market, because without such a market, industrialization cannot be realized. The GMD's betrayal of the revolution has prevented this.]]

IV) The Rapid Advance of the Imperialist Invasion

[[In the field of international relations, the reactionary bourgeois warlords [GMD] have completely surrendered to foreign capitalism. This has led to the expansion of imperialist power in China.]]

V) The National Bourgeoisie and the GMD

[[With regard to domestic policies, the reactionary bourgeois warlords have resorted to the savage means of fascism and the Asian form of brutal dictatorship. However, as it turns more reactionary, the national bourgeoisie is also approaching disintegration and collapse. It betrayed the revolution at the very climax of the mass movement. The national bourgeoisie cannot unite China either alone or in alliance with the landlords.]]

The GMD used to be a revolutionary league composed of various classes, but today it has decayed into a kennel of imperialist running dogs without doctrine or purpose, a party which murders workers and peasants and a bureaucratic body made up of grafters, corrupt politicians, murderers, and speculators. This fact reflects clearly the totally corrupt and deteriorated state of the reactionary bourgeois regime. As early as August, the CC of the CCP predicted that it was absolutely impossible

for the GMD to be a well-organized bourgeois ruling party. This prediction has proved correct. The present meeting entirely agrees with the CC's September resolution on canceling the plan for organizing a GMD-left and raising the slogan for the establishment of the soviet.⁹² We are convinced that the failure of the GMD-left demonstrates that the GMD has degenerated into a party of white terror and that the only way out for the true revolutionaries is to unite under the banner of the CP. Not only will we call on all revolutionary elements to withdraw from the GMD, but also we will expose its hypocritical, evil essence and its oppression of the people. We are determined to lead the broad masses of the people to overthrow the GMD.

The Chinese bourgeoisie is a historically aborted child. It cannot even organize a political party of its own and put forward a basic political program, to say nothing of a platform of real political significance.

VI) The Future of the Chinese Revolution

[[The unique character of the Chinese bourgeoisie has resulted in the failure of the reactionary regime of the bourgeois warlords to maintain the stability of their rule. Even if the national bourgeoisie were to gain power, it would have to hand it over to the gentry and landlord class with their reactionary forces. Capitalism using reformist methods is impossible in China. Further, the Chinese people's revolutionary movement is still powerful and is far from destroyed.]]

All these factors make the enlarged meeting of the Temporary Politburo of the CCP believe that the present conditions in China are favorable for a direct revolution. This analysis by the meeting has nothing in common with the illusion that "the revolution will surely achieve a complete success within the shortest time." The situation in China indicates that the period of the direct revolution is not that of several weeks or a few months. It will last quite a few years. In essence, the Chinese revolution is a long, uninterrupted process. It is what Marx would call a "continuous revolution" [*wujianduan de geming*]⁹³ because first, as far as its nature is concerned, in the development of the Chinese revolution, there will not be an interruption after the stage of the bourgeois revolution (the so-called theory of "two-stage revolution"). This is because the Chinese bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying out the democratic revolution to overthrow the feudal warlord regime. Hence the Chinese revolution must advance directly and rapidly from the democratic stage to the socialist revolution. Second, as far as the speed of development is concerned, although the Chinese revolution has suffered several setbacks, it has managed to make continued progress because the conflicts between the different factions of the ruling class are so sharp that they are never able to consolidate their regime. The various movements waged by the revolutionary people, particularly the spontaneous peasant uprisings that have broken out everywhere, are bound to merge into a general worker-peasant uprising which will overthrow the regime of the warlords, gentry, and landlords and the bourgeoisie. This continuous eruption of the revolution indicates vividly that the Chinese revolution is a permanent one. In short,

although the Chinese revolution has not yet finished its mission for the democratic stage, it will develop rapidly beyond it and turn directly into a socialist revolution.

VII) The High and Low Ebbs of the Revolutionary Tide

[[The permanent essence of the Chinese revolution is reflected in the recent new climax of the peasant uprisings in a number of important provinces. After a low ebb, the labor movement surged forth vigorously again in the several major industrial centers although it remains weak.]]

Of course, it is wrong to overestimate the development of the revolution and its strength and the organizational capability of the people, and to think that an immediate victory can occur over a large area. Nevertheless, it is clear that the revolutionary struggle is on the rise again despite the three major setbacks and the present reactionary pressure. It will be an absolutely unforgivable mistake if we overlook such a situation.

For the revolutionary tide to reach a low ebb, at least three factors must be present: first, the bourgeois warlords must maintain a stable rule; second, reformist policies must be gradually applied; and third, the revolutionary mass movement must decline and collapse. The enemy's harsh suppression alone cannot cause the revolution to collapse; rather, it indicates that the enemy has been scared by the surges of the revolutionary tide and that is why they desperately try to put down the revolutionary struggle. However, the revolutionary mass movement will fail if there is not a Bolshevik party to lead the proletariat, to mobilize enthusiastically the people to participate in the struggle, and to guide the revolution's development. To dream that the revolutionary movement will rise and succeed by itself is to make an opportunist error.

VIII) Our General Strategy at the Present Time

The CCP's current general strategy is to: (a) go all out to build the spontaneous revolutionary struggle of the masses into a well-organized movement; (b) try to unify the various isolated and scattered peasant uprisings into a general uprising across an area as large as possible; and (c) make sure that the working-class struggle and the peasant uprising can be combined to mutual benefit. The CCP should avoid launching any immature and hopeless armed uprisings because that is a desperate and risky strategy. But, at the same time, our party should take over the leadership of all spontaneous, mass revolutionary struggles. We Communists ought to be the leaders of all peasant uprisings. When a peasant uprising lacks preparation, we should postpone it. If an uprising is unable to score a large-scale victory, our party should transform it into guerrilla warfare, i.e., not attacking county seats, or spending time organizing a large, regular army, but building up a small and well-organized guerrilla force to launch frequent attacks on the government's army and the

landlord forces. Later, this kind of guerrilla warfare can easily develop into a major peasant uprising and seize political power over a large area. Of course, once guerrilla warfare begins, it is very likely that the peasants will attack cities, particularly small towns. Our party should make special efforts to guide this kind of guerrilla warfare in order to make it serve our tactical purposes. We should strike when the enemy is unprepared, seize its arms, execute the gentry and landlords, and destroy all kinds of reactionary government organs. However, it would be military opportunism if, after a peasant uprising, we concentrated only on attacking county seats and forgot that the fundamental task for the rural revolution is to mobilize more people, to distribute land to the masses, and to help them establish a government (the soviet).

It is much more difficult to apply the strategy of guerrilla warfare in the cities because such tactics do not always suit the urban environment. Therefore, we should not launch guerrilla warfare in a city unless we have finally decided to launch an uprising there and street fighting has already begun. At present, however, it is one of our urgent tasks to build up the workers' armed self-defense corps in all industrial areas, train them, and use them in the daily struggle against the "yellow" trade unions. The following conditions are necessary to launch a successful urban uprising: first, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the workers must be high, and their daily economic struggle must have intensified and expanded into part of the general political struggle; second, the ruling-class regime must be unstable and face a total crisis; third, ordinary people in the city must be panicked, feel hostile to the ruling class, and even begin to show sympathy for the struggle to overthrow the regime; and fourth, the revolutionary labor movement must be well organized and skillfully trained. Therefore, while actively engaged in the preparation for military operations, our party should also pay attention to the direction and mobilization of the daily economic and political struggles of the workers, artisans, and shop assistants in various cities, speed up the struggles and educate the workers to understand, even in a very small-scale strike, the necessity to seize power through an armed uprising and the significance of uniting with the peasants to overthrow the ruling class. This is a practical way to make political preparations for an urban uprising. Our party's most important task is to organize an association linking the working class and the peasant uprisings because without the leadership and assistance of the working class, the peasant uprising alone cannot expect to win final victory. However, this kind of association can only be organized and planned by the party. No matter whether in an urban or rural area, armed uprisings must always be suited to the local circumstances and begin at the right moment. They should not be postponed in order to wait for each other or start hastily when the conditions are unfavorable. We cannot expect to win an armed uprising with military opportunism or with the military influence from other insurrections.

Since the working-class uprising is very important, it is certainly wrong to neglect urban workers and to regard them only as a force for cooperation with the

peasant struggle. It is our party's responsibility to guide the daily struggle of the workers, raise their revolutionary consciousness, organize them, and lead them to launch insurrections so that an urban uprising can become a center to lead the spontaneous peasant uprisings in the area. In fact, urban workers' uprisings are the precondition for a large uprising and for consolidation of the revolution's victory.

With the general strategy of armed uprisings, two erroneous tendencies might occur. One is military opportunism. To launch an immature and hopeless insurrection is of course a kind of military opportunism. However, this is not the major danger. The real problem is that some of us trust only military power rather than the people's strength, and know only how to make military deployments rather than how to mobilize the masses. Thus, in an armed uprising, they would concentrate only on military operations and forget to develop the people's struggle. The other erroneous tendency is to adopt, as an excuse for lack of preparation, an attitude of wait and see toward the uprising. Such people would not mobilize the local masses and feel hesitant or act shakily in leading an uprising even when the majority of the people have taken up arms. Such a tendency to underestimate the people's strength, overlook the work of mobilization, and even place restrictions on the spontaneous struggle of the masses will cause our party to lose political influence among the broad masses of people. As regards how to handle these two erroneous tendencies, the party should first point out their dangers, and then make every effort to get rid of them. Of course, it is the CCP's responsibility to plan as carefully as possible a well-organized uprising, but we should also take into consideration leadership of the spontaneous uprisings of the masses even though they may lack preparation.

Finally, as far as the strategy of the worker-peasant uprisings is concerned, we must make particular efforts to eliminate ruthlessly the gentry, landlords, scabs, and all reactionaries. We should also try to persuade the urban poor and ordinary citizens (the petty bourgeoisie) to participate in the worker-peasant movement. Nevertheless, regarding our policy toward the higher echelons of the petty bourgeoisie such as shopowners, we should not feel hesitant in developing the dictatorship exercised by the revolutionary masses or place any restriction on their revolutionary activities for fear of disturbing the tranquility and peaceful order of the higher echelons of the petty bourgeoisie. Although the opportunity for a general uprising has not yet arrived, it is our party's task to raise revolutionary enthusiasm both in urban and rural areas in order to create a favorable environment for the general uprising. While taking the leadership of the spontaneous peasant uprisings into account, our party should also work hard to educate the impoverished peasants, guide the preparations of any potential uprisings, and launch guerrilla warfare. In addition, we should organize workers to wage class struggle, help them launch armed uprisings, and guide them to ally with the peasant uprisings to form a general uprising in order to triumph over as large an area as possible.

IX) The Slogan for the Establishment of the Soviet and the Political Program of the Workers and Peasants

During the present stage of the revolution, our party's main slogan is to call for the establishment of the soviet. This is because the political power of the worker-peasant dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat can only be founded within the soviet system. The party should make speeches and publish propaganda to explain to the broad masses that "it is necessary to establish a government made up of the representatives of the workers, peasants, soldiers, artisans, and the urban poor." (All power belongs to the congress of workers, peasants, soldiers, and urban poor.) However, organization of the soviet should not be started until the climax of the revolutionary mass movement has definitely arrived and the victory of the uprising is guaranteed. Only then can we establish the soviet as the organ of revolutionary power. The so-called guaranteed victory of the uprising means that the uprising is able to control a certain area for quite a long time. Once such a possibility appears, we should begin to establish a peasant congress [*nongmin daibiao huiyi*] (the soviet). As long as the uprising is really supported by the masses, we must organize the soviet when it triumphs. If the peasant uprising is still in the stage of guerrilla warfare, its leading organ should be the local revolutionary committee, which has been set up as a provisional government to prepare and direct the uprising. In general, a peasant uprising ought to be organized and led by the revolutionary committee elected by the local secret peasant organizations [*nongmin de mimi tuanti*] (the peasant association, etc.). (An urban uprising should be led by the revolutionary committee elected by the local trade union.) We must try hard to mobilize and attract more people to participate in the struggle, adopt a policy of self-determination [*zidong shou*] ("the democratic style") to confiscate land, eliminate landlords and scabs, destroy all the old Chinese social orders, apply guerrilla warfare tactics, disarm the enemy's troops, and found a worker-peasant revolutionary army. If an uprising can triumph and maintain control over a certain large area, we should begin to organize the soviet (the peasant congress). If the revolutionary forces are able to take over a city or several counties or even a whole province, and the uprisings of workers and peasants have united and triumphed there, we should set up a formal soviet government. When organizing the congress of workers, peasants, soldiers, and urban poor in cities, we must make particular efforts to recruit the broad masses of the workers, artisans, and shop assistants. From the very beginning, or even before an urban uprising starts, embryo forms of mass organizations such as the general league of the strike committee [*zong tongmeng bagong weiyuanhui*], the workers' congress, and the revolutionary committee should be set up. We must work actively to lead such mass organizations, use them as centers to direct uprisings, and make them governing bodies to exercise the revolutionary dictatorship. If the uprising triumphs, we must transform these mass organizations into the soviet to become the organ of revolutionary power. The victory of an uprising can only be consolidated with the establishment of the soviet because this

will give the mass of the workers and peasants their own government. Then they will fight even harder to defend and expand the victory of the revolution. In general, the soviet should not be organized before we have won a solid victory; otherwise, it would keep us busy with elections while neglecting military operations, and a petty bourgeois tendency of democratism might appear which would weaken the revolutionary dictatorship and even endanger the party's leadership. However, neither is it correct to postpone organization of the soviet using the excuse that the military operation has not been completed or the victory has not been consolidated. Such reasoning will lead to the growth of military opportunism in the uprising and change the worker-peasant uprising into a mere military operation concentrating only on taking cities, seizing territory, and making military deployments.

The general slogan for the armed uprising is that all political power belongs to the congress of workers, peasants, soldiers, and urban poor. The urban poor should include artisans, small farmers, and the ordinary petty bourgeoisie who do not exploit the people.

In accordance with local conditions and the preferences of the masses there, the party should organize the peasants into organizations such as a peasant association or peasant committee. These peasant organizations must be the political organs of the impoverished peasants (the poor and bankrupt peasants, tenants, farmhands, and unemployed peasants) for waging class struggle and preparing uprisings, rather than welfare organizations such as trade unions. The definite policy of our party is that once the uprising triumphs, the peasant association will be transformed into a peasant congress (the soviet). From now on, we must begin to advocate the principle of the soviet and explain the interim function of the peasant association. In fact, the principle of the soviet does not conflict with the idea of the peasant association, but the slogan that "all political power belongs to the peasant association" should be abolished. Apart from the idea of the soviet, we should also unite the peasants under the banner of the rural revolution. In those areas where the peasant insurrections have not yet been organized, the traditional secret peasant societies are useful. Our party should educate them to fight against rent, taxes, and debts, and, finally, to organize the armed uprising to confiscate the land. The general principle of our party's land policy has been elaborated on in the section on the land problem in the party program (draft).⁹⁴ We must oppose resolutely any attempts by the opportunists to give ambiguous or erroneous interpretations of, or even to revise the party's policy on, the land question. The main principle of the rural revolution is to confiscate totally the land of all landlords; distribute the land through the peasant congress to the poor peasants; a peasant should have his own land; abolish thoroughly the tenant system; unite together to fight against rent and taxes; cancel all unfair leases, exorbitant usury, and heavy debts; confiscate properties of landlords and usurers; and eliminate gentry, landlords, and all kinds of counterrevolutionaries. Our party firmly opposes any attempt to replace the aforementioned revolutionary slogans with such reformist ideas as reducing rent, confiscating only the land of the big landlords, and eliminating only the despotic gentry and the bad landlords. Our party

should make efforts to add democratic elements to the peasant uprisings but, at the same time, we must ruthlessly execute without hesitation all gentry and landlords as well as the counterrevolutionaries. We should keep this in mind even in a very small-scale guerrilla war.

Regarding our slogans in the cities, in addition to the principle of the soviet, we have also put forward the following ideas for the labor question in our party program: the eight-hour [work]day, a sharp rise in wages, one day of rest per week, a social security system, and supervision over production. Moreover, we must explain to the workers and the urban poor that we will put the following policies into practice once the uprising triumphs: confiscation of all properties of counterrevolutionaries; transformation to state ownership of large factories, large shops, banks, mines, and railways of the big Chinese and foreign capitalists; factories to be run by the workers; application of the labor law; confiscation of properties of the small mill owners if they slow down production or close their mills; elimination of all scabs and counterrevolutionaries; collection of taxes on properties of the bourgeoisie; and improvement of the living standards of the urban poor by such means as building houses for workers and the urban poor. Only with such revolutionary slogans can our party organize the oppressed people into uprisings and achieve success.

X) The Struggle Against the Warlords' War and Military Issues

[[It is absolutely wrong to adopt the attitude of revolutionary "defeatism" toward the warlords' wars. Most warlords in the north are big landlords or usurers and are representatives of the largest bureaucrat-compradore bourgeoisie, while the warlords in the south represent an alliance of landlords, usurers, and the national bourgeoisie. Although they belong to different factions of the reactionary camp, their attitudes toward the working class and the peasants are the same. The task of our party during all the warlords' wars is to try to turn them into revolutionary wars. Establishment of the soviet will rid us forever of the warlords' wars. We must instigate rebellion within the soldiers' ranks. A special order has been issued by this meeting to party committees at all levels to ask them to start immediately secret propaganda work among the soldiers and lower-ranking noncommissioned officers. Our party should call on the soldiers to take part in the worker-peasant uprisings, confiscate properties of the warlords, and send representatives to participate in the government of the congress of workers, peasants, soldiers, and urban poor. Where uprisings have been successful, we should organize the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army.]]

XI) The Anti-Imperialist Struggle

[[Since the 7 August [1927] Emergency Conference, China has entered a period of the most unprecedented, intensified class struggle in its history. As a result, our party has been unable to devote any time to the national liberation movement

against the foreign imperialists. Yet the Chinese bourgeoisie has submitted to the imperialists thus proving that only the proletariat is the true leader of the national liberation movement. Therefore, the CCP should lead the national liberation movement and expose firmly the traitorous behavior of the ruling class and the hypocritical “anti-imperialist” clichés of the GMD.]]

XII) The Evil Legacy of Opportunism

The 7 August Emergency Conference seriously criticized the opportunist and semi-Menshevik political line of the party’s former leading organ, and the Temporary Politburo has repeatedly corrected the opportunist errors of the various local party leading organs. However, the evil influence of petty bourgeois opportunism remains within the party. One of the major reasons why the Ye [Ting]–He [Long] troops failed at Chaoshan and the Nanchang Uprising lost its political significance was because the commanders at the front did not carry out the revolutionary policy. Rather, they adopted a compromising reformist policy on various major issues. For example, they only wanted to confiscate the land of the landlords with over 200 *mu* and maintain a reduced rent which still accounted for 30 percent of the harvest. They neglected revolutionary propaganda work among the peasant masses; forbade workers and peasants to take their own independent decisions about executing the gentry, landlords, and counterrevolutionaries; and gave up the policy of confiscation of properties of the gentry and landlords. The party’s Front Committee also made bad decisions on military issues. Their direction lacked a revolutionary dynamic and firm resolution. The lack of determination and strong revolutionary will among the leaders is the main reason for the defeat of many peasant uprisings. Characteristically, the opportunists trust neither the strength of the mass movement nor rely on the workers and peasants. They always pin their hopes on troops who are, in fact, unreliable, and they only want to collaborate with the small local warlords. The CC has decided at this meeting to use all the party’s strength to get rid of this evil legacy of opportunism, which has brought fatal dangers to our party. Since one of the main reasons why this kind of opportunism can survive is that many of the leading party members are from a nonproletarian class background, this meeting orders party committees at all levels to act resolutely to replace the leading members with people from a working-class background and to eliminate all opportunists in the party. We ought to understand that our recent failures in Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong, as well as the failed Southern Expedition of the Ye–He troops, are largely owing to subjective errors, and that without a powerful and sound non-opportunist party leadership, the revolution cannot triumph.

Finally, this meeting believes that it is also necessary to prevent the occurrence of another kind of dangerous tendency—the underestimation of the significance of the daily economic struggles of the working class, its concentration on small matters and the work of the labor movement. In fact, the general strategy for the armed uprising does not conflict with the task of directing the working-class strug-

gle for economic interests. On the contrary, it requires our party to work more actively to lead the working class to fight for improvements in their daily lives and working conditions. Only in this way can the CCP be considered by the masses as their own revolutionary organization.

C.10 Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress [of the CCP] (9 July 1928)⁹⁵

I) China and the World Revolution

1. *The Development of World Revolution*

[[The world revolution over the last ten years can be divided into three stages. First, the October [1917] Revolution in Russia. Second, a phase of partial but temporary stabilization of the capitalist economy. Third, a phase that begins with the sharpening of conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist countries, and between imperialist powers and the laboring masses in the colonies and semi-colonies. This third stage will witness another round of open, decisive upsurges by the working class and uprisings in the colonies, accompanied by the danger of an anti-Soviet war and the possibility of many large-scale conflicts between the imperialist powers.]]

2. *The International Significance of the Chinese Revolution*

[[The Sixth Congress of the CCP sees a much sharper class struggle in the world as inevitable. The struggle of the Chinese laboring masses will advance the proletarian world revolution by weakening imperialist pressure on Soviet Russia and on workers in other countries. The second stage of the Chinese revolution—the proletarian socialist revolution—will be an even more direct component of the world socialist revolution than the first stage—the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The completion of the Chinese revolution will be the prelude to victory of the world proletarian dictatorship.]]

II) The Nature of the Chinese Revolution and Its Power

3. *The Nature and Tasks of the Chinese Revolution*

The Sixth Congress of the CCP agrees entirely with the evaluation of the Chinese revolution by the *Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Plenums of the ECCI* [emphasis in the original; 29 November–16 December 1926, 20–26 May 1927, 9–25 February 1928,

respectively]. The nature of the present stage of the Chinese revolution is bourgeois-democratic; it is erroneous to think of the present stage of the Chinese revolution as having already passed over into the socialist revolution. It is also erroneous to regard the present Chinese revolution as a “continuous revolution” [*buduan geming*], because: (a) the real unification of China has not yet been accomplished, and it has not yet been emancipated from imperialism; (b) the private landownership system of the landlord class has not yet been overthrown, and all semifeudal remnants have not been liquidated; and (c) the present political power is the governmental power of the landlords, warlords, compradores, and national bourgeoisie, an alliance of reactionary forces dependent on the political and economic strength of international imperialism; therefore, the immediate goal of the [Chinese] revolution is to solve these problems. The core of the Chinese revolution at present and the fundamental and central tasks are:

- (a) to drive out the imperialists and to accomplish the real unification of China; and
- (b) to abolish completely and popularly [i.e., through the people] the private landownership system of the landlord class and to carry out the rural revolution in which the Chinese peasants (small owners) will destroy all the semifeudal bondage in the land system.

These two tasks do not yet exceed the scope of the capitalist mode of production—but they can only be accomplished by overthrowing, through the revolutionary method of armed insurrection, the rule of the imperialists and that of the landlord-warlord-bourgeois GMD and by setting up a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants’ soviets under the leadership of the proletariat.

(c) Therefore, the third task of the Chinese revolution at the present bourgeois-democratic stage is already the struggle to establish the rule of councils of workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ deputies (soviets). This is the best method of inducing the vast toiling masses to participate in political rule and to realize the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.

The national bourgeoisie of China betrayed the revolution and joined the counterrevolutionary camp of the imperialists, gentry, and landlords. They were once (before spring 1927) a force that could weaken the imperialists and undermine the warlord system, but they have now come to strengthen and unify the imperialists and the warlord system. Therefore, the sole source of power [of the Chinese revolution] lies, at the present bourgeois-democratic stage, with the Chinese proletariat and peasantry.

China’s anti-imperialist, bourgeois-democratic revolution, which completely transforms the [existing] land system, can only be accomplished in opposition to the national bourgeoisie, which is one of the most dangerous enemies obstructing the success of the revolution.

4. The Program of the Chinese Revolution at the Present Stage

At the present stage, the major slogans of the Chinese revolution are:

- a) Overthrow the rule of imperialism.

- b) Confiscate enterprises and banks of foreign capitalism.
- c) Unify China and recognize [the principle] of national self-determination.
- d) Overthrow the warlord-GMD regime.
- e) Establish the regime of councils of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies (soviets).
- f) Realize the eight-hour [work]day, higher wages, unemployment relief, social security, etc.
- g) Confiscate the land of all landlords—land should belong to the peasants.
- h) Improve the livelihood of the soldiers and allot them land and work.
- i) Abolish taxes imposed by the [GMD] government, warlords, and local administrations; institute unified, progressive taxes.
- j) Unite with the proletariat of the world and the Soviet Union.

These ten great demands are the present major slogans of the CCP for winning over the masses, preparing armed insurrections, and overthrowing the regime of the gentry and bourgeoisie.

5. The Source of Power of the Chinese Revolution and Its Transition to a Socialist Future

The proletariat and the peasantry now constitute the sole source of power of the Chinese revolution, and the leadership of the proletariat has already been established in the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. (The proletariat can support and guide the peasantry in the rural revolution and the struggle against the imperialists.) This will therefore open the path of the Chinese revolution toward a noncapitalist, that is, socialist, future.

World capitalism is at present in a frightened state of depression. There have been ten years of socialist construction in a country under proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union, whose political and economic power is growing; this will help the Chinese proletariat to win the revolution for a socialist future and guarantee its victory.

At the same time, the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in the form of soviet rule will be the starting point of transformation to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only the struggle, the strength, the solidarity, and the organizational

strength of the proletariat and only the comparative ratio of class strength can decide when the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution will end, and how it will be transformed into the process of socialist revolution of the proletariat.

III) Experiences of Past Struggles

6. *The Objective Causes for the Failure of the Chinese Revolution*

Despite its impressive development in the initial stage, the Chinese revolution finally failed. At this historical stage, it did not have sufficient strength to overcome the numerous difficulties of the period. Among the objective difficulties and causes [of failure], the following should be mentioned.

a) The imperialists, the archenemies of the Chinese revolution, were very strong and are the organizers and controllers of all reactionary forces. By means of their political and economic power and some puny concessions to the national bourgeoisie, they split the national United Front through coercion and bribery—using the traditional methods of bribing the warlords, of suppressing the revolution by forceful gunboat “diplomacy,” and of economic blockade. By using their powerful strength (in the form of banks, corporations, warships, and troops), they became one of the most serious obstacles to the development and success of the Chinese revolution.

b) The national bourgeoisie betrayed the revolutionary United Front. In the initial stage, the bourgeoisie participated in the revolution. This sowed the seed of its [the bourgeoisie’s] inevitable betrayal and withdrawal from the revolutionary front. The betrayal of the national bourgeoisie temporarily weakened the revolutionary forces and strengthened the counterrevolutionary alliance.

c) The Chinese army is mercenary, which is one of the characteristics of Chinese warlordism; therefore, the reactionary group possesses a numerically superior force—the kind of force which often determines victory or defeat. The revolution [itself] once utilized this type of army. But the officers of such an army are usually the spokesmen of the landlord gentry. The soldiers (in such an army) are men who have been unproductive and who have little contact with workers or peasants. The army was then an obedient tool of the gentry, the feudal landlords, and the bourgeoisie.

d) The development of the revolutionary movement [has been] uneven. The peasant movement had just begun to develop when the Chinese proletariat was engaged in other struggles (such as the May 30 Movement [1925] or the March uprising in Shanghai [1927]). [Even though] the Chinese working class was weakly organized, dispersed, and not particularly powerful, still it very early entered the arena of political struggle and was beset repeatedly by the reactionaries without receiving timely support from the peasantry. The Chinese working class failed under these attacks, without being able to hold on long enough for the peasant movement to develop on an extensive mass scale. Furthermore, the revolution also

developed unevenly according to place. The peasants of Guangdong, Hunan, and Hubei in the south had already begun to overthrow the regime of the landlords and gentry and to confiscate and even redistribute the land in some localities, while the peasants in the north were only beginning to participate in the liberation struggle. This naturally made it even easier for the bourgeoisie and feudal gentry to carry out their own reactionary mission.

e) The overwhelming majority of the upper strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie are closely related to the feudal land [system] and also linked with foreign capital. These petty bourgeois elements wavered and [then] betrayed the revolution. During the rapid advance of the anti-imperialist movement and the rural revolution, the petty bourgeoisie vacillated more and more and finally surrendered to the reactionary camp of the gentry bourgeoisie.

7. The Mistakes of Opportunism

However, objective difficulties were not the only forces determining the inevitable failure of the Chinese revolution. The Sixth Congress of the CCP holds that the principal reason for the failure of the revolution was the opportunist policy of the directing organ of the vanguard of the proletariat—the CCP—which, at a critical juncture of the revolution, [adopted] a non-Bolshevik, opportunist policy, thus, in an objective sense, betraying the interests of the struggling, toiling masses. This opportunist policy was, first of all, owing to the CC's erroneous conception of the nature of the Chinese revolution and the tasks of the United Front. The independence of the CCP was not preserved; no class criticism was made of the revolutionary ally; the revolutionary forces were not mobilized; nor were the masses prepared to foil the reactionary plot of our temporary allies. On the contrary, at times [the CC] obstructed the development of the mass movement to suit its erroneous notion of the United Front. Thus the then leading organ of the CCP doomed the Chinese revolution to inevitable failure.

The CCP leadership at that time did nothing to develop the rural revolution and the class struggle of the masses, but engaged in intrigues with the [GMD-left] leaders, ignoring class conflict. It did not try to win over the army; nor did it arm the workers and peasants. It proved incapable of exploiting its participation in the [Wuhan] regime in order to fight for the interests of the masses. At the critical juncture therefore it was encircled by the enemy instead of breaking through [this] encirclement—as a matter of fact, it actually forfeited the leadership of the proletariat. This was the highest expression of opportunism, which manifested itself most shamefully during the May 21 [1927] incident [at Changsha]. Lastly, the leadership of the CCP failed to carry out the Comintern's directives, thus causing the eventual failure of the heroic struggle of the workers and peasants.

The Sixth Congress of the CCP admits that it was entirely correct for the Comintern to bypass the CC and call directly on the CCP membership [and on the]

masses, in order to demand a thorough change in the party line and a reshuffling of the party leadership.

8. The 7 August Conference and the Enlarged Conference of November [1927]

The Emergency Conference of 7 August [1927] based itself on the Comintern's directive to correct thoroughly the opportunist errors of the preceding period; therefore, it was a turning-point in the history of the CCP, and of great significance—[it posed] the task of Bolshevizing the party. The 7 August Conference criticized the errors of opportunism in a frank Bolshevik spirit, raised the central slogan of the rural revolution, and designated the overthrow of the reactionary GMD central government as the aim of the proletariat and peasantry, mapped out the general strategy of armed insurrection, and began to liquidate the opportunist elements in the leadership by mobilizing the party membership [and the] masses; thus reorganizing the old leadership, it rescued the party from the mire of opportunism and [put it back] again on the revolutionary path.

It is true that the 7 August Conference still harbored some wishful thoughts about the GMD-left and that it did not deal thoroughly with the rural question. But these defects can never diminish its great historical significance. [Therefore], the Sixth Congress of the CCP wholeheartedly supports the major resolutions of the 7 August Conference.

The Enlarged Conference of November [1927] continued the work of Bolshevization. It mapped out a more detailed and thorough rural policy, raised the slogan of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants' soviets, and resolutely decided on an overhauling of the party and the induction of worker-comrades into responsible positions. The Sixth Congress holds, at the same time, [that] the November Conference was very correct in pointing to the necessity of well-prepared, well-coordinated armed insurrections. In evaluating the Chinese revolution, however, the resolution of the Enlarged Conference of November erroneously chose the term "permanent revolution" [see above, **Doc. C.9**]. This permitted the possibility of interpreting the revolution as continuously ascending, and thus resulted in false tactics. Notions about the Bolshevik policy of insurrection also remained unclarified for a long time, entailing inaccuracies of judgment and tactics and underestimation of the enemy's strength—which can all become the basis of adventurist tendencies. Consequently, the already discovered adventurist tendencies in the party were not effectively checked. (Such ultraleftist tendencies are extremely harmful.)

9. The Significance of the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and the Canton Armed Uprising

The Sixth Congress of the CCP holds that the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and especially the Canton Uprising definitely did not constitute adventurism from the point of view of policy.

The Nanchang Uprising was a military action against the central GMD [government], and [as such] it was a correct move. The objective cause of its failure was the overwhelming superiority of the enemy. As to the tactical errors of the leadership at that time, they were:

- a) lack of a clear program;
- b) lack of determination in the rural question;
- c) lack of coordination with the peasant movement and failure to arm the peasants;
- d) failure to destroy the old regime and replace it by the workers' regime; and
- e) sundry military blunders. These mistakes were the subjective causes of the failure of the Nanchang Uprising.

In many places the Autumn Harvest Uprising deepened the party's influence among the peasant masses and introduced the slogan of the rural revolution into the mentality of broad peasant masses. The many peasant struggles that followed and even the establishment of soviet areas generally derived from the effect of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. But the mechanical application of the Autumn Harvest policy led in some places to playing at insurrections and military putsches.

The Sixth Congress of the CCP supports the (statement) of the Ninth ECCI meeting that the Canton Uprising [Commune] has world historical significance. The Canton Uprising was a necessary, heroic attempt, a struggle to retain revolutionary gains and to deepen the revolution and to directly set up a soviet regime. But objectively speaking, the Canton Uprising became "a rearguard fight" in the stage of revolutionary failure, and this was not taken into account by the party leadership. Because the revolution had suffered a severe setback, the direction of [party] work should have been resolutely shifted from direct armed insurrection on a large scale to better day-by-day organization and mobilization of the masses. Attention should have been concentrated on overcoming adventurist tendencies, further strengthening the party's leadership in the anti-imperialist movement, and further doing away with arbitrary dictatorialness [in method] regarding the working class and the masses. The leadership at that time did not fully understand this and obviously made inadequate efforts in this direction, underestimating the power of the imperialists and the reactionaries, considerably overemphasizing the success of the peasant movement, and also underappraising the degree of failure suffered by the revolution. The plans of the uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, etc., were erroneous in that they did not evaluate the situation in this light.

IV) The Present Situation in the Revolutionary Movement and the General Line of the CCP

10. The Situation Once the Revolutionary High Tide Has Passed

The first wave of the movement of workers and peasants led for the most part by the CCP has now passed because the workers and peasants have suffered serious defeats, their revolutionary organizations have suffered severe blows (trade unions, peasant associations, CCP departments), their best cadres have been slaughtered, and their vanguard has suffered tremendous losses.

In the present situation, there is, generally speaking, no revolutionary rising tide [involving] the masses on an extensive scale. The present situation is characterized by an uneven rate of development in the Chinese revolutionary movement. The peasants' guerrilla warfare has unevenly advanced and is still only in a scattered, decentralized condition. The armies of the warlords have begun to show signs of disintegration; at the same time, the urban workers' movement has suffered great reverses, and the fighting power of the working class has been weakened because, compared with other revolutionary forces, it has received the heaviest blows from the gentry, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie.

Because the Chinese revolution has failed, because the insurrection of the workers and peasants has been suppressed, and because the national bourgeoisie has betrayed the revolution of national liberation, the power of the imperialists in China is better consolidated and stronger than in 1925–27. Japanese aggression in north China and the dispatch of [Japanese] troops to Jinan actually mark the beginning of the partition of China [among the imperialists].

The objectives of the partition policy [of the powers] are: (1) to achieve colonial, economic exploitation by noneconomic force, so as to completely destroy the revolution in China, and (2) to step up the struggle for markets. As the powers [thus] redouble their efforts to secure the China market, conflicts among the imperialist powers intensify.

Therefore, there is the danger of an imperialist war in the Pacific, and the coastal provinces of China will become the battleground. The major causes of this war will be the fight over the China market and demands for reallocating [spheres of influence] to suit the new relationship among the imperialist powers. At the same time, although there are extremely great conflicts within the imperialist camp such as that between Japan and the United States, the imperialists are at present still much stronger than the Chinese revolution and are forming again an alliance to oppose the revolutionary United Front in China. Whenever their political and economic rule is slightly endangered, they will jointly oppose the Chinese revolution.

The bourgeoisie's turning to the reactionary camp enables the reactionary forces to consolidate and strengthen the forces of the imperialists, warlords, and landlords. Consequently, [they] are able to deal a severe blow to the working class.

Although there are many, many conflicts in the reactionary camp (between the

bourgeoisie and the landlords, between the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, among the various groups and cliques within the landlord class, etc.), which lead to armed clashes and warlord imbroglios, the imperialists, gentry, landlords, bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie form a united front to oppress the Chinese toiling masses whenever their revolutionary struggle explodes.

11. Why a Revolutionary High Tide Is Inevitable

Nonetheless, there are many indications showing that a new, extensive revolutionary tide is inevitable.

There are several prime forces accelerating and reinforcing the advance of a new [revolutionary] high tide:

(a) none of the conflicts underlying the revolution can be resolved [by the counterrevolution]; (b) the imperialists will never be willing to abandon lightly their privileges in China, such as concessions, leased territories, and tariff control; the bourgeoisie-led reactionaries cannot achieve real centralization and unification; (c) there is hardly any solution for the industrial and economic crisis; it is difficult to improve even slightly the livelihood of the working class; and there are many other difficulties [inherent] in a colonial status [such as] the aggravation of the periodical agricultural crisis, leading to a steady rise of prices for raw materials and foodstuffs, and the daily growth of the labor reserve army, [all of these] resulting in severe oppression of the industrial and working class; (d) the reformist devices of the bourgeoisie cannot solve the rural problem; there is no unused land from which to make concessions to the poor peasants, rich peasants, and tenants, because in China the small landlords constitute an absolute majority and refuse to accept even rent reductions; and (e) there are continuous conflicts within the ruling class and imbroglios among the warlords. In the future, these imbroglios are not only possible but inevitable—although on the surface the Nanjing government has unified China.

[Another] force helping the growth of the revolutionary high tide is the daily sharpening conflict among the imperialist powers. This will help to unleash the Chinese revolution. [The same is true for] the growth of the international proletarian movement and the development of the national revolutionary movement in the colonies adjacent to China (such as India).

The Sixth Congress holds that signs of a preliminary, weak new revolutionary high tide are already noticeable. First of all, there is the symptomatic revival of economic mass strikes. The working masses are rapidly losing their illusions about the GMD and are spontaneously organizing themselves from the bottom up. All this shows the deepening of the workers' class consciousness. Furthermore, the anti-imperialist movement is also developing, awakening not only the working masses but also some of the revolutionary urban petty bourgeoisie to join [the revolution].

As regards the peasant struggle, the bases in the soviet regime preserved until the present time (in the southern provinces) and their few revolutionary armies of workers and peasants will become an ever more important element in the new high tide.

The Sixth Congress also holds that the signs mentioned above should not be overestimated, because even taken together they do not make up a true rising tide, the number of people [now] participating in the struggle is still insufficient, and at present the urban working class has not yet overcome its setbacks.

The degree of consolidation of the reactionary regime in different regions is uneven; therefore, the revolution, in a general new high tide, may succeed first in one or more provinces. At present, there is no revolutionary high tide, and no such successes are possible; but such a prospect is possible. In this respect, the important role of urban leadership and the rising tide of the proletarian masses will show their decisive power and will decide how to turn the slogan "All power to the council of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies" into a slogan of direct action.

12. The Task of Winning Over the Masses

The new future high tide requires still more preparation for armed insurrections, and even actual insurrections, as immediate practical tasks for the party—this is the only way to accomplish the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the overthrow of the political regime of the imperialists, gentry, bourgeoisie, and the GMD.

Now is the time to rally and consolidate the proletarian forces; armed insurrection on a national scale remains for the time being a propaganda slogan. [We] should now make the masses realize, in leading them in everyday struggles, that if the GMD-warlord regime is not overthrown, the living conditions of the masses can never improve. Propaganda among the masses should also be carried on continuously.

At present, the first revolutionary wave is over, owing to repeated failures: a new [revolutionary] wave has not yet arrived, and the forces of the reaction are still stronger than those of the workers and peasants. The party's general line is to win over the masses. The party should use all its power to intensify the rallying and unifying of the proletarian masses and rally them around the main slogans of the party; it should engage in stupendous organizational work in order to consolidate the revolutionary unions and peasant associations. [The party] must do its very best to lead [the masses] in daily economic and political struggles in order to expand the mass organizations of workers and peasants. Finally, it is necessary to intensify the [work of] explaining to the proletariat the past experiences of the revolution.

The party should exploit every conflict between workers and capitalists in the factories, between peasants and landlords in the villages, and between soldiers and officers in the military camps. However small these clashes may be, they should be exploited to agitate and penetrate deeper into these class conflicts in order to win the vast masses of workers and peasants to our side. The party must exploit all the imperialists' brutal deeds in China and all slaughter and suppression of the masses by the reactionaries (naturally not calling for armed uprising on every occasion) in order to widen the resistance of the masses and to be in the position of sole leader of the revolutionary movement when the [revolutionary] high tide begins.

The task of winning over the masses is the task of preparing for armed insurrection—because the fulfillment of this task is a prerequisite for a new revolutionary high tide and for the possibility of turning the propaganda slogan of armed insurrection into that of direct practical action.

13. *The Danger of Opportunism and Putschism*

Winning over the masses depends on the realization by the party of a policy based on correct calculation; [it depends on] the liquidation of ultraleftist errors and sentiments (putschism, military adventurism, individual terrorism) within the party and of the GMD-style erroneous tendency to issue [arbitrary] orders to the masses.

The major dangers are putschism and commandism [*mingling zhuyi*]; they both alienate the party from the masses.

Putschism, in theory, means a few individuals wishing to attack an obviously far superior enemy by continual military actions, blind and impetuous measures which forsake and ignore the masses. Of course, sometimes it also derives from an overestimate of the rate and degree of disintegration in the counterrevolutionary camp and to neglecting all the prerequisites of insurrection, which is lightheartedly undertaken without serious preparations. A putsch in practical action is an insurrection by a few “party members” without the necessary day-by-day economic and political preparation, a brutal struggle that relies entirely on military strength, in the nature of a military adventure. Naturally, such a putsch usually forces the masses into military insurrection, often resulting in unorganized, sporadic acts of terrorism. This will lower the party’s prestige among the masses and end in the unrequited loss of the vanguard units of the workers and of communism.

Putschism represents class-alienated elements, rural and urban poor (unemployed, bankrupt petty bourgeoisie, some of the revolutionary intelligentsia), and mercenary soldiers who recently joined the revolution; it is an expression of their ideology and [way of] action. It thus shows the influence of the petty bourgeoisie on the working class and contrasts with the characteristics of discipline and organization among the proletariat.

At the same time, the CP must not look down on the poor; they are a great and powerful force in the revolution. The task of the party is to carry out maximum organizational work among these poor masses and raise their political consciousness, especially regarding the urban and rural semiproletarian class. The party must do its utmost to absorb these poor elements into the general revolutionary movement under the leadership of the industrial proletariat. However, the party must also constantly increase its efforts to oppose the influence of petty bourgeois ideology on the working class and the CP.

Besides putschism, there are other dangerous tendencies. Elements in some party organizations, in dealing with some problems, hold views that make the party incline toward the bankrupt peasants, the urban poor, and the lumpenproletariat and alienate it from its proletarian base. For example, there are erroneous notions re-

garding the relationship between the working class and the peasantry, which falsely conceive of socialism as equalization of property (in villages, equal distribution of land; in the cities, of goods). Also, a tendency to burn down cities has appeared in some peasant uprisings, and leadership by the urban proletariat (of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie) has been held in low esteem. These tendencies in the party should be firmly opposed.

Furthermore, working merely through commandism is also a dangerous tendency, alienating the party from the masses. The attitude of the party toward the working class would become the gentrylike GMD method of dealing with the masses. Commandism means the direction and compulsion of the masses by commandism without educating or convincing them. Formerly, under opportunism, (the party), on behalf of the GMD, ordered the masses not to act. Now, under putschism, the masses are ordered never to remain inactive in order to oppose the GMD.

Even in the workers' movement such methods have been used, with orders being issued everywhere. Appointments by order of union leaders or leading organs have generally been a top-to-bottom working method. Consequently, cadres were not raised from the masses. Even in party membership drives and in carrying on the labor movement, a method of approaching a few workers' leaders in order to influence their masses was adopted. As a result, genuine mass work was confronted with tremendous obstacles.

A similar tendency exists in party organizational matters, resulting in the unusual shrinkage of intraparty organization and the mere issuing of orders to the membership and to the masses. If such commandism is not resolutely and utterly liquidated, the party cannot become a fighting party capable of leading the masses. Commandism and the winning over of the masses cannot coexist.

Past experiences should enable the party to conquer ultraleftist sentiments and GMD-style commandism. At present an incorrect tendency regarding the question of the petty bourgeoisie may still arise.

Among the tasks of the party, the urban petty bourgeoisie is to be induced to participate in the anti-imperialist, antiwarlord movement. Among the tasks of the party, the peasant masses who own private property (owner-peasants) should also be induced to join the struggle for the confiscation of the landlords' land and against taxation by warlords. [But] misunderstandings of this policy may lead to an even more undesirable tendency; when the movement against rich peasants is not emphasized, too many concessions to the rich peasants in the villages or interference with the revolutionary movement of the workers and urban poor for the sake of compromise with shopkeepers and the petty bourgeoisie will result in subjecting this movement to the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie and actual loss of the [revolutionary] leadership [by the party] in the name of preserving the United Front.

When the interests of the workers and shop employees clash sharply with those of urban shopkeepers and the petty bourgeoisie, or when poor and middle peasants clash with rich peasants in the villages, the CP should always stand with the laborers against the exploiting class.

The Chinese revolution being a semicolonial revolution, the anti-imperialist struggle has a major function [in it]. It is a serious mistake to neglect the developing anti-imperialist movement by not assuming its leadership. Furthermore, class relations in the new stage of the Chinese revolution (soviet stage) are entirely different from what they were in the May 30 period [1925]. The deeper penetration of the revolution calls for greater attention to the anti-imperialist and the antimilitarist struggle of the future, which will result in direct mass action a dozen times more drastic [than the present]. We must not neglect these future prospects. It is a serious error to neglect the anti-imperialist movement and the anti-imperialist struggle of the vast lower strata while wanting to strengthen the opposition to the reactionary classes inside the country.

Furthermore, in the process of intense class differentiation [attendant on] the class struggle, and in the process of a thoroughgoing rural revolution, the most reliable ally of the proletariat in the general revolutionary front of China is no other than the peasantry. Therefore, neglect of the leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat and of the revolutionary role of the peasantry, as well as “tailism” [*weiba zhuyi*], which follows peasant petty bourgeois ideas, are all very dangerous tendencies.

The above-mentioned tendencies—such as putschism, commandism, the doctrine of equalization of property, conciliationism, neglect of anti-imperialism and of the revolutionary role of the peasantry—are all non-Bolshevik paths.

The Bolshevization of the CCP was assured by opposition to the opportunist leadership and to opportunist tactics. Now [we] must continue the antiopportunist struggle, especially against ultraleftist defections. These so-called leftist dangerous tendencies are only another aspect of the opportunist petty bourgeois ideology which has affected the working class and the CP.

V) The Tasks of the Party

14. Tasks for Inner-Party Work

At present the party's major tasks, after its fighting strength has been weakened by losses owing to defections, are to strengthen its fighting power and to proletarianize itself:

a) Revive destroyed party branches [*zhibu*] and party departments at all levels. Special attention should be paid to the establishment and development of party branches in big industrial establishments and factories, for they are the major places of assembly for the working-class masses.

b) Actively recruit party members among workers, continue to promote worker-comrades and “activists” to the leading organs of the party, and make sure the leading organs possess the characteristics of the working class. Attention, of course, should also be paid to the correction of any bias and false tendencies in these matters.

c) Realize true democratic centralism [*minzhu jizhongzhi*]; maximum democracy within the party should be guaranteed within the limits of secrecy; decide important issues through collective discussions and collective decisions; (but) at the same time oppose the tendency toward extreme democracy, because it can destroy party discipline, encourage an attitude of irresponsibility, and damage confidence in the party leadership.

d) Resolve all intraparty disputes and liquidate tendencies toward regionalism and “clique-ism” [*xiaotuan zhuyi*] because these tendencies damage party unity and lower its fighting power. Abolish the so-called punishment system; a comrade who commits mistakes in work should be corrected and retrained through work, unless he or she insists on upholding his or her mistakes with a system or a line. If a comrade can correct himself after committing an error, he should be given work to demonstrate his having reformed.

e) Intensify the training of party members and of the masses, raise their political level, systematically propagate Marxism-Leninism, and study the lessons of past stages of the Chinese revolution.

f) Intensify propaganda for correct concepts of armed insurrection and for the general task of setting up the regime of councils of workers’, peasants’, and soldiers’ deputies (soviets).

15. The Relations Between the Party and the Working Class and the Question of the Labor Movement

a) The major task of the party is to win over the majority of the working class, secure their active support for the vanguard of the proletariat, the CP, and induce them to believe in the CP and consciously accept its leadership. Full attention should be paid to the labor movement, especially to industrial workers. Only thus can the leadership of the working class over the peasantry be strengthened.

b) In order to accomplish this task, some old false notions concerning the relationship between the party and [the working] class should be corrected immediately. Such false notions seem to hold that the party is a special force standing ahead of the [working] class and is in a position to help and command that class; what is not realized is that the party is only the most conscious and the most advanced element of the working class itself.

c) Firmly oppose compulsion and orders imposed on our own class, [such as] the method of compulsory strikes and compulsory armed uprisings. The Congress holds that such methods are contrary to the interest of the proletariat and of the CP and will ruin the Chinese revolution.

d) The utmost effort should be made to revive revolutionary unions. Party members should join unions that have a real mass following in order to achieve the goal of winning over the laboring masses, even if these unions are reactionary.

e) Work systematically with every effort in various organizations in order to have the working masses discard their illusions about the GMD. Give the masses a

detailed explanation of the lessons of the Chinese revolution and the policies and tasks of the CCP.

f) All these are necessary for winning over the masses and should be carried out in the course of the struggle. The leadership of the masses in their daily economic struggles should be greatly strengthened.

16. The Major Tasks of the Party in the Peasant Movement

a) The central slogan of the peasant movement is the confiscation of the landlords' land for disposition by the peasant congress (soviet).

b) The tactical line is [as follows]: the archenemy being the gentry landlords, the basic strength of the proletariat in the villages lies with the poor peasants and the middle peasants. They are solid allies. It is wrong to step up intensely the struggle against the rich peasants because that would confuse the major conflict between the peasants and the landlord class. This, however, does not mean that the class struggle against the rich peasants and the semilandlords is to be abandoned.

c) Support the guerrilla warfare of the peasants and further its penetration [among the masses] and consolidation. Lead the peasants into organized struggle and into the struggle for the conscious establishment of soviet regimes and the carrying out of the rural revolution. Coordinate the peasant movement in rural areas with the struggle of the working class in the cities.

d) It is not only possible but necessary to organize revolutionary armies of workers and peasants in the present guerrilla areas. Because of singular political circumstances, this task is now the central issue in the peasant movement, deserving special attention by the party. The success with which this task is carried out may give an impetus to the growth of a new revolutionary high tide—[it may be] one of the major sources of power determining the new revolutionary high tide.

e) Pay more attention to the mass organizations of the peasants (such as peasant associations, peasant congresses, and peasant secret societies). Consolidate the guiding role of the proletariat in the peasant organizations.

f) Support and give leadership to the peasant masses' partial demands in refusing to pay taxes, rent, and debts, and in demanding rent-reduction, etc., so as to organize the vast peasant masses.

17. The Party's Task in the Soviet Areas

In the past, the error of neglecting the development and expansion of revolutionary areas was committed in many of the soviet areas. There was also an erroneous tendency to supplant the soviet by the party.

Henceforth our tasks are:

a) To expand the soviet bases and to capture and consolidate new areas which will serve as bases for further expansion.

- b) To develop, with maximum effort, a regular revolutionary army of workers and peasants—the Red Army.
- c) To carry out fully the party's rural program.
- d) To set up soviet regimes and to induce the broad masses to participate in their administration.
- e) To liquidate resolutely counterrevolutionary plots and to wipe out completely the political and economic power of the ruling class.
- f) To protect commodity transactions in business and to overcome any tendency toward equalization of property (i.e., the tendency to split up for equal distribution the property of the petty bourgeoisie, small merchants, artisans, etc.). Such a procedure will accentuate economic disruption and upset the soviet regime. But [we] should realize that sabotage by shopkeepers and the petty bourgeoisie is possible; and proper preventive measures should be taken. There must be a correct economic policy.
- g) To guarantee, to the highest possible degree, coordination with neighboring cities and the workers' movement.
- h) When the soviet regime can be extended to the urban centers, the livelihood of the working class must be thoroughly improved. Every means must be used to induce the laboring masses to participate actively in the soviets and to realize the leadership of the proletariat in the soviets.

18. The Anti-Imperialist and the Antiwarlord Struggles

a) Fight actively for the leadership of the anti-imperialist and antimilitarist struggles. Induce the vast laboring masses and the petty bourgeois masses to participate [in these struggles]. Expose the guilt of the national bourgeoisie, which supports the imperialists. Coordinate the struggle against imperialism with that against the warlords and the GMD government. Actively lead the masses of soldiers and poor petty bourgeoisie to fight a harsh struggle against the warlords.

b) In [the course of] the anti-imperialist movement, fight openly or secretly for the existence of the revolutionary unions. Boldly demand freedom for the mass movement, and show initiative in translating this freedom into action.

c) Utilize the slogans against the imperialists, those against the oppression of warlords, and the slogans for maximum tax and surtax reductions. By fighting against usury (through the establishment of credit, producers' and consumers' cooperatives), do not alienate the vast majority of people who do not exploit others, such as the laboring

petty bourgeoisie of the cities; propagandize them and coordinate their organizations with the proletariat. Make them understand that it is necessary, after the victory of the revolution, that society should organize them for collective production.

19. On the Question of [Our] Relationship with Other Parties

a) [[All GMD groups are reactionary. The major task of our party with respect to the GMD is to prepare for its overthrow. Parties such as the “Third Party” [of Tan Pingshan and Deng Yanda] must be opposed as they blur the workers and peasants’ class consciousness.]]

20. The Military Question and the Soldiers’ Movement

The high significance of military power in the Chinese revolution, the great necessity of preparing for military techniques in armed uprising, and the coming of a new revolutionary rising tide oblige the CCP to pay special attention to the military question and to the soldiers’ movement.

The tasks of the party are (as follows):

a) To extend the movement against the warlords’ wars; to break up the armies of the warlords; to bend all efforts toward winning their soldiers for the revolutionary camp; to raise such slogans as “Soldiers should get land or work,” “Improve the livelihood and treatment of the soldiers”; and to stir up mass struggles of the soldiers.

b) To establish revolutionary armies of workers and peasants in the soviet areas; to expand the regular army of the revolution; and to consolidate the party’s leadership of the army.

c) To intensify the military training of workers and party members as much as possible and to establish, with utmost effort, secret military units for the workers’ self-defense (pickets, etc.).

d) To train military personnel in the party, and to raise the most reliable officers from workers and party members.

e) To intensify [party] work among workers connected with military affairs (such as munitions factories, etc.), and among transport and communications workers. Systematically coordinate the above work with that in the armies.

f) To begin systematic work of sabotage among the imperialists’ naval and land forces stationed in China. Special attention should be paid to the soldiers’ movement among the Indian and Indo-Chinese soldiers.

21. The Question of Liaison Between the CCP and the CPs of Other Countries

[[To improve liaison, reports should be regularly exchanged, CCP delegations should visit other parties for consultations. Liaison with the Japanese CP should be strengthened.]]

The Sixth Congress of the CCP entirely accepts the resolution of the Ninth ECCI Meeting on the China question, which also forms the basis of this resolution. These two resolutions are to be regarded simultaneously as the principles by which all policy is to be guided during this period.

C.11 Resolution on the Question of the Organization of Soviet Political Power (10 July 1928)⁹⁶

I) Work in Preparation for the Establishment of Soviet Political Power

The party's essential task in preparing for uprisings lies in creating prerequisite conditions for maintaining and strengthening the political power of the soviets. After seizing political power in certain areas, the party's main difficulty is precisely the problem of maintaining and consolidating this political power. Therefore, apart from winning over the masses to participation in uprisings, the party should take all necessary measures beforehand to organize the nuclei of future political power in the cities and countryside so that these nuclei can prepare for various necessary actions after the seizure of political power. This nuclear organization will become the organization of state power after the seizure of state power. Its significance has already been pointed out by Lenin in his pamphlet *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?* Lenin said: "If the creative enthusiasm of the revolutionary classes had not given rise to the soviets, the proletarian revolution in Russia would have been a hopeless cause, for the proletariat certainly could not retain power with the old state apparatus, and it is impossible to create a new apparatus immediately."

The entire course of the Chinese revolution has already shown us that there is little possibility for repetition in China of a situation of "dual power" like that in Russia prior to the October Revolution (the soviets on the one hand, and the provisional government on the other). On the eve of the October Revolution, the nucleus of the revolutionary regime did coexist with the old regime. However, it will be difficult to achieve this in China. Moreover, we expect that a new regime will appear immediately after the uprisings and the seizure of state power by the workers and peasants. This means that the situation will be different from that in Russia in 1917, when the soviets could openly exist before [the October Revolution]. Therefore, the CCP must, on the one hand, take necessary measures to establish secretly nuclei of state power in advance and, on the other hand, take necessary measures to ensure that, after revolts, organizations of state power can be established resolutely and quickly.

The C[C] should make use of the experience in establishing soviets and widely extend this experience to party members and the broad masses so as to prepare cadres in advance for the prompt establishment of a state apparatus. The party

should enunciate in advance, extensively and clearly, the theory of soviets in areas that have been chosen for revolt and should propagandize all concrete forms and concrete tasks of the soviet regime so that the people in given areas will be prepared for revolts and be able to establish the soviets quickly. Apart from propaganda work, the party should carry out organizational work. Here we may follow the example of Shanghai in making secret selections of members to the Assembly of the People's Representatives before the seizure of political power. However, it is difficult to say whether it will be possible to make selections to political organizations in this way under present clandestine conditions in China. Probably, suitable conditions will not exist. Therefore, in every enterprise and on every street, through party branches, party members, or reliable workers, the party should prepare cadres to elect soviets and become government representatives, in these areas, enterprises, and streets. The party should draft in advance the general plan for the division of work of the future revolutionary committee [*geming weiyuanhui*] and the directives to be issued in the near future. The party should dispatch representatives to various large villages to carry out the work of organizing local governments. These representatives should make contact with the peasant associations, guerrilla forces, and active and prestigious peasants and should make them control political power in their areas and join the local revolutionary committees. [The party] must ensure absolutely its influence among these elements in order to organize revolutionary committees.

The formal name of the soviet should be the soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies (in rural areas it may be abbreviated to Soviet of Peasants' Deputies). The formal name of the state power of the Chinese soviets should be the Government of the Chinese Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies.

II) The Task of Seizing Political Power

The basic task after seizing political power lies in establishing a state organ that can ensure the existence of the new regime and the implementation of its revolutionary policies. It would be wrong to regard this organ as merely a technical organization for the execution of resolutions of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. The tasks and functions of this organ are much broader than those of a technical organization. [[Lenin said that apart from the 1 million who have voted for us we have a "magic weapon" the capitalists could never possess. This is to draw the working people and the poor into the state administration. Revolutionary democracy is needed to ease the burdens of war, and revolutionary methods of distribution must be employed. The oppressed and the working people must believe in their own strength.]]

III) The Soviet and the Revolutionary Committee

Before the organization of the formal Council of Deputies (soviet), the initial form of political power is provisional, that is, the revolutionary committee. The revolu-

tionary committee must be composed of the representatives of the various organizations taking part in preparing for [a given] uprising. At the very beginning of our work, we must distinguish clearly the responsibilities of the committee and of the staff headquarters of the uprising [*baodong zan moubu*]. The staff headquarters of the uprising should accept the direction of the revolutionary committee and should be capable of quickly being converted into a headquarters of the Red Army [*Hongjun silingbu*], which commands all military activities in its region, prepares the mobilization of the workers, organizes military supply and other needs of the Red Army, and safeguards general matters in its region. As to the revolutionary committee, it should be converted immediately into an organization of political power to meet the general needs of the people. On the first day of its establishment, the revolutionary committee should announce the establishment of the new political power and start to organize the regime of the formal Council of Deputies.

The revolutionary committee is a provisional government; the "Council of Deputies" (soviet) is a formal government.

The revolutionary committee is like a committee preparing for [the establishment of] the "Council of Deputies." It should immediately prepare for the convening of the inaugural meeting of the "Council of Deputies," which symbolizes the establishment of the formal government. The composition of the revolutionary committee must guarantee absolutely the fulfillment of party directives. Elements having influence among the soldiers or the local people must be allowed to take part in the revolutionary committee. However, if after their entrance into the revolutionary committee they cannot firmly safeguard the organization of our party, then from the very first day we must take measures to isolate them and prepare various means of expelling them from the revolutionary committee at the appropriate time. The revolutionary committee should take various measures to establish contact with the masses and prepare for the establishment of the regime of the Council of Deputies. Therefore, the revolutionary committee should, at regular intervals, convene meetings of the workers', peasants' (poor peasants'), and soldiers' deputies and report to them its own work. It should utilize members of these meetings to implement and encourage the fulfillment of its resolutions. The revolutionary committee should also report its work at general meetings of the broad masses of workers, peasants, and handicraft workers in its region. After the regularly operating government of the formal Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies has been established, political power in that region will then be consolidated and can win over sufficient and real support of the people and allow the people to guarantee the revolutionary composition and policies of the soviet of deputies.

IV) Organization of the Red Army

On the first day that the revolutionary regime is established, we must try to organize the Red Army, using the troops taking part in a given revolt as the basis of a regular Red Army. With the help of the trade unions and the peasant associations, the revolutionary committee must organize a regular Red Army with the troops taking part

in the revolt. It should also enlist the revolutionary elements of the peasant associations and the trade unions to become the Red Army's future cadres, the most reliable cornerstone of the Red Army. Troop recruitment should start with unmarried youths. When the Red Army has just been established, it can only recruit the general revolutionary elements, that is, members of the party, the CYL, the trade unions, and the peasant associations and reliable strong persons. After it is set up, it will carry out conscription, setting age limits for drafting soldiers into the Red Army. (This concerns only young men.) The conscript soldiers should live in barracks.

The existing guerrilla troops that take part in a given uprising should also use the same method of recruitment. The officers and political workers should be reorganized into a regular Red Army.

V) Composition of the Military Officers and Political Workers

[[Military commanders must come from among the workers and peasants. Military training courses should be set up immediately by the revolutionary committee. We can make use of men from the old armies to be officers, but for the most part they should be drawn from the low-ranking officers. In the political department, only CCP members can hold staff and commissar positions.]]

VI) Political Work in the Army

Within the army we should organize party branches and CYL cells. The latter should be under the direct control of the former. In order to guide political work, political departments should be organized. The political department should not limit itself to work within the army and agitation among the people but should also organize revolutionary regimes in various regions at the front lines. Therefore, within the political department, political affairs divisions should be established.

In various regions at the front lines, the directives of the political departments should be the highest political authority. The revolutionary committee and the political department should prepare the foundations for soviets within their region.

VII) Supplies and Services for the Army

[[Military headquarters should work with the local revolutionary committee to organize military supply organizations for their region. The rich peasants will be called on first to supply coolie labor.]]

VIII) The Struggle to Oppose Counterrevolution

In the cities we should arrange for special organizations to struggle against counterrevolutionaries. Under these organizations there must be special troops organized by the workers. We must study the past experience of the terror in Canton. Al-

though the terror in Canton was extreme, it was somewhat unsystematic. During the terror, only the counterrevolutionary lackeys were killed, but not their chiefs. Although many were killed in Canton, military leaders and counterrevolutionary leaders in Canton were completely unharmed. Terror must be systematic; it should strike at counterrevolutionary leaders. On the first day of the victory of a given uprising, the organization for opposing counterrevolution should arrest several dozen or several hundred leaders of the local bourgeois landlords, warlords, and vagabonds as hostages; at the same time, it should announce to all people that these hostages must be responsible for local peace and order. In the villages, they should arrest some landlords and gentry as hostages.

The organizations for opposing counterrevolution should register the guns possessed by the people in order to prepare for an unanticipated collection. On the first day of the victory of a given uprising, we must disarm the merchants' corps, vagabonds, and bandits. All those who hide weapons should be put to death. On the first day, the organizations for opposing counterrevolution should carry out registration of the people and gather statistics on those who have been in military service or who have worked in military organizations, because there is a possibility that in the future these may become cadres of the troops that oppose the uprising of the soviet regime. All organizations of the local gentry, big merchants, and landlords should be dissolved. Any attempt by the reactionary elements to form any organization should be punished severely.

The struggle against counterrevolution in the countryside should be carried out by special peasant self-defense organizations. Members of the peasant associations, those who take part in the uprising, and reliable rural elements all can join the peasant self-defense organizations (village militia). Their responsibility is to maintain order, to suppress bandits and counterrevolution. In the cities, the common people's militia should be organized, but the police will not be allowed to serve in the militia.

IX) Our Relationship with Military Groups Before the Soviet Regime Is Established

[[We should completely reorganize, or at least remove, officers and political workers of the surrendered troops.]]

X) Our Relationship with Bandits

[[Before a given uprising, we can form an alliance with bandits. After the uprising, we should disarm them and eliminate their chiefs.]]

XI) Our Relationship with Superstitious and Semisuperstitious Peasants' Armed Organizations (Red Spears, etc.)

[[We should win over the masses, isolate their chiefs, and take advantage of any opportunity to reorganize them.]]

XII) Militia

[[Expel their officers and send their troops to fight in the front lines.]]

XIII) Realization of the Uprisings' Slogans

On the first day of its establishment, the revolutionary committee should promulgate a land law and directives that will improve the lives of the workers and peasants. In addition, it should arrange for specialized organizations to implement these directives. During the initial period, the implementation of these directives is particularly important. On the first day, the revolutionary committee should provide the workers and peasants with practical benefits, such as confiscating the houses and clothing of the rich and distributing them among the poor masses and providing relief to the unemployed workers. Before promulgating these directives in its region, in order to make these directives correspond with the slogans of the uprising, it should consider them carefully.

In order to consolidate our financial resources, we should immediately confiscate the properties of the landlords and warlords [living] in the cities. First, we should nationalize the banks. This is a powerful weapon for controlling finance and the market. The following matters should also be carried out immediately: the replacement of the trust bonds of the old banks with the trust system of the new government; an accounting of the capital of the local bourgeoisie; the complete centralization of the power of financial control in the hands of the government; an accounting of the total sum of silver, copper, and other currencies; the prohibition of the export of cash outside the soviet areas; the severe punishment of violators by the organizations opposing counterrevolution.

Governmental organizations should immediately try to strengthen the finances of the soviets. In order to achieve this goal, we may demand temporary contributions from well-to-do families, confiscate the properties of the counterrevolutionaries, and carry out a system of progressive income taxation. The soviet regime should take into consideration beforehand the possibility of economic resistance by the bourgeoisie. Therefore it should set down various measures in advance, such as organization of supplies, establishment of cooperatives, establishment of national stores, etc., and should supervise them itself.

XIV) Workers' Control

[[Where the workers are in control, a fair tax system may replace confiscation. Workers' control must be carried out through organizations of the laboring masses. The people's economic department [*guomin jingjibu*] should be set up to manage all economic matters in a given region.]]

The slogan of implementing control by the proletariat has a very great significance. In an essay, Lenin said: "The important thing will not be even the confisca-

tion of the capitalists' property, but nationwide, all-embracing workers' control over the capitalists and their possible supporters. Confiscation alone leads nowhere, as it does not contain the element of organization, of accounting for proper distribution. Instead of confiscation, we could easily impose a fair tax, . . . taking care, of course, to preclude the possibility of anyone evading assessment, concealing the truth, or evading the law. And this possibility can be eliminated only by the workers' control of the workers' state."

2) Control of workers must be carried out through the organizations of the toiling masses.

Control of workers must be carried out through the trade unions, the factory committees, the unions of handicraft workers, and other organized toiling masses in general.

3) Establish an economic department to manage various aspects of the economy.

Furthermore, we must establish an appropriate organization to manage and control all economic matters in a given region and to make an accounting of all economic resources in the region. This organization is the people's economic department. This department should have the broad worker masses participate in its work, and its staff should be elected from among the workers in large factories. The people's economic department should make an accounting of all economic resources, factories, enterprises, and workshops and should call on the workers in general to carry out the control of these economic activities.

XV) Organization of the Soviets

Once local political power is consolidated, the soviet should be organized immediately. The party committee should estimate local conditions and appraise the opportunity for organizing the soviet. Before and after a given uprising, however, the party should make various preparations for organizing the soviet. The soviet should be organized on the basis of direct election by the laboring masses. Certainly it should not be like that in Canton (where in fact there was only a revolutionary committee and no soviet), which comprised representatives of only the higher organizations. Election should be carried out by factory workers, various street workers and the poor, union workers, handicraft workers (by general meetings of handicraft workers and not by the executive committees of trade unions), and students. It should include also local lower-strata organizations, trade unions, and party representatives. The distribution of the composition of representatives should enable the majority of those being elected directly to be the workers and the poor. Furthermore, election regulations are determined by local conditions so as to protect the revolutionary influence in the soviet. Strategy toward the petty bourgeoisie should depend on the extent of the intensification of the revolution at various places, the extent of the consolidation of [our] political power, the extent of class divisions, etc. The soviet should include representatives of the lower-strata elements of the petty bourgeoisie. The soldiers of the revolutionary army stationed at a given place

should also participate in the election of the soviet. In the election of the soviet and in the execution of its work, the industrial workers should have some privileges so as to guarantee their leadership function in the soviet.

We must remember well Lenin's following definition of the soviets:

The soviets are a new state apparatus which, in the first place, provide an armed force of workers and peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is very closely bound up with the people. From the military point of view this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary point of view, it cannot be replaced by anything else. Second, this apparatus provides a bond with the people, with the majority of the people, so intimate, so indissoluble, so easily verifiable and renewable, that nothing even remotely like it existed in the previous state apparatus. Third, this apparatus, by virtue of the fact that its personnel are elected and subject to recall at the people's will without any bureaucratic formalities, is far more democratic than any previous apparatus. Fourth, it provides a close contact with the most varied professions, thereby facilitating the adoption of the most varied and most radical reforms without red tape. Fifth, it provides an organizational form for the vanguard, i.e., for the most class-conscious, most energetic, and most progressive section of the oppressed classes, the workers and peasants, and so constitutes an apparatus by means of which the vanguard of the oppressed classes can elevate, train, educate, and lead the entire vast mass of these classes, which has up to now stood completely outside of political life and history. Sixth, it makes it possible to combine the advantages of the parliamentary system with those of immediate and direct democracy, i.e., to vest in the people's elected representatives both legislative and executive functions. Compared to the bourgeois parliamentary system, this is an advance in democracy's development which is of worldwide historic significance. . . . The soviets will be able to develop properly, to display their potentialities and capabilities to the full only by taking over full state power; for otherwise they have nothing to do; otherwise they are either simply embryos (and to remain an embryo too long is fatal), or play-things. "Dual power" means paralysis for the soviets.

This definition by Lenin explains very clearly the functions of the soviets in the past and present. From the above, we may also realize the relationships between the soviet system and other organizations.

Deputies (councilors) of the soviets (Councils of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies) should be mentioned in connection with the work of the soviets: implementation of the resolutions of the soviets or supervision of the implementation of the resolutions.

The soviets should not be general meetings of the masses such as the Shanghai Municipal Assembly was in the past. Nor should they be like the Canton Soviet, which resulted in an organization guided directly by its high-level leaders only. The reason the Canton Soviet was this way was that it was narrowly based (it had fourteen to sixteen members).

From the first day of its establishment, the soviet regime should rally the broad

toiling masses to oppose any faults that managers of the soviet regime may commit, such as bureaucratism, tardiness in management, arrogation of power, etc.

The soviet plans the major policies for given places and for the entire nation. In order to increase the general efficiency of its members, it should establish various departments to carry out various duties:

- a) department of military affairs—organizes the defense forces and the Red Army;
- b) department of finance—takes charge of the confiscation of properties and of their disposal;
- c) department of municipal administration—manages schools, water works, relief for the sick, etc.;
- d) department of social security—[concerns] labor laws and distribution of good housing to the poor people and the work of the workers and peasants;
- e) department of the people's economy.

Soviet deputies should report their work to their electors at regular intervals. The electors have the right to remove former deputies and replace them with new ones. A city soviet should include the peasants in its suburbs and the peasants' representatives of the entire region so as to make itself the revolutionary nucleus of that rural area. In order to carry out revolutionary work in the cities, it should elect an executive committee including the representatives of important organizations in that city or that region: the army, the trade unions, and persons who suppress the counterrevolution and supply necessary goods. The number of members of the executive committee should range from eleven to twenty-seven. A standing committee should be elected from the executive committee, which is virtually the actual government in that given locality. The number of members of the standing committee ranges from approximately five to seven.

All party fractions [*dangtuan*] of these organs absolutely must fulfill the directives of the party. All their major policies must be approved by the party committee in the given area.

XVI) Relations of the Soviets to the Trade Unions, the Uprising Headquarters, the Revolutionary Army, etc.

[[The soviet should be a real political power. We must not repeat the mistake in Shanghai of March 1927 when the municipal assembly was not a real political power. Real power was with the unions and the General Headquarters of the Workers' Pickets. The trade unions became a new form of political power thus

losing their links to the workers' economic struggles. We should attack the "yellow" unions and win over their membership. In Canton, we made the mistake of treating their leaders and members the same. The Workers' Pickets and the headquarters of the Red Army should obey the soviets.]]

XVII) Relations Between the Soviets and the Party

In the soviets at various places, the party must have party and league organizations. By means of these party and league organizations—through statements of party members—the party's opinion on various questions of soviet work is expressed. At any time and any place, the party should act as the ideological leader of the soviets, and it should not limit its own influence. However, the party should take precautions against the danger of either replacing the soviets with the party or replacing the party with the soviets. The party should plan ahead to guarantee its leadership function in the organs of the soviets. Therefore, the party should organize prestigious and efficient party and league [fractions] within the soviets to carry out party directives. However, it would be dangerous if the local party fractions were to replace the party and the league. The party and the league [fractions] only implement party directives. When the balanced influence of the party and the league and the local party headquarters cannot be maintained, and the functions of the latter are comparatively minor, the danger of replacing the party with the soviets will arise. During the first few years following the Russian Revolution, the function of the party in some places was reduced to a minimum. This experience must be taken into account. In China, as well, there exists the danger of replacing the party with the soviets. The correct organization of the soviet regime must be based on the condition of the party's firm leadership. In order to achieve this goal, we must pay attention to the organizational behavior of the party and should not allow it to show any sign of softness. Therefore, the comrades who work at the party headquarters should not be weaker than those who work in the soviets. Under any conditions, by means of the comrades [working] in the soviets and other organizations, the party should promote and consolidate the party's influence openly within the soviets and in the work of the soviets.

XVIII) Organization of the State Apparatus in the Villages

When an uprising occurs in a given village, a revolutionary committee should be organized in the same region. The organization of the committee should be determined by the local party headquarters before the uprising. The revolutionary committee must absorb the most resolute revolutionary leaders of the peasant movement, particularly the industrial workers living in the villages and the workers who are originally from the cities or have returned from the cities. These industrial workers are a mainstay in the party's work in rural areas. Therefore, the party should be very careful in utilizing every worker to work for the revolutionary committee.

We should choose areas affected by the revolutionary movement of the broad masses of peasants and rural workers as the sites of the revolutionary committees. These workers can be particularly resolute in advocating various revolutionary policies and can be the most reliable base of the CP. It is even more important to have a foundation for revolutionary committees in the peasant associations. The revolutionary committees should become the revolutionary power by basing themselves on the peasant associations. They should not make the peasant associations the political power. (In form, the revolutionary committee should be elected by the peasant associations before a given revolt.) The work of the revolutionary committee among the people of its region, particularly among members of the peasant association, should be as easily understandable as possible. In order to avoid any conflict between the peasant association and the revolutionary committee, leaders of the peasant association may be included in the revolutionary committee, and all those who are responsible for the peasant association should be absorbed into governmental organizations. The leadership function in the revolutionary committee of the peasants who take active part in a given revolt should be protected.

Once local political power, particularly political power in the cities, is consolidated, the soviet elected by all the laboring peasants in the region should replace the revolutionary committee and should carry on its regular work. The rural workers and the laboring elements in the region should have special and additional deputies [to the soviet].

The standing committee elected by the soviet should include the most important leaders of the region. This naturally will further protect the party's influence in the standing committee.

The administrative center of the soviet regime does not have to be at the site of the former government. (Such places always have many local bureaucrats.) We should select a place that offers better protection for the revolutionary influence of the workers and peasants.

If it is in a small city where there are no workers, then the city soviet should be united with the peasant soviet in the suburbs so that the leadership function of the soviet can belong to the poor peasants.

XIX) The Peasant Association and the Soviet

[[Conflict between the peasant association and the revolutionary committee should be avoided. The peasant association is the basis of the revolutionary committee. Where no peasant associations exist, soviets should be organized directly.]]

XX) The Party Organization in the Soviet Areas

In the soviet areas, the work of the party itself and the majority of the party members themselves should be known to the public in general. Only a small organization should be kept secret. In its composition, the party should expand itself to

become a mass organization. But it should be very strict in absorbing [new] party members. In the soviet areas, it is possible as well as necessary to eliminate the rich peasants and villains who have hidden themselves. The workers and rural workers who have taken part in a revolt should be given preference in joining the party.

The party should pay special attention to the organization of the peasants and workers, because they are the essential supporters of the party's policies in the villages. The party should always have prepared measures that it may be necessary to take in a retreat, and it should preserve its operating power and plan ahead to establish secret party headquarters and the workers and peasants' organizations.

XXI) Expansion of the Soviet Areas

[[The soviets must unceasingly broaden their own territories, either by military expansion or by striving to aid armed insurrections in neighboring regions. However, parochialism and regionalism should be avoided.]]

C.12 Resolution on the Peasant Question (9 July 1928)⁹⁷

I) The Development of the Peasant Movement at Present

[[The living conditions of the peasantry are deteriorating daily with the result that class contradictions in the countryside are intensifying drastically. At present, the peasant movement has a local and unbalanced nature caused by the looseness and disorganization of the peasant masses and the lack of centralized leading organs of the CCP within it. In south China, the struggle centers on opposing landlords, obtaining land, and fighting for political power. In north China, the struggle centers on opposition to warlords, bureaucrats, and gentry exploitation and aims at the overthrow of the warlords' political power.]]

II) Class Differentiation in the Villages and the CCP's Tactical Line

1) The more advanced the peasants' struggle, the more glaring the class contradiction. The experience of the peasant movement in the past teaches that in the struggle against warlords, landlords, gentry, and other forms of feudal exploitation, it may be possible for the whole peasantry to form a united front politically. When the movement advances and develops, however, a class conflict arises extremely rapidly between the rural proletariat and rural bourgeoisie, between poor and rich peasants, especially at the time of land redistribution after the victory of the uprising.

2) The characteristics of Chinese rich peasants and [our] tactics concerning them. In the course of the peasant movement, the attitude of the rich peasants often has been defeatist, neutral, or hostile, and they finally have joined the counterrevolutionary camp. This is owing to the characteristic of the Chinese rich peasants who employ [both] capitalist and precapitalist, semifeudal modes of exploitation. They usually engage in exploiting hired laborers in agricultural, as well as in industrial and commercial, enterprises; or at the same time they rent out a part of their land to exploit the tenants in the usual cruel manner, or else exploit the poor peasants through usury. The party must anticipate that the peasants will inevitably continue to differentiate into subclasses and the rich peasants will inevitably join the counterrevolutionary camp. Therefore (the party) should prepare, at the beginning of the peasant movement, for the struggle at the next stage.

In places where the rich peasants have already become reactionary forces, the struggle against rich peasants should be carried on simultaneously with the struggle against warlords, landlords, and gentry.

As long as the rich peasants have not yet lost their revolutionary potentialities, as long as they struggle against the oppression of warlords and bureaucrats, the CCP should endeavor to absorb rich peasants into the struggle against warlords, landlords, and gentry. Where the rich peasants waver between revolution and counterrevolution, the party, so far as the struggle of poor peasants and hired farmhands is not handicapped, should not intensify the struggle against the rich peasants, thus driving them all the more quickly into the counterrevolutionary camp and making them aggressive enemies of the revolution. The task of our party at the present stage is to neutralize this type of rich peasant in order to reduce the strength of the enemy; but the struggle of the poor peasants and hired farmhands should be carried on simultaneously, and no concession should be made to the rich peasants for the sake of the united front.

3) The alliance with the middle peasants is the main condition guaranteeing the success of the rural revolution. The main forces of the rural revolution are the poor peasants and rural proletariat struggling under the leadership of the working class, and the alliance with the middle peasants is the chief factor guaranteeing the success of the revolution. The CCP platform of confiscating the land of all landlords for distribution among landless peasants or peasants with small landholdings will win the support of the numerous middle peasants, because the middle peasants are themselves a part of the masses oppressed by the landlords and other feudal exploiters.

4) The tactical line of the CCP at the present stage of the revolution. At the present stage of the revolution, the major tactic of the CCP should be to create a united front which would embrace the overwhelming majority of the peasant masses, from hired farmhands to middle peasants who are exploited by the feudal remnants. Under all circumstances, special attention should be paid to the work among poor peasants, preventing the rich peasants from seizing the leadership in peasant organizations, and consolidating the ideological and organizational leadership of poor peasants and hired hands.

III) The Problem of Equal Distribution of Land

1) [The CCP] should support the slogan of equal distribution of land but should also criticize it. In the areas where there are many unemployed and poor peasants, a movement for "equal distribution of land" is bound to arise. If this slogan is supported by the majority of the peasant masses, the CCP should support it. For it is a slogan that leads to the complete liquidation of all feudal remnants and delivers a direct blow to the system of private property.

At the same time, however, this slogan is an illusion of petty bourgeois socialism. The party must criticize it in order to make the peasants understand fully that under the present capitalist system real equality is absolutely impossible. Only after the victory of the proletarian revolution will a truly socialistic reconstruction be feasible.

2) "Equal distribution of land" should not be applied forcibly in the areas where middle peasants constitute a majority. In areas where middle peasants and small landowners constitute the majority of the rural population, "equal distribution of land" will decidedly contravene the interests of the numerous middle peasants, and it is emphasized that it should not be enforced.

IV) The Rural Proletariat

1) The rural proletariat must have its own organization and platform. The proletariat and semiproletarian classes are the foundation of the party in the countryside. To organize the rural proletariat (hired farmhands), to map out a clear platform, and to lead it in its class struggle will be the urgent tasks of the CCP in the villages. The peasant movement in the southern provinces is already led by the poor peasants. In the peasant organization in these areas, cells of hired farmhands should be organized so that the leadership of hired farmhands in the peasant organization can be strengthened. In the areas where a rich-peasant economy and landlord economy already exist, it is better to set up an independent organization of the rural proletariat (the union of hired farmhands). [The union] should also join the peasant associations and establish liaison with the county (*xian*) workers' union. If no independent organizations [for the hired farmhands] are set up, there should at least be strong cells of hired farmhands within the peasant organizations of mixed elements. Workers in the handicraft industries may join the hired farmhands' union. Work should also be strengthened among the immigrants to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia because they are all landless peasants from various provinces migrating there as farm workers.

V) The Functions of Women in the Peasant Movement

In the struggle of the peasant movement toward victory, it is very important to absorb peasant women into the struggle. They participate directly in the economy of

the village, constitute an important element among the hired farmhands, and play a very important role in the life of the peasants. Therefore it is imperative that they join the movement. The experiences of the peasant movement in many areas in the past show that peasant women are the bravest participants among the struggling peasants. Scorning absorption of peasant women into the movement will definitely result in the failure of the rural revolution. The main task of the party is to recognize peasant women as extremely active participants in the revolution and to absorb as many as we can into all the revolutionary organizations of the peasants, especially the peasant associations and soviets.

VI) The Functions of Youth in the Peasant Movement

[[The peasant youth have played a tremendous role in the rural revolution, and we should strengthen their role.]]

VII) Publicize the Land Policy [of the Party] and Local Demands

[[The CCP must popularize its land policy and coordinate it with the special conditions of various localities.]]

VIII) Peasant Associations and Other Peasant Organizations

1) The [CCP] should do its best to enlarge and consolidate the organization of peasant associations. In the last few months, in the peasant movement in southern and central China, the organization and leadership of peasant associations have shown signs of decomposing. This is because the mode of peasant struggle has shifted to a more radical guerrilla warfare, thus lacking a close liaison with the broad masses. Peasant associations in the provinces of central and southern China have been revolutionary organizations with a long history, leaving a deep impression among the peasant masses. The CCP should work for the expansion and consolidation of the peasant associations, rally the hundreds of thousands of peasants, and lead their struggle to prepare for the coming of a new revolutionary high tide. The peasant associations should retain their characteristics as broad organizations of the peasants and use the slogan of rural revolution to mobilize the peasant masses. In the villages ruled by reactionary forces, the peasant associations should take the form of illegal organizations, leading the peasants in various forms of struggles—ranging from resistance to rent and tax collection, or the killing of gentry and landlords, to the preparations for armed revolt. The organization of the peasant associations should be as democratic as possible. The practice of appointment of the executive members of the peasant associations by the party should be corrected, making the peasant associations true organizations of the masses.

2) The peasant associations and the soviets. Since the peasant associations serve as executive organs leading the masses in revolt, they naturally should become the

core of the new regime of "peasant deputies' committees" (soviets) after the victory of the revolt. After the establishment of the soviet regime, all political and economic power in the villages should be concentrated in the hands of the soviets.

3) Tactics concerning the Red Spear Society, the Big Sword Society, etc. In many places, the Red Spear Society, the Big Sword Society, etc. are very powerful among the peasant masses. Their leadership is usually in the hands of the gentry, landlords, and rich peasants. But these organizations do possess the characteristics of being close to the masses and against the warlords, thus performing, objectively, revolutionary functions. Our party must continue to strengthen its work among the lower strata of the masses in order to seize the leadership in these organizations. Also it must propagate the major slogans of our party among the poor and middle peasants in these organizations and gradually change their nature.

4) Organizing peasant associations and other organizations. In addition, it is necessary to further the organization of peasant associations. If, in some places, the peasant associations are not supported by the masses, then other names or temporary organizations can be used. Or if it better suits local conditions, peasant organizations already in existence should be utilized (such as the Antiwarlord League, Tax Resisting League, etc.).

IX) Guerrilla Warfare

1) The party must actively lead guerrilla warfare, which will be the chief instrument of struggle. In places where the class struggle has reached an intensive stage, every minor struggle for livelihood leads to armed conflict. Thus guerrilla warfare has become the chief instrument of struggle in these places. Therefore the CCP must actively and resolutely lead these struggles, giving them better organization and closer liaison with the masses as a whole.

2) The major tasks of guerrilla warfare, the realization of the slogans of the rural struggle, etc. The major tasks of guerrilla warfare are: first, the immediate realization of the slogans of the rural struggle (such as confiscation of the land of the landlords for distribution among the peasants, killing of oppressive gentry and landlords, setting up of peasant committees and village soviets, etc.) in order to mobilize more peasant masses to join the fighting front of the revolutionary struggle; second, the setting up of the Red Army! The brave young fighters, particularly those of proletarian and semiproletarian background, should be gradually absorbed, during the course of guerrilla fighting, into the guerrilla units in order to expand them gradually into a worker-peasant revolutionary Red Army; third, the weakening of the strength of the reactionary elements (through such methods as the confiscation of the firearms of the village guards, of the police forces, etc.).

3) The weaknesses of guerrilla warfare: looseness, lack of close liaison with the masses, destruction of cities and villages, wanton killing and destruction. In the course of guerrilla warfare in the past, many weaknesses and undesirable tendencies

were discovered. These weaknesses and tendencies will hamper or even destroy the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare and therefore must be corrected. First, the conduct of guerrilla warfare separated from the masses has the effect of making them misunderstand the meaning of guerrilla warfare, or even responsive to the propaganda of the landlords that guerrilla warfare is banditry. Hence, from now on, guerrilla warfare must begin with the spontaneous demand of the masses and must be carried on simultaneously with propaganda and agitation work. Second, the tendency to destroy cities and kill, burn, and rob purposelessly. This tendency is only a reflection of a lumpenproletariat and peasant mentality, which may hamper the development of the party among the peasant masses or even among the proletariat. Therefore, every effort should be made to erase this erroneous concept within the party. Of course, our party should actively lead the peasant masses in their struggle to liquidate the landlords and gentry and to weaken the counterrevolutionary forces. What is opposed by the party, however, is purposeless killing and burning, which are irrelevant to our revolutionary mission. "Burning and killing for their own sake" and not for the real benefit of the revolution is objectionable. Third, looseness and lack of organization. From now on, [we] must direct the peasant associations in a planned, organized, and centralized manner.

4) When guerrilla warfare develops into local uprisings, the party must take into consideration the objective conditions and the subjective strength and lead with suitable tactics. The resolution of the Ninth Plenum of the ECCI states that "the spontaneous guerrilla warfare of the peasants in various provinces and districts . . . can be a starting point in the nationally victorious mass revolt only on the condition that it is carried on in alliance with a new revolutionary tide among the proletariat in the cities." Past experience has proved this to be an extremely valid statement. In the increasingly intensified class struggle at present, the setting up of a soviet regime in one county [*xian*] or several townships [*xiang*] is possible. It is not necessary that guerrilla warfare turn into local uprisings. Only when, during the process of struggle, the vast peasant masses are mobilized, when there arises a genuine demand on the part of the masses for a political regime of their own, and when the reactionary forces in the area are actually tottering can guerrilla warfare develop into local revolts. Therefore when the guerrilla forces have brought a large area under their control, have secured the participation of a large number of people, and the conditions are ripe for producing a county or municipal local revolt, the party must consider carefully its objective conditions and subjective strength, and proceed with the uprising prepared, well organized, well planned, employing suitable tactics, and under the leadership and with the cooperation of the workers of the county or municipality. After the success of the uprising, the slogan of the mass struggle should be put into effect, and all the reactionary forces should be liquidated so that still greater numbers of peasants and workers may be mobilized and the policies of the soviet regime be realized. Particular attention should be paid to the extension of the uprising to the adjacent areas.

5) The party should lead the spontaneous peasant uprisings. At present, when the

suffering of the peasant masses is increasing daily, spontaneous revolts easily occur. The party must give genuine leadership to spontaneous revolts. It should particularly intensify its work among handicraft workers and shop employees in the county cities or towns, to enable them to understand the significance of the peasant uprising and to help to lead such uprisings until the establishment and the expansion of the soviet regime.

X) Tactics Regarding Militia Corps and Bandits

[[The party should publicize the land policy among the militia corps and bandits, establish cadres (within them), and absorb their members.]]

XI) Working-Class Leadership of the Peasantry

The consolidation of working-class leadership among the peasantry is a prerequisite to the success of the rural revolution. A close liaison between the peasant movement and the workers' movement and the consolidation of the ideological and organization leadership of the working class and the CCP in the peasant movement are prerequisites to the success of the rural revolution. Therefore the liaison between the peasant movement must be tightened, and proletarian members should be drawn into the peasant movement and its leading organs. To achieve this purpose, constant intercourse should be maintained between the workers' organizations and the peasant associations, and propaganda should be directed at the vast peasant masses regarding the significance and aims of the working-class struggle, in order to make them realize that liberation can be achieved only under the leadership of the proletariat. Work should also be done among the unemployed workers who have returned to the villages from the cities.

XII) Party Work in the Villages

1) The main task of the village party headquarters is to consolidate the leading role of the working class in the peasant movement. To secure and consolidate the leading role of the working class in the peasant movement is the main task of the village party headquarters and the general policy in all practical work. In all peasant struggles and work, the party branch should strive to secure its leading role. In propaganda and agitation work, the party branch should explain the functions of the CCP and its present tasks.

2) The party organization in the villages should be composed of proletarian and semiproletarian elements. The organization of the CCP in the village should be expanded among the rural proletariat and the progressive elements of the semiproletariat (handicraft workers, hired farmhands, poor peasants). If all the revolutionary masses are absorbed into the party organization, then the peasant organizations (peasant associations) would be replaced by the party organization.

The revolutionary peasant masses must be gathered into the peasant associations or the soviets. The past tendency of replacing the peasant associations and the soviets with the party and accepting petty bourgeois peasant mentality should be rigorously corrected. The party should never directly command the masses but should only influence the peasant associations and the soviets through the functions of the party branches and the youth corps.

In order to carry out this work, the party must mobilize some active elements to work in the villages. The peasant committees of the central and provincial party organizations in particular should strengthen their work.

C.13 Constitution of the CCP (10 July 1928)⁹⁸

Chapter One: Name

1. Name: The Chinese Communist Party, a section of the Comintern, is named the “CCP” and is a branch of the Comintern.

Chapter Two: Membership

2. Qualifications for joining the party: Those who acknowledge the Comintern and our party’s program and Constitution, join and work in certain party organizations, obey all Comintern and party resolutions, and pay party dues regularly are eligible to become members of our party.

3. Procedures for joining the party: To join the party, new party members must be accepted by party branches [*dang zhibu*] and be approved by the relevant county party committee or the district party committee equivalent to the county party committee organization. The conditions for joining the party for different groups are as follows:

- a) Factory workers must be sponsored by one party member and be accepted by the party branch of the relevant production unit.
- b) Peasants, handicraft workers, intellectuals, and lower-level staff members of various organs must be sponsored by two party members.
- c) Senior staff members of various organs must be sponsored by three party members.

Notes: (i) Sponsors should be responsible for those sponsored. Incidences of untruthfulness in the letters of introduction can be punished by party sanctions including expulsion from the party. (ii) Before being approved as a formal party member, new party members may be assigned to certain jobs by the relevant party

organizations [*dangbu*] in order to examine them and their understanding of the party. (iii) Members of the CYL, when joining the party, should be sponsored by their CYL committee. Procedures similar to those above must also be followed, i.e., being accepted by a meeting of all the party members of the relevant branches or approved by the superior party leading organs. (iv) Under certain special conditions, party committees at all levels have the right to recruit or accept new party members directly.

- d) Those who leave other political parties (the GMD, etc.) to join our party must be introduced by three party members with over one year's party membership. Those who were ordinary party members of other political parties in the past may be approved by provincial party committees. Those who were responsible persons of other political parties in the past must be approved by the Party Center.

4. Changes of organization: When other political organizations or entire political groups or party organizations join or transfer to the CP, they must be approved by a Party Center resolution.

5. Transfer of party members: when party members transfer their scope of work (a district or town) from one party organization to another, they should be transferred to the organization of the new location and become members of the new organization. All procedures transferring party members from one organization to another and from one county to another must conform to the regulations promulgated by the Party Center.

6. Expulsion from the party: The decision to expel a party member must be adopted by a meeting of all party members of the relevant party branch and can take effect only on the approval by the superior party committee. Prior to the approval of the expulsion by superior organs, those expelled should immediately stop all party work. Those who do not accept the expulsion may appeal to the party's highest organ [*zuigao dang de jiguan*]. Party committees at all levels have the right to directly expel those party members who engage in antiparty activities. However, the lower-level party branches to which the expelled persons belong should be notified of the expulsions.

Chapter Three: The Organizational System of the Party

7. Organizational principle: As with all other branches of the Comintern, the organizational principle of the CCP is democratic centralism. The basic principles of democratic centralism are as follows:

- a) Lower- and higher-level party organizations [*dangbu*] are elected by the plenum of party members, congresses, and the National Congress.
- b) Party organizations at all levels should make regular reports to those party members who elected them.

- c) Lower-level party organizations must unreservedly accept the resolutions of the higher-level party organizations, strictly adhere to party discipline, and carry out quickly and effectively the resolutions of the ECCI and the party's leading organ [*dang de zhidao jiguan*]. The organization responsible for a certain region [*quyu*] is the superior organ for all other organizations in the region. Debate by party members on certain party issues may be held only before the adoption of decisions on these issues by the relevant organs. Certain Comintern Congress, Party Congress, or party leading organ decisions must be carried out unconditionally. Even if some party members or several local organizations disagree with the decisions, they must carry them out unconditionally.

8. The designation of leading organs: Where conditions of secrecy make it necessary, lower-level party organs may be appointed by superior organs. With the approval of superior organs, new committee members may be appointed to party organization committees.

9. The regional division of the party: The party is divided into units along regional lines. The organization that is responsible for all organizations in one region is the superior organ of the region. Party members are not distinguished on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, and all should join the local party organizations to become CCP members.

10. The executive power of organs at all levels: Within the scope of the Comintern's and our party's decisions, party organizations have discretionary powers to make decisions concerning local matters.

11. The highest organs of party organizations at all levels: The highest organs of the party at all levels are the plenary meeting of party members, congresses, or the National Congress.

12. Executive committees at all levels: The plenum of party members, congresses, or the National Congress elect the executive committees of the relevant party organizations. These executive committees are the leading organs between the convocation of two plenums and guide all the routine work of the relevant organizations at all levels.

13. The issue of approval: All newly formed party organizations (branches, county committees, etc.) must be approved by their superior organs.

14. The organizational system of the party is as follows:

- a) All factories, workshops, shops, streets, small towns, army units, etc.: the plenum of party branch members [*zhibu dangyuan dahui*]—branch secretariat [*zhibu ganshihui*].
- b) Urban or rural areas: the plenum of party members of areas or area congress—area party committees [*qu weiyuanhui*].
- c) Counties or cities: county or city congress—county or municipal committees [*xian huo shi weiyuanhui*].

- d) Special districts (including several counties or a part of a province): special district congress—special district committees [*tebie qu weiyuanhui*]. Whenever necessary, organizations of special districts may be established by a resolution of the provincial committee.
- e) Provinces: provincial congress—provincial committees.
- f) National: the National Congress—the CC.
- g) To facilitate the guidance of the work of all party organizations, the CC may, in accordance with circumstances, set up a central executive bureau [*zhongyang zhixing ju*] or appoint a special representative of the Party Center [*zhongyang tepaiyuan*] to cover a number of provinces. The executive bureau and special representatives are appointed by the CC and are accountable only to the CC.

15. The units of party organizations: To carry out various special party tasks, party committees at all levels may set up various departments or committees, i.e., the organization department, the propaganda department, the labor movement committee, and the women's movement committee. All departments and committees are under the jurisdiction of party committees, work under the committees' leadership, and implement their resolutions through party committees. The organization of various departments under party committees is determined by the Party Center.

Note: To facilitate work among the workers and peasants of other nationalities by using their own languages, work departments for national minorities may be established under local party committees. These departments should work under the guidance and supervision of local party committees.

Chapter Four: Branches

16. Basic organization: Branches are the party's basic organization (in factories, mines, workshops, shops, streets, the countryside, army units, etc.). All party members should join the branch in their place of work. New party branches may be formed where there are three or more party members, contingent on approval by county or district committees equivalent to the county committee organization.

17. The special organization of branches: In cases where there are one or two party members working in an enterprise, these party members may join the production branches nearest to their enterprise or form a branch together with party members in neighboring enterprises. Party members working in all kinds of enterprises, such as handicraft workers, self-employed workers, household helpers, intellectuals, etc., should organize street branches [*jiedao zhibu*] in accordance with the principle of residence. With regard to the rural branches, rural economic enterprises such as small mines, and certain types of agricultural workers may organize branches in line with production relations.

18. The tasks of branches: Branches are organizations that establish links with workers and peasants. The tasks of branches are (a) to employ systematic commu-

nist propaganda and agitation among nonparty worker and peasant masses for the purpose of implementing the slogans and resolutions of the party and to enable workers and peasants to stand on the side of the party. (b) To use the force of party organization to participate actively in all political and economic struggles of workers and peasants, to discuss their demands from the viewpoint of the revolutionary class struggle, to organize the revolutionary activities of the masses, to struggle for leadership over all revolutionary actions by workers and peasants, and to work hard to include workers and peasants in the common revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in China and in the world. (c) To collect dues and educate new party members, to distribute party publications, and to carry out cultural and political educational work among party members and nonparty workers and peasants.

19. Branch secretariats: Depending on the number of party members, a branch elects three to five persons to form the secretariat to carry out the party's daily tasks and arrange the tasks of the party members. Tasks include propaganda work, the distribution of printed materials, party and YL work in trade unions and peasant organizations, work among women, and maintaining contacts with the CYL branches. The branch secretariat elects one secretary and implements the decisions of the party members' meeting or branch meetings and the instructions of superior party organizations.

Chapter Five: Organizations at the Urban and Rural Area Level

20. Area congresses: Within the scope of urban and rural areas, the party's leading organ is the party members' meeting or the congress of delegates from various branches in the urban or rural area. The party members' meeting or the congress receive and approve the reports of area committees, elect area committees and the delegates to attend the congresses of counties, cities, special districts, and provinces.

21. Area committees: When the party members' meeting or congress is not in session, urban and rural area committees guide all party affairs in their own areas. Within the scope permitted by the conditions of secrecy, the standing committee of urban and rural committees should hold frequent meetings, at least once a fortnight. When the area committee is not in session, work is led by the standing committee of the area committee. Members of the standing committee should be elected from the members of the respective area committee.

Chapter Six: County and City Organizations

22. County congresses: The superior organ of the party within a county is the county congress, which is convened once every three months. An unscheduled county congress may be held by the county committee at the request of over half of the organizations in the county or in accordance with resolutions of the provincial

committee (or special district committee). County congresses receive the reports of county committees and county supervisory committees, elect the members of county committees and of county supervisory committees, and elect the delegates to attend the special district or provincial congresses.

23. County committees: County committees are elected by county congresses. When the county congress is not in session, they are the highest party organ in the county. In addition to delegates from towns in the county, delegates from branches in the rural areas and important villages should also participate in the county committee. County committees themselves may decide when to convene plenums, although they should be held at least once a year. County committees recommend a standing committee to administer routine work. Each county committee elects one secretary to handle routine work. Secretaries of county committees must be approved by superior party organs.

24. The organs of county committees: County committees implement the resolutions of county congresses, provincial committees, and the CC. To exercise leadership, they should strive to establish various departments or committees (such as a department for organization, propaganda, agitation, women's movement, peasants' movement, etc.). If they publish a newspaper, county committees should appoint an editor. County committees carry out party business within the relevant county. Prior to and after the convocation of county congresses, county committees are accountable to the superior party organs and should frequently report on their work to their superior party organs.

25. The cities where county committees are located need not set up city committees. The city's work should be guided by county committees directly. Cities may be divided into city districts. City district committees are responsible for leading the work of city districts.

26. City committees: City committees as well as county committees, with the exception of those subdivided into city districts, should have jurisdiction over suburban rural areas or suburban branches directly under them. Cities where provincial committees or special district committees are located need not set up city committees. The city committees' work should be guided by provincial committees or special district committees directly.

27. Special district committees: In places where special district committees have already been established, the special districts should conduct their work in accordance with the organizational rules and regulations governing county committees. In places which have no provincial committees, special districts should maintain direct contact with the Party Center and conduct their work in accordance with the organizational rules and regulations governing provincial committees.

Chapter Seven: Provincial Organization

28. Provincial congresses: The highest organ within a province is the provincial congress. Provincial congresses should be held once every six months. An unsched-

uled provincial congress may be convened by the provincial committee at the request of over half of the provincial organizations or in accordance with a proposal of the Party Center. Provincial congresses listen to the reports by provincial committees and provincial supervisory committees, discuss party business and societal work within the respective provinces, and elect members of provincial committees and provincial supervisory committees and delegates to attend the National Congress.

29. Provincial committees: Provincial committees are elected by provincial congresses. When the provincial congress is not in session the provincial committee is the highest party organ in the province. Delegates from organizations in the provincial capital and important local provincial party organizations should all participate in the provincial committee. Provincial committees may decide when to convene their own meetings. There must be a meeting at least once a fortnight. To facilitate work, a provincial committee may elect a standing committee from among its members and one secretary to conduct routine work prior to and after the meeting of the provincial committee.

30. The functions, powers, and organs of provincial committees: Provincial committees implement the resolutions of provincial congresses and the CC. Provincial committees set up all party organs in their respective provinces and appoint editors of provincial party newspapers. Provincial committees control the party's forces and finances in their respective provinces, manage the party's accounting sections, and guide the work of the party and the league in nonparty organizations. Provincial committees should frequently report on their work to the Party Center and notify lower-level party organizations of their activities. In order to research various important issues, provincial committees may establish various departments or committees, such as departments of organization, propaganda, and agitation and the labor movement committees. Normally, the director of a department should be a full or candidate member of a provincial committee and work under the direct guidance of the standing committee of the provincial committee.

31. Provincial committees work in the cities where they are located through and in conjunction with the city committees. Therefore, county committees situated in the locations of provincial committees must confine their work to their respective counties and towns.

Chapter Eight: National Party Conference [*dang de quanguo huiyi*]

32. The National Party Conference is normally convened twice a year. The composition and the size of constituencies (how many people elect one deputy) is decided by the CC.

33. The resolutions of the National Conference come into force only after review and ratification by the CC.

34. If the National Conference convenes just before a World Congress of the Comintern, it may, with the ECCI's permission, elect delegates to the World Congress of the Comintern.

Chapter Nine: The National Party Congress [*dang de quanguo dahui*]

35. The party's supreme organ is the National Party Congress. Normally, the National Party Congress is convened by the CC once a year with the permission of the Comintern. An unscheduled session of the National Party Congress may be convened by the CC at its own request or by a proposal of the ECCI or at the request of the deputies who participated in the first session of the National Congress and party organizations that represent over half of all party members. However, the convocation of an unscheduled congress must be approved by the ECCI. The National Party Congress may adopt resolutions only when the deputies present represent over half of all party members.

The size of the constituencies of the National Party Congress is decided either by the ECCI, by the CC, or by a party conference held prior to the National Party Congress.

36. The National Party Congress:

- a) Receives and reviews the reports of the CC and the Central Supervisory Committee.
- b) Decides on the party's program.
- c) Decides on the adoption of resolutions on all political tactics and organizational and other matters.
- d) Elects the CC, the Central Supervisory Committee, etc.

37. Deputies to the National Party Congress should be elected by provincial party congresses. However, because of the need for secret work, with the permission of the Comintern, deputies may also be designated by provincial committees. If the ECCI approves, the National Party Congress may also be substituted for an unscheduled National Congress.

Chapter Ten: The CC

38. The size of the membership of the CC is decided by the National Party Congress.

39. When the National Party Congress is not in session, the CC is the party's supreme organ. It represents the party in establishing relations with other political parties, sets up various party organs, guides all the party's political and organizational work, appoints editors of newspapers of the central organs under the guidance and supervision of the CC, dispatches special CC representatives to various provincial party organizations, and establishes executive bureaus of the CC according to circumstances, implements the work of the printing bureau and other causes that are significant for the whole party, distributes the party's finances and forces, manages the CC's accounting section, etc.

The CC should meet in plenary session regularly—at least once every three months.

40. The CC elects from among its members a Politburo to guide the party's political work when the CC is not in plenary session. It elects a standing committee to conduct routine work.

41. In accordance with different sectors of work, the CC sets up various departments or committees, such as the departments of organization, propaganda, and agitation, and committees for the labor movement, the women's movement, and the peasant movement. The tasks of the various departments or committees should be implemented by the respective work units in accordance with the instructions of the CC. The CC appoints the directors of all departments and all commissions. As far as is possible, these directors should be appointed from among CC members.

42. In line with economic and political conditions, the CC specifies the scope of activities of various local party organizations and determines the level of units of various regions in line with the administrative units of the whole country.

Chapter Eleven: The Supervisory Committee

43. To supervise the finances and accounting of party organizations and the work of all units, the National Party Congress and provincial, county, and city congresses elect supervisory committees at the central, provincial, county, and city levels respectively.

Chapter Twelve: Party Discipline

44. Strict party discipline is the most important duty of all party members and organizations. Decisions of the Comintern, the National Party Congress, the CC, and other superior party organs must be quickly and correctly implemented. However, with respect to differences within the party before a decision has been made, there can be completely free discussion.

45. Nonimplementation of decisions by higher party organs and committing other mistakes as judged by the party shall be punished by disciplinary measures taken by appropriate party organizations. For organizations, disciplinary measures include reprimands, formation of a temporary organization, disbanding the organization, and reregistering party members. For individuals, disciplinary measures comprise various forms of reprimand, warnings, open criticism, temporary cessation of important party work, expulsion from the party, or prolonged supervision.

Breaches of discipline are examined by the party members' meeting or the party organizations at all levels. Committees at all levels may set up special commissions to examine matters concerning discipline in advance. The decisions of such special commissions should take effect once approved by the relevant party organizations. Expulsion from the party should be decided in accordance with the procedures specified in Article 6 of this Constitution.

Chapter Thirteen: Party Finances

46. Expenses of party organizations are paid from membership dues, special donations, subsidies from the party's publishing units, and higher party organizations.

47. Dues for joining the party and being a member should be determined by the CC. Unemployed and destitute party members may be totally exempt from party dues. Nonpayment of party dues for three consecutive months without adequate reason is considered to represent voluntary withdrawal from the party and should be announced at the party members' meeting.

Chapter Fourteen: Party Fractions

48. In congresses, conferences, and organs of nonparty organizations (i.e., trade unions, peasant associations, social groups, cultural organizations), party fractions should be organized where there are three or more party members. Their tasks are to increase the party's influence, to carry out the party's policies, and to supervise party members' work in nonparty organizations. Party fractions should elect secretaries to carry out routine work. Party fractions can handle their own internal affairs and routine work. When there is a difference of opinion between the party committee and a party fraction, the party committee should help the representatives of the party fraction to reexamine the issue and adopt a decision. The decision should be implemented at once. If the party fraction disagrees with the decision and appeals, the issue should be settled by the next highest party organ. However, during the period of appeal, the decision of the party committee should still be carried out.

49. When questions related to a party fraction are being discussed by a party committee, representatives of the party fraction should be allowed to participate in the meeting and have the right of speech.

50. Secretariats elected by party groups should be approved by the party committee directly above them. The secretariats are accountable to the party committees at the same level regarding the work of the party groups. Party committees may dispatch their own members as representatives to participate in the secretariats and have the right to recall their members but they must notify party fractions of the reasons for the recall.

51. Staff members working in the various party fraction organizations may be proposed by the party fraction with the permission of the local party committee. Transfer of party fraction members to another fraction should also be settled in the same way.

52. All issues that need to be resolved in organizations that have party fractions should be discussed first in party fraction meetings or the secretariat meeting of party fractions. Decisions by party fractions must have the unanimous support of members and should be voted on in the meetings of the fractions. Party members who violate this provision must be penalized by party organizations in line with the party Constitution and party discipline.

Chapter Fifteen: Mutual Relations with the CYL

53. All leading party and YL organs (from branches to the Party Center) should exchange delegates with the right to speak and to vote. Similarly, the YL may elect delegates to all party congresses on the basis of the number of league members.

C.14 Political Resolution of the Second Plenum of the CC—The Current Situation of the Revolution and the CCP's Mission (June 1929)⁹⁹

I) The Deepening Crisis of the World Revolution

[[Events of the past year have shown that the view of the Sixth Party Congress and the Comintern's Sixth Congress that the world revolution had entered its third phase with the crises entering a period of unusual intensity was correct. They stated that this situation would help the Chinese revolution. First, the crisis of an imperialist war has worsened. Second, the consolidation and development of the socialist economy in the Soviet Union has enabled the world's proletariat to see the bright future of socialism. This has boosted their courage for struggle. Third, class struggle in each country and the revolutionary movement in colonial nations have also intensified.]]

II) The Fundamental Contradictions in the Current Political Situation in China and the Development of the Revolutionary Situation

[[Observation of the real situation in China reveals that the imperialists are the *de facto* rulers of every facet of political and economic life. Since the failure of the great Chinese revolution, especially since the GMD conquered Beijing, imperialist rule in China has grown stronger daily. But rivalry among the different imperial nations in China creates continuous conflicts among China's warlords. This is the first fundamental contradiction in China's current political situation.]]

4) At present, the feudal class still has a strong basis in the Chinese economy; the majority of the population—the peasantry—still suffers from the cruel exploitation of the landlord class. Because of the development of a currency economy, the system of feudal exploitation has been dealt a heavy blow and is collapsing, but it is still in a dominant position. In particular, imperialist aggression has produced a huge mass of unemployed and bankrupt people, who have become the foundation of the system of feudal warlords. This has allowed a temporary resurrection of the state feudal system. In addition, because of manipulation and support by the imperialists,

the system of warlords and the feudal and semifeudal superstructure are still the principal forces driving political change in China. China's basic problems will not be solved without a democratic revolution that will fundamentally eradicate feudalism and semifeudalism. The weak Chinese bourgeoisie, which is itself related to the [system of] feudal exploitation, has to ally with the warlords particularly because of the bourgeoisie's attempt to rule the whole country. This creates a coalition regime composed of compradores, landlords, the bourgeoisie, and warlords. Therefore, the Comintern's opponents now consider China's current [government] a completely bourgeois regime and the Chinese revolution a wholly socialist one. This is utter nonsense which glosses over the real relationships of economic exploitation in China. Therefore, the CC plenum resolutely denounces this type of view and the extremely mistaken tendencies similar to such a view.

[[5] The revival of economic activity in the last year has only helped the imperialists' industry and commerce to recover. The tendency for an independent national bourgeoisie to emerge means that it will resist attempts by the imperialists to subjugate China. Therefore, although the bourgeoisie has betrayed the revolution, it has not thrown in its lot totally with the imperialists. The Chinese bourgeoisie will continue with its reformist political programs. Yet reformist policies such as a 50 percent rent reduction will be resisted by medium and small landlords who live increasingly in the shadow of bankruptcy. Conflicts cannot be resolved because of the existence of different warlord cliques. Their collusion with one another and the imperialists means that endless wars are waged in China. This is the second fundamental contradiction in the current political situation in China.

6) This contradiction should never be exaggerated. The reformist political program of the bourgeoisie is a program of compromise with the imperialists and the forces of feudalism and is a program to subjugate China to the oppression of the imperialists and the forces of feudalism. But the bourgeoisie cannot adopt a unified policy when dealing with the imperialists. The ties of sections of the bourgeoisie to the feudal forces means that they cannot act in a unified fashion to deal with them. Because the bourgeoisie is relatively weak it will be forced gradually to betray the national interest and compromise with the feudal forces. Thus, while it is wrong to see no conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the imperialists and feudal forces, it is an even greater mistake to exaggerate these conflicts and to believe that the bourgeoisie can continue to play a revolutionary role.

7) The direct cause of wars in China is warlord competition but the main driving force behind such conflicts is the struggle between the warlords. Internal conflicts mean that it is impossible for peace to last for long. This makes it impossible for the bourgeoisie to use peaceful means to implement its reformist policies to bring about the unification and liberation of China. The three great missions of driving out the imperialists, eradicating feudal forces, and unifying China can thus be fulfilled only after the revolutionary struggle of the worker-peasant masses has won its complete victory.

8) Since the Chinese bourgeoisie is incapable of demanding concessions from

the imperialists and feudal forces, and since it must continue to compete with the goods produced by the imperialists, its only solution is to increase the exploitation of the workers. The living conditions for the workers in the past year have become much worse than before. The imperialist oppression has led to an increase in struggle that will form a huge tidal wave of revolution that will drive out the imperialists, overthrow the ruling class, and found a China ruled by a soviet of workers, peasants, soldiers, and the poor people. The conflict between the reactionary rulers and the revolutionary masses now is the third fundamental contradiction in the current political situation in China. It is the most serious. The Sixth Party Congress gave an impetus to the struggles of the workers and peasants, particularly the struggles of the workers in big cities. In the countryside, the struggles by the peasants have not stopped. The soviet areas have not altogether disappeared; the Red Army of Zhu [De] and Mao [Zedong] continue to exist in areas controlled by the reactionaries.]]

Several important phenomena are developing in these struggles: First, minor, everyday struggles have evolved into great strike movements. Second, economic struggles against the aggression of capital have evolved into struggles for freedom and to oppose the GMD. Third, the deceptive influence of the leaders of "yellow" labor unions and reformists has greatly decreased; the masses in several "yellow" labor unions with considerable followings in Shanghai have waged fierce struggles against their leaders. Fourth, the CP and red labor unions have greatly increased their influence among the masses. All this has proved that the struggles of the urban workers have begun to revive and the movement of a land revolution in the countryside is also gradually expanding—the entire revolutionary movement is marching forward. Therefore, it is an evidently erroneous notion to think that the mass struggles are only of a temporary nature and without the possibility of future, continual development. Although we should not overestimate these phenomena, the sign of a new revolutionary high tide can indeed be seen. Moreover, the party leadership has made some progress in the difficult working environment during the past six months.

There are numerous weaknesses in these mass struggles; for example, the influence of reformism still exists among the masses; the notions of defeatism and legalism have not declined among the masses; the number of "yellow" mass organizations is still rising; in particular, there has not been much improvement in the phenomena of the party's weak leadership and its isolation from the masses. Therefore, if one believes that the revolutionary high tide is about to arrive or will do so in the near future, this would be to commit revolutionary impetuosity. This plenum resolutely points out that if we do not remove these weaknesses, the newly revived workers' struggles will surely suffer setbacks and their progress will be delayed. The land revolution will certainly suffer continuous setbacks without the leadership of the urban workers. The party's limited progress will encounter new obstacles. Theoretically speaking, therefore, we do not deny the possibility that the direct victory of the revolution has to be postponed, out of necessity, for a few years. However, it is a great mistake to believe that China will undergo long "peaceful"

development without experiencing serious crises stemming from the fundamental contradictions that exist in Chinese society. It is also a great mistake to believe that the arrival of the revolutionary high tide will have to be postponed to some distant future. Our party must correct all kinds of [wrong] analytical methods based on extreme assumptions among our comrades. We must insist that only through struggle and our efforts to win over the strength of the masses can the speed and course of the arrival of the revolutionary high tide be determined.

III) Our Party's General Line and Basic Tasks

9) The above analysis and the estimation of the current political situation have proved completely correct the view of the Sixth Party Congress [June-July 1928], the Comintern's Sixth Congress [July-September 1928], and the recent letter of the ECCI [8 February 1929] that the party's General Line should be to win over the majority of the masses to prepare for armed uprising. The results of the party's work in the past year have expanded considerably its political influence and enabled it to improve greatly its relations with the masses. However, GMD influence among the masses has not yet been completely broken. Reformism still casts a great spell over the masses. The fighting strength of the mass organizations is still very weak. The party's authority among the masses still lacks an extensive and solid base. Therefore, the party should continue to execute, more resolutely, the General Line to win over the masses to prepare for armed uprising.

10) Based on the current revolutionary situation, on the weaknesses in revolutionary subjectivism, and on the experiences gained in the struggles of the past year, the party must make great efforts to win over the majority of the masses and firmly execute the following tasks:

a) Strengthen the struggle against imperialism in connection with opposition to another world war and support for the Soviet Union. The imperialists' aggression has furthered the interest of the GMD in betraying the nation. This has aroused indignation among the masses, so the party must resolutely wage and lead all struggles against imperialism in order to rally the majority of the masses around the party. At the same time, the party should point out the pressing crisis of another world war caused by the partition of China and seizure of other colonies by the imperialists as well as demonstrate that the Soviet Union is the only leader of the world revolution against imperialism. We must expose the imperialists' plot to invade the Soviet Union and call on the majority of the masses to wage resolute struggles against [this plot]. Only this will unite the majority of the masses under the party's political influence and with the forces of the world revolution, so as to reach our final victory by overthrowing imperialist rule. Several basic theoretical and strategic concepts in our struggle against the imperialists must be emphatically pointed out: First, the primary tool the imperialists use to rule China is the remnants of the feudal and semifeudal forces. Therefore, if we cannot fundamentally eradicate these, we will not be able to overthrow imperialist rule. Similarly, if we fail to

overthrow imperialist rule, we will never complete the land revolution. Therefore, the overthrow of imperialist rule and leading the land revolution to its completion are two inseparable primary missions at this stage of the revolution. Second, it would be a major mistake to think that there is no independent mass anti-imperialist movement besides the struggle of the land revolution. The majority of the masses suffer oppression by the imperialists and will surely rise up to join the struggle. Thus, we must resolutely and regularly strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle. The expansion of the anti-imperialist struggle will certainly give an impetus to the development of the labor movement and the peasants' struggles. At the same time, there must be a strong foundation underpinning the labor movement and the peasants' struggles in order to achieve an extensive development in the struggle against imperialism. Therefore, the anti-imperialism movement has a role to influence and promote the economic struggles of the workers and peasants' movement. If we pay no attention to the daily struggles of the workers and peasants and simply dream of setting off a huge, anti-imperialist movement that will revive the labor and peasant movement, this will be an extremely wrong notion. Third, in our previous anti-imperialist movements we did not put sufficient emphasis on propaganda and the struggle to oppose another world war and support the Soviet Union. This is an obvious flaw which the party must correct. In all mass movements, and the anti-imperialist movement in particular, we must pay close attention to propaganda and the struggle to oppose another world war and support the Soviet Union. Only then can we lead the masses' revolutionary struggle and carry out our party's mission in the world revolution.

b) Resolutely lead and develop all mass struggles against the rule of local tyrants, the gentry, compradores, the bourgeoisie, and the GMD. We must march resolutely toward this general objective. All crimes committed by the GMD in colluding with the imperialists, compromising with the feudal forces, and engaging in cruel exploitation and oppression have already been exposed to the majority of the masses. In all mass struggles, only through raising the slogan of overthrowing the GMD and leading all the struggles toward this general objective can our party destroy the GMD's remaining influence among the masses, reinforce the courage of the masses in their revolutionary struggles, and rally them around the party.

c) Expand opposition to the warlords' wars. The warlords' wars have directly brought unspeakable sufferings to the people. Our party must use every opportunity, in all cities and villages, to launch and expand the struggles against warlords. This struggle is certain to involve the majority of the masses, who will act in unison rallying around the same slogans. At present, this is a particularly important task. The general line in opposing the warlords' wars is to adopt the principle of "defeatism," which is to say that we must point out that these warlords' wars are simply ones between robbers—internal conflicts within the ruling class over exploiting the workers, the peasants, and the poor working people. They have no revolutionary or progressive meaning whatsoever. Therefore, our party must resolutely call on the people to rise to this confrontation and attack every participant in these wars in

order to bring about their defeat. At the same time, we must determinedly propagate the slogan that only a revolutionary mass uprising can exterminate wars. However, in our actions to implement this strategy, we must use the miseries caused for the masses by the warlords' wars to mobilize the majority to join the struggle. These miseries include imposing levies to pay the soldiers, requisitioning labor power and vehicles, closing factories, increasing hours of work, dismissing workers, and exploiting the soldiers' demand for pay. Only after these struggles have mobilized the majority of the masses, and only after the struggles of the workers, peasants, and soldiers have broken out on a tremendous scale can they be merged into the revolutionary uprising of the masses that will destroy the future of the warlords' wars. Therefore, it would be an obvious mistake to issue an unconditional call for soldiers to kill their officers as soon as a warlords' war breaks out without taking into account the development of the workers and peasants' struggle.

d) Strengthen and lead the expansion and deepening of the struggle in the land revolution. After the failure of the Great Revolution, instead of decreasing the exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class has intensified. The bourgeoisie has implemented none of its land reform policies and, thus, the struggle of the land revolution continues, and the spontaneous struggles by the peasants in individual provinces all have revolutionary significance. It has been two years since the defeat of the Great Revolution, but soviet areas still exist in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan. The workers and peasants' revolutionary Red Army continues to expand. The ruling class cannot achieve stability, as the continuation of the warlords' wars is a major cause of turmoil. However, the persistent development of the struggles by the majority of peasants in the land revolution is the fundamental cause [for such instability]. Therefore, the total completion of the land revolution will take place after victory of the armed uprising and seizure of power by the workers and peasants. However, it is a mistaken notion to believe that there will be no land revolution in the countryside before the victory of the nationwide uprising by the workers and peasants. On the contrary, under the current political and economic circumstances, developing the land revolution and organizing the Red Army in the course of the land revolution is one of the foremost conditions for advancing the revolutionary high tide and determining the final victory of the workers and peasants' uprising throughout the country. Therefore, our party should continue resolutely to initiate and lead the struggle by the peasant majority for the land revolution. Especially, in the soviet areas and amid our guerrilla wars, we should intensify the implementation of the land program of the Sixth Party Congress. Only then can we win over the majority of the peasants to the calls of the party and destroy the influence of bourgeois reformism.

e) Continue our relentless struggles against bourgeois reformism. The reformist political program amounts to a total compromise with the imperialists and the feudal forces. It is the best guarantee for prolonging imperialist rule and exploitation by the feudal forces. Therefore, if we do not exterminate the reformist influence among the masses and overthrow the rule of the imperialists, local tyrants, evil

gentry, and the bourgeoisie, we will never fulfill the mission of expelling the imperialists and eradicating the feudal forces. Because of the periodic outbreak of the warlords' wars, the GMD's step-by-step surrender to the imperialists, public retraction of the promise to reduce rent to 50 percent of the harvest, and escalation in the exploitation of the masses, the influence of bourgeois reformism has significantly declined among the masses. That is why the factions in the reformist camp such as the "reorganization clique"¹⁰⁰ and the "third party"¹⁰¹ have run into difficulties or collapsed. However, it is wrong to think that reformism is already dead and no longer a dangerous enemy of the revolution. It is obvious that illusions about reformism still express themselves in the mass struggles everywhere. The number of "yellow" labor unions is still increasing. Especially in the north, the enemies have fooled the majority of the masses. Moreover, there are many subjective weaknesses among the masses. The party has a very weak power of command over the masses. These are the conditions that allow reformism to continue to develop. Also, the bourgeoisie will not easily give up its policy. It will certainly step up its methods of deception and propaganda. Thus, at present, reformism remains the most dangerous enemy of the revolution. We must continue to wage a fierce and determined struggle against it. However, if we go to the other extreme and exaggerate the role of reformism, or even believe that reformism has great possibilities, that will also be an extremely serious mistake. Because the GMD is unable to gain any concessions from the imperialists and feudal forces, or to resolve the fundamental contradictions in the Chinese revolution, it is easy to expose to the masses the deceptive character of reformism. Its influence will not last long. Therefore, as long as we can implement the right strategies, we will certainly overcome the reformist influence among the masses. The most important antireformist strategy is to lead resolutely the struggle of the masses and expose the deceptiveness of reformism; it is not enough to rely on propaganda and agitation to exterminate the reformist influences. This will depend mainly on the political experience of the masses themselves. On the other hand, it is a very important project to launch a comprehensive theoretical attack against reformism. In the past there have been serious deficiencies in this work. The party should pay special attention to this.

f) Strengthen our leadership of the everyday struggle of the masses and channel all types of struggles into the general struggle of fighting for liberty and against the imperialists, the GMD, and the warlords. At present, it is still an important task for the party to initiate everyday struggles of the masses because a deep sense of defeatism still lingers among a majority of them. Their courage for the struggle has yet to be stimulated. The party can only begin the mass struggle by raising issues of the masses' everyday miseries and by correctly applying the strategies for struggle to gain successive victories. Only then can we gradually raise the masses' courage and rally the majority around the political slogans of our party. Under the present circumstances, however, we must never limit ourselves to the slogans used in everyday struggles. Rather, we should more determinedly lead the masses to expand their small everyday struggles into major strikes, to move from economic to political

struggles. With good planning, we should also prepare to channel all individual mass struggles into a general struggle for freedom. As many struggles over daily affairs have begun among the masses, their courage has been raised considerably. Especially, since all these struggles have been repressed directly by the GMD, the masses are forced to appreciate the urgent need to fight for the freedom of assembly, association, speech, publishing, and strike. Therefore, the party should resolutely lead every kind of mass political struggle that fights for freedom and against the GMD. We must lead and expand the minor struggles in individual factories and workshops into a major strike in the same industry or profession. Only such efforts will raise the masses' courage, expand the class and political understanding of the masses, and unite greater numbers together. If we limit ourselves to the slogans used in everyday struggles and are afraid to lead the masses and expand their struggles, this will amount to obstructing the mass struggle, surrendering the masses to the seduction of the GMD's reformism, and giving up our task of winning over and leading the masses.

g) Strengthen our work in the labor union movement and the "yellow" unions. If our party does not have a secure basis among the working class, or an extensive organizational basis in each factory and labor union movement, we will not be able to hold on to the leading position in the revolution. Therefore, the party's primary task is to strengthen our work in the labor movement and, in particular, among railway workers, sailors, miners, and other workers in important industries. At present, when the number of "yellow" unions continues to grow, if we want to establish our party's basis in the labor movement, we have to penetrate the "yellow" unions and intensify our efforts in exposing the deceptions made by the average "yellow" union leaders and the GMD. In this way, we can overcome the influence of "yellow" unionism and rally the majority of the masses around the political slogans of the party. If we think that only work in our branches forms the basis of party work and neglect work in the labor union that is part of a mass movement, and if we think that only the red labor unions are the focus of our efforts while neglecting work in the "yellow" labor unions or overlook its influence and fail to penetrate and work inside them, these would be extremely dangerous notions that would harm the party in its capacity to fulfill its fundamental task of winning over the masses. The party must carry out its secret branch work and its public or semipublic work in the labor union movement simultaneously; only then will our branches become the true nuclei leading the masses and organizing the majority. We must step up our efforts in the "yellow" labor unions to help expand the influence of the red labor unions.

The central strategy in the labor movement is to fight for the legalization of the red labor unions and oppose the method of licensing and registration used by the GMD to deprive the masses of their freedom. We must strengthen our work in the "yellow" labor unions, fight the leaders of these unions, organize leftist cadres who accept our influence, win over the majority of their followers, and change them into red unions. We must pay attention to initiating everyday struggles of the masses and organizing concerted strikes in the same industry or profession. We must correctly

use the strategy of the factory committee to win over the majority of the masses. At the same time, we must step up our work among the workers in important industries such as the railways, among sailors, and in munitions factories. These strategies should be explained in detail in the resolution on the labor movement. Our party organizations at each level must resolutely execute these strategies.

h) Strengthen our leadership over the peasant movement and plan the execution of our work better. In the past year, the peasant movement has made continuous advances, but it lacks effective leadership and planning by the party. Most of the peasant struggles were spontaneous, and the majority are developing in remote areas, while there is hardly any development in the peasant movement in crucial rural regions and around important cities. Of course, there will be great difficulties in building a central foundation for the peasant movement. This is a particularly vital flaw in terms of the party's ultimate task of seizing political power. Therefore, in the future, the party must strengthen its leadership over the peasant movement and plan its work better. The central slogan of the peasant movement is undoubtedly confiscation of the land of the landlord class and turning it over to the peasant congress for disposal. However, in light of the past two years' experiences in the land revolution and the situation of the class struggle in the countryside, we must, strategically, recognize that the poor peasants are the backbone in this struggle and that the middle peasants are our solid allies. Under the special economic conditions in China, the rich peasants engage in a semifeudal and semilandlord type of exploitation, and therefore their behavior ranges from oscillation to counterrevolutionary in the course of the land revolution. Thus, we must firmly oppose the rich peasants and thoroughly complete the land revolution. When the rich peasants still remain inside our camp to oppose the warlords, landlords, and gentry, our party must do its best to develop the ideological, organizational, and combative influences of the farmhands and poor peasants to compete with the rich peasants for leadership. At the same time, we must pay attention to developing the organizations of farmhands and leading their struggles. This has become an urgent task for the party not only because the farmhands and poor peasants are the leading force in the land revolution, but also because in the next stage of the revolution—the socialist revolution—victory over the rural bourgeoisie can only be won through the determined struggles of the farmhands in a strong alliance with the poor peasants and with the neutrality of the middle peasants. At present, the famine in the country, and particularly in the north, persists. This provides a great possibility for developing the rural struggle. However, among the peasant masses in the north there are deeply entrenched notions of peaceful development and, among those in the south, strong escapist sentiments of defeatism and backwardness. On the other hand, the previous policy of killing and burning by unorganized remnants of [peasant rebels] still exists, so the guiding principle of the party's work in the countryside must be resolute opposition to the dangers of right opportunism while at the same time never relenting in its rectification of the policy of killing and burning by unorganized remnants [of peasant rebels]. Our party must resolutely initiate the everyday struggles of the peasant

masses, promote class divisions in the countryside, and use guerrilla warfare to reunite the majority of the peasants and launch organized struggles, thus marching toward the goal of establishing soviets and deepening the land revolution. Of course, as much leadership as possible should be sought from the urban working class to direct these struggles. We must step up efforts to organize the peasantry in these struggles, expand the peasant armed forces through guerrilla warfare, and prepare for the final victory of the revolution.

i) Lead guerrilla warfare, expand the soviet areas, and establish the Red Army. The Sixth Party Congress pointed out that under the political and economic circumstances in the Chinese countryside, the peasants' struggles are apt to lead to armed conflicts. Therefore, the party should resolutely lead guerrilla warfare and spontaneous uprisings and establish a revolutionary Red Army of the workers and peasants in the course of the guerrilla wars. The congress also pointed out that the party's strategy in the soviet areas is to implement its land program resolutely so as to mobilize the majority of the masses and enlarge the soviet areas. At the same time, the party must do everything possible to expand the organization of the Red Army. This is the primary factor conditioning the [arrival of the] high tide of the Chinese revolution. In the course of the past year's struggles in the countryside, spontaneous peasant uprisings have broken out continually in all provinces; the guerrilla movement has continued to expand; the organization of the Red Army, despite several encirclement campaigns by the warlords, not only has escaped destruction, but has renewed expansion. All this has proved that the instructions of the Sixth Party Congress have been extraordinarily correct. In the future, our party should resolutely follow this line. However, our party should simultaneously make sure that guerrilla warfare is better organized; that slogans in the peasant struggles are applied correctly; that the policy of killing and burning by unorganized remnants [of peasant rebels] and other wrong activities are corrected. Only this will win us the support of the majority of the masses. As to whether the Red Army should follow a strategy of concentration or dispersion, the answer must depend on all objective and subjective conditions, such as the situation of the warlords' wars, the peasant struggles, the organization of the Red Army, and the geographical conditions. We should not mechanically order a strategy of concentration or dispersion.

[[j) Strengthen our work in the soldiers' movement. The cruel treatment of the soldiers by the warlords has led to mutinies in some areas. Efforts to win over the troops should be a normal main task of the party. In general, since the Sixth Party Congress, party organizations at all levels have neglected work on the soldiers' movement, so we must step up this work and develop secret party organizations among the troops. Also, work among the imperialist marines stationed in China should be stepped up.]]

k) Consolidate party organization and expand its proletarian basis. As a result of our work in the past year, [we] have overcome many difficulties, and the progress of the party is evident. However, party organization and, in particular, branch organization has yet to pull itself up. The party's foundation is still very weak among the

proletarian classes and especially among the railway workers, sailors, and miners. Such a situation will never enable the party to become a strong leader of the mass struggle—or the vanguard of the industrial proletariat. Therefore, the party should devote all its energy to overcoming many difficulties, consolidating its party organization, and expanding its basis among the proletariat. These are also important tasks for the party during the revolution.

[[1] Tasks in propaganda and education. This has been neglected in the past, and propaganda work should be developed to explain the significance of overthrowing the GMD and establishing a soviet regime. In this way, when the revolutionary high tide arrives, the party will be able to mobilize the majority of the people to complete our revolutionary mission. Theoretical explanations must not be divorced from reality.]]

m) Expand the party's influence among the urban poor and pay special attention to the student movement. The urban poor are ideal urban allies for the working class, as well as an important force in the revolution. In the past year, in objective terms, the movements of the urban poor, such as the struggle against harsh levies and multiple taxes, have made much progress; boycotts and strikes occurred everywhere. This is clear evidence that the urban poor have begun to break away from the influence of the GMD and march along the road of revolutionary struggle. However, there is universal neglect of this movement within the party. In the future, the party must step up its propaganda and agitation among the urban poor and aid their organizations. The party should try to penetrate their struggles and take over the leading role. The students' struggles have also developed dramatically. The student masses have become increasingly radicalized. It is a mistake to believe that the student masses lost their role in the revolution after the revolutionary high tide between 1925 and 1927. Of course, the development of the labor movement has been driven by the momentum of revolutionary struggles. Now, however, with the worsening fundamental contradictions in the political situation and the increasing bankruptcy of the GMD, the student masses, except for a few reactionary elements, are still in favor of the revolution. In particular, the movement against imperialism and for freedom [by the students] is the powerful ally of the working class. Our party must resolutely oppose wrong views and expend more energy to step up work in the student movement, in order to expand the party's political influence and rally the majority of the students around the party's political slogans. However, we should take care that the vacillating ideas of the petty bourgeoisie do not influence the workers or the party.

n) Pay attention to the work with youths and women. In the course of the development of the current political tendencies, the young have especially demonstrated their role in revolutionary struggles and their unique mission.

In the past year, the number of young and women workers has drastically increased, while their living conditions have deteriorated. The majority of the young soldiers and young peasants have been forced onto the battlegrounds by the warlords' continuous wars and the economic bankruptcy in the countryside. The

development of the struggles by the young and the poor students against imperialism and for freedom have revealed the following trends: (i) a deterioration in living conditions for the young and an intensification of political oppression; (ii) an increase in the number of young and female workers in industries; (iii) therefore, the rising anger of the youth and their need for organization and struggle. These factors are shown by the active participation of youths in previous struggles. However, the youth league's work has been inadequate in this respect. Work among the young workers is particularly weak. For example, in past struggles, [the league] has neglected: (i) the special interests of young workers, and (ii) the mass organization of young workers. All this shows that the party must make continuous efforts to work among the young workers. It should vigorously help and supervise the youth league in this line of work to bring the majority of the young people under our own flag. Therefore, the work of the youth league should: (i) actively create the league's young proletarian organizational basis; (ii) strengthen the political life of the league members and expand the party's political influence among the masses through the organization of the league; (iii) get rid of the previous forms and methods of work that do not suit the young, and invent new forms and methods of work for them in order to win over the majority of the young workers to the side of the red labor unions and actively fight for the special interests of the young workers in the course of the struggle; (iv) strengthen the work against imperialism. The party should give consideration to the interests of the young and women in all struggles. In particular, we should strengthen our work in the women's textile workers' movement.

[[o) Increase the military training of party members and organize military training for the masses. We must remember that during the Canton Uprising [December 1927], the masses did not know how to use many of the weapons they seized. To arm only the masses' brains and not their hands would be to commit a Menshevik mistake.]]

IV) Strategic Line

11) The relationship between open and secret activities. Under the present circumstances of the GMD's cruel repression of the masses and the initial revival of the struggles of the masses, the party's strategic line is to use all possibilities to pursue open activities while stepping up the party's secret work, so that open activities can be closely related to secret work. Only by using all opportunities to pursue open propaganda and agitation, openly organizing the masses, and openly calling on the people to struggle can we influence and mobilize the majority of the masses. At the same time, we should pay special attention to intensifying the party's secret work—the work of the party branches and fractions—so that we can further consolidate the party's strength of leadership. Only by strengthening the party's secret work can we assist the expansion of the party's open work; the expansion of open work can also facilitate the expansion of the party's secret work. Therefore, secret and open work are parts of the same strategic line, and not two opposing

strategies. Only rightist and leftist thinking will split and juxtapose these two types of work, or weigh the relative importance of one of them in order to abandon the opposing type. This is absolutely wrong. When objective conditions permit, we should pay special attention to trying to go aboveground. However, while maintaining the principles of our struggle, we should not surrender to the GMD's laws in order to seek legality. On the other hand, if one disregards the situation of the masses or objective conditions and thinks that we must display all the basic political slogans of the party at the outset of any work, this will certainly frighten away the masses. In fact, this is a method of eliminating open work as a course of action. During the demonstrations in Shanghai between May Day and 30 May, the application of this strategic line gained outstanding results and proved that the line was extremely correct. Therefore, in the future, the party must resolutely follow this line in order to fulfill the task of winning over the majority of the masses.

12) In fulfilling these missions, in strategic terms the party is confronted by the development of rightist thought within the party. The danger of this rightist thought not only is a continuation or revival of opportunism in the party, but has a basis that must not be neglected under the present circumstances. Since the ruling class resorted to repression through the reign of terror and the reformists used deception and launched a desperate propaganda and organizational attack against the masses, within the party there have been expressions of defeatist sentiment, incorrect views, and petty bourgeois thinking among a part of the masses in the party. Under these circumstances, the rightist ideas of peaceful development and legal activities have gained an increasing following. In terms of theory and analysis of reality, [these views] exaggerate the strength of the bourgeoisie, erroneously believe that the bourgeoisie, with the help of American imperialists, can obtain power in the counterrevolution, and neglect all the irreconcilable fundamental contradictions within the ruling class. These views deny the beginning or revival of the revolutionary struggles of the workers and peasants, or the existence of the party's strength; they even claim that the ruling class is beginning to stabilize or that the revolutionary high tide is something in the very distant future. Expressed in terms of strategy and perspectives, such views propose peaceful development and legal activities, downgrade our political slogans, and accept the deceptive policies of the bourgeoisie. In terms of organization, these views advocate peace within the party (these views are designed to stop our party's struggle against all incorrect tendencies and are thus politically most dangerous) and abandonment of the red unions as our pivotal organizations. At the same time, the party's proletarian organizational basis will be weakened; our cadres are all drawn from intellectuals. The low political standards of party members provide the organizational basis of the rightist views. Of course, we must make use of every possibility to seek open activities in our work among the workers and peasants; moreover, we have gained some results up till now. However, this is no more than a need for a new type of working method under illegal circumstances so that we may strive for the realization of the party's basic goals. By no means does this represent the abandonment of our original basic tasks or lowering of our politi-

cal slogans to accommodate objective conditions in order to seek our legal existence unaffected by interference from the ruling class. This latter view is fundamentally a product of the opportunists. If this idea is put into practice, we will not only become a third party or even the tail of the reformists, but also drive the masses into the trap of incurable reformism. In the end, this will complete the union of the tendencies of the liquidationists [of the revolution] and the oscillating, hesitant, and negative mentalities in the party and among the masses; the revolution and the party will then be abandoned; [these views] are diametrically opposed to the leadership and organization of communism. Of course, this does not mean that the rightist danger in the CCP has reached the stage of its final maturity, or that a dangerous faction has emerged, but in light of the objective conditions and its possible future development, the rightist tendency is especially dangerous. Our party must follow the correct line, resolutely fight, and correct this particularly dangerous tendency that is emerging in the party.

13) On the other hand, leftist dangers within the party have gradually lost their basis for development since the Sixth Party Congress. However, if we believe that "leftist" dangers have been thoroughly eliminated, this would mean allowing leftist elements to remain in the party. This would pose similar dangers to the execution of the party's correct line. At present, the most serious leftist danger is the unwillingness to pursue everyday struggles, or to recognize the necessity of pursuing these struggles, or to fight for open activities, or to join the masses' "yellow" unions to win over the masses. Leftist dangers also lie in the survival of the spirit of arbitrary leadership, in the raising of empty and exaggerated high-sounding slogans (slogans such as those used now), in the illusion about the arrival of major struggles—all this will not only prevent our party's influence from expanding among the masses, but on the contrary will diminish such influence. Therefore, we must overcome the party's tendency of divorcing itself from the masses. Instead, we must win over the masses, particularly the workers, revolutionize them, and resolutely eliminate the leftist danger. This is why it is obviously a mistake to think that the party should relax its attacks on leftism when the rightist tendencies are a particular danger.

V) The Organizational Question and Inner-Party Life

[[14] The party has many weaknesses, the most important being the weakening of the proletarian base and incorrect relations with mass organizations. The correct organizational line is: expand the party's proletarian base; treat party branches as the basic unit and the nuclei of the masses; local party organizations must concentrate on organizational work; party organizations must be distinct from those of the masses.]]

15) After the Sixth Party Congress, a new *esprit de corps* has expressed itself in party life (the new work spirit under the correct line of the Sixth Congress). However, because some comrades did not understand the resolutions, this gave rise to incorrect organizational proposals. Some comrades advocated peace within the

party; some comrades were for radical democratization, which would damage the principle of democratic centralism; some comrades developed negative organizational views. Under the current conditions of secrecy, all our enemies—imperialists, warlords, the GMD, reformists, and leaders of the third party—have tightly surrounded us, while nonproletarian ideas within the party are quite strong. Our party must pay attention not only to the correct application of our political line but also to safeguarding iron discipline within the party. All fallacious tendencies greatly affect the existence of the party. Refusal to execute the party's resolutions is tantamount to weakening the fighting strength and leadership of the party. Instigating unprincipled quarrels within the party is hindering its progress. Denying the party's old basis and looking down on its organizational strength are equivalent to developing the tendencies of abolitionism. We must lead all party comrades to fight resolutely fallacious tendencies. There is no such thing as peace within the party. Violation of party discipline is never allowed by a Bolshevik party. Of course, whenever the CC or other levels of party organization encounter erroneous tendencies, we must examine these tendencies before we resort to disciplinary measures. In particular, we must enable all comrades to reach a correct understanding. Recently, small opposition organizations of international Trotskyites have been discovered in our party. These small organizations now have become instruments used by imperialists to sabotage the Soviet Union and fight the world revolution. No doubt, these opposition groups in China will also become the tools of the Chinese ruling class to repress the revolution and sabotage the party. Therefore, our party must severely punish [these groups] and make our party's organization secure.

[[16] In a short space of time the party has been rescued from a situation of slackness and disorganization. Right policies and the correction of mistakes will guide us to ultimate victory.]]

C.15 Letter from the ECCI to the CCP CC (26 October 1929)¹⁰²

Dear Comrades:

Recent developments in China have made us feel that we must inform you of our views on the current situation and not wait for your report on the party's activities and the current political line. Meanwhile, we have made the following initial instructions concerning some of the significant tasks faced by the CCP.

I) China has entered a period of deep national crisis, which is revealed by the following facts: (1) War has again broken out because of the internal strife among the different warlord cliques. Behind these warlord blocs are the various imperialist powers whose own conflicts are gradually intensifying. (2) The GMD-Reorganization faction has been formed and is in contention with the GMD regime

based in Nanjing. Headed by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, this faction has stepped into the political arena with the support of Zhang Fakui's warlord bloc. (3) The regime's adventuristic act against the Soviet Union has intensified various contradictions at home and abroad, and these contradictions have in turn complicated the situation.¹⁰³ (4) The plans to attract large-scale foreign investment and to revise the unequal treaties that the imperialists imposed on China have all come to nothing. (5) The GMD's domestic policy is clearly bankrupt. It has failed to wipe out the revolutionary mass movement despite its use of an unprecedented white terror. On the other hand, it has neither improved China's financial situation nor brought about military unification. (6) The increasing influence of foreign capital on China's economy has caused a recession in several branches of industry. (7) The oppression of the bourgeois-landlord system means that there is no end to the prolonged agricultural crisis. (8) The already intolerable living conditions of the working class and the ordinary peasants have worsened. (9) The labor movement has again surged ahead. It is the prelude to the arrival of the revolutionary high tide. (10) The peasant struggle, particularly the guerrilla war, has developed rapidly.

The bourgeoisie-landlord alliance planned to establish and consolidate a unified state controlled by the national bourgeoisie on the basis of the counterrevolutionary victory. However, this attempt has failed totally. The signs at the beginning of the Nanjing regime that the rule of the Chinese bourgeoisie might be stabilizing have disappeared. The influence of imperialism is increasing, the economy is deteriorating, the ruling regime is disintegrating, and the worker-peasant mass revolutionary movement is rising. As a result, the various original conflicts that disappeared have again fully resumed. Although it is difficult to predict whether the national crisis can be rapidly turned into a direct revolution, we can and should help the masses of the people prepare to overthrow, by revolutionary means, the bourgeoisie-landlord regime in the future and set up a Soviet-style dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry. We should also actively wage and expand various forms of revolutionary class struggle such as mass political strikes, revolutionary demonstrations, and guerrilla warfare.

II) In forming a counterrevolutionary front, the imperialists, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie intended to suppress and eliminate the worker-peasant revolutionary movement at the end of 1927. The alliance continued to exist after the initial triumph of the bourgeoisie, landlords, and reactionaries, but now it has gradually disintegrated because of its intensified internal contradictions and conflicts. Currently, the alliance has divided into two major political camps despite the fact that all the exploiting classes have a common interest in suppressing the revolution and they have adopted basically the same attitude toward China's domestic problems and foreign relations.

The first camp is composed of warlords, feudal landlords, and the big bourgeoisie—mainly the compradore bourgeoisie and bankers, but also including some other capitalists. Currently, the political representatives of this camp are the ruling clique

of the GMD and the non-GMD landlord-bourgeoisie cliques such as the Chiang Kai-shek group, the Western Hills group, the Anfu clique, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and the Guangxi warlord clique. Differences in economic structure have created disequilibrium in the development of capitalism in different regions in China, and that phenomenon has, in turn, meant that the political groups in these regions have different class backgrounds. Though they all submissively obey the foreign imperialists, domestically they represent the interests of different factions of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. As feudal separatist rule continues and as China remains the arena of imperialist rivalry and contention, there will never be harmony within this political camp and the warlords' wars will surely break out one after another.

The second political camp is composed of the reformists representing the interests of the intermediate stratum of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, that is, certain industrial and commercial capitalists. At present, they have put on a show to rival that of the ruling clique of the GMD and have tried to increase their influence on such groups as the small and medium capitalists and entrepreneurs, the small landlords who feel discontented, and the upper stratum (the exploiting class) of the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie. The Reorganization faction (Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo) in the GMD is the political representative of this camp. Now, it is whipping up social opinion and putting forward hypocritical slogans such as the struggle for nationalism and democracy in order to make use of the growing discontent of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the broad masses of the people to reform the Nanjing regime and prevent the outbreak of a new revolution. In essence, this camp and its representative—the Reorganization faction—are a counterrevolutionary clique and are the die-hard enemy of the worker-peasant revolutionary movement. While hostile to the Soviet Union, they have made total concessions and adopted an out-and-out submissive attitude to the imperialists and the warlords. This attitude is clearly reflected in the fact that the Reorganization faction has relied on its own warlord (Zhang Fakui) to carry out warlord acts and has allied with military leaders in the north (Feng Yuxiang and others). Although the various elements in this camp want to find an escape from the prolonged crisis hampering the development of capitalism in China, they are too weak and incapable to realize this. Similarly, despite their desire to change the social background of the present regime, they lack the strength and the determination to complete this task. Once the independent worker-peasant revolutionary movement surges ahead and the proletariat and the peasants rise up to launch a resolute class struggle, this camp will immediately abandon its opposition to the present regime and join the first camp to form a unified bourgeois-landlord, counterrevolutionary alliance.

Nevertheless, because the Reorganization faction still possesses a mild desire to “reform” the GMD, it has not yet entirely shown its true colors to the laboring people. In this sense it is urgent for us to fight resolutely against this faction's reactionary tendency toward compromise so that we can further strengthen the revolutionary struggle and establish proletarian leadership.

Opposed to these two reactionary political camps is the sole revolutionary camp, made up of the proletariat, the peasants, and the urban poor, and led by the working class and its vanguard, the CP.

As a result of the betrayal by the bourgeoisie in 1927 and its submission to imperialism and feudalism, the social basis of the various political groups inside the GMD, particularly the social background of the "GMD-left," has changed drastically. Any attempt to equate uncritically the current different political groups within the GMD with those during the Wuhan period is clearly a thorough opportunist position. By no means must we consider the tentative and conditional separation of the reformists of the intermediate stratum of the national bourgeoisie from the big bourgeoisie-landlord alliance to represent an independent act of the petty bourgeoisie or the revolutionary act of national bourgeois reformists. However, the rightists in the CCP have done just the opposite. They keep talking about the various changes and the new factions appearing in the bourgeois camp but are never willing to do any practical work for the workers and peasants' revolutionary mass movement.

In fact, this reformist faction of the intermediate stratum of the national bourgeoisie did not separate from the Nanjing regime until the latter became completely bankrupt. It is simply a new plot by the Chinese bourgeoisie to get out of the political crisis, reduce the people's will to fight, and slow down the outbreak of the revolution through its claim to attempt to reform the GMD. To this end, the Reorganization faction has described its participation in the warlord war as a struggle for democracy and nationalism, as well as for the restoration of the "true GMD." The real purpose in waving the banner of "reorganizing the GMD" is to save the reactionary bourgeois-landlord forces from doom rather than to wipe out the counterrevolutionary forces.

III) The political reorganization inside the ruling clique and the formation of the Reorganization faction within the GMD indicate that a deep national crisis has occurred in China.

Both the national crisis and the high tide of revolution are the distinguishing characteristics of China's present situation.

Zhang Fakui's act and the war between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang¹⁰⁴ indicate that the national crisis has once again broken out into military and political conflicts. The war between different warlord blocs is the direct continuation of the counterrevolutionary policies of the bourgeoisie-landlord alliance, but objectively it has weakened the regime of the ruling clique, involved the masses of people in political struggle, and inspired them to fight more actively against the imperialist war and its outcome. In this way, the warlord war has helped promote the independent worker-peasant movement.

The peasant war is another factor revealing the national crisis and the high tide of revolution. The reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie and the landlords have failed to wipe out the peasant revolutionary movement. Although uprisings such as that of the Hui nationality and that of the Red Spear Society are led by the reactionaries,

objectively they have played a revolutionary role thanks to the participation of the broad masses of the people. Particularly, the mass rural revolution, which has swept over most provinces in China; the soviet movement, which has survived, expanded, and strengthened recently; and the guerrilla war, which has never stopped in the south, have all become the basis for the Chinese revolutionary movement to continue to surge ahead in the future. The most reliable and important sign indicating the continuous progress of the revolutionary struggle, however, is the revival of the labor movement, which has recovered from the serious setback of 1927. Economic strikes by the proletariat have occurred more frequently, and they have gradually turned to political struggle and demonstrations. The development of the labor movement has strengthened the CP, which successfully led the revolutionary demonstrations and strikes on 30 May, 1 August, and 1 September 1927.

Unfortunately, the ideological and political influence of the CP and the extent of organization of the working class lag behind the ever-increasing discontent of the workers, their growing revolutionary enthusiasm and increased spontaneous struggle. Most red trade unions have not yet become mass organizations, while the GMD's yellow trade unions remain powerful. In the north, the Reorganization faction has an even greater influence on the yellow trade unions. So far the CP has not done any serious work among the yellow trade unions or succeeded in uniting around itself the revolutionary labor cadres in major industrial fields. Moreover, the party has not completed the task of winning over the majority of the working class or solved the most important problem at present of how to take over the leadership of the spontaneous economic and political struggles of the proletariat. The party has not yet directly mobilized, organized, and led the broad masses of the people to wage a revolutionary struggle.

Within the CP, the leadership's attitude toward basic issues such as party strategy and policy still seriously wavers. For example, Chen Duxiu's liquidationist group wants to ally with the Reorganization faction and the officials of the yellow trade unions, and there is also the tendency to deny the necessity of supporting and leading the peasant war. These tendencies have jeopardized the party's capacity to lead effectively the independent struggle of the masses in the new situation of the high tide of revolution.

The weakness of the party's work among the masses of the working class—the development of the revolutionary trade unions and the party's organizational capability have lagged behind the rapid development of the spontaneous struggle of the working class—is the greatest danger for the further progress of the revolutionary struggle in China.

IV) The above has analyzed the CCP's current work. As a supplement to the two previous letters (on the peasant question and the trade union question),¹⁰⁵ we think it is necessary to remind you of the following basic tasks that the party faces under the current conditions.

First, we must try our best to take advantage of the present war among the warlords to strengthen the independent revolutionary mass movement. We should

make every effort, through publications, leaflets, and oral propaganda among the masses, to expose the reactionary nature of the various factions inside the GMD. The party should call on the people to overthrow all kinds of warlord regimes that dominate the different areas (the Nanjing clique and the Zhang Fakui clique in the south, the Yan Xishan clique, the Feng Yuxiang clique, as well as the Liaoning clique in the north). Slogans such as "Turn the warlord war into the domestic class war" and "Overthrow the regime of the bourgeoisie-landlord alliance" ought to be the main and practical slogans for party propaganda work among the masses.

Second, in the struggle to win over the masses of the people, that is, to gain leadership over the working class, we must aim first of all at the so-called Reorganization faction, which is attempting to make use of the discontent of the masses. This faction is the major danger to the further development of the worker-peasant revolutionary movement at present. We must launch immediately a resolute struggle against it and try to attract as many people as possible to participate in it so as to eliminate all influence of the Reorganization faction and expose its counterrevolutionary nature. We should also work hard to lay bare the schemes of its labor program and land program because in fact these programs are against the interests of the workers and the rural revolution and they protect the system of capitalist exploitation and the landlords' landownership. In particular, we must explain to the people the servile behavior of the Reorganization faction toward the imperialists. Such behavior is reflected clearly in its wild, fascist slander of the Soviet Union during the conflict over the North Manchurian Railway [Chinese Eastern Railway]. We should constantly unmask the pseudo-democracy of the Reorganization faction. For instance, its call for the principle of the "party-right" really means to exclude the masses from participating in political life, and its opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship is for the sake of the dictatorship established by other warlords. Obviously, we must never set up any kind of alliance with the Reorganization faction, for if we ally with it, it means we are handing over the leadership of the independent proletarian movement to the reactionary national bourgeois reformists. That will surely cause the failure of the revolutionary struggle. Now it is more important than ever to work hard to establish the independent worker-peasant movement under the direction of our party.

Third, our party ought to pay special attention to the workers' strikes. We must combine the economic struggle with the political struggle, concentrate all our efforts on developing political strikes, and prepare to launch a nationwide, general political strike. In areas where the GMD's reactionary rule is weak and where the revolutionary forces are growing, we should try to draw the revolutionary trade union movement out from its underground status.

Fourth, the party should spend even more energy waging and leading the anti-imperialist struggle, especially the movement against American imperialism. We must use all the savage acts of the imperialists to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, to organize political demonstrations and strikes, and to mobilize the broad masses of the working class to participate in the movement. We must also

try to attract the urban petty bourgeoisie to take part in the struggle. In this way it will be able to get rid of the influence of the reformists of the national bourgeoisie. A vigorously developed anti-imperialist struggle will certainly encourage the rising labor movement a great deal and provide it with a revolutionary dynamic. Because of the conflict in Manchuria, it is urgent to organize an open campaign under the slogan to "defend the Soviet Union" and to unmask the true colors of the various factions in the GMD, including the Reorganization faction. They are all the agents of the imperialists.

Fifth, strengthen and expand guerrilla warfare, especially in Manchuria and in the areas where Mao Zedong and He Long have been active. We must fight firmly against the tendency in the party to overlook the revolutionary significance of the peasant struggle (particularly guerrilla warfare), emphasize the importance of military work, capture the weapons of the warlord troops and their supplies in order to arm the worker-peasant forces, seize and consolidate the places that the warlords have abandoned, and build up the soviet base areas in the places where the peasant revolutionary struggle is active and well developed. In areas that have established soviet political power, we should enhance the work to confiscate the land of landlords, arm the peasants, and set up a soviet conference. It is necessary to coordinate the separate operations of the worker-peasant armed forces in Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan, and Hubei; wage actively the mass peasant movement all over the country; and lead and strengthen the daily struggle in the countryside against the GMD, landlords, and the warlords. The party should also improve its work on organizing uprisings such as that of the Hui nationality and the Red Spear Society, try to help the masses of the working class understand the significance of the peasant struggle, and do the best to strengthen proletarian leadership over the peasant movement.

V) Only by improving the fighting capability and the initiative of the communist vanguards of the proletariat can we complete the aforementioned task smoothly. The basic and major task of the CP in the new circumstances is to take over the leadership of the revolutionary movement. In order to avoid repeating the putschist mistakes that we have generally overcome, the party should go all out to enhance and intensify class conflicts, lead the masses to launch insurrections, put forward more advanced goals when conflicts become further intensified, and guide the revolutionary struggle to develop to the more advanced stages. All these tasks require the Communists to unite as one person, act dynamically, recruit boldly the outstanding and brave revolutionary fighters of the proletariat into the party, and oppose firmly any opportunist tendencies to deviate from the party's General Line.

At present, it is more important than ever for the party to uphold a Bolshevik ideology and to wage a resolute struggle against Chen Duxiu's liquidationist program. This program denies the rising revolutionary tide and does not even admit the objective presupposition that the revolutionary high tide will surely arrive.

We must continuously work hard to expose the counterrevolutionary nature of Trotskyism and at the same time point out that the so-called Trotskyite theory of the "socialist" revolution in essence complements the views of the rightist

liquidationists. The party must purge from its ranks hidden Trotskyites and liquidationists. The main danger in the party now, however, is right opportunist views and tendencies, because such views and tendencies can weaken the struggle against the Reorganization faction. Seeing the Reorganization faction as the representative of the petty bourgeoisie, these views and tendencies overlook the significance of the peasant war, ignore and hinder the revolutionary enthusiasm and initiatives of the masses, and jeopardize the independent position and leading function of the proletariat and the CP. Because of their capitulationist attitude toward the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, such views and tendencies have nothing in common with Leninism and in fact are really intended to deny the right of the proletariat to lead the Chinese revolution. If the CP fails to overcome all kinds of petty bourgeois vacillating viewpoints inside its own ranks, it will not be able to fulfill the role of mobilizing, organizing, and leading the new high tide of the revolution.

C.16 Politburo Decision Concerning Opportunist and Trotskyite Opposition in the Party (5 October 1929)¹⁰⁶

Currently, when the Soviet Union is faced by an extremely serious crisis caused by imperialist attack and our domestic revolutionary struggle has become increasingly tense, the opportunist and Trotskyite opposition inside the party is taking the opportunity to intensify its attacks and sabotage against the party in political, organizational, and all other realms. It was as if its attacks were coordinated with those of our enemy. This is indeed a serious problem. All our party's comrades should clearly realize that only by resolutely eliminating the erroneous ideas and factionalist activities of the opportunists and Trotskyites inside the party can the party's tasks of "supporting the Soviet Union" and leading the revolutionary struggle be smoothly carried out in the present serious situation. At the same time, only by resolutely carrying out the tasks of "supporting the Soviet Union," leading the revolutionary struggle, and promoting the development of the revolution can the thinking of the opportunist and Trotskyite opposition be thoroughly eliminated.

The opportunist and Trotskyite opposition has adopted a liquidationist stand on the fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution. The recent letter from Comrade Chen Duxiu is a very good example.¹⁰⁷ The viewpoint expressed in his letter completely negates the Leninist line that has been consistently pursued by the Comintern in guiding the Chinese revolution and completely negates the basic policies of the Sixth [CCP] Congress and the CC concerning the revolution. It represents an extremely shameful liquidationism.

1) He believes that past opportunism resulted from "the failure to observe the development of the bourgeoisie and its effect on the revolution and its danger and

the wrong class analysis of the GMD in particular.” Therefore he totally repudiates the Leninist line of the Comintern that states that in the early stages of national revolution in semicolonial China, it is permissible to ally temporarily with the bourgeoisie and join the GMD. This was the view with which Trotsky attacked the Comintern. The opportunist mistakes in the Chinese revolution were the results of failure to compete with the bourgeoisie for the leadership of the revolution and of making extreme concessions and even shamefully surrendering to the bourgeoisie contrary to the instructions of the Comintern. This transformed the Leninist theory of nationalist revolution in colonial countries pursued by the Comintern into a Menshevik opportunist line. There were no mistakes of the basic line in a temporary alliance with the bourgeoisie and participation in the GMD coalition of various classes at that time. By refusing to learn historical lessons correctly, trying only to avoid responsibilities and even vilifying the basic line of the Comintern as opportunism under the cover of the Trotskyite banner, Comrade Duxiu, like the Trotskyites, has gone further in his opportunist liquidationist views.

2) The fundamental liquidationist viewpoint is expressed in their belief that “the Chinese revolution has failed and the bourgeoisie has won by achieving political superiority over other classes and by gaining concessions and assistance from the imperialists.” According to this view, as the feudal forces have been overcome by the bourgeoisie and the imperialists have made concessions, capitalism should be able to develop smoothly without the hindrance of the feudal forces and economic interference by the imperialists. Politically, without the contradiction between the feudal forces and imperialism, the ruling class will naturally be firm and not shaky. This easy abandonment of the struggle against imperialism and feudal forces naturally leads to the complete abandonment of the entire revolution. In fact, the failure of the Chinese revolution is a defeat not of the proletariat but of the entire bourgeois revolution and the victory of the imperialist and feudal forces. The bourgeoisie may have won victories against the proletariat, but it has yielded to the imperialists, resulting in intensified imperialist aggression against China. Its accommodation with the feudal forces has again led to their temporary recovery. Therefore, the tasks of opposing imperialist and feudal forces have not at all been accomplished. Without the elimination of imperialist and feudal bondage, the present revolution is still bourgeois in nature. As the current contradictions remain unresolved and have intensified rather than abated, a revolutionary upsurge will inevitably come.

3) He holds the view that “the bourgeoisie has won victories against both feudalism and imperialism.” The corollary of his view is that “the current regime is a purely bourgeois one and the GMD is a purely bourgeois party.” History shows that this view is totally erroneous. By betraying the revolution, surrendering to imperialism, and accommodating feudal forces, the bourgeoisie has gained some political power. It has not overthrown imperialist and feudal rule and established the rule of its own class. Therefore, the present ruling class is a coalition of landlords, compradors, and the bourgeoisie under the direction of the imperialists. The GMD is a

concrete form of such a coalition that contains all manner of irreconcilable contradictions. Imperialists from various countries are scrambling to rule China; compradores, landlords, and the bourgeoisie are competing for the leadership of the counterrevolution, and warlords from different regions are competing for territories and causing endless wars. Thus, day by day, the coalition is moving toward collapse.

4) He does not understand this view and has reached the very strange conclusion that no contradictions exist between the bourgeoisie and the feudal forces and that the fighting among warlords is caused by clashes between various bourgeois factions such as between heavy industrial and light industrial capital. This statement reveals his ignorance of basic economic knowledge. Economic reasons may cause conflict of interest and political factionalization within the bourgeoisie in a country, but will not result in civil war. Their close economic interdependence overrides their contradictions. All civil wars in countries that transformed from a backward agricultural state to a capitalist one inevitably exhibit the contradictions between the bourgeois and feudal forces, e.g., the American Civil War for the emancipation of black slaves and the Japanese Southwest War to overthrow the feudal system. Comrade Duxiu treats all these wars as internal wars of the bourgeoisie. This is unheard of! Fighting among the warlords in semicolonial China is mainly the consequence of clashes among the imperialists and reflects the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and feudal forces. For example, both sides in the current anti-Chiang [Kai-shek] war are cliques of compradores, landlords, and bourgeoisie. However, the bourgeoisie on the different sides support the war only to expand its spheres of influence. The feudal forces on the different sides also serve their own class interests by using warlords to preserve their feudal exploitative position. However, the bourgeoisie on both sides must accommodate the feudal forces and collude with the imperialists, thus playing a counterrevolutionary role. Therefore, such wars are devoid of any revolutionary significance and are out-and-out reactionary.

5) Proceeding from abstract views and disregarding facts, his economic analysis asserts that "feudal forces have experienced the final assault with the encroachment of commercial capital and expansion in the rural areas of the imperialist commodity economy, especially after the Great Revolution. They are only remnant feudal forces." They can no longer maintain their feudal exploitation, and they "try hard to become the bourgeoisie." The conclusion is that "feudal forces have completely submitted themselves to bourgeois leadership and have no contradictions with the bourgeoisie." This is simply an illusion. Even after a lengthy period of change (mainly caused by erosion by commercial capital and peasants' uprisings), although capitalist landownership has acquired a dominant position, land relationships in China are still mainly characterized by the exploitative or feudal relationship between landlords and peasants. The imperialist commodity economy has hit the rural areas like a thunderstorm, crushing the seminatural economy and shaking feudal landlords. However, the landlords' feudal exploitation of the peasantry has become more ruthless. The Great Revolution dealt a heavy blow to such exploitation, and

the revolution's defeat caused another temporary recovery in this feudalist exploitative relationship, affording an opportunity for the landlord class to relax. In the current situation in China, the factors that dominate the national economy are: (a) the encroachment of the imperialist commodity economy; (b) feudal exploitation; (c) capitalist exploitation by the Chinese bourgeoisie. Although the bourgeoisie attempts to develop capitalism and feudal landlords want to transform themselves into the bourgeoisie, they are both restricted by imperialism, thus frustrating the hopes of the feudalists. Therefore, the bourgeoisie must continue its struggle to reform their political programs. (However, the fear of liberating workers and peasants means that the struggle will inevitably be based on collusion with imperialism and accommodation with feudalist forces.) It is a clear objective fact that the feudal forces will intensify their efforts to maintain their feudal exploitation. Any person who can do away with illusions and prejudices and carefully study Chinese economic relations will understand this correct viewpoint.

6) Therefore, there are different meanings between what he acknowledges as "the possibility of another revolutionary upsurge" and what the Sixth [Party] Congress and the CC point out as "the inevitability of the revolutionary upsurge." The directive of the Sixth Congress implies that the bourgeois revolution has failed totally, with imperialism continuing its extremely brutal rule over China and the feudal class still stepping up its ruthless exploitation. With the bourgeoisie failing to win concessions from imperialist and feudal forces and escalating its attacks against the workers, the masses of suffering people have no alternative but to rise up in a revolutionary upsurge to oppose the imperialist and feudal forces. Thus, the present rise of anti-imperialist and feudal forces. Thus, the present rise of anti-imperialist movements, the development of workers' struggles, and the continual peasant uprisings are in no way "the opposite side of the revolutionary upsurge." They are obvious signals of a new revolutionary upsurge. They (Chen Duxiu et al.) refuse to accept this premise and hold that imperialism has retreated and even helped the bourgeoisie develop capitalism (therefore so-called imperialism trampling on China is merely empty words), and that there is no feudal exploitation. There will be no democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism, only the workers' revolution against the capitalists. They deny that the current mass movement against imperialism and the continual peasant uprisings are signals of a revolutionary upsurge, and they deny the existence of revolutionary signs. The fundamental contradictions pointed out by the Sixth Congress and the CC remain unsolved, and thus the ruling class is heading toward an upsurge. They deny the fact that the ruling class is in a shaky situation and that the revolutionary struggle is beginning to revive. All they recognize is the contradiction between workers and capital. At the same time, they believe that the present workers' struggle is "only the opposite side of the revolutionary upsurge." Therefore the "strong possibility of another revolutionary upsurge" is a statement of no significance to practical policies, just like statements such as "we shall inevitably win the final victory" and "communism will certainly triumph in the end." They hold that the "liquidationist viewpoint argues

that the revolutionary upsurge will never come.” The argument that the revolutionary upsurge will never come is not only a liquidationist viewpoint, but also an illusion of a mad person or of the bourgeoisie. The so-called liquidationist viewpoint is none other than their belief that the ruling class is not in a shaky position and that the revolutionary upsurge will only occur after the ruling class has consolidated its position.

7) According to his view, which denies the shaky position of the ruling class and the revival of revolutionary struggle, what will inevitably come is not a revolutionary upsurge but the consolidation of the position of the ruling class. A policy line based on this point of view will naturally tend toward adopting legal actions and replacing the soviet banner with calls for a “national conference.” However, Comrade Duxiu is very timid and does not dare, like Trotsky, to advocate openly legal movements and a national conference. He only attacked the line of the party CC in a passive way, denouncing the CC’s call for demonstrations on “30 May” and “1 August” as reckless and playful actions. They refrain from publicly putting forward any positive proposals. In fact, according to their view, only legal struggles and compliance with the law are not reckless. That is why he borrowed Lenin’s words “bloodless legal measures” to reveal his own view. If his stand were similar to that of Lenin in his time, he would not consider the CC’s actions reckless. Yet the CC opposes only legalism (bloody legal measures) and does not renounce all legal methods that can be employed. Furthermore, it positively points out the need for using open and legal possibilities to mobilize and organize the broad masses. However, since the ruling class is heading toward collapse and the mass struggle is beginning to revive, it is not enough to rely only on legal possibilities to organize the masses and to focus attention only on leading the routine struggle of the masses. It is necessary to lead the mass struggle toward political demonstrations so as to expand the party’s political influence among the people. If these actions are called reckless, it is only in terms of his liquidationist methods derived from his liquidationist views, which are fundamentally no different from the slogans of the third party.

8) Their analysis of China’s rural economy asserts that the rural economic relationships are basically ones of capitalist exploitation and that the essential contradiction in the rural areas is the struggle between farm laborers and poor peasants, on the one hand, and rich peasants and commercial usurious capital, on the other. They give secondary importance to feudal exploitation by landlords. They even treat this as insignificant. Therefore, they believe that “rich peasants are reactionaries, that middle peasants are the vacillating elements in the center, and that only farm laborers and poor peasants are the pillars of the revolution.” Based on this belief, their policy line is one of uniting poor peasants, neutralizing middle peasants, and opposing rich peasants. This is another liquidationist concept with regard to the rural revolution and policies of rural struggle. In fact, the main economic relationship in China’s rural areas is the feudal exploitation of the broad masses of peasants by landlords and warlords. The exploitation by commercial usurious capital is carried

out only in conjunction with the exploitation of peasants by the landlord class through tenancy and is carried out mainly by large-scale gentry landlords. The exploitation of farm laborers by rich peasants is of only secondary importance in the entire rural economic relationship. Therefore, the key contradiction in the rural areas is the confrontation between the broad masses of peasants and the landlord class. The Chinese peasants, however, engage in an exploitation characterized partially by that of landlords and partially by feudalism. As a result, they cannot resolutely participate in the struggle to oppose feudalism. At present, peasants ranging from farm laborers to middle peasants are all revolutionary masses under feudal exploitation; rich peasants are vacillating elements or even reactionaries. Therefore, our main slogan of struggle in the countryside is rural revolution, and the tactics of struggle are to rely on farm laborers as the foundation, to unite with middle peasants, and to oppose rich peasants. If we do not use the slogan of opposing feudal exploitation by warlords and landlords as our central slogan, we cannot mobilize the broad masses of people. If we do not form a strong alliance with the middle peasants, we shall weaken the revolutionary forces and shall in no way be able to overthrow the ruling class. Therefore, their policies are the best methods of abandoning revolution.

9) The extent of democratization of the party depends on objective and subjective conditions. When faced by objective conditions such as the extremely serious white terror, to demand democratization beyond what is possible is only to "help the tsarist gendarme," as Lenin once said. When the subjective proletarian basis is weak, to expand democratization in the party will only permit the petty bourgeois tendency of vacillation and accommodation to grow inside the party. At present, the situation of the CCP is that subjectively the revolutionary foundation is still weak while objectively the white terror has never been so brutal, domestically and externally, in history. The revolutionary struggle has become extremely tense, with the party facing the warlords' war domestically and the war against the Soviet Union internationally. At the present time, demanding open discussion of all manner of opinions, the publication of views opposed to the decisions of the National Congress in the party newspapers, and the holding of democratic elections from the party branch level to the CC level is tantamount to requiring the party to abandon its concrete tasks of revolutionary struggle in the present situation, to indulge in empty talk, and to relax the party's strong rules on organizational secrecy, enabling the police to engage in large-scale sabotage. To call the CC's demand that the entire party membership obey party decisions and coordinate their actions according to party policies "commandism" or "the habit of commandism" is out-and-out anarchist thinking. One should not allow a Leninist party's fundamental principle of submitting to the majority and to all decisions and instructions of superior party organizations to be undermined by such anarchist ideas. The proposal for peace inside our party is a demand that the party give up its criticism of all incorrect tendencies and let these tendencies develop inside the party. Smearing the CC as using "police tactics" is nothing less than the worst method of sowing discord

learned from Trotsky's attack on the Russian party. More's the pity that this is a foolish act, because using these words in the context of the CCP will only cause all party comrades to respond with sneers and anger.

In light of the above analysis, their viewpoints and line have been consistently liquidationist. Their analysis of the causes of failure of the revolution runs counter to the entire line of the Comintern; their analysis of the Chinese economic and political situation implies abandoning the struggle against imperialism and feudal forces and the rural revolution; their analysis of the revolutionary situation denies the shaky position of the ruling class and the revival of the revolutionary struggle, thus fundamentally abandoning revolution. Therefore, it is natural for them to propose the tactics of abandoning all illegal struggles and suggest that strikes and demonstrations are all willful and reckless actions. Organizationally, it is natural for them to foster anarchist ideas, rejecting discipline and compliance with the decisions and instructions of superior party organizations and advocating internal peace and freedom to propagate all erroneous ideas inside the party. This is a complete opportunist and Trotskyite policy line. It is in very obvious opposition to the Comintern, the Sixth Congress, the CC, and the entire party.

The CC holds that the development of such ideas inside the party will not only jeopardize the implementation of the party's urgent current revolutionary tasks, but may also lead to the disintegration and demise of the party. The CC calls on the entire party membership to stand firmly by the decisions of the Comintern, the Sixth Congress, and the CC to oppose resolutely such liquidationist ideas and to work for their complete elimination.

There is a serious tendency toward compromise inside the party. For example, it is argued that because "Trotskyism is a system of theories," "we should not criticize it in a simplistic manner," and that "although they are wrong, the CC is not entirely correct either." Such views are held by comrades who are muddle-headed. They urge relaxation of the party's attack on liquidationists and cover up the development of liquidationist ideas within the party. They attempt to shake the party's will to fight for the correct principles and the Leninist line by focusing on certain technical and nonpolitical issues. Their difference with the liquidationists is like that between 50 percent and 100 percent. Both are weakening the party's line. Without eradicating the tendency toward compromise, it is impossible to carry out the struggle against the liquidationists. Therefore, the struggles against ideas of compromise and against liquidationism are of equal importance.

The organizational principle of a Bolshevik party requires that before convening a new national congress, the entire party membership must absolutely obey the decisions of the last congress and opinions contrary to those decisions are in no way allowed to be freely discussed within the party. At the present time when the revolutionary struggle is extremely tense, to promote discussion of views different from the principles of the party will undoubtedly obstruct the revolutionary struggle and undermine the party, thus helping the enemy. Therefore, the CC believes that

these ideas must be eliminated quickly and that it is even more important not to let such discussions weaken the leadership of the mass struggle.

Now, the opportunist and Trotskyite opposition has not only deliberately provoked discussions in the party, but has also engaged in factionalist behavior. The opposition has printed and circulated its secret publications inside the party. Comrade Duxiu also circulated his letter [8 August 1929] to the CC freely among the comrades before the CC made a decision on the matter. This is an act of sabotage against the party which cannot be tolerated by a Leninist party. Therefore, the CC has made the following organizational decisions.

a) Party organizations at all levels must immediately disband any such factions as soon as they are discovered, and comrades who participate in such factions must be subjected to organizational sanctions.

b) After discussions, those who still persist with their liquidationist ideas, refuse to implement the party's tactics and policies, and disobey decisions will be unequivocally expelled from the party.

c) Comrade Duxiu must immediately comply with the CC's decisions, accept the CC's warning, work in accordance with the party line, and cease all antiparty propaganda and activities.

In the CC's opinion, the above decisions in the current tense situation of revolutionary struggle are the essential means through which the party can resolutely exercise its leadership of the revolutionary struggle. The CC calls on all comrades in the party to unite in supporting the CC's decisions and eliminating the liquidationist ideas and all antiparty factions within the party.

C.17 An Outline of Our Political Views. *Chen Duxiu et al.* (15 December 1929)¹⁰⁸

I) The Cause of the Past Failures of the Chinese Revolution— The Comintern's Opportunist Leadership

Since Comrade Lenin's illness and death, a serious opportunist crisis has occurred in the leadership of the Comintern and the Soviet CP controlled by Zinoviev, Stalin, and Bukharin. Politically, they have used the conservative theory of building socialism in one country to replace proletarian internationalism. They have used Soviet bureaucratic diplomatic strategy to replace the world revolutionary class struggle. They have used the strategy of compromise with top leaders to replace that of developing the revolutionary mass struggle at the grass roots. They have used the Menshevik strategy of allying and supporting the bourgeoisie to replace the Bolshevik strategy of independent leadership of the peasant revolution by the proletariat. Finally, they have used the Menshevik mechanical theory of developing revolution

by stages to replace the theory of continuous revolution. Organizationally, they have used bureaucratic and authoritative formalism to replace proletarian democratic centralism. In this way, they have ruined the consciousness and initiative of the proletarian fighters in their political activities. [[These errors led to the defeat of the German revolution and the Bulgarian revolution in 1923, the ruin of the revolutionary labor movement in Britain, and caused the huge crisis in the Soviet Union.]] However, the most disastrous defeat under the opportunist direction of Stalin and Bukharin was that of the Great Chinese Revolution from 1925 to 1927.

In general, the failure of the 1925-27 Chinese revolution was caused by the fundamentally erroneous understanding of the counterrevolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie and the class distinction of the GMD. This erroneous understanding led to adoption of the wrong strategy, that is, helping and supporting the bourgeoisie while forbidding the Chinese proletariat to establish a genuine independent political party of its own which could consistently lead the revolution through to the end.

[[The GMD is a typical bourgeois political party as revealed by its actions, policies, etc. Its advocacy of world revolution, support for the interests of workers and peasants, and alliance with the Soviet Union is only a trick to win the proletariat's sympathy and help. Without an independent party, the proletariat has often fought on behalf of the bourgeoisie, only later to be suppressed by it.]]

Unfortunately, directed by the erroneous policy of the Comintern and the CCP, the Chinese proletariat became nothing more than an unconscious tool of the bourgeoisie and fought as a coolie for the bourgeoisie to overthrow the rule of the northern warlords, the bureaucrats, the compradores, and the capitalists, for only the bourgeoisie could make a deal with the imperialists. As soon as it controlled power, the bourgeois GMD began to persecute its former supporters—the proletariat—using unprecedented white terror. In this sense, our participation in the GMD and long cooperation with it have achieved nothing. On the contrary, it concealed from the proletarian masses the bourgeois reactionary intentions of the GMD, caused the vigilance of the workers and peasants against the enemy to slacken, raised the GMD's political position, and helped the bourgeoisie establish and consolidate its rule over the workers and peasants. As a result, the GMD is finally able to slaughter the workers and peasants in large numbers and its regime is surprisingly strong.

[[Because of our policy toward the GMD, our desire to stay in it and forge a long-term class alliance, we made endless concessions. For example, the 1924 decision that a GMD international liaison committee should examine first any policies and orders from the Comintern to the CCP. Also, there was the capitulation to Chiang Kai-shek after he launched the 20 March 1926 coup.]]

These facts indicate that by then the bourgeoisie had already openly forced the proletariat to obey its leadership and follow its direction. There was no alliance at all. Despite such circumstances, however, the Comintern continued to restrain the proletariat from acting independently in the face of bourgeois attacks. Moreover, it chose the most shameful capitulatory policy: sternly forbidding the CCP to withdraw from the GMD while not even allowing us to make preparations. Further, it

spared no effort to arm Chiang Kai-shek. The Comintern representative [Borodin] also fiercely insisted that we use all our strength to assist and support Chiang Kai-shek's military dictatorship. From that time onward, the proletariat submitted to the bourgeoisie and degenerated into complete dependence on the bourgeoisie. After Chiang Kai-shek launched the massacre on 12 April 1927, the Comintern continued to support Feng Yuxiang and Wang Jingwei, claiming that Feng was from a working-class background and Wang was the leader of the rural revolution. The Comintern continued to oppose CCP withdrawal from the GMD in order to establish Soviet political power. Prior to Chiang Kai-shek's betrayal, the Comintern ordered us to replace strikes with labor-capitalist arbitration and to avoid clashes with Chiang's army. Afterward, it forbade us to confiscate the land of army officers in the rural revolution and ordered us to restrain the party's power and limit the so-called extremist activities of the workers and peasants. Finally, when the whole GMD had openly turned counterrevolutionary, the Comintern ordered us to withdraw only from the Nationalist government but not from the party. Even the Nanchang Uprising was launched in the name of the GMD-left. Such a policy forced the CCP to rip up its own banner, obey GMD leadership, and become its tool in restraining the workers and peasants. From beginning to end, such a policy was clearly one of unprecedented and most shameful opportunism and obviously betrayed class interests. In no way was it similar to the policy adopted by the Bolsheviks in 1905, which firmly opposed any compromise with the bourgeoisie, led the peasants to act independently, made preparations for armed insurrection to seize power, and practiced the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship.

After the Comintern forced the CCP to merge with the GMD organizationally and claimed that "the idea of overthrowing GMD leadership represents a dangerous tendency of skipping a stage in the development of the revolution," how could it later accuse the CCP of giving up its organizational and political independence? In fact, ordering us to join the GMD ruined our independence and jeopardized our ability to carry out an independent policy. In following the Comintern's opportunist policy, the CCP had to submit bit by bit to the GMD and give up its organizational and political independence. This is an obvious and logical truth. How could we maintain any kind of independence while observing the Comintern's instructions on these practical issues?!

The bankrupt policy of the Comintern toward the GMD was made on the basis of its fundamentally erroneous understanding of the relationship between the bourgeoisie in the colonial countries and the imperialists. It thought that since the bourgeoisie in the colonial countries needed the revolution to resist the oppression of the imperialists, this would surely make the various progressive classes in the country form a united front for the national revolution. Thus, the Comintern regarded the GMD as the form for such a united front and called it "the alliance of various classes" or "the alliance of four classes." However, the GMD was an organizational mixture of different classes rather than an alliance formed by two independent political parties for joint action at a certain period or in a certain movement. The

Comintern did not understand that imperialism had penetrated into China's capital and markets so deeply that the Chinese bourgeoisie had to rely on the imperialists both economically and politically for its very survival. Hence, the immature Chinese bourgeoisie would have to exploit more cruelly the workers and peasants in order to resist industrial and commercial competition from the more advanced imperialist countries. This meant that a clash between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants was inevitable and made class war in China all the more likely. The initial motive of the bourgeoisie for participating in the national revolution was to bring the worker-peasant movement under its control and use it to bargain with the imperialists to gain maximum benefit for its own class. (The past policy of the Comintern only provided the bourgeoisie with such an opportunity.) However, once the bourgeoisie discovered that the masses of workers and peasants had acted in accordance with their own class interests, taken the leadership of the revolution into their own hands, and begun to violate the interests of the bourgeoisie, it realized immediately that in comparison with the imperialists, the worker-peasant revolution represented a more serious and fundamental danger. Thus, the bourgeoisie quickly turned against the revolution. Such a change was inevitable because of the class distinction of the Chinese bourgeoisie. We can conclude from the above analysis that the oppression of the imperialists could only intensify the domestic class struggle but would never ease it or pave the way for class alliance. In essence, the GMD is a tool used by the bourgeoisie to deceive the masses of the people. It advocated the abstract idea of "the national revolution" (under the condition that we would abandon the struggle against the bourgeoisie) for the purpose of blunting the vigilance of the workers and peasants so that they would not organize their own independent armed forces and merely fight to seize the power for the bourgeoisie. In this way, the bourgeoisie could take power alone. After achieving this goal, it immediately began to slaughter the workers and peasants. This is an overt reality which no one can deny.

The other reason why we participated in and remained in the GMD was that we wanted to use it to win over the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and ally ourselves with them. This is also a typical example of the opportunist attitude. The most reliable ally of the proletariat is the lower petty bourgeoisie, that is, the impoverished people in urban and rural areas. Assuredly, as the revolution develops and the situation changes, the proletariat will unite all the revolutionary elements. Nevertheless, we must always first of all aim at winning over the poor people, particularly the masses of the working people, rather than the democratic parties led by the bourgeoisie or the upper petty bourgeoisie. In order to attract the broad masses of the working people to our side, the proletariat should, above all, have its own independent political position and clear-cut aims. Sometimes we may or even have to ally with the bourgeois democrats for a certain limited program. Nevertheless, we must always keep in mind that the essential function of such an alliance is to use our independent political position to expose the compromising and fraudulent nature of the bourgeois democrats so as to make clear our party's political influence

upon the broad masses of the working people. We should not conceal our political identity or yield to the bourgeois democrats, still less merge with them organizationally for the sake of “concentrating revolutionary strength”!

[[Both Lenin and Marx had supported alliance rather than merger with other political parties.]] The Comintern completely abandoned the instructions of Marx and Lenin in its past policy toward the GMD and followed the ideas of the Second International. It asked us to perform within the GMD. Such an alliance based on an organizational merger restrained our actions and confused our political identity. It could not help us to attract the broad masses but could help us to lose people from our own class.

The best form for the proletariat to build an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie—the impoverished people in urban and rural areas—at the climax of the revolution is through the soviet, that is, the soviet congress comprising representatives elected by the workers, peasants, urban poor, and soldiers. Its task is to arm the masses and it functions as the leading organ directing the people to seize power in the political struggle. At the climax of the revolution, the leadership of the Comintern abandoned completely the interests of the working people in order to follow the big bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie, dreaming that it would be possible to form a united front with them. It followed the GMD’s political program for struggle and accused anyone who disagreed with the idea of being an “extremist.” It left all the organizations of the peasants, shop assistants, and small merchants to the GMD and forbade us to establish a soviet government. The leaders of the Comintern even claimed: “At this stage, the function of the GMD in the Chinese revolution is just like that of the soviet congress in the Russian revolution in 1905.” “The GMD in Wuhan is the center of the revolutionary movement.” “The Wuhan government is revolutionary.” “It would be of direct help to Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Zuolin if you began to set up the soviet right now, refuse to support the Wuhan regime and plan to overthrow it, and put forward the slogan of establishing a dual-power government” (Stalin). Bukharin also declared that “even in the future when China enters the stage of the proletarian revolution, you can still use the GMD as the state form for the proletarian dictatorship.” These wrong views of the Comintern leaders were caused by their blind trust in the Menshevik theory of developing the revolution by stages. Without analyzing the content of the GMD’s national regime and the circumstances of the rapid development of the mass revolutionary struggle at that time, they blindly opposed the establishment of the soviet government, and they entirely failed to understand that not only the GMD in Nanjing had openly turned counterrevolutionary, but that the GMD and the Nationalist government in Wuhan had also gradually moved over to the reactionary camp, particularly after the “Horse Day” incident [21 May 1927]. From this time, there was no difference between the Wuhan regime and Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Zuolin because by now the GMD and the bourgeoisie (including all the big and small capitalists who exploited the laborers) had already ended their participation in the democratic revolution. Meanwhile the worker-peasant movement, which both the Comintern and the GMD had

accused of “having gone too far,” had broken up the supraclass alliance, moved beyond the scope of the bourgeois democratic revolution, and developed from the democratic stage into the stage of the socialist revolution. Also, the nature of the revolution had begun to change. Our party should have withdrawn immediately from the GMD and acted independently, at least after the March 20 incident [1926]. We should have started to organize the soviet at the beginning of the Northern Expedition in the areas that had been taken over by the Northern Expedition Army. We should have established immediately the soviet government to confront the GMD regime at least after the April 12 incident [1927] and have moved from the stage of dual-power government to the struggle to overthrow the counterrevolutionary nationalist regime and to set up the proletarian dictatorship. In that way, we could have completed the mission of the democratic revolution on the one hand while marching toward socialism on the other. The leadership of the Comintern, however, did not think so. They rigidly adhered to the doctrine of the democratic revolution, constantly retaining their blind faith in the GMD, and dreamed of using the democratic party composed of the big bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie to replace the soviet, which represented the workers and the impoverished people in urban and rural areas. At this time, the CCP CC did not make an effort to withdraw from the GMD or establish the soviet to overthrow the leadership of the GMD. On the contrary, it admitted in both the declaration drawn up by the Comintern representative and the message from the Peasant Department that the peasants had “gone too far,” and it even volunteered to disarm the pickets of the Federation of Trade Unions in Hankou in order to avoid any clashes with the GMD army. These are all terrible mistakes. Not until the entire GMD had openly started to attack us and the revolutionary movement had suffered complete defeat did the Comintern and our party’s leaders suddenly think of the slogan of the soviet and decide to use it in a desperate attempt to seize political power.

A revolutionary party ought to be good at organizing both attack and defense. However, when the workers and peasants were slaughtered by the GMD at Canton, Changsha, and Hankou, our party was not able to launch any effective counterattack. The democratic bourgeoisie had already joined the reactionary camp, all the domestic and foreign reactionary forces had joined together, and the revolution had apparently met with total failure. In these circumstances, the party should have begun a strategic retreat as soon as possible to preserve our fighting capability, reorganize our class ranks, and accumulate our strength for future battles. But what the party did was just the opposite. Stalin and Bukharin, the leaders of the Soviet CP and the Comintern, made a desperate attempt to save their opportunist policy from bankruptcy through proletarian armed insurrections and by silencing criticism from the opposition. They sent their trusted subordinate [Lominadze], in the name of the Comintern, as their special representative to China to manipulate “the August 7 Conference.” The Conference did not systematically analyze or correct the real nature of the opportunist mistakes. It still insisted that there were four main reasons for us to stay in the GMD and that we should remain under the Blue Sky and Bright

Sun banner of the GMD-left. On the other hand, the Comintern representative brought with him these messages from Moscow: “The Chinese revolution is still surging ahead”; and “China has reached the stage of the direct revolution.”¹⁰⁹ Translated and relayed to the party by Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai, and Li Weiha, these messages helped bring about putschism. The party leaders thought that armed insurrections alone were the correct Bolshevik line and that only they and those who agreed with them were genuine Bolsheviks. They used such charges as “opportunist remnants” and “wrong viewpoint” to persecute any comrade who showed even slight suspicion about the “climax of the revolution” and the political line of the CC or who acted more cautiously with respect to armed insurrection. Reorganizing party committees at all levels and carrying out a new political line, the so-called general policy of the armed insurrection, they strictly forbade anyone who disagreed with the new line to register as a party member and even expelled from the party those who were already registered. Apart from ordering party organizations to launch the insurrections, they also asked the masses to act at once without making any preparations. Hence, a putschist atmosphere prevailed, and insurrections, big and small, were launched throughout the country wherever there were party organizations. The period from the “August 7 Conference” to “the Sixth Congress” was one of insurrections. During this period the party’s leading organ accomplished nothing except for closely following the Comintern’s instructions and using “the absolutely correct line of the CC” to help in reality the GMD destroy thoroughly the organizations and strength of the workers and peasants. As a result, even today we have not yet recovered from the defeat and are unable to resume the revolutionary struggle. Party organizations have been ruined and the party’s political position has so degenerated that it is merely a symbol for “murder and arson.”

Opportunism caused the defeat of the Chinese revolution, putschism completed the defeat, and the post-Sixth Congress line further consolidated the defeat and paved the way for the new disaster in the next revolution.

II) Current Conditions and the Party’s Crisis— Opportunism, Putschism, and Bureaucratism

The CCP’s Sixth Congress, under the direct leadership of the Comintern, avoided analyzing the fundamental mistakes of the opportunist policy implemented by the CCP CC during the climax of the revolution—mistakes such as the failure to make a timely withdrawal from the GMD, following the GMD’s leadership, and refusing to organize the soviet. This was because analysis of these mistakes would have meant dealing with the very essence of the Comintern’s policy toward the Chinese revolution. As a result, only three major problems were mentioned at the Sixth Congress: first, the party failed to act independently and did not carry out proper criticism; second, it failed to understand the necessity to transform the revolution from one stage to another; and third, it was unable to develop itself as the center for the revolutionary movement of the broad masses. In fact, this implies that there was

nothing wrong with the Comintern's opportunist policy but only with the technical mistakes made by the CCP in implementing the policy. Therefore, the new political line decided by the Sixth Congress under the direction of the Comintern claimed that the Chinese revolution in the future would still be a bourgeois democratic revolution, the nature of the future political power should be the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship, and furthermore that there must not be an intense struggle against the rich peasants but rather that we should unite with them because they still desired the revolution. Although the Sixth Congress loudly called for struggle against opportunism, the various practical policies adopted demonstrated continuance of a typical opportunist political line. The Sixth Congress adopted the same attitude toward putschism. Verbally it emphasized its determination to oppose putschism, but since it had to cover up the putschist direction of the Comintern, the Sixth Congress did not point out that it was fundamentally wrong for the CCP to choose a policy of insurrection throughout the country at a time when the revolution had been defeated. What the Sixth Congress did was to blame the CCP for implementing mechanically the policy of insurrection, lacking preparation, and being careless in directing the insurrections. Thus, there were technical mistakes made by the CCP while carrying out the Comintern's policy of insurrection. [[This view can be clearly seen in the political resolution of the Sixth Congress. A new revolutionary upsurge has recently been reconfirmed by the Comintern [see above, **Doc. C.15**]. This attests to the Comintern's attempts to foist a putschist line on the CCP.]]

Thus far we have not yet thoroughly exposed the essence of the whole opportunist line; that is why we cannot learn the lessons of the past failures of the revolution and that is why our party's present political line continues to be an opportunist one. Moreover, since we are unable to make a correct estimation of the present revolutionary movement and lack a deep understanding of the situation at this moment, the present practical line of the party is still a putschist one. The gradually broken political and practical lines have inevitably affected the present organizational policy of the party. This has followed the example of the Soviet CP and relies on stern bureaucratic rule to suppress criticism from average party members and to preserve the prestige of a few leaders. None of these problems originated with the CCP but are all imposed by the leading organ of the Comintern controlled by Stalin and Bukharin. Lacking systematic training in Marxist theory and class struggle, the CCP itself does not possess the capability to devise any new theories or formulate any new policies. In this sense, it is only natural to discover that its major erroneous theories and policies, both in the past and at present, are all handed down from the Comintern. To be sure, the former party leadership should also be blamed for these problems, because it neither perceived the opportunist nature of the theories and policies of the Comintern nor made any protest against them but carried them out faithfully and shamefully. However, the party's present leadership continues to stick obstinately to and defend consciously the opportunist and putschist line of the Comintern despite the fact that the Opposition has clearly pointed out the mistakes. The vital point is to understand them thoroughly, correct them completely, and

participate firmly in the struggle against opportunism and putschism. Only in this way can we make a significant contribution to the revolution. This is the correct road for us to take.

At present, the opportunist political line is represented by the viewpoint of the Comintern and the CCP CC, which holds that the future nature of the Chinese revolution is still bourgeois democratic rather than a proletarian socialist revolution, and that future political power in China ought to be the worker-peasant democratic government rather than proletarian dictatorship. They argue that the bourgeoisie in China does not yet have control of political power, that China is still ruled by the feudal class, Chinese society is still feudal or semifeudal and dominated by the feudal social elements, and that the present civil war in China is still one between the bourgeoisie and feudal forces. This point of view is no different from that of the reformists in the Third Party and even that of Chiang Kai-shek. Both now advocate a struggle against feudal forces.

[[The Third Party has made this clear in its recent political declaration.]]

We believe that anyone who thinks that China is still a feudal society dominated by feudal forces and who attributes the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie and all its reactionary behavior to the influence of the feudal elements is not only talking nonsense and harboring illusions about the bourgeoisie but also is deliberately acting as the defender of the bourgeoisie! In fact, economically the feudal system in China has collapsed, the land is owned by free landlords and free farmers, and political power is controlled by the state. All these changes happened earlier than in any of the European countries. The foreign capitalists have broken down the Great Wall of China.

[[Chinese society has already been transformed into a bureaucratic-compradore capitalist society, and the country has entered the era of large-scale national industrialization and capitalization. The production and consumption of commercial goods and the monetary economy have reached even the most remote rural areas and have eliminated completely the natural economy. The urban economy thoroughly controls the countryside. As a result, landlords have become capitalists using their land as personal capital rather than for feudal exploitation. Politically, the bourgeoisie controls power, and the development of the mass struggle had gone "far beyond the bourgeois democratic stage."]]

In short, the Chinese revolution from 1925 to 1927 is in reality a rehearsal of the future third great Chinese revolution. The performance of the different classes and their changed positions during the second revolution have provided us with rich materials that will enable us to foresee the situation of the third Chinese revolution. The aims of the democratic revolution (national independence, unification of the country, and rural revolution) of the Chinese bourgeoisie can only be completed when the working people in both urban and rural areas have seized political power under the leadership of the proletariat. In other words, in order to complete the Chinese bourgeoisie's democratic revolution, we should take the road of the Russian October Revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie has been linked so closely and

inseparably with the economy of foreign capitalism in both city and countryside that we can never expect it to fight against the imperialists and to distribute land to the poor peasants, especially not with the current landownership. Moreover, once the climax of the revolution arrives, the bourgeoisie will surely oppose the "extreme" activities of the workers and peasants. Thus, no possibility exists for the proletariat to cooperate with the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, in order to smash the economic basis of the bourgeoisie and consolidate the proletarian dictatorship, as soon as the proletariat seizes power, it should act at once to confiscate both the Chinese and foreign banks, as well as the big factories and enterprises, and break up private property ownership.

In the countryside, the rich peasants are the focus of the hatred of the poor peasants and farmhands. This is because while the land is controlled by the capitalist landlords, most rich peasants are both usurers and commercial exploiters, and thus have become the targets of the revolution for the poor peasants. In this sense, it is absolutely impossible to form a united front with the rich peasants in the countryside. We should lead the poor peasants to fight against the rich peasants and neutralize the middle peasants. Once the climax of the next revolution arrives, we must immediately mobilize the masses of the people to strive for the proletarian dictatorship rather than to ally with the petty bourgeoisie for a democratic dictatorship based on private property ownership. The democratic dictatorship has already degenerated into a reactionary slogan which can provide the theoretical basis for the opportunists and the petty bourgeois parties to form an alliance and restrain the development of the mass revolutionary struggle. Guided by such an opportunist theory and political line, the Comintern and the CCP CC met with shameful and miserable failures in the past. Now they are going to repeat the same serious errors and will surely meet with even more shameful and miserable defeat.

The present political and practical line of putschism is reflected in the fact that it is not admitted that the bourgeoisie has triumphed and the past revolution has been totally defeated. Under the slogan "the revolutionary high tide will come soon," workers are forced to strike, enlarging every small economic struggle into a big political battle, and party members are consistently ordered to lead the masses in street demonstrations. Party groups and branches are not allowed to discuss at their meetings political issues or work methods for the daily struggle but are asked merely to listen to instructions from above, hold street demonstrations, distribute leaflets, and put up posters. The CC has adopted a putschist and "self-defeating" policy everywhere and on every issue, thus making our comrades both in and out of the party feel that the situation is hopeless. Party cadres at the grass roots all find that they can do nothing under the CC's present line. Working-class comrades in the party feel that the policy and action of the party absolutely contradict the requests and conditions of the working class. In particular, the putschist orders have caused them to leave the party in droves. As a result, party branches in various industrial fields have collapsed, and the number of the party members and the strength of the proletariat have declined rapidly. In important cities such as Hankou, Changsha, and

Canton the party organizations have all disappeared, and there is virtually no connection between the party and the proletarian masses: there are no mass organizations led by our party in significant industrial fields such as the railways, mines, textiles and silk, and hardware. Those organizations that still exist are all under the control of the GMD. Few comrades are now working among the sailors. How could the tide of the revolution rise under such circumstances!

We believe that at the present stage conditions are unfavorable for the development of the revolutionary struggle. Opportunist policies ruined the last revolution, and putschism caused fundamental damage to the organizations of the workers and peasants and weakened the class strength of the proletariat. At present, on the one hand, we should adopt a defensive strategy, examine past failures, sum up the great experience and the bitter lessons of the previous revolution to educate our party, rally our disorganized ranks, restore our relationship with the workers and peasants, and reestablish the mass organizations so as to gather the strength of our class. On the other hand, we ought to reevaluate the new circumstances at the present time, that is, analyze the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and its political party and the military, particularly the tendency of democratic constitutionalism produced by the conflicts between the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeois military dictatorship. These contradictions and conflicts have become visible after the bourgeoisie defeated the revolution, consolidated its regime, and stabilized its economy. We must take advantage of this tendency and try to use thoroughgoing democratism as the form for our political struggle at the present transitional stage. In this way, we step again into the political arena, shorten the present counterrevolutionary rule, open up a new revolutionary environment, and move from the present political struggle to the future third revolution. Democracy requires slogans. At this time, not only the petty bourgeois masses but also the working class demand slogans for their struggle. The vanguard of the proletariat itself also needs to have some political freedom to practice democratic centralism, which is necessary for the development of its organization and strength. Therefore, at present, when it is impossible to wage a direct revolutionary struggle, we must concentrate on the creation of a thoroughly democratic National Assembly; that is, to set up a National Assembly produced by equal and direct elections and with a secret ballot. In addition to the idea of the "National Parliament," we should also put forward slogans such as "eight-hour working day," "land confiscation," and "national independence." These are four interrelated democratic demands for our struggle to substantiate the content of the National Assembly during the transitional period. This is the only way to mobilize the broad masses of the working people to participate in the open and realistic political struggle, continuously enlarge the struggle, and transform the thoroughgoing bourgeois democracy into proletarian democracy—the soviet congress representing and supporting the democratic right of the majority of the laboring people throughout the country. Our attitude toward the National Assembly is to participate in it actively and to try to democratize it thoroughly rather than to boycott it while shouting the abstract slogan of the soviet. The "soviet congress" can only be born through armed insurrec-

tion. At present, it is only a slogan for education and propaganda rather than for action, because neither the subjective nor the objective conditions are ready for it. If we issue orders to launch armed insurrection to establish the soviet congress, and call on workers to act immediately to fight for the soviet, we cannot expect any response from the masses but will only increase the putschist influence inside the party, separate ourselves further from the masses, and weaken the party's strength. We oppose the idea of replacing the National Assembly with the soviet congress. What we want is to make use of the parliamentary struggle to mobilize the broad masses of the people at the grass roots to fight against the bourgeois military dictatorship of the GMD in order to prepare for armed insurrection and the establishment of the soviet congress in the future. On the one hand, the leaders of the present CC are crying out loudly that the Chinese revolutionary movement has fully recovered. They call for the establishment of the soviet congress, denounce anyone who admits the Chinese revolution has failed, accuse those who have proposed the slogan of "the National Assembly" as being liquidationists or reactionaries, and issue the slogans "Transform the warlord war into the revolutionary war to overthrow the warlords" and "Use the revolutionary insurrections of the masses to eliminate the warlord wars." On the other hand, they claim that "the revolutionary movement at present is so weak that we must not call the masses to launch insurrections to overthrow the GMD warlord regime." This reveals that our party so far has not found any political slogans which can rally the masses. Hence, the party can only act blindly and remain outside of the political arena.

The party's recent policy has continued to follow closely the ridiculous putschist analysis made by the Comintern on the current situation in China. The party leadership does not understand at all the significance of the democratic movement for the political struggle during the transitional period. Its policy is a combination of opportunist military speculation and political putschism. On the surface, the CC has adopted defeatism, while in reality it orders our comrades to assist the anti-Chiang movement of the Reformist Group and to participate in the conference held by the various anti-Chiang factions in Hong Kong. While refusing to lead the people to wage an open political struggle, it participates in the military speculation sponsored by the generals of the Reorganization Group. Such a policy will not only keep our party away from the political arena but also will ruin the party's political life!

The bureaucratic organizational line is represented by the appointment system and the absolute commandism now prevailing in the party. Democracy within the party has been abandoned, and everywhere there is bragging and false reports—from the Comintern to party organizations at all levels. The party bureaucrats use these reports to cheat each other and to deceive the masses. The present organizational line favors factionalism within the party. For example, there are the Whampoa [Huangpu] Clique led by Zhou Enlai and the Trade Union Clique led by Xiang Ying. These factions support personal power, protect their own followers, clash with each other, and persecute at will any party member with political consciousness. They have expelled many party members in order to solve the political

problems inside the party, put the prestige of a few leaders above the interests of the whole party and the class, and forbidden the party members from discussing political issues with the excuses that “there is the danger of enemy attack,” “the situation is adverse,” “the necessities of secret work,” and “the application of iron discipline.” In this way, they have changed Bolshevik-style enthusiastic discussion into bureaucratic blind observation. Under the present system, the relationship between the leading organ (the Comintern) and the grass-roots organizations (the CCP’s branches) is just like that between the emperor and the village head. The average party member has to obey faithfully orders from above, otherwise he or she will be immediately persecuted. Hence, no party member dares express what he or she really wants to say.

Now, the most powerful weapon used by the bureaucrats of the party’s leading organ to control party members is “iron discipline.” Ordinary party members must submit themselves to party bureaucrats because of blind faith in this weapon. They dare not criticize the rule of the party bureaucrats even though, in their hearts, they disagree with it. Of course, iron discipline is one of the most important means for the proletarian party to lead the revolution to defeat the bourgeoisie. [[While Lenin saw the need for “iron discipline,” the way it is used by the party bureaucrats is quite the opposite.]]

Party members are forced to carry out the party strategy and tactics, which their own experiences have proved to be wrong. Party members are not given freedom to discuss and criticize the erroneous strategy and tactics. Party bureaucrats use it [iron discipline] to cover up their mistakes and maintain their bureaucratic rule. In light of this background, such “iron discipline” is nothing but pure nonsense, hypocrisy, and deceit.

Under the guidance of the opportunist leadership, our party has never provided party members with any opportunity to participate in the political life of the party and to gain a basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. As a result, the average political level of party members is very low. Meanwhile, the putschist direction has further ruined the party organizations. Things have become even worse since the Sixth Congress. Since then, opportunism and putschism have combined to prevent the party from making any progress. Under these conditions, to revive the party’s basis and discipline, party leaders must make a fundamental change in the political and organizational line, use democratic centralism to replace bureaucratic centralism, provide party members with freedom of discussion and criticism, and devise a strategy and tactics which average party members will find correct in terms of their own experiences. Only in this way can our party establish close relations with the broad masses of the people, carry out truly unified actions, and resist the enemy’s attacks. What the party bureaucrats have done is just the reverse. Taking advantage of the average party members’ ignorance of, and their estrangement from, the party’s political life, these party bureaucrats have manipulated the party, and deceived and threatened the party cadres. They use money to bind together party members, maintain some empty trade union organs, and hire people to hold demon-

strations for them. They forbid discussion and criticism within the party and rely on the prestige of the Comintern and the party's authority to force members and the masses to believe that "the CC's political line is absolutely correct." They even use the enemy's attack as an excuse to put pressure on the party. If we allow such a leadership to continue, our party, the party for which many of our comrades have sacrificed their lives, would cease to exist except in name. Therefore, all politically conscious party members must rise up immediately to overthrow this leadership from within the party and save our party from the current deteriorating situation and crisis!

III) Our Attitude and Suggestions

The responsibility of the Opposition is to help all party members understand the danger of opportunism, get rid of the opportunist leadership, and return to the Marxist-Leninist line. In a party with genuine democratic centralism, political differences inside the party can be dealt with through open discussion. This would not split but could further consolidate the party. On the contrary, bureaucratic-style coercion and deception will inevitably cause the party to split and collapse. In order to support the genuine proletarian line and realize Bolshevik-Leninist-style unity, the Opposition must wage a staunch and organized struggle against the party's opportunist leadership. Opportunism has repeatedly met with shameful defeats in China, and the Chinese proletariat has paid too heavy a price. However, it is only recently that the Opposition's struggle has begun. This means that after being deceived by the opportunist leadership of the Comintern for a long time, the CCP now has finally awakened and moved toward the Marxist-Leninist line.

We the undersigned hold that anyone who wants to restore the Leninist Comintern, consolidate the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union, and support the views of the Chinese proletarian revolution should rise to fight against the opportunist political line and bureaucratic organizational line of the Stalinists. The present policies and systems of the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the CCP must all be completely altered. We think that once the Opposition has won the sympathy of the majority of comrades within the CCP, Stalin may also take over some of the ideas and slogans of the Opposition, or he may change a few party leaders so as to continue his control over the left wing of the masses. However, we are striving for a fundamental change in the whole line rather than certain tactical reforms, still less the dismissal of a few leaders from office. We believe that since the CCP has suffered most under the opportunist and bureaucratic leadership of the Stalinists, it should stand, among the communist parties led by the Comintern in all the countries, at the forefront of the brave fight against the opportunist and bureaucratic leadership of the Comintern. Hence, we are putting forward the following suggestions and hope all party members can firmly and unanimously demand and supervise the CC to send, in the name of the CCP, the message to the Comintern and distribute it directly to communist parties in other countries. Meanwhile, we must

unite under the banner of the Comintern left-Opposition to fight through to the end to realize the following demands:

First, call back Comrade Trotsky and other Oppositionists, release the Oppositionists of the Soviet CP and the communist parties of other countries from jail and from exile in Siberia and Turkestan, and restore their party membership and Comrade Trotsky's leading position.

Second, publicize all documents the Opposition have written during the recent five or six years on the policies of the Soviet CP and the Comintern and publicize Lenin's will and his posthumous manuscripts withheld by the Stalinists.

Third, reexamine the political and organizational mistakes made by the CC of the Soviet CP and the leading organ of the Comintern during the recent five or six years and reformulate the policies of the Soviet CP and the Comintern.

Fourth, restore the party membership of those Chinese Communists who have been expelled from the party because of their opposition to the opportunist line of the CC and immediately start open discussion on various vital political issues.

Fifth, reexamine the lessons of the past failures of the Chinese revolution and work out a new political line.

Sixth, reorganize the leading organs of the Soviet CP, the Comintern, and the Comintern branches of the communist parties in all countries.

Signatures¹¹⁰

(Note: Above is the collective view of the signatories. Those who issued speeches previously are responsible for their own opinions.)

C.18 The New Revolutionary High Tide and an Initial Victory in One or More Provinces (11 June 1930)¹¹¹

I) The Chinese Revolution and the World Revolution

[[1] While the capitalist countries throughout the world are in a state of depression, the rising tide of strikes by the working class of all countries, the growing struggle of the unemployed and especially the great achievements in socialist construction on the part of the Soviet Union: [all these] have further bolstered the determination of the working class to advance toward a socialist revolution. To save themselves from crisis, the imperialists are anxious to attack Soviet Russia. A world revolution looms that is certainly advantageous to the development of the Chinese revolution.]]

2) From the standpoint of imperialist world rule, China focuses most sharply all the basic conflicts among the imperialists: China is the spot where the conflict

among the major imperialists—England, Japan, and the United States—is the most intense; it is one of the areas where the capitalist world and the socialist Soviet Union have direct contact; it is an area where the anti-imperialist colonial revolution has penetrated the deepest. At the same time, the conflict between the Chinese proletariat and bourgeoisie can easily be stepped up—for instance, every one of the present workers' economic struggles is rapidly being converted into a severe political struggle, or even armed conflict. Thus, the various forms of conflict among the imperialists, now focused in China, are likely to sharpen, resulting in incurable economic and political crises, in ceaseless imbroglios among warlords, in the collapse of the ruling class's foundations, and in the increasing turning of the working class and the broad toiling masses toward revolution to seek their own emancipation. Thus China is the weakest link in the ruling chain of world imperialism; it is the place where the volcano of the world revolution is most likely to erupt. Therefore, with the present aggravation of the global revolutionary crisis, the Chinese revolution may possibly break out first, setting off the world revolution and the final decisive class war of the world.

[[3) Because China is an integral part of the imperialists' economic system, its loss would mean the end of the imperialists. In the final decisive battle we shall undoubtedly be able to achieve complete victory.

4) Misunderstanding of this situation is the chief source of liquidationist and rightist thoughts. Proponents of this view do not understand that the Chinese revolution may break out first and set off the great world revolution.]]

II) A New Revolutionary High Tide Is Drawing Nearer Every Day

5) As a consequence of the effect of the basic crisis of imperialism, especially the continuous fighting among the warlords during the past two years, the Chinese political and economic situation has now reached an extraordinarily serious state: financial chaos, bankruptcies, increasing crises of unemployment, soaring prices, and growing deterioration of the livelihood of the masses. The rural economy has suffered unprecedented destruction, with famine and war spread over the whole country, exposing tens of thousands of people to hunger, cold, displacement, and death. Most areas of the south are in a cruel war between the peasants and landlords. No clique of the ruling class is able to save the critical situation or to unify the country; further deterioration and collapse are inevitable. On the other hand, the toiling masses of workers and peasants have no choice, in such unendurable circumstances, but to wage the revolutionary struggle with determination. This completely explains how the objective conditions for revolution have matured and serves to answer the lies of the liquidationists [to the effect] that "the bourgeoisie is being stabilized." The revolutionary struggle of the broad masses surges rapidly forward: the strike wave spreads out; the economic struggles turn into political ones; broad laboring masses, shaking themselves free from the deceptions of the GMD's yellow unions, turn to struggle against them and the GMD; and [the workers] free them-

selves from legal forms of peaceful petitioning and [proceed to] direct action or even to armed conflict. All this demonstrates that the political consciousness of the laboring masses is proceeding rapidly toward the revolutionary high tide. This situation became clearer after the extensive, serious political struggles of Red May—May 1 and May 30 of this year [1930]. Especially the rural struggle has undoubtedly developed into an extremely wide high tide, not only destroying the rule of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, and the GMD in the villages, but also establishing soviet regimes in many areas, in opposition to the imperialist-GMD regime which rules the whole nation. After the First All-China Congress of Soviet Areas' Delegates [May 1930, in Shanghai], [the rural struggle] will expand even more rapidly. In addition, [there are] the vigorous development of the Red Army and the conversion to the revolutionary camp, as well as spontaneous mutinies of the soldiers in the warlord armies; this overall situation shows that a new revolutionary rising tide in China is directly ahead.

6) Thus, while the ruling class continues to weaken and collapse, the mass struggle is daily approaching a revolutionary high tide. This shows clearly that the future of the warlords' strife may well turn into the victory of the national revolution and the final death of the warlords' rule. Only a victorious revolutionary upheaval of the masses of workers and peasants can completely eliminate the warlords' wars and achieve unification and peace in China. Therefore, the immediate task of the CP is to call on the broad masses to oppose the warlords' wars by revolutionary struggle, to prepare resolutely for the concerted general uprising of all revolutionary forces in order to overthrow the warlords' rule, and to eliminate completely the warlords' wars, [thereby] winning the victory of the revolution.

7) The major signs of the revolutionary high tide are the heightened political struggle of the revolutionary vanguard and of the general and even the backward masses, and the outbreak of great political strikes in the major cities. But serious rightist or even liquidationist concepts will inevitably result if [one] considers only the superficial unevenness in the development [of the revolution] in the cities and countryside, and neglects [to consider] the workers' struggle, the sharpening of class antagonisms, the rapid growth of revolutionary spirit and determination on the part of the broad masses, and the bankruptcy of the ruling power of the ruling class; that is, the conditions under which every incident may lead to the outbreak of a great revolutionary struggle. The major reason why the workers' strike movement has not yet turned into a revolutionary high tide decidedly does not lie in a lapse of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the workers, or in a lack of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the workers, or in their lack of desire for revolution; rather it lies in the fact that the ruling class, about to collapse, is waging a last-ditch battle in the cities, using all possible methods—white terror and trickery—to suppress the workers' struggle. Thus the urban struggle is more intense and cruel than that in the countryside; this is why we must redouble our efforts in city work for the ultimate victory in the revolution. But the major handicap in our present work are rightist ideas of doubt and pessimism regarding the workers' struggles. The elimina-

tion of such vacillation is the major prerequisite for speeding the arrival of the rising tide in the workers' struggles.

8) Generally speaking, not every struggle of the worker masses will turn into a revolutionary upsurge; other essential factors must accompany it. In the present Chinese situation, such factors are the extensive spread of peasant uprisings, the rapid expansion of the Red Army of workers and peasants, a growing awakening among the [GMD] soldier masses, and the mutinies on their part and the serious crisis of the ruling class. In fact, one great workers' struggle in an industrial or political center may immediately lead to the formation of a revolutionary upsurge—[that is], to a directly revolutionary situation. Furthermore, the outbreak of a great struggle in the key cities would, under present conditions, mean that the ruling class is not only unable to hold the rural areas, but also incapable of suppressing or controlling the revolutionary struggle in the cities. This would mean that objective conditions are ripe for armed insurrection. Therefore we may say that the upsurge of the revolutionary rising tide will inevitably be followed by armed insurrection. We should, therefore, actively prepare from now on for armed insurrection. Attention should be paid not only to political preparatory work—such as mass propaganda for armed insurrection and for the necessity of seizing political power—but also to hasten organizational and technical preparations. If we do not understand the objective situation clearly, we will undoubtedly commit grave rightist errors in our tactics, such as ignoring the necessity of preparing for armed insurrection, and will undoubtedly become the “tail” of the masses or even an obstacle to the revolution.

9) The basic economic and political crisis in China is everywhere becoming more intense, and there is no fundamental difference in it [as regards locality]. Therefore, the great workers' struggle breaking out in key cities will lead to a national revolutionary high tide, and the great struggle itself will signify the arrival of the national revolutionary high tide. So the revolutionary upsurge may break out first in this or that province, but there cannot be a single revolutionary high tide in one or more provinces apart from the national revolutionary high tide. Therefore, when the party prepares for the national revolutionary high tide, it must pay serious attention to coordination and mobilization on a national scale; the concept that a national revolutionary high tide can be pushed by establishing local regimes in one or more provinces is undoubtedly extremely erroneous.

III) Preliminary Successes in One or More Key Provinces and the Establishment of a National Revolutionary Regime

10) In industrially backward China, economic centers completely controlling the national industries have, generally speaking, not yet been formed. Furthermore, under the control of a few commercial centers trading with the imperialists (such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Dalian), political regimes of local warlords have come into existence. The nation's ruling class is, in general, in a condition of vacillation and collapse, but to a different degree in different areas.

Therefore, during the national revolutionary high tide, the revolution may win preliminary successes in one or more key provinces (judging from present circumstances, the objective conditions of Wuhan and its adjacent provinces are more mature). For the present, while the new revolutionary high tide approaches day by day, our general tactical policy is to prepare ourselves for winning preliminary successes in one or more provinces and for setting up a national revolutionary regime.

11) Preliminary successes in one or more provinces are inseparable from the national revolutionary rising tide. "These successes cannot be attained without the condition of a revolutionary rising tide" (resolution of the Sixth Congress). Therefore, in order to prepare for preliminary successes in one or more provinces, attention must be paid to the coordination of work on a national scale. The present expansion and intensification of the warfare among warlords will undoubtedly provide a favorable situation for preliminary successes in one or more provinces. To fight actively for the attainment of such successes is at present the main task of the party. But we must realize that after the revolution has succeeded in one or more provinces, the various groups of reactionaries, provincial warlords, and especially all the imperialists will temporarily forget their own differences and unite to suppress the revolution. In the first Great Revolution [1925–27], the revolutionary government in Guangdong could exist as a local regime for more than one year and consolidate its power. It is impossible for such a situation to reoccur in the present soviet stage of the revolution. Preliminary successes in one or more provinces will at once give rise to cruel war—not only civil war to liquidate the reactionaries, but also international war to resist all imperialist oppression. Therefore, only with the preparation for a national revolutionary high tide to achieve preliminary successes in one or more provinces can the revolutionary government rapidly mobilize tens or hundreds of millions of the masses of the nation to wage resolutely a decisive fight against the reactionary forces and obtain the support of the world proletariat—especially that of the Russian proletariat, which has already met success—so as to vanquish the reactionary forces and win national victory. Thus preliminary successes in one or more provinces are the beginning of national victory, a step toward more intensive struggle in the national revolution. There can never be any "local regimes" or "regional governments"; every provincial (party headquarters) should actively prepare for successful insurrection in that province in coordination with the general situation. Thus, in preparing for preliminary successes in one or more provinces, special attention must be paid to heightening our national activities, as well as to their coordination with the struggle of the international proletariat. In particular, more propaganda about the Chinese revolution must be spread among the international proletariat.

12) The great struggle of the proletariat is the decisive force in the winning of preliminary successes in one or more provinces. Without an upsurge of strikes of the working class, without armed insurrection in key cities, there can be no successes in one or more provinces. It is a highly erroneous concept to pay no special

attention to urban work, and to plan “to use the countryside to surround the cities” and “to rely on the Red Army alone to occupy the cities.” Henceforth, the organization of political strikes and their expansion into a general strike, as well as the strengthening of the organization and training of the workers’ militia to set up a central force for armed insurrections, are the major tactics in preparing for preliminary successes in one or more provinces. Particular attention should be directed to the fact that the ruling class will stage a final struggle in the cities. This cruel struggle will be even fiercer than that in the rural areas; therefore, we must redouble our efforts in urban work, set up strong bases in the key cities—especially among workers of important industries—and awaken the will of the broad masses to struggle to the death. These are the most grave tasks for the present and the tactical problems that must be solved first.

13) In view of the present objective economic and political conditions of China, a rising tide of proletarian struggles unaccompanied by peasant uprisings, soldiers’ mutinies, powerful assaults by the Red Army, and a whole combination of various revolutionary forces also will not lead the revolution to victory. Moreover, it will be unattainable if one of the above four revolutionary forces is lacking. The liquidationists who look down on the peasantry and want to liquidate the Red Army are undoubtedly spreading reactionary ideas and attempting to weaken the ally of the proletariat and to destroy the fighting power of the revolution. The great revolutionary role of the peasantry has even a higher significance in China; the birth of the Red Army in the rural revolution is a special feature of China, which can never be understood by the Trotskyite liquidationists. It is also entirely false to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, maintaining that the present workers’ struggle in the cities has not [yet] reached the rising tide [stage] and that a conservative policy should be adopted in the rural areas and the expansion of the Red Army should be stopped. Granted that the workers’ struggle has not yet reached a revolutionary high tide, and peasant uprisings, soldiers’ mutinies, and the Red Army’s expansion are still inadequate; still we should specially emphasize the intensifying of the workers’ struggle while working for the development of peasant uprisings, the outbreak of soldiers’ mutinies, and the vigorous expansion of the Red Army.

IV) The Reformist and Liquidationist Factions

[[Party members must be mobilized to eliminate the influence of the “reformist” group under Wang Jingwei and the “liquidationists” headed by Chen Duxiu.]]

V) Prepare for the Transformation of the Revolution

17) The major tasks of the present revolution are the overthrow of imperialist rule and the destruction of feudal forces by rural revolution. These are undoubtedly the characteristics of a democratic revolution. The unfounded assertion of the liquidationists that the present task of the democratic revolution is finished is a

reactionary concept that seeks to make us slacken our efforts in the task of democratic revolution and our work of mobilizing the masses against the imperialists and for the rural revolution. But at present the proletariat is the only class leading the revolution—the bourgeoisie having become part of the reactionary alliance—thus the complete victory of the democratic revolution is inseparable from the overthrow of bourgeois rule and will inevitably result in the consolidation of proletarian leadership and the successful establishment of a soviet regime. These factors assume in advance that the victory of the democratic revolution will transform itself into a victory of socialism.

18) When the revolution has won preliminary successes in one or more provinces, the imperialists, gentry, and bourgeoisie will oppose it by every means [such as] armed attack, economic sabotage, and organizing counterrevolutionary coups. This cruel war will be against the imperialists, landlords, and compradores, as well as against the bourgeoisie. At that time, the revolutionary government, in order to win the national revolution, will not only confiscate the banks, businesses, and factories of the imperialists, but also the factories, businesses, and banks of the Chinese bourgeoisie, so as to weaken the power of these counterrevolutionary weapons. It will also be necessary to organize and control production in order to cope with the grave economic blockade. At the same time, politically, it is necessary to have a centralized, dictatorial regime in order to meet the persistent counterrevolutionary attacks. This will necessitate an advance from the dictatorship of workers and peasants to that of the proletariat. A revolutionary transformation is primarily a transformation of class relationships. The dictatorship of the proletariat is already in the nature of a socialist regime. Therefore the beginning of revolutionary victory and the establishment of a revolutionary regime will be the beginning of a revolutionary transformation. There will be no interim stage.

19) It is a grave error to assume that the revolution can begin to be a revolutionary transformation only after victory on a national scale. For if the revolutionary government at that time does not carry out a class policy, [if it does not] confiscate the factories, businesses, and banks of the bourgeoisie, [if it does not] preempt the counterrevolutionary weapons of the bourgeoisie, then not only will the deepening of the revolution stop, but victory on a national scale will also be obstructed. This is a suicidal policy during a revolution. Therefore, the theory that the revolutionary transformation must have several stages is undoubtedly an extremely dangerous rightist notion. On the other hand, it is also erroneous to assume that “a revolution is still a democratic revolution on the eve of its victory, but that the regime set up after the victory of the revolution is a purely socialist regime.” This neglects the process of revolutionary transformation (no matter how brief this process, it must be gone through), and ignores the fact that, when counterattacking the cruel onslaught of the imperialists, the gentry, and the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to have the slogan and policy of democratic revolution for the mobilization of tens and hundreds of millions of the masses to overcome this counterrevolutionary attack.

20) The dawn of victory for the revolution will mean a more cruel class war. On

top of an all-out counterrevolutionary armed attack, the imperialists, gentry, and bourgeoisie will try every means to induce the petty bourgeoisie who remain in the revolutionary camp to turn against the revolution. Therefore, in the process of revolutionary transformation, new vacillations and betrayals are inevitable. Therefore we must never harbor any illusions about peaceful transformations of the revolution, but should henceforth utilize our correct policy of strengthening the leadership of the proletariat, establishing independent organizations for hired farmhands, consolidating the alliance with the poor peasants, eliminating the influence of the rich peasants, and winning over the middle peasants in order to lessen the difficulties during the revolutionary transformation in the future. Such a correct, firm policy definitely has an important significance in the smooth realization of the future revolutionary transformation and should never be neglected by us.

[[21) Another decisive factor for our victory is support from the proletariat in the Soviet Union and the outbreak of proletarian revolution in capitalist countries.]]

VI) The Tasks and Tactical Line of the Party

22) At present, when the revolution is rapidly developing and the great revolutionary tide is approaching, the party should not only pay attention to winning over the broad masses and organizing their struggle so as to hasten the arrival of this great revolutionary tide, it should also pay attention to the task of organizing armed insurrections on a national scale to capture political power when the great revolutionary high tide arises. Therefore, it is necessary to step up the organization of the masses for the political struggle and the propaganda for seizing political power by armed insurrection. The general tactical line of the party at present is to pay attention to hastening the national revolutionary upsurge, to organizational and technical preparations for armed insurrection, and to plan for preliminary successes in the provinces adjacent to and surrounding Wuhan.

23) The continued spreading of the warlords' warfare results in uprooting, bankruptcy, death, and destitution for the masses. The whole rule of the GMD is shown not only to have fallen into the lowest depths of despair, but also to have completely lost the confidence of the broad masses. Therefore, the masses can be mobilized only by resolutely carrying out the line of opposition to the warlords' warfare, under the central slogan of opposing warlords' war. If the party fails actively to raise such a slogan, but in its place proposes some partial economic demands, the masses will feel frustrated and will not rise enthusiastically to struggle. The masses said long ago: "Whenever the insurrection comes, notify us and we will come." The party should now boldly tell the masses: "The time for insurrection is approaching. Let all of you organize." It has been a grave shortcoming that in the past the party paid much too little attention to the struggle against the warlords' warfare. Now the party must resolutely raise the slogans of opposing imperialism, the GMD, and especially the warlords' warfare and must organize sympathetic strikes, even general strikes, local uprisings, and soldiers' mutinies, and summon the Red Army to attack relent-

lessly in order to carry out the general line of converting the warlords' war into a war to liquidate the warlords.

To carry out this line, it is, first of all, necessary to pay attention to the international mission of the Chinese revolution. The outbreak of the Chinese revolution will spur the imperialists not only to unite to suppress the Chinese revolution, but also to attack the Soviet Union with greater vigor. Therefore, armed protection of the Soviet Union should become one of the central slogans of the revolution. Attention should be paid, at the same time, to coordination with the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat in capitalist countries and colonies and to the strengthening of propaganda for the Chinese revolution among the revolutionary masses of the world. On the other hand, the danger of an imperialist war is coming closer day by day. Henceforth, it is also an urgent task to engage in extensive propaganda and agitation for the anti-imperialist war, as well as to hasten the mobilization of a widespread movement against imperialism and in support of the revolutionary movement in colonial areas.

In the struggle against the warlords, we must, at the same time, give stronger support to the resolution of the councils of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies in the soviet areas: the fight for the soviet regime movement. We must tell the broad masses that complete emancipation will come only after the overthrow of the warlords' regime and the establishment of a soviet regime. The movement, in order to arouse the determination of the broad masses to struggle for the soviet regime, should be carried into every factory, every school, and every village.

24) The crux of the question in this line is the organization of political strikes. We should not only pay attention to the strengthening of political propaganda in economic strikes and convert every economic struggle into a political one, but also resolutely raise political slogans (opposing, for instance, the stationing of troops in factories, White Russian guards, arrests of workers, yellow unions, and demanding freedom to organize unions and to strike). Slogans should concentrate on opposing the warlords' wars so as to organize extensive political strikes among the masses. Without resolute political struggles, economic gains are definitely difficult to win. Only resolute political slogans can heighten the courage of the masses to struggle. (We should take care that, in our tactics, every political slogan for agitation, every political struggle, is coordinated with economic demands.) The lessons of the organizing of the May 1 and May 30 Movements are that, in general, political propaganda and agitation are inadequate. We did not boldly raise political slogans in organizing the strikes of the May 1 and May 30 Movements; rather we mobilized the masses mostly by economic slogans. This was the major reason why, in various districts, large-scale strikes could not be organized. It was a very grave rightist error, manifesting not only a tendency to "tail" the masses, but also the serious error of obstructing the struggle of the masses.

25) General organizational weakness is a most serious weakness in the present workers' movement. We must pay the utmost attention and spend our greatest efforts on expanding the red unions and establishing factory committees. But we

must realize that such efforts can only yield greater results under resolute political battle slogans. We must resolutely begin a movement to fight for the freedom to organize unions and to strike. The masses can be rallied around us in increasing numbers only by struggling openly for the red unions, and against the yellow unions as well as the GMD. If the party limits itself to narrow, secret work, it will be difficult for the mass organizations to develop on a large scale and consolidate themselves.

26) At present it is our urgent duty to establish and expand the military organizations of the working masses (red storm troops and pickets), and to intensify their military training. Not only must we propagate, in the struggle, the need for organizing workers' pickets, but also we must use the slogan of preparing for armed insurrection to mobilize the broad masses to join the pickets and the red storm troops. Only thus can military mass organizations be rapidly expanded; only thus can the pickets and red storm troops become the central units of the insurrection.

27) One of the major tasks in the execution of the present General Line is the resolute organization of local uprisings. The aim of local uprisings is to capture cities and to establish local soviet regimes. This is the highest stage of peasant uprisings, whose future is inevitably linked with the uprisings in key cities to complete the success of a nationwide insurrection. The rural struggle has, at present, reached a high tide, and conditions for local uprisings, in general, are undoubtedly mature. The party should unhesitatingly mobilize the broad masses, under the slogan of local uprisings, to accomplish this task. The most serious obstacle to the accomplishment of this task is the "guerrilla" concept of the past, which advocates attacking cities, instead of occupying them, and lacks the resolve to establish local soviets in the cities. This is a reflection of the peasant mentality and has nothing in common with our present line. When a local uprising succeeds, a local soviet regime should be immediately established, and the masses should be immediately mobilized to carry out resolute attacks and substantial expansion of the regime.

28) The vigorous expansion of the Red Army is an even more pressing current task, especially in the soviet areas. Without the coordination of a large and mighty Red Army, a nationwide victory for the revolution cannot be won in a China ruled by warlordism. At present, our party—especially those party units in the soviet areas—should mobilize the broad masses to join, support, and concentrate their armed strength in the Red Army. In order to break down the localism and conservatism of the peasant mentality, we must tell the broad masses that the rural revolution can be assured of victory only if the regime of the GMD, gentry, and bourgeoisie is completely overthrown and if the revolution is carried to victory on a national scale. Such a mentality is at present the most serious obstacle to the vigorous expansion of the Red Army. The second grave obstacle is the failure to understand the general development of the revolutionary situation, and a stubborn adherence to the military concept of guerrilla warfare, in opposition to the expansion of the Red Army and its expansionist tactics. This (attitude) derives from complete ignorance of the fact that military tactics, equipment, troop designations, and organization should all change

with the general political line. To obstruct a change in party tactics by clinging to an old military viewpoint is a serious rightist mistake.

29) The strategy and tactics of the Red Army should not only consist of resolute attacks on the major forces of the enemy, assaults on key cities and lines of communication of the enemy, and a complete change from the guerrilla tactics of the past, but also should turn the warlords' warfare into a revolutionary war to liquidate the warlords, and carry out, in a coordinated and organized fashion, under the general plan, the military task of preliminary successes in one or more provinces. The overall aim of this task [of the Red Army] is the seizure of political power and the establishment of a national revolutionary regime in coordination with armed uprisings in key cities. The guerrilla tactics of the past have become entirely incompatible with this line and must undergo a fundamental change. Another serious task of the Red Army at present is to intensify political training along class lines. With peasants making up an absolute majority of the Red Army at present, special attention should be paid to their political training along class lines in order to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat and eliminate thoroughly the erroneous tendencies in the peasant mentality.

30) Under the present overall line, the mission of the soldiers' movement is not only to incite the soldiers in the warlords' armies to mutiny and to bring them over to the Red Army, but to organize the soldiers' antiwarlord mutinies as a central strategy. That is to say, not only to incite small-scale, scattered mutinies, but also to raise the banner of antiwarlord warfare and of the liquidation of warlords in an organized and planned manner, and in coordination with other revolutionary forces. Thus, after a mutiny, the tactic of resolute attacks should be adopted to rout the warlord troops. The past practice of fleeing after the uprising must be effectively corrected.

31) The gravest obstacle to the execution of this General Line are the rightist ideas, which are absolutely incompatible with it. The party must, as a prerequisite to executing this General Line, resolutely fight against all wavering, rightist ideas, especially "tailist" tendencies. The liquidationists, with their systematic liquidationist philosophy, have, in fact, turned from an intraparty opposition group into a class enemy. The party must carry out a more resolute struggle within its ranks and especially among the masses against the liquidationists. But the rightist ideas hidden inside the party have also become a great danger at present because they superficially support the party line, but in every actual tactic have shown doubts, vacillation, sabotage, and inaction. Without overcoming all these rightist ideas, it will be impossible to carry out the party line and policy to the full.

32) Youth and women are an important factor in the revolutionary struggle. We must resolutely oppose the tendency to neglect the youth and women's movements, because it is a grave political error. The positive role of youth and women can be witnessed in any struggle at present; and the party should actively draw them into the revolutionary camp. The party must, by all available means, assist the reorientation of the work of the CYL and oppose the tendency toward bohemianism within the CYL corps.

VII) The Organizational Problem of the Party

[[33) The major weakness of the revolution is the inadequate organizational strength of the party.

34) Serious weaknesses are: slow expansion among workers, only a few working-class cadres, and defective functioning of cells.

35) The threat of petty bourgeois romanticism is manifest in current party organization.]]

C.19 Resolution on the Chinese Question. *Political Secretariat of the ECCI (June 1930)*¹¹²

I) The High Tide of the Revolutionary Movement in China

1) The Resolutions of the CCP's Sixth Congress and the Comintern's Sixth World Congress both held that a new high tide of the Chinese revolution would inevitably arise. The current situation in China has proved the resolutions to be absolutely correct. Being an undisputable fact, the new surge of the revolutionary movement in China is contrary to the prophecy of the rightist opportunists and capitulationists, the Trotskyites, the Chen Duxiuists, and the other liquidationists. Particularly during recent months, a rapid and obvious progress in the revolutionary liberation movement has occurred. The motive forces of the Chinese revolution—the working class and the peasantry—have recovered from the heavy blows inflicted by the reactionaries and have rallied again to wage the rural revolution, wipe out the influence of the imperialists, and overthrow the reactionary GMD regime.

[[2) The living conditions of the laboring people in China have deteriorated rapidly under the reactionary rule of recent years. It has made people see through the false promises of the GMD, and the revolutionary consciousness of the workers and peasants has been raised. The resolve of the petty bourgeoisie has also been strengthened. It shows that the outbreak of the revolutionary storm is approaching.]]

3) The new high tide of the Chinese revolution has developed in a unique way. It first arose in most of the areas that were affected by the 1925–27 revolution, and then gradually spread to the neighboring areas. Such a phenomenon explains why at the beginning, the revolutionary forces could not control the industrial centers. This is a disadvantage because it puts the workers and peasants in a relatively weaker position. Only with the gradual development of the revolutionary movement can the peasant war led by the proletariat expand to the new areas and advance to a more advantageous position.

4) In analyzing the current situation, we should understand that a nationwide revolutionary high tide has not yet appeared. The labor movement and the peasant

struggle have not yet merged together, and our strength is not sufficient to overthrow the rule of the GMD and the imperialists. The peasants' revolutionary struggle so far has succeeded only in several southern provinces. Although the ruling class has been weakened by the factional struggle and rivalries, politically it has not yet collapsed. However, the recent change of the situation reveals that despite the fact that the revolutionary movement is not in a position to dominate China, it can at least take control of a number of major provinces. In reality, the progress of the revolutionary struggle depends largely on whether the CCP has a correct strategy, and particularly, whether it can establish a strong leadership to direct and promote the soviet movement.

II) The Major Tasks of the Party

5) The party's urgent task is to set up a central government to lead the soviet movement and to coordinate its action. This is a most important task. The party should also organize in the areas under our control a genuine Red Army—an army that is totally under the command of the CP and that supports the soviet government. Only with the help of the Red Army can the worker-peasant soviet government in China hold out and work effectively. Therefore, we must concentrate our efforts on organizing and strengthening the Red Army so that we will be able to take over one or several industrial and administrative centers in the future in accordance with the military and political conditions.

The CP must understand that the establishment of a Red Army with strong fighting capability and high political consciousness is the top priority at the present time. Once this task is completed, the revolutionary struggle will surely develop rapidly.

When organizing the central soviet government, we must be very careful in selecting staff and choose only those who have passed strict political examination and are unconditionally loyal to the revolution. Under no circumstances should we allow any GMD personnel to enter the government. The major task for this provisional government is to mobilize the peasantry and try its best to lead the peasant movement. It should wipe out the feudal-warlord system, keep the rich peasants and usurer elements in check, and make every effort to urge the people to take part in the struggle. The provisional government must provide a form of political power for proletarian hegemony over the peasant movement. We must encourage the broad masses of the people to participate consciously in the revolutionary government both at the top and at the grass-roots level.

6) In the soviet areas, the party's attention must focus on solving the land problem. The rural revolution should aim at serving the interests of the poor and middle peasants rather than those of the rich peasants. The driving force of the rural revolution should be the farmhands and the poor peasants. They should form a solid alliance with the middle peasants under the leadership of the working class. We must smash the resistant rich peasants who want to stop us from confiscating

landlords' land or who plan to distribute the confiscated land in accordance with the number of farm tools a peasant possesses. To deal this resistance a heavy blow, the party should confiscate the land of all the landlords, of the temples and churches, and of other big landowners. The confiscated land must be distributed equally to the poor and middle peasants. However, we should not confiscate the land of the well-to-do peasants, that is, the wealthy middle peasants. At the same time, the party must advocate the slogan of land nationalization. The policy is to be applied when the revolutionary movement dominates the whole of China and the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship triumphs.

7) In carrying out the rural revolution in the soviet areas, we should not set up an independent trade union of farmhands. The organizations of the rural proletariat should be closely linked to the poor peasant leagues. The poor peasant league should unite the middle peasants around it and make sure that the soviet government serves the interests of the poor and middle peasants. The soviet government should be elected but the gentry, landlords, and rich peasants should be denied a vote. The party should consider the village soviet congress as the major form for organizing the peasants in the soviet areas and the peasant association should gradually be changed into the peasant congress (the soviet).

8) In economic policy in the soviet areas, the party must not adopt any radical methods which might turn the peasants against us. Currently, there should be freedom of commerce and the purchase and sale of land. In addition, we should not monopolize supply, restrict trade, or control prices in the soviet areas (except for a few items such as salt and kerosene). Whether the purchase and marketing of a certain item should be controlled depends on the request of the people in the soviet areas, military necessity, and the struggle against speculation and sabotage.

9) To improve the life of the workers in the soviet areas, we should legalize the eight-hour workday, social welfare, and the right to organize a trade union. As far as other benefits are concerned, they should be decided in accordance with the specific conditions in various areas, the progress of the revolutionary war, and the effects of the work of the trade union rather than by decrees from the soviet government.

10) In the soviet areas, actions of the party and all measures of the revolutionary organs must truly serve the interests of the peasant struggle and aim at promoting the peasant movement, consolidating soviet political power, and expanding the soviet areas. For this purpose, the party must mobilize all possible means in the soviet areas to establish a powerful Red Army and guarantee that the Red Army is absolutely under the command and the supervision of the CP. The Red Army is of great significance for the revolutionary struggle and should really become the armed force of all laboring people. Social organizations, above all, trade unions and the poor peasant leagues, must mobilize their members to join the Red Army. We should select workers with revolutionary consciousness as Red Army commanders. The Red Army should also recruit poor peasants as well as other revolutionary people in the countryside and appoint revolutionary workers as its officers. The military commanders, especially the political commissars, must be granted the nec-

essary authority, and the power of leadership should be concentrated in their hands as far as is possible.

11) In all propaganda work and mass mobilization, the party must put forward, in the name of the workers and peasants' soviet government, the following major slogans: "Distribute the land of the landlords to the peasants," "Resist the imperialists," "Confiscate foreign enterprises that disobey the laws of the Chinese soviet government," "Unify China," "Establish an independent soviet state," "Overthrow the GMD regime," "Support and expand the soviet movement throughout the country," "Establish the eight-hour workday," and "Production supervision by the workers' organizations."

12) Party actions in the soviet areas must be coordinated with our work in the rest of China. As the revolutionary high tide surges ahead, the party's major task is to establish the leadership of the proletariat. Only through this can the peasant struggle develop successfully and the revolutionary movement move to a more advanced stage. The anti-imperialist struggle should aim at eliminating the feudal-warlord system as well as the influence of the foreign capitalists in China. Foreign capital has used, supported, and assisted the feudal elements, as well as various factions of the warlords and capitalists for its own interests.

13) To establish proletarian leadership, the party must organize strikes, lead the economic struggle of the workers, combine economic interests with political demands, develop political strikes, and work out a strategy for a general political strike in a number of major industrial cities. During political strikes, apart from using slogans that oppose warlords and the GMD, we should also take into consideration the economic interests of the average workers so that we can win over even the most backward workers. The party must improve work among those yellow trade unions that have a large membership. Meanwhile, it must make every effort to consolidate the position of the red trade unions and the workers' self-defense organizations. In those places where the GMD's reactionary rule is weaker and our strength is stronger, the underground revolutionary movement should come out into the open.

[[14) The party must also promote and direct all kinds of anti-imperialist struggles.

15) The warlords' war must be transformed into a revolutionary civil war. The party must also struggle against the GMD Reorganizationists, the Third Party, and the Hu Shi faction. The nature of the reactionary scabs in the Chen Duxiu clique must be exposed. They are liquidationists in disguise.]]

16) With respect to the peasant movement outside the soviet areas, the party should set up peasant committees, peasant associations, and struggle committees to direct the peasant movement and make full use of the various kinds of social organizations founded by the peasants for the revolutionary struggle. Revolutionary propaganda work should be intensified. The recent famine and the warlords' war have provided the party with an opportunity to launch a movement to boycott taxes and levies. Moreover, we must launch a guerrilla war, consolidate the soviet

areas, and capture the weapons of the landlords and local gentry's armed forces to arm the red militia and the Young Pioneers.

[[17] It is very important for the party to improve our work among the minority nationalities.]]

18) Since the Sixth Congress, the CCP has made substantial progress in the ideological field as well as in its effort to Bolshevize its ranks. However, many other issues remain that need to be dealt with. For example, we need to resolve the organizational problem and improve our fighting capacities. In addition, it is more urgent than ever for the party to follow the Bolshevik line. Nevertheless, to adhere to the correct political line, complete our current work, and truly carry out the party's line in practice, we must fight in both theory and practice against both right opportunism and "leftist" putschism. At the present time, the rightist tendency is the most dangerous. We must fight ruthlessly against any rightist and "leftist" tendencies inside the party no matter how small they may seem. Unless we do this, we will be unable to defeat the Trotskyite-Chen Duxiu liquidationist group and to eradicate any sympathetic feelings toward them inside the party. Only by launching an uncompromising two-line struggle can the party adopt a genuine Bolshevik attitude. Thus, the party must organize all our actions and policies in accordance with the requirements of the two-line struggle.

[[19] With the current economic crisis, we must gather all our strength for the forthcoming decisive struggle.]]

In light of this, the major danger now is the right opportunist tendency which is seen in the phenomenon of tailism. A few local party organizations have been left behind by the development of the mass revolutionary movement. Their opportunism causes these party organizations to worry about the continuous growth of the anti-imperialist struggle, abandon organizing strikes, feel hesitant about attacking the leaders of the yellow trade unions, and pursue the legalization of the trade unions. Sometimes they even surrender to the leaders of the yellow trade unions when asked to give up the strikes. The right opportunists also underestimate the significance of the guerrilla warfare and support the rich peasants' demands in the soviet areas.

20) Yet because of the urgent need to develop guerrilla warfare and to organize peasant uprisings and the labor movement, the dangerous tendency of putschism and closed-doorism has also increased. This tendency is displayed by the underestimation of the initiatives of the masses. When planning insurrections, the "leftist" putschists refuse to take into consideration the strength of the people, overestimate the strength of the mutinies within the warlord armies, which are alienated from the peasant struggle, mechanically adopt the strategy of nationwide strikes, and implement economic policies in the soviet areas that are marked by a "leftist" infantile disease. The task of the party is to wage a struggle against both the rightist and the "left" tendencies, especially right opportunism, because this tendency is the greatest danger preventing smooth execution of the party's tasks.

III) The Future of the Chinese Revolution and Its Tasks

[[21) The bourgeoisie-landlord alliance has failed and will never be able to solve the problems that triggered the 1925–27 revolution. A new revolutionary high tide will rise up as the rural revolution develops under proletarian leadership.

22) Because of the failure of the 1911 Revolution and that of 1925–27, it remains our task to establish the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. It still has a bourgeois democratic nature.

23) However, the Chinese revolution is different from normal bourgeois democratic revolutions. Its participants are the workers and peasants rather than the bourgeoisie, and the revolution is not led by the bourgeoisie. Indeed, while executing the tasks of the bourgeois democratic stage, they struggle directly against the bourgeoisie. The Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution is distinctive in that once it triumphs, it will directly move to the phase of the socialist revolution. For many reasons, the bourgeois democratic revolution in China is, at the same time, an anti-imperialist revolution and a prerequisite for the proletarian dictatorship and the socialist revolution. It will take a noncapitalist road, and will gradually transform into the socialist revolution through a number of transitional phases that will pave the way both materially and economically.

24) Changes in the international environment mean that the worker-peasant revolutionary democratic dictatorship in China will be quite different from that established by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1905. There will be more transitional phases in China to reach the socialist phase than in Russia. However, it will take less time than the 1905 Russian revolution to transform from the bourgeois democratic stage to the socialist stage.

25) The international environment for the prospects of the transition of the Chinese revolution is very favorable, and the future of the socialist revolution in China is bright.

26) Domestic economic conditions also make it necessary to follow a noncapitalist road. Foreign holdings should be nationalized, properties of reactionary Chinese capitalists should be confiscated, major water projects should be nationalized, and a cooperative movement should be begun.]]

27) Yet, in the initial stage of the Chinese revolution, the possibility for capitalist development will remain. This is particularly the case in agriculture. With the elimination of the landlord and warlord systems and usurious exploitation, capitalism will certainly develop. The noncapitalist economic development of the Chinese revolution does not mean that capitalist social relations will be eradicated immediately. We will use the political power of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship and our economic strength to create favorable conditions for the development of large-scale, noncapitalist (socialist) production. In the economic struggle between socialism and capitalism, the victory of the proletariat depends not only on domestic conditions but also on the international environment. We must remember that socialism cannot be realized overnight; it will take a long time. It will be necessary to

reach a number of transitional phases to transform into the socialist stage. There are many specific measures that must be put into effect. Nevertheless, the various plans to develop socialism must be made in accordance with the desire of the broad masses of the people. We must enable the majority of the people to understand the significance of these measures. On the other hand, these measures should be decided in accordance with the economic conditions and must be feasible. China is dominated by the small-scale peasant economy. Thus, transitional measures must be linked to the interests of the majority of the peasants. We should also be fully aware of the difference of the social conditions and the organizational capability as well as the consciousness of the peasants in various areas, and the influence of the clan system and other forms. We must remember that our task is to reform the small-scale peasant economy, not to eliminate it. Therefore, when deciding the transitional measures, the proletariat should never alienate its reserve army—the broad masses of the peasantry.

28) We should advocate and carry out propaganda on the future of the socialist development. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that the Comintern's policy is different from the theories of the Trotskyite—Chen Duxiuists and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. The noncapitalist development we propose has nothing in common with the Trotskyite view that claims that the present stage of the Chinese revolution is socialist. It is Trotsky who, while making empty noises about the “leftist” socialist nature of the Chinese revolution, completely neglects the strength of the growing peasant struggle. In fact, this is Trotsky's character—he always underestimates the strength of the peasantry and its enthusiasm for the revolution. He fails to understand the task of the bourgeois democratic revolution and the process for development into the socialist stage. The central task of the Chinese revolution is the rural revolution. The revolution itself is developing in the form of a peasant war led by the proletariat. The Marxist-Leninist theory of noncapitalist development, that is, the theory of the socialist road, has nothing in common with the empty talk of Trotsky, who claims that the Chinese revolution has already entered the socialist stage. Such Trotskyite empty talk is merely a mask to cover the Menshevik-Trotskyite proposal for a “National Assembly.” Also, the Comintern's ideas differ from Dr. Sun Yat-sen's utopianism. Sun's utopianism fantasizes that the problems of capitalism can be avoided by placing some restriction on capital. The nature of Sun's theory can be understood by looking at the support it has received from the foreign capitalist countries of the world.

C.20 Resolution of the Third Plenum of the CCP on the Political Situation and the Party's General Tasks (September 1930)¹¹³

The September 1930 Decision on Acceptance of the July 1930 Resolution on the Chinese Question Adopted by the Political Secretariat of the ECCI.¹¹⁴

I) The International Situation and the Chinese Revolution

[[1] The Boom in Soviet Socialist Construction and the World Economic Crisis

The main contradiction in the world is between the increasingly prosperous construction of the socialist state and the daily weakening of the capitalist system. Thus, the imperialists are preparing to attack the Soviet Union while heading for a war among themselves. The world economic crisis has prompted counterattacks by the proletariat and the rise of revolutionary struggles in the colonies. The worldwide workers' movement and the revolutionary upsurge of the working people in colonies have already started. The latest world crisis serves only to promote further the development of civil wars in colonies, and in the Chinese revolution in particular. This situation has clearly smashed the pessimistic, liquidationist evaluation of the world revolution made by Trotskyites at home and abroad and the rightists in the party.

2) The Upsurge of the World Revolution and the Chinese Revolution

It is wrong to argue that the Chinese revolution can only achieve victory after the victory of the revolutions in the important capitalist countries. The victory of the Chinese revolution will have a great impact on the victory of the world revolution.]]

II) The Upsurge of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement

[[3] The Worsening of the Chinese Political and Economic Crises

The reactionary GMD and the warlord government have colluded closely with the bourgeoisie and the imperialist powers. The world capitalist economic crisis has caused China's economy to deteriorate, resulting in a severe crisis in industry, agriculture, and finance. The imperialists clash with one another in their attempts to divide up China. Similarly, the GMD fights among itself. This has destroyed the illusion of the so-called unification of China under the banner of the blue sky and the white sun.]]

4) The New Period of the Upsurge of the Chinese Revolutionary Movement

The development of Chinese revolutionary forces is entering a new period. The Chinese Workers and Peasants' Red Army took over Changsha and then evacuated the city.¹¹⁵ Learning the military and political lessons from the occupation, the Red Army is now concentrating and reorganizing its forces for a more effective fight against the reactionary rule. Despite the slanders and smears of the various factions

of the imperialist GMD, Chen Duxiu, Trotsky, and others, the ten-day-old soviet government in Changsha has won broad sympathy and support from the working people throughout the country and the whole world. During the first occupation of Changsha, the various Red Army forces did not coordinate their actions fully. In addition, the Red Army's attack was not properly linked with the struggle of the masses in Changsha. Third, the rear bases were not organized properly. Fourth, there were many facets of guerrilla warfare. However, the occupation of Changsha has ushered in a new period in the upsurge of the Chinese revolution. The soviet uprising in Canton in December 1927 was a "battle by retreating soldiers" from the recently failed revolution, whereas the ten-day-old soviet regime in Changsha waged a "battle by advancing soldiers" in the new revolution. It began the revolutionary war for a soviet victory nationwide. The Red Army in Jiangxi, Hubei, Guangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong further strengthened its forces during this period. New soviet areas have been established and developed. Peasant guerrilla warfare, local uprisings, and spontaneous peasant struggles are expanding. Mutinies by the soldiers from the warlord armies have increased in strength and scale, especially in those forces which have contacts with Red Army units.

The spontaneous struggles by the urban poor have often developed into large riots and movements to seize rice. Under the extremely brutal white terror, workers in the key cities have launched mass strikes and have come into armed confrontation with the police, including the police in foreign concessions and the armed forces (for example, the massive national movement and political demonstrations of Red May 1930, the August 1 Movement, the strike of water and electricity workers in Shanghai, the strike of 50,000 female silk factory workers in Shanghai, the large strike of textile workers and rickshaw workers in Qingdao, and the strike of the workers at the Yuyuan Textile Mill in Wuhan). Although the scale and force of the movements are not sufficiently large, the intensity and increasing upsurge are apparent. The opposition of ordinary workers to yellow trade unions and the GMD has become more widespread and intense. This shows that the working class has increasingly realized that the only way forward is through armed insurrections and that the GMD regime must be toppled and replaced by the soviets. This situation clearly indicates that the development of the Chinese Workers and Peasants' Red Army, the occupation of Changsha, and the beginning of the revolutionary war have proceeded against the general background of a new upsurge in China and that the soviet regime is the only banner under which all the revolutionary movements can be united.

5) The Characteristic of the Current Revolutionary Movement

The current revolutionary movement is characterized by the possibility of a transition from revolutionary actions by some workers and peasants to a general revolutionary offensive. (a) Although class struggle has not yet developed fully, it is strong enough to attack the entirety of the imperialists and the GMD's rule and it is

increasing in intensity day by day. (b) The momentum and strength of the peasant movement is developing unevenly in different localities. While in some areas peasant guerrilla warfare has just started, in others it can overthrow local GMD governments. (c) The Red Army's war has expanded into a large-scale conventional war against imperialist warlords. Revolutionary mutinies by warlord soldiers and responses to Red Army appeals are increasing day by day. Thus, to some extent, the warlords' wars are beginning to turn into revolutionary wars. (d) The gradual convergence of soviet areas should begin by establishing revolutionary regimes in various scattered regions and then moving to set up an interim central soviet government, so as to command and organize the revolutionary war and to concentrate revolutionary forces. Thus, a united revolutionary soviet regime will counter the reactionary GMD regime, lead the national revolutionary movement, and fight for the victory of the soviet regime throughout the whole country.

***[[6] GMD Massacres and Armed Intervention
in the Chinese Revolution by the Imperialists***

The GMD has launched a reign of white terror to salvage its rule. It is helped by imperialist military advisors. The imperialists are preparing to send troops to China.

***7) GMD and Liquidationist Support
for the Policy of White Terror***

The reformists in the GMD and the liquidationists have put forward the slogan of convening a National Assembly. Trotskyites throughout the world have not protested against the white terror but have done their utmost to slander the Red Army, the CCP, and the Comintern.

8) The Future Development of the Chinese Revolution

The broadest possible revolutionary forces of the masses should be mobilized to oppose the enemies of the Chinese revolution.]]

**III) The Comintern's Correct Evaluation of the
Present Situation of the Chinese Revolution**

***9) The Unanimous General Political Line
of the CC and the Comintern***

[[Recent developments have demonstrated the complete correctness of the Comintern's view as expressed in July 1930 [see **Doc. C.19**].]]

The enlarged Third Plenum of the CC acknowledges that the Politburo's line is correct and accords with that of the Comintern. In view of the upsurge of general

revolutionary movements, the party's line should be to mobilize the masses for struggle, concentrate the revolutionary forces, organize the revolutionary war, and actively prepare for armed uprisings in the fight for a nationwide soviet regime. This means that first of all the role of the party and red trade unions should be strengthened in the factories and the daily economic struggles of the proletariat should be organized and should be closely integrated with political slogans and struggles. This will enable us to mobilize and organize the greatest majority of workers in industrial cities. At the same time, the mass movements in industrial cities should be coordinated with revolutionary peasant movements and the actions of the Red Army to create the necessary condition for general strikes and armed uprisings and the consolidation and expansion of soviet areas and bases.

10) The Correction of the Past Erroneous Estimates by the CC Plenum

Yet, this Plenum holds that it must point out the ambiguities and mistakes in the recent evaluation of the current situation by the Politburo on many important issues. This primarily concerns overoptimism regarding the situation, inability to observe the uneven development of the situation, neglect of the significance of the soviet bases, and the link between the routine struggles in industrial regions and political issues. In a nutshell, the Politburo has failed to foresee fully that the forces of the workers and peasants' movement are still developing in an uneven way and are not linked up. The peasants' war still lacks adequate proletarian leadership and organization. Also, the Politburo has failed to see that the ruling class has not been completely weakened or gone bankrupt. Therefore, there is overoptimism about the situation and about the probability for the collapse of imperialist reactionary rule, about the present status of the revolutionary forces, and about the speed at which the revolutionary situation will develop. Despite the correctness of the General Line, the 11 June Politburo resolution contained these erroneous evaluations, stating that the main cause of the "failure of the workers in cities to move to an objective revolutionary situation is the repression caused by the white terror" [see **Doc. C.18**]. It overlooks the fact that the inadequate organizational role of the CCP among the masses and in the revolution is also a cause. It even stated that "so long as a great workers' struggle breaks out in industrial areas and political centers, an objective revolutionary situation will immediately be created." This estimate is ambiguous and incorrect and will lead to, and has already resulted in, tactical mistakes.

Such evaluations are not based on the full realization that (i) at the present time in the industrial centers of major cities there is insufficient mass mobilization; (ii) leadership should be further strengthened and concentrated in all soviet areas and in the development and expansion of the Red Army. Positions should be set up and consolidated to meet more brutal and large-scale decisive battles. Therefore, the Politburo's previous policy contained mistakes of adventurism,

actively preparing for the task of armed uprisings without adequate and close coordination with the task of winning over the masses. Thus, adventurous and rash arrangements for armed uprisings replaced the struggle to create realistic conditions for armed uprisings.

In order to implement thoroughly and resolutely the Comintern's and the CCP's General Line, these mistakes must be corrected immediately and completely in line with the ECCI's instruction and the necessary changes should be carried out with respect to general tactics and work.

11) Oppose a Vacillating Party Line

At the same time, this Plenum points out that correction of the Politburo's previous tactical mistakes does not imply any alteration of party line. Recently, right-wing opportunists used these few mistakes in their attempt to attack the CC's line. By holding that it is necessary to adopt conservative policies at present, they tried to distort the Comintern's line to overthrow the CC's and Comintern's general line. To sum up, the leftist evaluation of the situation holds that a national objective revolutionary situation has arrived and that arrangements for armed uprisings should be made as soon as possible. By contrast, the right-wing evaluation denies a nationwide general crisis and the general revolutionary uprising and holds that the policy of preparing for general and integrated strikes and actively getting ready for armed uprisings should be abandoned. Both viewpoints contradict the party's and the Comintern's General Line. The right-wing evaluation is tantamount to a policy of surrender and represents the view of the liquidationist spies hidden inside the party.

In the final analysis, the left-wing empty talk that "workers only want armed uprisings, but not strikes and demonstrations" and the right-wing opposition to political struggles and to the creation of necessary conditions for armed uprisings are two tendencies that hamper the winning over of the broad masses and the initiation and direction of resolute struggles.

The party should wage steadfast struggles against left-wing empty talk about general strikes and armed uprisings, while neglecting routine mass work in the factories and the immediate and daily demands of the masses. The party should also oppose right opportunism that only takes note of economic struggles, denies the close link between economic and political struggles, and makes no effort to create the necessary conditions for general strikes and armed uprisings. At present, the main danger is right opportunism.

IV) The Main Tasks of the CCP

[[Points 12, 13, 14, and 15 outline the tasks put forward in the Comintern's July 1930 resolution. For occupying one or several industrial centers, the Plenum adds that the situation is ripest in the Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi areas.]]

16) The Relationship Between Gaining Mass Support and Actively Preparing for Armed Uprisings

[[No struggle no matter how small should be neglected, but this should not detract from the work of preparing for armed uprisings but rather should be used to strengthen it.

17) The Expansion and Preparation of Armed Revolutionary Forces

Attention should be paid to building up the workers' military organization and peasant armed forces. Army mutinies should be used to weaken the reactionary armies. Proletarian leadership must be strengthened in all these efforts.

18) The Relationship Between the Tasks of the Soviet Areas and the Areas under Reactionary Rule

Work in the reactionary-ruled areas must be coordinated with that in the soviet areas and should not be allowed to conflict with it.]]

19) The Movement to Prepare for the National Soviet Congress

The general struggle of workers, peasants, soldiers, and poor people throughout the country, and the policies of the soviet areas and the Red Army's war must be synchronized, organized, guided, and appropriately linked and coordinated. Therefore, the party's immediate concrete task is to lead activities to prepare for the First National Congress of the extremely broad-based Congress of Chinese Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers (the soviets). It is essential to be able to link effectively and closely the liberation movement of workers and peasants in China's big cities and areas ruled by reactionaries and their daily struggle with activities to prepare for the Congress of Soviets. Furthermore, the broadest-based masses from the various soviet areas should be mobilized to participate in preparations for the Congress. Thus, the National Soviet Congress and the interim Central Soviet Government of Workers and Peasants that will emerge from the Congress will genuinely be supported by the fighting working people of the country.

20) The Main Policy Guidelines for the Soviet Government

[[Both within China and abroad, a wide-ranging movement should be launched to support the Congress of Soviets. Unity with the Soviet Union is especially important.

21) The Party's Organizational Tasks

These tasks require the party to increase its subjective force by expanding its proletarian base. Party members must also be recruited from among rural laborers. Revo-

lutionary mass organizations should be expanded and party leadership in them must be strengthened. Nonparty mass organizations must be expanded to enable the party to develop and consolidate its influence among the broad masses.]]

In the future, one of the party's essential organizational tasks should be to expand systematically the base of the red trade unions to enable them to become genuine mass organizations. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Shanghai Trade Union Association, and all trade unions at the provincial level and trade unions of various industries must become organizations with fighting strength. New trade union cadres should be selected from among the best and most active workers in factories, and especially from among the most active participants in strikes and various forms of struggle. The tendency to worry about and distrust nonparty proletarian elements working in leading organs should be eliminated. Party branches and fractions, especially in factories and unions, should unite the many selected proletarian cadres around them.

Party organizations and trade unions should pay special attention to the working women's movement, and the women factory workers' movement in particular. Party and [Youth] League headquarters at all levels and the entire leading body of the trade unions, including all branches and every trade union grass-roots organization, must be responsible for the active promotion of women's work.

The party should not accept the present grave crisis that plagues the YL. Work among young laborers is extremely weak. The percentage of workers among the league members is even smaller than that among party members. Although mass organizations for youths exist in the soviet areas, they are in serious need of the league's correct leadership. The party must drastically accelerate its efforts to increase its political and organizational leadership over the YL and strengthen its opposition to the main danger of rightism and to left-wing empty talk and exclusivism, which hamper real changes in its work. The changes instructed by the International YL should be effectively implemented, and the league's work should be done by young people. It is especially important to oppose the tendency within the party to neglect youth work. The Politburo's resolution on "general administrative committees" had the effect of abolishing league organizations. This mistake was only recently corrected. The mistake has increased the tendency to abolish the YL. Therefore, it is of special importance to oppose resolutely this serious danger. Meanwhile, the struggle should be intensified to combat the "second party tendency" of the advanced members as a result of this recent mistake.

22) The Policy of a Grass-Roots United Front

[[The GMD Reorganizationists, the Chen Duxiu--Trotskyite liquidationists, and the so-called third party have used clever means to hoodwink the masses in order to maintain the rule of the reactionaries.]]

These political factions and saboteurs of the revolution have been hiding but are active in the soviet areas. Their activities, especially in areas ruled by reactionaries,

have been successful in deceiving the backward masses. At the least they cause a temporary hesitance, lack of organization, and confusion among the masses. Thus, the CP's task is to step up the struggle against these factions and elements in order to gain leadership over the spontaneous mass movements. It is essential to disarm them politically. This requires implementation of the tactic of a "grass-roots mass united front." The CP should unite with all non-CP and grass-roots masses in all struggles, especially in their daily struggles, and exercise leadership over their movements independently, so that all these movements can develop under the general slogan of the soviet regime. Thus, the course of struggle will expose the reactionary role and the true color of the factions, the deception, manipulation, selling out, and oppression of the masses by the leaders of yellow trade unions.

23) The Transformation of the Revolutionary Struggle against Sun Yat-senism and Trotskyism

The trend of Chinese revolutionary developments is characterized by the speed and depth of the development of the struggles. Therefore, the ECCI has especially pointed out the current tasks for the Chinese revolution and the question of the future of the road of socialist development. In recent resolutions, the Politburo has stated that on the question of transforming the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution the argument of "two totally separate revolutions" and of "the beginning of the revolutionary victory being the socialist revolution" are erroneous. Though this statement is correct, it is not based on a clear perception of who are our own masses, and it is arbitrary to say that "victory in one or several provinces would necessarily lead to the beginning of a revolutionary transformation." The party must correct these mistakes in line with the detailed instructions of the Comintern's July [June] resolution. It should point out more clearly and precisely and explain that the current state of the Chinese revolution is a democratic one and that the prospect for victory lies with socialist development. Furthermore, it is necessary to step up the struggle against Sun Yat-senism and Trotskyism on this issue.

V) The Struggle on Two Fronts Against Leftist and Rightist Tendencies

24) Self-Criticism and the Struggle Against Various Tendencies

At present, the party must take on the heavy task of organizing the revolutionary war, that is, the active preparation of armed uprisings. It should increase its own fighting power organizationally, oppose the influence of all reactionary factions among the masses, and win over the broad masses. In order to implement these tasks, the party must examine its work effectively and carry out Bolshevik self-criticism in accordance with the July [June] resolution of the Political Secretariat of the ECCI and the resolu-

tions of the current Plenum. From the Party Center to the branches, the Comintern and the party's line should be used to review and criticize mistakes in tactics and organizational work. These and other shortcomings must be firmly corrected. The whole party should understand the nature of these mistakes and draw lessons from them. Moreover, it is imperative to guard against reconciliationist and non-Bolshevik "free criticism" that deviate from the party line and against criticisms that go so far as to attack the party line. Under the present circumstances, the party should, more than at any other time, ensure ideological and Bolshevik unity and wage a struggle on two fronts against leftist and rightist tendencies and reconciliationism.

25) "Left-Wing" Mistakes

The need to lead strikes and work resolutely to develop the link between the peasant guerrilla warfare and local uprisings has given rise to adventurism and mistakes of closed-doorism [*guanmen zhuyi*]. This is in addition to the main crisis caused by right opportunism. The former mistakes are characterized by failure to win over the masses, inability to estimate the strength of the masses, operational plans that are divorced from the masses, etc. Some comrades have proposed slogans such as "ignore yellow trade unions," "expel all who are not farmhands from the party," "kill all rich peasants," "lead only poor peasants possessing less than ten *mu* of land in resisting taxation and rent." Under such circumstances, the leadership of the daily struggles of the masses has already been abandoned, and the organizational consolidation of the party's influence and mass organizations has been neglected. Some have even used the pretext that "the masses want only uprisings, but no strikes, and only major initiatives, not minor ones." In fact, they are engaging in extremely harmful opportunist passivism. Such sentiments among the masses show sufficiently that the masses' hatred of the GMD has increased and that the organization of their forces should be strengthened. To abandon the leadership of the daily struggle of the masses because of such sentiments is the same as waiting for uprisings. Furthermore, such "left-wing" sentiments often result in superficial "resolute offensives" in the revolutionary war but in reality lead to "fighting without protecting the rear." In the soviet areas, these sentiments would make it difficult to adopt policies to deal with the imperialists properly. Naive "left-wing" policies that are divorced from the peasant masses would be adopted. There could be opposition to rich peasants without unity with the middle peasants. Generally speaking, it would not be possible to disarm politically the reorganizationists, liquidationists, and yellow trade unions, and the tactic of a grass-roots united front could be opposed.

The "left-wing" mistakes result mainly from the emphasis by the advanced elements on their feelings, to the neglect of the down-to-earth and hard work of winning over the masses. Therefore, they make the mistakes of being divorced from the masses and of petty bourgeois radicalism. Left-wing mistakes in fact consolidate

the position of right opportunism. Thus, it is necessary to oppose resolutely all forms of leftist tendencies and to reject any kind of reconciliationist attitude.

26) The Main Danger of Rightist Tendencies and Reconciliationism

Meanwhile, the party must use the struggles to prepare and gather forces for the decisive battle in the near future and to launch bravely and lead independently the revolutionary struggle by tens of millions of people. Under these conditions of struggle, the main danger inside the party is right opportunism.

In the present situation, the most serious danger is actually lagging behind the mass struggle, or tailism. Some comrades argue that "the masses are right wing and backward" and have used that argument to cover up their own reluctance to work. The actual theoretical manifestation of such right opportunism is the argument for the legitimacy of trade unions (surrendering to yellow trade unions and the yellow tendency of abandoning independent leadership), the rich peasant line in the countryside (obstructing the land revolution, proposing conservative and peaceful development, abandoning the masses to the influence of rich peasants, etc.), contempt for the peasant war, fear of "excessive" development of the anti-imperialist movement, etc. Apart from such manifestations, there is a still more serious phenomenon of forming a complete rightist line, in an effort to urge comrades to oppose the party line. The rightist line takes the following forms: (i) By arguing that "international proletarian assistance to the Chinese revolution" are empty words and that the "planes and artillery of the imperialists are tangible forces," it indicates that victory of the revolutionary war is hopeless. (ii) It points out that workers in cities have not waged revolutionary struggles, that there is no possibility of a general strike, and that it is only possible to wage small-scale, day-to-day economic struggles at present. (iii) It states that the peasant struggle cannot become a major force without the revolutionary struggle of the workers and that the war waged by peasants comprises "tribal uprisings" (the occupation of Changsha has absolutely no future). (iv) It uses the pretext of uneven development to deny the general worldwide crisis and the widespread revolutionary high tide (rejecting the existence of the "third period") and to refuse to acknowledge the nationwide political and economic crisis in China and the general revolutionary upsurge. (v) Therefore, it believes that it is unnecessary to have an overall guideline for the organization of revolutionary wars and active preparation for armed uprisings. It fundamentally denies the achievements of the party and promotes pessimism, advocating avoidance of violent struggles and peaceful development of "subjective strength." It argues that everything has to wait until red trade unions have organized the majority of workers. (vi) It spreads rumors and discord inside the party by alleging that internally the party has adopted a delegate system and that "comrades are afraid to speak out." It promotes and instigates unprincipled factional struggles. Obviously, this line counters the party's entire line, thus also opposing that of the Comintern. However, taking advantage of the Politburo's few tactical and organizational mistakes, these rightists have not only manufactured rumors, smears, and dis-

cord and engaged in factional activities, but also have publicized that the CC's line differs from that of the Comintern. Employing diplomatic methods, in fact they oppose the line of both the Comintern and the party under the cover of "supporting" the Comintern's line. The leaders of these elements have always been against the Party Center since the earlier stage of the struggle against Chen Duxiu and the dispute on the question of Jiangsu before the Second Plenum.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, when the party criticizes and punishes these rightists, some comrades still entertain reconciliationist attitudes, arguing that the rightist line has not been formulated completely, that it may be necessary to repudiate rightism ideologically, but that there is no need to punish them organizationally. They only affirm that the Party Center and the Comintern have differences, but refuse to respond to the smear of the Party Center by the rightists. In sum, the characteristic of reconciliationism is to submit to the Party Center in terms of the organizational system, but to reserve ideological freedom and freedom of discussion, even though this might shake the party's line.

The reconciliationists have always been those comrades who have factional and small group tendencies. Now they are in fact hindering the party's struggle against rightism. If they refuse to abandon their hidden opportunist positions, sooner or later they will openly embark on the opportunist road.

The party must reject reconciliationism. Then it will be able to overcome ruthlessly the main danger of right opportunism and triumph over the petty bourgeois wavering and the mentality of foremen and rich peasants. If these comrades refuse to correct their mistakes and persist in them, the party must eliminate them. Viewed objectively, these rightists who have formed a complete line must be no other than liquidationist spies hidden inside the party.

27) The Party's Struggle on Two Fronts and the Implementation of the Revolutionary Tasks

The enlarged Third Plenum of the CCP CC unanimously holds that the last corrections and instructions from the ECCI concerning the Politburo are entirely correct. To implement these instructions and the Comintern's July [June] resolution in order to correct past tactical organizational mistakes and other mistakes in our work, to implement the Comintern's line more resolutely, and to fulfill the present heavy revolutionary tasks, it is essential to carry out steadfastly the struggle on two fronts and oppose leftism, rightism, and accommodationism, while concentrating fire on the main danger of rightism. The party's task on this question is to intensify simultaneously the struggle on two fronts with special emphasis on opposing rightism, because rightism is the main menace to the implementation of the party's current important tasks.

Notes: Since the Sixth Congress, the Politburo has basically used the phrases "revolutionary upsurge" and "direct revolutionary situation" synonymously. Syntac-

tically, the phrases “high tide” and “upsurge” are easily used interchangeably. However, the substantive meanings of “direct revolutionary situation” (or what the Comintern’s latest resolution calls the “objective situation”) and “upsurge” are very different. So the phrase “high tide” should be eliminated.

1) When referring to a general situation of flourishing and booming revolutionary movements, only use the word “upsurge.”

2) When referring to a situation of armed uprisings directly attacking the rule of the ruling class, Lenin’s phrase “objective revolutionary situation” should be used. The phrase “high tide” will not be used in the future. Comrade Manuisky¹¹⁷ recently explained that “direct revolutionary situation” has been used by Zinoviev and it might not be entirely appropriate.

C.21 Resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP (December 1930)¹¹⁸

1) In its July [June] 1930 resolution and previous resolutions the Comintern pointed out clearly that the CCP’s mission was to organize the revolutionary masses and to mobilize the revolutionary forces to wage attacks on the imperialists, the feudal system, and the GMD reactionaries. However, just at the critical moment when the revolution was surging ahead, the CCP leadership, dominated by Comrade Li Lisan’s line, ignored all the Comintern’s instructions and adopted an adventurist-putschist and anti-Comintern policy. People have all now realized that Comrade Li Lisan’s anti-Comintern line has brought enormous damage to the party. It is impossible, however, to analyze here all the disasters caused by Comrade Lisan’s anti-Leninist and adventurist line. The Fourth Plenum can point out only the most evil outcome of the Lisan line: the party’s influence on the masses and its relationship with the working people have been greatly weakened, its ability to mobilize the masses has been seriously damaged, the actions of all mass organizations have been reduced, and our labor movement has met setbacks. As far as our capability to lead and organize strikes is concerned, it has been greatly weakened rather than strengthened. Under the leadership of the Lisan line, the party did not do its best under the conditions of a revolutionary high tide to consolidate itself, the YL, and the mass organizations, but rather has liquidated the mass organizations and the YL, and sapped the party’s strength. In addition, Comrade Lisan put those comrades who supported the Comintern line under great pressure, thus creating a very abnormal state for party life. The general deterioration and the weakening of our party in various aspects have provided both the Trotskyite–Chen Duxiust group and the rightist faction with the opportunity to carry out their activities. Meanwhile, the Lisan line launched quite a number of rash uprisings based on purely putschist methods without the necessary preparations. As a result, our party lost prestige

among the masses, our best cadres were killed, and our party organizations were wiped out in the most important areas of the country. The urgent task of expanding the anti-imperialist movement was totally abandoned. The party's task of leadership outside of the soviet areas, of developing and gradually intensifying the struggle of the peasant masses in order to bring them to a level where they could provide direct assistance to the soviet movement has been completely abandoned. Finally, as a result of Comrade Lisan's policy, the same stupid mistake was repeated in the soviet areas, which seriously damaged the work to consolidate and develop the Red Army. The party issued premature, adventurist, and dogmatic orders to the Red Army to attack the large cities at a time when we had not yet consolidated the base areas or made any necessary preparations, and our forces were not strong and had not acquired the support of the people. Our failure in Changsha was a direct outcome of such an erroneous strategy. Concerning our work in the soviet areas, party leaders neither firmly opposed Comrade Lisan's theory of an alliance with the rich peasants nor did any work to organize the poor peasant associations and the unions of the farmhands and the coolies. Owing to the influence of the Lisan line and the negligence of the local party organizations, the rich peasants were able to penetrate our leading bodies and appropriate the fruits of the rural revolution for their own ends. The theory of collective farms and all other premature socialist ideas advocated by Li Lisan helped strengthen the position of the rich peasants. The policies of forbidding free trade and the buying and selling of land caused a further deterioration in the economy of the soviet areas. These errors destroyed our alliance with the middle peasants and dampened the enthusiastic participation of the majority of the peasants in the soviet movement. Li Lisan's leadership totally overlooked the necessity of consolidating the soviet base areas and establishing a powerful soviet government. Considering guerrilla warfare outdated, the party leadership ordered the Red Army to abandon it. As a result, our position has been greatly weakened during the current attacks by the warlords on the soviet areas. These are the major reasons why the Red Army has suffered serious defeats recently. Meanwhile, there has been a failure to carry out the work to expand the soviet movement; this is especially apparent with work to prepare the convening of the soviet Congress [31 May 1930].

Summing up the evil outcome of the Lisan line, the enlarged Fourth Plenum wants to make it particularly clear that during the period from the Sixth Congress [July–September 1928] until June 1930, although the CC made quite a few mistakes on the issues of rich peasants, the yellow unions, and the reorganization movement, under the correct General Line our party achieved great success. Nevertheless, much of the success was spoiled as a result of the Lisan line.

2) Comrade Lisan's errors were by no means isolated or accidental but were the product of a consistently and systematically anti-Leninist line embodying many incorrect ideas. In essence, these incorrect ideas were a repetition of Trotsky's theory. The Lisan line denied the uneven development of the world revolution at the general climax of the [Chinese] revolution. Thus, it dismissed the possibility of

separate victory and consolidation of the Chinese revolution. The Lisan line also completely failed to understand the nature and stages of the Chinese revolution. It replaced Lenin's theory that there must be a transitional period of the revolution with Trotsky's point of view that denies the bourgeois democratic stage in the development of the revolution. This demonstrates that Li Lisan did not understand at all the tasks of the present stage of the Chinese revolution. He denied the uneven development of the revolution in China and ignored the special features of the Chinese political and economic environment. Thus, the Lisan line denied the possibility of winning victory in one or several provinces first. Moreover, it completely failed to understand the party's role as an organizer of the revolution and the correct relationship between the communist vanguards and the masses of workers and peasants. It not only distorted but also rejected the Marxist-Leninist theory of an armed uprising, and thus provided the theoretical basis for the adventurist and putschist line and led the party onto that road. This is shown clearly in Lisan's statement that "Workers prefer insurrections to strikes." All in all, the Lisan line absolutely contradicted the Comintern line and was essentially an opportunist viewpoint camouflaged by "leftist" words. Its attitude toward the revolutionary task of organizing the masses was one of opportunist passivism. Historically, the Lisan line originated from the opportunism and putschism formed at the Sixth Congress and that still remain in the party even today. Relying on this absolutely erroneous line, Comrade Lisan waged a struggle against the Comintern and disobeyed the Comintern's discipline. With the help of the theory of the "leftist" and rightist traitors of the Comintern, he claimed that the Comintern was not in a position to lead the Chinese revolution because of its ignorance of the situation in China.

The Fourth Plenum firmly condemns the anti-Leninist line of the Politburo from June to August 1930 and its unbearably hostile attitude toward the Comintern. The Plenum firmly points out that the serious setbacks suffered by our party at present are all caused by Comrade Lisan and his supporters because they ignored the instructions and warnings of the ECCI. The Fourth Plenum also points out that the credit for the correction of all these mistakes belongs to the Comintern.

3) The Comintern has asked our party to expose fully Comrade Lisan's "theory" and eliminate completely the effects of all his anti-Comintern policies. At present, the imperialists and the GMD warlords have launched offensives against the soviet areas. This makes it all the more urgent for the party to eradicate the semi-Trotskyite Lisan line and to follow the Comintern's instructions and resolutions. Judging the Third Plenum [September 1930] in this light, the present Enlarged Fourth Plenum finds that the Third Plenum did not fulfill this task. The political resolution and other relevant documents of the Third Plenum all reveal this fact. (a) The political resolution of the Third Plenum only mentioned very briefly and mildly a few isolated mistakes of Comrade Lisan and said nothing about the nature of the Lisan line [**Doc. C.20**]. This is a serious error since the Lisan line was absolutely wrong and conflicted with the Comintern's line. (b) This resolution made a positive assessment of the notorious 11 June resolution [**Doc. C.18**] despite the fact that it was signifi-

cantly opposed to the program of the Comintern. (c) The political resolution of the Third Plenum also affirmed positively the political line and work of the Politburo between June and August 1930 while in reality the Politburo during this period was dominated by the semi-Trotskyite Lisan line. (d) Because of its wrong attitude toward the Lisan line and its reconciliationist stand, the political resolution and other relevant documents of the Third Plenum contained many incorrect ideas.

The resolutions passed by the Third Plenum demonstrate that the party leadership at that time had not yet realized the erroneous essence of the Lisan policy or understood that such a policy was contradictory in principle to the only correct line of the Comintern. In light of this background, it is not surprising that the resolution did not make any thorough change in the party's General Line. Nor could it serve as an ideological weapon for the party to expose and overcome Comrade Lisan's incorrect theory.

The other relevant documents of the Third Plenum had even more serious problems. They blurred Comintern instructions that asked the CCP to abandon its erroneous line. For example: (a) the Third Plenum's "Letter to All Comrades" further modified the wording of the political resolution.¹¹⁹ As a result, the broad masses of party members knew nothing at all about the difference between the Comintern line and the semi-Trotskyite Lisan line. (b) Comrade [Qu] Qiubai's article "The Significance of the Third Plenum," published together with the resolutions of the Third Plenum in the first issue of the *True Words* [Shihua], did not mention one word about Lisan's mistakes or about his adventurist line.¹²⁰ (c) The CC's announcement after the Third Plenum did not expose Comrade Lisan's mistakes. On the contrary, it tried to construe the Lisan line as correct and in line with the Comintern's resolutions on the China question. Guided by the general reconciliationist line of the Third Plenum, there was no significant improvement in the work of the local party organizations in various areas. During this period, the Northern Bureau, the Southern Bureau, the Jiangnan [Jiangsu] Provincial Committee, and some other local party organizations all passed incorrect resolutions.

The Enlarged Fourth Plenum has also pointed out that the party leadership adopted an unbearably arrogant attitude toward the Comintern's representative [Mif]. The Politburo leaders had agreed with the Comintern's representative beforehand to revise the wording of the Political Resolution of the Third Plenum to include a critical evaluation of the Lisan line and of the Politburo's work between June and August [1930], but they did not include the revision in the final version or even inform the Comintern's representative of this decision. Therefore, the Comintern's representative was not able to correct in time the reconciliationist attitude of the Politburo toward the Lisan line. The Fourth Plenum denounces this reconciliationist stand of the Third Plenum, which accepted the leadership of the Comintern only in word and paid no respect to the Comintern's representative. Comrade [Qu] Qiubai bears the major responsibility for this problem.

4) The Politburo's supplementary resolution of 25 November [1930] (and that of 9 December) were in complete agreement with the recent letter from the Comintern

[16 November 1930].¹²¹ It criticized the reconciliationist line of the Third Plenum and made a correct evaluation of the work of the Politburo between June and August. It exposed the anti-Comintern and anti-Leninist nature of the Lisan line, thus moving one step closer to the Comintern's position. However, since the second article of the resolution claimed that the Third Plenum had generally accepted the Comintern line, its significance was lost and its political influence greatly reduced.

Circular No. 96 [of the CC] corrected the mistakes of the Politburo and those of the 25 November resolution.¹²² Nevertheless, the circular still contained a number of problems. It did not declare the bankruptcy of the Lisan line but claimed that the party was in crisis. This was not true because by then the party was overcoming Lisanism and was making progress to perfect itself. In addition, the circular maintained that the struggle against the Lisan line was a struggle on two fronts. This analysis reflects a misunderstanding of the struggle on two fronts. True, Lisanism used leftist terms to cover up its actual right opportunism. But the struggle against the Lisan line by no means covers all the two-front struggle. The right opportunists can and have already found other people to represent them (such as Guo Miaogen and his like). In this sense, although it is of vital significance to oppose the putschist elements in the Lisan line, we must never forget that right opportunism is still the most serious danger in the party. We must bear in mind that we should fight against not only putschism but also right opportunism and conciliationism. Only by defeating all these dangerous tendencies can we keep to the Comintern line and develop the revolutionary struggle. Yet none of these views was mentioned in Circular No. 96. This disarmed the party in the struggle against the rightists. These rightists are very active in distorting the Comintern line under the false banner of anti-Lisanism, carrying on a struggle against the Lisan line on rightist grounds, denying the danger of a rightist tendency, blurring the necessity of an antirightist struggle, and attempting to mislead some local party organizations to adopt wrong methods in the struggle against Lisanism. For example: they deny the urgent need for the party to concentrate on practical work, demand ultrademocracy, put forward arbitrary slogans such as the unconditional replacement of the entire CC and all leading comrades who have made mistakes, attempt to change the fight of principle into factional and personal struggles, and refuse to make self-criticism, etc. Circular No. 96 also claimed that the Politburo continued to strengthen the Lisan line until very recently. Indeed, because of its wavering stand after the Third Plenum, the CC was unable to lead the struggle against the Lisan line. However, the explanation offered in Circular No. 96 regarding the process of the shift to the Comintern line by the CC is an incorrect one. This has made the CC's task more difficult in leading the party to carry out the struggle against the Lisan line both in the theoretical and practical spheres.

5) The Enlarged Fourth Plenum completely agrees with the recent letter from the Comintern. In order to implement all the instructions of the Comintern, the Fourth Plenum has decided to put forward the following urgent tasks for the whole party:

a) To overcome the Lisan line and reconciliationism toward it both in theory and

in practice. The Fourth Plenum emphasizes that to carry out this task we must implement all Comintern instructions and that party work as a whole must undergo a sweeping change. We should not confine ourselves merely to verbal struggles against Lisanism. The Fourth Plenum calls on the whole party to unite to carry out resolutely the many important and urgent tasks confronting it.

To realize this aim, the Enlarged Fourth Plenum deems it necessary to dismiss from the CC those members who followed Comrade Lisan and were belatedly added to the CC at the Third Plenum. We should add to the CC some comrades who have supported the Comintern line in the anti-Lisan struggle and reexamine the membership of the Politburo so as to secure a correct leadership for the party.

b) The key aspect of our current task is to effect a shift in the party's work to carry out a struggle against opportunism, against passivism, and against those people who are in low spirits because they are both the source and the followers of the various antiparty tendencies and prejudices.

c) To revive the organizations of the party and the YL that have been destroyed; to improve our work in the mass organizations, especially the trade unions. We should make a special effort to improve our work in factories and consolidate as well as strengthen the activities of the party branches there. Our party must use all means to wage open struggle and to develop and strengthen our leadership of the anti-imperialist movement.

d) To recruit new cadres, particularly the more active elements among the workers; to assume leadership in the party.

e) To mobilize all our strength to resist the imperialist and the GMD warlords' attacks on the soviet areas, to convene the soviet Delegates' Congress, and to organize the working class and the peasants to struggle against the enemy's attempt to invade the Soviet Union. This is a most important task.

f) The Enlarged Fourth Plenum authorizes the new Politburo on the basis of this resolution to issue instructions and tasks for the various local party organizations so as to replace the resolutions of the Third Plenum.

g) The Fourth Plenum finds that it is necessary to convene the party's Seventh National Congress [not actually convened until April 1945] and authorizes the new Politburo to begin preparations in order to guarantee that we can have qualified delegates from local party organizations, a well-prepared summary of the experiences of the soviet movement, and a new party Constitution and other documents.

h) The Fourth Plenum points out that the Third Plenum of the YL was influenced by the reconciliationist line of the party's Third Plenum. This was reflected in its resolutions. The CC of the YL did not correct this pro-Lisan attitude until recently and failed to carry out the line of the Youth International in its work. The Fourth Plenum considers that it was absolutely right for the Politburo to reorganize the CC of the YL. After its reorganization, the YL has worked in accordance with the Comintern line. The Fourth Plenum approves the decision to hold the Fourth Plenum of the CC of the YL.

i) In line with the Comintern's instructions, the Fourth Plenum has readjusted the

party's political line, solved the problems inside the party, and reorganized the party's leadership in order to make sure that the party's new political line can be carried out. The Fourth Plenum believes that from now on the whole party will unite as one person to overcome all the difficulties with the Bolshevik spirit and carry out our present historic mission. This promises new successes for the party and guarantees that the Chinese revolution will continue to surge ahead and that the struggle of the working people will win a new victory.

C.22 Program for an Emergency Session to Oppose the Report of the Fourth Plenum (January 1931)¹²³

Fight to eradicate completely the [Li] Lisan line and reconciliationism and to implement resolutely the Comintern line!

The tasks of our Chinese proletarian political party have increased with the rapid development of the Chinese revolution. Unfortunately, just at this critical moment, the Lisan line carried out by the Party Center deviated in essence from Marxism-Leninism and from the Comintern line and has caused a great failure and a tremendous loss to the revolution.

To rectify the party's leadership to bring about the rapid victory of the Chinese revolution led by the proletariat, all party members should adhere to Bolshevik principles and fight against the nonproletarian Lisan line and its followers. During this protracted struggle, however, we have encountered strong resistance and have been confronted with their various shameless deceits and slanders. Our Emergency Session has been sabotaged by them. Since the convening of the Fourth Plenum, the Party Center dominated by the Lisan line has betrayed our class interests even more wantonly. As a result, our task of carrying out the correct Comintern line and of fighting for the victory of the proletarian revolution has become more difficult!

Therefore, with a strong sense of responsibility, all Bolsheviks should now unite as one to fight resolutely and bravely to remove the Lisan line as well as reconciliationism and to implement the Comintern line!

I) The Anti-Marxism-Leninism-Comintern Lisan Line Has Met With Total Failure

The Lisan line of the CC opposed Marxism-Leninism and the Comintern. It has created serious setbacks and caused inestimable losses to the party and the revolution, thus proving a total failure of leadership. (For the Lisan line's essence, its historical origins, and its disastrous effects on the party and the Chinese revolution, please consult other dispatched materials. We will not repeat this here.)

II) The Reconciliationism Adopted by the Third Plenum Is Even More Dangerous Than the Lisan Line

The erroneous Lisan line of the CC has been criticized by the Comintern and has encountered resistance from our comrades. However, initially they adopted a stubborn and hostile attitude toward the Comintern's criticism and used punishment of a patriarchal style to suppress criticism and self-criticism inside the party. Later, when the Comintern's Resolution on China arrived in July [June] 1930 [**Doc. C.19**], they convened the Third Plenum, at which they deviously blurred the two fundamentally different lines (the correct Comintern line and the erroneous CC's Lisan line), obstinately claimed that they had kept to the Comintern line, and denied the existence of the Lisan line. They insisted that the CC's erroneous 11 June Resolution [**Doc. C.18**] was correct, and under the guidance of the Lisan line they also held an extra election at the Plenum for the CC and the Politburo. In this sense, the Third Plenum openly continued the Lisan line and fought more desperately against the anti-Lisan line movement inside the party. The Third Plenum's reconciliationism further intensified the development of the Lisan line, expanded and extended its evil consequences, and delayed the implementation of the Comintern line for as long as six months. Thus, it caused greater losses to the party and the revolution and was even more dangerous than the Lisan line.

III) Since the Third Plenum, the CC Has Systematically Repeated Many Errors and Continued the Lisan Line in Opposition to That of the Comintern

After the Third Plenum, the Comintern sent a long letter. At that time, throughout the party there was a struggle against the Lisan line and reconciliationism. They tried to suppress the anti-Lisan line movement and sowed dissension and spread rumors among those who actively opposed the Lisan line. Nevertheless, their attempts failed. Under pressure from the broad masses of party members, they had to revise the resolution of the Third Plenum, although the various supplements turned out to be even more shameless. In the decision of 25 November, they claimed that "the Third Plenum in general [has] followed the Comintern line." Meanwhile, they banned discussion of the Lisan line and decided that the Comintern's letter and the supplement of 25 November could only be relayed to the local party branches. In Supplement No. 9 [9 December] they tried to cover up the greater danger of reconciliationism. In Circular No. 96, they pushed reconciliationism and only made a superficial confession that the Lisan line was incorrect and that they would accept the correct Comintern line.¹²⁴ Although Politburo mistakes were admitted, they completely ignored to mention specific measures for fighting against the Lisan line and how to implement the Comintern line, and they omitted the main instructions on various urgent tasks contained in the Comintern letter (such as the establishment of the soviet government, the present political situation, and the party's tasks). At

the same time, their analysis of the origins of the Lisan line was far from adequate (considering it merely the remains of putschism), and their estimate of its harm to the party and the revolution was extremely insufficient and unclear. Moreover, they thought that criticism of the Lisan line entailed a rightist deviation in the two-line struggle and would weaken the attack on the major threat inside the party—the rightist tendency. In short, since the Third Plenum the Party Center has persisted in implementing the Lisan line, systematically repeated many errors, and had no real intention of accepting the Comintern line.

IV) The Emergency Session Is a Necessary Step to Implement the Comintern's Line, to Establish the Party's Correct Leadership, and to Guarantee the Victory of the Chinese Revolution Led by the Party

The Lisan line has completely failed, while the reconciliationist line has deepened the crisis inside the party and brought even greater losses to the revolution. This demonstrates that the Party Center is incapable of leading the revolution and lacks loyalty to the proletariat. (The report of the Politburo at the Fourth Plenum openly admitted that the CC was conscious of its opposition to the Comintern.) The CC has completely lost prestige, and its leadership has turned out to be a total failure both politically and organizationally. Ordinary party members do not want revision of the resolution of the Third Plenum, but the total abolition of it as well as of its various supplements. They unanimously support the Comintern representative's demand that the Comintern revoke the Politburo's power immediately and organize those members who oppose the Lisan line and reconciliationism into a provisional central organ to convene an Emergency Session to solve thoroughly all the political and organizational problems of the party.

The Emergency Session is of great political significance and is a request voiced by the broad masses of party members. Its purpose is to change the party's erroneous leadership and to restore the correct line. Below are our suggestions for the Emergency Session:

1. The nonvoting delegates at the Emergency Session must consist mainly of the party cadres and cadres of the mass organizations who strongly oppose the Lisan line.
2. The Emergency Session must unreservedly accept and firmly implement the Comintern line.
3. It must abolish the resolutions and the elections of the Third Plenum.
4. It must analyze appropriately the perniciousness of the Lisan line and reconciliationism and eliminate thoroughly their influence.

5. Under the guidance of the Comintern's July [June] resolution and its recent letter, the session must assess the party's general task, and compile resolutions on the problems of the party's organization, the labor movement, the peasant movement, land reform, and the soviet government. (The correct views on these problems are contained in various documents criticizing the Lisan line. They will soon be sorted out and put forward.)
6. Completely reorganize the Politburo.
7. Set the date for the party's Seventh National Congress. There are some urgent tasks concerning convening the Seventh Congress, including the immediate restoration of democracy inside the party, implementing Bolshevik self-criticism, and issuing anti-(Lisan line resolutions and documents).
8. Enforce iron discipline and punish the leading members of the Party Center who have systematically and resolutely carried out the Lisan line and reconciliationism.

V) Strive for Convening of Emergency Session

The call for the Emergency Session has won great support from the broad masses of party members, particularly from the party's local organizations, as well as our comrades working in trade unions and other mass organizations. They have spontaneously waged a ruthless struggle against the Lisan line and reconciliationism. As far as we know, they include some members of the CC, the party group of the ACFTU, the party group of the All-China Sailors' Union, the party group of the Shanghai Labor Federation, the party group of the Shanghai Anti-Imperialist Alliance, the Delegation of the Soviet Areas, the Soviet Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat of the Wai County Committee of the Jiangnan Provincial Committee; the Party Committee of Tianjin, the Shandong Provincial Committee, the Qingdao Municipal Committee, the party committees of all districts in Shanghai (Zhabei, Pudong, Huxi, Hunan, Huzhong, etc.), most party industrial branches, the central branches, as well as the party cells directly under the Party Center in the areas named above, and activists and cadres in trade unions all over the country (in Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, the Sailors' Union, the Railway Workers' Union, the soviet areas, Xiamen, etc.). Under pressure from the broad masses of the party members, the Party Center realized that it was impossible to maintain its erroneous leadership with a simple high-handed policy. So it has switched to various nonproletarian methods to deceive ordinary party members. It pretends to accept the request for the Emergency Session in order to ease our revolt. For example, the Party Center has informed the ACFTU of the decision to convene the Emergency Session and in a written notice asked the leaders of the party group of the Federation to draft a resolution on the labor movement for the Emergency Session.

In his speech at the Central Working Conference of the party group of the All-China Relief Federation and the Soviet Preparatory Committee, [Xiang] Zhongfa reported that they had officially decided to convene the Emergency Session. (He also promised that members who had followed the Lisan line and reconciliationism among the participants would amount to no more than one quarter.) When [Qu] Qiubai and [Zhou] Enlai delivered reports in the Zhabei and Huzhong districts, both indicated that they were willing to obey the district committees' decisions to call an Emergency Session. The Comintern's representative told the leaders of the ACFTU time and again that the resolution of the party group of the Federation was correct and that he would guarantee that it was implemented politically and organizationally. At the same time, however, the Party Center was secretly preparing the Fourth Plenum. This demonstrates that the Party Center acts in the same way as GMD bureaucrats and scabs of the yellow trade unions. On the other hand, this also shows the urgency and necessity of the Emergency Session.

VI) The Lisanists and Capitulationists Are Sabotaging the Emergency Session

The Lisanists are extremely hostile to the Emergency Session because they know it will inevitably bury Lisanism and its domination of the party. In addition, Wang Ming [Chen Shaoyu] and his like, who have made similar ideological mistakes, are also scared, because they have only criticized the Lisan line in words and from a leftist viewpoint. They agreed entirely with the general strategy of the Lisan line (the plan for a nationwide uprising and general strike, etc.) during discussions on the 11 June resolution at the CC's work conference. Their leftism meant that they saw great possibilities for a direct nationwide uprising. They even think that the 11 June resolution underestimated the situation. After the Third Plenum they claimed that "the Third Plenum [is] of great significance" and thought that Lisanism had disappeared except for a few "remnants," and that "disagreement [can] be avoided" as long as the CC admits its mistakes. (Please see Wang Ming's letter of opinion of 13 November.) Thus it is not surprising that they have tried to sabotage the movement for the Emergency Session. They have spread various rumors such as "Lisanism no longer exists," "the theoretical debates over Lisanism must stop," "the Comintern line has been realized in the party," "the CC has already admitted mistakes and thus we do not need to talk any more about reforming the party organization," and "the Emergency Session is a movement sponsored by leftists." These rumors have demonstrated that Lisanists and capitulationists are always trying to sabotage the anti-Lisan line movement in order to maintain their leadership. Moreover, their plans are directed by the Comintern representative Mif. At the meeting with the leaders of the party group of the ACFTU, the party group of the Labor Federation, and the party group of the All-China Sailors' Union, Mif openly adopted a leftist viewpoint to analyze the whole anti-Lisan line movement and ordered these comrades to leave the movement and accept Wang Ming's leadership.

(Naturally, the aforementioned leaders have refused his order and denounced him on the spot.) Under such circumstances, the Lisanists and capitulationists secretly replaced the Emergency Session demanded by the broad masses of party members with the Fourth Plenum that would meet the needs of the old CC and Wang Ming's faction.

VII) The Process of the Fourth Plenum

The Fourth Plenum is fundamentally different from the Emergency Session proposed by the broad masses of party members. First, the participants were all appointed by the Politburo. They were mainly Politburo members, the extra CC members at the Third Plenum working in central party organs such as Luo Mai and He Chang,¹²⁵ and the party secretaries from the various bureaus north and south of the Yangtze River. Comprising the majority of the participants at the Plenum, they were all activists of the Lisan line and reconciliationism. Second, except for the aforementioned members, the Party Center had kept the program of the Fourth Plenum secret from the rest of the participants—those CC members and party cadres who firmly opposed the Lisan line and reconciliationism. Since the Party Center had not informed them of the purpose and procedure of the Plenum beforehand, it brought about indignant and serious criticism from them. They pointed out that they would adhere to their view on the Emergency Session. Third, the Plenum was short, and discussions were very brief: the whole Plenum lasted no longer than fifteen hours with each speaker given only fifteen minutes. As a result of the time limitation, some comrades did not even have a chance to speak. This is a typical monopolized conference without any democracy.

VIII) The Fourth Plenum Not Only Failed to Solve the Party's Major Political and Organizational Problems But Also Continued the Leadership of Lisanists

What actually occurred at the Fourth Plenum? First, the Politburo rejected our proposals to discuss the party's general work and other major tasks under the principle of eliminating the Lisan line and implementing the Comintern line. The reconciliationist Politburo thought that these urgent and important items were insignificant and unnecessary. Second, the supplementary resolution of 25 November obviously adopted the reconciliationist view as it claimed that "the Third Plenum [has] generally accepted the Comintern line," but the Fourth Plenum, instead of pointing out the truth clearly, argued that "the resolution of 25 November has moved closer to the Comintern line." (The Emergency Session Announcement had declared the resolutions of the Third Plenum and 25 November invalid. Yet the Fourth Plenum was not willing even to go that far.) Third, in Circular No. 96, the Party Center abandoned its responsibility of leadership. Having ignored the party's urgent practical tasks, it only passively admitted the mistakes. In analyzing the

origins of Lisanism it also made serious errors. It failed to point out that the struggle against the Lisan line was in essence a two-line struggle; nor did it make an evaluation of the nature of the Lisan line and reconciliationism. (Please refer to the 1 January resolution of the party group of the ACFTU on the Emergency Announcement.) These errors all originated from reconciliationism. Nevertheless, the Fourth Plenum insisted that Circular No. 96 was absolutely consistent with the Comintern line and was correct. Fourth, because of the aforementioned factors, the Fourth Plenum was in reality in favor of reconciliationism and the organizational line of the Third Plenum. Though it indicated in its resolution the intention to nullify the extra election of the Third Plenum, it approved, except for He Chang and Luo Mai, most of the Lisanists and reconciliationists who were chosen. Moreover, it openly supported the activists of the Lisan line and reconciliationism at the Fourth Plenum and saw the CC—the party’s supreme leading body—as a place to educate people who had made mistakes and to test those who had been opportunists ever since Chen Duxiu’s time. As a result, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Zhongfa, Xiang Ying, and Ren Bishi were able to continue their leadership of the Politburo. Li Lisan and Qu Qiubai managed to remain in the CC, and Wang Ming, who was not only inexperienced but also had made Lisan-type mistakes, was elected to the Politburo and took charge of important tasks. Fifth, the Plenum was clearly divided into two camps: on the one side were the Politburo and its subordinate leading organs controlled by the reconciliationists, while on the other side were some CC members who had firmly opposed the Lisan line and the lower-level cadres, especially the worker-cadres. (There was almost no exception.) The Party Center had deliberately selected the participants in order to create a majority. In fact, it abolished democracy at the Plenum, monopolized the elections, and charged opponents with various accusations such as being “anti-Comintern,” “right deviationists,” “liquidationists,” “secret agents,” and having the “tendency of sectarianism” and “unprincipled factional strife.”

IX) Fighting Against the Fourth Plenum and Demanding the Convening of the Emergency Session Under the Correct Leadership of the Comintern

Politically, the Fourth Plenum resulted in a continuation of reconciliationism. We think that Mif, rather than the Comintern, should be blamed for this result. He has twisted the Comintern line and deliberately supported certain factions, thus introducing factional strife in the party. Moreover, organizationally the Fourth Plenum carried through even more aggressively the consistent line of Lisanism (the patriarchal system and commandism). On the surface, they have added a few workers to the party’s leading organ, but in essence the leadership is still in the hands of petty bourgeois intellectuals such as Zhou Enlai and Wang Ming. The Fourth Plenum has thus continued the development of the Lisan line and reconciliationism (for instance, Circular No. 97 is full of the spirit of the Lisan line and reconciliationism) and is even more ignominious than the Third Plenum. It has blocked implementation of the correct Comintern line and the progress of the anti-Lisan line movement. Therefore,

we should, under the correct leadership of the Comintern line, abolish all its resolutions and suggest that the Comintern immediately recall Mif, who bears the major responsibility for all the mistakes of the Fourth Plenum. We call on all party members to strive for the convening of the Emergency Session, and we ask the Comintern to replace Mif with a good representative to lead those CC members who firmly oppose the Lisan line and reconciliationism to form a provisional CC and to preside over the Emergency Session to resolve the party's pressing political and organizational problems. Only under the leadership of a new CC elected by the Emergency Session can the party's Seventh National Congress be held and be guaranteed of success. We strongly oppose the leadership of the reconciliationist CC produced by the Fourth Plenum and a Seventh National Congress convened and monopolized by it.

X) Support the Comintern and Call for the Replacement of Mif, Who Bears the Major Responsibility for the Mistakes of the Fourth Plenum

At present, the Lisanists and capitulationists such as Wang Ming and his small group are continually rumormongering and mudslinging. They have tried to threaten and deceive those comrades who are fighting actively against the Lisan line and the Fourth Plenum. Their major argument is that "the Fourth Plenum was directed by the Comintern and thus to oppose the Fourth Plenum is to oppose the Comintern." This is exactly the same tactic that Li Lisan and his followers used at the Third Plenum to attack the comrades who then opposed them. We can recall at that time that the Comintern's representative made mistakes in directing the Third Plenum. He considered it wrong to "think of the Lisan line as conflicting with the Comintern line," and he said that "the present guiding line of the party [is] the same as that of the Comintern, and there [have] never been two lines." (The quotations are from the letter to the Third Plenum by the representative of the Comintern's Far East Bureau.) We fought then against such incorrect ideas, and it has been proved that our struggle is in support of the Comintern line. This time at the Fourth Plenum, Mif, adhering to his stand of Bukharin right reconciliationism, which he adopted at the Sixth National Congress because of his personal factional prejudices, entirely ignored the opinions of the broad masses of party members and repeated his serious mistakes. Undoubtedly, what he did ran counter to the principles of the Comintern. In this sense, only by demanding firmly that the Comintern dismiss him from office and correct his mistakes can we thoroughly eradicate the obstacles to eliminating the Lisan line and implementing the Comintern line.

XI) YL Members All Over the Country Must Rise Up to Fight Against the Fourth Plenum and for the Convening of the Emergency Session

Lisanism liquidated the YL organizations and is a big obstacle for the development of the youth movement. However, Lisanism still has great influence in the YL, and

as a result the CC of the YL has obediently followed the Party Center and has made many mistakes. Therefore, in the present movement against the Fourth Plenum and for the Emergency Session, party members should guide the YL members and help them, under the correct leadership of the Youth International, to hold the Emergency Session and wage a ruthless struggle against Lisanism and the eclecticism of the CC of the YL so as to solve the political and organizational problems in the YL.

XII) Fighting Against Any Incorrect Tendencies in the Anti-Lisan Line Struggle

While firmly struggling against the Lisan line and capitulationism on the ideological and organizational fronts and in our practical work, we should always adhere to Bolshevik-Marxism-Leninism, and we should firmly and correctly wage a two-line struggle against any incorrect tendencies, particularly the rightist tendency—the most serious danger in the party. We must be on the alert against any conspiracies of Trotskyite–Chen Duxiu liquidationists to worm their way into the party. We must guard against factional strife caused by Li Lisan and Wang Ming. We must always use criticism and self-criticism correctly and thoroughly to examine all the mistakes the party has made in ideology, work methods, and other aspects during the long domination of the Lisan line. In addition, we must work hard to fight against Lisanism and reconciliationism in our practical work so as to accomplish the urgent tasks given by the Comintern.

C.23 Letter from the CC to Comrades Runzhi and Yujie and the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region Special Committee—On the Current International and Domestic Situation and the Party's Strategy (7 February 1929)¹²⁶

Comrades Runzhi and Yujie¹²⁷ and the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region Special Committee:

The new CC elected by the party's Sixth Congress [July–September 1928] has returned home and has taken charge of the work during the last half a year. During this period we have sent several letters to you via couriers but have never received any replies. We are extremely anxious! Two months ago the West Jiangxi Special Committee sent us a note which said that they had lost a report from you to the CC as well as the letter from the CC to you via them. It is very likely that someone in their committee has stolen the two messages and given them to the enemy. They are now investigating the case carefully. However, we are afraid that it has already damaged your work, since the information contained in the two messages would certainly help the enemy arrange attacks on you.

[[Our task on the international front at this stage is to oppose the coming world war as well as the attempt to divide China and defend the Chinese revolution. The conflicts among the various imperialist countries have become increasingly intensified. The confrontation between Britain and the United States will be the focus of the future world war. The turmoil in China indicates that the bourgeois regime will collapse soon. Party work in the cities has been weakened further, and we only have a real presence in Shanghai and Hong Kong. In the countryside in the south, party organizations have developed somewhat but they are very volatile. The party's proletarian base is weakened and its cadres destroyed by the white terror. Our weakness prevents us from taking advantage of even favorable circumstances to bring about a revolutionary high tide. The current stage of the revolution is bourgeois democratic with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. It is certain that the Chinese revolution will advance eventually to the socialist stage.]

The Sixth Congress decided that our party's central task at present is to win the support of the people. The party's major task at present is to establish and develop bases among the proletariat, mainly to establish branches among the industrial workers and to mobilize the masses. This does not mean that we will not expand the rural revolution or direct spontaneous peasant uprisings or ignore guerrilla warfare. Indeed these should be adjusted to fit with the central work of the party.]]

In view of this background, the armed forces under your direction should also reconsider their present task and act in accordance with the political situation throughout the country as a whole and with the party's task. In line with the decision of the Sixth Congress, the CC has said for a long time that you must make plans gradually to divide the Red Army troops into small detachments and scatter them over the countryside of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to carry out the rural revolution. The CC asks you to follow this instruction because the current political situation in China demands us to wage an extensive struggle in the countryside. This strategy can also help you divert the enemy's attention, solve the supply problem, and prepare for protracted warfare. However, either you did not receive this instruction or you are not willing to follow it. In your current operations, you have continued to adopt the tactics of concentrating forces. Of course, being surrounded by the enemy, you certainly have to amass the troops. However, the CC holds that you must clearly understand the current political situation and the party's tasks and firmly carry out the plan to disperse the forces in an orderly way. At the same time, you must also realize that the CC by no means orders you to take the pessimistic attitude to send Red Army soldiers back home. What we ask you to do is to scatter our armed forces into villages when the time and conditions are favorable; that is, when there is no serious threat of the enemy's attack. The dispersion of forces should be conducted in accordance with the enemy's military deployment, the fighting capability of our troops, and the local conditions. Depending on circumstances, a detachment can be composed of several dozen or several hundred people. But it should be no larger than 500 people (of course, this is not a fixed figure).

These scattered detachments must link up with one another and operate in close cooperation. They should mix as much as possible with the local peasants, mobilize the daily struggle of the masses, and wage a widespread rural revolution. Now, you must follow this instruction regardless of whether your army remains in the Sannan area of south Jiangxi or has already retreated into east Hunan. Otherwise, moving from one place to another, your army will gradually become isolated from the daily struggle of the broad masses and become estranged from the peasants. When the revolutionary high tide comes, the more concentrated the Red Army armed forces are, the greater contribution they can make to the revolution. However, at this moment the situation is entirely different. What we need to do now is to plan carefully to make sure that our army can survive the enemy's attack. Although sometimes we must concentrate the forces on the battlefield, we must never mass our troops to provide the enemy with a large target. Circumscribed by the environment, the Red Army in the Haifeng-Lufeng area and at Qiongya at Hainan Island tended to stay together. As a result, they were easily routed by the enemy and large numbers were decimated. The armed forces under the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region Special Committee must bear this lesson in mind. Once defeated by the enemy, you should immediately disperse the forces and scatter them into the villages so as to preserve their strength. If you plan to retreat to the Fujian-Guangdong Border Area, you must give the matter further thought. Since most of the soldiers in your army are from Hunan and Jiangxi, it would be difficult for them to mix with the peasants in Fujian and Guangdong. Thus, it might be necessary to concentrate the forces there. However, you should still make every effort to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics and to mobilize the peasants, and you must never follow the ways of the army of the Taiping Rebellion. During the last half a year, the peasant struggle in south Fujian has developed quite rapidly, particularly the insurrection in Yongding. It lasted six months. Although it has now failed, its forces have not been wiped out. In addition, the struggle is not only limited to Yongding but has spread over a large area. There are party organizations in many counties there. If indeed you move to south Fujian, you ought to make a special effort to help the development and expansion of the peasant struggle.

Under current conditions, we have decided to transfer Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Mao Zedong to the CC. The two comrades might feel reluctant to leave the army since they have worked in it for over a year. However, taking into consideration both the needs of the situation and the demands of our work, the CC believes that it is necessary for them to leave the army now. Zhu and Mao's departure will not cause the army any losses and will help it implement the plan to disperse its forces. If Zhu and Mao stay with the army, their activities will draw the enemy's attention, thus making it more difficult for us to disperse the troops. When Zhu and Mao come to the CC, they can introduce to our comrades all over the country their precious experience in leading a 10,000-strong armed force in dealing with the enemy for more than a year. This will make a greater contribution to the whole revolutionary cause. Therefore, as soon as Comrades Zhu and Mao receive

the CC decision, they should leave the army and come to the CC immediately. They must not neglect more important and difficult duties because of an emotional attachment to the soldiers in the army.

In regard to the method of dispersing the forces and the arranging for Zhu and Mao to leave the army, the Central Military Committee will send you a detailed plan. Of course, you should carry out the plan flexibly rather than implement it mechanically.

The Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region Special Committee can continue to exist for a time. You may make decisions on how to reorganize it.

(This letter is sent to you via the party committees in Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangdong.)

C.24 Letter from the Front Committee to the Party Center (5 April 1929)¹²⁸

The Party Center:

The Fujian Provincial Committee passed on your letter of 7 February [**Doc. C.23**] to us at Ruijin on 3 April. We are afraid that your estimate in the letter of both the situation and our strength is rather pessimistic. The campaign of the three offensives launched by the nationalist troops on the Jinggang Mountains represented the climax of the reactionary forces, but it was also a turning point. The reactionary forces are at a low ebb, while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although the fighting power and the organizational capacity of our party are as weak as you have pointed out, they will surely grow strong again, and the pessimistic atmosphere inside the party will soon disappear because the reactionaries will be at a low ebb. The broad masses support us unreservedly. The enemy's policy of harsh suppression and massacre is just like driving fish into deep water, and the promise of reformism can no longer win support from the masses. The people's illusions about the GMD are bound to vanish before too long.

In the future none of the political parties in China will be able to compete with us Communists for the support of the people. The political and the organizational lines decided by our party's Sixth Congress [1928] are correct. The revolution at the present stage is not a socialist one but a democratic one, and the party's task at present is not to prepare for a general uprising but to win the support of the people. We should, however, adopt a positive attitude toward the propaganda and preparation for an armed uprising because the revolution will develop very quickly. Under the present conditions of great turmoil, only by adopting a positive attitude and by issuing enthusiastic slogans can we lead the people. Such a policy is also necessary for the party to regain its fighting power.

Although our party used to be dominated by the erroneous strategy of putschism,

we think that now liquidationism has become the major danger inside the party. On our way through west Fujian and south Jiangxi, we found that the fighting will of the local party organizations there was so weak that many good opportunities have been easily lost. Many people there have a revolutionary spirit, but the party organizations are not willing to lead them. The situation in west Fujian and south Jiangxi suggests that this may not be an isolated phenomenon. Therefore, while it is necessary to fight against the erroneous tendency of putschism and commandism, we must also strive to oppose liquidationism and passivism.

Proletarian leadership is the only guarantee of victory of the revolution. At present, the party's vital organizational task is to form a proletarian basis within the party and found industrial branches in cities. Nevertheless, the development of our struggle in the countryside, the establishment of revolutionary regimes in rural areas, and the creation and strengthening of the Red Army are also important. They are of great significance in promoting our struggle in the cities and in paving the way for the revolutionary climax. While it is wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities, it would be incorrect for some party members to fear that the growth of peasant strength might surpass that of the workers and that such a development would not be good for the progress of the revolutionary cause. In a semicolonial country such as China, the peasant struggle will fail without the workers' leadership, but it will never harm the revolutionary cause if the struggle grows more powerful than that of the workers. Our party's Sixth Congress has pointed out the mistake of neglecting the peasant struggle, and the Party Center has mentioned again in its letter the necessity to "wage a massive and universal struggle in the countryside." We think this is a correct attitude.

The Party Center says that to preserve the Red Army and mobilize the masses we should break up our troops into very small units, disperse them throughout the countryside, stay away from any big targets, and that Zhu [De] and Mao [Zedong] should leave the army. This is not a practical idea. Since the winter of 1927 we have not only planned but also tried many times the tactic of dispersing troops throughout the countryside, operating separately on the basis of a company or a battalion, using the tactics of guerrilla warfare to mobilize the masses, and staying away from big targets. Unfortunately, all those tactics failed. They failed because first, unlike the militia forces, the majority of the main force of the Red Army is not made up of local people but of members of the former National Revolutionary Army; the peasant troops from Liu, Ping, and south Hunan; and previous prisoners of war. There are hardly any peasants from the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area in the Red Army because peasants there are not willing to join the Red Army but only the militia forces of their own counties. Second, once the troops are dispersed, the leading organ is also broken up. Hence it is difficult for us to handle the dangerous environment and it is easy to fail. Third, it will allow the enemy to defeat us separately. (The Fifth Army in Ping and Liu and the Fourth Army in the border area and in south Hunan were defeated five times by the enemy because they divided their forces.) Fourth, the more adverse the circumstances are, the more concentrated the

troops should be and the more firmly the leaders must act. Only in this way can we maintain morale and deal with the enemy. In fact, the tactics to disperse the troops for guerrilla warfare can only be used when there are favorable circumstances which enable the leaders to leave the troops.

During the recent move from the Jinggang Mountains to south Jiangxi and west Fujian, thanks to the concentration of forces and the determination of the leading organ (the Front Committee) and the commanders (Zhu and Mao), the enemy could not harm us. Their losses were heavier than their gains, whereas our victories outnumbered our defeats. The two battles we won at Ningdu and Dingzhou completely wiped out the local enemy's two brigades of Guo and Liu and paved the way for the successful mobilization of the masses in south Jiangxi and west Fujian. Such an achievement cannot be realized without the concentration of forces and direction by an integrated leading organ. The tactics we learned from the past three-year struggle are indeed very different from those of ancient or modern times, Chinese or foreign. By applying our tactics, the people's strength increases daily. No enemy, no matter how powerful, can defeat us. In general, our tactics are those of guerrilla warfare: "To disperse the troops in order to mobilize the masses, and to concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy." "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." "To build up stable base areas, use the strategy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around." "Use a very good method to mobilize a large number of people within a short period of time." Such tactics are like casting a fishing net. At any moment we can cast it or draw it in. We cast it to mobilize the masses and we draw it in to deal with the enemy troops. This is the very strategy we practiced during the past three years. In the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area each time after we defeated the enemy by concentrating forces, we dispersed the troops to mobilize the masses for a period of two or three weeks (breaking up the whole army first into a few large sections and then into several small groups). When the enemy started another offensive, we assembled the troops to deal with it. Afterward we scattered them again. This time when we were pursued by the enemy we circled around and passed many places. In this way, we mobilized a large number of local people. When we stopped at a place, we stayed there from as long as five days to as briefly as half a day. We usually began the propaganda work first. (The two work-teams of the political department—one for written propaganda and the other for oral propaganda—were divided into three-person groups and assigned to the companies. With two groups in each company, they carried out propaganda work both along the route of the march and at the places we stopped.) Then we distributed to the peasants the property of the big landlords and reactionaries, such as grain, clothes, and farm tools. After that, we set up various organizations such as the party branches, secret trade unions, and secret peasant associations. Our skills in mass work have been greatly improved. The present Red Army is more than a purely fighting force. Its major function is to mobilize the masses, while fighting is only a means to serve that end. In fact, in the Red Army today the ratio between

fighting and mass work is one to ten. It is different from that of the Ye [Ting]-He[Long] army, which was merely a fighting force and could not survive in today's conditions. Regardless of the conditions, there must be a unified party and military organ in the Red Army. Otherwise, anarchy will emerge and the army is bound to collapse.

The leading organ of the party in the Red Army at present is the Front Committee, with Mao Zedong as the secretary, and the leading organ for military affairs is the headquarters, with Zhu De as the army commander. If the Party Center wants to transfer Zhu and Mao to other posts, please replace them with competent cadres. In our opinion, Comrade Liu Bochong can take charge of military affairs, and Comrade Yun Daiying the party and political work. These two, if they are able to come, will definitely be able to do better work than we. The Party Center wrote last June to inform us that Comrade He Long would come for an inspection. We do not know why he did not come. Now, as it is very easy to reach us from Fujian, we hope that in the future the Party Center can frequently send people here for inspection.

There are almost no enemy forces in west Fujian and south Jiangxi after our rout of the two brigades of Liu and Guo. A major conflict will break out at any moment as Chiang [Kai-shek's] army and troops of the Guangxi warlords are heading for a confrontation in the Jiujiang area. Since the strength of the masses has gradually recovered and the conflicts among the reactionary forces have become more intense, the climax of the revolutionary struggle will soon occur. We should take this into account when we arrange our work in the southern provinces. In our view, the forces of the landlord and compradore bourgeoisie in the two provinces of Guangdong and Hunan are very powerful. In addition, as a result of the erroneous policy of putschism, both the party and the property organizations in Hunan have been almost completely wiped out. The situation in the three provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, however, is quite different. First, the enemy forces in these three provinces are the weakest in the south. Zhejiang has only a few provincial troops under the direction of Jiang Bochen. The five enemy units in Fujian total up to fourteen regiments, but one of them, Guo's brigade, has been routed, and the other two, Chen's and Lu's troops, are bandits with little combat effectiveness. Neither of the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast is good at fighting because they have no battle experience. Though Zhang Zhen's troops are more experienced, according to the analysis of the Fujian Provincial Committee, only two of his regiments have any combat effectiveness. Besides, the situation in Fujian now is totally chaotic; things are badly disorganized. Enemy forces in Jiangxi comprise sixteen regiments under the direction of Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui; they are relatively more powerful than those in Fujian and Zhejiang but still much weaker than those in Hunan. We have encountered them on the battlefield and defeated them all except Li Wenbin's brigade. Second, the party organizations in these three provinces have made fewer errors of putschism. We are not familiar with the situation in Zhejiang, but we have found that both the party organizations and those of the peasants in Jiangxi and Fujian are in better condition than they are in Hunan. Let

us take Jiangxi as an example. The party organizations are quite consolidated in De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu of north Jiangxi. The party and militia forces are still influential in Ninggan, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Zuichuan of west Jiangxi. Conditions are even better in south Jiangxi, and the second and fourth regiments of the Red Army stationed in the counties of Ji'an, Yongxin, and Xinggu are developing fast. In east Jiangxi, the Red Army under Fang Zhimin's direction has managed to survive. In this way, our forces in Jiangxi have formed a position surrounding Nanchang. We suggest to the Party Center that we should take advantage of the prolonged war between Chiang and the Guangxi warlords, in order to try to seize Jiangxi from them and make progress in west Fujian and west Zhejiang as well. We must recruit more troops and develop the Red Army in the three provinces and establish political power with the support of the people. These tasks are to be finished within one year.

We must also lay down a solid foundation for the proletarian struggle in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen so as to guide the peasant struggle in the three provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee ought to be expanded and trade unions established in Nanchang, Jiujiang, and Ji'an as well as on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway.

We did not know about the rupture between Chiang and the Guangxi warlords, and we had no advance information about the large-scale fighting between them until we reached Dingzhou on 14 March and defeated Guo's brigade (Guo Fengming was killed in the battle). As for present work, we decided, at the outset of the war among the nationalist warlords, to use the tactics of guerrilla warfare to mobilize the masses, deepen the rural revolution, build up the revolutionary base with the support of the people, and establish a worker-peasant regime in a large area of over twenty counties in west Fujian and south Jiangxi. We plan to link this area with our base in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to create a powerful stronghold for future development. Accordingly, we went to neither Hangyong nor Longyan but stayed at Dingzhou for seventeen days to mobilize the peasants. After that, we came to Ruijin on 1 April and will move to Yudu on 8 April. When we get to Yudu, we will hold an enlarged meeting to discuss operational plans with the South Jiangsu Special Committee and Comrade Luo Shouan, sent by the Military Affairs Department of the Party Center. The peasants of west Fujian and south Jiangxi have been very cooperative. In our work at the county towns of Changding, Xinqiao, and Hetian, the peasants turned out in the thousands whenever we called on them to seize grain from the landlords. We organized twenty secret peasant associations, five secret trade unions, and even a general federation of trade unions at Dingzhou. Party organizations were doubled, and a contingent of militia was set up. This contingent has come to Ruijin with us because it is difficult for a single unit to survive there. Political power was established first through the provisional revolutionary committee, and its members were appointed by our political department. After a few peasant associations and trade unions were organized, a conference was convened at which a formal revolutionary committee was elected. Both the provisional and the

formal revolutionary committees proclaimed political programs. On arrival at Ruijin, we drew up a four-day work plan. While stationing the headquarters in the county seat, we divided our troops into four parts and assigned them to the county seats of Rentian City, Xijiang, and Jiubao. Then we again broke them up into small groups in each of the four places to mobilize the masses. While people in Ruijin have given us a spontaneous welcome and have participated bravely in the struggle against landlords, unfortunately, there have been no party organizations in Ruijin or any local cadres to guide the masses or make preparations for the struggle. That is why we have not achieved much progress in Ruijin, particularly in the county town. When we get to Yudu, we plan to work for a week in the county town and in the surrounding countryside. After that, depending on the circumstances, we will either move to Ningdu and Guangchang or to Wannan and Taihe to wage guerrilla war for a period of time in south Jiangxi before we finally move to west Fujian. By then we must get ready to fight the remnants of Guo Fengmin's brigade as well as Lu Xinbang's and Chen Guohui's troops. We hope the Fujian Provincial Committee will make some preparations for us.

As far as the situation of our troops is concerned, except for a small part stationed in the border area, the majority of the Fourth Army has moved out, a total of 3,600 people and 1,100 guns. We lost about 600 people and 200 guns at Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu. Most of them had lost contact with us in battle. Only about 100 people and several scores of guns were really captured by the enemy. The terrible stories carried by the newspapers are all rumors invented by the enemy. After the two battles of Ningdu and Dingzhou, our troops have not only fully recovered but also increased in number. At present the Fourth Army has three brigades—the First, the Second, and the Third. Each brigade has two battalions, and each battalion has three companies. There are about 1,200 people and 500 guns in each brigade. When we engage in guerrilla war, we disperse the troops by brigades, and then again divide them into small teams. This is very convenient both for dispersion and assembly. When it arrived at the Jinggang Mountains, Comrade Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army had about 800 people and about 500 guns. Six hundred people and 400 guns have come to Ruijin with us this time and are redesignated as the Fifth Brigade of the Fourth Army under the direction of Comrade Peng Dehuai, who has been appointed deputy army commander. He will return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area with the brigade in a few days to gather his old troops, restore our political power there, and establish liaison with our forces in south Jiangxi. They will remain under the leadership of the Front Committee. There are political departments at both army and brigade levels. Each political department has a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section (divided into three sections of worker, peasant, and party affairs), and a security section. There are party representatives in battalions and companies. The party representative system at army and brigade levels is to be replaced by that of the director of the political department. The whole army has been issued new uniforms, and every one has received a four-*yuan* allowance. There are no supply problems, and the soldiers are now all in high spirits. Two forces in

Lichuan of east Jiangxi (near Guangchang) want to join us. One has mutinied from Jin Handing's forces and comprises about 500 people and 300 guns. It has been redesignated as the Fourth Brigade with Tian Guiqing as the brigade commander. The other is a bandit force of about 300 people and 200 guns. Having been defeated everywhere, it could find no alternative. We have redesignated it as an independent battalion with Hu Zhushen as commander. These two units will move to Yudu for reorganization and training around 14 April. The Second and the Fourth regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army are stationed in the Xingguo area and have cooperated well with us. Now is the time for us to recover the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area lost in the previous battles. Apart from Wang Zuo's unit with about 200 guns under the direction of the Fourth Army, the militia forces in the six counties of Ning, Yong, Liang, Sui, Ling, and Cha are also equipped with 800 guns. Since the warlords are involved in their own wars and are unable to control the situation, our forces cannot only maintain themselves there but also develop in the outlying areas. Conditions will be even better when Comrade Peng Dehuai's brigade returns there. The party secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region Special Committee is Comrade Deng Qianyuan. Since the failed insurrection of last March, the power basis of our party in Hunan has been completely destroyed because of putschism, and the peasant forces have been disarmed and the mass struggle suppressed by the landlords. When the Red Army launched an offensive on Chenzhou in August, we organized three county committees and three peasant militia contingents in Zixing, Ruchen, and Guidong and set up a special committee to lead them. Du Xiuqing was secretary. Recently we have heard that they failed again because of putschism. In the Lining area, after the insurrection of last spring, the party organizations and the peasant forces suffered a total defeat. Afterward, they received seventy guns from the Fourth Army in the summer but were again completely wiped out at Yellow Mud Hill in the You-Li Border Area. This demonstrates that it is extremely difficult for a few small forces to survive.

The party's leading organ in the Red Army is the Front Committee appointed by the Party Center. In the letter of 4 June, the Party Center said:

We think it is necessary to establish a Front Committee as the leading organ at the front. The Committee is to consist of the following five members: Mao, Zhu, a worker, a peasant, and the secretary of the party organization of the area where the Front Committee resides, with Mao Zedong as the secretary. In addition, a labor committee should be set up with the worker member of the Front Committee as its secretary and a military committee with Zhu De as its secretary. Members of the labor committee and the military committee are to be selected by the Front Committee. As regards the scale of jurisdiction of the Front Committee, it depends on the circumstances. However, all activities in the area under its jurisdiction are to be directed by the Front Committee. When the Front Committee is in Jiangxi, it is to be led by the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, and when it is in Hunan, it is to be directed by the Hunan Provincial Committee. On receiving a report from the Front Committee, the provincial committee there should reply immediately and then forward as soon as possible both the report and the reply to the Party Center.

We think the Party Center's instruction on the organization of the Front Committee is correct and suits well the conditions of the struggle. The Red Army operates across the boundaries of any specific area, so it should not be directed by a specific county committee, a special committee, or a provincial committee. Both the Fifth Army in Ping and Liu and the Fourth Army in Hunan and in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area had suffered many defeats because of the influence of localism. The cross-boundary Red Army must be led directly by the Party Center. Only in this way can it operate successfully in the battlefield environment and avoid the interference of localism.

Since last March, we have sent three reports to the Party Center. One is a long letter written by Mao Zedong at the time of our failure in the border area. This discussed the problems of how to establish the revolutionary base as well as the policies of the Hunan Provincial Committee. The letter was sent to the Party Center by the Hunan Provincial Committee but its draft was lost. The second is a report written by the Front Committee when we received the Party Center's June letter ordering the Red Army to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area. It presented the historical background of our struggle in the border area and the strategy and policies concerning the establishment of the revolutionary base. It was sent to the Party Center via both the Hunan and the Jiangxi Provincial Committees. Now we forward a copy of the report based on the draft we have kept. Since the Party Center has received neither of the two reports, no wonder you feel ill-informed about our activities. The third is a letter of the Front Committee written at Changding on 20 March forwarded by the Fujian Provincial Committee. We are now enclosing a copy to you because we are not sure whether you have received it. For three years, until our arrival at Dingzhou, we did not receive any journals of the Party Center. Here, we have read the third and fourth issues of the *Young Pioneer* [Shaonian qianfeng], the third issue of the *Chinese Worker* [Zhongguo gongren], the second issue of the *People's Voice* [Renyan], published in Beijing, and the second issue of *Vanguard* [Qianfeng], published by the comrades from Dingzhou living in Shanghai. In the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, often we could not get hold of any newspapers for two or three months because of the enemy's blockade. Since last September we have managed to buy some newspapers from Ji'an and Changsha, though it was still very difficult. After coming to south Jiangxi and west Fujian, thanks to the convenience of the mail system here, we are able to receive newspapers published in Nanjing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Nanchang, and Ganzhou every day. And at Ruijin, we can read newspapers published by He Jian and the *Changsha Republican Daily* [Minguo ribao]. Our happiness is beyond description as if we could clear the clouds to see the bright sky. In the future, we hope that the Party Center can write to us once a month; we, too, will report to you every month. Please also try to send us some journals published by the Party Center.

C.25 A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire—
A Letter to Lin Biao. *Mao Zedong* (5 January 1930)¹²⁹

Comrade Lin Biao,

It is several days after the New Year, and I still have not replied to your letter. One reason is that I have been busy with other things, and the second reason is that I have been wondering what to write to you and what benefit I can bring you. After racking my brains, I could not come up with anything appropriate, and therefore, I put off replying. Now, I have some ideas to talk about. I do not know whether they are applicable to your situation. However, these little matters of mine really concern an important issue in the current struggle. Even though they may not be compatible with our specific situation, they still constitute a generally significant issue. So I wish to put them forward.

What is the issue I want to raise? It is the issue of the evaluation of the current situation and our actions based on it. I thought in the past, and I still think to some extent now, that your evaluation of the situation is relatively pessimistic. Your opinion was most clearly evident at the Ruijin meeting on the evening of 18 May last year. I know that you believe in the inevitable arrival of a revolutionary upsurge, but not in the possibility of a rapid arrival. Therefore, in terms of actions, you do not support the plan of seizing Jiangxi in a year and only support guerrilla warfare in the three connecting provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. Since you do not have a deep understanding about establishing red political power in the three regions, you lack ideas about the promotion of a nationwide revolutionary high tide through the consolidation and expansion of such red political power. You seem to believe that the revolutionary high tide is still remote, that it is futile to carry out the hard work of establishing political power. Instead your belief in mobile guerrilla warfare means that you would rather use this method to extend our political influence and to wait for a nationwide uprising until the work of mobilizing the masses is more or less accomplished. You believe that this, combined with the participation of the Red Army, would create a great revolutionary situation throughout the whole country. Your theory of winning the support of the masses throughout the whole country and in all regions before establishing political power is, in my opinion, inappropriate to the Chinese revolution. The source of your theory, according to my observation, is mainly the lack of clear understanding of the fact that China is a semicolonial country for which the imperialists are competing in the first stage of imperialism. If one clearly understands this first, one will understand why the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes is to be found only in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and spreading, and why there has never been a unified government. Second, one will realize the important significance of the peasant problem and the current nationwide development of peasant uprisings. Third, one will understand the absolute correctness of the slogan of the government of work-

ers and peasants. Fourth, one will understand another strange phenomenon unique to China that follows from the prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes, namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces and the consequent development and expansion of small patches of red political power (soviets) in areas surrounded by the white regime. Fifth, one will understand that the development of the Red Army, guerrilla forces, and the soviet regions is the highest form of peasant struggle in the semicolonial countries and also the inevitable form of peasant struggle in such countries. Sixth, one will be certain that they (the Red Army and the peasant soviet regimes) are the most essential allies in the proletarian struggle in semicolonial countries (the proletariat should move forward to lead them), and that they are important factors in promoting a nationwide revolutionary high tide. Seventh, one will understand that the policy of relying on mobile guerrilla warfare alone cannot accomplish the task of promoting the nationwide high tide. The unquestionably correct policies are those models provided by Zhu [De] and Mao [Zedong], He Long, Li Wenlin, and Fang Zhimin. That is the policy of establishing base areas and systematically setting up political power, and by promoting and expanding this power emphasizing the coordination and organization among the Red Army, the guerrilla forces, and the broad peasant masses, training in the struggle, the pursuance of the rural revolution and the expansion of armed organizations—ranging from county uprising troops, district Red Guards, county Red Guards, local Red Armies, and even transregional Red Armies. This is the only way to build the confidence of the masses toward the nationwide revolution, as the Soviet Union has built it throughout the world. This is the only way to create tremendous difficulties for the ruling class, shake its foundations, and accelerate its internal disintegration. This is the only way to create a genuine Red Army that will become an important tool for the future great revolution. In short, this is the only way to promote the revolutionary high tide.

I want to discuss more about what I feel to be the reason for your relatively pessimistic evaluation of the current situation. I think that your evaluation is the opposite of the revolutionary impetuosity that exists inside the party. Comrades who commit revolutionary impetuosity exaggerate the subjective forces and belittle objective forces. This kind of evaluation, proceeding from the subjectivist point of view, will logically and undoubtedly lead to blind adventurism. You do not make this kind of mistake, but you appear to have another shortcoming, namely, minimizing the subjective forces and magnifying objective forces. This inappropriate evaluation will inevitably produce other adverse consequences. Although you acknowledge the weakness of the subjective forces and the strength of the objective forces, you do not appear to realize the following important points:

- 1) The subjective forces of the Chinese revolution may be weak, but all ruling-class organizations (governments, armed forces, political party organizations, etc.) are based on the feeble social and economic organizations of China and are also weak. This helps to explain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western Europe, where, although the subjective forces of revolution are

much stronger than in China, they cannot initiate a revolution soon, because the forces of their ruling classes are much stronger than those of the Chinese ruling class. Although the subjective forces in the Chinese revolution are weak, the objective forces are also weak, and thus the speed at which the Chinese revolution moves toward a revolutionary high tide will definitely be greater than that in Western Europe.

2) The subjective forces of the revolution have been greatly diminished since the defeat of the Great Revolution [1927]. The remaining forces, judged by their form, will naturally cause comrades to have pessimistic ideas. However, if judged in terms of their substance, they are very different. Here, we can use an old Chinese saying: “A single spark can start a prairie fire.” This means that although our forces are very small at present, they will develop rapidly. In China’s current situation, not only can they develop but this is inevitable, as the May 30 Movement and the subsequent Great Revolution have shown. When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its form merely as an introductory guide. As soon as we have passed the introduction, we should grasp its essence and put aside the form that serves as the introduction. This is the only scientific, reliable, and revolutionary method of analysis.

3) The same applies to the evaluation of objective forces. We must never look at their form only, but should see their essence. In the initial period of our independent rule in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, a few comrades influenced by the Hunan Provincial Committee’s inaccurate evaluation genuinely believed in the committee’s phrases “extremely shaky” and “panic-stricken.” These phrases, which are standing jokes, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee to describe the ruler of Hunan, Lu Diping [GMD governor] (in May to June 1928). This evaluation certainly produced putschism in the political sphere. But during the four months between December [1928] and February [1929] (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords [March–April 1929]) when the largest, third suppression expedition was about to reach the Jinggang Mountains, some comrades again asked, “How long can we keep the red flag flying?” In fact, at that time, the struggle in China among Britain, the United States, and Japan became quite open and was entangled in the fighting between Chiang Kai-shek, the Guangxi warlords, and Feng Yuxiang. In essence, it was a time when the reactionary tide was beginning to ebb and the revolutionary tide was starting to rise again. At that time, however, not only did the Red Army and the local party organizations have a pessimistic mentality, but even the Party Center was confused by the superficial objective circumstances and held pessimistic opinions. The Center’s letter of 7 February is proof of the pessimistic analysis inside the party at that time [**Doc. C.23**].

4) The present objective situation can still easily confuse those comrades who only observe the form but not the essence. This is especially true for those of us who work in the Red Army. When we meet defeat, are encircled or pursued by strong enemies, we often unconsciously generalize and maximize these temporary,

specific, and small conditions, as if the situation throughout China and the whole world was pessimistic and the future of a revolutionary victory very remote. The reason for disregarding the essence lies with the failure to make a scientific observation. To answer the question whether the high tide of the Chinese revolution is imminent, one has to make a detailed observation as to whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide have developed further. If we observe accurately that the contradictions are intensifying among the international imperialists, between imperialism and the colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat, we can understand the greater urgency for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. This greater urgency gives rise to the simultaneous development of the contradictions between the imperialists and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves in China, thus leading to the daily expansion and intensification of conflict within the Chinese ruling class—the contradictions within the Chinese ruling class have further developed. In the wake of the intensification of the contradictions among the rulers—the tangled warfare among the warlords—come heavier taxation and levies, which steadily sharpen the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the ruling class. The contradiction between the imperialists and the Chinese capitalists and the latter's failure to obtain concessions immediately sharpens the contradictions between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class. The Chinese bourgeoisie has to step up the exploitation of the working class. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression and the growing burden of taxes and levies that adversely affect the interests of the landlord class come more acute contradictions between the landlord class and the peasants. Exploitation through rent and usury has increased. Because of the pressure from foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses, and the increase in government taxes and levies, more and more merchants of domestically made goods and independent small producers have gone bankrupt. The troops suffer from shortages of food yet the wars are indefinitely prolonged, causing further misery from hunger, cold, exhaustion, injury, and death. Because of the increase in government taxes and levies, the rise in rent and interests demanded by landlords, and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are natural calamities and banditry everywhere, and the peasant masses and the urban poor have no way to earn a living. With no money for schooling, the students face the danger of losing the opportunity to study. The backward production system provides no prospect of employment for graduates. Once we understand the above contradictions, it is easy to realize that China is in such a state of constant trouble and anarchy that the anti-imperialist, anti-warlord, and antilandlord revolutionary high tide is inevitable and will come very soon. China is littered with dry firewood that can quickly turn into a raging fire. The phrase "A single spark can start a prairie fire" is an apt description of the current situation. One only needs to look at the workers' strikes, peasants' uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, shopkeepers' strikes, and students' strikes to know that it cannot be long before a "spark" starts "a prairie fire."

The gist of the above statement was already expressed in the Front Committee's letter to the Party Center on 5 April last year. [For the contents of the letter see **Doc. C.24.**]

[[Here is included the section criticizing the Party Center's evaluation of 9 February 1929 as being too pessimistic; also the operational tactics of the Red Army are repeated.]]

The weakness of this paragraph is that all the reasons listed for the concentration of troops are negative. This is very insufficient. The positive reason for the concentration of troops should be that concentrated forces can defeat larger enemy forces and occupy towns. Only by defeating larger enemy forces and occupying towns can we mobilize the masses on a large scale, set up political power extending over several counties, spread our tentacles far and wide (the so-called extending our political influence), and play some effective role in speeding up the revolutionary high tide. Both the regime set up by us in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area the year before last and that in west Fujian last year were the result of concentrating troops. This is a general principle. Is there a time when we should divide our troops? Yes, there is. The letter from the Front Committee to the Party Center mentioned the Red Army's guerrilla tactics, including the division of troops within a short radius:

[[This section from the 5 April letter outlines the tactics learned from the three years of struggle, concluding with the observation that they are like "casting a fishing net."]]

Here to "cast the net wide" means to divide our troops within a short radius. For example, when we first took Yongxin in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, we divided the troops of the Twenty-ninth Regiment and the Thirty-first Regiment inside the Yongxin area. When we took Yongxin for the third time, the Twenty-eighth Regiment moved toward the border of Anfu, the Twenty-ninth Regiment toward Lianhua, and the Thirty-first Regiment toward the border of Ji'an, thus making separate maneuvers. Again, the separate operations in various counties of south Jiangxi from April to May last year and in various counties of west Fujian last July are all appropriate examples. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two conditions that the environment is comparatively favorable and that the leading organs are relatively sound, because the purpose of dividing troops is to do a better job in winning mass support, furthering the rural revolution, establishing political power and enlarging the Red Army and local armed forces. If these purposes cannot be attained, and the dispersal of troops can even result in defeat, thus weakening the strength of the Red Army, as happened in the separate operations of the attack on Chenzhou on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi in August last year, then it is better not to divide the troops. If the above two conditions can be met, then it is undoubtedly necessary to divide our troops as this will be more advantageous than concentrating them. I oppose, in principle, the division of troops for the purpose of preserving effective forces and avoiding concentration so as not to

give the enemy a target. This has been explained in the aforementioned letter of the Front Committee to the Party Center. Moreover, will there be occasions when we have to divide our troops because the economic situation does not permit concentration? Probably there will be. But I cannot reach a positive conclusion on this point because we still do not have concrete experiences of such conditions.

The spirit of the Party Center's February letter was not good. The letter had a bad effect on a few party comrades in the Fourth Army. You also seem to be influenced. At that time the Party Center issued a notice, stating that war would not necessarily break out between Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi warlords. Since then, however, the Party Center's evaluations and instructions, in general, have been correct. The Party Center has already issued another circular to correct the one with the wrong appraisal (in fact, only part of the circular). Although there was no formal correction of the letter to the Red Army, the subsequent instructions were completely free of the pessimistic spirit, and the proposals for the Red Army's operations were also completely in line with those of the Front Committee. However, the bad effect of the Party Center's letter on some comrades still exists. Despite the fact that the reply by the Front Committee and the Party Center's letter were published inside the party at the same time, the former does not appear to have had a great effect on these comrades. The reason is that the Party Center's letter coincides with the preferences of these comrades, while many later correct instructions by the Party Center on the situation were ignored by these comrades. Some take note of them, but cannot shake off their previous ideas. Therefore, I believe that it is still necessary to make a further explanation of this issue.

The plan to seize Jiangxi within a year was also proposed last April by the Front Committee to the Party Center, and a decision to that effect was later made at Yuandu.

[[The following section reproduces the reasons given in the April 1929 letter to the Party Center.]]

This proposal to seize Jiangxi erred only in setting a rigid time limit of one year. My understanding was that conditions would be ripe in Jiangxi and that prospects for a nationwide revolutionary high tide would soon arrive. If we were not convinced that a revolutionary high tide would soon arrive, we could not have concluded that we could have seized Jiangxi within one year. The shortcoming of the proposal was the rigid specification of one year, thus giving a flavor of rashness and mechanical thinking to the word "soon" in the statement "a revolutionary high tide will arrive soon." However, if you do not believe in seizing Jiangxi within a year, you come to this conclusion because you have overestimated the objective forces, underestimated subjective forces, and therefore do not believe in the rapid arrival of the revolutionary high tide. Jiangxi's objective conditions are very noteworthy. In addition to the aforementioned subjective conditions, three points concerning the objective conditions can be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Jiangxi is mainly feudal with exploitation

through land rent. The commercial bourgeoisie is quite small, and the armed forces of the landlords in that province are the weakest among all the other southern provinces. Second, Jiangxi has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces sent there to “suppress the Communists” and “suppress bandits”; these troops are not familiar with local conditions and have no vested interests like local troops, and so they are often unenthusiastic. Third, the province is further from the influence of imperialist intervention, unlike Guangdong, which is near Hong Kong and is dominated by Britain in almost all aspects. If we understand these three points, we can explain why the peasant uprisings in Jiangxi are more widespread than in all other provinces and why the Red Army guerrilla troops are more numerous than in all other provinces.

I have basically said what I want to say to you. Once I started to write, I probably wrote too much. However, I feel that our discussion is useful. If the issue we have discussed can be resolved correctly, it will greatly affect the actions of the Red Army. So I am pleased to have written this letter.

Finally, there are still two points that need to be clarified. The first is how to interpret the word “soon” in the phrase “a revolutionary high tide will arrive soon.” This is a common question among comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers; they should and can only point out the general direction of future developments and changes and should not specify the timing in a mechanistic way. However, when I talk of an arrival soon of a revolutionary high tide in China, I am definitely not speaking of something which in the words of some people “is possibly coming,” something devoid of practical meaning, empty and unattainable. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast can already be seen on the horizon. It is like a rising morning sun in the east whose brilliant rays can already be seen from a high mountaintop. It is like a child moving restlessly in his mother’s womb. The second point is that, in my view, you prefer to use mobile guerrilla methods to enlarge political influence. This does not mean that you have a purely military viewpoint and the idea of roving banditry. Obviously, you do not share these two ways of thinking, neither of which are capable of winning mass support. Instead, you propose to “go all out to mobilize the masses.” Indeed, you have not only proposed this, but also have actually done so. What I do not support is only our lack of in-depth ideas about establishing political power, because this will not help fulfill the task of mobilizing the masses and promoting the revolutionary high tide as successfully as you wish. The main purpose of my letter is to make this point.

If I am mistaken in any way, please correct me.

Mao Zedong
At Shanghang, Gutian

**C.26 The Current Political Situation and the Tasks
for the First Front Army and the Jiangxi Party.
Strive for an Initial Victory in Jiangxi! Launch
a Decisive Class War! (26 October 1930)¹³⁰**

I. The Victory at Ji'an and the New Revolutionary High Tide

The capture of Changsha, the subsequent massive offensives against the enemy, and the merging of the First and Third Armies as well as the takeover of Ji'an demonstrate that the strength of the Red Army has developed rapidly.¹³¹ Moreover, the sharp struggle of the proletariat in major cities throughout China and the development of soviet political power in the countryside also indicate that soon the Chinese revolutionary high tide will arrive. The takeover of Ji'an is particularly significant because it will enable us to organize several million people in southwest Jiangxi and establish the soviet government in an area of over twenty counties where we have a strong power base and wide support from the people. In fact, the capture of Ji'an marks the beginning of our complete victory in Jiangxi Province because it is the first time the Red Army has taken over a major city in recent years. The victory will not only help the Red Army develop quickly and arouse the revolutionary masses to launch a general uprising in Jiangxi in the near future, but also give impetus to the progress of the revolutionary movement all over the country. This will enhance the future nationwide revolutionary victory. Undoubtedly, we should utilize the victory at Ji'an to take over Jiangxi Province first.

II. The International Situation and the Prospects for the World Revolution

[[Facts show that the world revolutionary high tide is surging forward. This is very helpful to the Chinese revolution and will turn the war against the Soviet Union into the victory of the world revolution.

III. Some Important Events of the Warlord Wars

IV. Analyses of the Aforementioned Events

A. The war among Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan, and Feng Yuxiang is in fact a conflict among Britain, Japan, and the United States, and the confrontation between Britain and the United States has put Japan in a favorable position.

B. Our capture of Changsha, the subsequent massive offensives, and the takeover of Ji'an have not only greatly strengthened the Chinese revolutionary movement but also changed relations among various factions in the ruling regime. In other words, the development of the revolution and the intensified class struggle have caused the imperialists and the ruling regime in China to ease their own conflicts so as to work

together to deal with the revolution. It is possible for Japan and the United States to reach a tentative compromise, and the British will have to follow them. The agreements between the imperialists and the warlords will enable Chiang Kai-shek to transfer troops to suppress the revolution.

C. The anticommunist alliance will inevitably collapse before the revolutionary high tide. Their intended alliances cannot last, and a new warlord war will occur. The broad masses want the Soviet Congress to be convened on 7 November and do not want the National Assembly dominated by warlords, bureaucratic-gentry landlords, and capitalists. They do want the so-called Constitution but do want soviet laws and decrees. They do not want local autonomy but do want soviet political power.

D. At present, we have two kinds of incorrect views about the present warlord war. One is the nonproletarian overoptimistic view that believes the war will continue until the warlords destroy themselves and will be unable to form an alliance against the revolutionary forces. The second is a pessimistic view that holds that the revolutionary movement has met with great difficulty since our enemies have united. This is a nonproletarian viewpoint because it does not recognize the revolutionary high tide. The fact that the reactionaries have to form an alliance shows that the nationwide high tide has arrived.]]

V. The Guerrilla Line in Opposition to the Idea of an Initial Victory in One Province

The task of winning an initial victory in one province is now before us. To accomplish this, we must change the guerrilla line—a product of the past guerrilla warfare—and the concept of exclusive concern with military issues. This concept failed to estimate correctly the warlord war and to perceive the significance of winning victory in one province in the decisive class war. The concept isolated us from the people, paid no attention to winning over the masses or to mobilizing the people, and neglected the task of expanding and strengthening the Red Army. Militarily, this line overemphasizes the tactics of guerrilla warfare and refuses to make preparations for the decisive class war. Guerrilla-style attack appears to be a leftist line since it advocates offensive action, but in reality it is an ultrarightist line because it has postponed the arrival of the revolutionary victory in one province. The contrast between our failure in Changsha and our victory in Ji'an is a clear example. The reason why we failed the first time to hold Changsha for a substantial period of time was that we did not mobilize the people and our troops were not the main force of the Red Army. The second time, the Red Army failed to take over the city, despite a vigorous fight for a fortnight, because we lacked support from the masses and cooperation from the enemy soldiers. The case of Ji'an was just the opposite. With strong support from the people, the Red Army succeeded in capturing the city. The Red Army was able to capture Changsha the first time because the enemy had no reinforcements or strong fortifications. Only under such circum-

stances can a guerrilla-style attack succeed. At present, the enemy troops have large reinforcements and have built up strong defense works in Nanchang and Jiujiang. By contrast the Army is short of supplies and lacks transportation. In light of this background, if the Red Army fights with guerrilla-style attacks, it will surely fail, and we will have to retreat to other areas, thus postponing the initial victory in one province. In this sense, the idea of assaulting a city with a guerrilla-style attack has nothing in common with a well-planned strategy which aims at winning an initial victory in one province. Thus, we must resolutely correct this tactic. The Party Center has recently pointed out that the Red Army should enhance its military training and select well-qualified peasants and working-class cadres to form a strong main force and backbone of the Red Army. Only with a main force consisting of 30,000 to 50,000 well-trained Red Army troops can we succeed in capturing big cities and establishing the people's confidence in the Red Army. The Party Center also asks us to adopt a well-planned strategy. We think these instructions are very clear and have greatly helped our work to win an initial victory in one province. However, it would be a serious rightist mistake for the Red Army to use the excuse of a lack of cooperation from the people to avoid carrying out a ruthless attack and disperse its forces aimlessly or refused to fight even though it could win the battle. The problem of lack of supplies and training can be solved only through a well-planned struggle. We must apply strategy and tactics flexibly. Strategy is made in line with the objective situation and subjective strengths, while tactics are the means to be applied in line with various specific conditions in order to carry out the strategy. Therefore, tactics can be changed frequently as long as they do not run counter to strategy. For example, in order to capture Nanchang, it is necessary for us to take over Ji'an first. This is an absolutely correct strategy. One should not simply and mechanically ask: "Since we have planned to attack Nanchang, why do we now take over Ji'an?" Again, our strategy is to capture the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. Tactically, we may first attack or wipe out enemy forces in carefully selected areas along the Gan River and then take over the railway. It all depends on our and the enemy's strength at a specific time and place. We must never rigidly adhere to one tactic and must make this point clear to the lower-ranking Red Army cadres and soldiers. Otherwise, only knowing the general goal, they might have doubts and waver as soon as there are strategic or tactical changes. This would mean that leading organs would have to follow the soldiers with their wrong view, and it might jeopardize the flexible application of our strategy and tactics. We must pay special attention to this issue.

VI. The Central Task for the First Front Army and the Jiangxi Party Committee Is to Win an Initial Victory in Jiangxi

To take over provinces and regions around Wuhan, we should try to win an initial victory in Jiangxi and then expand to take over Wuhan. Of course, whether we can

win victory in Jiangxi depends on the progress of the nationwide revolutionary high tide. At present, however, conditions in Jiangxi are particularly favorable for us. We have established soviet political power in over sixty counties in Jiangxi. There are peasant uprisings throughout the province. The First and Third Armies have joined forces. The Tenth Army is continuing its offensives toward the mouth of Pan-Yang Lake. The capture of Ji'an is particularly significant because it has gathered together all the revolutionary forces and created a powerful position threatening Nanchang. The economic base of the landlords and capitalists in rural areas in Jiangxi has been severely destroyed and will be completely wiped out as the revolution develops. Propaganda work conducted by the Red Army in the Qing River area has induced a whole platoon of the enemy's Eighteenth Division to cross the river with their guns and surrender. The enemy soldiers have said that they will not open fire when we attack Nanchang. Enemy officers have become so panicked that they even gather the soldiers together at midnight to give them an admonitory talk. Recently, some enemy soldiers have surrendered with their guns to our Third Army. They told us that the enemy troops had not received any allowance for five months, soldiers had deserted, and officers were often assassinated. They also said that many soldiers wanted to surrender to the Red Army because there is no oppression in the Red Army. These facts prove that the reactionary army—the tool of the ruling class to suppress the revolution—is no longer loyal to the regime. Past experiences have shown that enemy soldiers are reluctant to fight tough battles and that even though they outnumber us they are not invincible. The power struggle within the counterrevolutionary regime has not come to an end, and a new conflict is brewing. Chiang Kai-shek has merely taken advantage of the tentative compromise to deal with the revolution. Although he has sent many troops to Jiangxi, we will certainly defeat them because they are exhausted from the warlords' war. So long as we can strengthen our political and organizational leadership, we will certainly be able to wipe out the main force of the enemy. Therefore, the current task for the Jiangxi Party Committee and the First Front Army is to carry out a decisive class war with a well-planned strategy and with cooperation from the people to win a preliminary victory in Jiangxi Province.

VII. Tasks for the First Front Army and the Jiangxi Party Committee in Line with the Aforementioned Guidelines

1. We must intensify propaganda and agitation to expose the warlords' suppression of the revolution and enhance our preparation for the armed uprisings to seize political power in Jiangxi. We should spread the news of our victory in Ji'an and the establishment of the soviet government in Ji'an and the establishment of the soviet government in Jiangxi, publicize all the decrees and documents issued by the soviet government, put forward such slogans as "Oppose warlords' suppression of the revolution" and "Carry out armed uprisings to seize political power in Jiangxi,"

encourage the people to fight for the soviet, and firmly defeat the enemy's attack with a decisive class war to win an initial victory in Jiangxi. As the revolutionary high tide is coming, we should step up our struggle against various reformists, the Reorganization clique, the Third Party, the liquidationists, the A.B. League,¹³² and deceitful policies, as well as the National Assembly sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek. We must do our best to expose all their crimes and eliminate their influence among the masses. It is a very serious task for us to smash the enemy's plot to weaken the revolution in the forthcoming decisive class war.

2. We must improve our work in Nanchang, Jiujiang, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. At present, uprisings launched by the working class are a major and necessary means in the struggle to win over big cities. Enemies often make a final effort to hold cities with fortified defense works. Our failure at Changsha has taught us that it is impossible to win an initial victory in one province if we cannot win the support of people in big cities. Now we should correct the pessimistic attitude toward urban work, cease to neglect it, and overcome all kinds of difficulties to carry out our work in cities. The major task for the labor movement is to organize direct armed uprisings, launch political strikes, establish red trade unions, and set up workers' militia and pickets, which are to be used as the main force during uprisings. The daily economic struggle must be linked to the armed uprisings.

3. In preparing local uprisings, we should begin in Anfu, Aihe, Xinyu, Fengyi, and Yuanzhou in west Jiangxi; Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, and Xing'an in east Jiangxi; and Ganzhou and the other counties in south Jiangxi. We must wage guerrilla warfare and launch uprisings to liberate the white areas in order to link all the red areas together. We must expand further to Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, and Hubei and destroy the enemy's attacks through mass uprisings. However, we should bear in mind lessons from the past and confiscate immediately all land in local uprisings and distribute it equally to the peasants. In the struggle, we should establish the leadership of farmhands, set up independent farmhand unions, and organize poor-peasant associations. We must not allow the rich peasants to sneak into the soviet government and the red militia, and we must firmly promote farmhands and poor peasants as leaders. From the very beginning, the struggle in the countryside should not only ruthlessly attack the landlords but also distribute land to the peasants, abolish all rents and debts, oppose all kinds of exploitation and oppression of poor peasants by the rich, and mobilize the poor peasants to fight against the rich. Only in this way can we thoroughly wipe out feudal influences and consolidate the revolutionary base.

4. We should mobilize the broad masses of people to participate in the war, expand the soviet movement, develop the revolutionary struggle throughout the country, and point out to the people that the final victory is certainly ours. It is of vital importance to mobilize the broad masses—men, women, old, and young—to cooperate with the Red Army in the decisive class war to defeat the main forces of the enemy and strive for an initial victory in Jiangxi. In the areas where the enemy

will launch offensives, such Xiajiang, Xinyu, Fengui, Yuanzhou, Anfu, Lianhua, Ji'an, Jushui, Yongfeng, and Le'an, we should concentrate the red militia and Young Pioneers to intensify their military and political training. They should be placed under unified leadership to reconnoiter the enemy troops' route, sabotage their rear areas, destroy their transport, capture their weapons, cut off their supplies, ambush them whenever possible, and continually disrupt them to bog them down in the red areas so that we can wipe them out completely. The red militia should help the Red Army with sentry duties, reconnoitering among the enemy troops, transportation, and giving first aid to the wounded. We must organize the masses in every county and every district and try our best to collect enough spears, locally made cannons, and gunpowder. It is necessary to carry out the mass line, hold mass meetings in every district and town, and encourage the people to discuss plans among themselves and prepare for the war. Only if the masses take the initiative to participate in the war can we consider it our political victory. We must strongly oppose commandism, which forces people to carry out orders they do not understand, and parochialism, which means the party and soviet leaders make decisions on important issues at will without consulting the masses. Such behavior would give people the impression that they worked for individual leaders. At the same time, we should expose brutalities of the warlords in suppressing the revolution such as massacring the innocent, burning houses, and forcing revolutionaries to defect. We should raise the class consciousness of the masses and call on them to "fight to the end for class interests and never surrender to the enemy" so as to strengthen their will to fight. In the soviet areas outside the war zone, we must also mobilize the masses and push the revolutionary movement toward the white areas to expand our territory. It is important to unite all the people to fight against local gentry and landlords and persuade the revolutionary masses not to carry out reprisals but to distribute all the land equally. When we move into the white areas, we should remain there for a substantial period of time to help the people distribute land, and establish soviet political power so as to eliminate the difference between the red and white areas.

5. We must improve our work on the soldiers' movement in the white army. The heavy casualties of the warlords' war, the unbearable oppression as well as the miserable living conditions, and the worker-peasant revolutionary high tide have affected the enemy soldiers and caused them to lean toward the revolution. Recently, enemy soldiers have frequently come with their weapons to join the Red Army. Although there has not yet been a mutiny in the white army, conditions have matured. Now, we must establish party organizations and leadership in the white army. Local party organizations and party committees in the Red Army should correct their past negligence of this work and do their best to implement the task. We must understand that without the disintegration of the white army, the revolution will not be victorious. To do this work well, we must build up a broad political basis and secret organizations in the white army and turn the warlords' war into a revolutionary war to eliminate the warlords and liberate the workers and peasants.

We should raise the class consciousness of the enemy soldiers, help them launch mutinies, and correct the narrow-minded opportunist line that is interested only in encouraging a few enemy soldiers to desert with their weapons. Our local Red Army party committees and political departments must establish a special office for the soldiers' movement and dispatch a large number of cadres to the white army through various channels to carry out the work. At present, we must pay particular attention to soldiers and officers in the lower ranks of the enemy troops recently transferred to Jiangxi. We should tell them that they have received nothing except heavy casualties from the long and brutal warlords' war in Shandong and Henan and now they are being sent back to attack the workers and peasants. We must point out to them the evil nature of the warlords, the current progress of the revolutionary movement, and that their only escape is to launch a mutiny and participate in the worker-peasant revolution. In areas occupied by the white army, we should organize a mass movement to cause the enemy troops to fall apart. We must encourage women, children, and old men to contact and influence the enemy soldiers by washing clothes for them and selling things to them (except grain). The red militia should, on the one hand, bravely capture the enemy's weapons and, on the other, treat the captured enemy soldiers well in order to win them over. In this way we can expose the enemy's lie that the red militia kills prisoners of war.

VIII. Goals for West Jiangxi, South Jiangxi, and Other Soviet Areas

1. Unite farmhands and the poor peasants to oppose the rich peasants. In places where fertile fields are in the hands of the rich peasants, we should redistribute land according to its quality by taking fertile fields from the rich peasants and giving them to the poor. This is the most practical strategy to wage the class struggle in the countryside, satisfy the needs of the broad masses, and thoroughly smash the counterrevolutionary plot of the rich peasants. In places where land has been distributed fairly in both quantity and quality, our task is to protect the victory of land distribution and not allow anyone to change the principle of distribution. Our slogan is to "Protect the fair distribution and change the unfair."

2. Completely reorganize party YL organizations to purge all rich peasants and counterrevolutionaries (the A.B. League). This is necessary because party and YL organizations in west and south Jiangxi are full of rich peasants and counterrevolutionaries. The reorganization cannot be carried out unless we distribute land thoroughly and fairly, wage class struggle of farmhands and poor peasants against the rich, purge the rich peasants and all waverers, mobilize the masses to participate in the decisive class war against the enemy's attacks, and promote to leading positions the activists among the farmhands and the poor. Meanwhile, in cities (including county towns, especially the town of Ji'an), we must firmly protect the interests of the poor workers, let them run factories, and put forward labor-pro-

tection laws to oppose the capitalists' exploitation of the workers. We should also guard against those workers who are close to or are not exploited directly by the capitalists. We must use these struggles to purge the petty bourgeoisie and other vacillating elements from party organizations in both rural and urban areas. We must promote staunch proletarian fighters to leading positions.

3. We must advocate the slogans "Dismiss the cadres who violate the interests of the poor workers and peasants" and "Dismiss the cadres who violate the principles of the soviet congress." It is necessary to reorganize the soviet government at all levels, select cadres from farmhands, poor peasants, and leaders of the real working people, and purge the rich peasants and counterrevolutionaries (the A.B. League) from the soviet government at all levels. This is necessary because the soviet government from top to bottom in west and south Jiangxi is full of rich peasants and counterrevolutionaries. The soviet government should also get rid of new-style bureaucratism and commandism since they isolate us from the people and cause damage to our work. An important strategy to strengthen the soviet government is to invite working people to participate in the management of government activities. We must allow the delegates to the soviet congress to discuss and make decisions on all major issues. The soviet government should report on its work to the delegates and listen to their opinions and criticism. There should be regular meetings of the soviet congress at the village, town, and other levels. We oppose the fixed-delegates system and advocate the idea of "selecting poor worker and peasant leaders as delegates." In districts with big populations and covering large areas, it is necessary to set up the soviet government at the village level. However, members of the village soviet government should not become full-time cadres or have salaries. Only in this way can we prevent the emergence of new-style bureaucratism, make all the administrative work meet the requirements of the people, get support from the masses, and strengthen soviet political power.

4. Politically, we should expose all kinds of conspiracies of the A.B. League, ruthlessly suppress it, eliminate its influence among the masses, and execute all its activists.

5. We must set up genuine working-class trade unions in the cities, let the workers run factories, and improve the organization and training of the pickets.

6. We must establish an independent farmhands union. This is very important to ensure proletarian leadership in the countryside. We need to hold regular meetings of the farmhand union at the branch level, emphasize class education to its members, and lead them to fight against the rich peasants. In order to win over the basic masses of the poor peasants and launch class struggle against the rich, we must also organize poor peasant associations for the poor peasants who have suffered from heavy exploitation in the past and who still have an impoverished life even after the land distribution. Activists among them should be selected and promoted to leading positions.

7. We should expand greatly the Red Army and its reserves by persuading the broad masses to join our forces. However, we must strongly oppose commandism

and deceptive methods in our work because such behavior will not help recruitment but jeopardize it. The reserves should also have military and political training, good commanders, and take part in mass work.

IX. The Current Task for the First Front Army

A. Military strategy: As a large number of the enemy troops are moving toward us, it is a good opportunity for the First and Third Armies to replenish arms, recruit soldiers, and create the main force of the Red Army. Our current strategy is to develop the victory at Ji'an to win further victories and take over the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway, Nanchang, and Jiujiang. This means that we must mobilize the people in the areas between Ji'an and Nanchang, solve the supply problem, speed up the mobilization of the masses in our rear areas, and prepare supplies in order to launch a decisive war to wipe out the enemy's main force and win victory throughout the province.

B. Strengthen political training in the Red Army. At present, we should concentrate our propaganda work in preparation for a decisive class war and strive for an initial victory in Jiangxi. We must point out that the coalition of counterrevolutionaries will certainly collapse and that their massive offensives are in fact an excellent opportunity for us to create a main force of the Red Army. In this way, we can strengthen the fighting will of our officers and soldiers. At the same time, the Red Army should pay attention to the struggle against the A.B. League and the Reorganizationists, improve the general political education of the new soldiers, and establish soldiers' committees and party organizations. We must try our best to improve the party's leadership and expand its organizations. Within a month, the number of party members in both the First and Third Armies should be doubled. We should also work out a propaganda plan to teach communist theory and revolutionary ideas to our soldiers and eliminate illiteracy among them so as to raise the political level of the Red Army. It is necessary to lead our soldiers to do mass work frequently and enlarge the Red Army by recruiting workers and peasants in the mass struggle, thus creating a Red Army of iron.

C. Intensify the training of practical military techniques. This is particularly important because there are many new soldiers in the Red Army and we are going to carry out a decisive class war. We should scrap impractical formal military drills (such as manner drills) so as to make full use of the time to finish practical military training. Commanders in both armies should draw up a plan to supervise and check the implementation of this task.

Notes to Commentary C

1. The Conference was attended by twenty-two Chinese Communists and three Soviet advisors. The Chinese participants were CC members: Li Weihai, Qu Qiubai, Zhang Tailei, Deng Zhongxia, Ren Bishi, Su Zhaozheng, Gu Shunzhang, Luo Yinong, Chen Qiaonian, Cai

Hesen; Alternates: Li Zhenying, Lu Chen, Mao Zedong; Central Control Commission members: Yang Baoan, Wang Hebo; CYL representatives: Li Zifen, Yang Shannan, Lu Dingyi; Hunan representative: Peng Gongda; Hubei representative: Zheng Chaolin; Military representative: Wang Ruofei; Secretary: Deng Xiaoping; Comintern: Lominadze and two others. This list of participants was compiled on the basis of the meeting's notes and is contained in The Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives, "Guanyu baqi huiyi ruogan qingkuang de diaocha baogao" (Report of an Investigation into Some Circumstances Concerning the 7 August Conference), in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, p. 199.

2. This was formally discussed and approved by a Standing Committee meeting held on 3 August. "Baqi huiyi qingkuang jieshao" (Introduction to the Circumstances of the 7 August Conference), *Dangshi yanjiu* [Party research], no. 3 (1980): 30–31.

3. This conflict and its relevance to China is traced in C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China*.

4. This view differs somewhat from that expressed in Brandt et al. The authors attribute the mention of continued cooperation with the GMD to Stalin's need "to hide the ugly facts which belied his infallibility." C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J.K. Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, p. 98.

5. B. Lominadze had arrived in China as the Comintern representative to replace M. Borodin and M.N. Roy. He participated in drafting the "Circular Letter" adopted by the meeting. He returned to the Soviet Union at the end of 1927.

6. See "Dang de zuzhi wenti yijuean" (Resolution on the Question of Party Organization), in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 44–47. An abstract of this resolution and others adopted at the Conference can be found in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, pp. 118–23. A full translation of the resolution on organization can be found in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, book 1, pp. 451–55.

7. Its members were: Su Zhaozheng, Xiang Zhongfa, Qu Qiubai, Luo Yinong, Gu Shunzhang, Wang Hebo, Li Weiha, Peng Pai, Ren Bishi; alternate members were: Deng Zhongxia, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Peng Gongda, Zhang Tailei, Zhang Guotao, and Li Lisan.

8. Mao Zedong was appointed secretary of a south Hunan special party committee that would independently direct local work during the Uprising.

9. In fact, Mao did not arrive in time for the meeting; the committee was reorganized without his participation and the results were communicated to him. See **Doc. C.8**.

10. For an account of the decision to cancel the attack on Changsha by the Russian adviser in Hunan, "Comrade Ma," see "Report from Comrade Ma in Hunan" (16 September 1927), translated in H. Pak, *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party 1927–1930*, pp. 103–8.

11. The Front Committee had been set up to coordinate the Uprising in Hunan. In fact, the Hunan Party Committee had already decided on 15 September to call off the attack on Changsha.

12. The meeting was held in Shanghai and was attended by, among others, Politburo members: Qu Qiubai, Su Zhaozheng, Li Weiha, Luo Yinong, Ren Bishi, Xiang Zhongfa, Gu Shunzhang; alternates: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Tailei, Li Lisan, Deng Zhongxia, and Zhang Guotao; Northern Bureau representative: Cai Hesen; representative of the Shunzhi Provincial Committee: Peng Shuzhi; representative of the Yangtze Bureau and Hubei Provincial Committee: Ren Xu. Lominadze delivered a political report. The meeting elected Zhou Enlai and Luo Yinong to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. See Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao*, pp. 71–72, 75.

13. The suggestion that the Congress be held in Moscow had been made by Qu Qiubai, as

head of the temporary Politburo, and a Comintern representative in China, O.A. Mitkevich. This was accepted by the ECCI. A. Grigoriev and K. Shevelyov, "On the 60th Anniversary of the 6th CPC Congress," *Far Eastern Affairs*, no. 5 (1988): 81–82.

14. Zhao Pu, "Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiaohui" (The Sixth Party Congress), *Dangshi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1980): 51–52.

15. Drafts of these resolutions were prepared for discussion in April. Grigoriev and Shevelyov, "On the 60th Anniversary of the 6th CPC Congress," p. 82. The Congress was attended by eighty-four delegates with voting rights and a further fifty-four people who did not have such rights. Even Chen Duxiu had been invited to participate, but he declined to do so.

16. "Resolution on the Chinese Question," February 1928, in X.J. Eudin and R.M. Slusser (eds.), *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928–1934: Documents and Materials*, pp. 83–86.

17. It should be noted that the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI (November 1926) had already put forward the thesis that the rural question was the central component of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

18. In fact, the party was already becoming a predominantly peasant party. A breakdown of the party membership of 130,194 presented to the Congress showed that 76.6 percent were peasants, and only 10.9 percent workers. Intellectuals accounted for 7.2 percent, rank-and-file soldiers 0.82 percent, and other categories 3.5 percent. Zhao Pu, "Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiao dahui," *Dangshi yanjiu*, no. 3 (1980): 47. However, the peasantry was severely underrepresented among the eighty-four official delegates to the Congress. Workers accounted for 51 percent, intellectuals for 45 percent, and peasants for only 7 percent. Zhao Pu, "Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiao dahui," *Dangshi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1980): 52.

19. Zhao Pu, "Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiao dahui," *Dangshi yanjiu*, no. 4 (1980): 70.

20. Zhou Enlai also stood for the post of general secretary but was defeated in a majority vote.

21. The account of Li Lisan and his policies draws on B. Yang, "Complexity and Reasonability: Reassessment of the Li Lisan Adventure," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 21 (January 1989).

22. "Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui gei Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui de xin," in the Translation Department of the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), *Gongchan guoji youguan Zhongguo geming de wenxian ziliao*, vol. 2, pp. 1–18.

23. See the CCP CC resolution in the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao*, vol. 2, pp. 6–9.

24. The Plenum was held in Shanghai, although one usually reliable source states that it opened in Canton on 25 June 1929. See Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 84. It was attended by, among others, Zhou Enlai, Luo Dengxian, Xiang Zhongfa, Guan Xiangying, Xiang Ying, Lu Futan, Xu Xigen, and Zhou Xiuzhu. See Jiang Huxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Sheng (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, pp. 91–92.

25. The letter was published in *Pravda* on 29 December 1929.

26. See "Zhongguo gongchandang jieshou gongchan guoji dishici quanti huiyi jueyi de jueyi" (Resolution of the CCP Accepting the Resolution of the Comintern's Tenth Plenum), 20 December 1929, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 593–602 (originally published in *Buersheweike* [The Bolshevik], vol. 3, no. 1 [15 January 1930]), and "Jieshou guoji yijiuerjiunian shiyue ershilii ri zhishixin de jueyi—guanyu lun guomindang gaizu pai he Zhongguo gongchandang de renwu" (Decision Accepting the Comintern's Directive of 26 October 1929—Concerning Discussion of the Reorganization Faction of the GMD and the Tasks of the CCP), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 6, pp. 1–13.

27. One month later Chen Duxiu was expelled from the party.

28. This was one of several letters. For example, Chen had already sent a letter to

members of the Standing Committee on 5 August 1929 putting forward a defense of his position. See “Chen Duxiu guanyu Zhongguo geming wenti zhi Zhonggong zhongyang xin” (Chen Duxiu on the Problem of the Chinese Revolution and the Letter of the CCP CC), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 724–43.

29. See the confession of Xiang Zhongfa in Wang Jianmin, *Zhongguo gongchandang shigao*, vol. 2, pp. 159–61.

30. The war lasted until 3 November 1930 and spread to a dozen provinces, mainly in northern China.

31. The Academy of Military Sciences (ed.), *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dashiji*, pp. 42–43. Mao Zedong did not attend these meetings and was busy compiling reports on the situation in rural China that would provide important information for his future policy development. On the basis of reports presented at a fact-finding meeting, Mao wrote his “Report from Xunwu.” A translation can be found in Roger R. Thompson, trans., *Mao Zedong, Report from Xunwu*. In October of the same year, Mao wrote his “Report from Xingguo.” See *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 182–251.

32. This was adopted by a Politburo meeting held from 9 to 11 June in Shanghai. Among others, it was attended by Xiang Zhongfa, Li Lisan, Guan Xiangying, Xiang Ying, Li Weiham, and Wen Yuchang.

33. The agent of the Far Eastern Office of the ECCI in Shanghai did reply in a letter of 20 June. He expressed his disagreement with the resolution and requested that it not be distributed. This seems to have angered Li Lisan sufficiently to write to the ECCI calling for his dismissal and the dissolution of the office. Yang Yunruo, *Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi jishi, 1919–1943*, p. 86.

34. For details of the meeting see Jiang Huxuan et al. (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 111–14, and Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 103–5. See also, “Zhongyang tongzhi diyisiqi hao—hongsequ cheng zuigao de junshi zhengzhi zhidao jiguan (gongnong geming weiyuanhui) zhi chansheng yu yunyong” (CC Circular No. 147—the Creation and Utilization of the Highest Military and Political Leading Organ in the Red Areas [the Workers and Peasants’ Revolutionary Committee]), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 178–80.

35. This letter has usually been referred to as the 23 July letter because of the date when it was received in Shanghai. The letter was drafted in May in response to the CCP decisions. See A. Grigoriev, “The Comintern and the Revolutionary Movement in China Under the Slogan of the Soviets (1927–1931),” in R.A. Ulyanovsky (ed.), *The Comintern and the East*, pp. 345–88. For the differing views see B. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, p. 143: “Far from condemning the Politburo 11 June letter, the ECCI letter of 23 July actually endorses its basic strategic suggestions”; Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930–1934*, vol. 1, p. 25: “A close examination of the Comintern directive of 23 July 1930 and the CCP Politburo resolution of 11 June shows discrepancies which go beyond the scope of timing and tactics”; R. Thornton, *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931*, p. 175: “The Comintern’s analyses then stripped Li of any theoretical ambiguities he might have attempted to use to maintain his position.”

36. There was no direct telegraphic communication between the Party Center and the Comintern before early 1931.

37. In June 1930, Peng’s Fifth Red Army had been reorganized into the Third Army Corps.

38. Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu*, pp. 149–55. It is important to draw a distinction between Peng Dehuai’s capture of Changsha and Li Lisan’s leadership.

39. Yang Yunruo, *Gongchan guoji*, p. 96. Li even suggested that Soviet Russia dispatch troops to attack northern China.

40. Qu and Zhou arrived back from Moscow in the second half of August. Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 105.

41. The Plenum was held in Shanghai and was presided over by Qu and Zhou. It was attended by ten CC members (Xiang Zhongfa, Xu Xigen, Zhang Jinbao, Luo Dengxian, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, Yu Maohuai, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Gu Shunzhang), four alternates (Wang Ruofei, Shi Wenbin, Zhou Xiuzhu, and Luo Zhanglong), two members of the Control Commission and twenty members from the various bureaus, provincial committees, and youth league organizations. Jiang Huxuan et al. (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 116.

42. Full Politburo members were: Xiang Zhongfa, Xiang Ying, Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Guan Xiangying, and Zhang Guotao. Alternates were: Luo Dengxian, Xu Xigen, Lu Futan, Li Weiham, Wen Yucheng, Mao Zedong, and Gu Zuolin. In name, Xiang Zhongfa was general secretary, but in practice work was supervised by Qu Qiubai. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, p. 142, and Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 106.

43. Thus, for example, even at the ECCI meeting of 26 August 1930, while Li Lisan was blamed for committing some mistakes, he was not accused of pursuing a wrong line. The meeting promoted the idea that if the Red Army increased in strength, it would be possible to capture one or more industrial centers. This presumably would have been the kind of idea which Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubai brought back to China with them.

44. The "returned students" group refers to those who had come back to China from studies in Soviet Russia. They formed a loose group under the leadership of Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian. The group, insofar as it existed as a coherent entity, began to fragment on its return to China. The group is also referred to as the "Twenty-eight Bolsheviks" after the group of students who returned from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Pavel Mif had been their patron and had influenced them through his positions as director of the ECCI's Chinese Commission, deputy director of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat, and president of Sun Yat-sen University.

45. Shao Yu [Wang Ming], "The Current War Among the Warlords and the Tasks of the Party," *Buersheweike*, 15 June 1930.

46. This letter is often referred to as the letter of 16 November 1930 because of the date of its arrival in China. "Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui guanyu Li Lisan luxian wenti gei Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui weiyuan de xin" (Letter from the ECCI to Members of the CCP CC Concerning the Li Lisan Line), in the Translation Department of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), *Gongchan guoji*, pp. 103-12.

47. It was attended by thirty-seven delegates of whom fifteen including Wang Ming were not CC members. This group, however, had the right to vote. The CC members in attendance were: Xiang Zhongfa, Guan Xiangying, Wen Yucheng, Ren Bishi, He Chang, Li Weiham, Yu Fei, Xu Xigen, Qu Qiubai, Luo Dengxian, Zhang Jinbao, Gu Shunzhang, Chen Yu, and Zhou Enlai. Jiang Huxuan et al. (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 125.

48. Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 108-9. The name list for Politburo members had been approved prior to the Plenum by the Politburo and the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau and was presented by Zhou Enlai. Shi Wenbin presented an alternative list, but the majority voted to accept the former list. The new Politburo comprised: Xiang Zhongfa, Xiang Ying, Xu Xigen, Zhang Guotao, Chen Yu, Zhou Enlai, Lu Futan, Ren Bishi, and Wang Ming. The seven alternates were: Luo Dengxian, Guan Xiangying, Wang Kequan, Liu Shaoqi, Wen Yucheng, Mao Zedong, and Gu Shunzhang. Xiang Zhongfa, Zhou Enlai, and Zhang Guotao were to form the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Jiang Huxuan et al. (eds.), *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 126-27.

49. See He Mengxiong's two letters in Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement*, vol. 2, pp. 125-27.

50. Luo Zhanglong when interviewed by Tony Saich in the summer of 1988 confirmed his view that they had been betrayed by Wang Ming's supporters. Luo himself had been sent by the group to organize in Hong Kong and had escaped arrest.

51. “Guanyu kaichu Luo Zhanglong zhongyang weiyuanhui dangji de juejian” (Resolution Concerning the Expulsion of Luo Zhanglong from the Party and the CC), *Dang de jianshe* (Party Reconstruction), no. 3 (15 February 1931): 31–35. A translation can be found in Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, pp. 273–76.

52. On 31 January 1931, Luo’s group set up an extraordinary CC with Sun Zhengyi (a worker representative) as secretary general and Luo himself as director of the Propaganda Department.

53. These are the two letters mentioned in Mao’s article “A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire”; see below **Doc. C.25**. “Radical” and “moderate” are highly subjective terms in this context and need to be treated with care. With reference to Li, “radical” is used to indicate his tendency to interpret Comintern directives and policies as encouraging a policy of imminent uprisings. “Moderate” is used to refer to Zhou as he followed the more cautious, albeit ambiguous, tone set by Bukharin and the Comintern at the CCP’s Sixth Party Congress in Moscow. On the whole, the Comintern favored restraint over revolutionary adventurism. At this stage, however, Zhou, seeing no value in Mao’s exploits on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, claimed at the Sixth Party Congress that Mao’s troops were like “bandits” and were “flying from place to place.” Zhou’s comments in the stenographic records of the Congress are reported in E. H. Carr, *Foundation of a Planned Economy 1926–1929*, vol. 3, p. 867. I am grateful to Professor Stuart Schram for pointing out the problem of referring to Zhou as a moderate during this period; it is worth pointing out that the evidence is not clear-cut and that a case can be made for a more “radical” Zhou.

54. “Zhongyang gei sijun qianwei de xin” (Letter from the Party Center to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army), 3 April 1930, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 57–60. An English translation can be found in Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, pp. 38–42.

55. In May 1930, Peng’s Fifth Army became the Third Army Corps during the general reorganization of the military.

56. “Zhongyang tonggao nongzi dijiuhao—muqian nongmin yundong zong celüe,” in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 84–89. This copy is taken from the original document in the Central Party Archives.

57. Li Jishen was a southwestern general who had supported the Nationalists. On 15 April 1927, Li turned on the Communists in Canton, arresting some 2,000 and killing over 100. On 17 November 1927, Li was driven out of Canton in a coup that seemed to provide the opportunity for a communist uprising. This uprising, the Canton Commune, was crushed between 11 and 13 December. Tang Shengzhi was a general in Hunan who supported the Nationalists. In July 1927, he supported Wang Jingwei’s extermination of the Communists in Wuhan.

58. An Zhongyuan is the code name used for the CCP CC. Zong Rongming is the code name for the Central Peasant Department.

59. “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui gao quan dang dangyuan shu” was drafted on the basis of discussions at the 7 August Emergency Conference held in Hankou and disseminated to all party members. The translation here is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 102–18. This was translated from the Chinese text in *Zhongguo geming* (The Chinese Revolution), January 1933: 149–205, on microfilm at the Hoover Institution Library, Stanford. It has been checked and modified against the text published in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 5–37. This latter text was taken from *Zhongyang tongxun* (Central Bulletin), no. 1 (1927).

60. This was the ECCI Resolution on the Chinese Question of July 1927. This resolution was to form the basis of the Chinese critique of past policy.

61. Xu was a militarist who turned against the Communists. On 21 May 1927, his troops were ordered to break up the peasant associations in Changsha. The resultant massacre was called the “Horse Day Massacre.”

62. “Zhongguo gongchandang gao quan guo nongmin qunzhong” (CCP Circular to the Nation’s Peasant Masses), *Xiangdao zhoubao* (The Guide Weekly), no. 197 (8 June 1927).

63. See “Duiyu Hunan gongnong yundong taidu” (Attitude Toward the Hunan Workers and Peasants’ Movement), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 136–37.

64. The attack of Xu Kexiang’s troops on the Communists and the peasant associations on 21 May 1927.

65. General Tang first appeared to support the CCP but later turned against it. This refers to a telegram sent by Tang to the national government at Wuhan.

66. Tan Pingshan served in the GMD-left government as head of the Central Peasant Department.

67. In early 1927 General Zhu Peide had been considered hostile to Chiang Kai-shek. After the break between Chiang and the Communists, however, Zhu fell in line on 6 June 1927 when he ordered all Communists to be expelled from Jiangxi.

68. “Gongchan guoji daibiao Luominneisi de baogao” is a report delivered to the 7 August Emergency Conference. This translation is taken from the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 49–55. This is a reprint from the notes of the Conference contained in the Central Party Archives, Beijing.

69. Tan Pingshan participated in the Temporary Action Committee of the Chinese GMD, one of a number of third parties that tried unsuccessfully to carve out a space between the CCP and GMD. This was the forerunner of the Chinese Workers and Peasants’ Democratic Party.

70. Ironically, Tan Pingshan had played a dominant role in the Nanchang Uprising and chaired the Revolutionary Committee of the GMD, the executive body supposedly in charge of the Uprising.

71. “Zhongyang changwei daibiao Qu Qiubai de baogao” is found in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.) *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 69–72. This is taken from an original copy in the Central Party Archives, Beijing.

72. “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui dui zhengju xuanyan” (Statement of the CCP CC on the Current Situation), 13 July 1927, *Xiangdao zhoubao*, no. 201 (18 July 1927). The statement criticized the nationalist government for not protecting the workers and peasants as well as announcing the resignation of Tan Pingshan and Su Zhaozheng from their posts in the government. However, the statement maintained a commitment to working together with the GMD.

73. On 1 June 1927, the Communists in Wuhan received a telegram from Stalin sending instructions. It contained orders that were impossible to execute, calling for the seizure of land by the masses from below and the replacement of wavering GMD CC members by peasant and working-class leaders. Unreliable generals were to be relied on no longer, and a new army corps were to be created. On 5 June, the Comintern representative, M.N. Roy, revealed the contents to Wang Jingwei. Wang’s shock at the contents led to the break between the Wuhan government and the Communists.

74. General Zhang Fakui headed the Second Front Army, which had recently moved from Guangdong to take control of northern Jiangxi. Support of elements of his troops was seen as important for the uprisings in the southern provinces. If Zhang could not be persuaded to join by leading his troops back to Guangdong, the Communists would try to take over control of them.

75. At the time, Ye Ting headed the Twenty-fourth Division, and he became one of the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising.

76. On 24 July 1927, Song Qingling, Sun Yat-sen’s widow, had issued a statement denouncing Wang Jingwei’s anticommunist policies and announcing her resignation from the national government. This supported Deng Yanda’s earlier “Declaration of Resignation.”

77. At the time, Zhang, who was a Communist, was working in the Northwest Army.

78. “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui zhi Zhongguo guomindang geming tongzhi shu” (Letter from the CEC of the CCP to Revolutionary Comrades in the GMD), 29 July 1927, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 227–37.

79. “Mao Zedong guanyu gongchan guoji daibiao baogao de fayan,” in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, p. 58. These comments are reprinted from the original notes in the Central Party Archives.

80. This was Mao’s report on his investigation into the peasant movement in Hunan. See above, **Doc. B.20**.

81. This refers to the “Horse Day” (21 May 1927) massacre in Changsha. Party leaders, in order to preserve cooperation with the GMD, claimed that peasants had broken loose from control and had precipitated a reign of terror on the people.

82. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Xiang E Yue Gan sisheng nongmin qiushou baodong dagang,” in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 102–4. This is taken from an original document in the Central Party Archives.

83. “Zhongyang gei Hunan shengwei xin—linshi zhongyang zhengzhiju duiyu Xiang sheng gongzuo de jueyi,” in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Baqi huiyi*, pp. 112–14. This reprinted version is taken from the original in the Central Party Archives.

84. Mayeer was a Russian who acted as an advisor to the Hunan Provincial Committee. This is presumably the same person as Comrade Ma [Kefu] who provided a report on the circumstances under which the planned attack on Changsha was canceled. His account shows that there were severe internal divisions over the implementation of the Uprising. His report was originally published in *Zhongyang tongxun*, no. 6 (30 September 1927): 4–8; a translation can be found in Pak, *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 103–8. According to Hofheinz, “Comrade Ma” probably arrived together with Lominadze to direct the Uprising in Hunan. R. Hofheinz, Jr., “The Autumn Harvest Insurrection,” *China Quarterly*, no. 32 (1967): 76.

85. The three counties of Chenxian, Yichang, and Ruchen.

86. In the plan of 3 August Xia Xi was included as a member. See **Doc. C.6**.

87. This is a code name for the CCP CC.

88. “Guanyu Hunan qiushou baodong jingguo de baogao (jielu).” The extract of this report is reprinted in the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao*, vol. 3, pp. 7–18.

89. On 15 July 1927, the Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announced an end to all cooperation between the GMD and the CCP.

90. Zedong insisted most strongly that we reduce the scope of the uprising. Lirong, Minghan, and others all agreed with him. Gongda was the only one at that time to advocate an uprising throughout Hunan and insisted Zedong go to south Hunan immediately. He finally gave up his view because of the plan to launch an immediate uprising at Changsha. [Footnote in original Chinese text.]

91. “Zhongguo xianzhuang yu gongchandang de renwu jueyan” is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 445–67. The Resolution was adopted by the Temporary Politburo at an Enlarged Session held in Shanghai on 9 and 10 November 1927. The session was presided over by Qu Qiubai. It was revised, examined, and approved by the Standing Committee on 14 November. The Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, pp. 63–64.

92. See “Guanyu ‘zuopai guomindang’ ji suweiai kouhao wenti jueyan” (Resolution Concerning the Slogan of the “Left-GMD” and the Soviet), in the Central Party Archives

(ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 369-71. Originally published in *Zhongyang tongxun*, no. 6 (30 September 1927). This resolution was adopted by the Politburo on 19 September 1927.

93. This notion was put forward by Marx and Engels in March 1850. They argued that after the petty bourgeoisie had achieved their limited demands, their interests would divide from those of the proletariat. In these circumstances, it was the duty of the proletariat to make the revolution permanent "until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power." See "Address to the Communist League," in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, p. 109.

94. See "Zhongguo gongchandang tudi wenti danggang caoan" (Draft Party Program of the CCP on the Land Problem), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 3, pp. 487-502. It was originally published in *Buersheweike*, vol. 1, no. 6 (28 November 1927).

95. "Zhengzhi jueyian." This translation is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 127-55. This was translated from the mimeographed pamphlet *Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiao dahui jueyian* (Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CCP). The title is also in Russian on the cover followed by Izdanie, KUTK [Komunisticheskii Universitet Trudyashchikhsya Kitaia (Communist University for Chinese Toilers)], Moscow, 1928. This version has been checked with that in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1-17. The texts are virtually identical. The only significance difference is that the latter version contains no subheadings within the subsections.

96. "Suweiai zhengquan zuzhi wenti jueyian," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 17-27. This can also be found in the mimeographed pamphlet *Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci dahui jueyian* (Moscow, 1928). The translation here is based on that in *Chinese Studies in History* (winter-spring 1971): 102-26. Here the title of the document is translated as "An Explanation of the Question of Soviets." The main difference is that the latter version includes subheads in the subsections. These are excluded here.

97. "Nongmin wenti jueyian." The translation here is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 156-65. This is taken from the mimeographed pamphlet *Zhongguo gongchandang diliuci daibiao dahui jueyian*. This text has been checked against that in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 39-45.

98. "Zhongguo gongchandang dangzhang," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 4, pp. 468-82.

99. "Zhonggong erzong quanwei zhengzhi yijuean—xianzai geming de xingshi yu Zhongguo gongchandang de renwu," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 58-72.

100. *Guomindang gaizu pai*. This organization within the GMD grew out of the tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei. Its main figure was one of the founders of the CCP, Chen Gongbo. It was formally founded in November 1928 with the objective of rewriting the GMD's party program. In the elections at the GMD Enlarged Congress of August 1930 (after Wang Jingwei, Yan Xishan, and Feng Yuxiang had allied against Chiang Kai-shek), members of the group formed the majority in the central organs. Early in 1931, it was disbanded.

101. This group had been founded by GMD-left members such as Deng Yanda and CCP member Tan Pingshan. Tan had been expelled from the CCP in November 1927.

102. This letter was originally published in *Pravda* on 29 December 1929.

103. This refers to the Chinese Eastern Railway "crisis" of 1929. On 27 May 1929, the GMD regime conducted widespread raids on Soviet consulates along the strategic Chinese Eastern Railway. A Soviet note of protest was followed by the Chinese seizing of the railway and the arrest and deportation of a number of Soviet officials. On 13 July, the Soviet Union

severed diplomatic relations with the Chinese government. The Chinese government followed suit on 20 July. Hostilities broke out between the Soviet forces in the Far East and those under the command of Zhang Xueliang. In November 1929 Soviet forces struck some 125 miles into Chinese territory. On 22 December, a settlement was reached that restored the *status quo ante*. Full diplomatic relations were restored in 1932.

104. Conflicts over the leadership of the nationalist movement led to clashes in north China during October–November 1929 between Chiang and Feng. Chiang defeated Feng but the latter joined up with Yan Xishan, Wang Jingwei, and the Guangxi warlords to present Chiang with a more formidable challenge in mid-1930.

105. The letter on the trade union question presumably refers to that sent by the Political Secretariat of the ECCI on 30 August 1929. It is reprinted in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 744–48.

106. “Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu fandui dangnei jihui zhuyi yu tuoluosiji zhuyi fandui pai de jueyi,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 495–506. This was passed by the ninetieth session of the Politburo.

107. This probably refers to the letter sent by Chen Duxiu to CC members on 8 August 1929. For a copy of the letter see the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 724–43.

108. “Women de zhengzhi yijian shu,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 5, pp. 470–93.

109. For Lominadze’s comments see **Doc. C.3** above. For the Circular Letter disseminating the decisions of the meeting see **Doc. C.2** above.

110. The letter is signed by eighty-two people, including Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi.

111. “Xin de geming gaochao yu yi huo ji sheng de shouxian shengli” was passed at a meeting of the Politburo on 11 June 1930 as a resolution on the current political tasks. It is seen as the main expression of Li Lisan’s views. It was published in *Hongqi* (Red Flag), no. 121 (19 July 1930): 1–4.

112. “Zhongguo wenti jueyan” was the Comintern’s response to the Li Lisan line. It was originally published in *Shihua* (True Words), no. 1 (30 October 1930): 2–5. It was republished in *Hongse wenxian* (Red Documents), pp. 346–61. A full translation can be found in Pak, *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 567–80.

113. “Zhonggong sanzong quanhuì guanyu zhengzhi qingkuang he dang de renwu yijuean” was adopted in September 1930 at the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC held in Shanghai. The resolution is translated from the version in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 93–106.

114. See above, **Doc. C.19**.

115. On 27 July 1930, Peng Dehuai’s troops took Changsha but were only able to hold it for seven days. A second attack took place between 24 August and 12 September.

116. At the Second Plenum, the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee was disbanded because of the “political mistakes” it was said to have committed in opposing the Party Center.

117. D. Manuïlsky was a central figure in Comintern affairs from 1929 to 1933, when he often intervened at enlarged plenums of the ECCI on behalf of Stalin. At the ECCI’s Seventh Enlarged Plenum held in November–December 1926 he became a member of the Comintern’s Political Secretariat. It was this Plenum that marked Zinoviev’s demise. Together with Zhdanov he signed the May 1943 order dissolving the Comintern.

118. “Zhonggong sizhong quanhuì jueyan,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 114–18. This version of the document is the same as that in the pamphlet *Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui kuoda de disici quanti huiyi yijuean* (Resolutions of the Enlarged Fourth Plenum of the CCP). This pamphlet is dated January 1931 and was issued shortly after the Plenum. However, the document produced in *Liuda yilai* is dated December 1930. This suggests that the document was drafted and possi-

bly even accepted before the Enlarged Fourth Plenum was actually convened. This would not be surprising as it follows the guidelines of the Comintern directive on the question of Li Lisan that was received on 16 November 1930. Other English translations can be found in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 209-16, and Pak, *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party*, pp. 591-600.

119. "Zhonggong sanzong quanwei gao tongzhi shu" was distributed to party members in October 1930. A copy can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 401-3.

120. *True Words* was the organ of the CC and was set up in Shanghai in October 1930. It was superseded by *Hongqi ribao* (Red Flag Daily).

121. The resolution of 25 November concerned the recently arrived Comintern letter and both it and the Politburo resolution of 9 December 1930 can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 500-502 and pp. 503-5, respectively.

122. This was issued as an urgent circular on 23 December 1930 to all party members. The Chinese text can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 546-50. An English translation can be found in Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, pp. 197-201. Kuo gives the date of the circular as 26 December 1930.

123. "Lizheng zhaokai jinji huiyi fandui sizhong quanwei baogao dagang," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 7, pp. 51-61.

124. The party's 25 November decision on the Comintern's letter, the Politburo's decision of 9 December, and Circular No. 96 can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 6, pp. 500-502, 503-5, and 546-52, respectively.

125. Luo Mai (Li Weiham) and He Chang. Li Weiham had resigned as secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee to be replaced by Wang Ming. This had annoyed He Mengxiong, who had expected to take over the post. Both Li Weiham and He Chang opposed the leadership of the Jiangsu committee and may have considered joining the opposition. On 27 January 1931, the CC passed a resolution criticizing He Chang for continuing to support the Li Lisan line and called for him to mend his ways immediately and clarify his position. The resolution also called on Li Weiham and Qu Qiubai to clarify their opposition to the rightists and Li Lisan. See "Guanyu He Chang deng tongzhi wenti de jueyan" (Resolution on the Problem of He Chang and Other Comrades), *Dang de jianshe*, no. 3 (15 February 1931): 39-40. An English translation can be found in Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, pp. 279-80.

126. "Zhongyang gei Runzhi, Yujie liang tongzhi bing zhuan Xiang Gan bian teweixin—guanyu muqian guoji guonei xingshi yiji dang de celue fangzhen," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 5, pp. 29-38.

127. Runzhi is Mao Zedong and Yujie is Zhu De.

128. "Qianwei zhi zhongyang de xin," in the Jiangxi Provincial Archives (ed.), *Zhongyang geming genjudi ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 70-77. The letter was sent from Ruijin.

129. "Xingxing zhi huo keyi liaoyuan—gei Lin Biao tongzhi de xin," in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 2, pp. 127-41.

130. "Muqian zhengzhi xingshi yu yifangmianjun ji Jiangxi dang de renwu zhengqu. Jiangxi shouxian shengli! Shixing jieji juezhan!" in the Jiangxi Provincial Archives (ed.), *Zhongyang geming genjudi ziliao xuanbian*, vol. 2, pp. 251-65. The document is a directive drafted by the General Front Committee of the First Front Army and the Action Committee of Jiangxi Province.

131. In the first attack on Changsha, Peng Dehuai's Third Army Corps occupied it on 27 July 1930 but were only able to hold it for seven days. The second attack was launched on 24 August and lasted until 12 September. Ji'an was captured on 3 October.

132. The A.B. League (Anti-Bolshevik League) was a nationalist secret organization.

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Commentary D

The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Movement in Central China, 1931–January 1935

In November 1930, Chiang Kai-shek was victorious in the war with Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan.¹ Having resolved this problem, Chiang was able to turn his attention to central China, where the Communists had been able to build up their strength in the rural base areas. The decision was made to launch a campaign to suppress the communist movement. However, rather than direct the campaign himself, Chiang, for political considerations, appointed the governors of the relevant provinces (Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan, and Hubei) to be concurrently in charge of their own anticommunist activities.

By late 1930, three major communist strongholds existed in the rural areas of central China. These major bases were: the Jiangxi Central Soviet, the E-Yu-Wan Soviet (Hubei-Henan-Anhui), and the Xiang-Exi Soviet (West Hunan–Hubei). They were located to the south, north, and west, respectively, of the cosmopolitan city of Wuhan. In an attempt to bring order to the scattered base areas, it was decided to convene the First All-China Congress of Soviets in November 1930. However, the date was changed to February 1931 and eventually postponed again until November 1931. The November 1931 formal announcement of the existence of a Chinese soviet republic at Ruijin, Jiangxi, marked an important step in the recognition that the dominant strength of the CCP lay in the rural base areas rather than with the Party Center in urban Shanghai. The collapse of legal communism in mid-1927, and the failure to find an alternative urban-based strategy, meant that the real strength of the CCP was in the soviets.

The disputes in the Party Center and the collapse of the Li Lisan line afforded the Red Armies a high degree of autonomy to manage their own affairs in the base areas. The involvement of Chiang Kai-shek in the conflict with Feng and Yan had provided the Red Armies with a much-needed chance to consolidate the areas under their control. However, this was to change very quickly. In October 1930 the GMD launched the first of five “suppression” campaigns intended to annihilate the communist strongholds. This caused the Red Armies to go on the defensive. The ability to resist these suppression campaigns was undermined by intraparty struggles that eroded unity in the face of a common enemy.

(a) The Jiangxi Soviet—Resistance to the GMD and Suppression of the Futian “Rebels”

In the summer of 1930, retreating from the Changsha expedition, Mao led the First Front Army back to southwest Jiangxi. At the end of October, a joint conference of

the Front Committee of the Red Army and the Action Committee of Jiangxi Province was held at Luofang to devise a suitable strategy to deal with the GMD attack. A document drafted by Mao Zedong in December 1930 outlining the favorable factors facing the base area clearly mapped out the new strategy (**Doc. D.1**). The document laid down two fundamental features that were to characterize Mao's general military strategy during the Jiangxi Soviet period. First, Soviet territory was to be abandoned to lure the enemy deep into the base area, where the Red Army enjoyed such favorable conditions as support from the local peasantry and familiarity with the terrain. Second, mobile warfare was to be employed. Overwhelming force would be gathered together to destroy the enemy, leaving what remained to be picked off bit by bit. The document showed a marked divergence from the radical spirit of Li Lisan's policy. Despite references to the world revolutionary situation and attempts to dress the document in Marxist garb, it remained a practical response to concrete conditions.

While the party leadership was being reshuffled in the wake of the Li Lisan affair, contradictions between Mao's regular Red Army and other local communist forces began to intensify. Mao used the Jiangxi Soviet government to begin a purge of the Jiangxi Action Committee, which had been created just before the July 1930 offensive. Mao's opponents were accused of being members of a nationalist secret organization known as the "A.B. League" (Anti-Bolshevik League) and of being guilty of "liquidationist" tendencies. In response to the ensuing purge, a local Red Army battalion rebelled against Mao and was subsequently massacred at Futian in early December 1930. Mao's claims that the local Communists were anti-Bolsheviks and/or "liquidationists" were unfounded, as were the Futian rebels' counter claims that Mao intended to arrest Zhu De and Peng Dehuai and then surrender to the GMD army.² What the Futian Incident does demonstrate is the friction that existed between the newly arrived Red Army and local forces. Despite the rebels' claims and despite Zhu De's and Peng Dehuai's different political characters and approaches, the two, together with Huang Gonglue, expressed their unequivocal support of Mao. They vindicated his position vis-à-vis pressure from the GMD and the challenge from the local forces. The latter further criticized the "rebels" for their stand on land policy and military strategy. The three leaders criticized them for opposing equal land redistribution. Militarily, they had opposed Mao's strategy of luring the enemy into the red areas and then defeating them through guerrilla warfare and proposed a swift action and decisive war on enemy territory.³

The decisive battles of the First Suppression Campaign were fought primarily between the Jiangxi Provincial Army and the Red Army at the end of December 1930. After the GMD allied forces lost one and a half divisions, the campaign was called off. Because of the slow transportation of troops from the north, the Second Suppression Campaign did not begin until May 1931. Its importance is shown by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek appointed his trusted lieutenant General He Yingqin commander-in-chief. Again the campaign resulted in a defeat for the GMD forces, with two divisions effectively destroyed and another three badly bloodied.

The communist victory in these two campaigns appeared to vindicate Mao's strategy of luring in the enemy troops and then destroying them one by one. This enhanced Mao's position within the Red Army and among the other local communist forces. This, in turn, contributed to the pacification of the Futian rebels and helped with the consolidation of the Jiangxi base. Mao's total authority in the First Front Army is evident from the records of the meetings of the General Front Committee. All the meetings were chaired by Mao himself.⁴ Mao's dominance was confirmed at the Kangdu meeting of the General Front Committee held on 22 June 1931 (**Doc. D.2**). The meeting also displayed Mao's resourceful and calculating manner in dealing with both the enemy and those in the area under his control. The overriding objective was to build up military strength and political power. Tactics were to serve these purposes and were to be flexible. On the question of the GMD, Mao proposed that the Red Army be deployed in remote places so that Chiang Kai-shek's attention would not be aroused. As a result, Chiang would turn to fight the Guangdong Army. A revealing passage indicates how Mao felt opponents within the revolutionary ranks should be dealt with. Referring to the purge of the leader of a local peasant association who had resisted Mao's troops, he stated:

It was right to capture Hu Zhusheng, but technically speaking it was not so skillful. Before striking down a leader of the masses, we should find another one for them even if he is an A.B. League member. Afterward we can attack the leaders of the A.B. League. Nanfeng is without a leader. If it is necessary to arrest Hu Zhusheng, we must first disarm [the troops in] Nanfeng, detain them in great secrecy, and move them at night.

In the spring of 1931, the Party Center in Shanghai was still recovering from the problems created by Li Lisan, and divisions persisted. This weakened party authority and facilitated the GMD's apprehension of key communist members. Gu Shunzhang, the head of the CCP secret service, and Xiang Zhongfa, the CCP general secretary, were among the many arrested in 1931. Xiang was executed and Gu decided to collaborate with the GMD, thus endangering the entire party structure in central and east China. Almost all the underground branches of the CCP were exposed, and party work was greatly jeopardized. To a degree, the upsurge of the soviet movement and the escalation of the military struggle in the countryside had also contributed to the crackdown on the Party Center in Shanghai. For example, the Nanjing government had promulgated martial law, making all "leftist activities" in the major cities extremely difficult.

The Party Center in Shanghai was reduced to little more than a liaison organization relaying instructions from the Comintern to the soviets. Indeed, it appears that in early 1931 the Comintern made the suggestion that the Party Center consider a move to the rural soviets.⁵ While the Party Center became more involved in the work of the soviets, transferring key personnel, it was not until early 1933 that Bo Gu and the Party Center arrived at the Central Soviet.⁶ The conditions under which the Party Center began its move to the soviets meant that in reality legitimate

leadership of the revolutionary movement had passed to the soviets. However, the process inevitably produced conflicts and frictions. Yet this is not to say that Mao and his supporters were an immediate conscious target of the “returned students” who dominated the Party Center when it began its transfer to the Jiangxi Soviet.

In formal terms, the soviets and the Red Army had been established under the leadership of the Party Center. Thus it was seen as natural that Party Center cadres would take over leading functions on their arrival. Lacking good connections in the area, they sought to consolidate their positions by applying ideological standards to judge and purge the soviet and Red Army leaders. In their eyes, many of the local leaders had committed errors such as abuse of power, expropriation of wealth, licentious behavior, etc. The “revolutionary idealism” represented by the Party Center was in sharp conflict with the political realism represented by the soviet and Red Army cadres. In this context, the Futian Incident thus became an issue in the readjustment of the relationships between the Party Center and Mao Zedong and the leaders of the Jiangxi Soviet.

At the CC’s Fourth Plenum (January 1931), the Comintern representative, Pavel Mif, had suggested that Zhou Enlai and some other veteran cadres move to the rural soviets. As a result, in the same month the Central Soviet Bureau was established with Zhou Enlai as its secretary.⁷ However, Zhou was unable to leave Shanghai immediately, and Xiang Ying went in his place to the Jiangxi Soviet as acting secretary. Formally, this put Mao under Xiang’s leadership. But partly because of the general mood against the Li Lisan line, in which Xiang had played an active role, and partly because of the Red Army victory in the First Anti-CCP Suppression Campaign, Xiang had to acknowledge Mao’s position on the Futian Incident. Nevertheless, Mao was mildly rebuked for labeling all participants in the incident as “A.B. elements” or “liquidationists.”⁸ Furthermore, the creation of the Central Bureau also gave Mao an opportunity to increase his influence from the local to the national level within the CCP.

In April 1931, a Party Center delegation arrived at the Jiangxi Soviet to attend an enlarged CCP congress. After the congress, the three delegates, Ren Bishi, Gu Zuolin, and Wang Jiaxiang, remained in Jiangxi, joining the Central Soviet Bureau. These newcomers, with little experience of military affairs, remained in the red capital of Ruijin. The first target of their criticisms was not Mao, who was with the Red Army at the front, but Xiang Ying, who was at the rear running the party and soviet headquarters. The Central Bureau under Xiang’s leadership was bitterly criticized for following a “reconciliationist line” and displaying a “rightist tendency” and for its resolution on the Futian Incident that had failed to recognize the incident as a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” (**Doc. D.3**). Ironically, this conflict led Mao to replace Xiang as the acting secretary of the Central Soviet Bureau. This was in May 1931, and in August, during Chiang Kai-shek’s Third Suppression Campaign, Mao was made secretary.⁹

It took a few months before the new Party Center commissioners realized that Mao, not Xiang, was the real powerholder and hence the chief challenger to their

authority. At the Gannan Conference of November 1931, the verdict on the Futian Incident was altered.¹⁰ The emphasis was placed on Mao's harshness in handling the Incident rather than on the "crimes" of the Futian rebels. Mao lost his dominant position in the party and army and was transferred to work in the soviet government. Obviously such decisions on the Futian Incident had not so much to do with the Incident itself as with the subtly changing relationship between Mao and the Party Center commissioners.

In December 1931, Zhou Enlai arrived in the Jiangxi Soviet and formally assumed the position of secretary of the Central Soviet Bureau.¹¹ Zhou's arrival brought Mao into contact with a man who had not only a high position but also rich military and political experience. However, Zhou recognized a value in Mao and had no intention of destroying him completely so long as Mao's influence and experience remained useful to the communist cause. However, Mao's preeminent position in the soviet was now eroded.

(b) The Establishment of the E-Yu-Wan and Xiang-Exi Soviets

In early 1930, the Red Army troops in the E-Yu-Wan Soviet (Hubei-Henan-Anhui) included three divisions of only 2,000 men, and it did not attract much attention from the Party Center under Li Lisan. This was provident for them as they received no hard and fast orders from the Party Center to attack the large cities. By late 1930, the E-Yu-Wan Red Army had expanded to some 6,000 soldiers. After the CC's Third Plenum (September 1930), Zeng Zhongsheng was appointed secretary of the E-Yu-Wan CCP Committee. Zeng tried to correct the obvious mistakes of the Li Lisan policy and was later criticized for carrying out a "reconciliationist line." Under his leadership, the Fourth Red Army succeeded in breaking two suppression campaigns of the GMD troops in Anhui, and the army developed to a strength of 15,000. This rapid growth of the Fourth Army and the base area now attracted the attention of the Party Center. In April 1931, Zhang Guotao, Shen Zemin, and Chen Changhao were dispatched there. One month later, Zhang Guotao proclaimed the establishment of the E-Yu-Wan Subbureau of the CCP CC with Zhang himself as secretary. The former E-Yu-Wan CCP Central Committee was abolished, and Zeng Zhongsheng lost his leadership position. Zeng was assigned to be the temporary political commissar of the Fourth Front Army, where he carried out his activities in the name of the "new line" of the Comintern and the Party Center. Zhang's speech to the First Conference of the E-Yu-Wan Subbureau called for the new policy of the CCP Fourth Plenum to be carried out and for the mistakes of the incumbent E-Yu-Wan leaders to be corrected is (**Doc. D.4**).¹²

In the autumn of 1931, the GMD began its Third Suppression Campaign against the Jiangxi Central Soviet, and this provided the E-Yu-Wan Soviet with a good opportunity for expansion. However, differences of opinion emerged over the question of military operations between the Fourth Front Army and the CCP Subbureau. With the support of the Party Center, Chen Changhao set out to the front and took

over Zeng Zhongsheng's position as political commissar of the Fourth Army. A major anticounterrevolutionary movement in the army and the soviet followed. Zhang Guotao acknowledged that some 600 men were arrested. However, in a speech by Chen Changhao to the cadets of the Peng-Yang Military and Political Academy, he stated that the number of people arrested and executed was far higher (**Doc. D.5**). The widespread purge followed what was said to be a planned uprising to start on 15 September 1931 at Mabu, Anhui. As with the Futian Incident, leadership of the plot was said to be in the hands of Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party.

There was no real foundation for such accusations and, fortunately, the purge did not affect the fighting capacity of the Fourth Front Army. In late 1931 and early 1932, the Fourth Front Army successfully conducted the battles of Huang'an, Shangcheng, and Sujiafu and broke up the Third Suppression Campaign. The Fourth Front Army grew to be 30,000 strong.

By contrast with E-Yu-Wan, the Red Army in the Xiang-Exi Soviet (West Hunan and Hubei) was badly affected by the Li Lisan line in the autumn and winter of 1930. The recovery of the Third Army and its growth can be traced to the GMD's engagement with the First Front Army in the Jiangxi Soviet and with the Fourth Front Army in the E-Yu-Wan Soviet rather than to the change in its leadership. In April 1931, Xia Xi and Xu Xigen arrived as the representatives of the Party Center and, as in the other two areas, began to find fault in the current leadership. In the name of the Xiang-Exi CCP Committee, a resolution was passed condemning Deng Zhongxia, the political commissar of the Third Front Army, presumably for his execution of the Li Lisan policy (**Doc. D.6**).

From late 1931 until early 1932, the Xiang-Exi Soviet also enjoyed a period of rapid expansion. Under the political leadership of Xia Xi and Guan Xiangying and the military command of He Long and Duan Dechang, the Communists managed to create a large V-shaped area of influence running from south to north and cutting through Hubei Province. In early 1932, the soviet covered about twenty counties, and the Red Army comprised three regular divisions with a total of 15,000 soldiers.

(c) The First All-China Soviet Congress—November 1931— Effective Recognition of Jiangxi as the Revolutionary Center

In the wake of the military victory and territorial expansion in Jiangxi and the other soviets, the First All-China Soviet Congress was convened in Ruijin from 7 to 20 November 1931. The Congress founded the Chinese Soviet Republic as a national regime and established separate state and military structures to operate at the national level. While Mao lost direct control over the military, he was appointed to the newly created post of chair of the soviet government. Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao were appointed vice-chairmen. Zhu De was made chair of the newly created Central Revolutionary Military Commission, with Peng Dehuai and Wang Jiaxiang as the vice-chairmen.¹³

The Congress also adopted a Constitution for the Soviet Republic (**Doc. D.7**) and various resolutions, the most important of which was the Soviet Land Law (**Doc. D.8**). The Constitution officially designated the Soviet Republic a “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,” in accordance with Lenin’s formulation of 1905. However, in reality there was no pretense that the Soviet was anything other than a communist one-party dictatorship. Indeed, in the remote rural area there were no industrial workers, the proletariat consisted almost entirely of village artisans, handicraftsmen, and farm laborers.¹⁴ This notwithstanding, the Constitution acknowledged that “only the proletariat can lead the broad masses to socialism,” and thus they were to have extra representation in the Soviet.

While the land law called for confiscation, without compensation, of land belonging to “feudal lords and landlords, militarists and village bosses, gentry, and other big private landowners,” it was significantly more liberal than previous policy. Previous law had alienated the middle peasants, who were particularly frustrated by the clause forbidding the sale of property. Now, middle peasants could be exempted from the land distribution program if the “majority” of them so desired. Furthermore, there was no mention of land nationalization. Nor was any mention made of collectivization. In a conference of soviet delegates convened in Shanghai in May 1930 under the more radical atmosphere of the Li Lisan line, collectivization had been authorized. The first draft of the Land Law of 1931 had actually included a clause allowing for voluntary collectivization.¹⁵

By the end of 1931, the situation looked good for the communist movement. They had beaten off three GMD suppression campaigns, and the Congress had given them a framework of rule. Optimism was fueled further by the GMD’s preoccupation with the invasion of the Japanese army in Manchuria and by the Ningdu revolt in which an entire GMD army corps of 20,000 went over to the communist side. In the new circumstances, the Comintern sent a telegram to the CCP that was received on 29 December 1931 calling for a “national revolutionary war to oppose Japanese imperialists and all other imperialists.” The first step was to launch a “popular revolution to overthrow the GMD.”¹⁶ As a result, on 9 January 1932, the CCP Party Center passed a resolution urging an “initial victory in one or more provinces” (**Doc. D.9**). The title of the resolution shows the clear parallel with the radical policy of Li Lisan. The Central Soviet Bureau in Jiangxi accordingly adopted a “positive and offensive line” and launched an attack on the city of Ganzhou, a strategic location in southern Jiangxi. Ganzhou was defended by only one GMD brigade, and the Communists attacked with Peng Dehuai’s regular Red Army and Chen Yi’s local troops, some 30,000 soldiers. Instead of capturing Ganzhou, the Red Army lost an entire division and in March was forced to withdraw.

After the failure at Ganzhou, Mao was rehabilitated in March as the supervisor of the First Army Corps and in August 1932 as general political commissar of the First Front Army. However, Mao’s autocratic control of the Red Army troops at his disposal and his arrogant attitude toward party authority made him the focus of

criticism at the Ningdu Conference of the Central Soviet Bureau in October 1932. He was criticized by virtually all the participants, especially Xiang Ying and Ren Bishi. Consequently, Mao was removed from the front and direct contact with the Red Army and was posted to the rear. The First Front Army was put under the collective leadership of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, and Liu Bochong and was brought under tighter party control.¹⁷

(d) The Loss of the E-Yu-Wan and Xiang-Exi Soviets

GMD attention had been diverted during the period September 1931 to April 1932 because of the problems caused by the Japanese intrusions into Manchuria and Shanghai. Once a truce was reached in May 1932, Chiang Kai-shek set up the General Headquarters for the Fourth Anticommunist Suppression Campaign. Chiang himself assumed command of the headquarters in Wuhan. Chiang's general plan was first to attack the E-Yu-Wan and Xiang-Exi Soviets and then shift the attack to the Jiangxi Central Soviet. He had some half a million troops at his disposal.

The Fourth Front Army of the E-Yu-Wan Base Area followed its previous strategy, leaving the Twenty-fifth Army to defend the eastern front while positioning the main force of the Fourth Army in the west poised for attack. On this occasion, however, the strength of the enemy was too great. In the battles fought between July and September 1932, the GMD and the Fourth Front Army suffered similar losses. While the GMD could afford such losses, they proved fatal to the Communists. The Fourth Front Army had to abandon the E-Yu-Wan Base Area and withdraw westward. After three months of flight, it arrived in north Sichuan. Its strength had been reduced to a mere 15,000. On 29 December 1932, the Revolutionary Committee of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Base Area was founded.

The backward economic conditions and the division of the local military forces, the result of decades of conflicts among the Sichuan warlords, were beneficial to the Fourth Front Army, and it experienced a rapid growth in strength during the following two years. Yet the Communists had to change their former attitudes to survive in this different environment. On arriving, the Fourth Front Army issued a number of propaganda tracts, the tone, language, and contents of which were designed to appeal to the local peasantry. In fact, land confiscation and redistribution were stricter and harsher than in the Jiangxi Central Soviet. Able-bodied peasants were drafted into the Red Army while youngsters were organized into Red Guards. Such radical measures were considered necessary for consolidating communist power. They arose from the Fourth Front Army's own practical needs and had little to do with the Party Center's mandate. Zhang Guotao's 1934 speech shows the same concerns for survival and development (**Doc. D.10**), and his citations concerning the international and domestic situations had less to do with Marxist doctrines than with the practical task of cheering up his audience.¹⁸ In addition, Zhang's bragging about the size and power of the Party Center and Jiangxi was designed both to boost flagging morale and to increase his own prestige. At the same time, the picture he

painted of the Red Army in the Jiangxi Soviet must have seemed awesome to his men in the Fourth Front Army.

The decision to leave the E-Yu-Wan Base Area and engage in what was dubbed the “western flight” were criticized by the Party Center in March 1933.¹⁹ However, unlike the later flight from the Jiangxi Soviet, this did not result in a change of leadership, and the Party Center was careful not to apportion too much blame to Zhang Guotao.

The Xiang-Exi Soviet was also unable to withstand the pressure of the GMD troops. The Soviet leadership decided to station the major force of the Third Front Army outside the base for defense, leaving only a rump inside. In October 1932, the army was forced to leave Hubei and flee north. Taking a two-month detour, it returned to the Hunan-Hubei border where He Long had formed a base area in the late 1920s. He Long’s return to an old area where he could rely on former acquaintances helped the Third Front Army to survive temporarily. However, chances for rapid expansion were slim because it would require a new location with fresh supplies of material and personnel willing to take a risk. Yet the Hunan-Hubei Border Area was already exhausted both physically and mentally from the incessant communist revolution and war. In June 1933 the Third Front Army had to move on again. After roaming along the Hunan-Sichuan border for several months, it moved to northeast Guizhou in January 1934. Its strength had dwindled to only 3,000 troops.

The constant roaming and the difficult situation faced by He Long and the Third Army caused it to abandon open espousal of its revolutionary views and appeal to the local peasant rebels (see, for example, **Doc. D.11**). The revolutionary Military Affairs Committee of the new border region tried in this open letter to persuade the local peasants, organized as the “Celestial Soldiers,” that their cause was essentially the same. The attacks by the soldiers on exorbitant taxes and levies were interpreted as a primitive revolutionary struggle.

In June 1934, a party conference was convened at Fengxianxi, a village on the Hunan-Guizhou border. The conference corrected the former radical policies, stopped the anticounterrevolutionary measures, and adopted more opportune policies. On 21 and 22 July, a soviet congress was convened at which a complete set of records was kept. These records show the deviation of this small communist group from the Party Center’s line at this time (**Doc. D.12**). The Third Army’s situation caused it to call for an alliance with the native peasant rebels, the “celestial soldiers,” and the Miao tribes. Further calls were made for the protection of middle peasants and small merchants. The Third Army was able to found a new base on the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan and Guizhou borders, where it was able to survive until it was reunited with the Sixth Army Corps in October 1934.

(e) The Jiangxi Soviet Under the Fourth and Fifth Suppression Campaigns

The GMD Suppression Campaign reached the Jiangxi Soviet in January 1933 just as the remainder of the Party Center headed by Bo Gu was moving in. The Party

Center called for a more positive military policy and demanded that the General Headquarters of the Red Army besiege and capture the city of Nanfeng. This caused disagreements between Zhou Enlai and his army commanders at the front and Bo Gu and his Party Center leaders at Ruijin in the rear. The Party Center rejected Zhou's calls for a withdrawal, but after an unsuccessful attack on the city lasting for a few weeks, the Red Army had to abandon its attempt to take Nanfeng.

The first phase of the Fourth Suppression Campaign witnessed a few clashes on the northwest border of the Jiangxi Soviet in February 1933. The Red Army slowly retreated into the Lichuan area. In late February, two GMD divisions were ambushed by three Red Army corps at Yihuang. In two days of fighting, two GMD divisions were annihilated. After such losses, it was impossible for the GMD to continue with the campaign, and at the end of March it was called off. Since all the battles had been fought around the perimeter of the base area, the Party Center was able to declare victory for its new strategy. It appeared that the Red Army did not have to use the tactic of yielding up territory to draw the enemy deep inside. By contrast, the Red Army could engage and destroy the enemy outside its gates. The Party Center thus interpreted the victory as a justification for its more aggressive policies.

In October 1933, the GMD launched its Fifth Suppression Campaign. This campaign was bolder and larger in scale. According to communist claims, the GMD committed some one million troops. Chiang Kai-shek assumed personal command of the Nanchang Field Headquarters. He adopted a new strategy for the campaign, which he conceptualized as "strategic offense plus tactical defense." The keys to this strategy were the "blockhouse" and "highway" policies. Whenever his troops reached a new place, they would construct strongholds, or blockhouses, covering all strategic points. Then, highways would be laid to link the blockhouses one to another and also to link them with the reserve forces in the rear. The troops would not rush ahead to seize a new vantage point before securing the present one. Slowly this noose around the base area was to be tightened, strangling the communist forces.

This new, more thoughtful, campaign came at a bad time for the communists. The party was engaged in another inner-party struggle, usually referred to as the anti-Luo Ming line, as well as the mass movement of land investigation. While the 1933 anti-Luo Ming movement at the elite levels and the land investigation movement at the base levels might have temporarily increased the authority of the Party Center and created a militant mood, they did not create a long-term accord and stable environment that could serve as a basis for resisting the GMD's Fifth Suppression Campaign.

The attacks on Luo Ming were intended by the Party Center to strengthen the resolve of party cadres in the face of the GMD attacks. Panic and fear had been growing in CCP ranks, and some commanders were refusing orders to engage the enemy. Luo Ming had been acting secretary of the Fujian CCP Committee since

March 1932. At an early stage of the GMD's Fourth Suppression Campaign, Luo expressed his opinions on the current situation and the party's work in two articles (one is included here as **Doc. D.13**). The repeated GMD attacks had, according to Luo, produced an atmosphere of panic and fatigue in west Fujian. He blamed the party military leadership for being too mechanistic; implementing the same plan in different counties and districts was inappropriate. In other words, Luo opposed the Party Center's call for an "all-around offensive strategy" and "all-out military recruitment." In its place, Luo argued for the adoption of flexible military measures tailored to suit the varying conditions. The local Red Armies and the new soviet bases, such as those in west Fujian, should implement policies different from those of the Party Center. For example, Luo did not think that he could or should fulfill the Red Army recruitment assignment in his jurisdiction.

Luo was immediately attacked by the Party Center. It adopted a critical resolution on 15 February 1933, marking the beginning of the anti-Luo Ming movement (**Doc. D.14**). A study of Luo's views and the resolution clearly shows that Luo expressed his opinions from a local point of view and had no clear intention of challenging the general political and military line of the Party Center. However, it served the Party Center's interests to interpret it as just such an attack on its General Line.

As noted, defeat of the GMD's Fourth Suppression Campaign strengthened the political position of Bo Gu and the Party Center. With the campaign over, the Party Center moved to consolidate its position within the party by attacking its opponents. The attacks on Luo Ming were felt in the Jiangxi CCP apparatus where Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zetan, Xie Weizun, and Gu Bai were picked out as targets for attack because of their alleged sympathy with the Luo Ming line and their "factional activities." In the central soviet government, Deng Zihui and He Shuheng were criticized for their pessimism, and in the Red Army, Tan Zhenlin and Xiao Jinguang were punished for their defeatism.

The Land Investigation Movement formally launched on 1 June 1933 was an important issue in the Jiangxi Soviet during 1933-34 (**Doc. D.15**). With the movement, the Communists sought to use the land question to create a favorable revolutionary atmosphere that would serve their political and military purposes. Land distribution, investigation, and redistribution were to incite the peasants to join, or at least support, the Communists in the revolutionary war. However, constant changes of landownership caused social and economic problems within the base area, and excesses would often occur. This required periodic retrenchment and the adoption of a mild or "antileftist" policy. Thus, in the period from June to September 1933 the land investigation movement was pursued with a vengeance, and many "middle peasants" were classified as "landlords." From October to December, the policy was moderated, and many of the "landlords" were reclassified as "middle peasants." January and February 1934 were marked by another more radical phase with an anti-rich peasant policy. Only the deteriorating military situation finally brought these oscillations to an end.

Initially, in October–November 1933, the engagements in the Fifth Suppression Campaign around Lichuan, in the northeast of the Jiangxi Soviet, resulted in a stalemate. On 20 November, a large-scale army revolt within the GMD ranks broke out in Fujian.²⁰ It was led by the commanders of the Nineteenth Route Army. They repudiated the GMD and declared their intention to move closer to the CCP and Soviet Russia. Shocked by these events, Chiang Kai-shek quickly transferred his troops on the northern front to deal with the Fujian rebels, thus leaving the Fifth Suppression Campaign dormant for a couple of months.

In October 1933 before the start of the revolt, the commanders in Fujian appealed to the Red Army for an alliance. After several days of secret negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Pan Hannian, representing the soviet government and the Red Army, and Xu Hongming on behalf of the Fujian People's Government and the Nineteenth Route Army, a preliminary agreement was signed on 26 October 1933 (**Doc. D.16**). While militarily the agreement only called for a simple truce between the two sides, economically and politically the Communists made a number of demands on the Fujian rebels. Indeed, over the next month Bo Gu and the Party Center were critical of the rebels for not fulfilling their "promises."

In late December, the loosely knit Fujian People's Government rapidly collapsed as the GMD troops drove into the province. Mao Zedong saw the events as providing a chance to step up military activities not to save the rebels but to begin a strategic offensive from northeast Jiangxi to Zhejiang Province. The Party Center also shifted its position. Consultations with the Comintern and the Shanghai Sub-bureau had led to the adoption of an even more antagonistic attitude toward the Fujian government (**Doc. D.17**). The Communists had lost a chance to win over Nationalist troops during the Fifth Suppression Campaign and had merely succeeded in winning one month of free time. This month they used to convene two national conferences to congratulate themselves on their successes and to continue the struggle for power and influence within the CCP, the soviet government, and the Red Army.

From 15 to 18 January 1934, the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CC was convened at Ruijin and was attended by full and alternate CC members and by some delegates from provincial party committees. Given the pressing situation brought about by the GMD Fifth Suppression Campaign, Bo Gu's political report, which was accepted as the Plenum's resolution, is a good example of what Mao Zedong would term *benben zhuyi* ("bookism")—full of fine words but inappropriate to the real situation (**Doc. D.18**). According to the report, the revolutionary situation at home and abroad was excellent, and it deemed the policies of the Comintern and the CCP infallible. The party's major task was simply to continue the fight against the "right opportunists" who refused to see this excellent situation. Astonishingly, there was no formal report on military affairs at the Fifth Plenum.²¹ While clearly there was conflict between Mao and the Party Center, Mao was not dropped from the Politburo as many studies have suggested.²²

Immediately following the Fifth Plenum, the Second All-China Soviet Congress

was convened at Ruijin from 22 January to 1 February 1934. The Congress provided a chance for the regime to show off. A giant auditorium was constructed, and the ceremonies included a military parade and gunshot salute. As the “Organic Law of the Central Soviet Republic” (**Doc. D.19**) shows, no effort was spared to portray the soviet as a formal, national state rather than as a shaky local rebellious base area. This aspiration to statehood was reflected in the election once again of a full complement of people’s commissariats, including one for foreign affairs (headed by Wang Jiaxiang). Furthermore, the Congress proposed that all the soviet bases be designated as provinces. Their size hardly warranted such a description, let alone the fact that they were small islands in a large sea of GMD-controlled waters. As for the Fifth Suppression Campaign, the Congress called for the Red Army to adopt positional defense as its central task and basic strategy.

The most important speech to the Congress was delivered by Mao Zedong on behalf of the CEC and the Council of People’s Commissars. In broad terms, the speech follows the line laid down at the Fifth Plenum, an assessment that stands in stark contrast to the judgment sponsored by Mao in the 1945 Resolution on Party History (see **Doc. G.25**). In 1945, Mao criticized the Fifth Plenum for its bad judgment of the current situation. In 1934, Mao’s speech supported the “Russian returned students’” contention that currently the crucial factor in the Chinese revolution was the life-and-death struggle between revolution and counterrevolution. Again this counters Mao’s 1945 judgment that they had ignored the needs of the intermediate classes.²³ However, Mao did stress that the socialist revolution could not be achieved until the bourgeois democratic revolution was completed throughout China. This was in contrast to the views of the “Russian returned students.”²⁴

Finally, the Congress elected a new CEC of 175 members, which in turn elected a Presidium of seventeen members. Apart from Mao Zedong, the Presidium included Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu. Mao Zedong was reelected chair of the CEC, with Zhang Guotao and Xiang Ying as vice-chairmen. Zhang Wentian took over as the head of the Council of People’s Commissars.

On balance, these two meetings did little to resolve the fundamental problems facing the CCP. What would decide the life and death of the movement was the Fifth Suppression Campaign, and neither meeting had much impact on this. Seen in terms of the military situation, the two meetings had simply wasted much-needed time without providing any constructive views on how to proceed. In terms of intraparty struggle the results were ambiguous. Generally, the two meetings are seen in terms of an advance by Bo Gu and his supporters and a decline in Mao’s fortunes.²⁵ Clearly, politically and, to a lesser extent, organizationally Bo Gu and his followers had asserted their leadership through the two meetings. While Mao and his supporters suffered a decline in influence, they maintained important footholds within the administrative hierarchy. Indeed, in retrospect it was a good time not to be in control of the decision-making apparatus. Waller’s interpretation of the Second Congress as a personal failure for Mao is debatable. Mao had played a dominant role throughout the Congress: he opened the Congress on 22 January, on 24–25

January he delivered the main speech, he replied to comments on his speech on 27 January, and on 1 February he announced the closure of the Congress. In the eyes of many, Mao was identified with the one tangible achievement of the communist movement—the soviet.²⁶

In October 1933, the Comintern military advisor Otto Braun had arrived in Ruijin. Before then, Bo Gu had to rely on Zhou Enlai for advice on military affairs, but now he came to rely on Braun, a man well versed in the ways of modern warfare. Defense of the soviet was now the main priority, and Braun took over effective control of marshaling the defenses and operating what Mao later criticized as the “pure defensive line.” Braun’s tactic was what was referred to as the “short, swift thrust.” After two months of face-to-face confrontation with the GMD, the Red Army had been unable to win a single decisive victory.

The GMD followed its patient strategy, not making any rash pursuits of the Red Army forces. Along the northern front they developed their blockhouses and road networks and began to press slowly but steadily southward. By April 1934, they were approaching Guangchang, a strategic locality only twenty miles to the north of Ruijin, the red capital. Bo Gu took on the position of political commissar of the headquarters at Guangchang, thus removing Zhou Enlai from control and placing it effectively in the hands of Braun. Braun was given the chance to apply his tactics. While defending the soviet, the Red Army would make short, swift thrusts at the GMD troops to try to disrupt them before reinforcements could be brought from the rear. After two weeks the Red Army had suffered a stunning defeat and Guangchang was lost. During May–June, GMD troops penetrated deep into the Central Soviet. The defense of the soviet from inside the base area had proved unsuccessful.

A new strategy was needed. Thus in July and August 1934, two Red Army Corps were dispatched to engage GMD troops in the “white areas” to pull enemy troops out of the Jiangxi Soviet. The Seventh Army Corps, led initially by Xun Huaizhou and later by Fang Zhimin, was defeated and destroyed on the eastern flank. The Sixth Army Corps led by Ren Bishi eventually linked up with He Long’s Third Front Army in the southwestern highlands. Both failed to relieve the worsening situation in the soviet. Facing the blame for the Guangchang defeat, Braun tried to defend his position in the military command. He published a number of articles in his defense and persuaded some army corps commanders such as Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai to do the same. Lin Biao’s article “Short, Swift Thrusts” offers a concrete and positive description of this military tactic (**Doc. D.20**).

A plan for the evacuation of the Jiangxi Soviet was first brought up in the “Three-Man Military Group” of Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, and Otto Braun.²⁷ Shortly afterward it was discussed and confirmed by the Standing Committee of the Politburo, comprising Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Xiang Ying, and Chen Yun. In late August, members of the Politburo and the Military Council were notified of the decision. This is presumably why Mao was called back from the south to Ruijin. In September even senior military commanders were only informed “insofar as they were

concerned with executing certain maneuvers in their area of jurisdiction.”²⁸

Public indication of the general retreat was made in the article by Zhang Wentian in *Hongse Zhonghua* (Red China) on 29 September 1934. Ironically, the title of the article was “All for the Defense of the Soviet” (**Doc. D.21**). The article put forward the possibility of retreating from and surrendering a soviet in a particular place in order to gain victory for the soviet throughout the whole country. Zhang Wentian also indicated his position on the inner-party struggle in the article. He labeled all those who still proposed the strategy of defending the soviets from within its boundaries opportunists. He was openly flaunting his disagreement with the Party Center and Bo Gu.

In October, as the GMD closed in more tightly, the CCP had to make the final decision for a “strategic transfer,” or the Long March as it was later known. Some 30,000 troops were left behind under Xiang Ying and Chen Yi, while the major force of the Red Army, some 86,000 in all, embarked on a westerly flight. Where they were heading was unclear. A number of possibilities existed: they could make a detour and fight back to the Jiangxi base; they could open a new base in central Hunan or on the Guangxi-Hunan border; or they could join up with He Long and Ren Bishi’s troops. The pursuit by the GMD army gradually began to close off different options.

(f) The Zunyi Meeting—January 1935— Criticism of the Former Military Line

By the time the Red Army reached northern Guizhou and found time for a rest in early January 1935, its forces had been reduced to 40,000. Here an Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo was convened from 15 to 18 January.²⁹ Presumably the meeting was convened to discuss the current situation and where the Red Army should go from there. It turned into a major review of past policy and heralded a shift in the party leadership.³⁰ The main report was delivered by Bo Gu, followed by a supplementary report from Zhou Enlai. Subsequently, Mao Zedong delivered a long speech criticizing the military line, and he was supported by Wang Jiaxiang.³¹ On the basis of the debates at the meeting, and in particular Mao Zedong’s speech, two formal written documents were drafted under Zhang Wentian’s guidance. The first was “The Resolution on Summing up the Campaign Against the Enemy’s Fifth ‘Encirclement’ ” (adopted by the Politburo Meeting on 8 January 1935);³² and the second, “The Outline Resolution of the Enlarged Politburo Meeting on Summing up Experiences and Lessons in Smashing the Fifth ‘Encirclement’ Campaign” (the Secretariat of the CC, 28 February 1935) (**Doc. D.22**). Chinese historians have viewed the second, shorter resolution as intended for communicating and propagating the meeting on a wider basis. This seems unlikely; it was more probably for senior cadres and laid out the principles for the lengthier version. For example, both Bo Gu and Hua Fu (Braun) are named in the shorter version, but not in the longer version, and an almost identical version to the short one was sent in telegrams to Ren Bishi,

Zhang Guotao, and Xiang Ying, members of the Politburo and senior leaders of other Red Armies. The resolutions contained a compromise approving the party's political line, while ascribing the military failure during the Fifth Suppression Campaign to the erroneous military line of "pure positional defense" pursued by Bo Gu and Otto Braun. The most reliable factual details concerning the meeting are contained in notes drafted by Chen Yun that were intended to inform the lower-ranking party cadres and army officers (**Doc. D.23**).

Although Mao did not become the dominant figure in the party and army immediately, the Zunyi Meeting provided a decisive step in Mao's bid for supreme power.³³ He was appointed to the five-person Secretariat together with Zhang Wentian (general secretary), Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Bo Gu. Along with Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang, he was to serve on the CCP Central Military Leadership Group. While Zhou was to be the chief decision-maker, Mao was to be his chief assistant. This broke up Bo Gu and Braun's control over military affairs. At Zunyi, Mao did not become chair of the Military Council or of the Politburo as some historians have suggested, but he did become one of the five top leaders of the party and had the right to be involved in all party and army decisions.

The Zunyi Meeting marked the end of the soviet movement in central China. Obsessed with ideological doctrines and basking in revolutionary enthusiasm, Bo Gu and his supporters lacked a profound insight into the political relationships within which the CCP found itself enmeshed. Neither could they balance this deficiency with an adequate experience in military command. The Jiangxi Soviet collapsed from the pressures brought to bear from the GMD without and the disintegration of the CCP from within. Mao's assumption of key leadership positions at the Zunyi Meeting paved the way for a transformation of the general orientation of the CCP as it would develop during the Long March and in subsequent years.

DOCUMENTS 1931—JANUARY 1935

D.1 Eight Conditions for a Great Victory (22 December 1930)³⁴

The General Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army

I) The International Situation Is Advantageous to a Decisive Class War, But Not to the Imperialists

- [[A) The conflicts between the imperialists and their panic.
- B) The development of the international revolutionary high tide.

II) The Domestic Situation Is Advantageous for a Decisive Class War—But Not to Chiang Kai-shek and Lu Diping

A) There are major conflicts within the ruling class. Among Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Xueliang, Yan Xishan, and Feng Yuxiang there is conflict. We must use class struggle to oppose this war that will slaughter workers and peasants. The problem of Guangxi has not been resolved.

- B) The development of revolutionary forces.]]

III) Our Strategy Is Good and We Win Every Time; The Enemy's Strategy Fails Every Time

A) Entice the enemy deep into the red areas. The enemy wants us to fight in the white areas; but we won't go there. We want the enemy to come to the red areas; he has to come. When we don't go [to the white areas], the enemy's ships, trains, and fortifications are useless. If he wants to come to the red areas, our spears will be more deadly. When the enemy comes into the red areas, he will be like a shrimp washed up on the beach—at a glance one can see that the enemy will be defeated and we will win.

B) Use the strategy of prolonged warfare. The enemy wants to fight a quick battle; but we won't fight a quick battle. There are internal conflicts among our enemies. They want to defeat us so as they can start another war among themselves. In the three-month period of "exterminating the red bandits," we have clearly seen through their weakness and intentionally avoided directly confronting them. At present, we have been playing hide-and-seek for almost two months and frustrated every move the enemy has made. We have exposed their spies and have hit them hard. The elements of the A.B. [Anti-Bolshevik] League planted by the enemy among our troops mutinied but were all eliminated. We killed dozens of regimental commanders and altogether have eliminated over 4,000 A.B. League members. We

do not fight quick battles with them, but have found time to kill many small Chiang Kai-sheks and eradicate the spies inside the Red Army. This has united the Red Army more closely. The enemy has been defeated again; we have already won a major victory.

C) Subject the enemy to a prolonged encirclement. The enemy hopes to encircle us with concentric rings for a prolonged time. Several army groups from east and west of the river have encircled us. However, we have left nothing inside the houses or in the fields, and have called on the masses to join the battle in order to subject the enemy to a prolonged encirclement. At night, the enemy troops who had been enjoying a bit of peace scurry like rats in the darkness, running to the mountaintops and not daring to come down as soon as we fire a few shots at them. Because of our harassment, the enemy troops at Shijiabian opened up machine-gun and rifle fire through the night, killing several hundred of their own number. As soon as we begin to harass the enemy, they blow the bugle for assembly; they are frightened and nervous, unable to sleep all night. They want to attack, but cannot find us; when they cannot attack us, they fear that we will attack them. Now, you can see who is encircling whom. When the enemy comes into the red areas, it cannot find firewood, rice, cooking oil, or salt and has to send soldiers to look for them in the villages. It is a major effort for the enemy to make a proper meal. Now you can see who is encircling whom. We also put up many slogans and spread propaganda among the soldiers of the white army. The enemy is very demoralized. Even before the battle begins, the enemy has suffered defeat every step of the way, while we have won victories every step of the way. The enemy is both panic-stricken and demoralized; if we deliver a strong blow, we will surely win.

IV) We Have the Cooperation of the Masses; The Enemy Does Not

We have the cooperation of the masses; stretcher-carriers, transportation teams, first aid teams, reporting enemy movements—such is the help we have had from the revolutionary masses. The enemy does not enjoy such help. It does not have anybody to lead the way or send messages, but only those who destroy their communications, capture their spies, and disrupt their rear. Once we begin our battles, the masses climb the mountains to help us fight, so the enemy has little idea about the size of our forces and begins to panic. After the enemy is defeated, the masses seize the weapons of the enemy troops and take their soldiers prisoner, making sure that none escapes from the red area. This shows that we have the masses on our side while the enemy does not. The enemy is bound to be defeated, and we are sure to win.

V) Our Forces Are Concentrated; The Enemy's Forces Are Dispersed

Now our First and Third Armies have concentrated our forces by joining together. Our real strength and fighting power is sufficient for any battle. Although the twenty regiments of enemy troops constitute a large force, they are scattered, moving

from west to east of the river, and they are separated by hundreds of kilometers. The number of rifles in each army group is no more than 4,000 to 5,000. We concentrate the largest amount of firepower to rout one of the enemy army groups. Even if other enemy army groups come, they will then be rendered useless. This is called concentration of forces, the principle of which is to defeat the enemy individually and ensure every victory.

VI) Our Troops Are United; The Enemy Troops Are Demoralized

The enemy soldiers have been demoralized for a long time. After entering the red areas, they see our slogans "Brothers in the white army, kill your officers," and "Welcome our brothers in the white army to join the Red Army." After they see these slogans and think about them, they will begin to have doubts. In Le'an, enemy troops sold their rifles to the people and then ran away. In addition, there were many instances of enemy soldiers running away to join the Red Army. Our Red Army is an army led by the proletariat and fights for itself, uniting all hearts into one. Through the joint efforts of its soldiers, nothing can prevent this class-based Red Army from defeating the demoralized white army.

VII) We Have Enough Resources in Reserve; The Enemy Faces a Financial Panic

The Red Army never carries much food or money during battles. Soldiers in the Third Army Corps carry only enough rice for breakfast, and yet they captured Changsha. This is a special characteristic of our Red Army. Now we have stocked up enough food and money for three months. Thus, we can fight all kinds of battles with the enemy. This time our officers and soldiers even donated money to [preparations for] the battles. Only the Red Army can do something like this, because we contribute our own money to the fight. This kind of spirit in the Red Army supplements our good preparations. The enemy is in the grip of a financial panic; he has levied a housing tax, but now has to impose a shop tax, in addition to the salt tax and treasury bonds. The money always flows into the wallets of the warlords, while the soldiers get no pay. We must entice more enemy troops to come here and annihilate them all.

VIII) We Have the Advantage of Terrain; The Enemy Does Not

The areas of Ningdu, Yongfeng, and Xingguo are red areas with many mountains and steep hills. The roads there are narrow, and the terrain dangerous. The enemy cannot make major maneuvers, and even his artillery loses its effectiveness. The Red Army moves fast and knows the terrain well. With a frontal attack on the forward slope of the mountain and an encirclement behind the mountain,

the Red Army will corner and trap the soldiers of the white army and smash them to pieces.

These conditions will ensure our victory in the decisive class war. However, we must fight bravely since victories cannot be won simply by sitting at home. Let us talk about one thing. For example, the soldiers in the white army are demoralized, so we can win victories. However, the officers are diehard running dogs of the warlords, local despots, landlords, and the bourgeoisie. They will fight us to save themselves. Therefore, we must still resolutely and firmly attack the enemy in order to win. With our eight major conditions for victory and eight major handicaps for the enemy, however, we will be more assured of victory. Comrades, march bravely forward and fulfill your class responsibilities.

D.2 Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Red Army (22 June 1931)³⁵

The Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee

Eight P.M. at the headquarters in Kangdu, 22 June 1931

Present: Mao [Zedong], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Lin [Biao], Tan [Zhenlin], Zhou [Yishu].

Auditors: Wang Jiaxiang, Hui Wen [Cai Huiwen], Geng Kai, Hua Yu [Guo Huaruo].

1) Deployment of Troops

The Fourth Army (with the exception of one division) should concentrate its forces and then march at full speed along the shortest route to attack Sha County. Then it should (quickly) disperse and collect money. It should be dispersed over the two counties of Guihua and Yongan to collect 400,000 *yuan*. The timing for the transfer [of troops] from Sha County to Guihua and Yongan depends on the enemy disposition in Nanfeng. If the enemy retreats, we may postpone the transfer.

The Third Army Corps is to march with its full force toward Jiangle, drive out Zhou Zhiquan, occupy Jiangle and Shunchang counties, and collect 600,000 *yuan*.

The Twelfth Army should be dispersed over Ninghua, Qingliu, and Tingzhou to collect 150,000 *yuan* and to dispatch personnel to Tingzhou to purchase quilts and clothing and Western medicine and to open up communications in the western part of Fujian. If the enemy troops in Nanfeng retreat, the two divisions of the Third Army should occupy Nanfeng but only advance to Litayu. If the enemy does not retreat, only one division is to be left in Xingyu. If Jiang and Cai turn against Chiang Kai-shek, we should not put pressure on Ganzhou.

2) Evaluation of the Current Situation and the Principles for Action

It is a fact that Chiang Kai-shek is currently preparing to launch a third attack against the revolution. Chiang has reached a compromise with the north. Naturally, Zhang Xueliang will use this opportunity to take over the whole Shandong front, while Feng [Yuxiang] and Yan [Xishan] still present problems. Chiang will certainly take a defensive position vis-à-vis Guangdong, while attacking the Red Army first. If the Guangdong Army attacks Changsha and the Red Army attacks Wuzhou, Chiang will, of course, attack Guangdong first. Therefore, at the moment we are no longer advancing on Wuzhou. If the enemy retreats from Nanfeng, we will use only a small force to take Nanfeng, but will not use a large force to advance on Wuzhou. Our forces will stay in areas far from Chiang Kai-shek and will not go to the areas controlled by the Guangdong government. This will force Chiang to take a defensive posture against the Red Army and turn around to deal with the Guangdong government.

3) The Problem of Discipline in Attacking Qifang

If the enemy does not withdraw from Nanfeng, the Third Army will attack Qifang in line with the former plan. However, meetings of cadres must be called, and troops must be gathered together for lectures on discipline; the masses and the Red Guards are not allowed to go [to Qifang]. After we reach Qifang, we shall convene a peace conference and sign peace treaties. First, neither side should attack the other; both sides should attack the local despots. Second, the Red Guard Army in Xinghuo has the duty to help the peasants in Qifang to fight the reactionaries; cattle are not to be returned because not all of them can be returned. With the exception of those who have been killed, prisoners taken by both sides must be returned.

4) The Deployment of the Twelfth Division of the Fourth Army

One regiment is deployed along the Hetian-Kangdu line, one along the Xichengqiao-Shigouyu line, and one will follow the divisional headquarters at Jianning. The Twelfth Army is to send a company to Lixing to maintain communications (with Guangchang); one regiment is stationed at Anyuansi.

5) The Special District of Fujian and Jiangxi

Comrade Zhou Yishu is to be the secretary in command of Ting[zhou], Lian, Bai, and Rui[jin]; Zhou and Li [Jingquan] are county secretaries of Ting[zhou] and Rui[jin].

6) The Nanfeng Problem

In dealing with the Nanfeng problem, it was right to capture Hu Zhusheng, but technically speaking it was not so skillful. Before striking down a leader of the masses, we should find another for them even if he is an A.B. League member.³⁶

Afterward we can attack the leaders of the A.B. League. Nanfeng is without a leader. If it is necessary to arrest Hu Zhusheng, we must first disarm [the troops in] Nanfeng, detain them in great secrecy, and move them at night. When they are interrogated, none of them is to be told about it [the interrogation] in advance. Some are elements of the A.B. League, but we should not talk about this at random. Now, we should first find the armed forces. The political department and one division of the Third Army should go to the Nanfeng area. We should announce immediately Hu Zhusheng's crimes, distribute land, form peasant regiments, find³⁷ . . . and use every means to collect weapons.

D.3 Resolution on the Futian Incident (16 April 1931)³⁸

The Enlarged Meeting of the Central Bureau has listened to the report from the Party Center's delegation on the Futian Incident and completely agrees with the views of the delegation. (When the Party Center received news of the Futian Incident, lack of information prevented it from drafting a resolution. Therefore, the Party Center specially dispatched Central Bureau Comrades Ren Bishi, Wang Jiaxiang, and Gu Zuolin as its delegation empowered to solve the problem of the Futian Incident. They are empowered to represent the views of the Party Center.)

1) The Reasons for the Emergence and Development of the A.B. League

The A.B. League (or the Anti-Bolshevik League) is a counterrevolutionary organization comprising landlords; local despots, tyrants, and gentry; rich peasants, intellectuals born of wealthy families; and hoodlums. It is a national organization. Although its name varies across the country (such as the A.B. League in southwest Jiangxi, the Social Democratic Party in west Fujian, the North Pole Association in west Hubei), they are all fascist parties and groups directly under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Their sole objective is to destroy the revolution and the CP, attempt to overthrow the political regime of workers and peasants in the soviet areas, and restore reactionary rule. In the white areas, apart from undermining the CP, [they] are doing their best to occupy important positions within the GMD to help realize a fascist dictatorship to rule the whole country.

At the moment, class struggle within the soviet areas is still very intense. Although landlords, local tyrants, the gentry, and rich peasants have been toppled, and workers and peasants have seized political power, the conflict between classes has not disappeared; class struggle has not abated. On the contrary, the remnants of the landlord class, rich peasants, hoodlums, and all reactionary elements, taking advantage of their previous economic, political, and cultural privileges and the help from

the reactionary rule in the white areas, are resorting to every means to undermine the revolution and wage their last struggle. In particular, the deepening of the land revolution and the reform of the soviet regime have intensified class struggle. In this class struggle, there are, on the one side, the workers and peasants who hold political power and are under the leadership of the CP; on the other side, there are the reactionary classes that are being ruled by and form the class basis of the A.B. League; the A.B. League is the leader of these reactionary elements.

The A.B. League is able to expand greatly primarily because it can infiltrate the CP. In general, the important members of the A.B. League, the Social Democratic Party, and the Reorganizationists³⁹ are all members of the CP who occupy comparatively responsible positions within it. Therefore, the A.B. League has become a small party within the CP. It takes advantage of the CP's position to infiltrate the soviets, labor unions, and all the mass organizations, carrying out counterrevolutionary activities under the flag of revolution.

Why has the A.B. League been able to expand rapidly within the party recently? The main reasons are:

The CCP and, in particular, the party organizations in the soviet areas contain many children of local tyrants, the gentry, and landlords, as well as rich peasants and hoodlums. Moreover, these elements often are in responsible positions in party and governmental agencies. Landlords and rich peasants have found it easy to infiltrate the CCP particularly because of the past mistakes it has committed such as Chen Duxiu's opportunism and, later, the policy of relying on the rich peasants. Not surprisingly, as the revolution develops and thorough land redistribution is carried out, these elements are bound to betray us and go over to the side of counterrevolutionary organizations—such as the A.B. League.

During the period of expansion of the soviet areas, the party also followed the mistaken political line of Li Lisan and forced the Red Army to advance blindly on the cities instead of consolidating the soviet areas. This provided the A.B. League with an opportunity for major expansion. This was just what the A.B. League needed. In addition, Li Lisan's political line used "leftist" words to oppose the equal distribution of land. This was just what the A.B. League needed to use against the land revolution. Thus, the A.B. League attempted to use the pretext of the Li Lisan political line to engage in counterrevolutionary activities. At the same time, the A.B. League made use of the catastrophic results of the implementation of Li Lisan's political line to instigate the masses and fan their dissatisfaction with the party and the soviet areas. Moreover, while the General Front Committee opposed Li Lisan's political line, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee firmly supported it. In fact, several members of the Provincial Executive Committee (like Cong Yunzhong and Duan Liangbi) were all members of the A.B. League. In the name of supporting the CC's line and opposing so-called rightist tendencies, they fought the General Front Committee and worked for the counterrevolutionaries. As a result, the A.B. League used the inner-party struggle to cover up their antiparty activities, thus making it all the more difficult for ordinary party members to see through the A.B.

League's conspiracy. Party members who supported Li Lisan's political line were used by the A.B. League to undermine the party and the revolution. Thus, the A.B. League was presented with another opportunity to expand its organization.

In the past, we did not pay sufficient attention to the work of purging subversive elements. The captured members of the A.B. League were shot on the spot, instead of being used to dig up further clues. We did not set up an organization of political security agents to carry out the purges. All this was because in the past we did not take the problem of the A.B. League seriously. Neglect of work to purge subversive elements also made it possible for the A.B. League to expand.

2) The Futian Incident Is a Counterrevolutionary Rebellion Led by the A.B. League

The confessions by the principal perpetrators of the Futian Incident such as Li Baifang, Xie Hanchang, Jing Wanbang, Zhou Mian, Cong Yunzhong, Liu Jinghua, Hu Jiaju, and Zeng Juefei completely prove that the Futian Incident was a counter-revolutionary rebellion led by the A.B. League. The principal criminals in the Futian Incident—Duan Liangbi, Li Baifang, Xie Hanchang, Liu Di, Jing Wangbang, Zhou Mian, Cong Yunzhong, Liu Jinghua, and Zeng Juefei—were all important members of the A.B. League and also occupied important positions in revolutionary agencies. [[The positions of these figures are listed.]] When the imperialist GMD was attacking the soviet areas and the Red Army, the A.B. League was plotting an armed rebellion in response to the white army's attack. Therefore, we arrested Duan Liangbi, an important member of the A.B. League, but Liu Di immediately engineered an armed rebellion in Donggu, commanded soldiers to release the captured A.B. members, detained the commander of the Twentieth Corps, Li Shaojiu, and Yi Ershi and the CC's revenue collector. He also expelled the chairman of the provincial soviet, Zeng Shan, attacked the Red Army's school, disarmed a company of the Twelfth Corps, and commandeered his troops to the west of the river. Moreover, he instigated the masses in all areas to leave the Red Army, posted reactionary slogans, spread rumors, and sowed seeds of discord, attempting to undermine the unified leadership of the party and the Red Army. These are the most egregious facts concerning the counterrevolutionary rebellion.

After the Second Plenum of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee and the Provincial Executive Committee (except for a few members) before the Futian Incident they opposed the General Front Committee. The A.B. members in the Provincial Executive Committee and the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee used this opportunity to implement their plot. The Second Plenum, held in August 1930, was totally dominated politically by the Li Lisan line and overthrew the correct line of the "February 7" meeting, particularly in its resolution on the equal distribution of land.⁴⁰ It also dismissed Liu Shiqi who firmly implemented the line of the "February 7" meeting. The A.B. League did indeed play an important role at this meeting. Since that time, the A.B. League has waved the flag of the Li Lisan line to oppose the

party and the revolution. When Liu Di mutinied and set free the A.B. League members, the A.B. League still held up the flag of the Li Lisan line and purposefully attacked Ji'an to deceive the masses and call for opposition to the leadership by individuals and the Red Army. Under such circumstances, some comrades who supported the Li Lisan line were used. They joined the counterrevolutionary Futian Incident and became tools of the A.B. League.

To sum up, the Futian Incident was a counterrevolutionary rebellion led by the A.B. League under the flag of the Li Lisan line. More precisely, the Futian Incident was a counterrevolutionary rebellion led by the A.B. League and participated in by some supporters of the Li Lisan line. The A.B. League engineered this rebellion in order to overthrow the revolution. Supporters of the Li Lisan line joined this rebellion to support the Li Lisan line and oppose the General Front Committee, thus simply committing the same counterrevolutionary acts as the A.B. League.

3) The Mistake of the Central Bureau in Solving the Futian Incident

In the past, the General Front Committee adopted a policy of firmly attacking the A.B. League. This was entirely correct and, from a class standpoint, was necessary to protect the revolution. In dealing with the Futian Incident in particular, it was completely correct to define it as a counterrevolutionary rebellion led by the A.B. League and to call on the masses to attack [it] resolutely. At the time the enemy's large-scale attack was moving closer. Many A.B. League members were discovered in the Red Army, while, during this cruel struggle, something like the Futian Incident took place. If we had not adopted the strategy of firmly attacking [the enemy], we would never have been able to unite the revolutionary forces, or crush all the rebellions being plotted by the counterrevolutionaries, or defeat the enemy attacking the revolution, or fight for the great victory in the battle of Longgang. We regard those in the A.B. League who falsely upheld the flag of the Li Lisan line as liquidationists. This was a mistake in terminology. In truth, this was against the Li Lisan line; this was correct. However, in its efforts to eradicate the A.B. League, the General Front Committee committed some methodological and technical errors. For example, in some instances we believed too much the confessions of [members of] the A.B. League, adopted too harsh methods during interrogation, and failed to establish a complete security system organization to purge subversive elements. Therefore, sometimes we caused some party members and the masses to be uninformed and frightened.

The line adopted by the Central Bureau to solve the Futian Incident was completely wrong. The Central Bureau pointed out in its announcement and other documents: "In light of the history of our party's struggle in southwest Jiangxi, of our party's organizational basis, and of the objective facts of the Futian Incident, the Central Bureau cannot reach a subjective conclusion affirming that the Futian Incident was an armed rebellion by the A.B. League and the

liquidationists" (see Circular No.11).⁴¹ "They [referring to some in the Provincial Executive Committee] are engaged in unprincipled factional fighting among small groups; if such tendencies are allowed to develop, it is likely to lead to antiparty and counterrevolutionary activities similar to the Futian Incident" (see Circular No. 2).⁴²

This evaluation was of course very wrong and divorced from the class standpoint. The Central Bureau fundamentally failed to point out that the Futian Incident was a counterrevolutionary armed rebellion led by the A.B. League. Instead, it affirmed that the Futian Incident was not an armed rebellion by the A.B. League. This has completely obscured the counterrevolutionary nature of the Futian Incident. It also said that the Futian Incident was the result of the development of unprincipled factional fighting. This was an even bigger mistake. In the past, the Provincial Executive Committee opposed the Party Committee of the First Army and later its General Front Committee. It accused them of having a "peasant mentality," "resisting the Party Center," "right opportunism," etc. To view these most important struggles of principle and political line and of supporting and opposing the Li Lisan line as factional squabbles was to obscure the serious mistakes of principle and of past political line. It was also a very dangerous mistake, because such an evaluation will make people believe that the Futian Incident was a struggle against factional fighting within the party, rather than a class struggle. In fact, unprincipled factional fighting within the party will never evolve into a counterrevolutionary armed rebellion. This is the most obvious fact.

Because of this evaluation, to solve the Futian Incident, the Central Bureau adopted methods of "penalizing both sides," "using the method of education," and "seeking a peaceful resolution." Therefore, it decided to strip Comrade Li Shaojiu of his party membership (although it was not enforced later on) and expel or warn those who took part in the Futian Incident. In reality, [the Central Bureau] completely relaxed its efforts to investigate whether these people were A.B. League members. At the same time, [the Central Bureau] also informed party organizations at all levels not to speak of the Futian Incident as armed rebellion by the A.B. League. On receiving these resolutions and announcements, our party organizations at all levels thus relaxed, softened up, and diminished their struggle against the A.B. League. The A.B. League was able to hide under the erroneous resolution of the Central Bureau, under the "counterrevolutionaries in practice," and under "a certain kind of factional fighting" to continue their counterrevolutionary activities and develop counterrevolutionary organizations. Therefore, this erroneous resolution of the Central Bureau completely relaxed the struggle against the A.B. League. This was very dangerous.

The Central Bureau produced the erroneous resolution on the Futian Incident that diverged from the class standpoint and that made concessions to the A.B. League. This was because from its beginning the Central Bureau was under the rule of the Third Plenum's political line of conciliation with the Li Lisan line.

This is why it failed to recognize the substance of the struggle over principle between the previous Provincial Executive Committee and the General Front Committee, let alone to understand why the supporters of the Li Lisan line would organize the counterrevolutionary Futian Incident together with the A.B. League. This failure could only lead to the wrong conclusion that “the Futian Incident was a factional fight.”

4) Our Lessons from the Futian Incident

The Futian Incident did not happen by chance, but was a very serious problem in the history of the soviet and our party. The Futian Incident has further awakened us to the question of reforming the party and the soviet and, in particular, the question of intensifying the purge of counterrevolutionaries. We must step up our efforts to reform the party’s composition, weeding out children of landlords, local despots, the gentry, as well as rich peasants and hoodlums, to train and reform the cadres, and promote and educate cadres from among the workers and peasants. At the same time, we must continue to reform the soviet, eliminating undesirable elements and destroying dictatorship by the director of the Secretariat.

To purge the counterrevolutionaries we should implement the following:

A) Firmly implement the party’s correct line—the international line. Use the class standpoint to lead correctly the class struggle within the soviet areas, to step up the work of purging counterrevolutionaries, to adopt every means to attack the A.B. League, and to correct the serious previous mistake of relaxing the struggle against the A.B. League in order to destroy completely the conspiracies and organizations of all counterrevolutionary factions and groups.

B) Organize a governmental security organ specialized in dealing with counterrevolutionaries. The party should appoint the best and most reliable members to do this job. In the future, regulations and documents will explain the organization and working methods of our security bureau.

C) Expand our propaganda against the A.B. League and other counterrevolutionary parties and factions. We should apply the mass line in our trials so that the masses will rise up to oppose the reactionary factions and actively support the Communist Party and the soviet government.

D) Concerning interrogation, we should not use only harsh methods, but rather both soft and harsh methods interchangeably, and ask about all details. Concerning sentencing, we should consider the social background of the subject being sentenced (workers and peasants who have been deceived are allowed to turn themselves in and get a second chance). Stubborn counterrevolutionaries must be eliminated; we must avoid random arrests and killings; we should know that random arrests and killings can only frighten the masses and help the A.B. League instead of eliminating it.

Only by strengthening the soviet regime and winning continuous victories can we resolutely implement the above political line and methods.

D.4 Conclusions to the First Enlarged Meeting of the [E-Yu-Wan] Subbureau. *Zhang Guotao* (28 June 1931)⁴³

Comrades! The main agenda of this meeting is to review the reports of the CC's Subbureau, the CC of the League's CC Subbureau, and the Northwest Anhui Special Committee. Time constraints have prevented every comrade from speaking as much as he would like. This is a flaw. However, speeches by thirty-eight comrades were full of the spirit of self-criticism, and they were devoid of empty talk and closely related to practical work. This is an excellent phenomenon. However, there are some weaknesses, which include a lack of a correct understanding of self-criticism, an inability to criticize one's own work first and then criticize others' work, and the phenomenon of superiors criticizing subordinates while subordinates criticize superiors. Only comrades working in the Red Army can expose all mistakes and flaws in previous work more thoroughly. This is excellent self-criticism. [We] should use the party's Bolshevik spirit to carry out [self-criticism]. We should oppose any attempts to sabotage the party's discipline and organization under the flag of self-criticism. For example, when a county committee goes to a district committee to inspect work, the district committee must not attribute its own mistakes to the county committee; the district committee should criticize itself. However, if the policy direction given by the county committee has been incorrect, the county committee must not blame the district committee. The county committee must take the responsibility. This requires that both superiors and subordinates should all use self-criticism correctly.

What is a correct line? This is a revolutionary line led by the proletariat and based on Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis. For example, the Lisan line is not formulated according to subjective or objective facts. It is a non-Marxist-Leninist, unscientific, and incorrect line. Rightist tendencies are opportunistic. "Leftist" tendencies are also opportunistic. Nothing is more leftist and revolutionary than the line of the Comintern. The Lisan line used leftist slogans all the time, such as disarming the peasants, abolishing the peasants' armed forces, etc. They themselves believed that these were very leftist and revolutionary; in fact, they were utterly opportunistic. Many comrades often make the following criticism: someone did not grasp the key of their work or had a bad work-style. What is work-style? Work-style ensures the implementation of the correct line and is the most effective instrument to implement the correct line. It is wrong and unscientific to make a general claim that the key to work has not been grasped. Is it your fault or the Center's if you fail to grasp the key to work? Only by being informed can the key to work be grasped. There should not be similar unscientific critical remarks.

Now let me talk formally.

First, it is wrong to say that the enemy has now adopted a defensive approach; in many places the enemy is still organizing local militia to attack us. At the same time, we have learned that the enemy is massing forces to attack the Central Soviet

Area and then us. Before the enemy aggressively attacks us, we should take the opportunity to launch large-scale attacks against the enemy; we must not relax even a little the efforts of "countering encirclement and extermination."

Second, in implementing the Fourth Plenum's line [January 1931], the Central Bureau indeed began to change its practice. For example, militarily speaking, the existing soviet area has been increasingly strengthened; the enemy in Dushan in northwest Anhui has been annihilated; the enemy in Machen was frightened and took to flight. One enemy regiment in Taohua and Huang'an was destroyed, and this frightened away from the Popi River the enemy troops who were going to occupy Xingji. Also, many new soviet areas have developed. Within the Red Army, a basis has been established in terms of the organizational relationships of the party, of the army, and between the Red Army and local organizations. In particular, many good cadres were transferred to leading posts in the Red Army. The Central Branch Bureau has made expansion of the Red Army a priority.

The CC's Subbureau has called for resistance to coercion of the masses and the bureaucratization of the soviets, and for the establishment of supervisory committees of workers and peasants. It has sent many detailed instructions and methods to solve the food problem. The CC's Subbureau has called for resolute opposition to the bad phenomenon of peasants from the soviet areas going to the nonsoviet areas taking things away from the poor people. Change has now begun; for example, on the issue of labor unions, [we] specifically pointed out the tendency to neglect the workers' interests and the bad relations with the peasants. The work of the Political Security Bureau [*zhengzhi baoweiju*] has been strengthened. We also waged a firm struggle against the tendencies of Xu Pengren, Chao Dajun, Chen Dingho, and others. We intensified our efforts in the nonsoviet areas; the work of the special committees of Jinghan, Huangchuan, and central Hubei was reassigned and inspected. We rectified the county committees of Poxiaobei and Poannan counties and organized two training courses to rectify and strengthen party leadership. These are all the achievements of our work in the past.

However, there are many flaws, the principal reasons for which being: (a) There are too few personnel in the organs of the Central Branch Bureau; the work of the various departments has yet to be established. Therefore, we often cannot inspect work everywhere, thus causing relations between counties and the Central Branch Bureau to be distant. (b) In the past, there were no workers or peasant comrades in the Standing Committee of the CC Subbureau. Today we must elect a few comrades who are workers and peasants to join the standing committee, who will serve not only in name, but also will take charge of real work. (c) A few additional questions will be discussed here. The ways through which leading party organs realize their leadership include roughly the following forms: directives, party newspapers, inspection tours, and individual talks. Comrades, please do not think that the party newspaper belongs to the leaders (in the Soviet Union, party members will be expelled from the party if they forget to read the party newspaper each day). Such views are incorrect. If there are mistakes in party documents and newspapers, we

should make suggestions to the superiors. When the party newspaper is correct, subordinates should treat it as an announcement and implement it. (d) In the past, very few reports were made by local party organizations. Even when the occasional report came in, it was either untrue, empty, and simplistic, or long and boring without a central issue. This was true of all kinds of meetings. Either there was no report or discussion, or the report began with the earth's creation or focused on questions that were neither practical nor necessary. (e) Previously we did not understand all kinds of organizational relationships. From now on the Central Branch Bureau should do its best to improve these relations. (f) Comrade Zheng Weisan said that the leadership provided by the Central Branch Bureau to the government of the special soviet area was fragmented, restricted to only individual conversations and without systematic and planned leadership. In fact, although the government of the special soviet area often has only one or two persons in its administration and is rarely able to give directives—through meetings—to comrades working in the special soviet area, the government has intensified, instead of relaxing, its efforts concerning the key work of the special soviet area, such as grain, economics, training of cadres, the relationship between the CC's Subbureau and the special soviet, newspapers in the special soviet, and the committee on political work of the special soviet. The CC's Subbureau once said to the comrades working in the special soviet that if comrades who were workers and peasants committed mistakes, the party could excuse 30 percent of their mistakes. If comrades who were intellectuals committed mistakes, the party should increase the penalty by one-third. This is an extremely correct method. Since these words were spoken, we have heard that some intellectuals have been afraid to do anything out of fear of making mistakes. This does not have to be so. This tendency should not exist; those petty bourgeois comrades who are intellectuals should make greater efforts.

Third, now I would like to speak about the party's current principal tasks:

(A) The task of "countering encirclement and extermination" (military operations). The main missions here include (i) Clear the areas that are close to the enemy, reopen commerce, establish communications, solve the grain and economic problems in order to expand the soviet area. (ii) Support the Central Soviet Area. Now the enemy is concentrating enormous forces to attack the Central Soviet Area. Comrade Peng Yongjun said that consolidating the soviet area was a conservative view; this is wrong. A Comintern comrade said, "If Comrade Lisan said that strengthening the soviet area is conservative, then we would rather be a conservative party." One cannot separate solving economic problems from political tasks.

(B) The soviet congress. (i) The congress must set up a party and league Secretariat [*dang tuan ganshihui*] and subdivide the comrades present into several small groups. Comrade Zhou Chunquan is appointed responsible secretary, and it comes directly under the command of the CC's Subbureau. (ii) This congress should establish a good soviet; in the past, government institutions did not have representatives from the Red Army, or representatives from among youths and women. This time it should include their representatives. Once there are representatives from the

Red Army, no one will forget the families of the Red Army and the problem of the wounded. Once there are women representatives, there will be no incorrect limitations on women's development. With youth representatives, there will not be the phenomenon of oppressing the youth. The special soviet should emphasize the implementation of this line. (iii) Reexamine the mistakes in past work and fully carry out self-criticism. Moreover, determine policies for future change and transform the existing situation. For example, it is not enough simply to form an inspection commission composed of workers and peasants; [we] must let the masses know how to use it. (iv) The congress should not have too many documents. There should be only the manifesto, land law, labor law, economic policy, [documents on] issues of marriage, youth, organization of the soviet, the Red Army, etc. . . . Every party member should treat these documents as party documents. Should they not do so, they should be considered as violating party discipline. (v) After the conclusion of the congress, every delegate should go to the grass roots to call mass meetings [to propagate] the line and reform soviet administrations at lower levels. The enlarged meeting should explain to the comrades chairing the meetings that all the meetings' proposals should be approved by the party. This is the guideline adopted by the CC's Subbureau in leading the soviet congress. We request that the enlarged meeting approve it.

(C) On the issue of the Red Army. (i) A committee has already been organized to draft a resolution to be issued in the name of the enlarged meeting. The enlarged meeting is also requested to approve it. (ii) In dealing with the question of expanding the Red Army, we should regularly and continuously mobilize the masses to join the Red Army. With their consent, we should mobilize the masses as long as they are not rich peasants or members of the Reorganization clique or other political factions and as long as they are workers, hired hands, poor peasants, and reliable middle peasants. We oppose the practice of unauthorized conscription (without approval from the soviet) and failure to get good youths to join the Red Army. We oppose recruiting rich peasants and those suspected of being in the Reorganization clique into the Red Army. Those who have joined already must be purged from the Red Army. In the future when similar incidents occur, [perpetrators] must be severely punished. This is the first point. (iii) Do our best to help solve all the material problems of the Red Army and improve Red Army life. (iv) Oppose the failure to observe discipline within the Red Army, improve the soldiers' education, voluntarily obey discipline, establish a relationship between the Red Army and the masses, oppose incorrect sexual relations, and oppose sexual harassment of women. In particular, Red Army commanders should correct their own faults first in order to influence the soldiers. (v) Intensify the work of political education, reform members of the Red Army, and gain excellent results in training over the short term. (vi) Intensify party leadership over the league in the Red Army and oppose the liquidationist view of neglecting league work. (vii) Political commissars must firmly execute these party policies and train commanders in the Red Army to resolutely execute the above [policies] on the several problems in the Red Army. (viii) Party organization within the Red Army is different from local party organiza-

tions; there can be self-criticism only from the top down; [we] cannot develop self-criticism from the bottom up within the Red Army. Only this will avoid weakening discipline within the Red Army. Only this will strengthen the Red Army.

(D) The problem of grain. Continue the policies for solving the food problem. Every comrade should work hard to grow melons, sweet potatoes, oats, beans, and other crops. Moreover, they should lead the masses well to work on the land of the families of Red Army soldiers. This point should not be neglected. We must examine frequently the execution of this work.

(E) The problem of the land and the peasantry. (i) Hired hands are the proletariat in the countryside; poor peasants are semiproletariat; middle peasants do not exploit others and are not subject to exploitation by others, so they are the petty bourgeoisie; rich peasants exploit labor, rent land, lend at high interest rates, and are the exploiting elements in the countryside. (ii) We may penalize families of reactionaries with hard labor or otherwise expel them and deprive them of the right to get land. (iii) We should inform the good peasants about the land so that when they go to the countryside for inspection tours they will correct all the mistakes concerning land. (iv) We should recruit more good peasants to work in the land committee. We should train specialists in the land problem to solve the problem completely in all villages. In particular, the villages in west Anhui urgently need such a solution.

(F) Work in eliminating counterrevolutionaries. (i) The principal danger is the rich peasant line. We must firmly oppose, but not exterminate, rich peasants. (ii) Perfect our work in establishing security bureaus. (iii) Intensify the work on eliminating the Reorganization clique. We must wage a tremendous political struggle against the rumors and reactionary propaganda of the Reorganization clique in order to weed out its influence. (iv) Confiscate the weapons of rich peasants.

(G) The peasant association should drive out landlords and rich peasants. The association should carry out one investigation per set period (every six months or one year).

(H) The question of labor unions. Quickly promote cadres and ensure that the unions are led by the party. Resolutely implement labor laws.

(I) Economic policies. Immediately impose excise taxes on goods not needed by workers and peasants.

Work in the nonsoviet areas. Establish a good communications network with the nonsoviet areas. Where possible, the party in the soviet areas should directly guide party work in the nonsoviet areas and attract the comrades and masses in the nonsoviet areas for training in the soviet areas. We should set up training courses. Step up our efforts on the soldiers' movement.

(J) Various organizational relationships. (i) Only under the leadership of the CP can all organizations avoid conflicts. The party is the supreme leading organ. In a county, only the county party committee is the supreme leading organ. Even when one disagrees with the views of the county committee secretary, one has to abide by his or her views and then report to the superior party. In the Red Army, it is not the military commander but the supreme leader who is the political commissar, who is the party and soviet representative. (ii) Every county should accomplish at least the

following: (1) All important political documents from the county and districts must be approved by the county committee. (2) Economic distribution and cadre allocation must be authorized by the county committee. (3) The soviet government can only inquire about the policies of the Political Security Bureau and should not manage everything. (4) The soviet government is not allowed to give orders to labor unions and peasant associations. Only party organizations can perform the leadership functions. (5) Absolutely avoid dictatorship by secretaries, especially by non-party secretaries. (6) Overcome all difficulties, train all kinds of personnel, actively cultivate cadres, run all kinds of training courses, adopt the system of internship, and use meetings to train personnel. (7) In the future all organs and groups should have simple work plans that are fully implemented. (8) On the question of inner-party struggle, we should actively encourage self-criticism and intensify the struggle between two lines. Party organizations at all levels should establish a supervisory committee to enforce strictly party discipline. Inner-party struggle and struggle within government organs are different. To carry out inner-party struggles properly we rely on the strength the party and the masses. In principle, we oppose right opportunism and the remnants of the Lisan line, and we particularly oppose opportunism in practice. We also oppose the line of reconciliation and peace tendencies both within and outside the party. Because of the restrictions of time, I cannot deal separately and in detail with questions of how to improve party branches and district committees, the question of economic associations, etc.

Comrades! The environment of struggle in which we now find ourselves is extremely complex. On the one hand we must fight the enemies from without, while on the other we must fight the enemies from within. This is our line of attack.

After the conclusion of the enlarged meeting, all comrades should swiftly implement these resolutions; do not wait for the resolutions and announcements of the CC's Subbureau. We will use the evaluation system to assess the results of our comrades' efforts.

D.5 The Great Victory of Purging Counterrevolution Arises in the E-Yu-Wan Soviet. *Chen Changhao* (22 November 1931)⁴⁴

Report on the Details of the Current Purge of Counterrevolutionaries by Comrade Chen Changhao, Commissar of the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants

Place: The Peng-Yang Military and Political Academy in the E-Yu-Wan [Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet] Area

Comrades:

The process of the current purge of counterrevolutionaries within the Red Army's Fourth Front Army is well worth the serious attention of all the armed comrades in the Peng-Yang Academy and all the poor working people in the E-Yu-

Wan Soviet Area. This purge demonstrates the great significance of the consolidation and expansion of the Fourth Front Army and the Soviet Area. All comrades have heard that the Central Soviet has broken through the enemy's encirclement and captured over 100,000 weapons. Even the relatively underdeveloped peasant movement in Shaanxi and Shanxi is now thriving and providing an enormous impetus over a large region of the Soviet Area. The victory in the E-Yu-Wan Soviet Area is even greater. Every day it is strengthening and expanding. Thus, the revolutionary tide is surging ahead daily. This has frightened the wits out of the reactionary rulers and shaken their rule. Therefore, to maintain its deathbed struggle, the enemy is concentrating even more on attacks against the Soviet Area and the Red Army. However, the enemy has already seen how useless its airplanes, guns, and machine guns are. Therefore, it is making use of the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party to infiltrate our Soviet Area and the Red Army to try to sabotage them. This is a very vicious plot. It is easy for us to see the enemy attacking with airplanes and guns, but it is not easy for us to see the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party. How vicious the enemy is in dealing with us! No comrade should forget this. Now let us talk about the activities of the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party in the Red Army and the process of our current purge:

1) The routes of infiltration into the Soviet Area by the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party. The infiltration began as early as 1928. (a) For example, Xu Jishen came from Shanghai. At that time he had very close connections with the Third Party, and thus the CC sent someone to talk to him. Old Xu expressed repentance and, as a result, the CC dispatched him to become the commander of the First Army. In fact, Xu Jishen came with the orders of the Third Party's CC. Xiong Shouxuan was also entrusted by the Third Party's CC and the A.B. League to develop their organizations. (b) Gao Jiandou was a battalion commander under Zhang Fakui. He came from Wuhan also on an assignment for the A.B. League and the Third Party. (c) Feng Jun used to serve under Yang Hucheng's command. He was a CP member who had betrayed the party. He came [to us] while the Red Army was attacking Xingyang. (d) Li Ronggui joined the Third Party in Shanghai and then came here to become political commissar of the First Division. That Pan Banfu could stay, regain his party membership, and be promoted to chief-of-staff was the work of Ronggui. (e) Pan Banfu was an officer under Tang Shengzhi. On Tang's orders he went from Xingyang to Xiaogan and then came here. He also brought his wife to engage in joint sabotage. We should also report that when Gao Jiandou came here, he was told by the A.B. League that to establish contact with Xiong Shouxuan he should tap him on the shoulder three times. Thus, they formed an organization within the Red Army and the local government as soon as they arrived.

2) The development of the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party within the Red Army. Our comrades all know that these [elements] have had a long history of infiltration and, as a result, they have been frantically developing

their organizations. In the past year and this year alone, they set up a governing agency and a counterrevolutionary Military Affairs Committee of nine members: Xu Jishen, Zhou Weijun, Gao Jiandou, Liao Yeqi, Xiao Cai, Wu Jingchi, Xiong Shouxuan, Pan Banfu, and Jiang Jingtang, with Xu Jishen as chair. Under them, they have developed organizations in individual divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. However, if we destroy their links at the lower levels, it is very difficult for those at the top. Let me cite another example for you. Zhou Weijun was a hero. He used the cover of the CP to create bases for them. For him, there was no such thing as the soviet or the CP. He once murdered two party representatives and a CC inspector. He expelled comrades Guo Shusheng and Liu Ying. Long ago he had already established organizations of the A.B. League and the Reorganizationists in the town of Shangcheng. This aided the Reorganizationists' further development. In particular, when Shang Guanglu, Ye, and Li came south, they were very active. In the current process of purging traitors, we can see, simply from the example of the Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth divisions of the Fourth Corps, that two division commanders (Xu Jishen and Zhou Weijun), one division political commissar (Liao Yongjun), eight regiment commanders, five regiment political commissars (regiment commanders: Pan Banfu, Wu Yunsan, Gao Jiandou, Wang Zhexian, Xiao Fang, Wang Ming, Wei Mengxian, Cao Guannan; regiment political commissars: Feng Jun, Jiang Zhiying, Yuan Liang, Wu Jingchi, and Liu Xingmao), two directors of divisional political departments, and twelve directors of regimental political departments have joined the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party. There were also many managers, staff officers, and aides who joined. Some company and platoon commanders also joined. For example, Jiang Jingtang of the Military Affairs Committee for west Anhui, the party secretaries of the four counties in west and north Anhui (rich peasants), several members of the special party committees (rich peasants and landlords), and most of the organizations in Xinhuangguang were all such elements. This is proof of the attempt by Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei to attack the soviet areas and of the enormous size of the counterrevolutionary organizations. This proves that in the past the Fourth Army of the Red Army was effectively under the command of the Reorganizationists. Principal Red Army leaders turned a blind eye to this and even reported to the branch bureau that the Red Army was in a state of perfect health. This time, altogether about 1,000 people have been eliminated as well as roughly 1,500 or 1,600 rich peasants and other undesirable elements. Most of the 1,000 Reorganizationists and A.B. League and Third Party elements were landlords, rich peasants, hoodlums, gangsters, GMD spies, students from the Whampoa [Huangpu] Academy, mutineers, prisoners of war, and expelled CCP and YL members. There are hardly any workers or peasants among them. Among the 1,000 people, there were over 700 CP members (fools) and a few youth members. At the same time, we can see a massive convergence of parochial mentalities and sentiments of local talents (local nepotism). This is fairly common in the cities of Shan and Liuhe but less so in Huangma.

3) Comrades, let us look at their strategies, lines, plots, and conspiracies. In general, their strategies are: to defect with their guns; murder workers, peasants, and CP members; surrender to the GMD; and sabotage the Red Army and the soviet areas. These elements were extremely pleased when the veteran Twenty-eighth and Twenty-second regiments lost most of their men in the attack on Dashanzhai. We employed a strong force in the attack on the Qing district, but we could not achieve a breakthrough. Zhou Weijun and Xu Jishen often sent men to report to Gu Jingzhi, the head of the Qing district police. Thus, he knew everything. On the Shanguang Route, Gu had one wireless set with which he sent their messages to Chiang Kai-shek and reported on their activities. A long time ago, they wanted to defect with their guns. When the second meeting was convened in Xingji, Jiang Jingtang, Xu Jishen, and Zhou Weijun exerted a great effort in recommending that we continue to the Yangtze River. At that time, Zeng Zhongsheng (follower of the Lisan line) completely agreed. As a result, they decided that going south provided the best opportunity of destroying the Red Army. The day after Yingshan was taken, Chiang Kai-shek sent two fully empowered representatives, Zhong Junzhong and Mei Qiao, to connive with Xu Jishen and the others, promising them positions as commanders of the temporary Fourteenth Corps; Xiao Fang and Zhou Weijun were given divisional command posts and promised 300,000 in silver dollars. They planned to drag the Fourth Corps of the Red Army, which our heroic comrades created with their blood and lives, to Wuxue where it could be destroyed and its guns handed over. They wanted it to raise the GMD flag. After the Red Army took Yingshan, the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and Third Party elements mobilized to support the plan by Zeng Zhongsheng to occupy Wuxue. They held a secret meeting in the mansion of Xiong Shouxuan to change the course of action and go to Wuxue. At the same time, Xu Jishen immediately sent Zhong Jun to Hankou to meet with old Chiang [Kai-shek] to discuss details. At Wuxue, three huge warships were waiting, loaded with money. They planned to use the troops of Xu and Xia to attack from both sides. Xu Jishen and the others also located two Reorganizationists from Huangguang who disguised themselves as peasants. They acted as a liaison informing them [Xu, etc.] on the other side's actions. They decided to go to Wuxue and change the plan for the Fourth Army of the branch bureau of the CC. Writing from Yingshan, Zeng Zhongsheng said: Jing Huangguang organized many responsible elements for liaison and wanted the Fourth Army to go to Wuxue. These representatives were sent by the Reorganizationists. Chiang Kai-shek sent Zhong Jun. They did not reveal his real name, saying that he was Zhong Suowu. They posted an announcement stating that Zhong Suowu was a spy sent by Chiang Kai-shek and had been shot. In fact, Old Xu set him free, giving him a letter, travel expenses, and a pass. There was another character, Zhong Meiqiao, who was the younger brother of Zhong Jun. He stayed for thirty-one days in the Political Department of the Twelfth Division, and when he left, he was given a letter of introduction as a pass. He ran a secret station at Luotian to contact the representatives of Xia Douyan and Zeng Qiyu. Hundreds of soldiers died to take Yingshan, yet it became an exhibition

center for their gambling, drinking, lust, and gluttony. Every day they feasted at the Xiong mansion and looked for concubines. Long Yongjun was a worker who had returned from the Soviet Union. This rotten egg was also involved. Xu Jishen, Xiong Shouxuan, and Xiao Fang said at a public meeting in Yingshan: the GMD's encirclement and suppression is too strong and the Red Army has too few soldiers. Only by supporting the GMD can we find a way out. An aide to the Twelfth Division said this. It was entirely accurate. The Twelfth Division remained at Yingshan and engaged in such activities. The entire Political Department and Political Section had Reorganizationist meetings. They said that those peasants who had been given some land and arms were gangsters of the Green and Red Gangs, local hoods, and rich peasants. Cao Zhongshen, in his letter opposing the CC's branch bureau, explained such political efforts at length: redistribution of tens of thousands of *shi* of land and arming tens of thousands of masses. In fact, this was to deceive himself and the CC's branch bureau. The guns for which hundreds and thousands of soldiers shed their blood and lost their lives were given to the Reorganizationists. The land was given to landlords and rich peasants. How chilling. How poisonous are the Reorganizationists!

Let us look at the situation when the Fourth Army arrived at Xinshui. A few days after its arrival, it was said that the enemy had been at Shangba for two weeks. The army headquarters immediately ordered the staff department to send out investigators. In so doing, they fell into the trap set for them. A Reorganizationist, Fan Lun, immediately sent a traitor, Tao Rong, the chief-of-staff of the Thirty-first Regiment of the Eleventh Division. When Tao left, he took with him several couriers. They did not go to Shangba, but to a place several miles from Shangba. Then he ordered the couriers to return to Xinshui, while he himself convened a Reorganizationist meeting, saying that the Fourth Army should go to Wuxue. The gold obtained at Xinshui was under the tight custody of the corps headquarters. When it was transported to the Military Affairs Committee at the rear, however, Xu Jishen gave one package to his concubine (who was the sister of Wang Ganzao and very beautiful); Xiong Shouxuan gave a package to his wife. Moreover, he gave the 76,000 silver dollars that was to be used to purchase winter clothing for the Fourth Army to the Third Party's CC and the Reorganizationists in Hubei and E-Yu-Wan. Even now one-third of the Fourth Army officers have little protection against the cold and freezing weather. An even more shameful act was the following: when the Red Army was attacking Xinshui, about 300 local despots, dressed in government-issue clothes, welcomed the Red Army with ceremonial cannon fire. The second day, dressed in blue clothes and wearing straw shoes, they all disguised themselves as peasants to welcome the Red Army with a huge rally. According to the accounts of the masses, the chair of the revolutionary committee of Xinshui was a rotten hoodlum. At that time, the Department of Military and Political Affairs did not concern itself with the matter. Zhou Weijun's headquarters was situated in a pawnshop. He feasted often, and when they finished eating and drinking, they went out to convene Reorganizationist meetings.

[[Other examples exist. Yan Desheng fired two shots at Xu Xiangqian but both missed. In the battle for Maban, we suffered many casualties, and the murderous Xu Jishen abandoned the sick and wounded, and thus many died at the hands of the Red Spear Society and the Big Sword Society.]]

Second, the Reorganizationists completely controlled the economy and conducted extensive sabotage. The head of the Department of Military Logistics, Wang Shaohuan (the general head of the Reorganizationists), abused his economic power, produced false accounting, and spread the rumor that every day those in the corps headquarters received 4.6 cents, those in the political department of the corps received 6.8 cents, while soldiers got only 1.2 cents. In this way he spread discord among the soldiers. Lu Zunwu of the Tenth Division got some clothes for Liu Ying. Lu himself then used the example of Commander Liu being well-dressed to claim that the Red Army was not equal. The commander of the Thirty-third Regiment, the traitor Gao Jiandou, asked the battalions of his regiment to compete in dispossessing local despots. As a result, they got more than 10,000 dollars and yet we received only 1,600 dollars of the total amount. No one knows where the rest of the money has gone. When he [Gao] was arrested at the security bureau, 480 dollars were found on him. Comrades, while we traveled south, every reformist had money. At their feasts, they were eating and drinking the blood of our red soldiers. The Reorganizationists engineered an enormous sabotage of the Red Army's economy. Wang Chaohuai himself claims that he spent between 20,000 and 30,000 silver dollars. This deprived our Red Army soldiers of cooking oil, salt, and decent food. These are all examples.

[[In case the 15 September mutiny at Wuxue should fail, another mutiny was arranged at Mapu on the same day. However, disagreements brought about the plot to mutiny at Huangma. We reached Mapu on 13 September and smashed their plan for revolt, arresting Pan Banfu, Zhong Xingshan, Ding Chao, and about twenty others. Following the purge, we discovered the plans of the Reorganizationists and the A.B. League.]]

When we stayed for a few days at Wumiao Village, local Reorganizationists launched activities in the Shanggu area to respond to the internal strife of the Red Army. In northwest Anhui, the Reorganizationists indeed had much strength. The recruits they had mobilized to join the Red Army were mostly bad elements. They disguised rich peasants as middle peasants and hired hands to be infiltrated into the Red Army. They stepped up their deception and oppression of the workers and peasants to prevent them from joining the Red Army in large numbers and frighten them away from us. Most party and league organizations within the Red Army were composed of members of the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party. In general, they recommended that rich peasants and hoodlums join the party and the league while suppressing workers and peasants. They promoted Reorganizationists to cadre positions while persecuting workers and peasants. Thus, the lower-level organizations and leadership of the Red Army and the party were completely controlled by the Reorganizationists. It was like the time when we, the

CP, were operating within the GMD. I remember that when Zeng Zhongsheng was giving a report on the work of the Red Army at the branch bureau, Comrade [Mao] Zemin raised the criticism that there was no party presence within the Fourth Army. At the time, Comrade Zhongsheng did not take this seriously. In fact, in retrospect, we can see that party members in the Red Army at that time were not really CCP members, but GMD members; a point Comrade Zhongsheng especially denied.

[[With the internal strife, the Fourth Army could not concentrate all its power on the external enemy. To do so it had to stress the purge of counterrevolutionaries.]]

In particular, the main force of the Fourth Army reached the soviet area near Huangma to conduct a special purge. At the same time, it transferred two regiments, the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth, of the Twelfth Division to Huangma to join the purge. This led to the arrest and interrogation of all the traitors who had been exposed by such substantive evidence (with the exception of a very few combat troops). Thus, the principal leaders of the traitors (Xu, Zhou, Xiong, Gao, Li Ronggui, Jiang, Xiao, and others) were arrested. The purge of counterrevolutionaries was continuously stressed as was political work for the entire unit. As a result, we have won today's great victory while the counterrevolution by the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party has suffered a serious defeat.

4) The victory of the purge—our victory with this purge was that of the tens of millions of poor workers and peasants in E-Yu-Wan and throughout China. It is a great victory under the correct leadership of the CP. The reasons for this victory are: (a) The majority of the worker-peasant soldiers and masses within the Red Army did not follow the Reorganizationists as they matured through the land revolution and the liberation struggle. Workers and peasants genuinely understood that the CP was their only leader and participated resolutely in the purge under the leadership of the CP. This dealt the Reorganizationists a disastrous defeat, as they were without the support of workers and peasants. (b) The CCP CC's Branch Bureau in E-Yu-Wan, under the correct leadership of the Fourth Plenum, resolutely carried out the purge. It mobilized the majority of the masses to counterattack the traitors and left them no place to hide. (c) The current purge within the Red Army received the assistance of the majority of the poor workers and peasants. The wave of purges within the Red Army not only gave extra momentum to local purges of counterrevolutionaries but also meant that we were able to recruit large numbers of worker-peasant cadres. Local governments kept a close watch on the purged traitors and rich peasants. In particular, local governments mobilized the masses to support the Red Army's southern move. The principal reasons for the failures of the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party were: (i) They did not have the masses of workers and peasants on their side, and they could not command the guns of the red soldiers. (ii) The counterrevolutionary program of the Reorganizationists was completely bankrupt and was rejected by the masses of workers and peasants. Their pro-imperialist capitulationist program of "reduction of rent on a two-by-five basis," "compromise between labor and capital," and a "national assembly" represents only

the interest of the gentry, local tyrants, landlords, and the bourgeoisie. They used this program to slaughter workers and peasants and sabotage the soviets. It was nothing but arbitrary propaganda. (iii) The propaganda, fabrications, conspiracies, and sabotages by the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party were smashed by cast-iron realities. The particular undeniable facts were the victory of the revolution in the soviet areas, the revolutionary high tide, and the worsening bankruptcy and collapse of the GMD Reorganizationists.

Our victory not only eliminated 1,000 traitors, A.B. League members, and Third Party elements, and nearly 2,000 rich peasants, but also contributed to the following: (i) The firm implementation of the class line and the winning back of the few grass-roots masses who had been deceived by the traitors (we organized training teams and production teams and used political education to win them back). (ii) We mobilized the masses to run a check on every red soldier and officer. At the same time, we put traitors on public trial to publicize their conspiracies. (iii) We resolutely mobilized the masses to deal with the traitors' leaders. At present, all the red soldiers at the front are calling loudly for the execution of Xu Jishen, Zhou Weijun, and others. (iv) We have promoted a large number of cadres from among the workers and peasants. Now military, administrative, party, and league cadres in the Red Army have all been changed. Twelve workers have recently been promoted to the position of regimental commissar; seven or eight workers and peasants have been promoted to director of the regimental political department. Commanders and political instructors of divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons all come from among the workers, hired hands, poor peasants, and good middle peasants who have been seasoned through class struggle. (v) We have greatly strengthened and thus raised the morale and fighting power of the Red Army soldiers. (vi) We have reformed political work within the Red Army. The previously superficial political work now has an impact on the fighting soldiers. (vii) We have fundamentally reformed the party's organization and continued the purge of large numbers of rich peasants. We have recruited many active workers and peasants in the party (in the past they were completely oppressed by the Reorganizationists and rich peasants). Moreover, we have educated the majority of party and league cadres. We have truly established the leadership of the party and the proletariat. (viii) We have restructured the entire military, political, and economic organizational system. (ix) On a large scale, we have begun real and practical military and political training. (x) We have fulfilled the seven-day work plans. The Fourth Army moved south and took Huang'an. Mobilization has been expanded and is more penetrating. (xi) We have recently established the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants and greatly strengthened the Fourth Army. Under the Fourth Front Army, we have established the Twenty-fifth Corps, and expanded the Seventy-third, Seventy-fourth, and Seventy-fifth divisions. This has enabled the Red Army to survive any losses caused by the sabotage by the Reorganizationists. Furthermore, it has expanded and strengthened the Red Army. This is our victory.

5) The current primary tasks. This does not at all mean that the anti-

Reorganizationist efforts have been completely victorious and that we do not need to continue the purge of counterrevolutionaries or that these efforts need to be suspended for a period of time. Absolutely not! Precisely because the enemy's encirclement and attack against us are continuing, the remnants of the Reorganizationists within the Red Army have not yet been eliminated. There are a very small number of rich peasants who still remain [in the Red Army]. The proletariat lacks leadership and has not yet been strengthened to the necessary extent. While the party's work is just beginning to change, the anti-Reorganizationist efforts at the local level have not yet deepened. All this shows that there are still remnants of the Reorganizationists within the Red Army. If we relax our purge slightly, it is possible that the Reorganizationists may make a comeback. Moreover, there remain within the Red Army a very small number of stubborn elements who do not want to turn themselves in. There is an even smaller minority of workers and peasants who have been deceived by the Reorganizationists or who worship particular individuals. They have been intimidated by the traitors and dare not turn themselves in. There are even some traitors for whom we have built up a file and placed under surveillance. The party wants them to wake up and turn over a new leaf, and [if they do so] we will promise them immunity and a decent position. Instead, however, they operate secretly, saying, "We now have suffered a defeat; so we temporarily suspend our activities only to resume them later." All this demonstrates that [we must continue] to use disciplinary means to deepen and intensify the effort to purge counterrevolutionaries and rich peasants politically, and the Reorganizationists, the A.B. League, and the Third Party organizationally. This remains our primary task at the moment.

Now we must:

a) Deepen all our political work so that every soldier can understand the redistribution of land, all the political programs of the soviet government, and all CC directives and resolutions—so that every soldier can understand fully that only the political programs of the CP offer a salvation. By contrast, the GMD and the Reorganizationists who are engaged in the slaughter of workers and peasants are moving day by day toward extinction.

b) We must frequently hold individual investigations of every soldier and officer; firmly oppose the rich peasants; never let a rich peasant infiltrate our ranks; firmly recruit and promote cadres from among the workers and peasants.

c) Expand and strengthen the responsibilities and activities of party and league members so that they may become real models for, and leaders of, the masses; recruit good workers and peasants and strengthen political education.

d) Local governments should utilize fully the experiences and lessons of purging counterrevolutionaries in the Fourth Army and plunge into the work of purging so that counterrevolutionaries will have no place to hide. In particular, this means the reform of all operations of the party, the league, the soviets, and the labor unions, so that the majority of the Red Army soldiers, hired hands, poor peasants, and middle peasants may reap the benefits of the land revolution and so that the Reorganizationists have no opportunity to stir up trouble.

Comrades, the Fourth Army of the Red Army now is a genuine worker-peasant army. It is truly the pillar of the red areas in E-Yu-Wan. It is a weapon to overthrow GMD rule. With such changes, however, cadres become a serious problem. Thus, I have the following requests for the conference:

Comrades, at the moment, the revolutionary tide is rising even higher, while counterrevolutionary rule is collapsing even faster. The Japanese imperialists have occupied the three northeastern provinces and partitioned China. They are attacking the Soviet Union and suppressing the Chinese revolution. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei, and all the counterrevolutionaries are surrendering to the imperialists in order to seek a compromise so that they can attack the soviet areas together. We should continue tirelessly and relentlessly to purge the counterrevolutionaries. We should use the victory of smashing the enemy's second encirclement campaign to prepare for a large counterattack on the enemy and further smash the enemy's third encirclement campaign. This will strengthen the soviet areas in E-Yu-Wan and help the attempt to bring about an initial revolutionary victory in one or several provinces. Final victory is ours.

D.6 Resolution of the Xiang-Exi Provincial Committee on Comrade Deng Zhongxia (9 December 1931)⁴⁵

The party in the Xiang-Exi [West Hunan–Hubei] area and in the Second Army Corps of the Red Army, under the former leadership of Comrade Deng Zhongxia,⁴⁶ did not implement the policy of consolidation and development. As a result, many Red Army units fled from the soviet areas to the mountains. This has caused a drastic reduction in the soviet areas and serious damage to the Red Army during the enemy's encirclement offensives. In particular, no effective steps were taken to divert the enemy force from attacking the Central Soviet Area. This meant that the main force of the Red Army in Jiangxi faced numerous difficulties in its battles. This was caused by Comrade Deng Zhongxia's serious political errors.

2) Comrade Deng Zhongxia's party leadership in the Xiang-Exi area and in the Second Army Corps of the Red Army amounted to the implementation of the [Li] Lisan line (the rich peasant line, adventurism, and fleeing from soviet areas) in violation of the Comintern line. It then openly drifted toward a line of right opportunism (flight toward the mountains, overestimation of enemy strength, and pessimism about the revolution) when the Lisan line caused setbacks. These indisputable facts were obvious to all.

3) A key point in Comrade Deng Zhongxia's errors was his distrust of the strength of the masses. It was 100 percent mountaintopism. During the attack on Jinli in Hunan, he advanced the strange theory of "leaving the water to take to the land." He also mistakenly considered the ideal revolutionary base area as being

situated in "rugged mountains good for defense." This was the major reason for choosing Wufeng and Hefeng in west Hubei as the base area, the opening up of new base areas at Jingmen, Tangyang, and Yuanan, and the retreat of Red Army troops toward west Hubei. Therefore, he credited the victory of the Red Army in Jiangxi to the "superior terrain at Donggu." Because he confused a revolutionary base with "mountains," he attached a priority to "mountains" in all military operations. He thought about "winning over the masses everywhere" using dependable "mountain positions." For this reason, he shared the liquidationist dislike of the Honghu base, which is devoid of mountains. Therefore, he put forward the shameful opportunist thesis of "leaving the water to take to the land," deeming that "Honghu is a sanctuary good only for small units" and that "to return to Honghu is to hole up in a well without chance of rescue." He adopted a contemptibly hostile attitude toward the Honghu base and despised it. He said sarcastically, "What is good about Honghu? All it has are 'free brothels,' " thus preventing the Red Army cadres and warriors from demanding a return to their revolutionary base areas. He committed the crime of tarring the revolution with scandal.

4) Under the leadership of Comrade Deng Zhongxia's persistent opportunist line, the party program could not be enforced. The Party Center once criticized him for "forgetting the important responsibility of the Red Army of workers and peasants toward the Chinese soviet revolution and the basic task of the land revolution," and for "giving up the work of developing mass struggles and of organizing the masses, abandoning the work among trade unions altogether, and doing nothing to carry out the task of reforming and consolidating the Red Army." This criticism was entirely correct. Yet, he still tried to conceal the real face of his opportunism with the "leftist" lie of "creating new base areas."

5) The provincial committee deems that Comrade Deng Zhongxia is completely insincere in admitting his own errors. He has simply attempted to put the blame on others. Though he admitted in a perfunctory manner certain errors in the reports, he concluded that the "errors were caused first by the Party Center in the period of reconciliation and later by the special committee in the Xiang-Exi area." In other words, it was not he, but the Party Center and the special committee, that had caused these errors. In fact, during the period of reconciliation some of his errors did originate with the Party Center. However, Comrade Deng Zhongxia was sent to the Xiang-Exi area to "consolidate and develop" the Comintern line. He did precisely the opposite. The provincial committee does not deny the errors made by the special committee during the period of the Lisan line. However, when the Second Army Corps was instructed to attack Jinli from Shimen, the special committee instructed "the Second Army Corps to return to the battle line of Nanxian, Huayong, Anxiang, and Gong'an and then fan out in waves." When it received Deng Zhongxia's report about the withdrawal to Yanglin, it again instructed "the Second Army Corps to return to the battle line of Nanxian, Huayong, Anxiang, and Gong'an so as to advance with a rear base and push forward from a fixed position." This was an entirely correct instruction. After the retreat of the Second Army Corps

into the mountains, the special committee dispatched no fewer than thirty couriers to ask "the Second Army Corps to return to the soviet areas to coordinate with the broad masses to break through the enemy's encirclement." This was also a correct view. In light of these facts, Comrade Deng Zhongxia cannot legitimately blame the Party Center in the period of conciliation for the error of his departure from this soviet area and his flight into the mountains. Further, he should not blame the special committee for his wanderings of the past few months. Had he listened to the special committee's instructions, it would have been possible for him to return to the soviet area after the battle at Jinli or later after his withdrawal to Wufeng and Hefeng. He would have been correct if he had done that. He would also have made the right move if he had returned to the soviet area following his arrival at Jinmen. Moreover, Comrade Deng Zhongxia used the March instruction to repudiate the special committee's instructions of the Party Center the previous month. He deliberately confused the Party Center's instructions of 29 June to the Second Army Corps with those of the Central Bureau and the provincial committee's instructions that were based on the Party Center's instructions. This was an obvious attempt at confusion in order to cover up his own mistakes. He even refused to accept the criticism by the Party Center and the Central Bureau of his policy of "alliance with rich peasants" and his "anti-Comintern errors" during his tenure of office in the Comintern.⁴⁷ He rejected these criticisms as mere slander. This was a non-Bolshevik attitude.

6) The provincial committee agrees entirely with the resolution of the Front Committee of the Third Army on Comrade Deng Zhongxia. It agrees with the Party Center's request to relieve him of all posts and send him to work among the masses at the lower levels so that he may see his errors. In addition, the provincial committee has decided to give Comrade Deng Zhongxia one last serious warning and ask the Party Center to decide about his party membership.

D.7 Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic (7 November 1931)⁴⁸

The First All-China Soviet Congress hereby proclaims before the toiling masses of China and of the whole world this Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, which recites the basic tasks to be accomplished throughout all China.

The accomplishment of these tasks has already begun in the existing soviet areas. However, the First All-China Soviet Congress holds that the complete realization of these tasks can come only after the overthrow of the rule of imperialism and the GMD and the establishment of the rule of the Soviet Republic throughout all China. Only then will this outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic find more concrete application and become a more detailed constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

The First All-China Soviet Congress calls on all Chinese workers, peasants, and laboring masses to carry out the struggle, under the guidance of the provisional government of the Soviet Republic, for the realization of these basic tasks:

1) The task of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic is to guarantee the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the soviet areas and to secure the triumph of the dictatorship throughout the whole of China. This dictatorship aims to destroy all feudal remnants, to eliminate the influence of the imperialist powers in China, to unite China, to limit systematically the development of capitalism, to carry out economic reconstruction of the state, to promote the class-consciousness and solidarity of the proletariat, and to rally to its banner the broad masses of poor peasants in order to effect the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

2) The Chinese soviet regime is setting up a state based on the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. All the power of the soviet shall belong to the workers, peasants, and Red Army soldiers and the entire laboring population. Under the soviet regime the workers, peasants, Red Army soldiers, and the entire laboring population shall have the right to elect their own deputies to give effect to their power. Only militarists, bureaucrats, landlords, the despotic gentry, capitalists, rich peasants, monks, and all exploiting and counterrevolutionary elements shall be deprived of the right to elect deputies to participate in the government and to enjoy political freedom.

3) In the Chinese Soviet Republic supreme power shall be vested in the All-China Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. In between congresses, the supreme organ of power shall be the All-China CEC of the Soviets; the CEC shall appoint a Council of People's Commissars, which shall conduct all governmental affairs and promulgate laws, decrees, and resolutions.

4) All workers, peasants, Red Army soldiers, and all laborers and their families, regardless of sex, religion, or nationality (Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Muslims, Tibetans, Miao, Li, as well as all Koreans, Taiwanese, Annamese, etc., living in China) shall be equal before the soviet law, and shall be citizens of the Soviet Republic. In order that the workers, peasants, soldiers, and laboring masses may actually hold the reins of power, the following regulations concerning soviet elections shall be established: All the above-mentioned soviet citizens of sixteen years or older shall be entitled to vote and to be voted for in the elections of the soviets. [They] shall elect deputies to all congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers (soviets); they shall discuss and decide all national and local political questions. The method of electing deputies [is as follows]. The workers shall elect their deputies in the factories; the artisans, peasants, and urban poor shall elect deputies according to their place of residence. Deputies to the local soviets shall be elected by these basic units [i.e., factory districts] for a definite term; they shall participate in the work of one of the organizations or commissions attached to the town or village soviets and shall periodically submit reports to their electors concerning their activities. The electors shall have the right at all times to recall their deputies

and demand new elections. Since only the proletariat can lead the broad masses of peasants and laborers to socialism, the Chinese soviet regime grants special rights to the proletariat in the elections to the soviets by allowing it a greater number of deputies.

5) The purpose of the soviet regime is to improve thoroughly the living conditions of the working class, to pass labor legislation, to introduce the eight-hour working day, to fix a minimum wage, and to institute social insurance and state assistance to the unemployed as well as to grant the workers the right to supervise production.

6) In setting itself the task of abolishing feudalism and radically improving the living conditions of the peasants, the soviet regime of China shall pass a land law and shall order the confiscation of the land of all landlords and its distribution among the poor and middle peasants, with a view to the ultimate nationalization of the land.

7) The purpose of the soviet regime of China is to defend the interests of the workers and peasants and restrict the development of capitalism, with a view to liberating the laboring masses from capitalist exploitation and leading them to the socialist order of society. [The soviet government of China] shall announce the abolition of all burdensome taxation and miscellaneous levies introduced during the counterrevolutionary regime and shall put into effect a single progressive income tax. It shall harshly suppress all attempts at wrecking and sabotage in the party by either native or foreign capitalists; it shall pursue an economic policy beneficial to the workers and peasant masses, which shall be understood by these masses and which shall lead to socialism.

8) The soviet regime of China shall set itself the goal of freeing China from the yoke of imperialism. It shall declare the complete sovereignty and independence of the Chinese people, shall refuse to recognize any political or economic privileges for the imperialists in China, and shall abolish all unequal treaties and foreign loans contracted by the counterrevolutionary governments. No foreign imperialist troops, whether land, sea, or air, shall be allowed to be stationed on any territory of the Chinese soviets. All concessions or territories leased by the imperialists in China shall be unconditionally returned to China. All custom houses, railways, steamship companies, mining enterprises, factories, etc., in the hands of the imperialists shall be confiscated and nationalized. At the present time, it shall be permissible for foreign enterprises to renew their leases (for their various businesses) and to continue production, provided they fully comply with the laws of the soviet government.

9) The soviet government of China will do its utmost to develop and ensure the final victory of the workers and peasants' revolution throughout the whole of China. It declares that it is incumbent on all laboring masses to participate in the revolutionary class struggle. The gradual introduction of universal military service and the change from voluntary to compulsory military service shall be especially worked out. The right to bear arms in defense of the revolution shall be granted only to

workers, peasants, and the laboring masses; all counterrevolutionary and exploiting elements must be completely disarmed.

10) The soviet government of China guarantees the workers, peasants, and laborers freedom of speech and the press as well as the right to assembly; it is opposed to bourgeois and landlord democracy, but is in favor of the democracy of the worker and peasant masses. It breaks down the economic and political prerogatives of the bourgeoisie and the landlords in order to remove all obstacles placed by the reactionaries on the workers and peasants' road to freedom. The workers, peasants, and laboring masses shall enjoy the use of printing shops, meeting halls, and similar establishments by the power of a people's regime, as a material basis for the realization of these rights and liberties. Furthermore, under the soviet regime, all propaganda and other similar activities by reactionaries shall be suppressed and all exploiters be deprived of all political liberties.

11) It is the purpose of the soviet government of China to guarantee the thorough emancipation of women; it recognizes freedom of marriage and will put into operation various measures for the protection of women, to enable women gradually to attain the material basis required for their emancipation from the bondage of domestic work, and to give them the possibility of participating in the social, economic, political, and cultural life of the entire society.

12) The soviet government of China shall guarantee to all workers, peasants, and the laboring masses the right to education. The soviet government will, as far as the conditions of internal revolutionary war allow, begin at once to introduce free universal education. Above all, the soviet government shall defend the interests of laboring youth and give them every opportunity of participating in the political and cultural revolutionary life with a view to developing new social forces.

13) The soviet government of China guarantees true religious freedom to the workers, peasants, and the laboring population. Adhering to the principle of the complete separation of church and state, the soviet state neither favors nor grants any financial assistance to any religion whatsoever. All soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in antireligious propaganda. No religious institution of the imperialists shall be allowed to exist unless it complies with soviet law.

14) The soviet government of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Muslims [Hui], Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans, and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i.e., they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they prefer. The soviet regime of China will do its utmost to assist the national minorities in liberating themselves from the yoke of the imperialists, the GMD warlords, the nobility, the lamas, the tribal headmen from the national minorities [*tusi*], and others, in achieving complete freedom and autonomy. The soviet regime must encourage the development of the national cultures and of the respective national languages of these peoples.

15) The Chinese regime offers asylum to Chinese and foreign revolutionaries persecuted for their revolutionary activities; it will assist and lead them in recovering their strength so that they may fight with increased vigor for the victory of the revolution.

16) All foreign toilers living in areas under the jurisdiction of the soviet regime shall enjoy equal rights as stipulated by soviet law.

17) The soviet regime of China declares its readiness to form a united revolutionary front with the world proletariat and all oppressed peoples and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally.

D.8 Land Law of the Soviet Republic (November 1931)⁴⁹

The peasant struggle launched under the leadership of the proletariat continues to develop and each day rises to new heights. Despite the violent resistance of the imperialists and militarists, the soviet movement grows and expands. In one area after another the Chinese peasantry, armed and organized in the ranks of the Red Army, casts off the centuries-old yoke of feudal barons and landlords, the village bosses [*tuhao*], and the gentry; it confiscates and redistributes the land of these oppressors; it demolishes the feudal order of society, destroys the power of the GMD, and builds up the workers and peasants' Soviet regime—a regime which will consistently and finally accomplish tasks in the anti-imperialist and rural revolutions.

The First All-China Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies ratifies the confiscation of the lands of the landlords and of other big private landowners. In order to establish uniform regulations for the confiscation and distribution of land, the First [All-China Soviet] Congress, in defense of the interests of the basic peasant masses and in order to safeguard the further development of the revolution, has passed the following land law, which will best secure the solution of the rural question.

Article 1: All the lands of the feudal landlords, village bosses, gentry, militarists, and other big private landowners shall be subject to confiscation without any compensation whatever, irrespective of whether they themselves work their lands or rent them out on lease. The soviets will distribute the confiscated lands among the poor and middle peasants. The former owners of confiscated lands shall not be entitled to receive any land allotment. Hired farmhands, coolies, and toiling laborers shall enjoy equal rights to land allotments, regardless of sex. Independent workers living in villages who have lost their previous work shall likewise be entitled to a portion of the land, subject to the consent of the peasant masses. Aged persons, orphans, and widows who are not in a position to work and who have no relatives on whom to depend shall be given social relief by the soviet government, or be taken care of after the land redistribution.

Article 2: The Red Army is the front rank fighter in the defense of the soviet government and in the overthrow of the rule of imperialism and the government of landlords and capitalists. Therefore, each Red Army soldier must be given a plot of land, and the soviet government must see to it that the land is tilled, whether or not his home is in the soviet area or in an area ruled by the reactionaries.

Article 3: It is a peculiar feature of the Chinese rich peasant that he is at one and the same time a landowner and a usurer; therefore, his land shall also be subject to confiscation. If a rich peasant, after his land has been confiscated, does not participate in any counterrevolutionary activities and works his land by the use of his own labor power, he may be assigned land, but not of the best quality.

Article 4: All the property and lands of all counterrevolutionary organizations and of the military organizations of the White Army, as well as of the active participants in counterrevolution, shall be confiscated. However, exceptions to this rule shall be permitted in the case of poor and middle peasants who have been drawn into the struggle against the soviets because of their ignorance. [These] shall be granted pardons by the local soviets, but their leaders shall without fail be dealt with according to the provision of the present law.

Article 5: The First [All-China Soviet] Congress recognizes the principle that an egalitarian distribution of land is the most thorough method of destroying all feudal agrarian relations and the shackles of the private ownership of land by the landlords. However, the local soviet governments shall on no account carry out this measure by force or by an order issued by higher authorities, but shall explain this procedure to the peasantry from every angle. This measure may be put into operation only with the direct support and at the desire of the basic masses of the peasantry. Thus, if the majority of the middle peasants so desire, they may [be allowed] not to participate in the redistribution [of land].

Article 6: All lands belonging to religious institutions or to temples and all other public lands shall be unconditionally delivered into the possession of the peasants by the soviet government. However, in disposing of these lands, it shall be essential to obtain the voluntary support of the peasants, so that their religious feelings may not be offended.

Article 7: The rich peasants seek to have the land distributed according to the means of production. The First [All-China Soviet] Congress considers this to be a counterrevolutionary effort on the part of the rich peasants to hinder the development of the rural revolution and to further their own ends, and it must be strictly prohibited. The local soviets, in conformity with the local conditions in each village, shall choose the method [of land division] most advantageous to the poor and middle peasants, i.e., either division on a mixed principle according to the number of consumer workers in each family, or division of the land among the middle and poor peasants, as well as hired farmhands, in equal portions according to the number of consumers, and among the rich peasants according to the labor power supplied by them (i.e., in localities where egalitarian distribution shall take place according to the number of consumers, every rich peasant capable of working shall

receive as much land as is allotted to one consumer). In dividing up the land, not only the area of the land assigned but also the quality of its soil (especially its productivity) shall be taken into consideration. Furthermore, in dividing up the land it shall be essential to introduce all possible land reforms in order to create the necessary conditions for destroying feudal remnants like state-owned uncultivated land, scattered land holdings, or demarcating lines running across fields.

D.9 Resolution of the CCP CC on Winning Initial Revolutionary Successes in One or More Provinces (9 January 1932)⁵⁰

I) The heavy blow of the world economic crisis and the oppression and exploitation of the landlords and warlords have led the Chinese national economy to the verge of general collapse. Depression has occurred in all sectors of the economy. The industrial crisis has severely damaged major branches of light industry. For example, silk factories, textile plants, and flour mills are now all in crisis: the silk factories in Shanghai are operating at 20 percent of capacity. The situation is similar in other cities, with the result that over 100,000 workers in the silk industry have lost their jobs. Textile plants such as Houshang and Sanxing have gone bankrupt, but the production of Japanese textile factories in Shanghai has increased rapidly. Only half of the flour mills are now operating fully. Heavy industry has been further monopolized by the foreign capitalists. The conditions of the rural economy are even worse. In addition to the exploitation and oppression of the landlords and usurers, the looting of the warlords, and the plundering of the imperialists, there is also unprecedented flooding. Several hundred thousand peasants have drowned, several hundred thousand houses have been destroyed by floods, and tens of millions of peasants are starving and freezing in the cold winter. The flood has destroyed altogether 1.4 billion *mu* of crops. The oppression and the exploitation of the GMD regime and the imperialists have caused the unprecedented flooding, but they have done nothing to help these starving and freezing peasants in the flood-stricken areas. The GMD regime has issued 80 million *yuan* of government bonds for flood relief, increased dozens of taxes and levies, and taken loans at high interest from the American imperialists in order to buy wheat from the United States. However, none of the money or food has been sent to the flood victims. On the contrary, the GMD regime has used the excuse of emergency relief and industrial relief further to exploit the people. They have increased dozens of taxes and levies in the flood-stricken areas. Taking advantage of the surplus cheap labor power, the numerous jobless workers, and the landless peasants, and the capitalists have further reduced the wages of the workers and increased their working time. The landlords and usurers are also taking this opportunity to make more profits. The catastrophe of the national economy has brought millions of workers and peas-

ants horrible suffering, poverty, hunger, disease, and death. The bitterness of the working people has increased to an unbearable degree.

II) The heavy blow of the economic crisis, the deterioration of the national economy, and the bitterness of millions of workers and peasants have intensified the revolutionary struggle. Against this background, the soviet movement in China has achieved many great victories. The GMD regime has failed to check the rapid progress of the revolutionary movement, much less wiped it out. The GMD warlords met with total failure during all three "encirclement campaigns" while the Red Army has routed over fifteen divisions of GMD troops. In the battles of the third "encirclement campaign," the Red Army in south Jiangxi alone captured over 10,000 rifles, 5 million bullets, 150 machine guns, and took 20,000 prisoners of war. Since then, the Red Army has won many new victories. In the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi area, we have recovered the Hang-Wu-Yong soviet area, taken over Yongding, Dingzhou, and Liancheng, and expanded our territory to Ninghua and Qingliu. In the northeast Jiangxi area, we have not only linked up the territory with the Chong'an-Qianshan soviet area in north Fujian, but also advanced toward the Zhejiang-Anhui border and taken over the counties of Changshan and Wuyuan. In the E-Yu-Wan area, smashing the scheme of the counterrevolutionaries to sabotage the Red Army, we have greatly strengthened soviet political power and the Red Army and have taken over the counties of Yingshan, Houqiu, and Huang'an. In the west Hunan-Hubei area, under the command of Comrade He Long, the Third Army has joined forces with the Ninth Division, thus further consolidating the Honghu Base Area. Now they are fighting heroically against the enemy to found a new base on the northern bank of the Xiang River. In both the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi and the Hunan-Jiangxi border areas, our forces have expanded throughout the territory and are now moving toward Puqi, Jiayu, Shangyou, and Chongyi. In the Central Soviet Area, apart from recovering the territory we held before the first "encirclement campaign," we have taken over the counties of Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, and Xingfeng in south Jiangxi and are now besieging the central city there—Ganzhou.⁵¹ Since the revolt of the Twenty-sixth Army (over 20,000 soldiers) of Sun Liangzhong's forces and their joining the Red Army, Ningdu and Guangchang have again fallen into our hands, and now the news has arrived that our troops have taken over Fuzhou. Ji'an has been completely isolated. The reactionary regime now has control of only eight or nine counties along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway throughout the whole of Jiangxi Province. The Red Army has tempered itself on the bloody battlefield of the current civil war. Armed with weapons captured from the enemy forces, it has build itself into a powerful army and a tough and strong fist of the revolutionary movement. Moreover, we have uncovered counterrevolutionary organizations inside the soviet area, firmly gotten rid of the evil influence of the Lisan line, distributed the confiscated land to the farmhands and poor peasants, reorganized the soviet government, and eliminated the alien class elements who sneaked into the revolutionary ranks. All these achievements have greatly raised the revolutionary initiative and enthusiasm of the workers and peasants and heightened the

prestige of soviet political power among them. The establishment of the All-China Soviet Central Provisional Government [*quanguo suweiqu zhongyang linshi zhengfu*] has provided the revolutionary movement in both the soviet and nonsoviet areas with general guidance, hence guaranteeing more effective proletarian leadership over the peasants' rural revolution. Our task at present is to *strive for the expansion of territory in order to link up the separated soviet areas and struggle hard to win an initial victory of the revolution in one or several provinces* [emphasis here and below in original].

III) The triumph of the Red Army and the soviet movement and the decline of the GMD regime have made the imperialists switch from secret armed interference (such as providing reactionary forces with weapons and ammunition, money, and military advisors) to direct, open aggression. Japan's armed occupation of Manchuria is a clear example. It is the prelude to the redivision of China by the imperialists and a dangerous and concrete step toward an attack on the Soviet Union. Japanese imperialism not only plans to turn Manchuria into its own colony as well as a military base for invasion of the Soviet Union, but also wants to attempt to take over North China and attack the Mongolian People's Republic using running dogs such as Han Fuqu, Yan Xishan, and Feng Yuxiang. The French imperialists agree entirely with Japan's actions and have aided it because France has the ambition to take Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces away from China and plans to attack the Soviet Union. British imperialists are also willing to support Japan as long as the latter does not violate Britain's interests in China. Hoping to bring all of China under its control, the American imperialists adopted a wait-and-see attitude at the beginning of the Manchurian Incident.⁵² In reality, this was acquiescence that allowed the Japanese imperialists to exploit the Chinese people and establish an antisoviet base area. Now as the [Manchurian] Incident continues, conflict has arisen between the United States and the imperialist group headed by Japan and Britain. This is the current situation: the various imperialist countries have *agreed with each other* to prepare for the antisoviet war, turning Manchuria into an anti-soviet military base, exploiting the Chinese people, and suppressing the Chinese revolution. (The United States and the countries of the League of Nations are in essence the same robbers and aggressors of China.) However, they scheme and clash against each other trying to divide the spheres of influence in China and on seizing China's rich natural resources. At present, however, the focus of their plot is to prepare for the antisoviet war, carve up China, and suppress directly and openly the Chinese revolutionary struggle. At present, they are rapidly implementing this plan. The progress of the Red Army and the soviet movement have made the imperialists interfere more openly with armed forces in the Chinese revolution. The confrontation between the worker-peasant revolutionary movement in China and the armed forces of the imperialists is thus inevitable. Therefore, our party's mission is to *mobilize, organize, direct, and arm millions of the working-class and peasant masses in order to launch a revolutionary national liberation war to defend China, to fight against the Japanese and all other imperialists, and to win the liberation, independence, and unification of China.*

IV) The deterioration of the economy, the triumph of the Red Army and the soviet movement, and the imperialists' invasion of China and suppression of the Chinese revolution are the three basic elements that have brought about the rapid development of the Chinese revolutionary struggle. The collapse of the national economy caused by the economic crisis has caused millions of workers and peasants to lead an extremely miserable life. Having lost jobs and land and suffered hunger and coldness, they have realized that there are only two choices before them: either to wait for death or to rise up and fight. In this way, they have participated in the revolutionary struggle. The soviet movement and the Red Army under the guidance of the CP have become the backbone of the new revolution and the leaders as well as the organizers of the working people's struggle all over China. The success has pointed out a road toward national liberation and social progress for the broad masses of the working people under the GMD's rule. The Manchurian Incident has awakened the national consciousness of the working people and the petty bourgeoisie in cities and in the countryside, raised their revolutionary enthusiasm, and stimulated their hatred and anger toward imperialism. The GMD regime's submission to the imperialists has further promoted and shifted the anti-imperialist movement to the direct revolutionary struggle against GMD rule.

The labor movement in cities is on the rise. Despite the prohibition by the GMD regime, strikes have frequently occurred: at factories, in mines, on railways, on ships, and among coolies and rickshaw pullers. Although most strikes have economic goals, there is a close association between economic and political goals. The strikes often last for a long time. These are the characteristics of the current labor movement. Strikes against imperialism are no longer an isolated phenomena. In some cities, general strikes have already broken out. For example, in Taiyuan, there was a one-day general strike. There have also been joint operations by workers in the same trade, such as the general strikes held by the shipbuilding workers, textile workers, printing workers, and civil construction workers in Shanghai. The working class has fought heroically to resist the persecution of the GMD regime, the capitalists, and the yellow trade unions. As the GMD regime is now in decline, the antilabor nature of the yellow trade unions has been gradually exposed. As a result, the struggle against the yellow trade unions has developed vigorously. However, the yellow trade unions are not willing to take their defeat lying down. They have schemed to come up with various new ways to deceive the workers and have tried to sabotage the labor movement by leading it in a wrong direction. In addition, there are some workers who still have illusions about the yellow trade unions. We must also be fully aware that most of the strikes are spontaneous, and the leadership of our party and the red trade union among workers is very weak. So far we have not made a patient or painstaking effort to organize working-class strikes. Because of erroneous strategy and tactics, some strikes launched by the red trade unions have met with failure. We have not studied carefully the experience of strikes and have not tried hard enough to win over the workers in the yellow trade unions. Meanwhile, the struggle against right opportunism among the red trade unions has not

fully unfolded. We have not formed a strong link between the red trade unions and the masses of the workers.

The anti-imperialist movement has drawn millions more people to participate in the revolutionary struggle, and it has been transformed from presenting peaceful petitions to violent demonstrations in which the participants fight with their fists against the police and destroy the GMD organizations and government offices. Based on their experience of struggle during the recent months, the broad masses of the people have realized that the GMD regime has shamelessly submitted to the imperialists. They have been aware that unless they overthrow the GMD regime and build up a *government by the people*, they cannot win national independence and liberation. Thus, demanding political power and the establishment of a people's government have become the common desire among the broad masses of the people. There have even been a few initial attempts in this respect such as the establishment of the people's courts. So far, however, this movement is sponsored *mainly* by the *students*. The working class has not become the main force in the anti-imperialist struggle. Hence, it lacks persistence, an indomitable spirit, and clear ideas. Our party has not built up a strong leadership through the struggle or exposed the nature of all the reactionaries. Some party organizations are lagging behind the masses, some fear criticizing the tendency of bourgeois liberalism among the students, and others (such as in Shanxi) have even adopted the absolutely wrong policy of closed-doorism and abandoned the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement. In general, we have not been able to combine closely the anti-imperialist movement with the economic struggles of the working class.

The struggle launched by the peasants in GMD-controlled areas has developed rapidly. The peasants boycott taxes and levies, seize grain and distribute food, destroy GMD offices, and organize guerrilla warfare. In some areas, uprisings have even broken out in which the peasants took over the towns of county seats (such as Changle).

There are also mutinies and revolts among the GMD soldiers. The Twenty-sixth Army, with over 20,000 soldiers, revolted, and all joined the Red Army. There are individual mutinies and revolts in various areas. These facts demonstrate that the progress of the rural revolution has affected the reactionary army and caused its collapse. On the other hand, however, our strength among the peasants and the GMD soldiers is still quite weak, and there remains the pessimistic influence of opportunism.

V) The triumph of the Red Army and the soviet movement, the rise of the worker-peasant revolutionary struggle in GMD-controlled areas, and the conflicts and schemes between the different imperialist countries have brought down the Chiang Kai-shek military dictatorship. Having ruled China for four years, this decadent regime has sold out the national interest and has exploited and suppressed the working people. But Chiang's group continues to have the dominant influence in the new government. The government is a coalition of various factions inside the GMD. In essence, the new regime is still one of landlord-bourgeois dictatorship and it has adopted the same domestic and foreign policies. Since there is a strong pro-Japanese faction in the new regime, it will submit more completely to Japanese

imperialism and betray our national interests. Meanwhile, this regime is no more than an unstable, transitional government. Supported by different imperialist groups, the various warlord factions have sped up their preparation for a new warlord war, which so far has been checked by the victory of the Red Army and the rise of the anti-Japanese movement throughout China.

The current situation proves that the GMD regime has definitely collapsed. The broad masses of the people have seen through the GMD's dirty tricks and its shameless submission to the imperialists. Hence, its contemptible means and arbitrary propaganda can no longer deceive the people. In light of this background, all the reactionary opposition parties now begin to work actively. They include the "National Salvation Conference" of the Reorganizationists, the "Disaster Relief Committee" of the old politicians in Jiangsu Province, the "Peace Cabinet" of the Third Party, and the "Convention for a National Assembly and People's Government" set up by the Trotskyite-Chen Duxiu Liquidationists. The purpose of these parties is the same—to help the GMD maintain its rule. They advocate "government-people cooperation" in order to divert the struggle of the people to overthrow the GMD regime. These organizations will be the most dangerous enemies when the revolutionary high tide arrives. Thus, we should concentrate our strength to strike at these reactionaries who call for compromise.

VI) Analyzing the current situation, we must realize that the balance of the domestic class forces has changed, and that this change is favorable for the workers, peasants, the Red Army, and the soviet movement. The strength of all the factions within the GMD has been weakened. On the other hand, the worker-peasant struggle and the soviet movement are growing stronger. The Red Army has now become a very powerful force, and the soviet government controls areas with a population of millions. The Red Army and the guerrilla forces have now surrounded a number of large or middle-sized cities such as Nanchang, Wuhan, and Ji'an. We used to avoid attacking large cities. This strategy was correct in the past but is no longer right because circumstances have changed. *Our task now is to expand the territory, link up the separated soviet areas to form an integrated soviet area, and take advantage of the present favorable political and military conditions to seize one or two important central cities so as to win an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces. Now is the time to put this task on the agenda of the party and the soviet movement.* In order to complete this general task, the party must further strengthen the Red Army and consolidate soviet political power as well as its Central Provisional Government. We must carry out the correct land, labor, and economic policies in order to serve the interests of the workers and peasants, make every effort to wage the worker-peasant revolutionary struggle in the GMD-controlled areas, improve our direction of the anti-imperialist movement, strengthen our leadership over the spontaneous strikes by the workers, organize workers into red trade unions, win over the masses in the yellow trade unions, launch and guide the peasant struggle, enhance our work to sabotage the GMD army, and win over the enemy soldiers.

VII) First of all, with regard to our work in the soviet areas, the Red Army must

operate more actively. Its troops must act in close cooperation with each other and launch offensives in accordance with the present favorable conditions. It should follow the recent CC instruction on military issues to link up the Central Soviet Area, and the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi, northeast Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, and Hunan-Jiangxi areas to form a large integrated soviet area. It should aim at taking over the central cities such as Nanchang, Fuzhou, and Ji'an, so as to unite the present scattered soviet base areas together. In this way, we can win an initial victory of the revolution in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. To the north of the Yangtze River, taking the E-Yu-Wan area as its core, the Red Army should link up northeast Anhui, east Hubei, the Hubei-Henan border, and the west Hunan-Hubei areas to create a position that will threaten Wuhan, the upper and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, and the Beijing-Hankou Railway. To mount successful revolutionary offensives, we must strengthen the Red Army, improve the political education of the Red Army fighters and their class background, and raise their revolutionary consciousness. Only in this way can we defeat all the reactionaries' schemes to sabotage the Red Army.

Second, a correct solution to the land problem is of decisive significance in raising the revolutionary enthusiasm and creativeness of the working people and for paving the way for the success of the soviet movement. We must forbid anyone issuing orders in the name of the soviet government to force the equal distribution of land. Land redistribution should be carried out to develop the organizational and creative abilities of the peasants. Our party's principle in distributing land is to defend the interests of the farmhands and poor peasants, oppose the rich peasants, and take care of the middle peasants. Without the permission of the middle peasants, no one should change or replace their land. The party must confiscate without hesitation all the land of the landlords and distribute it to the coolies, farmhands, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Since most of the rich peasants are feudal exploiters, their land should also be confiscated. However, they should be given a small lot of bad "subsistence land" on the condition that they farm it themselves.

Third, the party must rectify immediately all the radical and immature economic and tax policies as well as measures that have violated the interests of the peasant masses (such as the attempt to organize collective farms in northeast Jiangxi and the heavy taxes in the E-Yu-Wan area). Poor peasants should be exempted from all taxation.

Fourth, we should reorganize the soviet government at the grass-roots level, ruthlessly purge all counterrevolutionaries and alien class elements, and raise the enthusiasm and creativeness of the people to develop the soviet movement. It is necessary to improve the daily work of the soviet government because it is an important means to consolidate soviet political power.

Fifth, since neglecting labor protection and improvement of the living standard of the workers will provide the class enemy a good excuse to sabotage the proletarian leadership, we must not delay any longer the founding of the red trade unions among the workers in the soviet areas, and we should immediately choose capable cadres to implement this task.

VIII) In the GMD-controlled areas, the party's task is to develop all kinds of mass movements, direct the daily economic struggle of all the people, lead the anti-imperialist movement, and transform it into a general attack on the GMD regime. Thus, the movement can cooperate with Red Army operations and serve the purpose of winning an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces.

The most important task is to make every effort to organize strikes in cities because only working-class strikes can provide the anti-imperialist movement and the struggle of the urban poor and the unemployed with courage, persistence, and a revolutionary determination. Therefore, now it is more urgent than at any other time for the party to carry out work in factories and among members of the yellow trade unions. We must organize carefully all kinds of struggle of the working class, lead the spontaneous strikes of the workers, advocate better treatment for the workers during the Spring Festival period, expand the red trade unions, win over the masses in the yellow trade unions, establish a strike committee elected by the workers and turn it into the leading organ of the factory, set up a joint struggle committee for both workers who have jobs and those who are unemployed, and organize pickets recruited from unemployed workers. These are our current major tasks. We must be good at transforming the economic struggles of the working class into an anti-imperialist movement and into a struggle to assist the Red Army and the soviet movement. *The labor movement is the party's central task in the GMD-controlled areas. We must focus our efforts on work in factories, the trade unions, and the leadership of strikes.*

The party must make full use of the continuous outrages committed by the Japanese imperialists, the attempt of the French and other imperialists to carve up China (such as France's invasion of Yunnan and Britain's occupation of Xikang), and the GMD's submission to the foreign powers (its policy of nonresistance, the secret agreement with Japan, and the Mitsui Loan) to educate the people in order to push the anti-imperialist struggle to a new stage. Party organizations at all levels must implement bravely and firmly the recent instruction of the Comintern on strengthening our leadership over the anti-imperialist movement.⁵³ In our propaganda work, we must further expose the GMD's mean tricks to sell out the national interests and uncover the schemes of the various counterrevolutionary parties to help the GMD maintain its reactionary rule. We should step up our propaganda work and call on people to rise up to make revolution and establish the people's government. We should let the people understand that only the soviet government is the true political power of the people. The party and the soviet government should encourage the people to take up arms to wage the national revolutionary war, fight against all the imperialists, and win the independence and unification of China. We must also tell the people that only by overthrowing the GMD regime, the running dog of the imperialists, can we win victory in the national revolutionary war.

We must develop further the anti-imperialist movement: set up anti-imperialist mass organizations in factories, schools, barracks, and neighborhoods; establish an anti-imperialist conference in every city; organize anti-imperialist demonstrations; and win the freedom to hold such demonstrations. We must enhance our struggle

against all the opposition parties, strengthen our party's organizations, and expand our political influence. These are our party's central tasks in the anti-imperialist movement.

The party must exert firm leadership over various kinds of antitax movements in the flood areas and the struggle waged by the GMD soldiers. We must correct completely the opportunist pessimistic attitude toward our work. Our party must stand at the head of all the struggles launched by the oppressed and exploited people, use these struggles to sabotage the GMD regime and support the operations of the Red Army, and coordinate them with the Red Army's attacks on the GMD troops.

It is of vital importance to consolidate party organizations and prepare party members well for the forthcoming decisive class battle. Here, we must pay special attention to the political education of party members, promote new cadres with working-class backgrounds to leading positions, and educate old cadres. We should take strict precautions against the enemy's scheme to sneak into the party and carefully examine party organizations. Meanwhile, we must recruit many workers and peasants as well as some poor revolutionary students into the party, improve the leadership methods of all party organizations, particularly those at the party branch level, strengthen our work at the grass roots, and establish our party foothold in factories and mills.

IX) To carry out the task facing the party and to win an initial victory of the revolution in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, we must wage a ruthless and staunch struggle on two fronts. At present, right opportunism is still the greatest danger to the revolution. One can see it in the underestimation of the revolutionary situation and in the pessimistic attitude toward the Red Army. Spreading rumors that the Red Army is lax in discipline, the right opportunists refuse to take advantage of the current favorable circumstances to launch attacks, regard the outdated strategy as forever-correct dogmas, adopt a pessimistic attitude toward work in the trade unions, and overlook the workers' economic struggles. They think that it is impossible to organize the labor movement in the present economic crisis and act as followers of various factions in the GMD and other opposition parties. We must concentrate our strength to fight against rightism. On the other hand, as the revolutionary high tide arrives, there has also appeared the danger of the "leftist" tendency and the attempt to revive the Lisan line (such as the plan to hold a one-day general strike in Shanghai and the idea to ask a small number of workers to withdraw from the yellow trade union rather than making every effort to win over all the masses). We must not neglect the struggle against the "leftist" tendency either. In general, we should fight against all kinds of double-dealers who in speech admit the correctness of party resolutions but who in deeds either resist them or implement them reluctantly. The Party Center believes that with painstaking Bolshevik-style efforts, self-criticism, and the struggle on two fronts, our comrades in party committees at all levels will surely carry out this resolution and win an initial victory of the Chinese revolution in one or more provinces.

D.10 Political Report to the Conference of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army on Party and Political Work. *Zhang Guotao* (2 November 1934)⁵⁴

1) The significance of our great victory

What is the significance of this conference of ours? This must be understood first.

The task of political work and the party's work in the Red Army is to strengthen, increase, and develop the Red Army's combat capability. Therefore, this conference of the Red Army's Fourth Front Army on political and party work is to prepare ourselves politically to defeat the enemy. This has a great significance for us. The victory of the Fourth Front Army will help realize an initial victory of the revolution in the whole of Sichuan and one or several provinces in the northwest. This victory is a basic factor determining the Chinese revolution. This initial victory must provide a basis for the success of the entire revolution. We are responsible for the future of the revolution.

We all know that we have already gained great victories. This year of prolonged warfare was the first in the history of the Fourth Front Army. It has demonstrated the bravery and firmness of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and its spirit of never stopping unless the enemy has been defeated. In the past year, we have dealt our enemy blows in the battles of the Dongling River and the Huofeng Mountains. The Ninth and Thirtieth corps, Seventy-third, Seventy-fifth, 263rd, 268th, and 264th Regiments demonstrated extraordinary heroism in these battles. In the battle of Dakou Village, the 269th Regiment showed its contribution; in the battle of the Tonghua Mountains, the 268th and 265th Regiments displayed enormous bravery; in the battle of the Ma-An Mountains, the 265th Regiment completely wiped out Commander Hao's troops. The 265th and 268th Regiments, the Ninth and Thirtieth Corps all achieved great things. Our counterattacks in several great battles, such as those at Zhenlong Pass, Gaobei Village, and Wanyuan, have demonstrated our firm spirit. In the battles of the past year, our triumph over the enemy has doubtlessly been achieved through the determination and political correctness of the commanders of the Fourth Front Army, as well as the bravery of the soldiers. These victories of ours were won under the command of the Party Center. The Party Center has praised these great victories. This should be made public and made known to the fighting men and officers.

One further major significance of our victory is that we have severely undermined the entire reactionary rule in Sichuan and given confidence to the masses in all the red areas. The Fourth Front Army is self-confident; the masses depend on us; [we] have proved to all the comrades that victory certainly belongs to us. Our victories have an enormous impact not only on the masses in the red areas, but also on the masses in the white areas. They have learned that the soviet republic and the Red Army have won; their savior has won. This fact has fundamentally shaken the reactionary forces throughout Sichuan Province.

For the same reasons, this has further shaken the GMD's rule throughout the whole country.

Not only have we gained political influence, but we have greatly expanded the forces of the revolution. Tens of thousands of rifles have fallen into the hands of the workers and peasants, increasing the strength of the revolutionary forces. This has also dealt a great blow to the imperialists' attempts to partition China and gives a great impetus to and support for the entire revolution. These are great victorious steps taken to wipe out thoroughly the counterrevolutionary fifth "extermination campaign" and are capable of utterly smashing this campaign by the imperialists and their lackeys.

However, these victories did not end the war. It will not end unless we have completely destroyed the enemy. Without annihilating the counterrevolutionary rule of the GMD throughout Sichuan Province; the rule of landlords, local despots, the gentry, and the bourgeoisie throughout the country; and the rule of the imperialists, there will be no break in this war; nor will we see its final conclusion. Therefore, our task is to continue the war. The war still rests on our shoulders, and we must strive for greater victories until the final triumph has been obtained.

How should we estimate our victories? We have dealt the enemy a severe blow, prevented it from attacking us in the short term, and defeated the enemy's original plans so that it cannot continue its attack without adding new forces. However, our victories are not yet substantive. We have merely prepared the ground for greater victories—such as the complete annihilation of enemies like Liu Xiang, Tian Songrao, and Deng Xihou and the routing of Chiang Kai-shek's main forces and all enemies in Gansu, Hubei, and Shaanxi. This will provide the possibility and conditions to turn Sichuan and the northwest into red areas. Such a possibility lies before us. Future battles will turn this possibility into reality.

This calls for strengthening our ranks and determination through unwavering struggles despite countless difficulties; it is the task of this conference to make this possibility a reality.

If it is true that we have the capacity to attack Chengdu as the soldiers of the 271st Regiment claim, we should do so. We should be clear that we must not make self-serving estimates [of the situation]. We have damaged the enemy, but have not annihilated it. While we have won great victories, they are not yet complete. Expansion and consolidation are inseparable. Therefore, we must apply the offensive principle to strive for greater victories. This is the conference's task.

Victory in any war requires basic conditions and resolute struggles. Through resolute struggle and hard work, we can change the ratio between the forces, increasing our own strength and weakening the enemy. The problem now is how to increase our strength most quickly. This problem must be solved by the conference.

My political report will focus on the following points:

First, class struggle throughout the world.

Second, the situation of the class struggle in China.

Third, the situation concerning the red areas in Sichuan and Shaanxi and the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.

Fourth, tasks for the future.

[[2) Class struggle throughout the world

a) Revolutionaries must be internationalists. Thus, comrades in the Soviet areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi must study the international situation.]]

Since little anti-imperialist work has been carried out among the Red Army soldiers, we know little about the “world” of the imperialists and the situation in the world. We do not know what is necessary to defeat the enemy. For example, at the battlefield when the reactionaries shout out propaganda such as “you are the running dogs of the Soviet Union,” many of our comrades do not know how to respond. Our comrades did some very stupid things and let us be accused rather than turning on our accusers. This has confounded us all.

The bourgeoisie’s world is one of imperialism. There is no imperialism in the Soviet Union. What the rich fear most is that others will point out that they are the running dogs of the imperialists. Moreover, they fear that we will expose this fact. However, we do not know how to expose this. Our inability to use good propaganda to attack the enemy renders us passive and allows the enemy to appropriate the term [running dog]. We do not understand how to use our best weapons. It is like a guerrilla soldier being unable to use a machine gun. This is the biggest mistake in our political work. The enemy slanders us, accusing us of being the running dogs of the Soviet Union. The question can be very easily answered. Because the bourgeoisie fear most the unity of the proletariat—it is afraid not only of the alliance among our workers and peasants and the Soviet Union, but of our alliance within China. The rich are most afraid that the poor will unite. Thus they plot their sabotage. Things will be easy if we present the facts. If we study properly the international situation, as instructed by the Party Center and the Comintern, [we can see] our basic task is to conduct a land revolution to oppose imperialism. Now we have relaxed our efforts on one important task. Neglecting work to oppose imperialism is like being able only to shoot a rifle but not being able to command a machine-gun company in a battle. The principle is the same.

Therefore, fundamental changes must be made at this conference. We must understand how to oppose imperialism and win over the majority of the masses.

[[The imperialists are the number one enemy of the workers and peasants.

b) The Soviet Union is the great base of the world revolution.

c) The development of the world revolutionary situation.

d) The fundamental contradictions of imperialism and the danger of an imperialist war.

e) The imperialists are stepping up preparations to attack the Soviet Union. The pivotal class war in the world is that between the Soviet Union and the imperialists.]]

f) The savagery of the fascists is a new cycle in the revolution and war at the present time.

Germany is where fascism is at its most rampant, and Italy is where fascism has lasted longest. What is fascism? Fascists are open robbers. Chiang Kai-shek is also learning from the Fascists. His fascism is betraying the country and [perpetrating] open slaughter. This is the content of his fascism. Second, there is the world proletariats' war against fascism.

Third, there is the attack on the Chinese revolution and the partitioning of China. The GMD has sold out four provinces of China (in the northeast) and all the most important places. With the help of the GMD, the imperialists have carved up China. The greatest event in China is the emergence of the great soviet republic and the Red Army. This has given a great impetus to the revolutionary movement in colonial countries, but has also compelled the imperialists to attack the Chinese revolution. Now, the imperialists' attack on the Chinese revolution is our greatest danger. The imperialists attack China in order to attack the Soviet Union and partition China.

The war launched by the imperialists and the GMD on the Chinese revolution and our war against the fifth "extermination campaign" [are reflected] at the international level in the imperialists' war against the Soviet Union. This is a fundamental problem. Meanwhile, the international imperialists are preparing for war among themselves. The oppressed peoples in colonial countries are waging fierce wars to expel imperialists and liberate themselves. This is the national revolutionary war.

Therefore, the world now is in the "period of revolution and war." That is, it is the period for the workers and peasants to rise up and fight the imperialists to the death. The Comintern has warned workers and peasants throughout the world. The Comintern's warning is: the situation now is very urgent; the wars of the world revolution and the wars of plunder are about to be launched. We must prepare.

In these wars, our war does not stand alone. We are making revolution. The workers and peasants the world over are also fighting their governments. The workers in Britain, France, and the United States have risen up to support the Chinese revolution. Chiang Kai-shek had seventy airplanes in Hangzhou, but all of them were set on fire by us in a minute. Who did this? The CP led the people to do this. The bombs dropped by Chiang Kai-shek's airplanes on the Central Soviet Area often failed to explode. This is the manifestation of the support for the Chinese revolution and the organized sabotage of the enemy's attack by workers in various foreign countries. Therefore, in these struggles, the oppressed battlefronts and the oppressed classes in all countries are helping each other. If we undermine the enemy's forced conscription, that will benefit them [those conscripted]. Therefore, land distribution is not carried out because we are somebody else's running dogs, but is to help ourselves. In order to crush the Chinese revolution and betray China, the GMD puts forward slogans to protect the foreign devils wherever it goes. This is why we are not willing to be slaves without a country. This is why we fight the GMD. This is our proposal. Because of the interrelated nature of the world revolution, the Chinese revolution now occupies an extremely important position in the world. Our war is part of the war to liberate the workers and poor people throughout the whole world—it is the most important part. The Soviet Union makes greater efforts

than we. The Chinese soviet areas have played enormous roles in the world revolution. What has been said above explains that the Soviet Union presents a very bright picture for the world revolution and that the revolution in various countries has also developed very fast. Yet, there have been instances where the economic and revolutionary crises in individual countries have not been able to support the revolution and war. Here the Chinese revolution is of enormous significance. The historic period we are in today is one of earth-shattering changes. We are struggling against this period. This situation affects every one of us.

In this period of revolutionary development, with an international situation favorable to us, we should step up our efforts, take over responsibilities, win even greater victories through difficult struggles, and fight for the final victory. The task for the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and the party is to prepare ourselves to ally with the Soviet Union and the proletariat throughout the world in order to defeat the imperialists. In the war against the fifth "extermination campaign," in the war against imperialism, and in the war of national revolution, the CP must be able to lead the majority of the workers and peasants to overthrow imperialism and gain the victory for the soviet republic. Only this will bring about the realization of the world revolution.

3) The situation of the Chinese revolution

a) The situation in the soviet areas throughout the country

The soviet areas throughout the country and the Red Army have fought a war against the fifth "extermination campaign" for over a year. We have gained many victories in this war. In the Central Soviet Area alone, we routed over 100 enemy regiments and wiped out about fifty regiments. There have been great victories in the soviet areas in the border regions of E-Yu-Wan and Xiang-Exi. In our soviet area covering Sichuan and Shaanxi, we have defeated 200 enemy regiments and wiped out over fifty regiments. In this red area, we have obtained many rifles and defeated warlords like Liu Xiang, Deng Xihou, Tian Songrao, Liu Cunhou, Yang Sen, Li Jiaju, and Ruo Zezhou. Excluding munitions factories, we have captured over 40,000 rifles. In the Central Soviet Area, [our comrades] have fought a slightly better battle by using extensive guerrilla war. They have dispatched many special teams to the enemy's rear to attack the enemy 50 to 100 kilometers behind the front line. Most of the able-bodied middle-aged men have joined the Red Guards. They number half a million and some 200,000 often take part in the action. There are over 100,000 Young Pioneers. [The Red Army there] can deploy tens of thousands of Red Guards, who can dig trenches, construct false positions, deploy units to deceive the enemy, and fulfill missions on their own. Therefore, the main forces of the Red Army can be concentrated in one place to attack the enemy. The Red Guards can dig traps filled with sharpened bamboo sticks all over the fields and slopes. Such traps are dug on all the entries into the red areas, making it difficult for the enemy to find its way when it attacks. The enemy cannot move at night, and can only do so slowly during the day. If the bandits come in, we concentrate some forces to launch an attack, rush to the edge of the trap-infested positions, and take the

enemy's surrender. When things become tense, we immediately withdraw. The enemy has no way to find us. [The Red Guards] also make many tiger arrows to be mounted on important roads, so as to make it difficult for the bandits to attack. They also know how to make mines. They have used every means of attack and all kinds of homemade rifles and guns. It is a pity that we know too little about these methods and cannot talk about them all. They can use all kinds of methods to hit the enemy; they fight an excellent guerrilla war and can take tens of thousands of white soldiers prisoner in one battle. The guards watching over the white soldiers are all Red Guards and Young Pioneers. The Red Guards are also in charge of clearing the mountain of enemy troops. That is why the soldiers of the white army say, "We are at the end of our wits when we fight the Red Guards and Young Pioneers of the Central Soviet Area." There are certain conventions when they fight the Red Army, but the Red Guards hit you hard without using any conventions or giving warning. The Red Guards can build all kinds of artillery positions, but that is not all. The Red Guards all help take care of the wounded and the sick. That is why their local armed forces have developed very fast. Special political and party work is carried out among the Red Guards and Young Pioneers. We have not yet learned this; we are very far from [using this method].

For battle, the Red Army there has more guns than we do; it has several hundred metal guns. Its machine guns and mortars are more numerous than ours. Every division has a wireless so that when it fights, it can concentrate the fire of several hundred guns on one GMD stronghold. Their assault fire is devastating. When their main forces, the First, Third, and Fifth army groups, are together, each of their regiments is stronger than our Seventy-fifth or 268th Regiment. The enemy has a headache whenever these three army groups are gathered and attack the enemy. They are best at moving at night and maneuvering the troops. When they maneuver at night, they are protected by the local armed forces. This means that the enemy has no way of knowing where our main forces are.

They have a regular Red Army University with over 10,000 students who, on graduation, can become battalion commanders. It is much bigger than our Peng-Yang School. The students there cannot only build fortifications, shoot, and throw hand-grenades, but many of them can fire cannons and pilot airplanes. They have the Red Army's Articles of Discipline and detailed political regulations, and they receive regular training. Even the Red Guards and Young Pioneers get the same modern military training and learn to aim [guns] and command troops. A regimental commander of the Red Guards perhaps knows more than our own regimental commander. Of course, they have some difficulties caused by the enemy's blockade. But food is not a problem. Women have joined in production. Salt? They can produce it themselves. These problems have been solved. Medicines? They have also developed them. If we do not capture enough from the enemy, we can organize many doctors of Chinese traditional and herbal medicine to solve this problem. They have invented many things. The inventors are amply rewarded. They print paper currency and sell public debt. The people and Red Army soldiers all use paper

money. Whether in terms of guerrilla warfare or commanding military operations, they have done better than we in many respects. Not long ago six divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's troops attacked a certain place, but were immediately defeated by them. Later Chiang Kai-shek again mobilized his officer corps, but it was decimated. That they could achieve this is owing to the fact that their work among the masses is better than ours, their land distribution is better, their soviets are better than ours, their party and government work is better than ours. The masses there are very enthusiastic and vie with each other to join in the battle. Not too long ago, the Central Soviet Republic convened a meeting of families of the Red Army soldiers. Over 10,000 representatives of families of Red Army soldiers attended. They wrote tens of thousands of letters to the front and sent a delegation which told the Red Army soldiers to fight resolutely. They also sent a telegram to the Fourth Front Army telling us to fight resolutely as well.

The work they have done is far superior to ours. They bravely fight for the revolution with their lives. Now the Central Soviet Area is fighting for the revolution with its life. It wants to defeat the enemy, drive Chiang Kai-shek into the sea, and render Chiang Kai-shek's airplanes useless.

Let's talk about Xiao Ke. He leads the Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army that has fought heroically all the way from east to west Hunan. His troops are fierce. He has fought more fiercely than we have. The enemy is busy transferring troops to attack him. He Long is an expert in guerrilla warfare; wherever he attacks, he distributes grain and clothing. This is much better than some of the comrades in our Fourth Front Army who everywhere forbid the masses to cut down the rice crops.

[Our forces] in E-Yu-Wan are also fighting fiercely. They have taken over Jingjia Village from Zhang Xuiliang. Several months ago, Comrade Wu Huanxian brought the war to the railway station at Xingyang, frightening the wits out of the GMD.

Thus, the red areas and the Red Army all over the country are fighting fierce battles with the enemy. In every aspect they have provided us with examples to follow and learn. In general, every place is in the middle of a red-hot war with the enemy. In Sichuan and Shaanxi, we broke through the fifth "extermination campaign" but it has not been thoroughly destroyed. As long as we continue our efforts, we can thoroughly smash this fifth "extermination campaign." Therefore, our coordination with the soviet areas throughout the country is of great significance. Even now, we should thoroughly defeat the fifth "extermination campaign" in the spirit of Wanyuan when we had to eat potatoes and corn [to survive].

How many CP members are there in the country? There are 380,000. They have led the party struggle in the soviet republic and the white areas. We should view this struggle as part of the struggle of the soviet areas throughout the whole country. Our responsibilities are indeed very critical. We should never stop, even for a minute, the fight to smash thoroughly the fifth "extermination campaign."

b) The situation of the struggle in the white areas and the dramatic development of the labor movement

First, apart from the extremely important aspect of the expansion of the soviet

areas, let us take a look at the situation of the labor movement in the major cities in China. Large cities are under the control of the imperialist forces. Recently, the CP led the general strike of 50,000 workers in Tangshan, which raised the slogan of overthrowing the GMD. The [workers] in the textile, silk, and British-American tobacco factories are on general strike. The strikers often fight street battles with the GMD police—this has enormous political significance.

In Hebei, under a severe reign of white terror, one of our labor unions has over 6,000 members. No matter how severe the reign of white terror, the CP is leading the workers to fight. The party's strength has expanded.

Second, these struggles have been of a ferocious character. A solid foundation has been laid among the workers in the north. The work in the white areas is underground. However, as a result of the party's many efforts, we have our people in all the major factories. We have also organized major struggles among the unemployed workers.

Therefore, the Party Center has said, "the struggle of the Chinese working class is surging forward in a fierce, lively, and strong manner." This has a great deal to do with our struggle.

In addition, the CP in "Manchuria" (the Japanese imperialists occupied the three provinces of the northeast and called them "Manchuria") has organized many people's volunteer fighters and attacked the Japanese imperialists. Their fighting is fierce. It is said that they have captured many rifles. They kill the Japanese one day, and Japanese officers the next. They have established people's military revolutionary committees, volunteer armies, and guerrilla forces.

Fourth, the peasants' guerrilla warfare is also getting fierce. Let's simply talk about the areas around Sichuan.

In the areas of south Sichuan, Gusong and Mabian, and the sixteen counties of Yinglai, there are several armies of tax resisters. In Qushan and Wudu, guerrilla wars are being waged by peasants everywhere. There are so many of them that they must have spread to countless provinces and counties. In Wudu, Gansu, after the peasant uprising, the flag of "the special brigade of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army" was raised.

Concerning the soldiers [of the white army], defectors to the Red Army are increasing daily. The troops of Sun Liangzhong that have defected to the Central Soviet Area included four divisions with over 26,000 rifles. They were reorganized into the Fifth Army Corps. Now mutiny among the GMD troops is a serious problem. Soldiers cut off the heads of their company commanders, take their rifles, and run in our direction.

Therefore, our comrades can see that as far as the revolution throughout the entire country is concerned, there are so many soviet areas, workers' strikes, peasants' uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, and many other things—this is roughly the revolutionary situation throughout the country.

4) The character of GMD rule

[[a) The GMD's certain capitulation to the imperialists

The most shameful example is in northeast China. GMD rule has now become openly and shamelessly fascist. The GMD's treason has caused a vast anti-imperialist movement to develop. The petty bourgeoisie in every city hates the imperialists.]]

b) The Three Principles of the People are murderous! The GMD is a party of extortion

Therefore, their so-called Three Principles of the People were called murderous principles by the workers during the Canton Uprising [1927]. The GMD was called the party of extortion.

Lenin has said very clearly that the CP's definition of the national problem is: national self-determination and opposition to oppressing weak and small nations. What is the national problem? There are several races in the world: whites, yellows, blacks, reds, and browns. Even in China, there are special regions like Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. The Chinese people are of the yellow race. There are strong and weak races. The imperialists take advantage of their superior force to oppress weak and small nations. The imperialists do not treat the Chinese as humans. At the gate of a park in Shanghai hangs a sign, "Chinese and dogs not allowed." They simply do not regard the Chinese as human beings.

The comrades from Hong Kong can tell us many stories. Our view on nationalism is that under the principle of liberty [nations] unite to oppose imperialism and liberate all nations. The GMD's nationalism amounts, first of all, to the betrayal of China. Second, it oppresses the Muslims, Miaos, Koreans, and Mongolians. The CP's and Lenin's views are the only correct views. Sun Yat-sen was a traitor of China—he was the leader and teacher of treason. His program for nation-building amounts to a plan to sell out China's treasures, selling everything in China to the imperialists to get money from them. His program oppresses the weak and small nationalities within China.

What is the doctrine of people's power? The doctrine of people's power is to beat the poor people everywhere, slaughter workers and peasants. Where is people's power?

There is no power whatsoever. There is forced conscription everywhere. Liu Xiang [a warlord in Sichuan] has power; the people have no power at all. The people's power of the GMD is the power to kill and burn. Only the communist views and soviet political programs grant people power; the soviets do not have forced conscription; people have the right to vote and be elected. Under the soviet regime, 90 percent of the poor in China participate in the government.

The doctrine of people's livelihood means death for the people. In the last few years countless people have been killed and persecuted to death. [The GMD] has done everything imaginable in terms of slaughtering poor people, like selling opium and morphine. Only the CP gives the masses a real life. It redistributes land and finds jobs [for them]. Therefore, the doctrine of people's livelihood is a doctrine of killing and burning. The GMD can do nothing about the problems facing the masses in China. The masses can only rise up and overthrow the GMD, and seize power.

These reactionaries are also saying: communism cannot be realized in China. We all know the ten political programs of the CP. Which one cannot be realized? First, drive the imperialists out of China. Second, confiscate all the imperialists' businesses and banks in China. Third, national self-determination for the Chinese people. Fourth, overthrow GMD rule. Fifth, establish soviet power. Sixth, the eight-hour workday. Workers should receive unemployment, labor, and social insurance. Seventh, confiscate the land of the rich and redistribute the land to workers, peasants, and soldiers. Eighth, provide soldiers with a livelihood and land. Ninth, abolish levies, establishing a unified tax law. Tenth, unite with the world proletariat, weak and small nations, and the Soviet Union.

Which one of the above ten proposals cannot be realized? Only communism can improve the livelihood of soldiers. Only communism can help China gain independence and freedom. This "ism" is the only "ism" that can be realized in China. The political program of the CP is the only political program demanded by the workers and peasants in China and has already mobilized many millions of people to fight for it. Only communism represents the interests of the masses. Our comrades struggle to realize the political program of the CP. The GMD can only succeed in turning the Chinese people into slaves without a country, and in starving workers and peasants to death. Such a party will only perish—it will be overthrown by us.

The reactionaries are also saying: China can only have Germanism—which is fascism. In China there are two forces locked in struggle: one kind is the fascist doctrine of the Three Principles of the People; the other kind is the flag of communism. Many millions of people not only hope, but also struggle, for the realization of the political program of communism. You can reply: "The doctrine of the Three Principles of the People will certainly be overthrown. Only communism can save the poor people in China; only communism meets the demands of the majority of the people of China."

c) China can only travel along the road to a soviet republic

The situation in China at present is simply the betrayal of China by the GMD and the partition of China by the imperialists. Therefore, this situation invites all imperialists to compete for China and to carve it up. The British move into Tibet, the French into Yunnan, and the Americans to the Yangtze River, while the League of Nations uses its technical committees. China is a juicy piece of meat. In confusion, the imperialists are fighting over it. The GMD paves the way for them and carves out a route for the imperialists—this route is called the route to colonization. The other route is national self-determination, opposition to the imperialists, and overthrow of the GMD. This is the soviet route. The GMD troops and the Red Army led by the CP are fighting to decide which route is to be taken. The workers and peasants in China can win the soviet victory only by resolutely struggling forward.

Which comrades have read the five programs for fighting the imperialists and resisting the Japanese? These five programs for fighting the imperialists and resisting the Japanese are the mobilization order for us to struggle for a new independent and free China.

The most critical battle against the fifth "extermination campaign" in China is in the midst of a life-and-death struggle. The workers and peasants throughout the country must all regard this war as their task and thoroughly break down and smash the fifth "extermination campaign." This is a very serious problem, requiring that we mobilize our forces on all fronts and use all our might to fight and win victory.

5) The general situation of the Chinese revolution

[[The imbalance in revolutionary development means that many industrial centers are under reactionary rule. The workers have risen but have been unable to form soviets or a Red Army. To preserve its rule, the GMD must use many deceptions. The vying for spheres of influence by warlords within the GMD is a destabilizing factor. The conditions to defeat the enemy exist. We must beat the "extermination campaign" and extend our control from one area to the whole of the northwest.]]

6) The future struggle in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area

a) The mass struggles in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area

The situation in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area is: Liu Xiang (was called Magician Liu) has collapsed and cannot continue. He resigned, saying, "We have lost 5,000 officers, and 80,000 soldiers have been killed. The results of twenty years of military buildup have been destroyed once and for all." His First, Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions were routed by us at the Suiding and Xuanhan front. The paper money issued by his local bank is useless. As a consequence of his defeat, huge riots took place in Chengdu. The rich are fleeing in droves because all of Liu Xiang's forces—over 100 shabby regiments—have been defeated at the front. Of the thirty regiments of Deng Xihou's troops, eighteen have been routed. Of the twenty to thirty regiments of Tian Songrao, we have annihilated six out of the ten relatively good regiments. The regiments of Li, Ruo, and Yang have all been defeated by us. Thus, the reactionary rulers throughout Sichuan have panicked. Although the enemy is still collecting its tattered troops and is supplementing them with many recruits from the militia to plug holes, there are so many deserters that the officers have to lock up the soldiers in houses. In addition, many soldiers have died; there is hardly a regiment which has not suffered 50 percent casualties. Who knows how many have died or deserted. In Suiding and Xuanhan, there were many men, but all of them have been forcefully conscripted, so that not a single shadow remains. In Liangshan, nobody comes to the market any more. The people do not use the paper money printed by Liu Xiang. Such a humiliating defeat has greatly demoralized the enemy. Thus it has begun to draw on the landlords' militia and all the filth it can get. The workers in the paper factory in Liangshan have rebelled and raised the red flag.

There is a great deal of guerrilla activity in Liangkai. The mass activities in the Mabian area are very important. For example, did the masses in the southern and Xuanhan areas disapprove of us last year? No. Because of the weakness in the CP's forces and opportunism, some organizations in the white areas did not lead the mass struggles in Sichuan. After the decisive defeat of the Sichuan warlords, the CP in those areas adopted a right opportunist attitude and did not provide active leadership. This reminds us that it is very important to intensify and deepen our work in the white areas.

The situation is the same in Shaanxi. A few days ago reactionary newspapers reported that the Twenty-sixth Corps of the Red Army captured a GMD county secretary and many rifles. In Longxi, over 100 cavalry soldiers mutinied. There are CP guerrilla forces in Hanzhong. There have also been Muslim revolts in Gansu that have turned very fierce.

A few days ago, four soldiers from the white army facing our Twelfth Division deserted to our side. Two of them even actively propagandized for us on the firing line. They shouted to Liu Xiang's soldiers to come over to our side. This shows the increasing revolutionization of the reactionary troops in Sichuan, providing us with an even more favorable situation.

b) The focus of our work is the "joint extermination campaign in Sichuan-Shaanxi"

First, the warlords in Sichuan are now attempting to replenish their battered troops and are inviting Hu Zongnan and Sun Wei to come here and join the battle. This would create a "joint extermination in Sichuan-Shaanxi." The enemy has made quick preparations to attack us. We should prepare to break this "joint extermination campaign in Sichuan-Shaanxi," attack the enemy, take the initiative, and defeat him individually. This is the task that faces us.

Second, let us evaluate the situation of the red areas in Sichuan and Shaanxi. Where are the difficulties in our work? Because our expansion here came a bit late and because of the lack of a foundation in our work in the local areas, we do not have a strong provincial party committee and party organizations. Neither have we aroused fully the initiative of the masses.

In E-Yu-Wan, we never dispersed our forces too widely, but always concentrated our main forces to attack on the same route because we have powerful guerrilla forces. The [masses] there enthusiastically support the Red Army, and mass activities are organized. Last year before we contracted our positions, several thousand people in Cangxi and Langnan joined the Red Army. Such revolutionary enthusiasm was rarely seen before, not in E-Yu-Wan. The masses pick up the rifles and march forward. This kind of spirit is excellent.

If our work last year had been better, then our [present] work would have been better. The Red Army's expansion has not been very great. The local party is still weak.

The situation in Sichuan is such that the masses cannot survive any longer. There are also many contradictions among the reactionary rulers. There are many more Magician Lius and Liu Xiangs. They are simply bastards and capable of doing anything. The feudal air is very heavy in this area. Most of the masses have not been mobilized. These are the results of our insufficient work.

Therefore, some masses say to us: it is not that we do not want to join the Red Army, but we will join after you cross the Jialing River. Of course, on the one hand there is the sabotage by the counterrevolutionaries who obstruct the masses from joining the Red Army; but, on the other hand, there is indeed this kind of psychology among the masses. This should be solved completely by the work of our party's political department.

The situation in Sichuan. We are in the stage of the arrival of the Fourth Front Army that will precede the extensive explosion of the mass revolution. Therefore, previous work in this locality was heavily influenced by that of the political department. From now on the political department should continue to play a major role in the work in this locality. Now we should particularly increase our Bolshevik strength, recruit most of the masses to join the party, and form a mass party to lead the fight.

Third, [we should] actively work on the soldiers in the white army.

Fourth, there is the question of work on anti-imperialism. We should develop a great anti-imperialist movement and have the majority of the masses smash the "joint extermination campaign in Sichuan-Shaanxi" together with us. This will thoroughly smash the fifth "extermination campaign." To win the victory of thoroughly smashing the fifth "extermination campaign" is to win the initial victory in the northwest!

c) Urgent tasks

Several things are needed for us to be able to annihilate the enemy. First, labor power and the masses; second, weapons: rifles, machine guns, mortars, etc.; third, to achieve all these things and defeat the enemy through offensive strategy, there must be the heroic leadership of the CP.

Is it that we do not have guns? There are many extra rifles here. The opportunists say that Liu Xiang has everything. But our antipersonnel rounds of ammunition here were brought to us by Liu Xiang in boxes. He is our transportation team bringing many weapons. Now our Thirty-first Corps wants to fight Hu Zongnan because they want his automatic rifles. To someone who says that the enemy's weapons are superior, and fears we may not be a match for the enemy, we should reply that he is an opportunist, and we must struggle against him. We will certainly capture the better weapons from any enemy who has them.

The human factor is presented to our conference. First, how can we intensify our work in the Red Army and raise the class consciousness of our troops, so that they know the war is a struggle for the liberation of the entire class? Raising the class consciousness of our troops will enable them to have resolute determination in their struggles. This work will establish the authority of the troops and enable every soldier to understand that the only way forward is to struggle under the leadership of the CP. [The only salvation lies] in establishing strict military discipline in the Red Army led by the CP to ensure the combat capability of the troops and to use these methods to strengthen our party's organization and leadership. In particular, during battles, we must use party leadership to strengthen our command. Unless we do this, when the enemy presents us with a difficult problem, we will not be able to find a solution. Close political unity is imperative. This is the first point. Second, because of historical factors, the experience of many years of struggles, and the experienced organization of the CP, the Red Army has become the principal leading force in the red areas. This is also because the CP in Sichuan-Shaanxi emerged quite late. Third, how can we use the political department to mobilize many new recruits

to join the Red Army? We must work among the masses not only in the red areas, but also in the white areas. Fourth, work among the soldiers of the white army is extremely important. Fifth, there is the task of leading the anti-imperialist movement (including the question of minority nationalities). These are the basic issues for the Red Army.

d) Change future work so that our work is organized and systematic—this is the precondition for fulfilling our tasks

If we can solidify and strengthen our internal forces, we can eliminate the previous insignificant rate of desertion. Even in a newly formed unit, class consciousness and iron determination, in addition to military training, can greatly increase our strength. This can double a regiment's strength.

Mobilize large numbers of people to join the Red Army. Work among the masses is of a much greater scope. Our anti-imperialist campaign is virtually fruitless. The weakness in our previous work was the neglect of the anti-imperialist campaign. The directives of the Party Center have criticized a kind of opportunism within the red areas, meaning that the red areas are not capable of fundamentally opposing imperialism. This tendency is often very mistaken.

Our work among the soldiers of the white army has just begun, but has not been expanded greatly. Our work among our own troops is still deficient. The leadership of the political department itself is incomplete. The commissars have not yet taken up their own responsibilities. The commissars in each regiment and battalion have played very important roles in battles, but have neglected party work or have even developed the tendency to neglect party and government work.

Moreover, the political department does not have a regular plan, or regular propaganda and organizational work. The propaganda and organization departments are engaged fully in managing work in the local areas. The party committees are only capable of carrying out work among the troops. Moreover, their work in the local areas leaves a lot to be desired.

We have not implemented the plans for keeping discipline before, during, and after battles. There are many instances of personnel from headquarters and logistics, management, and medical care creating a bad political image outside. We do not have regular work among buyers, horse grooms, and logistics personnel. These instances are particularly numerous.

Did we achieve anything in the past? Yes. We have great achievements. Through the battles of the last few years, we have consolidated our army's foundation, broken away from guerrilla warfare, and become an iron Red Army. We have strengthened the leadership of the proletariat and laid the strongest foundations. These are things we can be proud of.

However, there are many shortcomings here.

We have certainly displayed a high degree of flexibility in contracting our positions. But our work is still very lacking.

In terms of the work in the local areas, it is not that our political departments and party organizations do not understand the party line. They have some basic idea

about it. However, the greatest flaw is their inability to turn to the masses or mobilize the mass struggle. Thus, in practice, our work is turned into land redistribution by departmental cadres and directors. In particular, our weakness lies in our inability to organize labor unions or peasant associations, or to mobilize the mass struggle. We are not saying that our leadership should be reduced, rather that it should be strengthened a hundredfold. Several tendencies are to be opposed in our party and government work: (i) Liquidationist views: believing that it is enough to do military work only and failing to understand the enormous force of political work. (ii) Ordinary political personnel regard political work only as something to be done in local areas, and abandon or neglect the work among our troops, failing to understand the scope for political work or to relate military work to political work. They act as if they were learning to aim and shoot. They use the party's energies to promote, to an unusual extent, the military training of our troops. This tendency does not understand how to relate the military to the political. It simply believes that good ideologies and understanding are enough to defeat the enemy. We must understand that we can defeat the enemy only by combining Marxism-Leninism with modern military knowledge. This lack of understanding about relating military to political work is a tendency that is most likely to develop among the political personnel. Although the party branches have been extremely active during the battles, this is far from enough. Their work must be intensified. We must not neglect the integration of military and political work. This requires that party leadership should be the model for the masses both in political and military aspects. (iii) Oppose closed-doorism in our organizational work. Many companies do not know how to recruit the bravest and most active soldiers in battle into the party. There is no vigorous leadership. We only know how to read a document to the soldiers, but not how to arouse the initiative of the soldiers. The reverse of this problem is an emphasis on only practical work at the expense of study.

While contracting our positions, two tendencies have arisen: (i) The view that we cannot strengthen our positions during contraction. This causes right opportunism to emerge in our political work. (ii) There is another view that believes the enemy will be defeated as a matter of course. This ignores the major additional efforts that have to be made during this period. Most political work has failed to play the intended role.

There is also the problem of discipline in the Red Army. Either we relax discipline or mechanically enforce it. The relationship between discipline and education has not been clarified in the enforcing, screening, and purging of counterrevolutionaries. This problem too must be solved at this conference. For our conference to fulfill these tasks, we should first of all understand our own line clearly.

Our basic task is to strengthen further our own troops and mobilize more people to join this war. We should concentrate our forces to strike at the enemy on one front and then break up the other fronts. We should mobilize everyone and rely on firm leadership to defeat the current enemy. This is our basic line. This is also the Party Center's line of countering the fifth "extermination campaign."

When we implement this line, we should hit hard at all the right opportunists and

all those elements who refuse to follow the offensive line. To safeguard the implementation of this line, we must oppose the loss of self-confidence while struggling against the enemy. This takes the form of exaggerating the enemy's strength, fearing class struggle, fearing intense hostility to the rich peasants, and fearing to purge the landlord spies from our ranks. Moreover, such loss of self-confidence also lies in exaggerating the difficulties for us at the moment, complaining about the difficulties everywhere, and lacking the spirit of overcoming difficulties with determination. Of course, neglecting party and government work will produce the same results.

On the other hand, we should also oppose a different kind of fatalism, which believes that since the enemy has been defeated, victory is naturally ours. This means that we can take a break until our leadership gives us the order to fight again. This amounts to abandonment of the current difficult preparations. This is "leftist" empty talk.

In destroying the enemy and implementing the basic line, we must oppose all forms of right opportunism, empty talk, and self-satisfying "left" opportunism. We must prepare to increase our strength, have better political preparations, replenish our personnel, and never hesitate to implement the offensive principle.

We are sure to defeat the enemy and completely rout him. Thus we can speed up our victory. Wars are extremely capricious. Military principles tell us that up until the last second, one cannot guarantee that there will be no drastic changes.

Therefore, we should strengthen the conditions to safeguard our defeat of the enemy. This is the only route to our complete Bolshevization.

This conference has solved all the problems. It has clarified the international and Chinese revolutionary tasks and pointed out that our central task is to smash thoroughly the fifth "extermination campaign." This task will promote the world revolution and particularly the revolution in the colonial countries in the East. Smashing the GMD's fifth "extermination campaign" will have a decisive impact on our efforts to make China a communist country. We have defeated the enemy in the red areas in Sichuan and Shaanxi and we have the task to smash thoroughly the fifth "extermination campaign" throughout the entire country. Ours is not only a supporting position, but also provides the base from which to launch the revolution throughout the entire northwest.

When our work is done well, we will create better conditions for the revolution. Now we have Comrade Xiao Ke joining forces with Comrade He Long to attack Liu Xiang from both sides. This is an unprecedented favorable situation. Therefore, the particular task of the Fourth Front Army, among those of the Red Army of workers and peasants throughout the country, is to adopt an offensive line to attack the enemy. This conference is to solve the following issues:

- i) work within the Red Army;
- ii) work in local areas;
- iii) work among soldiers of the white army;
- iv) work in the anti-imperialist movement.

The [resolutions] of this conference are to be implemented fully at the company level. This conference is especially important, and this conference can explain these tasks. There must be constant leadership between battles, expansion of party organizations, development of class consciousness, and strengthening of military discipline.

The implementation of these tasks will safeguard our victory. Correct party leadership combines Marxism-Leninism with modern and new military knowledge. With dauntless determination, and with the determination to overcome all difficulties, we can quickly break the “joint extermination campaign in Sichuan-Shaanxi.” We cannot only capture automatic rifles from running dogs like Hu Zongnan, but also must thoroughly smash the fifth “extermination campaign.” We shall fight to the last drop of our blood in order to drive all the imperialists out of China!

(Thunderous applause, everybody rises and sings the “Internationale.”)

D.11 Public Letter from the Revolutionary Military Affairs
Committee of the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Border Area
of the Chinese Soviet Republic to Our Comrades in the
Celestial Temples of Yingjiang, Dejiang, Wuchuan, and
Yanhe Counties in Guizhou Province (16 June 1934)⁵⁵

Dear Comrades Among the Celestial Soldiers:

You have had enough of the exploitation caused by harsh levies and multiple taxes and have risen up to resist the evil warlords, the township bosses, and the evil gentry. We wholeheartedly salute your courage and determination in this struggle!

We, the temporary central government of the Chinese soviet, have over one million Red Army troops fighting in the interests of the workers and peasants. The Third Army of the Workers and Peasants' Red Army is now waging guerrilla warfare in the scores of counties on the borders of Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei, in the hope of mobilizing tens of millions of workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the warlords, local despots, and the gentry, and to fight for the interests and rights of the workers and peasants. Therefore, we and you are fighting on the same side. We are more than willing to establish revolutionary cooperation with you.

We have heard of the many heroic struggles by the Celestial Soldiers and have been saddened by the defeats you have suffered. Why have the Celestial Soldiers never achieved a victory in their history? Because:

First, the objective of the Celestial Soldiers is to resist the imposition of levies. They do not have a plan to overthrow the reactionary GMD. However, if the reactionary government is not overthrown, harsh levies and numerous taxes cannot be abolished. Since the Celestial Soldiers have no plan to overthrow the government

of warlords and the GMD, they often suffer severe repression by the troops of the GMD and the warlords. Second, the Celestial Soldiers have organized only the Celestial Temple, without a government of their own making. Since there is no army trained in the use of modern weapons, how can they fight the armies of the reactionary government? Third, the Celestial Soldiers have not structured a political program, which jointly represents the workers, peasants, and the poor people. This program could also cement their unity. Very often, the Celestial Soldiers make a compromise with the local despots, the gentry, and the reactionary government, all of whom have ulterior motives. Switching to the government side, they can be pacified, so that the cause of the Celestial Soldiers is often abandoned in mid-course and defeated. Fourth, the Celestial Soldiers have failed to create a national united organization such as the Chinese soviet. Celestial Soldiers in different areas have no ties with each other.

Owing to these weaknesses and flaws, the Celestial Soldiers have failed to reach their goals despite making enormous sacrifices.

At present the Chinese workers, peasants, and poor masses under the CCP's leadership have adopted a new method of struggle—the soviet revolution.

What are the tasks and methods of a soviet revolution? First, the soviet revolution is totally opposed to the imperialists and the GMD warlords. Second, the soviet revolution is totally against the landlord class and the bourgeoisie. It defends the interests of the workers and peasants. Its most important [task] is to confiscate the land of the landlord class and redistribute it among peasants and soldiers. Third, the soviet is a government elected and established by the people themselves. It also organizes the army of the workers and peasants—the Red Army. Fourth, the soviet represents the political power of the workers, peasants, poor people, and soldiers, which is to say that it is also the strongest united body of the workers and peasants. It allies itself with the proletariat and soviets throughout the world.

Comrades! Here you can see the difference between the method of struggle of the Celestial Soldiers and the revolutionary method of the soviet. This difference is why the Celestial Soldiers are easily defeated while our Red Army has dramatically expanded! The progressive elements among the Celestial Soldiers, therefore, have seen this point. For example, over 1,000 men from the Heroes' Association in Qianjiang and Pengshui in Sichuan Province, and the Celestial Soldiers in Hegang, Hubei Province, have joined the Third Red Army. They have also organized spontaneous Red Army guerrillas to protect their own areas.

Our comrades among the Celestial Soldiers in Yingjiang, Wuchuan, Dejiang, and Yanhe! We are more than willing to help you win great victories. Therefore, we sincerely welcome you to join the soviet revolution! To win victory, we think that you should do the following immediately:

- 1) The workers should organize labor unions; the peasants should organize peasant committees to fight for their interests. The Celestial Temple should support all activities of the farmhand unions and the peasant committees. It should support totally the interests of the workers and peasants.

- 2) Organize Red Army guerrillas and self-defense forces to eliminate local despots, the gentry, and warlords to protect yourselves.
- 3) Organize revolutionary committees to act as unified leadership organs.
- 4) Completely oppose local despots, the gentry, warlords, and imperialists; never surrender; never compromise.
- 5) [Fight for] freedom of religious belief. Protect the freedom of the believers of the Celestial Temple and other nonbelievers.

We trust that the comrades within the Celestial Temple will certainly accept our suggestions. Because the majority of you are peasants, and despite some elements born of the landlord class, you can cooperate with us as long as you are willing to support the development of the mass struggle of the workers and peasants. Therefore, we hope the Celestial Temple in all areas will send representatives to establish ties and discuss everything with us. We vow that we will sincerely establish a close and revolutionary alliance with you.

Revolutionary Salutations!

The Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee
of Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou
Xia Xi, Guan Xiangying, He Long, Lu Dongsheng

D.12 Records of the First Congress of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers of the East Guizhou Special District (21–22 July 1934)⁵⁶

One. Summary of the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District and Statistics of the Representatives' Social Status

On 21–22 July [1934], the Border Area Revolutionary Military Committee of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Guizhou held the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress in Qianchangba. About 100 representatives from the three counties of Yanhe, Yinjiang, and Dejiang and about thirty from the Third Army of the Red Army attended. The Revolutionary Committee of the East Guizhou Special District was established at the congress. Sun Xiuliang, Qin Yuqing, and others were selected to form a presidium for the congress. Xia Xi, the CCP representative, delivered an opening address, and Zhong Zitong, representative of the Third Army of the Red Army, spoke after him. Afterward the participants held discussions on land, arms, and other important questions. Everyone participated actively in the discussions amid a great deal of applause and cheers. The congress was indeed the most magnificent ever held in Guizhou.

The problems discussed at the congress were as follows: (1) Land Regulations; (2) Resolution on Armed Forces; (3) Regulations on the Favored Treatment for Families of Red Army soldiers; (4) Regulation on Labor Protection for Workers and Farmhands in the Countryside; (5) Resolution on the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries; (6) Resolutions on Self-Determination for the Miao Nationality.

[[After the discussions, there was an election for the Revolutionary Committee.]]

Below is the social status of the representatives to the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District: fifty-five hired laborers and craftsmen, twenty-five poor peasants, eight middle peasants, four soldiers, four merchants, thirty-two Red Army soldiers, and seven with unclear social status.

The above statistics indicate that the soviet government is truly a government of the working people and that it completely deprives the landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists of political rights.

Two. Address by Comrade Xia Xi, Representative of the West Hunan–Hubei Branch Bureau of the CCP

Comrades:

Today, we, the representatives of the workers, peasants, and guerrillas from Yanhe, Dejiang, and Yinjiang and representatives from the Red Army are holding the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District! This congress is the first of its kind ever held in Guizhou Province. It is time for us to hold up our heads! On behalf of the CCP, I extend to you a warm revolutionary salute!

The purpose of our conference is to abolish the old regime ruled by the landlords, despotie gentry, and capitalists and to establish a worker-peasant government of our own, that is, the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress—the soviet government.

Presently all over the world, the Soviet Union—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is the only nation that has won a complete victory in its soviet revolution. It is only seventeen years since the success of the soviet revolution, but the living standards of the workers and peasants there have become the highest in the whole world! In the Soviet Union, there are no landlords, no capitalists, and no rich peasants. Peasants are organized into collective farms. Workers work only seven hours a day. They are implementing a great socialist construction.

The soviet revolution in China has under seven years of history. At the beginning, we had a peasant guerrilla force only a few hundred strong, but now we have developed an iron Red Army with nearly a million men all over the country and have taken over one-sixth of China's territory. Soviet areas have expanded into twelve provinces, including Jiangxi, Fujian, Sichuan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Guizhou. The largest soviet area is the Central Soviet, covering the four provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Guangdong. We also have soviet governments in the areas of Sichuan-Shaanxi,

Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Hunan-Jiangxi, and West Hunan–Hubei. The First Central Soviet Congress was held on 11 October 1931.⁵⁷ The Chinese Soviet Republic was founded, and a provisional Central Government was established. In the Chinese Soviet Republic, peasants have been given land and workers have had a pay raise. Their treatment has been improved, and exorbitant taxes and levies have been canceled. There is a world of difference if one compares their life to that of workers and peasants in areas ruled by the GMD.

Who has advocated the soviet revolution? Not Buddha or God, not the emperor. It is the CP. The CP was first founded in Russia, and already it has a history of thirty or forty years. In China, it has had a fifteen-year history. To whom does the CP belong? It is the party of the proletariat, representing the interests of the workers and peasants. It is organized by the laborers because they suffered a great deal from exploitation by capitalists. They organized the CP to oppose oppression by landlords and capitalists. Since September 1927, when the CCP decided to carry out the soviet revolution, workers and peasants all over China have united around the party and have founded the Chinese Soviet Republic. They have realized that the only way for the working people to gain liberation is to follow the road of the soviet revolution.

We people in Guizhou are poorer than anyone else in the country because we have suffered a great deal from the oppression and exploitation by both the French imperialists and such warlords as Wang Jialie, You Guocai, and Mao Guangxiang. People have been longing for the day when they can hold up their heads. Perhaps you dreamed that an emperor or the son of God would save you from the suffering. Comrades, if you do, you are utterly wrong! Didn't we have Xuantong as emperor before? Now he is still the emperor, but he has sold our four northeastern provinces to the Japanese imperialists and led the Japanese imperialists to destroy our Chinese nation. So the emperor cannot be trusted. Moreover, we must firmly fight against the Xuantong emperor, a running dog of the foreign imperialists!⁵⁸

When you failed to find an emperor to save you, you then thought hard and turned to Buddha and God for help. You began imitating Celestial Soldiers and made a Celestial Temple. Claiming to be the "Celestial Soldiers and Generals," you were indestructible. You organized people around the temple and rebelled against exorbitant taxes and levies [see **Doc. D.11**]. This was indeed a very primitive form of revolutionary struggle by peasants against the rule of landlords and despotic gentry. However, such a rebellion was soon suppressed by the counterrevolutionary GMD army. The "Celestial Soldiers" failed, and many houses were set on fire. The attacks by the counterrevolutionary GMD army were in fact attacks and suppressions by the landlords and despotic gentry of our peasant rebellions against exorbitant taxes and levies. The failure of the struggle made the people around the temple divide into two. Those who were landlords and despotic gentry themselves went to join the reactionaries, tried to persuade the rebels to surrender, and helped the enemy to oppress the workers and peasants. The others were the workers and peasants and their leaders. They not only were oppressed by warlords but also

suffered from the betrayal of those landlords and despotic gentry who were the traitors of the temple. So these people realized that the only way out was to continue their rebellion against warlords, landlords, and despotic gentry. Now among those who have come to join the Red Army, the majority are these people and their leaders. This shows clearly how the peasant rebellions have finally developed from operating as Celestial Soldiers to taking part in the soviet movement. Under conditions of sharp class confrontation, the masses of the workers and peasants would sooner or later gather around the soviet revolution.

You may ask why the Celestial Soldiers failed. Some people might reply that it was because they didn't have guns. It is good that they have realized the importance of having modern weapons. However, they have not yet found out the real reason. The real reason for the failure was that there were some landlords and despotic gentry in the leading body of the Celestial Soldiers, and they had the illusion they could reform the landlord class and make a compromise with the landlords and despotic gentry. In reality, they betrayed the interests of the masses. This was the major reason for defeat. Other causes such as bad organization and a lack of modern military training of the Celestial Soldiers are secondary.

Buddha is no more than a superstitious illusion. There is no Buddha at all. If there were, how could the Celestial Soldiers be defeated and their houses burned? And what is more, the Buddha himself was frightened and ran away when the reactionary army came in! So, if there is a Buddha, he must be a paper tiger as timid as a mouse. The Celestial Soldiers should be criticized for another reason. They discriminated against nonbelievers. If a person did not join their temple, he was discriminated against even if he was one of the poor. In this way, they did harm to class unity and forced the workers and peasants who did not join the temple to rally around the forces of the heads of districts and towns and the local tyrants and despotic gentry. This was also one of the reasons that caused the failure of the Celestial Soldiers.

It is said that Buddha has often shown himself at your temple through incarnations and he frequently leaves words in people's dreams. However, we have never heard of any Buddha who declares land redistribution for the poor and a raise for the laborers. This proves that even if there is a Buddha, he would not necessarily work for the interests of the poor. There is an old saying: "With money you can buy access to God," implying that even Buddha can be bought by the rich people. This shows that we cannot trust Buddha but must unite to help ourselves.

Now you have found a bright road; that is, the establishment of a worker-peasant soviet government and the organization of a worker-peasant Red Army. With our own government and the Red Army we will be able to overthrow all the enemies oppressing us. This is the way to help ourselves.

Right now there are three urgent and important things for you to do:

A) Carry out the rural revolution. You must take over the land from the landlords and despotic gentry and redistribute it evenly among the poor and middle peasants.

B) Organize farmhand unions, poor peasant leagues, and soviet representative councils. You must firmly wage struggles against landlords and rich peasants as well as all counterrevolutionaries who want to destroy the soviet revolution.

C) Arm the workers and peasants. You must organize 30,000 militia men and 10,000 guerrilla fighters and recruit 3,000 soldiers for the Red Army. With such a revolutionary armed force we will be able to prevail over everything. So long as we march bravely along the road of the soviet revolution and unite closely around the CP, we will definitely win an initial victory for our soviet government in the East Guizhou Special District.

Let's shout slogans: Long Live the Soviet Government and the Red Army! Long Live the CCP! Long Live the First Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District!

[[Three. Address by Zhong Zitong]]

Resolutions of the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District

I. Regulations on Land Confiscation and Redistribution

In accordance with the Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic [see **Doc. D.8**], the First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District has stipulated a set of unified regulations to confiscate and redistribute the land. These regulations are to be passed on to the masses of workers and peasants for discussion and are then to be carried out.

1. A landlord is a person who has land (i.e., landowner), but does not farm it. He asks others to farm for him all year round, or he rents it to others. The land of these landlords should be confiscated in its entirety. No land should be left for them.

2. The land of the heads of districts, townships, and towns must be completely confiscated. No land should be left for them.

3. A rich peasant is a person who has his own land (including some rented land). Besides working on the land themselves, they also hire one or two full-time farmhands. Some rich peasants farm on half of their land and rent the rest to others. The land of rich peasants should be confiscated. After land redistribution, rich peasants may be given some bad land. Nevertheless, they have to farm the land themselves.

4. The property and land of the sponsors and activists (such as battalion commanders) of all counterrevolutionary organizations and the white army troops must be confiscated. However, this regulation, with the approval of the Soviet Council, does not apply to the poor and middle peasants who are enticed unconsciously to work against the soviet.

5. Most of the temples' cultivated fields are to be confiscated except those used to support the temples. The fields used to provide the harvest for ancestor sacrifice will not be confiscated.

6. Public fields, school fields, and those belonging to the nation or society should also be confiscated.

7. During land confiscation and redistribution, the land of middle and rich middle peasants should not be violated. The private land of the middle peasants or the poor peasants will not be confiscated. On the contrary, if they do not have sufficient land, they will be given some.

8. All the confiscated land, with the approval of the township worker-peasant councils (the soviet councils), will immediately be distributed by the poor and middle peasants. All farmhands, men and women, have an equal right to be given land. Hoodlums and thieves can also be given land so long as they promise to do the farming and never to make trouble. The same treatment also applies to the soldiers of the white army (or warlord army). They are expected to come home to farm. Merchants and owners of the small workshops should not be given land.

9. The Red Army soldiers are the vanguards who are fighting fiercely against the GMD reactionaries and imperialists for the interests of the workers and peasants. Therefore, no matter whether they are natives of this place or not, they must be allocated good land. Farmhands should be given good land too, but the reason why must be made clear to the poor and middle peasants and approved by them.

10. The Third Army of the Red Army is the mainstay for founding, consolidating, and developing the East Guizhou Soviet District. During land redistribution, each township should give the Third Army soldiers (nonnatives) land equivalent to that of ten people.

11. Each township should reserve a public field with a grain production capacity of about 1,000 to 2,000 *jin* for those nonnatives who will join the Red Army in the future.

12. Each township soviet council should reserve a public field with a grain production capacity of about 1,000 *jin*. Its income will be used for administrative expenses.

13. Workers and peasants, the elderly, the disabled, widow[er]s, and those who are not able to work and do not have any relatives to rely on should also be given land. They can ask other people to farm for them or rent the land.

14. The confiscated land must be equally distributed by the poor and middle peasants.

- A. Anyone who is able to farm may have one share of land.
- B. Anyone who is too old or too young to farm may have half a share.
- C. Those poor and middle peasants who have some private land will be given less land.
- D. The farmhands or the poor and middle peasants who do not have any land of their own will receive more land.
- E. Among the farmhands and poor peasants, those elders who are alone or those who have aged people or have too many children to support may enjoy special treatment. In this case, three elders or children, with the approval of the township council, can be given two shares.

15. Fields should be evaluated according to how much grain and what sort of grain they can produce. All fields can be sorted into three categories: upper, middle, and low. The middle is the standard field. Evaluation should be based on the production of core and unhusked rice. A piece of land which can produce one *dou* and two *sun* dry core is as valuable as that which can produce one *tiao* of unhusked rice. (The standard container for measurement is the *dou* which holds 100 *wan*.)

16. How much one share of land should be depends on the size of the local population and the amount of the land.

A. The population count includes:

- i. The number of poor and middle peasants who have less or no land.
- ii. The number of rich peasants whose land has been confiscated.
- iii. The number of full laborers and how many are unable to work.

B. The land count includes:

- i. The amount of confiscated land (including the land the poor and middle peasants rent from the landlords).
- ii. The amount of land owned by the poor and middle peasants.

C. Dividing the amount of land by the size of the population will determine the size of one share of land that one full laborer may have. This is the way to distribute land according to the size of the labor force.

D. The middle peasants who have sufficient land of their own to support their families are excluded from the land redistribution. Their population and fields are not counted.

17. Land redistribution is carried out within a township (each township is only responsible for itself). The land of a landlord is distributed among the people in his township. The land of the poor and middle peasants must not be confiscated or exchanged no matter where they are.

18. While confiscating the property and land of the landlords and despotic gentry, we must abolish all oral or written leases and declare debts of all kinds of usury invalid. It is strictly forbidden for peasants to return part of their distributed land or debts to the landlords and despotic gentry; nor are they allowed secretly to hand in any rent. If a poor or middle peasant has pawned his land to another, the former can properly take the land back while the latter will be given another piece of land in compensation; or the former can be given another piece of land. It depends on the decision made by the township council.

19. During land redistribution, the peasants do not have to move their houses. But rich peasants have to move if their houses are located on good land which is to be confiscated and is to be distributed to the poor peasants and farmhands. After the land distribution, boundary markers should be set up, and owners given land deeds by the district soviet so that they can use the land. No registration fee is charged.

20. The property and real estate of all the feudal landlords, warlords, and despotic gentry such as houses, storehouses, livestock, and farm tools must be confis-

cated. After rich peasants are given some land, their extra farm tools and livestock should also be confiscated. The confiscated houses are to be given to the homeless poor and middle peasants or turned into offices for the workers and peasants to use. The livestock and farm tools can be distributed to poor and middle peasants based on groups or households or put in a plowing station managed and used by the public.

21. Detailed procedures for land confiscation and redistribution:

A. Each township will hold a peasant meeting in every village to announce regulations concerning land confiscation and redistribution.

B. The township congress will send investigative groups to all its villages to inspect the land and population of landlords and rich peasants. Members of farmhand unions, poor-peasant leagues, the party and YL, the Young Pioneers, and women's peasant councils are expected to take an active part in the land inspection to make it a popular movement.

C. In order to distribute land fairly and equally, the land and population of the poor and middle peasants should also be checked and registered after investigating those of the landlords and rich peasants.

D. The congress will arrange a time to work out a standard share in the land distribution.

E. The land will be divided according to the amount of shares of each household.

F. The result of the land redistribution will be publicized at mass meetings in each village. Two things should be examined carefully: whether all the land of the landlords and rich peasants has been confiscated and whether the farmhands, the poor and middle peasants, truly benefit from the land redistribution.

22. During the land confiscation and redistribution struggle, the landlords and rich peasants will inevitably try to conceal their land to avoid having it be confiscated. The township congress should rely on the farmhand union and the poor peasant league to fight resolutely against the landlords and rich peasants. Therefore, the farmhands union and the poor peasant league should be guaranteed absolute freedom to organize activities, because they are the basic pillars in the soviet rural revolution.

In addition to mobilizing the farmhand union and poor peasant league to take action in the land investigation, the township congress must frequently hold mass meetings in villages (or stockaded villages) to initiate a popular land investigation and land redistribution movement.

The soviet must fight against any tendency to shield the landlords and rich peasants. If there are any landlords or rich peasants hiding in the soviet, they must be ruthlessly flushed out.

23. Any poor or middle peasant who, in order to get more land, reports his private property as comprising less than is actually the case must be punished by not having any land distributed to him.

24. The previous owner of crops planted on a distributed field must be compensated (if he is a poor or middle peasant) by the present owner.

25. If personnel in the soviet reserve land for a landlord or better land for a rich peasant, or keep good land for themselves, they must be publicly criticized and punished accordingly.

26. If a landlord or a rich peasant snatches products from his confiscated land or asks for debts to be paid by the poor and middle peasants, he must be punished by the soviet according to the most severe laws.

[[III. Draft Regulations on the Labor Protection of Workers in the Countryside

The regulations stress an eight-hour workday with four days off per month and two weeks' holiday per year. Minimum wage to be set and coolies to receive one-third more than ordinary workers. Equal pay for men and women for equal work. Women are forbidden to do heavy or dangerous work; they will receive two-months' maternity leave on full pay. For breast feeding, women may have a thirty-minute break every other hour; pay may not be deducted. Work must be arranged on a contract basis. Medical insurance is paid by employers, and sick workers must receive full pay. A social security fund should be set up. The freedom of trade unions to declare and lead strikes and to negotiate and inspect collective contracts is guaranteed.

III. Resolution on the Workers and Peasants' Armed Forces

Everyone must be armed to fight against the warlords and the GMD. Guerrilla warfare should be expanded by forming a force of 10,000. To meet this objective, every township should mobilize thirty to fifty people. Every man and woman between sixteen and forty-five must take up arms and join the militia.

IV. Regulations Giving Favored Treatment to Red Army Soldiers and Their Families

Red Army soldiers and officers must be given first-rate fields. Plowing and harvest teams should be organized to help Red Army families. They should receive a 5 percent discount on edible oil, salt, and cloth. They are exempted from land and business taxes. Sons should be given priority in enrollment to Lenin primary schools. Sick and wounded should be properly cared for.}}

V. Resolution on the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries

1. The current soviet revolution in China is a movement, under the leadership of the working class and with support from the broad peasant masses, to overthrow the GMD regime controlled by the landlords and capitalists, to eliminate imperialism, and to destroy the feudal system by carrying out the rural revolution. This is a

violent revolution, a movement to overthrow the oppression and exploitation by the landlords and capitalists, and a life-and-death struggle between the soviet government and the GMD regime. Now, it has reached the sharpest and fiercest stage.

2. With the help of the imperialists, the GMD reactionaries have mobilized all their powers to launch attacks on the soviet areas. Apart from the reactionary armed forces, in order to save their dying and declining rule, they also try to use the landlords, despotic gentry, and capitalists inside the soviet areas or those who have access to the soviet areas to carry out sabotage for them. This includes violating soviet decrees and orders, spreading rumors, carrying out assassinations, worming their way into the soviet government and the Red Army, creating various problems for revolutionary work, and even organizing counterrevolutionary rebellions. Such sabotage inside the soviet areas is a very important strategy of the reactionaries to attack the soviet areas and to overthrow the soviet government.

3. In the early days of soviet construction, some landlords and rich peasants often tried to sneak into the soviet government and the Red Army in order to protect their own interests and damage soviet work. Those who sneaked into the soviet during land redistribution frequently attempted to conceal the land of landlords and rich peasants and hold back the poor and middle peasants' struggle against them. When the reactionary army launches attacks on the soviet areas, they act in collusion with the enemy to overthrow the soviet government. We must flush out these counterrevolutionaries inside the soviet movement and wage a ruthless struggle against them.

4. We must not take it for granted that once their regime is overthrown and their land confiscated, the landlords will not have any power. In fact, the overthrown counterrevolutionary class has been dreaming continually of restoring their lost power and of continuing the old system of exploiting and enslaving the masses of workers and peasants. Since soviet political power is the dictatorship of the workers and peasants, it is absolutely necessary for us to deprive the landlords, capitalists, and rich peasants of all their political rights and freedoms.

5. In order to protect the interests of the people, the soviet government will adopt very severe measures to suppress ruthlessly any counterrevolutionary activities aimed at overthrowing the soviet government. The First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of East Guizhou has decided to adopt the following measures:

- A. Arrest any warlords, officials, and despotic gentry who work for the counter-revolutionary regime and anyone who is involved in the counterrevolutionary armed forces.
- B. Severely suppress any counterrevolutionary activities which attempt to help the GMD to overthrow soviet political power (such as spreading rumors, spying for the counterrevolutionary army, hiding counterrevolutionaries, and conducting armed resistance against the soviet government and the Red Army).
- C. Deprive all landlords, rich peasants, and proprietors in the soviet areas of political freedom and power. They are not allowed to join the soviet but have to observe soviet law and public order.

- D. Found a political security system under soviet leadership. The political security bureau is a special organ of the soviet government whose function is to detect, arrest, bring to trial, and even execute any counterrevolutionaries.
- E. The soviet government must organize its own judicial system. Judicial departments must fight against anyone who violates soviet law.
- F. Impose a red curfew. Anyone who travels in the soviet areas must be investigated. Any suspects must be carefully examined and checked.

6. The struggle carried out by the soviet government against the counterrevolutionaries is a struggle to protect the interests of the broad masses of the workers and peasants and to defend the victory of the rural revolution. Therefore, it must have the participation of and support from the workers and peasants. With regard to the workers and peasants influenced by counterrevolutionaries, the soviet government must, for the interests and unity of our class, try to persuade and educate them so that they will be able to shatter the influence of the landlords and despotic gentry. The soviet government opposes any revenge killings and any revengeful activities that may create conflicts among the workers and peasants.

7. The First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress has entrusted the Revolutionary Committee of the Special District with drawing up detailed decrees on the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and bring them into effect.

Four. Resolution on the Miao Nationality

The First Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet Congress of the East Guizhou Special District accepts without any reservation the policy of the Chinese Soviet Republic on minority nationalities declared in article 14 of the Constitution [**Doc. D.7**] and strongly opposes the massacre of the Miao people carried out by GMD warlords Bai Chongxi, Wang Jialian, and Chen Quzhen. Therefore, the Congress decides to spare no effort to help the Miao people in Guizhou, Hunan, and Sichuan gain liberation and freedom. The Congress publicizes and will put into practice the following political program:

- 1. Unite with the Miao people to oppose oppression by the imperialists, the GMD warlords, and the Miao headmen.
- 2. Help the Miao people establish an autonomous region with a soviet system. Recognize that they have the freedom to secede from China and to establish a separate soviet of their own, and that they have their own decisive right to join or secede from Soviet Federal China.
- 3. Help the Miao people to organize the Miao Worker-Peasant Red Army.
- 4. Help the Miao peasants to obtain land of their own. Confiscate all the land of the landlords and despotic gentry and national land (such as government fields) and allocate it to the poor and middle peasants.
- 5. Encourage the Miao people to use their own native language and to develop their own culture.

6. Abolish any taxation.
7. The workers and peasants of the Miao and Han must become united and eliminate any racial prejudice and hatred.
8. The Miao workers and peasants living in the soviet areas shall enjoy all the rights of soviet citizens.

D.13 Some Opinions About Our Current Work. *Luo Ming* (21 January 1933)⁵⁹

Provincial Committee:

(Work in the Shanghang and Longyan area will be reported on separately.)

Under the circumstances that the enemy has launched an attack on the Fujian section of the Central Soviet Area, and in accordance with our general work plan, I think that at present we should pay special attention to the following urgent work:

First of all we should try our best to turn south Lianchen and southeast Changting red as quickly as possible so that Xinquan can be consolidated with Lianchen and Changting. Also, we should link these areas with Ninghua and Qingliu and move in the direction of Yong'an. This is the most urgent task in our plan to consolidate west Fujian and to develop north Fujian. We should seize this great opportunity to carry out the work.

I have mentioned to Comrade [Tan] Zhenlin several times that our military strategy should be planned according to this situation, and our party and government work must also be directed toward this central goal. However, Comrade [Tan] Zhenlin has told me that the Southeast Military Headquarters, the Provincial Party Committee, and the Provincial Soviet Committee still adopt slow-moving tactics. I think these slow-moving tactics will [cause us to] miss a great opportunity. We must put our strength—military and party and government—into this so as to accomplish the task swiftly and rapidly.

MY REASONS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

I) The local enemy forces in these areas are very weak. So far they do not have support from the regular white army, hence it is quite easy to wipe them out. In the battles to eliminate the enemy, we can temper our local forces in the areas of Ting, Lian [chen], and Xinquan (only a small detachment from the regular Red Army is needed to guide them) and improve their combat effectiveness in many small battles. In this way, they will be able to fight against the regular white army soon. Furthermore, with the help of many small victories, the morale of the people in these areas can be raised and their confidence in the revolutionary struggle strengthened. This is in fact of vital importance, and we should take it into consideration in our major battle.

II) The task to develop into and win over these areas is not only our most urgent

work in the Ting-Rui region, but it is also an important tactic to intimidate the enemy, to attack him, and to stop him from moving toward Xinquan and Baisha so that we can win much more time to speed up our mobilization in the areas of Changting, Lianchen, Xinquan, and Shanghang and to bring our fighting capacity into full play. We must intimidate the enemy, and attack him, prevent him from advancing or moving rapidly, and stop him from successfully cooperating internally. In this way, the enemy will be exhausted and expose greater weaknesses; and we can win more time, even one day or one hour.

III) Only at this time can we more effectively mobilize people and consolidate the strong leadership of our party and the government among the people in these new liberated areas.

IV) There were many serious mistakes in our struggle to take over Number Four and Five North Districts and the northwest Longyan area, but the most important one was that we did not carry out our work in time; nor did we strengthen our leadership; we thus missed an opportunity.

Now as we try to win over the south Lianchen and southeast Changting areas, we must learn from our mistakes in Number Four and Five North Districts and the northwest Longyan area, and we must certainly not miss this great opportunity. Of course, I don't mean that this work cannot be done afterward. However, we must understand that now is the most favorable time. If we can make the best use of it, we will achieve more.

Because of our failure in Number Four and Five North Districts and our weakness in the nearby areas (Shanghang's Huajiating and the Zhixi area), the enemy's Ninth Route Army and Fu Pocui's troops will probably attack the Xinquan region soon. If this happens, it will make our work in the south Lianchen and southeast Changting areas even more difficult. With direct support from the regular white army, the local enemy forces, landlords, and rich peasants will become more active and will make trouble for us behind our backs, on our flanks, and from within. Further, because we have not consolidated ourselves in the areas, the war will further affect the lives of the local people and weaken their morale. We must foresee this situation and start to improve our work in these areas right now so that we will not panic when the time comes. By acting in this way, we would not be caught unprepared and would not be at a loss. This is another lesson drawn from our failures at Longyan and Ninghua.

Based on the four points mentioned above, we should mobilize all our forces to accomplish this task.

Second, on centralization and enlarging the Red Army. We should pay attention to the Twelfth Army and quickly create a new main force. We must improve our work in the Eighth and Ninth Divisions, and enlarge and strengthen our political and military leadership there. Hence the two divisions can be expanded to three and become a new main force as capable as the Twelfth Army. This new main force should function actively between west and north Fujian, and it should try to take over Yong'an and defeat Lu Xingbang. If we deploy it in this way, it can cooperate

more effectively with our main force in the north and keep contact with our troops in west Fujian.

I THINK WE MUST PROCEED RAPIDLY IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

The independent Eighth Division can leave one regiment in the Shanghang and Yongding areas to operate with the special battalion (it can be renamed the Seventh Regiment of the Eighth Division). With the cooperation of the two independent regiments in the two counties, and of the Yan-Tai guerrillas, they can launch an offensive against the enemy and move toward Shanghang and Yongding. (The Yongding independent regiment has only one company, but with the local guerrilla troops, it is as strong as a regiment; an independent regiment will soon be formed in Shanghang County and the 200-strong Yan-Tai guerrilla force is almost equal to an independent regiment. In any case, I don't think we should be restrained by regular methods.) Another major task of these troops is to take over the two county towns of Longgang and Shanghang—we should mobilize all our forces in order to accomplish this. Meanwhile, these troops should support the Tenth Division to move toward Wuping and try to link it with Huichan and Xunwu in Jiangxi Province.

The designation of the Eighth Division should be kept in Shanghang and Yongding to avoid any negative influence and panic that might occur among the people there.

Based on a regiment of the present Eighth Division, a newly recruited regiment, and a regiment transferred from the Seventh Division, we can establish a new division. It may be named as a certain division of the Twelfth Army. Since the Twelfth Army has already built up its reputation in west Fujian, it can be rapidly deployed to operate in the Lianchen area. We can also use the Third and Fourth independent regiments and a regiment of the Ninth Division in this operation.

If necessary, the Seventh and Ninth Divisions can be combined for action. I think the headquarters of the military region should immediately move to Nanyang to be together with the political department. Then the headquarters can pay more attention to the military operations from Xinquan and Lianchen toward north Fujian and monitor the work of the Red Army and the local troops. We should make every effort to develop to the north. In this way, we can strengthen our position in west and north Fujian, link the two areas together, and operate actively with our main force in the north to defeat the enemy's offensive from that direction and the attack of the Nineteenth Army toward west Fujian.

It will be a most serious crime if we miss or let such a great opportunity pass by.

Such a strategy won't interfere with the work to consolidate our position in west Fujian. On the contrary, only in this way can our position in west Fujian be strengthened and can Yongding avoid being isolated.

A military subcommand can be established to guide the struggle in Shanghang and Yongding.

I have mentioned the above ideas to Tan Zhenlin several times, but he has not yet found an opportunity to put them into action properly and quickly.

When recruiting soldiers for the Red Army, we should focus our attention on

Changting and must not let the opportunity slip by. Since Changting is now in the war zone, it will be easier for us to carry out political mobilization and to break up the illusions of peace and pleasure among the ordinary party members. At the same time, it will not create a state of panic. This is a great opportunity for mobilization.

The situation in Shanghang is quite different. It is difficult to recruit men into the Red Army, though we should make more effort at mobilization.

I do hope the provincial committee will provide us with more assistance in Changting for this most important and urgent task!

We will send more of the best recruiters from Shanghang to Changting to help with the work there. How effective are the five men we sent?

Regarding other counties such as Yongding, Wuping, and even Shanghang, I think that during the enemy's current offensive, we should, first of all, make use of this opportunity to expand local forces—independent divisions, independent regiments, and other troops—and to find a way to launch an immediate counterattack. We can raise the fighting spirit of the local forces and the ordinary people and recruit soldiers into the main force of the Red Army through urgent mobilization in these areas. This sort of mobilization can easily be accepted by the local people. It can also make it possible to transfer, in a fairly organized way, large parts into the main force of the Red Army from the various local forces: independent regiments, independent divisions, model militia battalions, or model Young Pioneer teams. (There were such examples in the past. Transfer by mobilization does not mean reorganization or establishing new units.) This is to take care of the morale of the local people under the conditions of the present struggle. It is by no means a surrender to localism.

While enlarging the local forces, we must link the work with recruitment for the main force of the Red Army. We should take this point into consideration in our propaganda and organizational work.

I have written two letters on how to recruit soldiers into the Red Army, so I will not repeat this here.

Third, concerning the problem of the local forces: I believe our most important and urgent work at present is to organize a hard core combat unit, commit it to battle, and temper it through fighting.

The local forces in the border areas should push forward into the enemy areas and take the offensive against the local white troops. Meanwhile, they should avoid confrontation by the regular white army. They can adopt guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare and heighten their combat effectiveness via small battles. Battles and victories will raise their courage and morale and provide them with fighting experience.

It is absolutely wrong to disperse the troops for defense. However, it is also wrong to overestimate the strength of the local forces and ask them to launch a frontal attack on the regular white army. Local party and government leaders must direct the forces carefully. Concerning the interior local forces, we had better transfer them to the border areas for fighting and send them into battle frequently, backed by the troops with more combat experience.

According to the instructions of the central government, it is necessary to intensify the military training of our troops and strengthen party leadership, paying special attention to class, political, and military status.

At the same time, we should bear in mind:

Fighting a successful small battle is better than conducting ten days of training at the barracks or three maneuvers.

Organizing one militia company of excellent combat effectiveness is better than having three or five average militia companies.

In the past, many model militia battalions and companies were organized at Shanghang and they engaged in some small fights. However, they have collapsed completely during the present major battle because they lack a hard core composed of an experienced combat unit to lead and back them.

We must understand that it is an important job to speed up the development of the local forces so that they can effectively cooperate with the main force of the Red Army and help promote the revolutionary struggle of the people and encourage their morale. For example, the two big victories we won in Jiangxi are certainly a great encouragement to the people here. However, if our local forces always lose battles and the local people are often devastated by the enemy, it will be difficult to arouse the fighting will of the masses. This is the truth.

Fourth, concerning work at county and district level: I think it is of vital importance for us to set up key counties and key districts and let them exercise leadership over the work of nearby counties and districts.

Meanwhile, when we issue instructions to various counties and districts, we should analyze the circumstances there and assign work in accordance with the fighting capacity and will of the people there, and the strength of the local party organizations.

In the past, the method of leadership of the party and government was very rigid and mechanical. It is not good to adopt a general work-style of leadership or a general plan for different counties and districts. One of the reasons we have failed to make steady progress in the enemy areas is that we have overlooked the specific circumstances of the border and the new liberated counties and districts.

We used to assign the same task to different border and new liberated counties and districts and ask people there to discuss the same plan both at the top and at the grass-roots levels, i.e., recruitment for the Red Army, the quotas for each district. The other problem is that the method of political mobilization is oversimplified. Such a method of mobilization cannot help us realize our purpose; on the contrary, it will damage our work.

In the past, the provincial committee assigned inflexible recruitment quotas for the Red Army to Yongding County. This is not correct.

I think that in most border districts and villages in Yongding as well as in Shanghang, the key point at present is to build up powerful guerrilla forces and militia units and expand in the direction of the enemy areas. Our local forces there should take the initiative to launch offensives against the enemy and conduct guer-

rilla warfare in enemy areas to break up the enemy's attacks. They must try continuously to win battles and use victories to raise the fighting will of the masses. Only in this way can we help people there gain confidence in the strength of our local forces and no longer rely entirely on the protection of the main force of the Red Army.

"The local forces of the upper and lower Xi'nán districts in Yongding have made persistent efforts to conduct guerrilla warfare. They have operated actively in coordination with our overall development and in cooperation with the actions of the main force of the Red Army. Thus, they have in fact made a larger contribution than merely sending 300 men to the Red Army at the front." Recently, our work at Yongding and Shanghang has developed somewhat.

If we can adopt such a method of leadership in all locations, we will be able to make more progress, improve the circumstances, and recruit more men for the Red Army.

Recently in Shanghang and Yongding we have relied on this kind of leadership to change the situation and to mobilize the people. So far we have been very successful.

D.14 Decision of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area Regarding the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Committee (15 February 1933)⁶⁰

Following the Central Bureau's investigation of the work of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, it came to the conclusion that the Provincial Party Committee is in a very grave condition. Within the Provincial Party Committee, a small group of comrades, under the leadership of Comrade Luo Ming, is clearly following the path of opportunism. This group's appraisal of the present revolutionary situation is pessimistic and defeatist. They cower in the face of enemy attack. They believe that mass struggle in the Hangyongyan Soviet Area is in a state of decline. The masses are becoming indifferent; they regard soviet power and GMD power equally. The falsified election of the Guangdong Army and Nineteenth Route Army has already affected the masses. All our mass mobilization political work seems destined to fail. Therefore, Luo Ming's faction advocates that we abandon this soviet base area and retreat to the rear lines. This faction is even openly advocating the abolition of the party and the revolutionary unity of the masses. (An obvious example is the letter to the Provincial Party Committee from Yang Wenzhong [Ming] of Xinquan County's Party Committee.)

Although Luo Ming's faction has encountered resistance and criticism from the faction led by the temporary party secretary, Comrade Liu Xiao, the struggle against their opportunism has not yet been completed. The opposition is confined to the Provincial Party Committee and is restricted to opposition centered around particular issues. The majority of the comrades in the Provincial Party Committee do not fully understand the gravity of this problem and have not resolutely come over to

the side of the Party Center and the Central Bureau. They are not willing to struggle to the end against this opportunist tendency. The majority of comrades in the Provincial Party Committee have revealed their own unstable and opportunist irresolution in the face of this struggle. As a result, they have also committed many grievous opportunist errors in their practical work. Therefore, the Party Center has resolved: (1) To commence immediately a struggle within the party against the opportunism represented by Comrade Luo Ming and to point out the most obvious expression of this opportunism: the nihilism of Comrade Yang Ming of the Xinquan County Party Committee. (2) The liberal attitude of the Provincial Party Committee toward this corrupt opportunism must be vehemently attacked. We must expose the fact that this liberal attitude and this irresolute struggle are in reality a form of compromise with, and surrender to, Comrade Luo Ming's opportunism. (3) We must immediately convene an unscheduled provincial party congress, doing our best to include the workers and peasants from local party organizations in order to establish a new Provincial Party Committee. (4) Before the unscheduled party congress is convened, we will allow Chen Shouchang, Liu Shao, Zhong Youxun, and other comrades, in their role as an *ad hoc* standing committee, to deal with all matters. (5) We will send representatives from the Central Bureau to attend this meeting, report on it, and see to it that the meeting is smoothly carried out. (6) We will immediately withdraw Luo Ming from the positions of temporary provincial party secretary and representative of Hangyongyan. (7) We will announce this decision and explain it at all party meetings and in all party newspapers.

D.15 Order of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on Land Investigation (1 June 1933)⁶¹

At present in all soviet areas and particularly in the Central Soviet Area, there are still large regions where the land question has not been thoroughly solved. Such regions account for almost 80 percent of the territory in the Central Soviet Area, with a population of over two million. For example, in the following places the land problem has not been thoroughly solved: all the fifteen counties of Ruijin (except Wuyang District), Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, Lingdu (except Xinpo District), Le'an, Yihuang, Guangchang, Shicheng, Jianning, Lichuan, Ninghua, Changting, and Wuping, most parts of Bosheng, Shengli, and Yongfeng, some parts of Gonglüe, Wantai, Shanghang, Yongding, and Xinquan, and two districts, Juncun and Huangtang, in Xingguo County. The peasant masses in these places have yet to be extensively mobilized. The remnants of the feudal forces have not been completely overcome. Inside the soviet governments, the mass organizations, and local armed forces there are many class traitors operating under cover. There are also many secret counterrevolutionary organizations operating in various areas and sabotaging

the revolution. For these reasons, mobilization for war and cultural and economic development all lag behind the advanced areas (which are: almost the entire county of Xingguo; parts of Shengli, Gan, Wantai, Gonglüe, Yongfeng, and Shanhan Counties; the Huangpo and Anfu Districts of Bosheng, the Wuyang District in Ruijin, the Nanxi District in Yongding, etc.). In this huge area, the soviet government's immediate task is to carry out a universal movement to investigate land, develop a high level of class struggle among the over two million masses, and launch the final attack against the feudal forces to annihilate them completely. As for the concrete agenda for the land investigation movement, the people's council has made the following special decisions:

1) The chair of [soviet] governments at all levels must devote the greatest amount of attention to leading the entire land investigation movement.

2) Mandate the land departments, workers and peasants' investigation departments, departments of arbitration, and the state political security bureaus and their special emissaries to devote all their energies to leading the land investigation movement, thoroughly solving the land problem, reforming the local soviets, and eradicating the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside. The Central People's Commissariat's departments of Land, Workers and Peasants' Investigation, Justice, and the State Political Security Bureau should do their best to direct their subordinate agencies to fulfill these tasks.

3) Mandate the Central People's Commissariat's Treasury Department to direct financial departments at all levels to attack the feudal and semifeudal forces through imposing fines on landlords and levies on rich peasants. At the same time, they are to increase state revenues. Mandate the Central People's Commissariat's Military Affairs Department to direct military departments at all levels to consolidate and expand the local militia and urge the masses to join the Red Army in the course of the land investigation movement. Mandate the Central People's Commissariat's Department of the National Economy to direct departments of national economy at all levels to work on the recovery and development of production in agriculture and handicrafts, the development of cooperatives, and the adjustment of production inputs and consumption goods during the expansion of the land investigation movement. Mandate the Central People's Commissariat's Education Department to direct education departments at all levels to launch the land investigation movement and to provide all kinds of simple and popular textbooks and pamphlets for all cadres and masses involved in land investigation. We should follow the development of the land investigation movement to improve the cultural education of the masses.

4) Provincial and county governments should transfer cadres from all areas where the land investigation movement is advanced or relatively advanced to open short-term training courses on the land investigation movement. The county soviet should call a monthly meeting of the leading comrades from individual districts. Every ten days, the district soviet must call a meeting of chairs of township soviets and heads of poor peasant leagues to review the process of land investigation.

5) We should first call meetings of the principal leading comrades above the

district level in the eight counties of Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, Yudu, Shengli, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting, as well as a congress of delegates from poor peasant leagues in the eight counties. These meetings are to be convened at the central government so as to launch the land investigation movement in the eight counties.

6) In the land investigation movement, we must resolutely adhere to the class line. We should take the working class in the countryside as the leaders, rely on the poor peasants, firmly ally with the middle peasants, and resolutely attack the feudal and semifeudal forces. Weed out all landlords and rich peasants who falsely call themselves "middle peasants" or "poor peasants." Confiscate all the land and properties of the landlord class; confiscate the land of the rich peasants and surplus draft cattle, farm tools, and houses. These should be distributed to the workers, poor peasants, and middle peasants who were given insufficient or no land in the past. The rich peasants are to be given poor-quality land for them to toil on. . . .

7) In the land investigation movement, we must emphasize sufficiently mobilizing the majority of the masses to fight against the remnants of the feudal forces. First, following extensive propaganda and agitation, we must investigate the class background of all landlords and rich peasants. Then, the confiscation of the land and assets of these people based on their class background should have the support and participation of as many people as possible. The confiscated assets, with the exception of cash, should be distributed in their entirety to the poorest peasants. We should pay special attention to distributing these assets to the families of soldiers in the Red Army, as well as to distributing a larger portion to the masses from the villages where such assets are first reported.

8) The poor peasant leagues are extremely important mass organizations in the land investigation movement. The district and township soviets should do their best to direct the poor peasant leagues, purge the bad elements among them, and attract more active elements to join them. The workers' groups inside them should be the active leaders of the poor peasant leagues.

9) In the land investigation movement, we should concentrate our energy on all backward, and particularly the most backward, districts, townships, and villages.

We should pay attention to carrying out the land investigation movement in the backward districts and townships, and particularly in large villages. We must mobilize the poor masses in these villages to rise up and fight the landlords and rich peasants in their own villages. We must consciously avoid causing conflicts among clans and all wrong actions.

10) In the land investigation movement, we must eradicate all counterrevolutionary organizations and activities and prevent and expose the rumors and sabotage by landlords and rich peasants.

11) In the land investigation movement, we must reform the local soviets, purge all the traitors of our class and other bad elements from them, and recruit large numbers of revolutionary activists into the soviets.

12) In the soviets at all levels, anybody who directly or indirectly obstructs the land investigation movement must receive severe or extreme punishment. Only by

firmly implementing the above decisions can we expand and deepen the class struggle in the countryside, arouse the initiative of the largest majority of the masses, thoroughly exterminate all the feudal and semifeudal forces in the countryside, and complete the land investigation movement.

From:

Chairman: Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen: Xiang Ying, Zhang Guotao

D.16 Preliminary Agreement on Opposing Japan and Chiang Kai-shek (26 October 1933)⁶²

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Worker-Peasant Red Army, on the one hand, and the provincial government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army, on the other, in order to save the Chinese nation from extinction, to resist the imperialist intrigues to colonize China, and to put into practice what the soviet government and the Red Army have repeatedly asserted in their statements, are prepared to enter into a military alliance against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, a preliminary agreement has been formulated containing the following provisions:

a) Both sides shall immediately stop all military operations and draw up a provisional demarcation line (see the attached document [not included]) along which neither side is permitted to deploy its main forces. In the meantime, the Nineteenth Route Army must use all possible means within its power to expel or annihilate any forces blocking the implementation of this agreement that exist in the border areas between Fujian Province and the soviet areas.

b) Commercial trade, both import and export, is to be reopened according to the principle of mutual help and cooperation.

c) The Fujian provincial government and the Nineteenth Route Army shall release all political offenders now confined in Fujian's various prisons.

d) The provincial government and the Nineteenth Route Army shall approve all activities of revolutionary organizations (such as mass organizations for resisting Japan and opposing imperialism and all armed forces of the revolutionary people) within its boundaries and allow the freedom of press, speech, association, assembly, and strike.

e) After the conclusion of the preliminary agreement, the provincial government and the Nineteenth Route Army shall issue an anti-Chiang statement with the principles of the agreement and immediately make preparations for military operations against Japan and Chiang.

f) After the conclusion of the preliminary agreement, resident plenipotentiaries shall be exchanged; it is the responsibility of the governments to protect the safety of the plenipotentiaries and other personages.

g) When visits are necessary, the plenipotentiaries may request passports, and the governments shall be responsible for the safety of the visitors.

h) The negotiations involved in concluding the agreement are to be kept strictly secret before the Fujian provincial government and the Nineteenth Route Army have completed their battle dispositions against Japan and Chiang. Approval by both sides is required for the announcement of the agreement.

i) On fulfillment of the above conditions, and at the earliest possible date, the two sides should conclude another detailed military treaty for opposing Japan and Chiang.

j) A commercial treaty governing bilateral trade relations should be concluded on the basis of mutual help and mutual benefit.

k) This agreement becomes effective as soon as the plenipotentiaries from both sides have signed it. The two copies of the official agreement will be kept separately in the files of both sides after the officially responsible personages of both governments and military organs have signed and put their seals on it.

The Plenipotentiary of the Provisional Central Government and
the Worker-Peasant Red Army
Pan Jianxing [Hannian]

The Plenipotentiary of the Fujian Provincial Government
and the Nineteenth Route Army
Xu Minghai⁶³ [Hongming]

D.17 Statement of the CCP CC to the People of the Whole Nation on the Fujian Incident (5 December 1933)⁶⁴

People of the Nation:

Since the "September 18" Incident [1931. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria], the GMD's anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist mask has been completely shattered by ironclad facts. The GMD has become most openly the lackey of the Japanese and all imperialists and the prime mover for the partition of China. Most of the people in China have realized, from their own bitter experiences, that only by overthrowing the GMD can they organize, arm themselves, directly fight the Japanese and all imperialists who are plundering China, completely overthrow imperialist rule in China, secure the independence and unification of China, and seek the fundamental liberation of the Chinese people. At the same time, the great victories in the struggle against the imperialists and the GMD won by the Soviet Republic and the Red Army have shown the people of China that only the Soviet Republic, which resolutely fights the imperialists and the GMD, can finally liberate China from under the iron heel of the imperialists. Therefore, the revolutionary struggles

waged by the majority of the masses against the imperialists and the GMD have expanded further. Their sympathy and support for the Soviet Republic and the Red Army has also greatly increased. They demand a revolutionary solution to the political and economic crisis in China!

Under these circumstances, when the revolutionary situation is becoming increasingly critical, it is indeed no surprise that among the rulers of the counterrevolutionary GMD there is further demoralization and collapse. Some GMD leaders in Fujian, because of the GMD's fundamental bankruptcy and the revolutionization of the masses, have finally thrown away the carcass of the GMD, created their own people's party for production, reformed their former GMD government into a people's revolutionary government, and put forward their new proposals and political programs. Undoubtedly, this is the most concrete manifestation of, and most important key in, the further demoralization and collapse within the GMD!

However, it is almost a month since the establishment of the people's revolutionary government [20 November 1933]. Beyond verbally opposing the imperialists, warlords, bureaucrats, local despots, and the gentry and landlords, it has not done anything concrete or genuine to oppose them. It has declared that people have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, belief, demonstration, and strike. Yet, at the same time, it also announced temporary emergency rule and a curfew to deprive the people of all the rights they had been granted verbally. Its political program states that manual and mental laborers will receive the greatest protection, but it has taken no measures to improve the lives of workers and the working people. Its "distribution of land on a per capita basis" is, in fact, designed to discourage the peasantry from launching its own struggle to confiscate all the land of the landlord class. Yet, it has not changed at all the harsh levies and numerous taxes which the peasants cannot presently endure, or the situation of oppression and misery. Even in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek it has uttered only empty talk without any concrete plans or actions. Its "people's volunteers" are simply the armed forces of the landlords (the civil police bureau) under a different name. It has not begun the work of really arming the people. The one-month existence of the people's revolutionary government has proved, in fact, that this government is not yet a people's government, or a revolutionary government.

The CCP and the Chinese people will never believe any of the revolutionary words or proclamations or pleasant-sounding phrases. Only concrete revolutionary actions will prove whether a government is revolutionary. The Fujian people's revolutionary government must not stop where it is now but should act to prove that it has truly given the people the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, belief, demonstration, and strike, and should take genuine emergency measures to improve the lives of workers, peasants, and poor people. Furthermore, it should genuinely prepare to concentrate all military forces and arm large numbers of workers and peasants to fight the war against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. If it acts no differently from the counterrevolutionary government of the GMD, then all its actions will amount to no more than old wine in new bottles, used by the GMD counterrevolu-

tionary leaders and politicians who want to deceive the people. Their objective is not to overthrow the rule of the imperialists and the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie, but rather to maintain this rule and obstruct the people of China in their process of revolutionization and their advance toward the goal of a soviet republic!

The CCP always maintains that only the people's own independent revolutionary actions are capable of overthrowing the Japanese and all other imperialists and all counterrevolutionary GMD governments. The hope and expectation that the revolutionary struggle of the people can be replaced by a "revolution" from above will certainly result in a massive disappointment!

The CCP calls on the majority of the workers, peasants, and poor working people to organize themselves independently, form their own revolutionary labor unions for the workers, peasant committees and associations, and anti-Japanese associations. This will attract the participation of the majority of the workers, peasants, revolutionary students, and intellectuals. They should organize an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek people's revolutionary army, armies of heroes, and all kinds of people's special forces.

The CCP calls on the people of Fujian to demand that the people's revolutionary government distribute weapons at once and arm them. They should ally with the revolutionary soldiers to fight a decisive battle with Chiang Kai-shek's troops who are attacking Fujian and the Japanese armed forces and other imperialists who are preparing a military intervention in Fujian. The people of Fujian must rely on their own strength to take back the Japanese settlement and the customs duties they control, declare the annulment of all the unequal treaties with Japan, launch a boycott movement of Japanese goods, confiscate the companies and assets of Japanese imperialist capitalists, and immediately expel the Japanese navy, army, and air force from Fujian. The people of Fujian must arrest all traitors immediately, crush their counterrevolutionary activities, and confiscate all their property in order to replenish the military funds used in the war against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek and distribute them to poor people. At the same time, workers must use strikes to oppose the cruel exploitation by capitalists and fight for an eight-hour workday and pay raises. Peasants must resist rents and taxes, disarm the landlords' militia to arm themselves, improve their own livelihood, confiscate all the land of the landlord class, and carry out a thorough land revolution. [The people of Fujian] must demand that the people's revolutionary government take emergency measures to provide relief to the unemployed workers and poor people in the cities and countryside and improve the living conditions and benefits of soldiers. In addition, the people of Fujian must demand that the people's revolutionary government respond to the repeated declarations and calls by the soviet government and the Red Army for opposing Japan, the imperialists, and the GMD. They must demand that the government stop attacking the Chinese soviet government and the Red Army, which totally oppose the imperialists and the GMD, that the people's revolutionary government ally with the soviet government and the Red Army to fight the common enemy of the Chinese people—the Japanese and all imperialists, and their lackeys—the Chinese GMD.

The primary target should be the Nanjing GMD government headed by Chiang Kai-shek. The people of Fujian and the people of the nation will see, in this struggle, how revolutionary this people's revolutionary government is, or whether it is a deceptive trick of the counterrevolutionaries!

The CCP declares to the people of China: there are only two roads in front of the Chinese people—either the road to colonization taken by the imperialists and the GMD or the road of resolute struggle against the imperialists and the GMD leading to the liberation of the Chinese nation. Only the victory of the popular revolution by the workers, peasants, soldiers, and the poor working people can safeguard the victory of the Chinese national liberation. There is no middle course. All those who want to seek a third course between revolution and counterrevolution are bound to face a cruel and sad defeat and become accessories to the counterrevolutionaries in their attacks on the revolution!

All people who oppose the imperialists and the GMD, unite!

People arm themselves independently; Down with the Japanese and all imperialists!

Down with the Nanjing GMD government and all GMD governments that have betrayed and humiliated our country!

Expose all the conspiracies and arbitrary propaganda designed to deceive the people!

Long live the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation!

CCP CC

D.18 Resolution on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (16 January 1934)⁶⁵

1) The Twelfth Plenum of the Comintern in its "Analysis on the Current International Situation" points out that the "relative stability of capitalism is beginning to end, but a direct revolutionary situation does not exist in most important and decisive capitalist states. The current situation represents a new stage moving toward great conflicts between classes and states, namely a transition toward a new period of revolutions and wars."⁶⁶

The Fifth Plenum accepts unreservedly this fundamental and historical viewpoint of the Comintern. It calls on the whole party to carry out thoroughly the party's current great tasks and responsibilities deriving from this conclusion with the determination characteristic of a Bolshevik party. Developments over the past year have proved the correctness of the Twelfth Plenum's decisions. The overall situation that has unfolded since the plenum displays obvious features of a transition toward new wars and revolutions.

Socialist construction in the Soviet Union is advancing rapidly, fulfilling the

industrialization and collectivization plans and carrying out a cultural revolution. It is moving rapidly toward a classless socialist society. The success of the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan has not only established greater economic independence of the socialist economy, but also tremendously enhanced defense, thus making the Soviet Union an invincible force. The international significance of the Soviet Union and its influence on the working and suffering people of the world have been increasing daily. These have aroused the hatred and jealousy of the imperialist powers who are engaging in various conspiracies, provocations, and military preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. Japanese imperialism is particularly frenzied in its preparation for a military adventure against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the success of Soviet socialist construction, the strengthening of its defense capability, and its thoroughly peaceful policies have forced many imperialist countries to yield to Soviet peace policies and sign agreements of nonaggression and restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The development of the economic crisis accelerates the further collapse of the capitalist system and shows obvious signs of the approaching wars. The methods used by the capitalists in various countries to overcome the economic crisis are the same as those employed to prepare for new wars.

[[The imperialists are trying to moderate their conflicts in order to launch an anti-Soviet war first. Yet, the development of the revolutionary movements and the bankruptcy of the Second International demonstrate that the transition toward a new stage of revolutions and wars is accelerating rapidly.

2) The Twelfth Plenum's conclusion that a revolutionary situation exists in China is entirely correct. The imperialists are carving up China directly. The Japanese rule northeast China and are preparing with the help of their GMD lackeys to occupy all of China north of the Yellow River. They are strengthening their positions along the Yangtze River and in Fujian. The British have attacked Sichuan and Qinghai and operate through their puppets in Tibet. The French are using Vietnam to try to control Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. The United States is preparing to compete with the Japanese in the Pacific. The League of Nations has actively participated in the division of China and in preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. Despite their divisions, all the imperialists support the GMD in its attacks on the Chinese Soviet regime.

3) The Chinese economy presents a sad picture of collapse, bankruptcy, unemployment, and hunger. This derives from GMD rule and is exacerbated by the Japanese imperialist bandits. The rural economy is totally destroyed, and the vast majority of peasants are hungry. National industry is also in a state of collapse with virtually all heavy industry seized by the imperialists. Over 60 percent of the workers are unemployed and receive no relief. Domestic commerce is stagnant.

4) The flames of the revolutionary struggle are blazing across the entire country. The workers are rallying around the CCP, and there have been strikes on an unprecedented scale. The deep political nature of the anti-imperialist strikes has revealed more clearly the leading role of the working class in the anti-imperialist movement.

Peasant struggles against taxation, etc., often led to armed uprisings and the establishment of guerrilla forces. The Chinese revolutionary crisis has reached a new acute stage, and a direct revolutionary situation exists.]]

5) The best sign of the existence of a revolutionary situation is the expansion of the soviet movement, its victories and successes, and its forces growing stronger and more determined every day. The soviet movement has become a forceful pillar of the Chinese revolution, a center around which the mass struggle in all GMD regions develops. It makes the Chinese revolution a vanguard force for the mass revolution in all colonial and semicolonial countries.

The workers and peasants in the soviet regions have overthrown the rule of the imperialists, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie; set up their own soviet government; obtained land, jobs, and freedom; and genuinely improved and raised the standards of economic and cultural life. Their whole strength and enthusiasm are thrown into building a new state of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants and into the sacred revolutionary war to protect the soviet territories. Since its creation, the great, invincible, and ironlike Red Army has smashed four major offensives organized by the imperialists and the GMD. It has not only protected the existing soviet areas but also has expanded the map of soviet areas by establishing the large Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Region in northwest China. The soviet movement, supported by millions of working people throughout China, is an indomitable force. The experience of success and failure of the working people under the leadership of the proletariat in the soviet regions demonstrates to the masses of the whole country that only with the victory of the anti-imperialist rural revolution, the fall of GMD rule, and the establishment of a soviet regime can China be liberated, united, and freed from the colonial enslavement of the imperialists and from the inhuman fascist terror of exploitation, oppression, starvation, and unemployment.

In the present situation, there exist two absolutely opposite regimes and two extremely different worlds engaged in a life-or-death struggle. A critical issue confronting China and the Chinese working people is whether to become a colony of slaves to imperialism via the instrument of the GMD or to win the victory of the anti-imperialist rural revolution and set up a soviet regime throughout the land.

After repeated defeats, the imperialist-controlled GMD is mobilizing all available forces to launch desperate attacks against the central soviet areas. The attacks have lasted for several months. The heroic and skillful fighting of the Red Army of workers and peasants with the support of tens of millions of working people in all the soviet areas and the GMD-occupied areas and the development of internal contradictions within the ruling class have frustrated Chiang Kai-shek's original five "encirclements" plan. However, the five "encirclements" have not ended. Chiang Kai-shek's change of operational plans is only aimed at a speedy passage through Fujian to invade the main sector of the soviet from the east, and to continue the five "encirclements." Therefore, the decisive battle lies ahead. Every worker, peasant, red soldier, and revolutionary should be prepared, at this critical juncture, to join this decisive battle and achieve its victory. This victory, in the form of an

initial victory of the soviet revolution in one or more provinces, will lay a solid foundation for the triumph of the soviet revolution throughout China.

6) The worsening of the national crisis, the success and victory of the soviet movement, and the evolution of the revolutionary situation testify most visibly to the bankruptcy of the reactionary rule of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The GMD has most shamelessly surrendered to the imperialists, betrayed China, and paved the way for the imperialist invasion of China. Chiang Kai-shek openly declares that "whoever expresses anti-Japanese sentiments will be executed at once without mercy." This declaration reveals most clearly the total submission of the GMD government to the Japanese imperialists. In both theory and practice, the GMD has become the spokesperson of Japanese imperialism. It suppresses the Chinese people's boycott movement and all other anti-imperialist actions. It has prosecuted the volunteer army and confiscated its weapons. It relies on imperialist assistance to launch its large-scale offensives against the soviet areas. It uses white terror to murder and torture Chinese workers and peasants. To prolong its exploitation, it has exacerbated the suffering and hunger of tens of millions of people. It has signed the Tangu Agreement with the Japanese imperialists, effectively handing over all the Chinese territories north of the Yellow River to the Japanese imperialists.⁶⁷ It has shamelessly made direct representations to Japan, further betraying China and encouraging the greediness of other imperialist powers.

The GMD Guangdong faction's opposition to the Nanjing government and its anti-Japanese propaganda are efforts to whitewash itself in order to deceive the masses and win their support, thus maintaining its bankrupt rule. The anti-Japanese propaganda of the Guangdong faction is a reflection of the growing opposition between British and Japanese imperialism. The result is that the Guangdong faction is displaying all manner of despicable ingratiating behavior toward the British imperialists. At the same time, the Guangdong faction is negotiating loans with the Japanese imperialists, promoting the dumping of Japanese products, and importing Japanese goods through Canton to China's interior.

The north China warlords and Huang Ru, the Nanjing government-appointed chair of the Administrative Reorganization Committee of Beijing, are all representatives of the Japanese imperialists. They are in no way different from the "Manchurian" traitors. They are prepared to set up a Japanese puppet regime openly and to serve loyally as an instrument for Japan. The time will come when the Japanese imperialists believe that they do not need to worry about the other imperialists' interests in the north.

The provincial governments of Yunnan and Guizhou are under the complete control of French imperialists, and the provincial governments of Guangdong and Sichuan are increasingly ruled by the British imperialists. This picture shows the extent of the GMD and the feudal warlords' betrayal of China to the foreign imperialists.

The Nineteenth Route Army [in Fujian] has openly raised the banner of independence, abandoned the cover of the GMD, established a so-called people's revolu-

tionary government, and engaged in some “leftist” empty talk and propaganda. This indicates the deepening of disputes within and disintegration of the GMD. The one-month existence of the “people’s revolutionary government” shows that all its empty slogans and revolutionary words amount to nothing more than a trick played by some former GMD leaders and politicians to deceive the masses. They do not intend to overthrow the rule of the imperialists, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie, but to maintain this rule and to prevent and obstruct the Chinese people’s triumphant struggle against imperialism and for national liberation and its march along the soviet road.

The national crisis, the economic crisis caused by the GMD, and the revolutionary struggle of the masses have shocked the landlord and bourgeois rulers and sharply intensified their internal contradictions and disintegration. All these contradictions and conflicts reflect the fact that international imperialists are using various warlord groups for their own interests to open the way for aggression against, and the division of, China. The internal disputes and conflicts of the ruling class, increasing financial difficulties, and the bankruptcy of reactionary propaganda and deception are all accelerating the weakening and decline of the reactionary political and military rule. The attempt by Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters at fascist dictatorship does not prove that GMD rule is strong. On the contrary, it shows the bankruptcy of GMD rule and the strengthening of the revolutionary forces. Further, it shows the need for dictatorship by one man to concentrate all reactionary forces to suppress the revolution. The Fujian Incident displays that old-style GMD rule cannot possibly continue. Thus some warlords and politicians want to entice the masses by destroying the GMD flag, so as to maintain the regime of landlords and the bourgeoisie. The short existence of the so-called people’s revolutionary government and its miserable collapse fully demonstrate that there are two roads before the Chinese people: the colonial road of the imperialists and the GMD, and the triumphant soviet road of opposing imperialism and engaging in the rural revolution. There is no middle road. Under such circumstances, the party, while mobilizing the broad masses of working people to smash the five “encirclements,” overthrow the rule of the imperialists and the GMD, and win a national victory for the soviet regime, must, “with great caution, care, and speed, take advantage of every possible (even the smallest) difference among the enemy and . . . every conflict of interest among the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and use every possible (even the smallest) opportunity to gain allies of the masses, despite the fact that the alliance may be temporary, shaky, uncertain, unreliable, and conditional” (Lenin). Meanwhile, fire should be concentrated on all reactionary reformist factions (i.e., the Social Democratic Party, the A.B. League, the Production Party,⁶⁸ etc.). All these factions now claim that there is a middle road between the colonial and the soviet. In fact, however, they are trying to salvage reactionary rule and to produce a smoke screen for the scramble for China by the imperialist bandits.

7) Developments over the three years since the Fourth Plenum [January 1931] and the great achievements of the mass struggles led by the party demonstrate more

clearly the great significance of the Fourth Plenum in the history of the CCP. With the Comintern's help and on the basis of a resolute two-line struggle, the Fourth Plenum has defeated the semi-Trotskyite line led by Comrade Lisan to oppose Marxism and Leninism and has severely criticized the hypocritical and double-dealing attitude of some Politburo comrades toward the Comintern line. It has also dealt a severe blow to the right-wing liquidationists who try to take advantage of some worker cadres' discontent with Lisanism and reconciliationism to wage struggles inside the party. The two-line struggle, the streamlining of the party's leading organs, and the corrections of the political line have laid the foundation for the complete transformation of the party's internal work and guaranteed the party's Bolshevik unity and firmness in both ideology and action. The Fourth Plenum made great progress in the Bolshevikization of the party.

Since the Fourth Plenum, the Politburo has, under arduous conditions, faithfully carried out the line of the Comintern and the Fourth Plenum, resolutely opposed all opportunist tendencies and vacillations, and smashed various types of opportunism (i.e., the opportunism in the workers' movement, the argument about backwardness in the north, the Luo Ming line in the soviet regions, etc.). In practical work, the thorough transformation of the party's entire work has begun and has achieved many important successes and victories.

The Fifth Plenum makes clear that the party's major achievements during this period are the firm foundation of the soviet bases: the improvement in the quality and quantity of the Red Army of workers and peasants, the soviet Central Government has been established and is increasing in influence and reputation, reactionary schemes have been dashed and repeated and wanton attacks against the soviet areas by the imperialists and the GMD have been smashed. The party's political and organizational work in the soviet areas has improved greatly. The issue of rural revolution is thoroughly settled in the main region of the soviet areas. This has consolidated significantly the alliance between the workers and peasants. The revolutionary initiative and creativeness of the broad masses have increased. They are actively participating in the struggle to protect the soviet areas, joining the Red Army, organizing guerrilla forces, and guaranteeing provisions and supplies to the Red Army. Great economic constructions and cultural revolution are under way. The establishment of the soviet representative system has fostered closer ties between the soviet regime and the masses and has attracted more and more masses to participate in the construction of the country.

Serious shortcomings in the party's work in the soviet regions are clearly evident. There are special weaknesses in the border and new regions: the extremely inadequate development of guerrilla warfare, the weak work in the GMD-ruled areas surrounding the soviet areas; the existence of arbitrary command in work; the intolerably inadequate trade union work in many regions, and particularly in Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Shaanxi.

In the areas ruled by the imperialists and the GMD, the extremely difficult conditions caused by the white terror have forced CP work underground. Despite

this, the party is still growing and strengthening its influence. The party has achieved some success and progress in many provinces. Fearless of all difficulties and the terror, the party tried hard to launch and seek leadership over the anti-Japanese and imperialist movements, to organize and win over anti-Japanese volunteer army soldiers, and to unite them under a thoroughly revolutionary political program. The party works hard to strengthen its preparation of and leadership over strike movements. In many provinces, the party has strengthened its leadership over peasant movements, tried hard to increase peasant initiative and consciousness in the struggle, developed revolutionary guerrilla warfare, and created new Red Army units and soviet bases in the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region. The Fifth Plenum emphasizes that the party's work in the white areas is too weak; the party's work in many key industrial cities especially is in a serious situation. The party's biggest weakness is the extremely inadequate trade union work. Incorrect assessment and neglect of trade union work and the lack of preparation and leadership of strikes have resulted in some important sections of the working class still coming under the sway of the leaders of GMD yellow trade unions. The links between the party and factories are very weak, and the red trade unions have failed to become genuine unions of the broad masses. The work of forming a united front at the grass roots in the anti-imperialist movement has yet to show the necessary success. Therefore, proletarian leadership in the anti-imperialist movement has not been strengthened. In the countryside, there is a lack of planned and consistent work and the existence of insufficiently serious guerrilla warfare. A thorough rural revolution cannot be speedily carried out even in many areas where conditions are ripe. Therefore, our guerrilla troops have suffered defeats. The work of spreading discontent among the white soldiers is still far from adequate. The consolidation of party organization lags far behind its growing political influence. These serious weaknesses must be overcome immediately and they are the preconditions for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

8) The acute revolutionary situation demands that the party should use all means to step up its work among the revolutionary masses, use all forces to win over the masses through a united front at the grass-roots level; organize, prepare, and lead the masses; raise their revolutionary enthusiasm by launching daily economic and political struggles, and lead them in the struggle to find a revolutionary solution to the national crisis and economic catastrophe and to build a soviet China. The victory of the struggle depends entirely on the total and complete defeat of the five "encirclements." The five "encirclements" are the most concrete and vicious steps of the imperialists and the GMD in the colonization of China. The struggle to smash the five "encirclements" is a struggle to prevent China from moving along the colonial road and to gain a complete victory for a soviet China. The urgent current fighting task is to mobilize all our forces to defeat the five "encirclements" thoroughly and completely.

To accomplish this glorious and great task:

First, the party organizations in the soviet areas should try hard to fulfill the following tasks with Bolshevik resolution.

A) All forces, resources, and the enthusiasm of the masses must be mobilized to

the greatest extent to expand and consolidate the Red Army. All other work should serve this task. All party work should be implemented in line with the Leninist slogan that "everything is for the victory at the battlefront of the civil war." The serious revolutionary situation requires us to realize the slogan of creating an iron army of one million as soon as possible. The party's youth and women's organizations must be strengthened in an effort to enable them to play a greater role in mobilizing fighting forces. It is particularly important that Red Guard troops and Young Pioneers should be trained as good reserves and local forces for the Red Army. Under party leadership, the Red Army has achieved a high degree of coordination in its actions. This is the result of the Red Army soldiers' clear class consciousness, iron self-discipline, and rich organizational and fighting experience and the improvement and strengthening of political and military leadership. However, there should not be any relaxation in continuing to strengthen and improve work. All revolutionaries must see it as their duty and task to raise the Red Army's military, technological, and tactical standards, class consciousness, and iron discipline. All Red Army units should rally under one unified strategy to complete the fighting tasks. The political and military tasks of the soviet region of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet, the E-Yu-Wan Soviet, and the units of the Second Red Army should be coordinated better with the great tasks of the Central Soviet. One of the most essential tasks is to engage in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and around the soviet areas in order to disrupt the enemy's transportation and communications and to organize the revolution and new soviet areas. The guerrilla fighters must be the initiators and organizers of the rural revolution and the disseminators of the influence of the party and the soviet regime and the backbone of the armed struggle by the masses.

B) Soviet work should be stepped up and improved to enable the soviet regime to build up closer ties with tens of millions of working people and to attract their most active members to take part in the administration, management, and other activities of the state. Resolute struggle must continue to be carried out to oppose the hidden alien-class elements in the soviet organs. The struggle against the few corrupt elements, embezzlers, and bureaucrats in the soviet organs should be expanded. In addition to perfecting the organization and work of the inspection committees of the workers and peasants and smashing the few specific culprits, the struggle should also improve the literacy standards of the masses, encourage more masses to participate in and supervise soviet work, and promote soviet democratic self-criticism. Superior soviet government organs (i.e., provincial governments under the central government) should strengthen their leadership over the soviet work of their subordinate units. It is of special importance that they do not remain solely as the political regimes of the soviet workers and peasants, but also become the organizers and leaders of the working people's struggle against imperialism and the GMD in the white areas.

C) The correct implementation of soviet land policies is a major step and method for increasing the influence of the soviet regime during the Civil War and

economic blockade. The thorough rural revolution has made great progress in the old soviet areas. However, the land question is still a serious problem in the new soviet areas and in some border areas where erroneous methods and the "rich peasant line" denounced repeatedly by the party are still being implemented partially or to a certain extent. Therefore, in the old areas where the rural revolution has been fully implemented, the key issue is to consolidate land in the hands of the peasants. The party and the soviet regime should adopt all methods and use all forces to heighten and organize peasant enthusiasm for production and work, and organize the broad movement of sowing and harvesting in order to raise greatly land productivity. The party and the soviet regime government must pay great attention to the development of irrigation and the improvement of water conservancy projects, to the appropriate allocation of farm tools and cattle, to strengthen mutual-aid organizations, labor management, and the teaching and dissemination of scientific agricultural knowledge. In areas where the land question remains unsolved, the basic issue is to confiscate all land of the landlord class and large private land rapidly in accordance with the party's previous instructions and divide it equally among the farmhands, hard laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Immediate action should be taken to launch the land investigation movement so as to benefit the broad masses. With regard to economic construction, the most important current task is to develop extensively various forms of cooperation, to restore the damaged production in the handicraft industry, and to revitalize the trade and commerce within the soviet areas and between the soviet and white areas. These actions will help break the enemy's economic blockade and further improve the livelihood of the workers and peasants.

D) To realize the party's major tasks in the soviet areas, its mass organizations of workers, youth, women, etc., should be expanded, strengthened, and improved.

The trade unions in the soviet areas are the pillars of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, the most reliable supporters of the soviet government and schools of communism. The party must raise the standard of trade union work to the highest level and overcome its neglect. The trade unions in the soviet areas must, to protect the daily interests of the working class and improve the workers' economic and cultural life, resolutely draw the vast majority of the workers into active participation in the revolutionary war and the various aspects of building the soviet regime. The party should put forward and practice the slogan of "all workers in soviet areas belong to trade unions." The great role played by young workers and peasants in the revolution and the Civil War and all aspects of economic and cultural construction is apparent. The party must pay more attention to youth work and to the economic and cultural needs of the young. In the shortest possible time, the YL must be transformed into a mass organization of young workers, semi-proletarian poor peasants, and the conscious elements among the middle peasants. This would make it several times larger than at present. The greatest attention should be paid to educating YL members in communism and Leninism. The YL should be the vanguard on all fronts and the immediate assistant to the party.

The work of the women workers' and peasant committees in all areas and districts

must be improved in line with previous party resolutions. This will involve the largest majority of women workers and peasants in economic and cultural construction.

Under conditions of severe and violent civil war, party organizations should be built up and strengthened to be adaptable to the rapidly changing environment. This is an important task. The party in the soviet areas must pay utmost attention to the development and consolidation of party and league organizations. New worker cadres must be trained and promoted to leading organs. Alien-class and unreliable elements should be eliminated from the organizations. Strengthening the education of Marxism and Leninism inside the party and a resolute, unceasing two-line struggle are the guarantees that the party will accomplish its great tasks.

Second, the party's tasks in the GMD-ruled areas are as follows:

A) Use maximum strength to prepare, organize, and lead working-class strikes. In an acute revolutionary situation, the meaning of strikes has increased greatly. The party must focus attention on this weakest link in our work and bring about a transformation. The party's entire strength should be concentrated on strikes in factories and by trade unions. Here our attention should first and foremost concentrate on the key industrial centers and the largest factories that are most threatened by the attack of capital, especially those located in industrial cities near the soviet areas. The Fifth Plenum sternly criticizes many local organizations and a few party members for their tendency to neglect trade union work and holds that those who overlook and avoid trade union work cannot be regarded as CP members. To overcome the backwardness of trade union work, the Fifth Plenum calls on every organization from the center down to the branches to draw up concrete work plans. These plans should include various concrete steps for forming large red opposition groups and mass red trade union preparatory committees in major factories and enterprises. This work should be checked frequently. The key to successful leadership of the strike struggle is wider use of the grass-roots united front. It is only on the basis of a correct grass-roots united front and in the persistent struggle for every minor demand of the workers that we can win over the workers to our side, form a red opposition and red small groups among the masses, successfully lead strikes, and stop the yellow trade union leaders from influencing the workers. The party should seriously prepare for every strike and must eliminate the rigidity and mechanism of our slogans and demands. To win victory in a strike it is necessary to form strike committees comprising many people. Work among unemployed workers should be stepped up, and propaganda and agitation work among them should be strengthened and improved. Committees of unemployed workers need to be organized, and the struggle of the unemployed should be linked closely with the struggle of the employed. Leadership should be exercised in unemployed workers' demonstrations to demand support, continuance of normal pay, and work. To strengthen our ties with workers, more attention should be focused on the work of workers' auxiliary organizations and sports organizations.

B) Basic party work among the peasantry is the promotion of all peasant struggles against taxation, usury, and land rent and struggles for redistribution of grain,

seizure of rice, and confiscation of land. These struggles should be raised to the level of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and rural revolution. The party's attention should be shifted first toward areas of important strategic significance for the development of the soviet movement and to link these peasant struggles directly with the military operations of the worker and peasant Red Army. In areas affected by drought, the party must intensify its propaganda, agitation, and organizational work and organize the peasants' struggle for food, housing, and support. The party must consider divisions among the peasantry in its rural war, resolutely organize independent organizations of rural workers (trade unions of agricultural workers), unite poor peasants around them, and draw in the middle peasants during the resolute struggle against rich peasants. The party should strengthen its work and win over the masses in such primitive and religious peasant organizations as the Red Gun Clan and the Big Sword Society. The party must double its efforts to win the support of the masses at the basic levels. Where conditions are ripe, the party must resolutely organize and lead the peasants to wage guerrilla warfare, expel the GMD bureaucrats, overthrow the landlords and despotic gentry, and confiscate and redistribute land. The party must strengthen its work among the white soldiers and the landlords' local armed forces, incite a hatred of them on the basis of the soldiers' political and economic discontent to oppose the GMD attack on the Red Army, demand resistance to imperialist aggression, and organize their mutinies and uprisings.

C) The intensification of imperialist aggression and the shameful surrender of the GMD provide us with a good opportunity to consolidate and expand the anti-imperialist struggle of the broad masses. The party must fight resolutely for the creation of an anti-imperialist united front at the grass roots. This united front should be formed in the struggles against imperialism and on the basis of a clear and easy-to-understand program of national revolutionary warfare. The leadership of the proletariat should be strengthened and consolidated in this united front. The party must exert its utmost efforts to spread the call of the soviet government and Red Army for an agreement among all military forces in the country to fight against Japan and its three demands so as to ruthlessly expose the role of the GMD and reformist factions in clearing the way for imperialist aggression. The party must use various pretexts to develop mass organizations opposed to imperialism and Japan, to participate actively in all anti-Japanese organizations; to put forward our program, lines, and proposals to lay bare the true features of the leaders of these organizations; and to mobilize the masses actively to oppose imperialism. The party needs to increase its leadership over the boycott movement and turn it into a mass movement. The party should actively take part in the activities of the volunteer armies in Manchuria, Jehol [Chengde], and Hebei and send reliable comrades and workers there to strengthen the leadership of the volunteer armies. The volunteer armies and guerrilla troops under our leadership or influence must reach agreement on coordination of anti-Japanese military operations with other anti-Japanese units in accordance with a precise revolutionary program. These units should be won over by our own heroic examples and political work among the soldiers. These volunteer

units should coordinate the anti-Japanese struggle with the launching of the land revolution, destroy the rule of despotic landlords in their areas of activity, establish people's governments, and call on the people of Manchuria and other Japanese occupied territories to refuse to pay tax and rent and not obey orders from the "Manchurian" and Japanese authorities.

D) The upsurge of the struggles of minority nationalities inside China has exposed the intolerable feebleness of the party's work among the minorities. The party must increase its work among the Mongolian, Hui, Miao, and Yao nationalities and lead their struggle for national liberation and autonomy (including the right of independence). It is imperative to promote their revolutionary struggle to oppose imperialism, GMD rule, native landlords, headmen, lamas, nobility, and usurers and to link their liberation struggle closely with the rural revolution. It should be pointed out that only the Chinese soviet revolution can ensure the liberation of minority nationalities, the formation of their own soviet republics, and the achievement of genuine peace and freedom among all nationalities. The Fifth Plenum calls on the Politburo and all provincial committees to formulate concrete work programs for all nationalities in accordance with the party's revolutionary nationality policies.

The most important tasks of party organizations in the white areas are to consolidate party organizations, set up solid factory branches, improve secret work methods and style of leadership, and change the methods of propaganda, agitation, and approach to the masses. The key task here is to create and strengthen party work and organization in key industrial centers. Reliable and competent comrades should be sent to the important enterprises in these cities to form strong and solid fortresses for the party. The focus of all party work must be concentrated in the factories, workplaces, countryside, schools, and barracks. This is the only way to strengthen links with the masses and avoid the fascist terrorist attacks of the GMD. The white terrorist attacks and party activities in many areas result in sharply increasing demands from new cadres. Only by bold promotion of those worker cadres who maintain a close relationship with the masses and display loyalty and a vanguard role in the mass struggle can this problem be resolved. The conservatism of refusing to promote cadres under the pretext of secret work must be countered. This problem is more serious in those provinces where intellectuals are still in key leading positions. Under the ferocious terror, the party must improve secret work, strengthen communications among various party organizations, and wage a resolute struggle against enemy spies. The party should step up its leadership over the YL by sending competent representatives to work in the league and by often including the work and life of the league on the agenda of the party's work.

9) The victory of the Chinese revolutionary struggle, first of all, depends directly on the CP and on its correct Bolshevik political line and actual work. It relies on the party's unity in action, ideology, and politics; on party members' Bolshevik discipline, and on the party's ability to lead the mass struggle.

Only through steadfast efforts and by opposing all deviations from, and distortions of, the Comintern and the CCP line can the party lead the victorious struggle to create a soviet China.

Since the Fourth Plenum, the party has been tempered in the resolute two-line struggle, achieved a Bolshevik determination and unity in thinking, and finally embarked on the Bolshevik road. However, this fact can in no way weaken our ruthless struggle against "left" and right opportunism and double-dealing attitudes. Faced with a new situation, new difficulties, and the turning point of the acute revolutionary situation, new tendencies of vacillation will inevitably occur among the least resolute elements. Indeed, there is already clear evidence of this. The party should spare no efforts to oppose "left" opportunism, factionalism, neglect, and underestimation of trade unions, of anti-imperialism work, and of the work of other mass organizations, and the tendency to ignore the development of our strength and work through the pretext of relaxation and optimism. The party can develop a Bolshevik line only through firm struggle against the most dangerous right-wing opportunism and the right-wing attitude of reconciliation. Right-wing opportunists are suspicious of the development of revolution and contemptuous of the force of the masses, and they are frightened by the enemy's attack. They obstruct the process of revolutionary movements, try to lower the level of the workers' struggle, and follow the masses [tailism]. Right-wing opportunists are spreading pessimism, disappointment, and a sense of loss of confidence among party ranks to confuse our forces and assist the enemy's attacks. This will send the revolution along the road to failure. Right-wing opportunists seldom put forward open political programs to oppose the party line and more often passively resist the party's line with their double-dealing attitudes. The party must expose the true face of right-wing opportunism in theory and practice and its proponents' double-dealing nature to ensure the complete implementation of the party and Comintern line. At the same time, the greatest efforts should be made to promote Bolshevik self-criticism and a new genuine flexible style of leadership and to oppose all forms of bureaucratism and commandism so that we can shoulder the glorious tasks of communist pioneers amid these great events.

10) China is in the vortex of revolution and war. In the decisive battles of smashing the five "encirclements," the question as to whether the soviet road or the colonial road will triumph has been seriously raised. The Fifth Plenum is convinced that on the basis of the party's correct Bolshevik line and the enthusiastic, arduous, and tireless Bolshevik work among the masses by hundreds of thousands of party members, the party will lead the masses of workers, peasants, and the Red Army to win new victories and deal greater blows to the reactionary forces. Proceeding from this basis, the party will strengthen proletarian leadership in the current struggle of the Chinese revolution and will further transform the bourgeois democratic and anti-imperialist rural revolution into a socialist revolution. Once the democratic dictatorship of the revolution of workers and peasants has spread throughout the major areas of China, we shall make the socialist revolution the basic task of the

CP. Only on this basis can China be unified, can the Chinese people win national liberation and be freed from the imperialist rule of the GMD, and can the working people be emancipated from enslavement, exploitation, and starvation. Only on this basis, can the Chinese workers and peasants set out on the wide glorious road pointed out by the victorious revolution of all nationalities of the Soviet Union.

D.19 Organic Law of the Central Soviet Republic (17 February 1934)⁶⁹

Chapter I. General Rules

Article 1. This Organic Law, drawn up in line with the principles of the Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, must be enforced by all bodies under the jurisdiction of the Party Center.⁷⁰

Chapter II. National Soviet Congress

Article 2. The National Soviet Congress is the highest organ of state power of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 3. Delegates to the National Soviet Congress are elected by the Soviet Congress at the provincial level and that of counties directly under the Central Government, and by the Red Army.

Article 4. The National Soviet Congress is convened once every two years by the CEC. It may be postponed if it cannot be held on time owing to unexpected circumstances.

Article 5. An unscheduled National Soviet Congress can be convened when necessary by the CEC or can be convened by the CEC at the request of local soviet authorities representing one-third of the nation's population.

Article 6. The National Soviet Congress listens to and discusses reports of the CEC, draws up and modifies the Constitution and other laws, outlines policies and principles concerning major national issues, and reelects the CEC.

Chapter III. The CEC

Article 7. The CEC is the organ of supreme authority when the National Soviet Congress is not in session.

Article 8. The number of members of the CEC should not exceed 585.

Article 9. A Plenum of the CEC should be convened every six months by the Presidium. It may be postponed if it cannot be held on time owing to unexpected circumstances.

Article 10. An unscheduled meeting of the CEC can be convened by a resolution of the Committee's Presidium or at the request of over half of the members of the Committee.

Article 11. The CEC is responsible for presenting a work report to the National Soviet Congress.

Article 12. The CEC is responsible for promulgating all kinds of decrees and issuing orders to be implemented throughout the entire Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 13. The CEC reviews and ratifies all policies concerning national politics and economy, as well as changes in all state organs.

Article 14. The CEC is authorized to suspend and revise decrees and resolutions adopted by its Presidium, by the People's Commissariat, as well as by other bodies.

Article 15. Members of the Presidium elected by the CEC should not exceed twenty-five persons, including one chair and two vice-chairmen.

Article 16. The CEC elects the People's Commissariat and designates the chairman. Those elected should be members of the CEC.

Chapter IV. The Presidium of the CEC

Article 17. The Presidium of the CEC is the organ of supreme state authority when the CEC is not in session.

Article 18. The Presidium of the CEC supervises the implementation of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic and all kinds of decrees and resolutions adopted by the National Soviet Congress and the CEC.

Article 19. The Presidium of the CEC has the authority to rescind or amend resolutions and decrees adopted by the People's Commissariat.

Article 20. The Presidium of the CEC has the authority to rescind or amend resolutions and orders by a Soviet Congress at the provincial level and its executive committee.

Article 21. The Presidium of the CEC is authorized to draw up all kinds of laws and issue orders. It also has the right to examine and approve decrees, regulations, and orders by the People's Commissariat and all its departments, as well as by other affiliates.

Article 22. The Presidium of the CEC should solve problems concerning relations between the People's Commissariat and its departments, and those among the soviet organs at the provincial level.

Article 23. The Presidium of the CEC has full responsibility for presenting its work report to the CEC.

Chapter V. Powers of the National Soviet Congress and the CEC

Article 24. The powers of the National Soviet Congress and the CEC are as follows:

- 1) Promulgate and modify the Constitution. (Note: This is the exclusive right of the National Soviet Congress.)

- 2) Represent the Chinese Soviet Republic in concluding all kinds of treaties with foreign governments and in ratifying those treaties.
- 3) Establish a systematic court system and promulgate civil, criminal, and procedural laws.
- 4) Issue labor, rural, electoral, and marriage laws and the Soviet Organic Law, and all other separate laws.
- 5) Initiate major domestic and foreign policies.
- 6) Reformulate national boundaries.
- 7) Define the jurisdiction of local soviet powers and settle disputes among them.
- 8) Classify administrative zones and establish, merge, restructure, or disband organs of local authority.
- 9) Declare war on and negotiate with foreign powers.
- 10) Establish weights and measures and currency systems.
- 11) Issue domestic and international government bonds.
- 12) Examine and approve the budget and the final accounting of revenues and expenditures.
- 13) Establish rates of taxation.
- 14) Organize and direct all armed forces.
- 15) Fix the civil rights of citizens of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the civil rights and the right of residence of foreign citizens in the Republic.
- 16) Declare complete or partial amnesty.
- 17) Outline the general principles concerning national education.
- 18) Appoint and dismiss members and the chair of the People's Commissariat.
- 19) Make policies for the development of industry, agriculture, commerce, and transportation.
- 20) Represent the Chinese Soviet Republic in concluding agreements with all nationalities inside China on the organization of the Soviet Federal Republic.
- 21) Dismiss, replace, and change members of soviet executive committees at lower levels.

Chapter VI. People's Commissariat

Article 25. The People's Commissariat serves as the administrative body of the CEC and takes charge of national political affairs.

Article 26. The People's Commissariat consists of the following personnel:

- 1) Chair [Zhang Wentian];
- 2) Commissar for foreign affairs [Wang Jiaxiang];
- 3) Commissar for labor [Deng Zhenxun];
- 4) Commissar for land [Gao Zeli];
- 5) Commissar for military affairs [Zhu De];
- 6) Commissar for finance [Lin Boqu];
- 7) Commissar for the national economy [Wu Liangping];
- 8) Commissar for food [Chen Tanqiu];

- 9) Commissar for education [Qu Qiubai];
- 10) Commissar for internal affairs [Zeng Shan];
- 11) Commissar for justice [Liang Baitai]; and
- 12) Commissar of the Worker-Peasant Procuracy [Xiang Ying].

Note: 1) The number of delegates for each sector can be added to by the CEC depending on the workload.

2) The term delegate can be used only by the delegates of the People's Commissariat. No other members of the central and local committees are allowed to use this term.

Article 27. In order to suppress counterrevolutionaries, a National Bureau of Political Security is established under the People's Commissariat. Its organization will be decided separately.

Article 28. In order to meet the goal specified in Article 25 of this Organic Law, the People's Commissariat must, within the areas designated by the CEC, promulgate all kinds of decrees and regulations and adopt suitable administrative policies aimed at maintaining administrative efficiency and order.

Article 29. Resolutions adopted and all kinds of decrees and regulations drawn up by the People's Commissariat must be reported to the Presidium of the CEC.

Article 30. Resolutions adopted by the People's Commissariat, if concerned with major issues of principle, must be submitted to the CEC and its Presidium for review and approval. The People's Commissariat should deal with urgent cases and then report them to the CEC and its Presidium.

Article 31. The People's Commissariat is authorized to review, revise, or suspend decrees and resolutions submitted by all its branches.

Article 32. If departments of the People's Commissariat and soviet executive committees at provincial levels disagree with resolutions adopted by the People's Commissariat, they may submit their opinions to the CEC. In the meantime, they must continue their implementation.

Article 33. The People's Commissariat is responsible for delivering its work report to the CEC and its Presidium on time.

Chapter VII. Supreme Court

Article 34. The Supreme Court is established under the CEC to protect the laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 35. The Supreme Court has one president [Dong Biwu] and two vice-presidents designated by the Presidium of the CEC.

Article 36. Criminal, civil, and military courts are established under the Supreme Court, with one head for each court.

Article 37. The powers of the Supreme Court are as follows:

- 1) Define general laws in legal terms.
- 2) Review written judgments and resolutions submitted by the legal (judgment)

divisions in each province and the high-level Institute of Military Affairs.

3) Examine criminal cases committed during the term of office by high-ranking staff not in the CEC (criminal cases relating to members of the CEC are dealt with by the CEC or its Presidium).

4) Review and adjudge cases of appeal against decisions by the legal divisions at the provincial level and the high-level Institute of Military Affairs; or cases of protest lodged by inspectors against decisions by the legal divisions at the provincial level and the high-level Institute of Military Affairs.

Article 38. Establish a committee within the Supreme Court, whose members are decided by the Presidium of the CEC and whose chair is the president of the Supreme Court, to discuss and decide all important matters and cases relating to the Supreme Court's powers.

Article 39. The Supreme Court is established with one chief inspector, two deputy-inspectors, and several other inspectors. The chief and deputy-inspectors are designated by the Presidium of the CEC.

Article 40. Details concerning organizations of the Supreme Court are dealt with separately.

Chapter VIII. Audit Committee

Article 41. The Audit Committee, established under the CEC, enjoys the following powers:

- 1) Audit state annual income and annual expenditure; and
- 2) Supervise the state budget and its execution.

Article 42. The Audit Committee comprises five to nine persons appointed by the Presidium of the CEC.

Article 43. The Audit Committee has one director, one deputy director, and other staff members as necessary.

Chapter IX. Departments of the People's Commissariat and Committees of Departmental Affairs

Article 44. Departments of foreign affairs, land, labor, military, finance, national economy, food, education, internal affairs, and justice are established under the People's Commissariat.

Article 45. Each department of the People's Commissariat has one or two deputy people's commissars appointed by the Presidium of the CEC who assist the commissar and assume the commissar's responsibility during his or her absence.

Article 46. To facilitate the work of each department of the People's Commissariat, committees of departmental affairs should be set up under each department to discuss and initiate work of the department.

Article 47. Members of each departmental committee are appointed by the People's Commissariat which decides the size of departmental committees, whose

chairmen are automatically the commissars for each respective committee.

Article 48. Each commissar may deal with issues within his/her jurisdiction but must refer important issues to the departmental committee. If there is a difference of opinion between a committee and its commissar, the commissar is authorized to submit the issue to the People's Commissariat or to the Presidium of the CEC.

Article 49. Details concerning the powers of each department of the People's Commissariat as well as their organizations are spelled out separately.

Article 50. Under the People's Commissariat, revolutionary military committees and worker-peasant procuracies are established. The terms of reference of these committees are laid out separately.

Chapter X. Appendix

Article 51. The present Organic Law shall come into force on the date of issue.

D.20 Short, Swift Thrusts. *Lin Biao* (17 June 1934)⁷¹

A) In the fifth "extermination campaign," the enemy has given up its previous military strategies of deep penetration, advance on a broad front, close pursuit, and quick-and-decisive battles. Instead, the enemy has adopted a strategy of protracted advancing step-by-step combined with the tactics of using blockhouses. The enemy understands very well that the Red Army is enthusiastically supported by the majority of the people; it is too fierce an opponent to be resisted, and it moves fast and has an advantage in ordinary mobile battles, especially in unexpected encounters and raids. Therefore, when deciding strategy and tactics, the enemy tries its best to avoid confronting the Red Army's advantages and superior political conditions. Instead, it tries its best to attack where it finds weaknesses in the Red Army's material, weapons, and technology. It does its best to deny the Red Army opportunities to engage in ordinary battles and, in particular, unexpected actions and raids. This is one of the most fundamental points on the basis of which the enemy determines its strategies and tactics. However, "the ultimate destiny of war is not determined by technology (the enemies of the Soviet Union provided [Anton] Denikin and [Alexander] Kolchak with enormous amounts of arms), but by the right policies, the sympathy and support of the majority of the masses" (Stalin). Those GMD lackeys and stupid swine are incapable of understanding this truth!

To reduce the soviet areas and prepare for the final decisive battle with the Red Army, the enemy relies on the strategy of protracted warfare and blockade tactics to advance along separate routes toward each vital military and political locality in the soviet areas in line with the overall plan. (This is instead of advancing toward the area where the main forces of the Red Army are located.) Each enemy army group

on each route has roughly more than three divisions of troops. The distance and speed of every advance it makes varies according to the circumstances of the local population, its understanding of the whereabouts of our main forces, the size of its own forces, the extent of losses inflicted by the Red Army, and other conditions such as terrain and circumstances. For example, when the Chen [Jitong] Route Army occupied Guangchang, and the Tang-Zhou Column seized Jianming,⁷² their advance was much slower when they were in the border regions than in the white areas. Finally, as soon as the Xue Route Army encountered our main forces at Longgang and received a blow, it stopped advancing. Instead, it adopted a tactic of movement that could be completely covered by the fire from its fortresses. In the advance of the Chen Route Army toward Guangchang, although it discovered that the Red Army was nearby, it had already concentrated sufficient superior forces. The terrain allowed the use of large forces, and so it was able to continue its advance and occupy Guangchang.

Whenever the enemy occupies a place, it immediately begins the construction of blockhouses to secure its foothold. Then the enemy links the blockhouses and the blockaded highways and coordinates with armies on other routes to cut off and block the soviet areas and to receive support from the rear.

While advancing, the enemy emphasizes reconnaissance and security, while during battles with the Red Army, the enemy does its best to capitalize on the firepower of its numerous light and heavy machines and artillery, as well as utilizing reconnaissance and aerial bombing by formations of planes. In battles, although the enemy may reach and occupy a certain point, it does not aggressively pursue the retreating Red Army. The enemy advances only short distances into the soviet areas. It advances only about five kilometers at a time, often moving from higher ground to a prearranged target. If the enemy encounters relatively strong or strong opposition from our troops during the advance, it immediately stops moving toward the prearranged target and begins to construct fortresses and engages in defensive battles.

These tactics of the enemy are all based on its experience and lessons drawn from previous defeats. The enemy adopts the above methods in order to avoid engaging the Red Army in mobile warfare, to restrain the fierce charges of the Red Army, to avoid sudden raids by the Red Army, to counter the policy of the masses in the soviet areas that denies the enemy food and supplies, and to avoid the dangers of fighting in isolation and having its retreat cut off by the Red Army. These methods are designed to make it difficult for the Red Army to utilize fully its political and military advantages. They will enable the enemy to capitalize on its superiority in material and weaponry, as well as to correct as many previous tactical flaws as possible (such as the neglect of reconnaissance and security, the slow construction of pillboxes, etc.).

Short, swift thrusts are a response to these strategies and tactics of the enemy and to other subjective and objective conditions. This type of battle has many special characteristics; it is not a conventional offensive battle, or a conventional defensive battle. It utilizes a mixture of all kinds of complex battle tactics. We should understand this question in the following manner.

Short, swift thrusts can gain not only tactical victories but also victories for entire campaigns.

For example, the battles of Luoyangbao and Xinqiao offered great possibilities for victory of the entire campaign. Because of the demoralization and weak fighting abilities of its soldiers, the enemy had to adopt dense formations of large numbers of troops. At the same time, it took advantage of our weak firepower and dared to adopt dense formations. That is why sometimes large enemy forces are crowded into small and narrow areas. If our troops can quickly rout the enemy and cut off its retreat, we will win a great victory. This kind of battle needs superior coordination and organization. Even minor flaws in this kind of battle will result in catastrophe and a defeat.

The enemy has now entered the main soviet areas. In the future, when the enemy uses the tactic of step-by-step fortification more completely and in a more orthodox manner, our army will encounter more battles that require the elimination of the enemy through the tactic of short, swift thrusts. In this kind of battle, we should not be satisfied with winning partial tactical victories, but should try to fight for the greater victories of the entire campaign.

B) Short, swift thrusts are those sudden, fast raids launched against the enemy troops who come out of their blockhouses to advance the line of fortification by a small distance (specifically a distance of between 2.5 and 5 kilometers or even less). These thrusts are launched to wipe out the main enemy forces at a time when the enemy has not yet stabilized its foothold.

1. Before the battle we should make accurate assessments, based on the most up-to-date information, of the timing of the enemy advance, destination, route and battleground, deployment of forces, and methods of movement.

2. Before the battle, the commanding officer or the dispatched responsible staff officer on the spot should reconnoiter the enemy's conditions and its location very carefully. The staff should also map out the terrain. We certainly cannot rely on searching for the route and on existing maps (which are sketchy and contain many errors) to conduct this kind of battle. In the Battle of Luoyangbao, a certain regiment did not reconnoiter the terrain or the roads beforehand. Only after shots had been fired did it hastily deploy its troops. Its large force was crowded onto a narrow road, and its advance was blocked by part of the enemy forces, with the result that our troops failed to fulfill the mission of cutting off the enemy's retreat. This kind of lesson should not be forgotten or repeated. Before a battle, it is necessary to reconnoiter the roads and obtain guides.

3. According to the reconnaissance of the location of the battleground and the evaluation of the enemy's situation, the senior commanding officer (the highest commanding officer responsible for the campaign) assigned to the battle should devise principles and plans for the battle in advance. These principles and plans should predict possible changes of the enemy as well as the most probable change. While our principles and plans should be adaptable to all possible situations, they should be based on the most probable scenario. When we use a plan to prepare for

battle, we should not treat all possibilities equally but should prepare mainly to adapt to the major possibilities. The position of the battle area and the deployment of troops should also be determined mainly on the basis of dealing with the major possibilities. This plan will enable subordinate commanders to prepare in advance, so that if communications are severed, they can act in accordance with the plans of the superior commanders. The subordinate commanders can act independently but in a coordinated way. We must inform the essential subordinate commanding officers of the plan.

4. We must be aware that the predetermined battle schedules and plans can only provide a basis to prepare for the battle beforehand and act as a reference manual for acting independently but in coordination during the battle. We are very likely to commit errors and lose coordination if we only follow a set plan or if each unit acts only according to the predetermined battle plans, because changes in the enemy's own conditions sometimes cannot be predicted in advance. The real situation may fall between two or three predicted scenarios. Some commanders may feel that the situation accords with scenario A, and thus will employ the predetermined actions for scenario A. However, another commander may feel that it accords to scenario B and act accordingly. Under these circumstances, mistakes and confusion will inevitably result.

5. If the battleground is in the mountains, the enemy will advance along commanding heights. Under these circumstances, we should, according to our evaluation of the situation, occupy the commanding heights, thus blocking the enemy's march. However, we should locate ourselves beyond the fire of the enemy fortifications. We should deploy a small contingent (a battalion or so) to defend this position securely. Occupation of this position should be absolutely secret, lest the enemy discover that our forces have already taken the position. To avoid revealing our intentions, the defending troops should not enter the position too early. The firing line of this position should be established on the forward slope near the mountain peak, so that in case we abandon the position the enemy cannot use the defense works we have built. We should establish a cross fire in the middle and at the foot of the mountain. This position should be well camouflaged to avoid detection by the enemy from the air or on the ground. It should have sufficient obstacles to force the enemy to stop so that it receives heavy losses inflicted by our fire. Foxholes and trenches should be able to sustain bombardment by enemy artillery and airplanes. The troops selected to defend this position must be politically reliable and have strong fighting abilities. If the troops defending the position are of low quality and fail to defend the position, our main forces will lose the opportunity to launch a sudden attack against the enemy during the battle, and may even face the danger of being struck by the enemy. The troops that are assigned to the defense should undergo a campaign before the battle to raise their political consciousness sufficiently. They should be determined to defend their position to the death and perish together with their position in face of the enemy's fierce and barbarous aerial bombing, artillery bombardment, and infantry assault. At the same time, tactical

training in defense should be conducted; the ammunition, particularly hand grenades, of the defending troops must be replenished. If no ammunition is available at the moment, some supplies should be obtained from the assault troops.

6. In the areas where our planned attack on the enemy is to be launched, if there are no ready-made roads to enable the assault troops to advance in parallel formations and if the geography of the area makes any movement impossible without roads (dense forest, for example), we should first open up roads. However, the ends of the roads should not be too close to the enemy's route of advance. If they are too close to the enemy's route of advance, it is liable to betray our intentions. However, we should not give up flexibility in implementing [the battle plan] if there are no roads; we should advance outside the roads in battle formations.

7. We should dismantle old fortifications (such as old village walls and pillboxes) near the predicted enemy route of advance to deny the enemy their use. We should also use the fire from the commanding heights we occupy to cover the high ground in front of our position. Outside our range of fire, we should plant bamboo nails, trip mines, and other obstacles on the slope facing the enemy. These should be well concealed to avoid early enemy detection. This will control [the slope] through denying the enemy easy occupation [of the slope], as well as enabling us to prepare for a quick recovery of this position.

8. This kind of battle requires organizing the fastest possible communications because actions during the battle require speedy and excellent coordination. Several of our previous short, swift thrusts did not gain full victories because most were marred by poor coordination of action. The telephone should be the primary tool, with other instruments of communication as supplementary tools. These tools of communication should be used simultaneously to eliminate the possibility of disruption.

9. Observation stations should be set up on appropriate high ground. Relying on good locale, some observation stations enable us to know like the back of our hands the enemy's situation and terrain for dozens of kilometers around. Staff officers should be sent to the observation stations to keep watch with field glasses and maintain telephone communication with headquarters.

10. In dealing with the advancing enemy, we should employ the tactic of counterattack during the enemy's upward assault against our commanding heights. We may use the simple method of ambush to attack the enemy from one or both sides. We may even allow the enemy to occupy some places that can be easily attacked, and then launch our attacks before the enemy secures a foothold. We may also use other kinds of tactics, depending on the terrain, the distance between the enemy and its fortifications, the number and quality of the enemy, and other conditions.

11. The timing of the enemy advance may be judged by the speed with which it completes its blockhouses and highways, redeploys its troops, and other intelligence gatherings. When we predict that the enemy is about to make an advance, we should secretly dispatch troops into the chosen area to camouflage themselves. This chosen area should guarantee that the troops will be able to reach the predetermined

point to raid the enemy within one hour, or at most less than two hours. However, the enemy may not launch an attack at the predicted time, so sometimes such waiting is futile. Sometimes, for several days in a row the troops march out early in the morning and return late at night for nothing. Of course, this will exhaust the troops. However, this should not raise doubts, and in order to avoid fatigue we should not become slack and fail to make proper preparations for the assault. Otherwise, once the enemy has begun its advance, we will always lose the opportunity to win the battle. However, when we feel that there is only a remote possibility that the enemy will advance, we should not march the troops to the chosen area every day. This will prevent useless fatigue, and our intentions will not be betrayed. If it is possible that the enemy might change his route of advance, the troops already in the chosen area for attack should carry out educational work insofar as security is not breached. This kind of education should be linked to the mission of the battle.

12. The enemy predetermines the objective of its advance. When the mission of our own troops stationed [in that area] is not to slow down the enemy advance, but to wipe out the main forces of the enemy, we should allow the enemy to march according to its old plan. It is not necessary to resist and slow down the enemy (however, we should not stop our garrison from engaging in guerrilla activities and reconnaissance, or enticing the enemy to continue its advance). Because the enemy immediately halts and starts to build fortresses once it encounters resistance from our troops, this diminishes our advantage (there are exceptions) for annihilating the enemy by forcing it to move far away from its fortifications. If we let the enemy continue to march toward its predetermined objective, and raid its troops when they advance into the battleground we have selected beforehand, we can annihilate the enemy more completely. This method does not mean enticing the enemy deep into our territory. We must know that the method of enticing the enemy deep into our territory is no longer a reliable one for dealing with an enemy that has experienced repeated disastrous defeats and learned bloody lessons in the past.

13. If the enemy has already marched into the predetermined area where we are to launch our raid, or if the enemy has stopped its advance, or if the enemy attacks our commanding height from below and has had heavy losses inflicted on it by our firepower, even if it is only for a short period of time, we should begin to launch our thrusts in accordance with the battle orders, provided that the area we have selected in advance for launching our thrusts will not be under effective fire from the enemy fortifications. At this time, no matter whether the enemy has support troops, or whether the troops are completely beyond the cover of fire from the enemy fortifications, we should begin our thrusts without any hesitation.

14. Normally, the disposition of the battle is to use one unit to engage the advance party of the enemy, while our main forces move along a parallel route (not necessarily the road) and raid one of the enemy's flanks. Where we have numerical superiority without dispensing our troops, ideally we should raid the enemy flanks from both sides. In addition, we must use another small but powerful unit to cut off the enemy's retreat. If we do not cut off the enemy's retreat, there is little guarantee

of complete victory, as the enemy can still retreat to its fortifications. In this kind of battle, annihilation of the enemy is not achieved by pursuit, but by encircling the enemy on the battleground and eliminating it on the spot. In the battle areas where we have cut off the enemy's retreat, even if we are beyond the effective fire of its fortresses that are nevertheless not too far away, our main forces must not engage it in the area of its retreat. This is because new enemy troops moving out from their fortresses will be able to pin down our main forces. This will put our main forces into a defensive and disadvantageous position. In our battle plans, if we estimate that when we launch our raid the enemy may have enough reserves to encircle our troops in battle, we must hold back enough reserves to safeguard our own flanks.

15. When the opportunity for launching our thrust is ripe, ideally we should use the assigned unit to cut off the enemy's retreat unexpectedly. Then our main forces should immediately, or simultaneously, attack the enemy's flanks. The units assigned to attack the enemy's front should launch a counterattack or forward assault only after our units assigned to attack the enemy's flanks and cut off its retreat have launched their attacks. Only when it is necessary to strengthen their positions may they launch a partial counterattack.

16. After the raid has begun, we should use the swiftest movements and the fiercest continuous thrusts to annihilate the enemy swiftly and completely before it secures a foothold or builds defense works, and before help from its support troops can arrive. In these battles, there is no room for vacillation, hesitation, or slowness. In the battles of Guangchang and Luoyangbao, such serious mishaps occurred. In future battles, no such mistakes will be allowed to occur!

17. The formation of the front-line troops of the assault units should be parallel battle groups made up of squads or platoons. We should avoid the formation of a large force marching in a single line, or group charges in dense formation. We should deploy superior forces at the front to fight the decisive battle.

18. The troops that raid the flanks of the enemy usually do not need the preparation of advance fire but can assault the enemy directly. The troops that are to fight the enemy's retreat rely mainly on firepower to block the enemy's reinforcements and prevent the [trapped] enemy from withdrawing. In conditions of victory, they should prepare to move on the enemy's fortresses, subject them to our firepower, and seize them.

19. When victory has been won or, say, when the main forces of the enemy troops have already been annihilated and the troops defending the enemy's fortifications have been shaken, we should ride the tide of the victory and charge and seize the enemy's fortresses. If our victory is limited or, say, if the troops inside the enemy's fortresses have not panicked, we should, without any hesitation, finish the battle and direct our main forces to shake off the enemy.

20. The enemy spy and reconnaissance units often come out to conduct espionage activities. We should deploy our own scouts to capture the enemy spies, ideally through an ambush. In dealing with the enemy reconnaissance units, we

should prepare to annihilate them by using all available forces. Each unit on stand-by (with less than a battalion of troops) should guard one area. When enemy reconnaissance units are discovered in their area, our units on stand-by are to be dispatched to annihilate the enemy by encircling them from the rear. It will be of little use to order in a unit at a moment's notice rather than one that is on stand-by. These units on stand-by also have a role in defending against surprise attacks by the enemy.

21. When the enemy is building fortifications, it usually exposes itself [to our fire] in dense groups of entire battalions and regiments. We should send [a few soldiers with] one or two machine guns to approach the enemy under camouflage and cover, and fire on the enemy at close range. This is also very meaningful.

22. We should also have correct tactics to solve the air raid problem. At all times all our units should pay attention to camouflage and cover. Troops guarding commanding heights should construct anti-air raid shelters and have antiaircraft fire ordnance. The troops that are in the chosen area waiting for the opportunity to launch a raid should treat camouflage as their main task and conceal themselves from aircraft during the waiting period. Once the raid has begun, no matter how fierce [the attack] from the air is, they should not stop their charge and pursuit. At this time, only by fighting in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy can we prevent defeat and a fierce air bombardment. Antiaircraft fire is also indispensable on such occasions.

23. The shrewd enemy often intentionally deploys one unit in a certain direction to feign a move, waits until our main forces are drawn in that direction, and then deploys its main forces to reach its true objectives. Therefore, we must always distinguish between the enemy's false and real moves in order not to be deceived by them. The Battle of Sanxi and the loss of the Wangdu Village and Donghua Mountain are lessons that must not be forgotten. "We should not be drawn into secondary battles and be forced to fight according to the enemy's intentions. Rather we should seek and keep the initiative in our own hands." (See *Revolution and War*, no. 4, 11, by Hua Fu [Otto Braun].)

24. In this kind of battle of short, swift thrusts, one of the most important conditions for victory is to keep military secrets. When our main forces are planning to fight this kind of battle, we must prevent the enemy from learning that our main forces are nearby. We must seal off communications, capture elements who have sold themselves to the enemy, capture enemy spies, and set up camouflage and concealment against aircraft. We must pay serious attention to all of the above and employ concrete methods to execute and arrange these tasks. While preparing our troops before the battle, we must pay attention to preventing the leaking of secrets.

25. In fighting this battle, we must have a clear and constant knowledge of enemy conditions. Therefore, we must use observation stations to watch every move the enemy makes, or send scouts to monitor the enemy constantly. Moreover, we should pay attention to the problem of security and prevent the enemy from launching surprise attacks against us when we relax our vigilance during the waiting period.

26. Because the enemy is never too far away from its fortresses, and because the fortifications are close together, we cannot deploy too large a force in battle. However, precisely because the distance of the enemy's advance is not too great and it arrives very quickly, we must attack the enemy before it secures a foothold and while its number is inferior. Therefore, the battle is always sudden, and its duration brief. Otherwise, our troops will be crushed and suffer meaningless casualties. We will also reduce our troops elsewhere in order to exploit opportunities.

C) In terms of strategy and tactics, we should do our best to utilize all the secondary forces of revolutionary war (guerrilla warfare and defense). However, the fundamental point is to engage in brilliant maneuvers, deploying our main forces in open and fortification-free areas to fight conventional and large-scale mobile battles and destroy the enemy's vital forces. Although short, swift thrusts are one form of mobile battle, it is very wrong for us to limit ourselves to this form of fighting. On the other hand, if we do not believe that short, swift thrusts can annihilate the enemy, or win a victory in the entire battle, and thus neglect this kind of battle, then it is even more dangerous and harmful.

Finally, let me cite Comrade Hua Fu's words to conclude this article of mine!

"We should especially point out the greatest danger in simplification and mechanical application of tactical principles. The enemy's tactics and ours are both in the process of evolving, changing, and maturing. If we are content with these tactical principles, we will lag behind the current situation of the war. Therefore, we must study the experience of each battle to supplement and change our tactics. In this creative enterprise we must create the most important preconditions for our ultimate victory." (See *Revolution and War*, no. 4, 7.)

D.21 All for the Defense of the Soviet. *Zhang Wentian* (29 September 1934)⁷³

The bloody battles of the past year or more to defend the soviet area and resist the fifth "encirclement and suppression" [campaign] by the imperialists and the GMD have attested to the truth, for the people all over China as well as the rest of the world, that the political power of the worker-peasant soviet is an invincible and unconquerable force. No airplanes or big guns or any type of new weapons, not watchtowers or blockhouses or blockading lines can possibly stop the expansion of the soviet campaign throughout the country. The seeds of the soviet, with the movements of the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Brigade and the Sixth Army Corps, have been scattered extensively to western Zhejiang, southern Anhui, and distant places such as western Hunan and northern Guizhou. The blockhouse warfare in Gaohumao of Banqiao in the Central Soviet Area inflicted 5,000 to 6,000 casualties on the enemy troops; the night battle at Wenfang annihilated five of the enemy's

regiments, dealing a heavy blow to the enemy on the north and east fronts; in Sichuan, the red Fourth Front Army, with its valiant counterattacks, recovered all the soviet areas it had evacuated from, striking a fatal blow to Liu Xiang's army.⁷⁴

The battles of the past year or more to defend the soviet areas and resist the fifth "encirclement and suppression" by the imperialists and the GMD have greatly excited and revolutionized all the nations in the east as well as the people all over China, making them see that they are truly powerful and spurring them to struggle ever more courageously and audaciously for the defeat of the imperialists, for the overthrow of rule by the landlord and bourgeoisie classes, and for their own emancipation. Under the circumstances where the imperialist powers are directly carving up China, and Japan has annexed half our territory, while the nation's economy is disintegrating and the famine caused by flood and drought is widely spreading, the masses of workers and peasants and all the revolutionary people throughout the country are speedily abandoning the GMD and going over to the soviet.

The struggle of the past year or more to defend the soviet areas and resist the fifth "encirclement and suppression" by the imperialists and the GMD has greatly tempered and strengthened our soviet and the Red Army, giving our party the most profound experience of fighting a revolutionary war. This is demonstrated by the fact that we have learned and are still learning how to use, in a flexible manner, all kinds of methods of struggle to achieve our goal of defending the soviet areas and defeating the fifth "encirclement and suppression." In our effort to defend the soviet areas and smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression," the main force of our Red Army did its best to wipe out the effective enemy forces in mobile warfare; at the same time, however, we made use of blockhouse warfare for the same purposes and did our best to inflict huge casualties on the enemy in front of our own defenses. The battle at Gaohumao of Banqiao was an excellent model of this kind of blockhouse warfare. In order to defend the soviet areas and smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression," we sought the opportunity to fight decisive battles with the main enemy forces within the soviet boundaries, while for the same purposes we divided our main forces and sent part of them deep into the enemy's rear areas, where they aroused the masses to struggle, began guerrilla warfare, crippled the enemy's armed forces, built up new effective forces for the Red Army, and opened up new soviet areas so as to pull the enemy forces back to their own homes and annihilate them there. It was for the sake of this positive task, and not for the mere purpose of causing the disintegration of the enemy forces in their rear, that the Anti-Japanese Vanguard troops and the Sixth Army Corps were dispatched. In order to defend the soviet areas and smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression," sometimes we had to give up some of our soviet areas and cities temporarily when pressed by a preponderance of the enemy forces, so that we could shorten our battlefront and concentrate our strength to obtain a tactical superiority over the enemy and secure victories in decisive battles. That was how the Fourth Front Army won an unprecedented victory in Sichuan. However, in other places, where the enemy fortresses formed ring after ring of blockading lines, it was necessary to break through the

blockade and transfer the Red Army to other places, so that its effective forces could thus be preserved and would be able to continue its efforts to smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" under new and favorable conditions. A good case in point would be the E-Yu-Wan Soviet, where our effective forces were preserved by this kind of transfer and were finally able to win a partial victory. The guerrilla warfare of the masses that has sprung up everywhere in coordination with the sudden attacks of the main forces of the Red Army is also carried on for the same purpose of defending the soviet areas and smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression."

In our struggle to defend the soviet areas and smash the fifth "encirclement and suppression" by the imperialists and the GMD, we did not let any chance go by to make use of conflicts within the enemy ranks so as to create conditions favorable for the completion of our basic tasks. The conclusion of the treaty with the Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian for military operations against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek was a brilliant success of ours in this respect, though we failed to achieve what should have been possible to achieve owing to the pitiable and swift collapse of the "people's revolutionary government." However, we shall not because of this forsake the methods of struggle, i.e., making use of the enemy's internal conflicts and allowing concessions to the enemy on certain conditions. Lately, some warlords inside the GMD offered us concessions under various conditions with respect to opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, and certainly we will not refuse to make use of these opportunities.

In the white areas, it is clear to all how, in response to the actions of the soviet and the Red Army, and in order to assist our safeguarding of the soviet areas and smashing the enemy's "encirclement and suppression," our party carries on the mass campaign against Japan and other imperialist powers and exercises leadership among the masses in the "committee for armed self-defense of the Chinese nation" (which has its own definite program of struggle), in the People's Revolutionary Army of Manchuria, and in guerrilla warfare; how it leads the workers in their strikes, the peasants in seizing grain from landlords and distributing it among themselves, in refusing to pay taxes and contributions, in the struggle to seize land, in uprisings and soldiers in mutiny, etc. Every mass struggle in the white areas is, without exception, most closely linked to the actions of the soviet and the Red Army.

We were able to achieve such great success precisely because our party has learned, and is still learning, how to use all possible methods of struggle against the enemy in defending the soviet areas and smashing the "encirclement and suppression." A Leninist party follows faithfully these instructions:

[[Marxists are different from all primitive socialists in that they do not tie up the movement with a singular fixed method of struggle but acknowledge all kinds of struggle methods. Marxists never confine themselves to those struggle methods that only exist at that time; they acknowledge that given changes in the social situation new struggle methods that are unknown to those engaged in the present movement are unavoidable.]]

Our party, which is faithful to Leninism, acknowledges all means of struggle in defending the soviet areas and smashing the fifth "encirclement and suppression." It

does not abstractly repeat from memory slogans or political resolutions, but, rather, by analyzing and understanding the concrete circumstances, decides what is the most proper method of struggle to be adopted at a given time and changes its struggle methods along with changes in circumstances. In this respect, admittedly, our party is still learning through struggle and learning creatively and dialectically to employ and master the various methods of struggle in the same way as Marx, Lenin, and Stalin did. Lenin said:

[[If an army is not prepared to use all the weapons, all the means of struggle, and all the methods of combat that its enemy possesses and is likely to possess, one can say that the attitude of this army is not only silly but also effectively evil. It is even more so in politics than in the military. (*Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*.)]]

The battle lines of the Civil War are being drawn up throughout China. As circumstances differ and the ratio of the enemy's forces to ours varies on each battle front, we must use a variety of different methods of struggle in order to win final victory in the war. Given the present political situation of the revolutionary war and the foreign interference in China, our party's general offensive line must by no means be interpreted as meaning that we can achieve victory only by persisting in an offensive method of struggle. This interpretation sees the revolution as a rising, linear, and continually victorious movement, or as a singular, short-term decisive battle fought out on only one front or with a sudden attack. Based on such an abstract understanding of the revolution as this, one is bound to come up with all kinds of "abstract formulas" or "dogmatic prescriptions" to restrain one's own activities. The consequences are obvious: either we fetter our movement with one fixed manner of struggle, or we give up leadership over other struggles as a result of our prejudice and rigidity.

Lenin once said:

Socialist Revolution (i.e., the worker-peasant democratic revolution in the case of China—[author's note]) is not merely an action or a life-and-death struggle on one battlefield; it is a vehement clash between classes, a long-term life-and-death fight on all fronts and throughout the period, a life-and-death fight over political and economic matters, which will only be terminated with the seizure of the possessions of the bourgeoisie. (See *On the Question of the National Revolution*, p. 18.)

The battle lines of the Civil War are being drawn up throughout China. In line with the real situation of the time on various fronts, we adopt different forms of struggle for attack, counterattack, defense, or even retreat. Without exception, they are used to carry out the party's general offensive line and achieve the complete victory of the soviet revolution. This Civil War is a long-term, life-and-death combat; it cannot be completed in a few days or a few months or even a few years. In the course of this decisive struggle, it is possible that we will win unprecedented

great victories in some areas, while in others we may suffer a certain degree of defeat. However, this defeat of a certain degree cannot cause our organization to disintegrate or dissolve, or shake our entire battlefield, or prevent the Chinese soviet movement as a whole from moving forward.

The lack of understanding of this basic issue in the Chinese revolution will lead to all manner of opportunistic vacillation within our ranks. The dogmatists attempt to squeeze every aspect of real, complicated life into their formulas; they demand that our party adopt some abstract formula or cure-all prescription of theirs: either we defend our soviet areas, fighting regardless of the cost, to the last person on our territory, surviving or perishing with every inch of soviet land, or we abandon the soviet areas, giving up the soviet revolution, retreating and running for our lives. To defend the soviet areas with every possible means, as we have discussed above, is something beyond the comprehension of the dogmatists. Individualistic heroism with no regard to the cost of lives, defeatism, and escapism are the only solutions these dogmatists can offer. Obviously they have absolutely nothing in common with the soviet line. We want to gather all our might to defend our soviet areas and smash the "encirclement and suppression" by the enemy; but every method of struggle we employ must perforce be the most detrimental to the enemy and the most constructive to us. We are opposed to all abstract formulas or cure-all prescriptions.

Opportunists of all kinds, because of their lack of understanding of this basic problem of the revolution, tend to predict the outcome of the overall soviet revolutionary movement from observing only one side of the overall Civil War and to forecast the fate of the whole battle from defeat or victory on only one front. A few military victories on a certain front will make them wild with joy and turn their heads so that they will conclude that the revolution will triumph the next day, that we will be able to capture Nanchang and Shanghai tomorrow. Thus, they give up the protracted, persistent, and relentless effort to struggle for greater victories. On the other hand, once the revolution meets some obstacle or comes to a standstill and is unable to be victorious the next day, these "revolutionaries" will become pessimistic and hopeless, losing confidence and faith in the future of the revolution. Here, although from opposite viewpoints, the left opportunists are identical to the right opportunists. These right opportunists, on seeing that the enemy and our forces are locked in a stalemate, or that for the purpose of gaining more favorable political and military conditions we move to another area or shorten our battle line, immediately cry out that the soviet revolution has been defeated and the counterrevolution has won a victory. They are driven to despair and resignation. Depending on the outcome of a particular struggle, these opportunists are now elated and in high spirits, now pessimistic and discouraged. They are unable to see all aspects of the struggle or the essence of the whole civil war. They have no idea how to employ in a flexible manner every means of struggle to conquer the extremely vicious enemy.

Our Bolshevik party must wage a struggle against these types of opportunists so as to show all our party members and the broad masses of the people how, in following the instructions of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, we can accomplish the historic

task of defending the soviet areas and smashing the fifth “encirclement and suppression.” Lenin said: [[At a time when intensifying class struggle has developed into a civil war the CP must play a leading role. It goes without saying that it is an arduous task. It cannot be achieved with only one try.]]

The CCP has effectively tempered, educated, and transformed itself in the Civil War of the past few years and has become the unconquerable, the unshakable, and the only resolute leader of the soviet revolution. But it will not remain content with what it has already achieved. The completion of the great historic task of China’s soviet revolution requires that under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and with the utmost firmness and courage the CCP fight the enemy on all fronts, oppose the vacillation of all kinds of opportunists, and continue to learn to use freely and flexibly every means of struggle to strike at the enemy and doom it to destruction.

Let us hold aloft the banner of the soviet, carry on the vigorous and flexible spirit displayed by the First and Third Army Corps—i.e., tenacious in defense, firm in offense, fierce in pursuit and attack—and fight a bloody war in order to defend the soviet areas and smash the fifth “encirclement and suppression” by the enemy! We will win this bloody war; we can and must win at all costs!

D.22 The Outline Resolution of the Enlarged Politburo Meeting on Summing Up Experiences and Lessons in Smashing the Fifth “Encirclement Campaign” (28 February 1935)⁷⁵

1) The main points of the resolution of the Enlarged Politburo meeting are as follows. The general political line of the party in the fifth “encirclement” was correct, and what essentially caused the failure to break the encirclement were subjective factors, not objective ones. In other words, it was because we committed the mistake of a pure defense line in military command, which did not accord with the basic strategic and tactical laws of the Chinese Civil War.

2) In the fifth “encirclement,” the enemy adopted the strategy and tactics of a protracted war and the principle of fortresses, attempting to wear out our human and material resources, to compress our soviet base, and eventually to search out our main forces for a decisive battle to destroy us. Under such circumstances, our strategic line should have been decisive-battle defense [*juezhān fāngyù*] or offensive defense—concentrating superior forces, ferreting out the enemy’s weaknesses, applying mobile warfare to destroy a part or a large part of the enemy with confidence, and defeating the enemy troops one by one in order to crush the encirclement.

3) What we adopted, however, was a pure defense line or solely protective defense instead of decisive-battle defense, and a positional war of fortresses instead of a mobile war, coupled with the so-called tactical principle of “short, swift thrusts” as a support to this strategic line of pure defense. This enabled the enemy’s

strategy and tactics of a protracted war and the principle of fortresses to achieve its aims, inflict partial losses on the Red Army, and force it to leave the Central Soviet. This line is totally opposed to the basic strategic and tactical principles with which the Red Army has won victories.

4) The pure defense line called for resisting the enemy's attacks on all fronts but, in the end, it gave the enemy chances to break in on all fronts and did not allow us to resist on any front. It was afraid of the enemy's occupying one single place or city but, eventually, had to give up the entire soviet area. The reasons for decisive-battle defense are that, first, we should search for favorable opportunities to engage the enemy in decisive battles and then shift to counterattacks and offensives. Then, under unfavorable conditions, we should refuse any decisive battles, withdraw our main forces back to a suitable distance, transfer them to the rear or flanks of the enemy and concentrate them in secret, induce the enemy to commit mistakes and expose weaknesses by tiring and wearing him out and confusing him, and thus enable ourselves to attain a victory in a decisive battle. In order to find favorable opportunities, it may be all right for us to abandon a part or even a large part of the soviet territory. So long as the decisive battle is won and the encirclement broken, not only can the lost soviet base be recovered, it can also be expanded.

5) To resist the enemy on all fronts, the pure defense line often dispersed our forces and at the same time rejected mobile warfare. This dispersal of forces, particularly that of the First and Third Army Corps, caused many opportunities to win victories in the fifth campaign to be lost. Comrade Hua Fu's [Braun] theory of "short, swift thrusts" in fact abolished mobile warfare, and his positional warfare could only be to the benefit of the enemy and to the detriment of the Red Army. The forceful attacks on the enemy's fortresses could only result in consuming the Red Army's strength.

6) Under the present tactical conditions, the principle of fortresses can be smashed only by relying on mobile warfare. That is to say, within the ring of fortresses, wipe out enemy troops in great numbers when they are advancing; beyond it, shift the Red Army to operate in those vast areas without fortresses and compel the enemy to leave its fortresses to engage us in a mobile war. The pure defense line rejected mobile warfare and hence was unable to break the principle of fortresses. It even raised the argument that under the principle of fortresses we could achieve no more than small tactical successes, which is actually tantamount to surrender to the strategy of fortresses.

7) To cope with the enemy's protracted war, we must, under favorable conditions, conduct counterattacks or offensives resolutely, rapidly, and valiantly to smash the encirclement whereas, under unfavorable conditions, we may adopt a strategic retreat to avoid engagement, to preserve our substantial strength, and to await and create favorable opportunities for new counterattacks and offensives. With a strong Red Army maintained intact, the temporarily lost soviet can be rebuilt. Furthermore, new soviet areas can only be created by depending on the Red Army. At the same time, the Red Army must be allowed some time for rest,

recruitment, education, and training. The pure defense line could not break the encirclement on the one hand while it exhausted our own strength on the other. In both respects it served the requirements of the enemy's protracted war.

8) One of the important conditions that enables the Red Army to defeat the encirclement is the exploitation of every conflict among the reactionaries. The mutiny of the Nineteenth Route Army offered us favorable conditions, but militarily we did not exploit it at all.⁷⁶

9) Fundamental mistakes were committed as regards changing the strategy and breaking through the siege. The desperate, aimless fight against the enemy in the soviet, even after the decision to withdraw had been reached, greatly wore out the Red Army's strength. The withdrawal from the soviet became a flight in panic and a sort of moving house operation. There was no explanation to the cadres and masses concerning such a shift in strategy; the formation of giant rear area organizations was detrimental to the conduct of operations by an army on the march; the transformation of all combat troops into guard units and, above all, the strategic policy made it impossible to create any necessary favorable opportunities to engage the enemy in decisive battles. The original principle was not changed; thus we always placed ourselves in a passive position, suffering the attacks of the enemy, losing a large number of Red Army soldiers, and being unable to reach our original destination. There are only two prospects for the pure defense line: either desperate adventure or panicky flight.

10) The resolution also refers to Comrade Hua Fu's rude method of leadership that caused some extremely abnormal phenomena in the Military Council. It points out that the pure defense line is a concrete manifestation of right opportunism. In the past the Secretariat and the Politburo did not exert adequate leadership over the Military Council. They paid utmost attention to the rapid recruitment of the Red Army and the supply of material, and other tasks at the rear, but paid very little attention to exercising any direct strategic and tactical leadership, not clearly realizing that military command decides successes or failures in a war and blunders in military command may turn the best work at the rear into nothing. In this respect, Comrade Bo Gu should bear most of the blame. At the same time, it is stated that these mistakes of Comrade Bo Gu did not amount to a mistake in the political line as a whole, though they were serious partial political mistakes.

11) Finally, the resolution states that the present circumstances are still favorable for us to create a new soviet. The transformation of the nine soviet bases into guerrilla areas is merely a partial setback in the soviet revolutionary movement as a whole, which should not in the least cause us any panic regarding its future. In fact, it is impossible for the imperialists and the GMD to arrest even temporarily the development of the soviet revolutionary movement in China. The success of the Second and Sixth Army Corps and that of the Fourth Front Army; the success of the Central Red Army in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan; and the revolutionary struggles throughout the country have proved that the soviet revolution as a whole is heading forward. At the same time, serious tasks confront the whole party. It should

be pointed out that any new soviet can be created only through bloody struggles. The most crucial issues at present are to strive all out to defeat the troops of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan and those of Chiang Kai-shek, to strengthen and enlarge the Red Army, to develop and organize the struggles of the broad masses, to dissolve the white armies and to continue guerrilla warfare in the Central Soviet, in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet, and in other guerrilla areas. It is a combat task now to apply, precisely and skillfully, basic strategic and tactical laws in order to win victory. As we believe these tasks can be fulfilled, we must win.

D.23 Outline for Communicating the Zunyi Enlarged Politburo Meeting. *Chen Yun* (February–March 1935)⁷⁷

The convocation of the Enlarged Politburo meeting at Zunyi was decided on earlier at the Politburo meeting at Liping on the basis of various debates in south Hunan and Daotong.⁷⁸ The objectives of the meeting were: (1) to examine and resolve the issue proposed at the Liping Conference as regards establishing a temporary soviet base with north Guizhou as its center, and (2) to review the experiences and lessons in military command in the fifth anti-“encirclement campaign” and the Western March.⁷⁹ The Enlarged Politburo meeting was convened right after the capture of Zunyi by the Red Army. In addition to the full and alternate members of the Politburo, the participants also included the commanders and political commissars of the First and Third Army Corps, Lin, Nie, Peng, and Yang; the political commissar of the Fifth Army Corps, Li Zhuoran; the director of the General Political Department, Li; and the chief-of-staff, Liu.⁸⁰ In three days the meeting reached its resolutions.

1) The enlarged meeting reached a unanimous decision to change the resolution of the Liping Conference on establishing a soviet base centered in north Guizhou and, instead, it was unanimously decided that the Red Army should go across the Yangtze River to set up a soviet base to the southwest or the northwest of Chengdu. The reason for this decision was that Sichuan had better conditions than Guizhou politically, economically, and militarily (with its easier access to the Fourth Front Army and its back to the enemy-free region of Xikang).

(Looking at this decision from the perspective of today, we should criticize it as one merely pronounced in fairly abstract terms concerning the establishment of a soviet base, without providing a concrete understanding and assessment of the enemy’s situation and all the possibilities, and without searching for concrete measures to fulfill this goal. Furthermore, some comrades underestimated the strength of the enemy troops in Sichuan, and later on, precisely because of that, we failed to achieve the purpose of crossing the river to enter Sichuan and had to retreat from Weixin back to north Guizhou.)

2) A review of errors in opposing the enemy's fifth "encirclement" and in the Western March.

A) The enlarged meeting holds that the resolution of the Politburo on smashing the fifth "encirclement" of the imperialists and the GMD, which was adopted after breaking the fourth "Encirclement," is correct.⁸¹ The Enlarged Politburo meeting objects to the report of Comrade Bo Gu, which in fact ascribes the failure in defending the soviet and breaking the fifth "encirclement" mainly to objective factors such as the support of the GMD by the imperialists, the shortage of coordination between the anti-imperialist and revolutionary movements in the white areas. The report does not clearly attribute to our mistakes in military command the level of importance they deserve among those other factors. (Of course, Comrade Bo Gu also mentioned in his report the subjective mistakes in military command and apparently did not put this factor in a secondary place.) This attitude is actually one of right opportunism, attempting to cover up the errors in military command and refusing to draw any lessons.

The enlarged meeting believes that our failure in protecting the Central Soviet and breaking the fifth "encirclement," besides various important objective reasons, is due mainly to the basically wrong strategy and tactics of our military command.

The enlarged meeting regards the general political line of the party at that time as generally correct, and the work at the rear in the soviet area as exemplary and commendable. Nevertheless, because the military command constituted a major part of the party's general political line in the Civil War and because our military command in that period and in the Western March was basically mistaken, we were unable to fulfill our own task in terms of protecting the soviet base and successfully breaking up the fifth "encirclement" as well as reaching west Hunan, the prescribed destination of the Western March.

The enlarged meeting does not deem the fifth "encirclement" to be a complete success for Chiang Kai-shek. Not only did the main forces of the Red Army break through the heavy sieges, but they survived and are developing in Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Hunan. On the other hand, the military strength of Chiang Kai-shek has been weakened through one-and-a-half years' bloody fighting in the fifth "encirclement."

The Enlarged meeting believes that the soviet movement in China is not at all declining, but still keeps developing. [This is shown by] the successes of the Red Armies in several soviets, the activities of the Central Red Army, and the upsurges of the anti-imperialist movement and the collapse of the national economy under GMD rule. The soviet movement has deep historical roots in China, and both the Chinese soviet movement and the Red Army are invincible foes.

B) Why do we say that the military command was basically wrong? (The time from the fifth "encirclement" to the arrival of the Western March in Zunyi is divided into four periods.)

First Period: From the smashing of the fourth "encirclement" to the Battle of Pengkou before signing the military agreement with the Nineteenth Route Army.⁸²

First of all, in this period, after the victory in the battles of Donggpi and Huangpi (the fourth "encirclement" was thus smashed), an insufficient assessment of this

victory delayed the main forces of the Red Army for a short while at the northern front. Afterward, it started operating toward the Min River to open a new battlefield in the east. That is good. The Battle of Pengkou was won. That is also good, and the command in this period was generally correct. The greatest mistake, however, was the failure to concentrate the main forces. Only the Third Army Corps and a weaker local army corps were fighting with the Nineteenth Route Army in a decisive battle. If we had gathered more troops at the eastern front then, we could have achieved far greater successes than we actually did.

Second Period: From the signing of the military agreement with the Nineteenth Route Army to the defeat and the enemy's capture of the strategic point, Lichuan.

In this period, it was right for the Party Center to decide to make a military agreement with the Nineteenth Route Army. But the military command at that time did not measure up to the political demands: instead of striking through the Jian-Li-Tai region⁸³ to attack the flanks of Chiang Kai-shek's troops moving toward Yanping, we transferred the main forces of the Red Army to operate along the Gan River. By the time Comrade Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] (he was a member of the Military Council) realized this and raised a protest and the Red Army turned to the east and arrived at Yong'an and Shaxian, the situation of the People's Government in Fujian had already changed. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek brought the eastern front under his control and from it launched active assaults on the soviet. Meanwhile, Lichuan was lost because of the errors of a certain army commander [Xiao Jingguang].

The Enlarged Politburo meeting believes that if we could have had correct military command, we most probably would have crushed the fifth "encirclement" and the national situation would have been an entirely different one—to the benefit of the growth of the revolutionary and soviet movements.

Third Period: From the Battle of Guangchang after the defeat of the Nineteenth Route Army to the departure of the main forces of the Red Army on the Western March.

This is the period of the fiercest engagement in the fifth "encirclement," when the enemy applied the utmost force to suppress us inside the soviet. It is also in this period that we committed severe blunders in military command. Instead of trying our best to pursue mobile warfare and operate on the enemy's flanks, we adopted the strategy and tactics of positional warfare and a direct confrontation with the enemy's blockhouses, and invented "red blockhouses" to resist the enemy. The confrontation of "red blockhouses" and enemy blockhouses gave rise to the well-known tactics of "short, swift thrusts," thus repudiating the tactics of destroying the enemy with mobile warfare and of any maneuvers on the exterior line and at the rear and flanks of the enemy. Consequently, palatial blockhouses were built everywhere along the border of the soviet (naturally this does not mean that we need not build any blockhouses in certain strategic places), and we depended on these blockhouses and fortifications to resist the enemy. Such tactics totally exposed our main forces as well as our weaknesses to the enemy so that his air force and artillery could cooperate with his infantry divisions and regiments in attacking us at identified targets. Consequently, we could only be engaged with the enemy in "mutual

attrition” (which was no good for us); many of our red blockhouses were destroyed by bombers and guns, and some were occupied by the enemy and used as offensive strongholds against the soviet.

The tactics of “short, swift thrusts” prevented us from winning the successes which we could have had in mobile warfare (e.g., the Battle of Longgang), and caused us to suffer immensely great losses under the strong firepower of the enemy. When the enemy troops, several times stronger than ours, were attacking us, eventually we could not but retreat from the red blockhouse zones (e.g., Jianning, Taining, and Guangchang). In the battles of Guangchang, Sanxiyu, Taiyangzhang, and Shicheng, and in many engagements after our withdrawal from the soviet, “short, swift thrusts” also caused us major losses. In each battle there would be two or three thousand Red Army soldiers killed or wounded, and, for a short while, all the veteran company leaders in the Third Army Corps were either dead or wounded. The Military Council ordered the Thirteenth Division to go all out to defend the city of Xingguo even two days before the commencement of the Western March. The result of “short, swift thrusts” was that all the new soldiers, enrolled from Red May 1933 to September 1934 and amounting to more than 150,000 or nearly 200,000, were lost, all owing to this method—except for some losses caused by weaknesses in our political work and errors in mobilizing the Red Army.

Fourth Period: From the start of the Western March to the Liping Conference. The military command and organizational policy were generally wrong, as stated previously.

Summing up the above four periods, we can conclude that our strategy and tactics in military command were basically wrong.

C) The pure defense line of right opportunism.

The enlarged meeting regards the strategy applied by the military leadership at that time as one of the pure defense line. The political origins of this strategy lay in a lack of confidence in our capability to defeat the enemy’s principle of fortresses.

The manifestations of the pure defense line are as follows:

a) The rejection of mobile warfare and operations at the rear and the flanks of the enemy.

b) The attempt to protect the soviet base by relying on the red blockhouses and undertaking a war of attrition. (This is a mechanistic application of the slogan “Never lose an inch of soviet land” to military tactics.)

c) The enemy attacked us along six routes, so we divided our forces to resist him. In this way we put ourselves in a passive position and were unable to concentrate our main forces so that on each front we were weak and were beaten everywhere.

Although it is incorrect to deny the special features of the enemy’s strategy of blockhouses in the fifth “encirclement,” still there were opportunities, and quite a few opportunities, for us to lure the enemy in deep. Just because our tactics required us to make attacks as soon as the enemy started out—three or five *li*—the enemy became ever more cautious and set up fortresses step by step. At the beginning of the fifth [“encirclement”] campaign, the enemy built one fortress every ten or fifteen *li*, but

later, thanks to our “short, swift thrusts,” he learned to build three or five block-houses within one *li*. Take the Battle of Longgang for example. We launched an attack when the enemy stretched out for only five *li*. Thus, the main forces of the Red Army were exposed and the enemy quickly turned back to its blockhouse strongholds. In the end, we could only capture one enemy battalion in the battle in which we might have obtained a giant victory. There were countless examples like this. The many campaigns cited by the army corps leaders are all illustrations of this mistaken method. They said, “In the battle we got orders from the Military Council, and knew that we would fight hard for no merit even before we set out. But we had to obey the orders.” The Battle of Wenfang, which was fought against Li Yannian’s column at the eastern front shortly before the withdrawal from the soviet, was a major success (with over 1,000 men and rifles captured). That this success was achieved, however, is precisely because the leaders of the First Army Corps did not follow the orders of the Military Council—strike the enemy and defend Wenfang by all means—but operated on their own initiative. They retreated from Wenfang back to the soviet area for twenty *li* (but they were unable to sleep well for two days and nights for fear of being scolded by the Military Council), lured the enemy to march on carelessly, far from its fortresses, and defeated it. At the later stage we merely divided our troops for resistance and, except for the Seventh Army Corps, which was named the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Brigade and was dispatched to the north, no action whatsoever was taken at the rear and flanks of the enemy.

As for the slogan of using the red fortresses to resist the enemy’s fortresses, everybody understands clearly that such a kind of “reckless battle of attrition” is extremely detrimental to us in our present situation.

The method of dividing the troops to resist the enemy did not simply bring us into a completely passive position. The enemy often feigned an attack to draw the Red Army’s attention at one front and produced a forceful attack at another, with the result that Red Army troops ran around, became exhausted, and suffered otherwise avoidable losses. It went against the basic principle that under the condition of fighting on interior lines in the present Civil War, the Red Army must concentrate its main forces—concentrate superior forces to strike at the weak points of the enemy—and defeat its troops one by one and disrupt its strategy of coming in different routes to attack one focal spot. Since our division of troops for resistance obstructed the concentration of our main forces, in many battles we could not win victories as we should have. After the Battle of Wenfang, two enemy divisions were rushed in for reinforcement—continuing their risky advance—but we could not win another victory because we did not bring in additional army corps.

While such errors in military command persisted, controversies occurred within the party and the Military Council. Mao [Zedong], Zhang [Wentian], and Wang [Jiaxiang] raised many objections, and even Comrade [Zhou] Enlai expressed his disagreement concerning some individual battles, but such mistakes could not be successfully overcome. The leaders of all the army corps, especially those of the First and Third Army Corps, expressed their opinions about the combat plans in

numerous proposals and telegrams as well as in “detailed reports” on each battle. Unfortunately, none of them was accepted.

The enlarged meeting points out that while the three comrades A [Braun], Bo [Gu], and Zhou [Enlai] constituted the erroneous military leadership, the two comrades A and Bo must bear the main responsibility.

The enlarged meeting points out that the correction of the erroneous military leadership in the party is not a split in the party. On the contrary, it makes the party more united, puts the military leadership on the right track, and further increases the prestige of the party and the Military Council. All vacillating, discouraged, and pessimistic elements have not the least bit in common with the advancing Bolsheviks. The enlarged meeting calls for opposing all right opportunist trends while refuting the pure defense line in military command.

D) Finally, the enlarged meeting made the following decisions:

- i) Comrade Mao Zedong has been elected a member of the Standing Committee.
- ii) Comrade Luo Fu [Zhang Wentian] is designated to draft the resolution, which will be examined by the Standing Committee before being distributed to the branches for discussion.
- iii) Suitable work assignments will be made within the Standing Committee.
- iv) The Three-Man Group has been abolished, and the supreme military leaders, Zhu [De] and Zhou, will reassume the military command, with Comrade Enlai being entrusted by the party with the final decisive responsibility for military command.

At the enlarged meeting, Comrade Enlai and other comrades entirely agreed with the proposal and remarks made by Luo Fu together with Mao and Wang. Comrade Bo Gu did not thoroughly admit his mistakes; Comrade Kai Feng did not agree with the views of Mao, Zhang, and Wang; and Comrade A totally and firmly rejected the criticism of himself.

Work assignments in the Standing Committee were made after the enlarged meeting ended. Comrade Zedong was appointed as the assistant to Comrade Enlai in military command. It was also decided that when the resolution was sent down to the branches for discussion, the name of Comrade Hua Fu could be pointed out. (Hua Fu is another name of A. Under this name, he published in *Revolution and War*, the organ of the Military Council, many articles, particularly those on “short, swift thrusts.”) Comrade Bo Gu’s name could be mentioned only at meetings of cadres higher than the regimental rank.

After the resolution was sent out, all members of the Standing Committee, Mao, Zhang, and Chen [Yun], went to the various army corps communicating and propagating the resolution at meetings of cadres. The resolution of the enlarged meeting was warmly welcomed at all these meetings.

On the way from Zunyi to Weixin, the Standing Committee in assigning tasks, decided to replace Comrade Bo Gu with Comrade Luo Fu as the person with overall responsibility.

Notes to Commentary D

1. The war had lasted from May 1930 and spread over some ten provinces, mostly in North China.

2. For the fullest account of these events see Stephen C. Averill, “The Origins of the Futian Incident,” in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*. Averill points out that the origins of the name A.B. League are not certain. While it is popularly referred to as the Anti-Bolshevik League, he suggests that the name derives from the two levels (the “A” or provincial level and the “B” or local level) on which the group operated.

3. “Zhu De Peng Dehuai Huang Gonglüe wei Futian shibian xuanyan” (Statement by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Huang Gonglüe on the Futian Incident), 17 December 1930. The statement can be found in Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930–34*, vol. 2, *The Chinese Documents*, p. 259. The letter was issued from Huangpi in Jiangxi.

4. See the minutes of the eight meetings of the General Front Committee held from 25 May to 10 June 1932, in the History Department of Fudan University (comp.), *Zhongyang hongjun wuci fan “weijiao” ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 105–17. These minutes provide an interesting example of how meetings were conducted under Mao.

5. Yang Yunruo, *Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi jishi 1919–1943*.

6. This is the date that is used in official publications and is still followed by PRC historians. See, for example, the Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, p. 91. Some contemporary evidence suggests that the Party Center moved as early as 1931. Here it is suggested that movement of key personnel did begin in 1931 but that the formal organization did not move until January 1933. However, the Provisional Party Center in Shanghai was a largely ineffectual rump at this time.

7. Both Mao Zedong and Zhu De were members.

8. See “Zhongyangju tonggao dierhao—dui Futian shibian de jueyi” (Central Bureau Circular No. 2—Resolution on the Futian Incident), in Hsiao, *Power Relations*, vol. 2, pp. 391–97.

9. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, pp. 159–60.

10. This conference is formally referred to as the First Party Congress of the Central Soviet, and it was held from 1 to 5 November 1931. Mao delivered the main report on behalf of the Central Soviet. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, pp. 127–29.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

12. There is a sharp contrast between the documentary evidence on this event and Zhang Guotao's memoirs. See Zhang Guotao, *Wode huiyi*, vol. 3, p. 938.

13. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 164.

14. On these two points see C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 218–19.

15. This was drafted by the Party Center in preparation for the Congress. See “Suweiai diyici quanguo dahui tudi fa cao'an” (The First All-China Soviet Congress Draft Land Law), in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 181–83.

16. A translation of this telegram can be found in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, book 2, pp. 413–14.

17. In fact, the Ningdu Conference was the only occasion on which Mao was so directly and strongly criticized. Wang Jiaxiang is said to have been the only participant not to have spoken against Mao. In addition, the conference was attended by, among others, Zhu De, Gu Zuolin, and Deng Fa but Zhou Enlai was not present. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 133.

18. As with Mao in Jiangxi, Zhang Guotao changed his policy to suit changing circumstances. The communist revolution was itself a radical venture, and the Communists often needed to adopt radical policies for their own practical interests. The real issue is not to judge an individual CCP member simply from the radical or moderate position they adopted at any one time, but to look at the circumstances and underlying motives that led them to adopt such a position.

19. See the letter from the Party Center to the Provincial Party Committee of the E-Yu-Wan Soviet Area, 15 March 1933, in Yu Jinan, *Zhang Guotao he "Wode huiyi,"* p. 177.

20. In fact already on 18 November, Cai Tingkai had placed the Fujian branches of the Central Bank and the Maritime Customs Office under his control. On 19 November he imposed martial law and on 20 November the People's Revolutionary Government was declared. See F.S. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," in *Republican China*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1988): 58.

21. In addition to the political report, Chen Yun delivered a report on the workers' economic struggle and trade union work in the GMD-ruled areas and Zhang Wentian delivered a report on the soviet movement and its tasks. Both were adopted as resolutions. See "Wuzhong quanhai guanyu baisequchengzhong jingji douzheng yu gonghui gongzuode jueyi" (Resolution of the Fifth Plenum on the Economic Struggles and Trade Union Work in the White Areas), in *Douzheng* (Struggle), vol. 50, no. 11 (March 1934): 1-12; and "Wuzhong quanhai gei erci quansu dahui dangtuan de zhiling" (Instructions from the Fifth Plenum to the Party Fraction of the Second All-China Soviet Congress), in *Douzheng*, vol. 47, no. 16 (February 1934): 16-20.

22. Most scholars have used the list of newly elected Politburo members provided by Warren Kuo. While this list is more accurate than that provided by the Japanese scholar Hatano Kenichi, it did exclude Mao from the list. Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, p. 565. The lineup of the newly elected Politburo was as follows:

Full members: Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Xiang Ying, Wang Ming, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Ren Bishi, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong, and possibly Gu Zulin.

Alternates: Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Guan Xiangying, Deng Fa, and Kai Feng (Wang Kequan).

Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Li Fuchun, Li Weiham, and Kong Yuan were elected as alternates of the CC. The meeting also decided to establish a Central Secretariat (also referred to as the Standing Committee of the Politburo) with Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Xiang Ying as members. Bo Gu had overall responsibility.

See Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 136, and Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 190.

23. For a discussion of these and other differences of interpretation with the 1945 Resolution on Party History see Hsiao, *Power Relations*, vol. 2, pp. 271-72. For an analysis of the resolution and its construction see T. Saich, "Writing or Re-writing Party History? The Construction of a Maoist Party History," in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives*.

24. "Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui yu renmin weiyuanhui dui dierci quanguo suweiai daibiao dahui de baogao" (Report of the CEC and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Second All-China Soviet Congress), in Hsiao, *Power Relations*, vol. 2, pp. 702-27.

25. See, for example, R.C. Thornton, *China: A Political History, 1917-1980*, pp. 72-73, and D. Waller, *The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the Two National Congresses of 1931 and 1934*, pp. 84-98.

26. The Comintern praised Mao's speech as a "very significant historical document. We and the comrades in the Comintern regard it as a record of achievement of the Chinese soviet

movement and progress of the CCP. It also reflects the rich experiences of Comrade Mao Zedong.” “Letter of the CCP Mission to the Comintern to the CCP Politburo,” 6 September 1934. Mao’s speech and a few other articles of his were edited into a book in Moscow.

27. Contrary to Warren Kuo’s view, this decision does not seem to have been the result of a so-called Emergency Meeting of the CCP CC in early May. He makes this claim on the basis of information provided by Chen Jan. See Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 2, pp. 610–11. The account here is based on Otto Braun’s memoirs, *A Communist Agent in China, 1932–1939*, pp. 76–79.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

29. Originally, most Chinese and Western accounts gave the date of the meeting as 6 to 8 January. However, memoirs and documentary evidence now suggest a probable date of 15 to 18 January. On this point see B. Yang, “The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao’s Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party,” *China Quarterly*, no. 106 (June 1986): 236–39.

30. The meeting was attended by Politburo members Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu. Alternates: Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, and Kai Feng. Central military leaders: Liu Bocheng and Li Fuchun. Army Corps Commanders: Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, and Li Zhuoran. Comintern military advisor: Otto Braun. Also in attendance were Deng Xiaoping, possibly as a note taker, and Wu Xiuquan, who acted as interpreter for Braun. See “Guanyu Zunyi zhengzhiju kuangda huiyi ruogan qingkuangde diaocha baogao” (Investigative Report Concerning Certain Circumstances of the Zunyi Enlarged Politburo Meeting), Appendix to the Committee for the Collection of Materials on Party History of the CCP CC and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zunyi huiyi wenxian; Zunyi huiyide guangming*, pp. 126–27, and the Research Department on Party History of the CCP CC, *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, p. 102.

31. There is no evidence to support Wilson’s contention that Mao also criticized the political line; nor is there support for Kuo’s assertion that Liu Shaoqi had proposed a thorough review of party policy. D. Wilson, *The Long March*, p. 135, and Kuo, *Analytical History*, book 3, pp. 17–19, 42. See the Committee for the Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zunyi huiyi wenxian*, and *Zunyi huiyide guangming*; and The Memorial Hall of the Zunyi Conference (ed.), *Zhang Wentian yu Zunyi huiyi*.

32. This lengthier resolution was first published in The Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 669–78. The date of 8 January is incorrect. Official Chinese accounts now use the date of 17 January. See, for example, the reprint in the Committee for the Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zunyi huiyi wenxian*, p. 3. However, it seems most possible that after some of the military leaders left Zunyi on 17 January Politburo members stayed on to pass the necessary resolutions. A translation of this resolution can be found in J. Ch’en, “Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference,” *China Quarterly*, no. 40 (December 1965): 1–17.

33. As the German historian Kampen has noted, however, there was nothing inevitable about Mao’s rise from this point on, and indeed he could have been demoted again as had happened to him earlier. T. Kampen, “The Zunyi Conference and Further Steps in Mao’s Rise to Power,” *China Quarterly*, no. 117 (March 1989): 129.

34. “Bage da shengli de tiaojian,” in History Department of Fudan University (comp.), *Zhongyang hongjun*, pp. 37–43.

35. “Hongjun diyi fangmianjun zongqianwei dijiuci huiyi jilu,” in *ibid.*, pp. 140–41. The minutes stopped at 8:00 P.M. The meeting was held at the headquarters in Kangdu.

36. The A.B. (Anti-Bolshevik) League was an anticommunist group within the GMD in Jiangxi Province. It was formed by Duan Xipeng shortly before the CCP–GMD split in 1927 and formed a major anticommunist force in Jiangxi. For details of the origins of the league see Averill, “The Origins of the Futian Incident.”

37. The words are missing from the Chinese original.

38. "Guanyu Futian shibian de jueyi," in Jiangxi Provincial Archives (ed.), *Zhongyang geming genjudi ziliao xuanbian*, pp. 93–100. This was resolution number four adopted by the First Enlarged Meeting of the Central Bureau of the CCP Soviet.

39. The Social Democratic Party was organized in early 1931 with Chen Mingshu and Wang Xili among its leading figures. The Reorganization clique of the GMD had been founded by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo in winter 1928 and was disbanded in January 1931 when Wang joined the Nanjing government.

40. The Second Plenum of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee was held in July 1930. Its opposition to land redistribution was based on the May 1930 land law enacted by the Li Lisan leadership. It ran counter to the land policy that was adopted at the 7 February 1930 meeting dominated by Mao Zedong. The later meeting was a joint meeting of the party organs of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Red Armies and the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.

41. This refers to "Zhonggong suqu zhongyangju tonggao dishiyihao—jiuzheng geji dangbu zhixing zhongyangju jueyi de cuomi" (Central Bureau of the CCP Soviet Area Circular No. 11—Rectifying the Errors of Party Departments at All Levels in Implementing the Central Bureau's Decisions). It was issued on 19 February 1931. A copy can be found in Hsiao, *Power Relations*, vol. 2, pp. 281–82.

42. This refers to "Zhongyangju tonggao dierhao—dui Futian shibian de jueyi" (Central Bureau Circular No. 2—Resolution on the Futian Incident). It was issued on 16 January 1931. The Chinese text can be found in Hsiao, *Power Relations*, vol. 2, pp. 269–73; an English translation can be found in H. Pak (ed.), *Documents of the Chinese Communist Party 1927–1930*, pp. 605–11.

43. "Zhang Guotao zai fenju diyici kuangda huiyishangde zongjie," in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao wenti yanjiu ziliao*, pp. 296–304. These are Zhang Guotao's concluding comments at the First Enlarged Meeting of the E-Yu-Wan (Hubei-Henan-Anhui) CC Sub-bureau.

44. "Eyuwan suqu sufande weida shengli," *Hongqi zhoubao* (Red Flag Weekly), vol. 28, no. 18 (January 1932): 43–57. This report by Chen Changhao, political commissar of the Fourth Front Army, was originally delivered to the Peng-Yang Military and Political Academy.

45. "Xiangexi shengwei dui Deng Zhongxia tongzhi de jueyi," *ibid.*, vol. 29, no. 25 (January 1932): 70–73.

46. Deng Zhongxia was the political commissar of the Second Army Corps. Under Li Lisan, Deng had been secretary of the party's South China Bureau. After the Third Plenum (September 1930), he was appointed the Party Center representative to the Xiang-Exi Base Area. The military commander of the army corps was He Long. Deng was transferred to work in Shanghai where he was later arrested; he was executed in Nanjing.

47. Deng Zhongxia was criticized in a Party Center letter of 17 November 1931 to the Central Bureau's branch in the Xiang-Exi Base Area. Indeed, a 25 October resolution had called for open criticism of Deng Zhongxia's opportunism.

48. "Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo xianfa dagang," *Hongqi zhoubao*, vol. 25 (4 December 1931): 2–7. This translation is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History*, pp. 220–24. It has been amended in light of the original version of the document published in *Hongqi zhoubao*. The outline was passed at the First All-China Soviet Congress on 7 November 1931.

49. "Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo tudifa," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 181–83. This translation is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History*, pp. 224–26 and has been checked against the version in *Liuda yilai*. It was a draft proposed by the CCP CC.

50. “Zhongyang guanyu zhengqu geming zai yisheng yu duosheng shouxian shengli de jueyi” was originally published in *Shihua* (True Words), vol. 3 (20 April 1932): 7–11. This translation is taken from the reprint in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 195–200.

51. Ganzhou was a strategic location and was only defended by one GMD brigade. However, the Red Army was unable to take the city; it lost one division and was forced to withdraw in March 1932.

52. On 18 September 1931, the Japanese army occupied Shenyang (Mukden). By January 1932, the army had taken over all of northeast China beyond the Great Wall.

53. This instruction was sent on 29 December 1931. A copy can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 7, p. 552.

54. “Zhang Guotao zai hong sifangmianjun dangzheng gongzuo dahuishangde zhengzhi baogao,” in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao*, pp. 392–428. The conference was convened in the town of Maoyu in Tongjiang on 1 November 1934. About 800 political officers above the level of company commander attended the meeting. This was Zhang’s political report to the meeting.

55. “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo xiangechuanqian geming junshi weiyuanhui zhi guizhou yinjiang dejiang wuchuan yanhe gexian shentanzhi tongzhi shu,” in *Qianshan hongqi*, pp. 165–67.

56. “Qindong tequ diyici gong nong bing suweiai dahui jilu,” in *ibid.*, pp. 184–202. The meeting was held in Yanhe County and passed a total of six resolutions. In addition, the meeting set up the East Guizhou Special Region Revolutionary Committee.

57. In fact, the First Central Soviet Congress was held between 1 and 5 November 1931. The First All-China Soviet Congress was convened at Ruijin from 7 to 20 November 1931.

58. The Xuantong Emperor was Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, who abdicated in 1912. He was installed by the Japanese as the head of their puppet regime in Manchuria in 1932.

59. “Dui gongzuo de jidian yijian,” reprinted in the Political Academy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*. Luo wrote this article at Xinquan in Fujian.

60. “Suqu zhongyangju guanyu minyuegan shengwei de jueding,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 330.

61. “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang zhengfu guanyu chatian yundong de xunming,” in *ibid.*, pp. 384–85.

62. “Fan-Ri fan-Jiang de chupu xieding,” in *Hongse Zhonghua* (Red China), no. 149 (14 February 1934): 4. This preliminary agreement was made public by the CCP in January 1934 following a report on the Fujian Rebellion carried out by Zhang Wentian.

63. Xu had gone to Ruijin, Jiangxi, to negotiate and conclude the agreement.

64. “Zhonggong zhongyang wei Fujian shibian gao quanguo minzhong shu,” *Douzhen*, vol. 38 (12 December 1933): 1–3.

65. “Muqian de xingshi yu dangde renwu jueyi,” *ibid.*, vol. 47 (16 February 1934): 1–16. This was the political report to the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CC delivered by Bo Gu. It was passed on 18 January 1934 at Ruijin.

66. The Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI met in September 1932. It also urged the CCP to adopt the tactic of the united front from below in the anti-imperialist struggle.

67. In May 1933, the Chinese armies signed a humiliating truce agreement at Tanggu, a coastal town near Tianjin. The agreement stipulated that northeast Hubei would be a demilitarized zone patrolled by Chinese police. With the exception of troops guarding the safe approaches to Beijing, the remaining Japanese forces would move back to the Great Wall.

68. The Production Party was set up by the Nineteenth Route Army at the start of the Fujian Rebellion in November 1933.

69. “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo zhongyang suweiai zuzhifa,” in the Secretariat of the

CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 543–48. The law was promulgated on 17 February 1934 by the Executive Committee of the Central Government.

70. The Congress adopted a Constitution very slightly amended from that of 1931.

71. “Lun duancu tuji,” in the History Department of Fudan University (comp.), *Zhongyang hongjun*, pp. 314–24. This article was originally published in *Geming yu zhanzheng* (Revolution and War), a publication of the Red Army.

72. Heavy fighting started in late April in and around Guangchang between GMD and Red Army troops. The Red Army lost 5,000 men and had to abandon the entire area. In May 1934, the GMD also took Longgang and Jianming, making the situation appear even worse. Otto Braun was in charge of the defense of Guangchang.

73. “Yichu weile baowei suweiai,” *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 239 (29 September 1934): 1–2.

74. Liu Xiang was the general commander of the Sichuan army.

75. The Chinese text of this document can be found in the Committee for the Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zunyi huiyi wenxian*, pp. 29–33. This version was sent by telegram to He Long and Ren Bishi with the Second and Sixth Army Corps, Zhang Guotao with the Fourth Front Army, and Xiang Ying, who had remained with the central forces. This translation is based on the identical text in Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” pp. 262–65.

76. This refers to the Fujian Rebellion of November–December 1933. See above, **Docs. D.16** and **D.17**.

77. “Zunyi zhengzhiju kuangda chuanda tigang,” in the Committee for the Collection of Materials on CCP History and The Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zunyi huiyi wenxian*, pp. 34–44. The manuscript is originally entitled “B. The Enlarged Politburo Meeting at Zunyi,” with no author or date attached to it. The manuscript was written by Chen Yun during the march between Weixin and Yaxi shortly after the meeting. This is based on the translation in Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” pp. 265–71.

78. The Red Army arrived at Liping on 15 December 1934 and, remaining for a few days, held a Politburo meeting on 18 December. It was presided over by Zhou Enlai. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 141.

79. The Western March was the name initially given to the Long March.

80. These are Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Li Zhuoran, Li Fuchun, and Liu Bocheng, respectively.

81. This refers to the 24 July 1933 CCP resolution on “The Party’s Tasks and the Fifth Extermination Campaign.” A copy of the resolution can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 9, pp. 269–81.

82. The Battle of Pengkou took place in Liancheng County, Fujian, on 30 July 1933.

83. Jianming and Taining are two counties in Fujian; Lichuan is a county in Jiangxi.

Commentary E

Transition from the Civil War to the United Front, May 1935–November 1938

This period was marked by two main themes. The first was the consolidation of Mao Zedong's position as the dominant figure within the CCP. The Zunyi Conference criticized the previous military strategy and in so doing raised both Mao's position and prestige. However, his position was not undisputed. In the ensuing period, Mao faced two serious challenges to his leadership. First, there was the challenge posed by Zhang Guotao, who at the time headed a far larger military force. Zhang, who did not accept the Zunyi decisions as binding and had not attended the meeting, was deftly outmaneuvered by Mao politically. Second, Mao differed with Wang Ming over the correct policies to be pursued in the United Front. Wang returned to Yan'an in November 1937 from his prestigious position as head of the CCP mission to the Comintern, and Mao moved swiftly to blunt any threat posed by his return. Further, during this period the CCP leadership moved toward cooperation with the GMD, a move that was culminated after the Xi'an Incident in late 1936.

(a) Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong Differ About the Way Forward

The changes in the military leadership agreed to at the Zunyi meeting temporarily raised the spirit and morale of the Communists. It was decided that the First Front Army should vacate northern Guizhou, cross to the north of the Yangtze River, and establish a new soviet base area in south Sichuan. In late January, shortly after the meeting, the Red Army's headquarters issued orders to army corps commanders of the First Front Army to try to secure this objective. Also, the Central Military Council and the Politburo sent telegrams requesting active cooperation to Ren Bishi and, importantly, to Zhang Guotao. Ren was with the joint forces of the Second and Sixth Army Corps on the Hunan-Sichuan border and Zhang was with the Fourth Front Army.¹ Subsequent events showed that the Party Center underestimated the strength of the GMD forces; the First Front Army was defeated by the GMD Sichuan army at Tucheng. At the same time, it overestimated the loyalty of Ren and Zhang, and neither mobilized their troops to take effective action to help the central army achieve its objective.

The defeat meant that the First Front Army had to abandon its original plan. During the next three months, the army roamed around Guizhou and Yunnan unable

either to create a new base area or to annihilate the enemy that was pursuing it. Its strength was further sapped by defeats in several battles. In late April, it made a detour through Yunnan to cross the Jinsha River, an upper tributary of the Yangtze, and enter southwest Sichuan. From there, it continued north to try to contact the Fourth Front Army in the Sichuan-Xikang area. Despite the new leadership, the First Front Army's combat record had been poor.

Zhang Guotao had very good reasons for ignoring the telegram of 22 January from the Party Center as basically it asked his troops to make a sacrifice for the First Front Army by immediately engaging in offensive actions against the GMD Sichuan troops. While in his memoirs Zhang records that he moved immediately to cross the Jialing River in response to the central army's maneuver,² this was not true. Instead of attacking south as requested, Zhang led his troops north to begin the "Southern Shaanxi Campaign," which lasted from late January until early March 1935. He won a major victory over the Shaanxi Army, and it was only when his troops were blocked by Hu Zongnan's central army near Guanyuan that he withdrew to Sichuan. It was not until late March that the Fourth Front Army crossed the Jialing River, by which time the First Front Army was far away in Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. By now, Zhang had accepted that it was better to evacuate north Sichuan rather than be driven out and that the area was, in any case, economically and physically exhausted from the continual warfare.

During late March to early June 1935, Zhang organized the withdrawal of the Fourth Front Army from north to west Sichuan and then to the Sichuan-Xikang Border Area. Here, Zhang set up the Northwest Special Committee of the CCP on 15 May, and on 30 May he proclaimed the establishment of the "Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic" (**Doc. E.1**). Not only was Zhang's proclamation made without prior approval from the Party Center, Zhang's ideas showed a distinct variation with central policy. Although this government was to form part of the Soviet Republic, its form was less radical than the government form envisaged by the Party Center. Zhang proposed policies that recognized the realities of the situation and which were thus milder than those of the earlier period. Thus, for example, he proposed unity with all minorities to fight against Japanese imperialism.

In June 1935, the First and Fourth Front Armies met somewhat unexpectedly and on 14 June held a rally to celebrate the reunion. However, the joy expressed at this initial meeting soon turned to suspicion as a bitter power struggle followed. The struggle was not so much about different strategies as it was for power between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao, the leading figures of the First and Fourth Front Armies, respectively. While ostensibly they argued over whether the Red Army should march north or south, the real problem was the balancing of military strength with political position. While Mao had only 15,000 troops under his command to Zhang Guotao's 80,000, Mao and his supporters held the key positions in the Party Center and the Military Council.

During the three-month reunion of the two armies, a number of Politburo meet-

ings were held, culminating in the important meeting at Shawo on 5–6 August 1935. On 26 June, the Politburo met at Lianghekou.³ This meeting dealt with urgent military matters such as strategic policy, operational maneuvers, and army leadership. Zhang and the Party Center differed over the direction in which the Red Armies should move. While Zhang proposed moving east, the Party Center had initially suggested moving west but had now decided that it was best to move north.

Two days after the meeting and after Zhang Guotao had left, Zhang Wentian drafted the resolution to sum up the discussions.⁴ The resolution reflected the Party Center's view in favor of the move north. However, a concession was made to Zhang by the suggestion that a smaller portion of the troops secure areas that would be beneficial for a push to the east. Compromise with Zhang was judicious given that his troops outnumbered those of the Party Center by around five to one.

The meeting did not resolve the issue of how to balance power between the better-equipped and larger Fourth Front Army and the smaller but politically better-placed First Front Army. This issue underlay deliberations at the Shawo Conference.⁵ Mao Zedong sought to use his majority in the Party Center to compel Zhang to go north, whereas Zhang wanted to use the defeat of the First Front Army in the Jiangxi Soviet to reform the Party Center leadership.⁶

On balance, the conference resolution favored Mao and the Party Center (**Doc. E.2**). In fact, the resolution had been drafted before the meeting by Zhang Wentian. Zhang's presentation of the resolution on behalf of the Politburo caused a bitter argument with Zhang Guotao, and it was decided to redraft it to omit personalized criticisms.⁷ Despite this, the final resolution confirmed the Lianghekou decision to march north and create a base area in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu. Further, it reaffirmed that the political line of the Party Center had been correct during the Jiangxi period and that the rural revolution should be deepened to liberate the peasant masses. Party leadership over the Red Armies was to be tightened, and "a very small number of comrades in the Red Army" who thought that the party's political line was incorrect were criticized. This was, of course, the criticism raised by Zhang Guotao.

Although the political resolution favored the First Front Army and the Party Center, certain personnel changes recognized an increase in strength of Zhang's Fourth Front Army. The meeting confirmed Zhang Guotao as political commissar of the Red Army, with Zhu De as commander-in-chief. This decision had been taken on 18 July.⁸ Ironically, Mao's plan to march north had been accepted, but it was to be carried out through Zhang's command of the army headquarters.

After the meeting, the troops were divided into two groups for the move north: the left route army under the General Headquarters (Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, and Liu Bochong) and the right route army under the Front Headquarters (Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao, and Ye Jianying).⁹ Frictions continued, and in September the two groups broke up. After an exchange of telegrams between the Party Center and Zhang had not resolved the divisions, Mao convened an emergency Politburo meeting at Baxi on 10 September and obtained agreement for an immediate move

north.¹⁰ Zhang was not present. Pressing his political advantage, Mao delivered a report at a CC meeting on 12 September at Ejie (Gansu) criticizing Zhang Guotao.¹¹ This presumably formed the basis for the decision on Zhang Guotao's mistakes, a decision that was to be circulated only among CC members (**Doc. E.3**). Zhang was accused of "opportunism" and with splitting the Red Army, thus displaying his "warlord" tendency.

Mao led his men in the First and Third Armies to the north until they eventually arrived in north Shaanxi. Here, together with the local red armies, he was able to create a new base. Zhang and his troops turned south to the Chengdu plain. After several inconclusive battles with GMD troops in southwest Sichuan, the Fourth Front Army moved toward the Tibet-Xikang border, where it would spend the winter of 1935.

(b) Origins of the United Front Policy— The August 1 Declaration (1935)

While these arguments were taking place among the Chinese Communists in the western highlands, a fundamental shift had taken place in Comintern policy with implications for China. The Comintern's Seventh Congress (July–August 1935) adopted a new policy that called for a united front of all elements, classes, and nations in the fight against fascism. This policy shift came primarily as a result of Soviet Russia's awareness of the increasing threat to its security posed by Germany and Japan.

This new policy line was applied to China by Wang Ming, the head of the CCP mission to the Comintern in Moscow. However, it should be noted that Wang Ming's own ideas had already been evolving from the notion of a united front from below to a united front from above.¹² Indeed, the Japanese occupation of northeast China had caused the CC to suggest a shift in policy in the Manchuria region in January 1933 (**Doc. E.4**).¹³ This letter indicated that it would be possible to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie if a solid united front from below were assured. This, according to the letter, would ensure proletarian leadership in the United Front.

The "August 1 Declaration" issued in Moscow in the name of the CCP and the Chinese soviet government was a clear signal that the CCP was to make the strategic shift from civil war to a new united front (**Doc. E.5**).¹⁴ The declaration claimed that it was the "sacred duty of everyone to resist Japan to save the nation." It then criticized the actions of "scum" and "traitors" such as Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang who had not adopted a policy of resistance to Japan. If the GMD would stop its attacks, the CCP and the soviet government pledged that they would cooperate closely with it to defend the country against the Japanese no matter what their other differences might be. The CCP declared its willingness to cooperate with all those prepared to join a government of national defense that would pursue a ten-point program to expel the Japanese. The suggestion was clearly for a united front from above.

It is not entirely clear when this news reached the Party Center, as communications with Moscow had been severed during the Long March. Certainly communications were restored in November 1935, when Zhang Hao, an envoy of the CCP mission to the Comintern, arrived in north Shaanxi, but evidence suggests that its contents were known earlier. A CC secret directive in October 1935 reflected the thrust of the declaration (**Doc. E.6**).

In December 1935, an enlarged Politburo meeting presided over by Mao Zedong was convened at Wayaobao to discuss the implications of the United Front strategy.¹⁵ The meeting adopted two important resolutions, one concerning the military situation and one on the current political situation and the party's tasks.

The military resolution adopted on 23 December put forward the slogan of combining the Civil War with the national war against Japan (**Doc. E.7**). The main task for 1936 was to gather strength to prepare for a direct fight with Japan. Thus, a large increase in the size of the Red Army was necessary. At the same time, the soviet areas were to expand, especially in Shaanxi to the east and Suiyuan to the north. The resolution called for the Soviet and Chinese red armies to be united on the basis of the resistance to the Japanese aggressors and outlined a detailed plan for linking up the base areas with the Soviet Union. Finally, widespread guerrilla warfare was to be adopted in a shift from regular warfare.¹⁶

The political resolution passed on 25 December was drafted by Zhang Wentian (**Doc. E.8**). It pointed out that the Japanese invasion of the northeast and its threat to subjugate the rest of the country had created a new revolutionary situation in China. To deal with this situation, the party was to adopt the broadest political front possible to oppose Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁷ This front would include workers, peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie, and even members of the national bourgeoisie, rich peasants, and small landlords. The party was to strive for leadership of this coalition. The highest manifestation of this new united front would be the government of national defense and the combined anti-Japanese army that would be united on the basis of the ten-point program. This conciliatory approach was reflected in the change of the name of the Worker and Peasant Soviet Republic into the People's Soviet Republic and in policy shifts. Policy was moderated. Rich peasants were to enjoy the same rights as others and not have their property confiscated, while industrial and commercial entrepreneurs would be welcomed to invest in the area.¹⁸ Criteria for party membership were relaxed. In line with this, "left closed-doorism" was seen as a greater danger than "right opportunism." The use of ideology as dogma was criticized, as were those who did not respond flexibly to the changing circumstances.

(c) Zhang Guotao Accepts the New Policy But Divisions with the Party Center Deepen

Despite the bitter split between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao, Zhang accepted the new policy line; indeed he had already suggested moderating policy and seeking

new allies. Zhang heard of the decisions through an exchange of telegrams with Zhang Hao. On 28 January, at a conference of party and army activists, he warmly welcomed the new Comintern line and called for a broad front against the Japanese and the Nanjing government (**Doc. E.9**).

However, this agreement on policy did not mean that organizational unity was restored. Through the winter of 1935–36, the relationship between Mao in the north and Zhang in the south remained at a low ebb. The secret flight of the First and Third Army Corps under Mao from Baxi on 11 September 1935 angered Zhang, and on 13–14 September he convened a conference at Aba that labeled Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu as “right opportunists” and criticized their northern march as “flightism and defeatism.”¹⁹

In early October, Zhang convened a meeting to set up a new central party apparatus in a direct challenge to the Party Center that had moved north.²⁰ A resolution was passed to dismiss Mao, Zhou, Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu from their posts, deprive them of their party membership, and order their arrest.

By December, Zhang thought that he would be able to establish a firm base area on the Sichuan-Xikang border. With this security, he sent a telegram on 5 December to party and army leaders with the First Front Army in north Shaanxi (**Doc. E.10**). The telegram informed them of the establishment of the new party center and called on them to stop using the “false title of Party Center,” demoting it to the CCP Northern Bureau.

The Party Center in Shaanxi did not reply until 22 January, when it passed a resolution denouncing Zhang’s false claims to power and instructing him to give up all his false titles (**Doc. E.11**). Before this date, the Party Center had ignored the question of titles, simply communicating with Zhang over concrete practical matters. It also announced that it was making public within the party the critical decision about Zhang Guotao taken on 12 September at Ejie. A major split was now evident, and it was clear that neither side would budge willingly. The standoff was eventually decided by the differing fortunes of the two army groups during 1936. Mao and his supporters in the north were to fare much better than Zhang in the south.

Mao’s main objective in 1936 was to consolidate the new settlement in north Shaanxi. To achieve this end, it was important to forge an alliance with the local GMD troops of the Northeast Army of Zhang Xueliang and the Northwest Army of Yang Hucheng.²¹ A truce with these local troops not only would eliminate an immediate threat to the Red Army but also would create a thick wedge between the base area and the GMD central army. It is difficult to say whether Mao had any broader scheme in mind at the time but the logic of the alliance would propel events forward.

On 25 January 1936, Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai, and others, in the name of the Red Army, issued an open letter to all officers and troops of the Northeast Army. The letter recalled the bitter experiences that the northeastern people had endured under the Japanese occupation and the army’s unjust treatment by the Nanjing

government. The letter called for an immediate truce between the two armies as a part of their common fight against the Japanese invaders.²²

After patient and careful probing, the CCP succeeded in establishing preliminary contacts with both Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in the early months of 1936. On 9 April, Zhou Enlai went to Fushi (later Yan'an) for a secret meeting with Zhang Xueliang to discuss the problem of opposition to Japan. Three days before the meeting, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai had sent a telegram to Zhang Xueliang and his general, Wang Yizhe (**Doc. E.12**). The telegram called for a halt to the Civil War and for both armies to unite in opposition to Japan. Zhou and Zhang agreed to end the fighting and to open trade.

To consolidate its relationship with the Northeast Army, the Party Center issued an internal directive on 20 June outlining a number of principles on how to deal with this important matter (**Doc. E.13**). The policy outlined in the directive provides a striking contrast to the CCP reaction to the Fujian Rebellion. Instead of resorting to the use of slogans about unending class struggle, the directive stressed the genuine nature of the Northeast Army's patriotism in resisting the Japanese invaders. This patriotism was to be encouraged. At the same time, the directive outlined a number of tactics for future work such as negotiating with the Northeast Army's senior officials while agitating among the rank-and-file soldiers and establishing secret CCP organizations within it. The directive even sanctioned military attacks on the Northeast Army where necessary to maintain the alliance. Such attacks were not intended to destroy the army but to support the political lobbying.

Although the Communists had been forced to abandon Wayaobao by Chiang Kai-shek's troops in late May 1936, their agreement with Zhang afforded them some respite so that they were able to establish themselves more firmly in north Shaanxi during the latter half of 1936.

Things did not go so well for Zhang Guotao in the south. In February 1936, his troops were defeated by the GMD central army and he was forced to retreat westward. In March, the Fourth Front Army arrived at Ganzi on the Tibet-Xikang border. While the GMD enemy had been left far behind, Zhang and his army found themselves in a nomadic region where the natural conditions were even less hospitable and that was inhabited by far from friendly locals. Clearly his southern expedition had failed. Against Zhang's wishes, his troops pushed for evacuation.

When the First and Fourth Armies originally left the south, the Second and Sixth Army Corps had remained behind in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Gansu Border Area and became the main target of GMD attacks. In early 1936, they also had to flee and began their own Long March. In early June 1936, after several months of fighting on the move, Ren Bishi and He Long led these troops to join the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi.

While the arrival of another Red Army group brought cheer to Zhang's beleaguered troops, it brought unexpected consequences for Zhang himself. On the whole, it led to a decline in his authority as the approach of the two army corps caused him to moderate his criticisms of the First Front Army and to downplay his

own claims to rule the party. Ren Bishi positioned between the authority of the Party Center far away in Shaanxi and the realities of Zhang's power close by, opted for caution. Before the reunion, he had already sent out instructions that comments about the split between the First and Fourth Armies would not be allowed and documents from Zhang Guotao in the name of the "Party Center" were not to be distributed.²³

As Zhang Guotao's speech of 6 June 1936 to a meeting of party and army activists in the Fourth Field Army shows, he had to stop using his self-given titles and began to acknowledge that the Communists in north Shaanxi had made progress and enjoyed success (**Doc. E.14**). In his speech, Zhang claimed that relations with north Shaanxi had improved recently because of agreement on the Comintern's instructions for promoting the national revolution. Further, according to Zhang, there had been an agreement between the two groups that both sides would abolish their titles of "Party Center" and let the CCP Mission to the Comintern temporarily exercise the functions of Party Center. The Shaanxi group would become the Northern Bureau and Zhang's group the Northwest Bureau. It is not known whether such an agreement was ever made, but if it was it would have placed party power in the hands of Wang Ming, something that would not have pleased Mao Zedong. On military affairs, Zhang made it clear that control lay with Zhu De and himself as commander-in-chief and political commissar, respectively. Finally, in criticizing Mao in Shaanxi, Zhang put himself forward as a faithful follower of the Comintern line while pointing out that it was only recently that the group in north Shaanxi had adopted the new Comintern policy.

The arrival of the Second and Sixth Army Corps also led to the decision being taken to move north to rejoin the Party Center. This decision was made at a joint conference in early July. Ren Bishi had resisted Zhang's attempts to call the meeting a Party Center conference, and it was referred to simply as a meeting of party and army activists. The joint forces left Ganzhi in early July and joined the First Front Army led by Peng Dehuai in Gansu in October. The reunification of the Red Army troops in north Shaanxi was a clear victory for the group based there. It provided a considerable boost to Mao's position and was a major defeat for Zhang as a political rival.

Zhang Guotao came in for severe criticism during the early part of 1937, and on 31 March a decision was passed by the Politburo concerning his mistakes (**Doc. E.15**). This clearly marked the end of his challenge to Mao and the Party Center. As he became increasingly marginalized and as cooperation between the CCP and the GMD developed, Zhang decided to flee Yan'an, and in April 1938 he joined the GMD. On 18 April, he was expelled from the CCP, and the following day the party issued an internal party report on the affair.²⁴

In May, Zhang published an open statement in which he was severely critical of the CCP (**Doc. E.16**). He condemned the cruelty of the inner-party struggles in the CCP and exposed what he saw as the hypocrisy of the CCP's united front policy. While he may have been right in both respects, politically he was now out of the mainstream and could have no effect on future events.

(d) The Xi'an Incident—December 1936—The Shift to a United Front with Chiang Kai-shek

The agreement with the Northeast Army gave the CCP some respite, but clearly it needed to push forward the policy of cooperation on the national stage. As cooperation with Zhang Xueliang was consolidated, he was placed in a difficult position. He was deputy commander-in-chief of the GMD government in charge of anti-communist warfare, yet at the same time he was a secret collaborator with the CCP. This position would draw him into conflict with the GMD central government.

With cooperation secured, the CCP began to tone down its criticism of Chiang Kai-shek. On 5 May, the CCP sent an appeal to the Nanjing government asking for a ceasefire and unity in the struggle against Japan and sent a similar secret message to the GMD on 20 June.²⁵ On 25 August, Zhang Wentian drafted an open letter on behalf of the CCP commending Chiang Kai-shek for his opposition to infringement on China's territorial integrity and referred to him as Generalissimo.²⁶

Finally, on 17 September 1936, the Politburo passed a resolution on the new situation that suggested an agreement be reached with Chiang Kai-shek (**Doc. E.17**). This shift in policy to "dine with the devil" needed to be handled delicately to prevent confusion or opposition within CCP ranks. Thus, while the resolution called for GMD participation in the United Front, it informed party members that this did not mean an end to criticism of the GMD; nor did it mean that the ultimate goal of socialism was rejected. The resolution pointed out that the largest political party in China, the GMD, had not yet joined the anti-Japanese united front but that the GMD itself was now internally divided on the question of how to oppose Japan. The resolution noted that the rise in the anti-Japanese movement would eventually make the GMD end its wavering and join in. The CCP proposed the formation of a democratic republic, a form of government that would have a more universal form of democracy than that practiced in the soviets and more progressive than that under the GMD. This form of government would not only provide the political basis for mobilizing the people against Japan but also for the victory of socialism in the future. Finally, the resolution tightened up again on the requirements for party membership that had been relaxed in December 1935.

For Zhang Xueliang, these overtures must have contrasted markedly with Chiang Kai-shek's continued belligerence. In early December 1936, Chiang flew to Xi'an to supervise the campaign to eradicate the Communists; while there he was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and held hostage for a week. This event, commonly referred to as the Xi'an Incident, while not a part of CCP policy, was of great benefit to the CCP in its attempts to end the conflicts with the GMD. After considering the problem for a few days and after consultations with the Comintern in Moscow, the CCP decided to resolve the situation peacefully. Zhou Enlai was sent to Xi'an for negotiations, arriving on 16 December. The CCP's objective in the negotiations, which ended with Chiang's release on 25 December, ultimately had not been to bring about either the latter's execution or salvation but

to extract as much as possible from the situation for achieving a peaceful agreement with the Nanjing government.²⁷

Three CCP documents are included here concerning the Incident. The first is a statement for the media, the second a secret telegram for senior cadres, and the third an instruction for party members. On 19 December, the central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the CCP CC issued a public statement that was moderate in tone (**Doc. E.18**). It called for a peaceful settlement to the Incident and other domestic conflicts as this would be in the interest of the whole Chinese nation. This was in marked contrast to the statement of Red Army leaders on 15 December that had called for GMD leaders to support Zhang Xueliang and for the people to pronounce the verdict on Chiang Kai-shek.²⁸ That this quick shift in approach, owing partly to Comintern pressure, needed justification to ordinary party members is shown by the fact that on 19 December an inner-party directive was issued explaining why the new approach was necessary.²⁹

In a telegram to Zhou Enlai on 21 December, the Central Secretariat put forward the ambitious suggestion that Zhou take advantage of this golden opportunity to bypass Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to make contacts with, and win sympathy from, all possible military forces and political groups. This included local warlords, Nanjing government officials, and even British and American diplomats (**Doc. E.19**). The Incident could prove a field day for the CCP and Red Army.

On 7 January, the CC issued an inner-party circular about the Incident that was probably drafted by Mao Zedong (**Doc. E.20**). The directive sought to excuse the CCP from any blame by the Nanjing government for the Incident at the expense of Zhang and Yang. At the same time, however, the CCP was not to provoke the Northeast and Northwest Armies. Thus, the directive said that the Incident had been an internal problem of the GMD and that the CCP had immediately called for a peaceful solution!

The final result of the Xi'an Incident was the arrest of Zhang Xueliang when he accompanied Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing and the disbanding of the Northeast Army. Taking advantage of the Northeast Army's devolution, the Red Army moved immediately to occupy Yan'an, a much larger city that became the Communist capital for the next ten years. It extended the area under its control to Sanyuan, close to Xi'an, and established secret party branches in a score of counties. Militarily, the threat to CCP existence in north China had been removed. Ultimately, the CCP gained the peace with the GMD central government which it had sought. For Zhang and Yang, the Xi'an Incident marked the end of their political careers and the removal of their troops.

The Incident provided the link between the phases of Civil War and the national War of Resistance. The CCP adopted a moderate tone in its communications with the GMD as it pushed for further collaboration. On 10 February 1937, the CCP CC sent a telegram to the GMD's Third Plenum calling for a new period of CCP-GMD cooperation. In return for democratic reforms, immediate preparation for war with Japan, and improving the people's livelihood, the CCP offered a number of concessions. The CCP would cease all hostilities to overthrow the GMD government, change the name of the Workers and Peasants Government to the Special Regional

Government of the Chinese Republic, and change the name of the Red Army to the National Revolutionary Army and place them under the jurisdiction of the Nanjing National Government and the Military Council. In addition, it would introduce a democratic system based on universal suffrage in the urban areas in the Special Region and stop the policy of confiscating landlords' land in the countryside.³⁰

In February and March, CCP and GMD representatives met in Xi'an to discuss terms for cooperation.³¹ There were two major stumbling blocks. Politically, the GMD negotiators required that jurisdiction over the soviet area be rearranged and its officials reassigned by the various provincial governments. While willing to change the soviet into a special region of the Chinese Republic, the CCP would not give up jurisdiction over the area. In addition, the CCP demanded that it be allowed to operate openly and legally. Militarily, the CCP agreed to reduce its three front armies to three divisions of 15,000 troops each. The GMD would accept only three regiments of 5,000 with the right to appoint the commanders. To break the impasse, the CCP negotiators requested a direct meeting with Chiang Kai-shek.

Zhou Enlai met with Chiang in late March and again in early June. It seems that a basic agreement was reached. Chiang proposed that each party nominate the same number of representatives to form a "National Revolutionary Alliance," with Chiang as chair. The CCP could retain three divisions with 15,000 troops each but under Nanjing's control.

On 15 June, Zhou returned to Yan'an for consultation. While Mao and the Party Center were willing to agree to the formation of a "National Revolutionary Alliance" under Chiang, they would not surrender absolute CCP control over its own troops. In July 1937, Zhou returned to Lushan, where he had met Chiang in June, to offer further concessions on behalf of the CCP and the Red Army (**Doc. E.21**). The CCP put forward three demands and four promises. The CCP called on the GMD to begin the anti-Japanese war, hold a national congress to draft a constitution, and draw up a policy for national salvation and to assure the people's livelihood. In return, the CCP effectively promised to give up Marxism-Leninism and accept Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" as the guiding ideology of the whole nation, stop the land revolution, abolish the soviet system, and change the name of the Red Army to the National Army.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident in Beijing on 7 July 1937 and the Hongqiao Airport Incident in Shanghai on 9 August demonstrated Japan's aggressive intent toward China. The urgent situation that arose with Japan's large-scale invasion of China's hinterland combined with the prompting of the CCP and the concessions it offered kept pushing the GMD toward cooperation. Eventually, Chiang Kai-shek accepted communist troops as part of the nationalist army. On 21 August, the GMD Military Commission issued an order naming the Red Army the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. On 22 September, the cooperation between the two parties was formally recognized with each party issuing its own statement. Finally, in November the remaining guerrilla forces in central China were renamed the New Fourth Army.

(e) Liu Shaoqi Opens the Debate on Party History—March 1937

While these developments were taking place, Liu Shaoqi, who was in charge of work in the white areas, used the background of the new united front to launch a devastating critique of CCP policy during the Jiangxi period.³² His views were strongly refuted at the time, but they provided an important framework for the line of analysis that would be worked out during the rewriting of party history during 1943–45. In late February/early March, Liu Shaoqi wrote four letters to the CC expressing his concern about past and present party work.

In a letter of 4 March 1937, Liu attacked the political line of the party as suffering from “leftism” ever since the 7 August Emergency Conference of 1927 (**Doc. E.22**).³³ Because the mistakes of “left adventurism” had not been properly cleared up, they had now become a tradition in the party. Liu saw this fault, together with “factionalism,” as more important than “objective” factors such as GMD suppression in preventing the party from doing its work properly in the white areas. However, Liu did not limit his criticism to work in the white areas. “Leftist” mistakes had also been made in the soviets on issues such as the land question, mass work, and inner-party struggle. Liu felt that the party had missed the chance that the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 had provided for building a broad united front both to isolate Chiang Kai-shek and to resist the Japanese incursions into Chinese territory. The party, according to Liu, should have shifted the focus of its work from the class struggle to the national struggle, and he criticized what he saw as a serious strategic mistake in dealing with the Fujian Rebellion.

Rounding off his letter, Liu stressed again that the mistakes in the past ten years had been consistently “leftist.” Within the party, Liu claimed that the methods in ideological struggle had always been excessive, so much so that “absolutely no freedom of calm discussion” existed within the party. Liu wrote that new or unorthodox ideas created panic within the party and resulted in the convening of meetings to struggle against them. Later, Mao and his supporters, including Liu, attributed this “leftist” line to Wang Ming, but here Liu blamed the party leadership in China for not following Comintern instructions.

Liu’s views of the “leftist” errors committed by the Party Center during the Jiangxi period were rejected by the party leadership. This was not surprising given that contemporary leaders such as Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian had been key figures during those years. In May and June 1937, the party held two important meetings where this and other issues concerning the United Front were discussed. From 2 to 14 May, a national conference of party delegates (*dangde quanguo daibiao huiyi*) was held in Yan’an.³⁴ While Mao summed up the current state of affairs in the United Front on behalf of the Party Center, it seems that much of the remaining discussion focused on the points raised by Liu.

In his opening comments to the conference Zhang Wentian made it clear that Liu’s attack on the party line as having suffered from “leftism” was unacceptable (**Doc. E.23**). Zhang stressed that just because of recent changes in the united front

policy one could not conclude that the political line of the past ten years had been mistaken. On the contrary, he claimed that the history of the past decade had been a glorious one. While admitting that some mistakes had been made, he claimed that the Party Center's line was basically correct and had implemented the Comintern's line. He was willing to concede, however, that there had been mistakes in work in the white areas. In particular, he referred to the existence of closed doorism over a long period of time and military adventurism and conservatism (!) in the Civil War. Instead of Liu's views, a report by Zhang Wentian was adopted that defended the political line of the Party Center during the Jiangxi Soviet period. The document laid the blame for failure of work in the white areas squarely on the "white" terror and the military attacks of the Nationalists as well as with disruption caused by "Trotskyism."³⁵

After this conference, a party conference on work in the white areas was held (May until mid-June 1937). The main address was given by Zhang Wentian, and a major report was delivered by Liu Shaoqi.³⁶ Liu noticeably dropped his criticism of the Party Center's political line during the Jiangxi period. However, he continued his criticism of mistakes that had dominated party work since the 7 August Emergency Conference such as "closed-doorism," "sectarianism," and "adventurism." Further, he claimed that the party suffered from "subjectivism" and "formalism" in mechanically mouthing Marxist phrases and support for the Comintern's line while often opposing it in practice.³⁷ Unknowingly, Liu was providing Mao Zedong with the framework for his later criticism of Wang Ming.

(f) Military Strategy in the United Front— The Luochuan Conference, August 1937

At this time, Mao's main concern was what to do now that Chiang Kai-shek had agreed to cooperate. His problem was how to use communist troops in the War of Resistance. While the CCP was prepared to make declarations about the democratization of the GMD regime, Mao's concern was how to preserve military strength, avoiding needless sacrifice, during the national War of Resistance for which he had been calling for so long.

To discuss these issues, the CCP convened the Luochuan Enlarged Politburo Conference from 22 to 25 August 1937.³⁸ Mao presented the main report to the conference, and this provided the basis for the brief resolution that was adopted (**Doc. E.24**). It seems that there were some mild disagreements with Mao's views from military personnel such as Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, who favored a more active engagement with the Japanese troops than Mao's dispersal of troops behind enemy lines. Zhou Enlai, who had been the key negotiator with the GMD, feared that lack of action on the part of the CCP would undermine its national standing.³⁹ Mao's aim was to preserve and develop the strength of the Red Army. Thus, the Red Army's movements could be decided on only by the CCP. Given these differences, the resolution adopted was bland. It called for an "all-around war of resis-

tance” and emphasized the “leading role of the CCP” in the war. It called on all party members to participate in the “national resistance” and to guard against pessimism.

To consolidate the united front, the conference issued a “ten-point program of national resistance” the main theme of which was to call on the GMD government to promote political democracy and improve the livelihood of the people.⁴⁰ Finally, the conference decided on the composition of the leadership of the Eighth Route Army. Zhu De was appointed general commander, Peng Dehuai his deputy, Ye Jianying chief of staff, and Ren Bishi director of the Political Department with Deng Xiaoping as his deputy.⁴¹

On the whole, it seems that the idea of self-preservation and expansion was accepted, and after the conference a number of more concrete measures were undertaken and the Eighth Route Army set off for the front. Three divisions were sent out from Shaanxi to Shanxi in late August. The 115th Division went to northeast Shanxi, the 120th to northwest Shanxi, and the 129th Division to southeast Shanxi. Despite Mao’s stress on conserving strength, the military showed its capacity and courage in battle. During September and October, they engaged in about 100 battles and defeated some 10,000 Japanese troops. Two of their most notable victories were at Pingxing Pass, Shanxi, where the 115th Division annihilated a Japanese brigade and killed about 1,000 troops, and at Yangming, Shanxi, where the 129th Division ransacked an enemy airport and destroyed twenty-four airplanes.

Such victories were popular with the Chinese people, but Mao appeared to receive news of them with a mixture of elation and concern. Publicly, he praised the victories as evidence of CCP loyalty in the national war, but secretly he warned his military commanders against risking their own forces in engagements with the Japanese. After September 1937, Mao issued one instruction after another to the Eighth Route Army’s General Headquarters or to the command of individual divisions reminding them of guerrilla tactics and warning them against undertaking any reckless mobile warfare. Three telegrams from the early period of the Sino-Japanese war are included here that demonstrate Mao’s preference for guerrilla warfare tactics (**Doc. E.25**). Mao was clearly worried that his military commanders might sacrifice the Red Army for the sake of engaging the Japanese. To protect and preserve their strength, Mao stressed again and again that guerrilla warfare was the correct policy.

(g) Mao Zedong and Wang Ming Differ Over the Tactics of the United Front—March 1938 Politburo Meeting

By November 1937 Mao had shifted back to his view that the GMD was incapable of leading the War of Resistance and that the CCP must retain its “independence and initiative.” This did not mean that the united front should be disrupted. However, party members were to remember the differences between the two parties and, he claimed, the chief danger now was no longer “left closed-doorism” but “right

opportunism.”⁴² Wang Ming, who was about to arrive in Yan’an from Moscow, would be scorned by Mao as the chief “right opportunist” after their clash of opinions about how to proceed with the united front.

On 29 November, Wang Ming and seven members of the CCP Mission to the Comintern, including Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, arrived in Yan’an. Although their arrival was initially welcomed, for a while Wang and his close supporters became a challenge to Mao’s authority. To deal with the situation created by these new arrivals, the Politburo held a conference from 9 to 14 December 1937 at which Wang Ming established his influence, although his power base remained weak.⁴³

After an official report by Zhang Wentian, the keynote speech to the conference was given by Wang Ming. Mao made no formal speech. Wang’s speech and his other writings around this time show his ideas about the united front. Included here is the article he wrote shortly before leaving Yan’an for Wuhan (**Doc. E.26**).⁴⁴ This article is commonly used by CCP historians to criticize Wang for “right capitulationism.” Contrary to Mao’s call for “independence and initiative,” Wang called for improving the unification of all work in what came to be known as the policy of “everything through the united front.” Wang clearly felt that this was the best way to develop CCP activities outside of the base. While Wang acknowledged that problems still existed with the GMD, he felt that the foundations had been laid for a solid anti-Japanese national united front. This cooperation would be long-term, continuing after the war during the period of national reconstruction. He also called for the united front to be extended beyond the two parties and to mobilize effectively other groups for resistance. Although Wang accepted that CCP members could join the GMD government, he maintained that the Eighth Route Army must retain its independence.

The conference also adopted a resolution that congratulated the CCP Mission to the Comintern for the work in formulating the new policies for the anti-Japanese united front.⁴⁵ While Wang was the dominant figure at the meeting, organizational changes strengthened Mao’s position. The conference adopted a resolution to convene the Seventh Party Congress as soon as possible. A twenty-five-person committee was set up to prepare for the Congress, to which Mao was appointed chairman and Wang Ming secretary. This reflected the power relations at the time as Wang, despite his prestige, must have realized that he could not take over from Mao. Furthermore, on Comintern instructions and to encourage collective leadership, it was decided to abolish the position of secretary in overall charge of the work of the Secretariat. Thus, Zhang Wentian lost his position and a new Secretariat was formed to accommodate the recent arrivals in Yan’an. It consisted of Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Chen Yun, and Kang Sheng.⁴⁶ Mao retained his influential position as chair of the Military Council. To handle relations with the GMD, a CCP delegation was appointed comprising Zhou Enlai, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and Ye Jianying.⁴⁷

Finally, the Politburo passed a resolution praising the guerrilla warfare conducted by the armies in south China under Wang Ming supporter Xiang Ying.

Xiang and others were said to have provided a brilliant example for the whole party with their “spirit of bitter struggle” for the liberation of the Chinese people.⁴⁸ As is discussed below, in 1941 Mao had quite a different assessment of Xiang Ying’s work.

Following the conference, Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Bo Gu went to Wuhan to set up the Yangtze Bureau, of which Wang was to be secretary. Mao remained behind with the others in Yan’an to run the Party Center and the army headquarters. In Wuhan, Wang Ming began to develop an approach to the United Front that was seriously at odds with Mao’s. Of course, this was, in major part, dictated by the vastly different conditions in Yan’an and Wuhan. Initially, Wang’s policy of cooperation and taking advantage of opportunities to work legally and to expand communist influence paid off.

Conflict between Mao and Wang reached a high point at the Politburo meeting held in Yan’an from 27 February to 3 March.⁴⁹ The key issues discussed were the role of the CCP in the Sino-Japanese War and the relationship between the CCP and the GMD. Wang Ming delivered the keynote speech while Mao made no formal speech. However, because of Mao’s opposition, no formal resolution was adopted, although the written version of Wang’s report was published and widely circulated after the conference. Wang’s report outlined the main decisions of the meeting (**Doc. E.27**). Wang said that the united front was to be consolidated in the form of a “national revolutionary alliance.” This either would take the form of the First United Front or would be a confederation within which all parties would have political and organizational independence. He stressed the need for a “united army, united assignment, united command, united combat, etc.” He also stressed the need for the GMD to formalize the legal activities of other groups. He proposed the establishment of a national assembly so that other parties could be consulted and that the government could legalize and encourage the development of mass organizations. Finally, Wang stated that the correct military strategy was to use mobile warfare as the main form of combat coordinated with positional warfare. Guerrilla warfare was relegated to a support role.

The question of military strategy became a key issue in the next few months, especially after the fall of Xuzhou in late May threatened Wuhan itself. As has been noted above, Mao stressed guerrilla warfare, and throughout April he called for the development of guerrilla bases in north China. In May 1938, Mao addressed the “Study Group on the War of Resistance” in Yan’an on the question of the war. He restated emphatically that at the present stage the main task of the Eighth Route Army was to engage in guerrilla warfare and only to engage in mobile warfare where the conditions were favorable.⁵⁰

This clash of approaches became critical as Wang Ming began to participate in the defense of Wuhan. On 14 May, the Party Center sent out instructions to the New Fourth Army and the party’s Yangtze Bureau instructing them to shift their work to the rural areas. There they were to set up guerrilla forces where they would have more freedom to expand and develop.⁵¹ This was followed on 22 May 1938 by

instructions to the Hebei, Hunan, and Wuhan party branches that after the fall of Xuzhou they should focus their work on guerrilla warfare in the countryside and the creation of bases there. To this end, the majority of students, workers, and revolutionary elements were to be mobilized to return to their home villages to help with this process. The instructions recognized that this would result in setbacks for party work in Wuhan.⁵²

These instructions stood in stark contrast to the strategy proposed in the public statement issued by Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu on 15 June. While it was accepted that Wuhan might fall, the statement cited the case of Madrid as demonstrating the possibility of a heroic defense. To do this, the GMD would have to mobilize all sectors of the population and put together a large contingent of crack troops. The statement argued that the best form of defense was to engage the Japanese in mobile warfare in the neighboring areas and defeat them before they reached Wuhan. The Eighth Route Army, operating in the enemy's rear, could be used to destroy supply lines.⁵³ These proposals for mass mobilization to defend Wuhan aroused GMD suspicions, and on 5 August restrictions were placed on the activities of mass organizations. Beginning on 17 August a number of them were closed down, and subsequent activities by the GMD secret police prevented further operations by the CCP-controlled mass organizations. Thus, Wang Ming's attempt to expand communist influence through legal means had ended in failure. His prestige was further undermined in party circles when Wuhan fell to the Japanese on 25 October.

(h) The Sixth Plenum—September–November 1938— The Dominance of Mao Zedong

It was during this rapidly changing situation that the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC was held in Yan'an from 29 September to 6 November 1938.⁵⁴ Mao was the dominant figure at the Plenum, and his authority was strengthened by news brought from Moscow by Wang Jiaxiang. Wang relayed information contained in a September Comintern directive as well as the ideas of Dimitrov, the main Comintern leader responsible for China. The directive approved of the political line of the CCP during the past year in its united front work, while Dimitrov fully endorsed Mao's leading position in the party. Indeed, it is claimed that it was after receiving this news that Mao decided to convene the Plenum.⁵⁵ Initially, the Plenum appeared to be relatively harmonious, with Mao and Wang expressing broadly similar views. By the end, however, Mao had strongly asserted his differences with Wang. It should be remembered that by then, Wuhan had fallen and Wang's strategy had been completely disgraced. Further, Mao's concluding speeches were held after Wang Ming had left Yan'an to attend the National Political Consultative Assembly scheduled for 28 October to 6 November.

While Mao may have had differences with Wang over military strategy and how much emphasis to place on the united front, it is clear that Mao saw the strategy of

the united front as vital. In his opening speech, after stating that the current military task was to concentrate on guerrilla warfare in the countryside, Mao went on to praise both the GMD and Chiang Kai-shek (**Doc. E.28**). Not only did Mao praise the GMD but he even went so far as to state that the CCP occupied second place to the GMD in the united front. He envisaged a glorious future for Chiang Kai-shek, the GMD, and the other parties that participated in the United Front. Mao repeated his earlier view that the aim of the CCP was to establish a “new democratic republic” based on Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” rather than on socialism. While the CCP was to maintain its independence, this was not to override the spirit of unity whereby the principles of class struggle were not to conflict with the interests of national resistance. Finally, Mao reconfirmed that it was necessary to convene the Seventh Party Congress.⁵⁶

Not surprisingly, in his report of 20 October Wang Ming was able to express his approval of Mao’s views. Indeed, he even praised indirectly the pivotal role that Mao played in the CCP. After Wang had departed, Mao delivered a summing-up speech to the meeting on 5 and 6 November. On 5 November, he offered a summary of the CCP’s relationship to the GMD that differed radically from his opening remarks. Mao blamed the GMD for not allowing the United Front to assume a proper organizational form. Mao particularly criticized the slogan of “everything through the united front.” This was, of course, a slogan associated with Wang Ming. Mao also claimed that it was not necessary always to seek GMD agreement to actions as long as they did not upset the situation as a whole.⁵⁷

The following day, Mao criticized Wang Ming’s approach of using legal channels to develop the communist movement and moving from the cities to the countryside. Mao clearly implied that this derived from the influence of the soviet revolution on Wang Ming’s thinking. Mao made it clear that the revolution would move from the countryside to the cities.⁵⁸

The political resolution adopted by the Plenum on the basis on Mao’s political report did not include these condemnations of Wang Ming’s approach (**Doc. E.29**). In fact, Wang Ming claims that he had drafted the resolution himself.⁵⁹ The resolution is even-handed, stressing the need to persist in a protracted anti-Japanese war and also to consolidate and expand the united front. It refers to the need to seriously support Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, the national government, and close cooperation in any form between the CCP and all other political parties.

Now that the Party Center was reunited in Yan’an, the decision was made to bring order to the *ad hoc* decision-making that had taken place during the years of dislocation. In addition, it was important to outline rules for how the party organizations should function in the different environments they inhabited. On 15 October, Zhang Wentian provided a comprehensive review of the party’s organizational tasks in light of the current circumstances, and three resolutions were adopted on concrete organizational questions.

In his speech, Zhang noted changes in the party’s work that had come about as a result of the beginning of the War of Resistance (**Doc. E.30**). The CCP now had a

basically legal existence, with the result that it could engage in a wide range of activities in contrast to its secret work, which was small in scope. These legal opportunities were to be used to develop the party. However, Zhang stressed that party independence must be maintained in the united front and that the tendency toward "capitulationism" had to be opposed. Yet, for Zhang, "rightist" errors would be easier to deal with than problems such as "left closed-doorism."

On 6 November, the meeting passed a resolution on the work rules and discipline of the CC (**Doc. E.31**). The decision sought to regularize the channels through which decisions were made and information was passed on. Thus, it forbade individuals from speaking on behalf of the party or distributing documents in its name unless entrusted to do so by the CC, the Politburo, or the Secretariat. This was presumably in reaction to the activities of Zhang Guotao but was probably also agreed to by both Mao and Wang Ming as a way of each trying to keep a check on the other.

The decision reconfirmed that the CC was the highest organ of the party when the National Congress was not in session but then went on to outline where real power lay in the party. When the CC was not in session, the Politburo elected by it would guide work. The Politburo was to meet at least once every three months. The most interesting section concerns the role of the Central Secretariat and indicates the growing power of this organization in party affairs. The Secretariat was to handle the day-to-day affairs of the CC and execute its policies. Further, it was to convene Politburo meetings and prepare the issues to be discussed. It was to meet at least once a week. This placed it in an extremely powerful position by allowing it to control the flow of information and effectively control the agenda. Most importantly, between Politburo meetings, if a new emergency arose and the Politburo could not be convened immediately, the Secretariat could make new decisions and issue them in the name of the CC. Only afterward would the Secretariat have to seek the approval of the Politburo. Clearly, whoever could control the Secretariat would be in the best position to control the party. Mao Zedong was placed in control of the daily work of the Secretariat.⁶⁰

Immediately after the Plenum, the regional bureau system of the party was reorganized, resulting in an undermining of Wang Ming's organizational position. On 9 November the Yangtze Bureau was abolished and its former area of jurisdiction was placed under two bureaus, the Southern Bureau headed by Zhou Enlai and the Central Plain's Bureau headed by Liu Shaoqi.⁶¹

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DOCUMENTS MAY 1935–NOVEMBER 1938

E.1 Declaration of the Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. *Zhang Guotao* (30 May 1935)⁶²

The Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has been formally established!

The establishment of the Northwest Federal Government of the Soviet Republic has occurred at a time when the invincible Red Fourth Front Army has achieved numerous victories in its bold western expedition and the rapid development of the revolution is under way in the northwest. Also, the activities of the Red Twenty-fifth Army in south Shaanxi led by the Comrade Xu Haidong; the Red Twenty-sixth Army in north Shaanxi led by Comrade Liu Zhidan; the Red Ninety-third Army in south Sichuan led by Comrade Meng Guangyuan; and the strikes in Chengdu and Chongqing, the guerrilla warfare, and the soldiers' mutinies in Anjin are all being coordinated with the attacks of the Red Fourth Front Army. The flames of the soviet revolution are burning across all northwestern provinces. The soviet Northwest Federal Government is the leader and organizer of the large northwestern base of the revolutionary movement.

The foundation of the Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has established the center for revolutionary struggle in the northwest and united the leadership of the liberation struggle by all nationalities in the northwest. From now on, Chengdu and Chongqing in the south, Shaanxi and Gansu in the north, and Qinghai and Xinjiang in the west will be better connected with the large forces of the western Central Red Army. The Chinese soviet revolution has not only consolidated further and developed in all provinces in the southeast, but it has also laid firm foundations in the northwest. This has dealt a deadly blow to the imperialists, the GMD, and Chiang Kai-shek and has begun the concrete process of spreading communism throughout the entire northwest. The declaration of this government's existence means further collapse and doom for the imperialist GMD and Chiang Kai-shek and the liberation of the workers and peasants and all nationalities in the northwest. The soviet Northwest Federal Government is a formidable weapon to destroy the "five encirclements" of the imperialist GMD and Chiang Kai-shek.

At present, all provinces in the northwest and the rest of China are in a life-and-death situation. The imperialists are frenziedly invading China; the chief traitor Chiang Kai-shek has sold off one-fifth of China's land to the imperialists, and recently he attempted to sell off the whole of China to them under the name of technical cooperation. The sad fate of slaves in a subjugated nation is threatening every suffering worker and peasant. The troops of Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government have not been dispatched to fight the Japanese or to recover lost territories.

On the contrary, they are used to attack the soviet government and the Red Army of Workers and Peasants, which has long since declared war against Japan. They are helping the imperialists slaughter the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist masses and have willingly become the path-breakers for the imperialist scramble for China. Everywhere, they press for rent, money, and grain, causing widespread unemployment of workers and bankruptcy of peasants, big disasters, famines, and bankruptcy unprecedented in the past several hundred years in China. Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government betrays the country, brutalizes the people, and forces the poor to be slaves in a subjugated nation. Only by eliminating the traitor and collaborator Chiang Kai-shek can the imperialists be expelled, can China win independence and freedom, and can the Chinese people be liberated.

Only the Central Government and the Northwest Federal Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic are governments of China and the people of the northwest. They are the only governments to save China and the poor people in the northwest! The soviet Northwest Federal Government implements all policies of the Central Government of Soviet China!

The soviet Northwest Federal Government calls on the working people and minority nationalities throughout China and the northwest to take up weapons; to participate in the sacred war of national revolution; to oppose the imperialist scramble for China and the GMD sell-out of China; to expel the Japanese and all other imperialists; to eliminate the GMD running-dog party of traitors and collaborators and the chief traitor Chiang Kai-shek; to take back the four provinces in the northeast, [Xi]Kang, and Tibet and other lost territories in an effort to set up a new soviet northwest and a new China that enjoys independence, freedom, and territorial integrity!

The soviet Northwest Federal Government resolutely carries out all measures that protect the interests of the working people in the northwest; establishes the eight-hour working day; increases wages and unemployment relief; and confiscates the land, property, oxen and sheep, grain, tea, and clothes of the landlord class, traitor bureaucrats, and other rich people in order to redistribute them among the workers and peasants and the poor brothers of all nationalities in the northwest! It abolishes all taxation and debts to the GMD and opposes the forced recruitment of soldiers. Poor people refuse to pay money, grain tax, rent, and debt! The working people have the freedom of assembly, association, speech, and publication, and the interests of working women and youths will be protected so that every poor person has food to eat and clothes to wear.

The soviet Northwest Federal Government is resolutely opposed to the oppressive policies carried out by the imperialists, the GMD, Chiang Kai-shek, Liu Xiang, Deng Xihou, and Hu Zongnan toward minority nationalities such as the Hui, Koreans, Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, and Yi. It practices self-determination and helps the Hui, Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan, Miao, and Yi nationalities to become independent. All nationalities have the right to organize their own government and to unite freely in the common struggle against the traitor Chiang Kai-shek and the imperialists.

Workers and peasants of China, poor and suffering brothers of all nationalities: Rise up quickly to take up arms and join the battle for the independence and freedom of China and of your own nationalities and for the survival of your people. The soviet Northwest Federal Government swears to lead the Red Fourth Front Army's 300,000 soldiers to fight together with you to the last drop of their blood.

White soldiers quickly kill your traitorous officers and bring your guns to the Red Army and join the fight against the imperialists, and refuse to follow Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in becoming subjugated slaves.

The masses of China and the northwest unite!

Fight to Chengdu and Chongqing to spread communism throughout Sichuan!

Destroy Chiang Kai-shek, Liu Xiang, Hu Zongnan, and Deng Xihou, and spread communism throughout the northwest!

Long live the workers and peasants and all national minorities in the northwest!

Long live the independent, free, and new soviet China!

Chairman of the Northwest Federal Government
of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Zhang Guotao

May 30, year five of the Chinese Soviet Republic

E.2 Resolution of the CC on the Political Situation and Tasks Since the Meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies (5 August 1935)⁶³

1) The Characteristics of the Present Situation

[[The political situation in China is serious. The GMD cannot solve the problems, and its rule is weak and collapsing. Despite partial losses and a temporary change in several soviet areas, the soviet revolution has not declined and is still developing. The enemy's attacks, although fierce, have met with difficulties.]]

The convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the exchange of the experiences of revolutionary warfare, and the unity of command have not only strengthened the fighting forces of the Red Army in quantity but also in quality. The actions of the First and Fourth Front Armies in China's northwest will greatly promote the struggle of the minority nationalities in the northwest against imperialism and the GMD, intensify the rural revolutionary struggles in the vast areas of the northwest, and expand the influence of the CP and the soviet Red Army. At the same time, the provinces in the northwest are areas where the Chinese reactionary rule and the imperialist forces are the weakest. Geographically, they are near the motherland of the world proletariat—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia. This is another favorable condition for the development of the soviet

regime and the Red Army. The Party Center's correct leadership and its appropriate guidelines for strategies and tactics convince us further that we are certainly capable of thoroughly crushing the enemy's attacks and establishing and consolidating soviet bases in the northwest.

2) The Basic Tasks After the Meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies

The meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies has dramatically strengthened the armed forces of the soviet revolution, paving the way for future great victories. On 18 June, the Politburo decided, "After the meeting between the First and Fourth Front Armies, our strategic policy is to concentrate our main forces to attack in the north, destroy large numbers of the enemy through mobile warfare, and create a soviet base in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu first. This will place the Chinese soviet movement on a more solid and broad footing and will achieve victories in all China's northwestern provinces and even throughout China." This decision is undoubtedly correct.

The creation of a soviet base in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu is a historical task for the First and Fourth Front Armies. The establishment of this base serves not only as the rear area of the Red Army but also as the territory of the soviet state for the promotion of the advance and development of the entire Chinese revolution. Its existence can inspire the oppressed workers and peasants throughout China to fight against the imperialists and the GMD. Its model role will point out a road of political and economic liberation for the people of the whole country. It is the leading core for gathering together revolutionary forces throughout the whole country and a source for spreading revolutionary seeds over the entire country.

The basic heavy responsibility of the Red Army is to create such a base in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu and the vast regions of the northwest. The preconditions for creating such a base are the complete smashing of the encirclement and boycott by Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD and the elimination of large numbers of enemy forces. It is impossible to establish new soviet regions peacefully. Only by making all efforts and sacrifices to achieve victory in the revolutionary war and by submitting all other interests to the highest interest of the revolutionary war can the soviet base in the northwest be established and the victory of the soviet regime be won throughout China.

To build a solid soviet base requires the further development of the peasants' land struggle; a thorough solution of the land issue; the formation of revolutionary committees to set up genuine soviet governments of the worker and peasant masses; the establishment of the masses' self-defense forces, such as the Red Guards, Young Pioneers, independent divisions and regiments, and guerrilla forces; and the intense suppression of counterrevolutionaries. To turn the areas under reactionary rule into genuine revolutionary soviet regions, it is imperative that the above basic policies be implemented.

3) Strengthening the Party's Leadership in the Red Army

To fulfill the historical task of creating a soviet base in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu, the party's absolute leadership should be strengthened further in the First and Fourth Front Armies and through the authority of the Party Center in the Red Army. The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was born and has developed under the singular and absolute leadership of the Party Center of the CCP. Without the CCP, there would be no Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and no soviet revolutionary movement.

After the meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies, some comrades in the Red Army, having seen the central soviet turned into guerrilla zones, the casualties of the First Front Army, and some mistakes and shortcomings in party work, felt that the Party Center's political line was incorrect. These opinions are completely wrong. However, the Politburo recognizes that there should be clear explanation and education to overcome the lack of understanding and their suspicions of individual comrades.

[[The Fifth Plenum [January 1934] resolution stated that after the Fourth Plenum [January 1931], the Politburo carried out a correct line and the party embarked on the Bolshevik road. The Zunyi Conference [January 1935] reaffirmed the correctness of the party's political line and criticized the mistaken military line.]]

Since the Enlarged Politburo meeting at Zunyi corrected the Party Center's military mistakes, its leadership in military affairs has been quite correct. Therefore, the many victories of the First Front Army after the Zunyi Conference stem from following the Party Center's predetermined strategic policies.

It is essential to let all comrades know that the correctness of the party's General Line depends on the party's correct evaluation of many basic issues in the Chinese revolution, its correct evaluation of the present situation, and the correct formulation and implementation of various tactical and strategic tasks. The issue of military command is only one issue among many. As long as the party is basically correct on the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution and follows Marxism and Leninism, a few mistakes on military matters in a certain period, while constituting serious political mistakes, will remain partial mistakes.

The party made a full self-criticism at the Zunyi Conference about the reason for the First Front Army's casualties. The party did not try to cover up its mistakes in any way. Since the Zunyi Conference, the party's military command has made marked progress, but has had some shortcomings in practical work. There is no question about this. Here, special mention should be made of the weakness of political work in the armies. First of all, the General Political Department has not employed all possible means to give timely instructions to the lower-level political departments, thus depriving them of strong leadership. The struggle to oppose right opportunism has not been developed in a major way. After the convergence of the First and Fourth Front Armies, not every opportunity has been seized to reorganize and streamline the First Front Army.

Obviously, it is erroneous to regard partial mistakes by the party as total mistakes, and some weaknesses in the party's daily work as mistakes of party line. This means that [such people] refuse to make appropriate evaluations of the unprecedented great cause of the party. Therefore, the party should explain and correct this misunderstanding immediately to enable all party members and red commanders and soldiers to unite as one around the Party Center. This is the guarantee for future successes.

4) The Brotherly Solidarity Between the First and Fourth Front Armies

The brotherly solidarity between the First and Fourth Front Armies is the necessary condition for the accomplishment of the historical task of establishing a soviet base in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu and a Chinese soviet republic. All deliberate and unintended tendencies to sabotage the unity and solidarity between the First and Fourth Front Armies are harmful to the Red Army and beneficial to the enemy.

The few current problems between the First and Fourth Front Armies are mainly owing to the lack of mutual understanding and correct evaluation of the First and Fourth Front Armies.

The First Front Army's long march of 18,000 *li* is a great and unprecedented achievement in Chinese history. Pursued, intercepted, and blocked by the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD in seven or eight provinces, it marched great distances without any rest and suffered all kinds of hardships, difficulties, hunger, and coldness. Under the leadership of the Party Center and the Military Commission, however, the commanders and soldiers of the First Front Army fought numerous bloody battles against the enemy with astonishing heroism and determination; broke through the enemy's encirclement; beat back the pursuits, interceptions, and obstructions of the enemy; destroyed many troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the warlords; crossed the natural barriers of the Xiang, Wu, Jinsha, and Dadu Rivers, and finally reached the predetermined destination to meet up with the Fourth Front Army, completely defeating Chiang Kai-shek's plan of attack.

However, this does not in any way deny the losses of the First Front Army on the long march of 18,000 *li*. For ten weeks after leaving the central soviet regions, the First Front Army suffered enormous casualties (the main responsibility lay with mistakes by the military command before the Zunyi Conference) and large losses in effectiveness because of physical exhaustion, lack of rest, and failure to carry out in-depth political work. The manifestations of this were loose organization, weak discipline of the army units, growing guerrilla tendencies and warlord habits, and increasing weariness, irresponsibility, and right-wing, pessimistic, and disappointed sentiments and ideas. This caused a major reduction in the troops' fighting power. To ignore these weaknesses in the First Front Army, to exaggerate them or to refuse to analyze them, will inevitably result in excessively left or right evaluations of the First Front Army. The too-leftist evaluation may cover up passivity in the actual

work of reorganizing the troops, stepping up the anti-rightist struggle, and reinforcing discipline. The too-rightist evaluation may produce distrust of the forces of the First Front Army. The comrades in the First Front Army should exert the utmost effort to consolidate their own units; learn from the heroism and excellent fighting skills of the Fourth Front Army; believe that with a period of rest, reorganization, replenishment, and expansion they will not only restore their past fighting force but will make great progress. They should not feel distressed by the currently heavy casualties and partial losses. The comrades of the Fourth Front Army should provide the most effective brotherly assistance possible to the First Front Army.

The basic line of the party leadership of the Fourth Front Army has been correct. Since the Fourth Plenum [January 1931], it has carried out the line of the Comintern and the Party Center. Thus, it has built up a strong and resolute Red Fourth Front Army, achieved victories in many battles, and set up red areas in Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and Tongnanba. The First Front Army should learn from the Fourth Front Army's heroism and excellent fighting skills, fearlessness of hardship, tenacity under difficult conditions and hard work, observance of orders and discipline, and many other strong points, especially its vigorous attacking spirit and fighting sentiment. However, the Fourth Front Army, instead of becoming conceited because of these strong points, should develop them further. It should also learn from the First Front Army's rich experiences in the fields of strategy, tactics, and the construction of the Red Army, so as to seek greater progress and become an iron Red Army.

Every comrade of the First and Fourth Front Armies should be made to understand that both are components of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and are led by the CCP Party Center. Only class friendship and mutual assistance exists among us, not conflict and opposition. This is the only way to solidify the unity between the First and Fourth Front Armies, make it last, and turn the armies into one force to destroy the class enemy.

5) The Party's Basic Policies Concerning National Minorities

The meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies has occurred in an area where the Fanyi national minority is in the majority. In future activities in China's northwest, the Red Army will have considerable contact with minority nationalities everywhere. Therefore, it is of decisive significance for the future of the Chinese revolution to strive to bring national minorities under the leadership of the CCP and the Chinese soviet government.

The basic policy of the CCP and the Chinese soviet government toward national minorities is to recognize unconditionally their right of national self-determination, namely the political right to be independent and free, should they wish, from the oppressor nationality, i.e., the Han nationality. The CCP and the Chinese soviet government should actually help their movements for national independence and liberation against the imperialists, the GMD, traitors and collaborators, headmen and lamas, and other exploiting classes.

Given the degree of class polarization among the national minorities and their state of social and economic development, it will not always be possible to use the soviet model to organize the governments. With some nationalities, it is possible in the early stage of the struggle to establish a national united front, excluding a few upper-level elements. Under such circumstances, the form of the people's republic or the people's revolutionary government may be adopted. With other nationalities or in a situation of heightened class struggle, the form of the soviet government of workers and peasants or the soviet government of the working people may be adopted. Generally, it is inappropriate to organize a soviet democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.

Before the meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the Fourth Front Army had achieved considerable success in helping the Fan people organize guerrilla troops, establish revolutionary governments, and initiate class struggle within their own nationality. However, it is still premature to set up a soviet federal government in the northwest. This is because the present basic policy toward the national minorities is to assist their independence movement and to help them set up their own independent states. The central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic ought to call openly on the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, and other nationalities to rise up and fight for their independent states and provide concrete and practical assistance to these struggles. After the establishment of their independent states, they may, in accordance with the principle of self-determination, join the Chinese Soviet Republic to form a Chinese soviet federal government on the basis of genuine equality and unity among all nationalities. Only at this time will the policy of federalism be correct.

On many issues, the theories and methods of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism are reliable weapons for us to settle issues concerning national minorities. Only with the guidance of these theories and methods can our work have a clear policy and line. Studying the theories and methods of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism on issues of nationalities is an urgent task for the whole party at the present time.

6) The Current Central Task

To create a new soviet region in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu, our central task at present is as follows:

a) Propaganda and persuasion should be carried out immediately among the First and Fourth Front Armies to raise the troops' fighting spirit and confidence in victory so as to prepare for the destruction of large numbers of the enemy, the achievement of a complete victory in all campaigns in the northern strategy and the fulfillment of the Party Center's strategic policies.

b) The moment should be seized and utilized to reorganize the troops, to carry out military and political education and training, and to reinforce the fighting power of the troops.

c) To strengthen leadership over the Red Army, a system of political commissars

must be set up, the work of the party's organizational and political departments in the Red Army should be strengthened, and political work should focus on basic army units and party branches.

d) The discipline of the First Front Army needs to be greatly enhanced and tightened. Strict measures should be adopted to ensure the enforcement of discipline. At the same time, the comrades in the Fourth Front Army should understand that the discipline of the Red Army does not rely mainly on compulsion, but on class consciousness. The spirit of class friendship and discipline needs to be widely promoted among party members and the red commanders and soldiers.

e) Basic class education for party members and red commanders and soldiers should be stepped up to make them struggle to the end for the soviet revolution under all manner of complicated and changing circumstances. A Red Army university and a party school of senior cadres should be set up to cultivate large numbers of military and political cadres.

f) The work among the Fan people [nono-Han people from current-day Xiajiang and region] must undergo a rapid change. The General Political Department must gather experiences and lessons of work with the Fan people in all areas and use them to educate its own cadres. All ways and means must be employed to persuade the Fan people to return home, to organize guerrilla groups, to urge them to participate in the struggle, and to set up revolutionary governments of the Fan people. Some excellent Fan people must be selected to be given class and national education to turn them into our own cadres. After arriving in the areas of Gansu, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Ningxia, the main forces of the Red Army should make greater efforts among the Hui and the Mongolians.

g) We should plan the initiation of struggle and guerrilla work by the broad masses of workers and peasants in the white areas, especially the neighboring white areas. Our current urgent task is to respond to, and coordinate with, the actions of the Red Army to create new soviet regions and guerrilla zones. The Party Center must use all means to strengthen the party's leadership in the white areas of Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu. At the same time, using past experience and developing the new favorable circumstances, the organizational and leading force of the struggles in the various central cities, industrial regions, and rural areas of north and south China along the lower stream of the Yangtze River should be strengthened as much as possible.

[[h) A number of characters are missing in the Chinese, thus making it difficult to read. Work should be begun among the white armies to cause them to disintegrate. All should understand the importance of this work and how to carry it out.]]

i) The work of the provincial military commissions in Sichuan-Xikang and Ningxia should enable us to focus properly on local work and leadership of the guerrilla warfare. We should make this area a part of the soviet region of Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu. After arriving in north Shaanxi, the Red Army should step up the work of establishing and consolidating local [word missing in original].

j) An organizational system of security bureaus should be set up to strengthen the struggle against counterrevolutionaries.

k) The best cadres in the Fourth Front Army should be selected to work in the Party Center and other military and political organs.

l) Appropriate methods should be adopted to increase the leadership over other soviet regions and guerrilla zones and to coordinate actions in all respects.

7) The Future of the Victory of the Soviet Revolution and the Two-Line Struggle

In the process [words missing] the new soviet region in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu, we will certainly encounter many difficulties. The enemy will not ignore us, and they will certainly increase their strength to attack us. At the same time, high mountains, rivers, and grassland [words missing] gave us many difficulties. However, if we implement the Party Center's line resolutely and develop our creative spirit, we will overcome these difficulties.

Various kinds of right opportunist vacillations should be resolutely opposed. The emergence of vacillation is the result of overestimation and exaggeration of the enemy forces, overlooking the enemy's internal weaknesses and underestimating our own forces. A concrete manifestation of this vacillation is the suspicion of the Party Center's determined strategic policies, fear of bold advances and attempts to keep long distances between us and the enemy to avoid battles, lack of confidence in setting up new bases, worries about the difficulty of working among national minorities, and failure to work hard and resolutely among them. Concrete manifestations of this vacillation are the lack of trust in the forces of the First and Fourth Front Armies and the lack of understanding of the great significance of the meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies and the fundamental suspicion of the fighting strength of our own forces. Concrete manifestations of this vacillation are pessimism and disappointment, passively slowing down, irresponsibility, and hopelessness as soon as we meet difficulties. Finally, there are the incorrect evaluations of the present situation and suspicions as to whether a revolutionary situation exists that lead to the conclusion that the soviet movement is in decline and to disappointment in the future of the revolution.

These right opportunist vacillations apparently exist among the armies, and some of them are growing. This is the biggest danger to the task of [word missing]. One of the current central tasks is to unfold the struggle against right opportunism. In this struggle, detailed explanations should be made to every party member and red commander and soldier about the current situation and our future success. This is to convince them that while the soviet revolution is facing some temporary difficulties, it will eventually triumph. The work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries must be intensified in the struggle against these tendencies. Neglect and leniency with respect to counterrevolutionary activities must be opposed.

While struggling against right opportunism, we must not ignore "left" empty talk. The specific symptom of this "leftism" is to substitute "boasting" for the correct analysis of the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy. There-

fore, it has naturally resulted in an excessive “leftist” evaluation of the present situation. The consequence of this “leftist” evaluation is either the adventurism of underestimating the enemy or dismissing their “right” opportunist nature of fearing the enemy.

The party must use Marxism and Leninism to educate our party members and Red Army commanders and soldiers on how to evaluate in a sober way the balance of power between the enemy and us and the current situation. Only a correct evaluation can enable us to put forward the tasks and slogans of the party. Marxists and Leninists are supporters of truth and opponents of deception.

The reason is that the main purpose of the two-line struggle is to educate all party members and red commanders and soldiers so that they will make all efforts and sacrifices to accomplish their historical task. The party should mete out resolute disciplinary sanctions only against those opportunists who cannot be redeemed.

The tasks in front of us are arduous, but we are confident that under the leadership of the Party Center and the Military Commission, the First and Fourth Front Armies will fulfill them, create a northwest soviet region in Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu and achieve the victory of the soviet revolution throughout China.

E.3 Decision of the Party Center on the Mistakes of Comrade Zhang Guotao (12 September 1935)⁶⁴

After listening to Comrade Mao Zedong’s report on the dispute with the leader of the Red Fourth Front Army and on future strategic policies, the Politburo agrees with the measures already adopted and future strategic policies and points out the following:

1) The dispute between Comrade Zhang Guotao, the leader of the Fourth Front Army, and the majority comrades at the Party Center reflects, in essence, principled differences in the evaluation of the present political situation and the balance of power between us and the enemy. Comrade Zhang Guotao underestimates the upsurge in the national revolutionary movement of the entire Chinese people caused by the Japanese imperialists’ active aggression. He also underestimates the victories of the Red Army in the struggle against the enemy’s five “encirclements” and during the Long March of 20,000 *li* after breaking through the encirclements. However, he exaggerates the enemy’s forces and especially the fighting ability of the Red First Front Army. Thus, he lost confidence in establishing new soviet regions in northwest China while resisting Japan. He proposes a policy of retreating to the remote border areas of southwest China (the borders of Sichuan, Xikang, and Tibet) to replace the Bolshevik policy of advancing toward northwest China to establish model anti-Japanese bases there. It must be pointed out that this opportunist tendency of Comrade Zhang Guotao began to form when his troops, on their own,

successfully smashed the Sichuan enemy's attacks against the soviet region of Tongnanba. The latest crimes of splitting the Red Army, defying the instructions of the Party Center openly, and leading the Red Fourth Front Army to the Sichuan-Xikang borders, which are strategically unfavorable for the development of Red Army, are the final consummation of Comrade Zhang Guotao's opportunism.

2) The causes of Comrade Zhang Guotao's crimes of splitting the Red Army and his opportunist evaluations of the present situation are his warlord tendencies. These tendencies reveal that Comrade Zhang Guotao does not believe that communist party leadership is the primary condition for the Red Army to become an invincible iron Red Army. Therefore, he paid no attention to strengthening party work and political work in the Red Army. He refused to set up a system of political commissars in the Red Army to ensure absolute party leadership in the Red Army. On the contrary, he used unprincipled and noncommunist methods to unite cadres. He maintained the warlord armies' system of physical punishment and verbal abuse in the Red Army. He used physical and verbal abuse to lord it over the political regimes of the local parties and mass organizations, thus poisoning the relationship between the Red Army and the masses. Moreover, he adopted Han chauvinism when dealing with weak and small nationalities. These actions reflect the Chinese warlord system in the Red Army. These tendencies have created great obstacles to the advance and development of the young, heroic, and valiant Red Fourth Front Army.

3) The opportunist and warlord tendencies of Comrade Zhang Guotao have made him absolutely intolerant of the Party Center. He has not only totally rejected the Party Center's patient persuasion, explanation, advice, and guidance, but also organized his own antiparty small group to wage an open struggle against the Party Center, thus negating the party's basic organizational principle of democratic centralization, ignoring all party discipline, and willfully destroying the Party Center's authority before the masses.

The Politburo is of the opinion that Comrade Zhang Guotao's right opportunist and warlord tendencies have deep historical roots. Comrade Zhang Guotao has committed many opportunist mistakes and waged many factional struggles inside the CCP. Shortly after the Fourth Plenum, he expressed obedience and loyalty to the then reformed Party Center. However, he did not have a thorough understanding of past mistakes. Therefore, when he was far away from the Party Center and was separated from its leadership for a long time, he manifested again new tendencies of opportunism and warlordism. It was extremely clear that Comrade Zhang Guotao's development and persistence in these tendencies would cause him to diverge from the party. Therefore, the Politburo believes that all concrete methods must be adopted to correct Comrade Zhang Guotao's serious mistakes and calls on all comrades in the Red Fourth Front Army who are loyal to the communist party to unite around the Party Center and fight these tendencies resolutely so as to consolidate the party and the Red Army.

(This decision should be issued only to members of the CC.)

E.4 Letter from the Party Center to Party Organizations at All Levels and All Party Members in Manchuria. On the Situation in Manchuria and Our Party's Tasks (28 January 1933)⁶⁵

1) The Situation Since the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria

[[In the sixteen months since the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, they have turned it into a colony run solely by them. They are openly attacking the Soviet Union, the first proletarian country. This has created an economic crisis.

2) The Character and Prospects of the Current Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Movement in Manchuria

At present, the guerrilla detachments in the region amount to some 300,000 soldiers. There are the following four types.

a) The old Jilin army units under the command of the GMD. They rely on the landlords, bourgeoisie, and rich peasants. While anti-Japanese, they are hostile to the revolutionary mass movement. They are prone to betrayal and may surrender to the Japanese imperialists.

b) The Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army is composed mostly of peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and even workers. GMD influence is relatively small, and this has given our party limited freedom to propagate anti-imperialism and the revolution.

c) The various peasant guerrilla groups such as the Big Sword Society and Red Spears are comprised of, aside from the peasants, some workers and petty bourgeoisie and intellectual elements. Some are still under the influence of landlords, rich peasants, and affairs of the old Jilin army. Some are under the influence of revolutionary elements.

d) Red guerrilla units. Worker and peasant revolutionary fighters under the leadership of our party. They are the most progressive, revolutionary, and powerful. They can also wage a successful struggle against the GMD. However, our organization and influence are extremely weak. This has prevented them from becoming the basic force in the anti-Japanese struggle.]]

3) Our Party's Combat Tasks in Manchuria

Manchuria's future is linked not only to resistance to the armed attacks on the Soviet Union and the imperialist war in the Pacific but also to the further progress and development of the soviet revolution in China and to the advancement of the struggle for liberation in colonial countries throughout the world. Successful leadership of the revolutionary mass struggle in Manchuria by our party will fulfill not only our own revolutionary tasks of achieving national liberation and protecting soviet China but also the international task of protecting the Soviet Union while struggling against the imperialist war.⁶⁶

Our party must understand clearly the task of gaining leadership over the anti-Japanese mass struggle. This is a basic task of the Chinese revolution at the present time. (Other tasks are: developing further and linking up the soviet areas; consolidating the Red Army; overthrowing the GMD; expanding the mass revolutionary struggle, in particular the strike movement of the workers, the intention of which is to draw in the members of the yellow trade unions and the nonorganized workers. This will transform the red trade unions into genuine organizations for the broad masses.) This process proves that the general strategy of the ECCI and the Party Center of using revolutionary methods to resolve the Manchurian problem is totally correct. The slogans put forward have also been entirely correct. At the current stage of the development of the mass movement in Manchuria, the general principle of our strategy is to create as broad an anti-imperialist united front as possible to rally and unite all possible forces, even those that may vacillate and be unreliable, to fight against the common enemy—the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. However, we must prepare for further class differentiation and class struggle within the united front thus improving the prospects for the soviet revolution in Manchuria. The slogans proposed by the Comintern's Twelfth Plenum—such as confiscating the property of the Japanese imperialists and national traitors, a general strike and an anti-Japanese and Manchurian boycott, expansion of the mass-based guerrilla movement, resistance to the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a popularly elected soviet regime—will certainly be supported enthusiastically by the broad masses in Manchuria and throughout the nation. However, to realize these slogans, the party must implement correctly and effectively the “special” national anti-imperialist movement, and, in particular, the anti-Japanese united front. We must ensure the leadership of the proletariat within this united front. Our party must make use of the extremely valuable experiences of the 1925–27 revolution. We must be aware of the relative class strengths at the current stage of development of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in Manchuria. In implementing this strategy, we should pay attention to the following:

First, at all times, we must resolutely maintain our own political and organizational independence. This means allowing the proletarian party open and unrelenting criticism and exposure of all conspiracies and phenomena within the united front, such as indecisiveness and vacillation, treachery, disloyalty, and submission. We must resolutely and ceaselessly combat the rightist elements who attempt to change the strategy of ensuring proletarian leadership into surrender and becoming the tail of the bourgeoisie. However, we must also declare war on “left” closed-doorism and the scheming and tendencies in practical policy implementation to bypass the current stage. These could prematurely destroy or fail to create the united front that is needed at the present time. Objectively, this helps the Japanese imperialists.

Second, when implementing the tactic of the united front, we must pay particular attention to both objective and subjective factors and we must deal with different issues separately. For example, when dealing with the first type of guerrilla move-

ment outlined above (Zhu Jiqing's troops do not comprise anti-Japanese volunteers with a mass character; these troops temporarily obey his command), the most important thing is to organize a united front from below with the soldiers. When it is necessary to engage in a joint anti-Japanese struggle, we must lay down specific agreements on joint operations. With the second type of guerrilla units, to a certain extent, we can carry out a united front from above as well as the united front from below. Depending on their struggle against the reactionary leaders and our revolutionary political influence among them, with the third type of guerrillas we can decide on the extent and scope of the united front, and we may even join with them in a certain type of anti-Japanese alliance.

Third, we must not forget that the united front from below must be the basis of our activity. Even if we can form a united front from above, we must remember only a solid united front from below that threatens the upper strata with the revolutionary spirit of the lower strata is practicable and useful. Only in this way can we implement the united front from below and enable the working class and the revolutionary movement in Manchuria to be effective in carrying out the united front tactic in the national revolutionary war.

Fourth, we must pay particular attention to the following. If, under certain circumstances, the proletariat can implement a united front with a certain section of the national bourgeoisie and it wages an armed struggle against the imperialists, this provides not only an example of a common struggle against the imperialists but also an example of a struggle with the bourgeoisie to win over the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and bring them under proletarian leadership. Without a proletarian nucleus to the anti-imperialist movement and without revolutionary organizations of the broad proletarian masses (the red trade unions, the strike committees, the anti-Japanese associations, the workers' pickets and workers' volunteers), it will be impossible to implement a genuine revolutionary united front around the proletariat that is beneficial to the proletariat. It will also be impossible to gain proletarian leadership. Thus, we must strive resolutely to expand the political education and organization of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie (particularly the workers). This will further the political and economic struggles. This is our party's most important task in Manchuria at the present time.

[[The quantity and quality of the proletariat in Manchuria constitute a great political power. The wave of strikes and active participation by workers in guerrilla warfare prove the proletariat's great political strength. The party must strive to expand and lead the proletarian mass struggles. While conducting anti-imperialist and class struggles, as many workers as possible should be organized into revolutionary mass organizations. We must resolutely support the peasants' demands. Party organizations must combat the view that the land question is not so important in the northeast.]]

In light of this situation, we must pay special attention to organizing rural workers in Manchuria. They will provide us with leadership in the land movement. Only struggle will keep the peasantry from famine, poverty and death. The party's task is

to put forward realistic demands and slogans. For example: let the peasants retain 80 percent of the harvest; resist taxes and levies of the Japanese imperialists, the Manchurian government and the warlords; oppose the wholesale massacre of the peasants by the Japanese imperialists and the Manchurian government, oppose the burning of peasant homes and the looting of property and livestock; refuse the payment of usurious loans; allow the unrestricted cultivation of *gaoliang* and other crops; resist the laws of slavery enforced by the Japanese imperialists (such as the prohibition of free farming and the use of farm implements such as sickles, plows, and shovels). We must use these slogans to organize the economic and political struggles of the peasantry and link them to those of the urban workers. By expanding the mass struggle of the peasantry, the party should develop our organization within the various revolutionary mass organizations, especially the peasant committees. The peasant committee should become the real political organ of the village and function as a broad and powerful basis for the people's political power. It should deal with relations between the peasants and the guerrillas, providing the latter with provisions, and should organize self-defense corps. The party should expend every effort to turn the farmhands and poor peasants into the leading force of the peasant committees. The party should use the committees to organize the broad masses of middle peasants.

[[We must use appropriate slogans to mobilize the 8 to 10 million refugees displaced by the floods and war. We should use slogans against those who join the Manchurian troops that suggest that they are traitors and that they should come over to our side. We should call on those in the Jilin army not to kill their own brothers. For the petty bourgeoisie, we should call for the suspension and reduction of all kinds of levies and taxes, demand freedom of speech, association, and religion. For students and intellectuals, we should oppose the closing down of schools and the murder of students and journalists. Oppose Sun Yat-senism, as it covers up the bloody white terror, treason, and our country's humiliation. Do not forget that particularly in the initial stage, the petty bourgeoisie, especially students, can play a great role in expanding the mass anti-imperialist movement. We must expose the propaganda by the Japanese imperialists.]]

It is estimated that there are between 10,000 and 15,000 Japanese workers in Manchuria. Compared to Chinese workers and Japanese workers in their homeland, they are in a privileged position. However, we should consider establishing links between their revolutionary struggles and the struggles within Japan. We should also raise slogans that are in the interests of both Japanese and Chinese workers, and organize joint strikes. Among Japanese workers in Manchuria, we should organize branches of the CP. At the same time, we must raise similar demands such as the right to organize labor unions.

Based on the experiences of Shanghai and the facts in Manchuria, anti-Japanese associations in Manchuria and other [associations] can become organizations to rally the majority of the people. At the same time, we must take the power of such organizations into our own hands. Every organization and party member in Man-

churia must raise slogans that most excite the masses and that can mobilize the majority of the masses to join in the struggle. Moreover, we should link up their daily demands and struggles with our party's overall political mission and the struggle against the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. In addition, the party must carefully consider the complex international relations of Manchuria and ruthlessly struggle against the imperialists. At the same time, we must carry out struggles against all imperialists. These imperialists are competing against the Japanese imperialists for the sake of oppressing and enslaving the Chinese and other peoples in Manchuria. This is one aspect. On the other hand, we must use, whenever possible and however slim the possibility, the contradictions and conflicts between the imperialist robbers so that such conflicts may benefit the revolutionary mass movements.

[[The party must propagate the friendly alliance between the Soviet and Chinese workers and peasants and between the Chinese and Outer Mongolian peoples. We must propagate the achievements of soviet China in solving the problems of imperialism and the land. The Chinese Soviet Republic has declared war on Japan and would be fighting at the front with the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces if the GMD had not attacked our bases. In our soviet areas, the party should launch a movement to support the guerrilla forces in Manchuria.

4) The Consolidation and Development of Our Party and Organization Will Ensure the Victory of the Mass Struggle in Manchuria

Achievement of these tasks will depend on our party's capabilities. However, our party organization lags behind what is objectively possible. The number of party and YL members are very small. Thus, the consolidation and development of our party's organizations in Manchuria is one of the most urgent tasks. Problems of communication mean that we must build strong party committees that can work independently and on their own initiative. We must combat the pessimism that suggests that there are no people in Manchuria who can be recruited as cadres. Open and secret work must be linked together, yet the Manchurian provincial committee has put forward no concrete policies for this. In the struggle on two fronts we must oppose rightist tendencies—liquidationism, pessimism about the mass struggle, and “leftist” tendencies—closed-doorism, underestimation of the national revolutionary united front, and the remnants of the Li Lisan line. We must be resolute in the struggle against the counterrevolutionary Luo Zhanglong and the Trotskyite Chen Duxiu faction. A basic weakness in the Manchurian party is that it never experienced the 1927 revolution.]]

We believe that the Manchurian party and all comrades will implement resolutely the resolution of the Comintern's Twelfth Plenum and the Party Center's directive. They must carry out Bolshevik work among the toiling workers and the armed masses. Above all else, we must fight the imperialists and the GMD with the

utmost bravery, with a spirit of ultimate sacrifice, and with maximum effort. The final victory in Manchuria is ours!

The Party Center, 26 January 1933

* * *

The GMD signed the treasonous “Ceasefire Agreement in the North,”⁶⁷ recognized the “Manchurian State,” and finally sold out Manchuria, Rehe [Chengde], Beijing, Tianjin, and the north, thus taking a further step toward more shamelessly and openly capitulating to the Japanese imperialists, helping the Japanese and all imperialists to partition China totally, and causing an even more critical national crisis. In addition to publicizing our opposition to the “Cease-fire Agreement in the North” and all other documents, the CC believes that it is necessary to publish our January letter to the party [organizations] in Manchuria. It is hoped that all organizations, particularly the party in the north, appropriately apply the tasks and strategies pointed out in this letter to the practical struggle in all areas in order to organize and expand the struggle against Japan, imperialism, and the GMD and struggle for the victory of the Chinese revolution!

The Party Center, 9 June 1933

E.5 Message to Compatriots on Resistance to Japan to Save the Nation (1 August 1935)⁶⁸

Workers, Peasants, Civil and Military Personnel, Merchants, Students, and Male and Female Compatriots at Home and Abroad:

The Japanese imperialists have quickened their invasion of our land. As a result of the gradual submission of the traitorous Nanjing regime, first the four provinces of the northeast and now all our northern provinces have fallen into the hands of the Japanese aggressors!

Today the troops of the Japanese aggressor have in fact gained complete control of Beijing and Tianjin—two cities with several thousand years of culture and history—and Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, and Henan—provinces rich in natural resources. They have also taken Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan—regions with major important strategic value—and the Bei[jing]-[Liao]ning, [Bei]jing-Han[kou], [Tian]jin-Pu[kou], and [Bei]jing-Sui[yuan] railways—the political and economic lifelines of our nation. The headquarters of the Japanese Northeastern Army is now aggressively pursuing its plan to create a so-called “Mongolian State” and “North

China State.” In less than four years since the “September 18 Incident” [1931], the Japanese aggressors have run over and annexed step by step almost half of our territory: from the three provinces of the northeast to Rehe, to the fortress of the Great Wall, to the “military free zone of East Luan,” and to the *de facto* occupation of Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, and other northern provinces. The venomous scheme to annex our country completely, as scheduled in the Tanaka Memorial, is being carried out. If things continue this way, the area of the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers, as well as other places, will all gradually fall into the hands of the Japanese aggressors, and our nation, which has a 5,000-year history, will be reduced to the status of a colony, and our 400 million compatriots will all become slaves of the Japanese aggressors.

In recent years, our nation and our people have arrived at a critical, life-and-death moment. To fight against Japan is to live, whereas to surrender to Japan is to die. It has become the sacred duty for every one of us to resist Japan and save the nation!

It is most distressing to find, however, that in our great nation there are a few scum who have the face of a man but the heart of a beast! During recent years traitors such as Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan, and Zhang Xueliang, and old collaborators like Huang Fu, Yang Yongtai, Wang Yitang, and Zhang Qun, have sold out our territory by adopting the policy of “nonresistance.” They have accepted all the demands of the Japanese aggressors by preaching “we should resign ourselves to adversity”; they have launched the Civil War and suppressed all the anti-imperialist movements by carrying out the autocratic propaganda “to resist foreign aggression by first eliminating the internal enemy.” They have blocked the anti-Japanese patriotic struggle waged by the people by using deceitful slogans such as “ten years to gather strength,” “ten years to develop,” and “preparing well for revenge.” They have tried to deceive our people into waiting for death by advocating the idea: “Let’s wait for the Second World War to start.” Recently these traitors and collaborators have acted even more flagrantly by surrendering to Japan in the name of “Sino-Japanese Friendship,” “Sino-Japanese Cooperation,” and “Great Asianism.” Their shameless behavior is unprecedented in the history of our nation and at home and abroad! When the Japanese aggressors demanded that the troops of Yu Xuezhong and Sun Zheyuan be withdrawn, these troops were ordered to move immediately to the south to participate in the civil war. The Japanese aggressors demanded that certain military and civil authorities be dismissed, and these officials were dismissed at once. The Japanese aggressors demanded that the Hebei provincial government be moved out of Tianjin, and it was transferred to Baoding immediately. The Japanese aggressors demanded that certain newspapers and journals be banned, and they were closed down at once. The Japanese aggressors demanded that editors and journalists of *New Life* [Xinsheng] and some other magazines be punished, and these editors and journalists were arrested and put into jail immediately. The Japanese aggressors demanded that the Chinese government carry out the education of enslavement, and so the traitor, Chiang Kai-shek, began to burn

books and execute scholars at once. The Japanese aggressors demanded that the Chinese government employ Japanese advisors, and the military and civil authorities of the Chiang Kai-shek regime started to invite these robbers to take over immediately. Even when the Japanese aggressors demanded that the GMD organizations be disbanded, those in the north and Xiamen and elsewhere were disbanded immediately. And when the Japanese aggressors demanded that the Blue Shirt Society be dismissed,⁶⁹ Zeng Kuoqing, Jiang Xiaoxian, and some other leaders of the Blue Shirt Society in the north immediately ran away.

The Chinese soviet government and the CP consider these actions and behavior of the Japanese aggressors and collaborators to be unbearable insults to our nation! The Chinese soviet government and the CP solemnly declare that not only do we strongly protest the Japanese invasion of our territory and their interference in our internal affairs but also vigorously denounce their demands to disband the GMD and the Blue Shirt Society. The Chinese soviet government and the CP firmly hold that all Chinese affairs must be handled by us Chinese. No matter what sort of monstrous crimes the GMD and the Blue Shirt Society have committed, they must be dealt with by the Chinese. Whether they should be disbanded or allowed to remain is none of Japan's business.

Our territory has been occupied province after province; our people have been enslaved thousand upon thousand; our towns and villages have been destroyed one after another; our compatriots residing abroad have been driven away group by group; and our internal and foreign affairs have been interfered with continually. How can a country in these conditions be considered a sovereign state?! How can a nation like this be regarded as independent?!

Compatriots! China is our very motherland! The Chinese people are all our dear compatriots! Can we wait to see our motherland conquered and our people enslaved while doing nothing to defend our motherland and save our people?

No! Absolutely not! Abyssinia is a state with only 8 million people, yet it has risen up in arms to fight heroically against the Italian imperialists to defend its land and people. How can we—a great nation with 400 million people—wait to die in this way? The Chinese soviet government and the CP firmly believe that, except for a very few traitors and collaborators such as Li Wangyong, Zheng Xiaoxu, Zhang Jinghui, and Fu Yi, who please and serve our mortal enemy, most of our workers, peasants, military and civil personnel, merchants, students, and male and female compatriots in all circles would never want to be the slaves of the Japanese imperialists. The Chinese soviet government has declared war on Japan; the Red Army has proposed repeatedly to act together with other forces to resist Japan; the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Detachment of the Red Army has fought its way into the north with great courage; the Nineteenth Route Army and the people in Shanghai have engaged in bloody battles against the Japanese aggressors; the Chinese troops and the masses at Chahar, the Great Wall, and various places of the East Luan have fought heroically against the enemy; and the Fujian People's Government has accepted the Red Army's proposal to unite together to resist Japan. Luo Dengxian, Xu

Minghong, Ji Hongchang, Deng Tiemei, Bo Yang, Tong Changlong, Pan Hongsheng, Shi Cantang, Qu Qiubai, Sun Yongqin, Fang Zhimin, and other national heroes have sacrificed their lives for the patriotic cause to save the nation. Liu Chongwu, Tian Han, Du Zhongyun, and other patriotic personages have gone to jail for their anti-Japanese activities. Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangding, Weng Zhaoxuan, Chen Mingshu, and Fang Zhengwu have led their troops in a brave fight against the Japanese aggressors. Song Qingling, He Xiangning, Li Du, Ma Xiangbo, and several thousand other people have declared the basic program of the Chinese nation for the war against Japan. Workers, peasants, merchants, students, and compatriots in all walks of life have wholeheartedly engaged in various anti-Japanese patriotic movements during recent years to boycott Japanese goods, go on strike, stop business activities, stop going to school, and hold demonstrations. And particularly, several hundred thousand anti-Japanese armed forces in the northeast under the direction of such national heroes as Yang Jingyu, Zhao Shanzhi, Wang Detai, Li Yanlu, Zhou Paozhong, Xie Wendong, Wu Yicheng, and Li Huatang have made great sacrifices to carry out bravely and unflinchingly the armed struggle against the troops of the Japanese aggressor. All these facts prove the noble spirit and the strong determination of our people to defend the country and defeat the enemy. These facts also show that our struggle to resist Japan and save the nation will surely succeed. If the anti-Japanese patriotic cause of our people has not yet achieved the full success that it should, it is because of the combined attacks by Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese aggressors from both within and outside of the nation. On the other hand, there are misunderstandings and differences that have caused disunity among the various anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang forces.

Therefore, at this critical moment when our nation is facing the danger of being conquered and our people becoming enslaved, the Chinese soviet government and the CP once again call on all compatriots that no matter how different past and present attitudes of various parties and organizations are on political issues, no matter how people in different circles disagree with one another regarding their respective interests, and no matter how hostile the various armed forces feel toward each other, we ought to realize that "brothers quarreling at home should join forces against attacks from without." First, we must stop the Civil War in order to concentrate all our strength (labor power, financial power, and military power) to strive for the success of the sacred cause to resist Japan and save the nation. The Chinese soviet government and the CP solemnly declare once again that as long as the GMD troops cease attacking the soviet area and as long as they are willing to fight against Japan, the Red Army not only will suspend hostilities toward them but also will cooperate closely with them to defend our land no matter how deep the hatred is between the Red Army and these troops, and no matter how they differ with the Red Army on internal affairs. In addition, the Chinese soviet government and the CP now sincerely appeal to:

All compatriots who do not want to be slaves of Japanese aggressors!

All officers and brother soldiers who have a patriotic conscience!

Comrades in all parties and organizations that are willing to participate in the sacred cause to resist Japan and save the nation!

All ardent youths with national consciousness in the GMD and the Blue Shirt Society!

All nationals residing abroad who care for our motherland!

Brothers of all the oppressed nationalities in China (Mongolian, Hui, Korean, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Li, and Yi)!

Rise up! Smash the heartless oppression of the Japanese aggressors and the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. Join bravely with the Chinese soviet government and the anti-Japanese political powers in various places of the northeast to set up a unified all-China government of national defense. Unite with the Red Army, the People's Revolutionary Forces in the northeast, and the various anti-Japanese volunteers to organize a unified all-China anti-Japanese army.

The Chinese soviet government and the CP are willing to sponsor such a government of national defense. We are willing to work together immediately with anyone who will participate in the anti-Japanese patriotic cause to negotiate establishing a joint government of national defense, including political parties, social organizations (trade unions, peasant associations, student unions, chambers of commerce, churches, leagues of journalists, unions of teachers, associations of fellow provincials, members of Zhigongtang [one of the democratic parties], the National Armed Self-Defense Association, the Anti-Japanese Society, and patriotic leagues), distinguished personages and scholars, statesmen, and various local civil and military authorities. The government of national defense produced by negotiation should be the provisional leading organ for the resistance against Japan to save the nation. Such a government of national defense should hold a convention that would truly represent all the Chinese people in order to discuss further specific issues concerning the anti-Japanese patriotic cause. (The delegates at the convention must be elected in accordance with democratic principles by workers, peasants, civil and military personnel, merchants, students, and people in other circles, all parties and organizations that are willing to resist Japan and save the nation, and nationals residing abroad and the various national minorities.) The Chinese soviet government and the CP firmly support and completely approve the creation of such a convention that represents all the Chinese people and will implement fully the resolutions of the convention. The Chinese soviet government and the CP are political powers that deeply respect the will of the people.

The major responsibility of such a national defense government is to resist Japan to save the nation, and its executive policies should cover the following items:

- 1) Resist Japan and recover the lost territories.
- 2) Provide disaster relief and regulate rivers and watercourses; maintain social order; and stabilize the people's livelihood.
- 3) Confiscate all properties that the Japanese imperialists have in China and use them for military expenses in the war against Japan.

- 4) Confiscate the property, grain, and land of the traitors and collaborators; distribute them to the poor people and the anti-Japanese fighters.
- 5) Abrogate exorbitant taxes and levies, solve financial and monetary problems, and develop industry, agriculture, and commerce.
- 6) Raise wages and salaries; improve the lives of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and students.
- 7) Adopt a democratic system and guarantee freedom of speech; release all political prisoners.
- 8) Implement free education and provide the unemployed youths with jobs.
- 9) Provide equal treatment to all the nationalities of China; protect the lives, property, freedom of residence, and the right of commercial activities of our compatriots residing abroad.
- 10) Unite with the people who are opposed to Japanese imperialism (the laboring masses in Japan, the Koreans, the Taiwanese, etc.) as our allies, unite with all peoples and nations sympathetic toward the Chinese national liberation movement, and establish friendly relations with all peoples and nations who opt for a well-considered neutrality in the anti-Japanese war.

The allied forces resisting Japan should include all troops willing to fight the Japanese under the leadership of the government of national defense. A headquarters for the allied forces should be established. On the basis of public opinion, the convention will decide whether this headquarters will be made up of officers and men elected from all the anti-Japanese armed forces. The Red Army will be the first to join the allied force and the first to carry out the task of resisting Japan to save the nation.

To realize a government of national defense, national defense must be made an important task. To achieve an allied anti-Japanese area, opposition to Japan must become an important duty. The CP and the soviet government call on compatriots: those who have money, give money; those who have guns, give guns; those who have food, give food; those with strength, use it; those with specialized skills, contribute them. This will fully mobilize our compatriots. Moreover, it creates a new form of armed uprising for the millions of masses.

The CP and the soviet government believe that if our 400 million compatriots have a united government of national defense as its leader, a united anti-Japanese allied force as its vanguard, with millions of masses as reserves, and countless Eastern and world proletarians and oppressed people as support, they can certainly defeat Japanese imperialism, which is resisted by people at home and opposed by the powers abroad!

Compatriots arise!

Fight for the life of the mother country!

Fight for the existence of the people!

Fight for the nation's independence!

Fight for our territorial integrity!

Fight for people's rights and freedom!

Long live the great opposition of the Chinese people to the Japanese to save the nation and their great unity!

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet
The CCP CC

E.6 The Party Center's Secret Letter of Instruction on Opposing Japan and Condemning Chiang at the Present Time (October 1935)⁷⁰

The Party's Main Task Is to Oppose Japan and Condemn Chiang [*Fan-Ri tao-Jiang*]

Since their occupation of the three provinces in the northeast, the bombing of Wusong in Shanghai, the destruction of Rehe, and the carving up of a big portion of Chahar and Suiyuan and the effective annexation of five provinces in north China, the Japanese imperialists are now implementing the Tanaka Plan. This is a plan to subjugate China under slogans such as "Sino-Japanese cooperation," "economic mutual assistance," "development of the northwest," and "peace in East Asia." Therefore, there is only one way out for the Chinese people—to save the nation and to save themselves. Resisting Japan is the only way out. We can survive only if we resist Japan. If we do not resist Japan, we shall die. We shall be men if we resist Japan, and we shall be slaves of a subjugated nation if we do not resist Japan.

If China did not have Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Xueliang, and Wang Jingwei and the Nanjing government, Japan would have found it less easy to invade Chinese territories and trample on the Chinese people. The occupation of the three provinces in the northeast resulted from the nonresistance and sell-out of Chiang and Zhang. The failure of the war of self-defense in Shanghai is the consequence of the sell-out contained in the Songhu ceasefire agreement signed by traitor Chiang. This sold out the larger part of Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan, recognized Manchuria as a state, and provided for the opening of traffic and mail. Furthermore, accepting an unprecedented Japanese humiliation of China under the name of "friendly and neighborly relations" and "peace and trust," traitor Chiang's so-called solution of the North China Incident led to the total loss of the five provinces of Hebei. Traitor Chiang and the Japanese forces have helped Sun Legin's volunteer troops in their "encirclement and suppression" by abolishing anti-Japanese mass organizations, arresting anti-Japanese masses, destroying anti-Japanese cultural movements, and pushing their total surrender.

To facilitate his groveling surrender, Chiang Kai-shek uses the pretext of "restoring domestic order before dealing with the outside." He used the planes of the national army to spread poisonous gas when attacking China's only anti-Japanese

armed forces—the Red Army of the Workers and Peasants—destroying the people's bases for fighting against Japan—the soviet regions—and obstructing the Chinese people and the Red Army from fighting against Japan.

However, the heroic Red Army, under the leadership of the CP, despite traitor Chiang's obstructions and sieges, has finally succeeded in fulfilling the plans by reaching destinations where war on Japan can be declared—Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Shanxi. Its purpose is to coordinate with the Chinese anti-Japanese masses and anti-Japanese guerrillas and volunteer armies in a joint secret armed struggle directly against Japan for the recovery of the lost territories.

Chiang Kai-shek has seen the great victories of the Red Army, but he fears his master more. The Japanese imperialists are threatened by the united front of the Chinese Red Army and the anti-Japanese volunteer armies and the anti-Japanese masses. Frightened of losing his role as a lackey, Chiang has hurriedly set up a general headquarters for the elimination of bandits in Xi'an with the aim of selling out northeast China and pursuing nonresistance. Zhang Xueliang is the deputy commander-in-chief, and together they are attempting to stop the Red Army's declaration of war against Japan.

Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek is the number one traitor and collaborator with the Japanese imperialists in China. It is obvious that the Chinese people have gradually realized that it is necessary to condemn Chiang before resisting Japan and that only by condemning Chiang can the resistance against Japan be conducted smoothly. The Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chiang Kai-shek are the main enemies of the Chinese revolution. Resisting Japan and condemning Chiang is the only way out for China now, and it is the CCP's most important current task.

The Further Expansion of the Current Revolutionary Bases

Because of the incessant aggression against China by the Japanese imperialists and the total sell-out and surrender of traitor Chiang, unprecedented floods, mutinies, and famines have occurred over the past few years throughout the country, giving rise to an unprecedented economic bankruptcy of the people. Thus, traitor Chiang has sold some people to Japan, forcing them to live the lives of slaves of a subjugated nation. He has also destroyed, killed, attacked, and pushed other people into danger, thus causing them to live inhumane lives. Therefore, everyone wants to see him die a terrible death. Since "September 18" [1931], the anti-Japanese actions of the broad masses in all regions have been flourishing daily. For example, there is Ji Hongchang, Fang Zhenwu, and Sun Dianying's past resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang; the military actions to resist Japan and oppose Chiang based on the agreement between the Nineteenth [Route] Army, the People's Government of Fujian, and the Red Army; the program issued last year for armed self-defense issued by Song Qingling, He Xiangning, Li Du, Ma Xiangbo, Zhang Naiqi, etc., and the fact that in just one week in Shanghai alone over 300,000 people signed on. Re-

cently, the volunteer armies in north China have been developing rapidly. According to a Japanese newspaper, anti-Japanese handbills have appeared among the soldiers in Hankou and Hangzhou [as in original]. There are even some GMD CC members who openly propose resistance to Japan. In this mighty torrent to resist Japan and condemn Chiang, participants are not limited to the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army; many are petty-bourgeois university professors, university students, secondary school pupils, and intellectuals. Even some middle- and high-level GMD military officers and CC members, politicians and bankers, and some landlords and bourgeois elements have participated.

The failure of the 1927 Revolution was caused by the combined opposition of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and the reactionaries. The current situation is very different. Now in China, the petty bourgeoisie has been awakened by the call to refuse to be the slaves of a subjugated nation, has been aroused by the battle drums of the national revolutionary war, and has to join in the revolutionary current of resisting Japan and opposing Chiang. In addition, even some national bourgeoisie and GMD military officers and politicians have also wormed their way into the revolutionary current. They have learned a lesson from the "Manchurian state" and "coexistence and co-prosperity." Therefore the social base of the Chinese revolution has expanded greatly.

Because of different class interests, these people's enthusiasm and degrees of participation in the revolutionary struggles are different. However, if they have any revolutionary spirit, they should not be rejected from the united front by the revolutionaries. Lenin said: "If revolutionaries are not good at utilizing all revolutionary forces, they are as stupid as pigs"; he also said, "Even though their revolutionary spirit is temporary, wavering, and it is known that it might change tomorrow, if they still benefit the revolution today, we should make as much use of this as possible." If the party does not see these new class changes in China, does not recognize new revolutionary forces, and does not know how to use these new forces, it is impossible for the Chinese revolution to succeed.

The General Tactic for Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang Is the Formation of the United Front

Using this new social base, the party has decided to fulfill the task of resisting Japan and condemning Chiang. The party's general tactical guideline is to form a broad united front. This means that the party should unite all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang forces to overthrow the Japanese imperialists and eliminate Chiang Kai-shek.

Two ways of survival are sharply conflicting with each other in China now. Either Chiang Kai-shek overcomes the Chinese people and presents Chinese territories to the Japanese emperor as a gift, or the entire Chinese nation that does not wish to be slaves of a subjugated nation unites to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek and overthrow the Japanese imperialists and bring about China's independence and libera-

tion. The CCP has always been a vanguard fighting for the second path. Therefore, the party should unite all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang organizations and individuals without hesitation and launch joint attacks on the Japanese imperialists and the traitor Chiang Kai-shek. These are the main enemies endangering and destroying China. It should be understood that an increase in the forces of traitor Chiang increases the danger of China's destruction. An increase in the forces opposing Chiang increases the Chinese revolutionary forces.

Therefore, the party must call on all party comrades to bring together all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang groups and forces and to fight together with them against the enemy. Only by so doing can we weaken the forces of traitor Chiang and increase the revolutionary forces. Only by so doing can we enable the broad masses to carry out the national revolutionary struggle and win victories. Only by so doing can we spread the Chinese soviet regime throughout the whole of China.

How to Carry Out the Work of the United Front with Respect to the Participants in the United Front

It has been pointed out already that the party should unite in a joint struggle with all groups and individuals that resist Japan and oppose Chiang. From the class point of view, the party must be willing to unite all classes (ranging from workers and peasants to capitalists) to work out common plans for resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang. This should include all those who do not wish to be slaves of a subjugated nation and who wish to work to fulfill the duty of saving China. Regarding political parties, the CCP should be willing to form a genuine united front with all parties (ranging from the Production Party⁷¹ to the Social Democratic Party and the Nationalist group) with the joint responsibility of saving China. It should include all those who wish to engage in any activities of resisting Japan and opposing Chiang and have some sentiment of saving the nation and avoiding subjugation.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in the period of the revolutionary war and the period of the war of national revolution against Japan, the party's work in the enemy armies is the most important work (more important than the labor movement). Party headquarters at all levels should be mobilized to penetrate enemy ranks. However, the present task of work in the enemy armies is not only restricted to winning over the lower-level masses. Attention should also be paid to winning over middle- and upper-level military officers. It is possible to win over these officers under the present circumstances.

Finally, it should be pointed out that party committees in many regions have always neglected, and even do not wish to conduct, work among students and the urban petty bourgeoisie. This phenomenon is not permissible and must be corrected quickly. It should be understood that the Chinese revolution cannot succeed without the help of the petty bourgeoisie.

The Forms of the United Front

There are three forms of the united front: (1) the united front from above; (2) the united front from below; and (3) the united front from above and below.

Under the present circumstances in China, all three forms can be used in accordance with concrete circumstances.

A) The participants in and methods of using the first form of the united front. Organizations of important GMD officials or prestigious Chinese and famous scholars contain no masses and are composed merely of upper-level groups. However, they resent the aggression by Japan and are angry at the sell-out by traitor Chiang and the Nanjing government. Influenced by patriotic indignation, they wish to engage in all work of opposing Japan and Chiang. We must unite and make common plans with them and help them to develop methods for their anti-Japanese activities.

B) The participants in and methods of using the second form of the united front. In organizations of the Japanese imperialists and traitor Chiang Kai-shek and his lackey troops loyal to Japan, i.e., the fascist Blue Shirts and other similarly reactionary groups, the upper levels are thoroughly counterrevolutionary. However, there are many people at the lower level who have been deceived and used by them and who are still sufficiently conscious to engage in anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang activities. There are also some people who understand nothing. Here, the party can only establish a united front from below, unite with those who have awareness, and work among those who lack awareness to guide them onto the road of resisting Japan and opposing Chiang.

C) The participants in and methods of using the third form of united front. There are many participants who can be united in this form, i.e., the spontaneous mass organizations in all regions. Their upper-level organs—such as in the Red Gun Society, the anti-Japanese Big Sword Society, students' organizations, and the League for Eliminating Traitors—are elected democratically. The fighting spirit of their upper and lower levels in resisting Japan and opposing Chiang is very high. Furthermore, some GMD generals do not want to be lackeys of the Japanese and slaves of a subjugated nation. On the other hand, they are also threatened by the soldiers' revolution and see no alternative for survival (i.e., the Nineteenth Route Army, Feng Jiuxiang, Sun Dianying, etc.). In addition, some ruling or opposition factions of the GMD or political parties (i.e., the new GMD and many other groups currently opposing Chiang) are jointly planning a movement to overthrow Chiang because they are discontent with traitor Chiang's dictatorship and wish to participate in the work against Japan because they resent Japanese aggression. In the above-mentioned organizations, either the united front from below or the united front from above may be established. We can open up avenues for, and expand the work of, uniting with their lower levels on the basis of uniting with their upper levels. We may also strengthen and consolidate unity with their lower levels on the basis of uniting with their upper levels.

Conditions for the United Front

The conditions for the success of the united front are of decisive significance. These must be considered carefully when thinking about the united front. Attention should be paid to concrete conditions in various localities and to understanding the level of the mass struggle in various areas.

The unified principles of the party should be combined with the urgent demands of the masses in daily life in a flexible way, putting forward concrete demands for an alliance that enjoys the support of the people. We must avoid rigidly and mechanically putting forward all positions, resolutions, and programs of the party's struggle as this will frighten away the masses and weaken us.

The Forms of Organization and Methods of Leadership of the United Front

1) Bolshevik parties stress the substance of all organizational work. Form is secondary. However, if form adversely affects, restricts, or harms substance, then it should be firmly rejected. This applies to the form for opposing Japan and condemning Chiang. Therefore, the organizational principles of the united front must first and foremost utilize all possibilities. As long as we can win the support of the broad masses, all forms are permissible.

2) To use the correct methods of leadership, we must understand the essence of the issue of party leadership. In the past, some comrades believed that party leadership meant that all in the upper-level organs and the leadership of mass organizations must be party members or red elements and that all their resolutions, slogans, and handbills should be just as red as those of the party and red trade unions. At the same time, in the newspapers of party organs, it was openly stated that the organizations were led by the party. Therefore, in practical work, they either blindly expelled leaders with some mass following from various parties and groups, thus causing mass resentment, or rashly adopted so-called leftist and revolutionary resolutions that frightened the masses away. In the newspapers, they created excuses and evidence for the enemy to disrupt and destroy the organizations and their work.

What is the party leadership? Party leadership means trust, support, and implementation of party proposals, tactics, and resolutions by the broad masses. This cannot be achieved overnight, and it cannot be achieved by narrowly restricting the party among the masses. The party can achieve this only through a long period of hard persuasion of the masses. Therefore, party leadership over mass organizations or united front organizations is as follows:

First, it is necessary to adopt the mass line of work and grant a high degree of democracy to the masses. Bold efforts should be made to absorb all kinds of parties, factions, and leaders with mass followings into our organs to assist and develop their talents and capabilities of opposing Japan and Chiang to the utmost.

Second, tasks for the struggle and programs or work tasks of different localities

should be proposed in accordance with the different circumstances of various regions and need to be discussed and adopted by meetings of all the masses.

Third, the general programs of resisting Japan and condemning Chiang should be linked with the lives of the masses of all classes in all regions. Small incidents (i.e., Japan's new policies toward China, Japanese expulsion of Chinese in Japan, and the Xinsheng Incident⁷²) must be utilized flexibly to inspire the sentiments and courage of the masses in their struggle.

Fourth, utmost efforts should be made to preserve and consolidate the forces of all the masses (especially those of the legal mass organizations). Premature struggles should be absolutely prohibited to avoid wasting one's energy. The leadership of the struggle should be good at predicating the future of the struggle and whether it can be successful. If it is very unlikely to succeed, preparatory work must be stepped up and the struggle must be halted temporarily to avoid meaningless sacrifice. If the struggle fails, a well-organized retreat should be made to restore order and to prevent a major attack by the enemy.

Fifth, open work should be closely linked with secret work. On the one hand, all possibilities for open activities must be utilized, while on the other hand, the secrecy of the party organization should be adhered to strictly. The capability of party members for independent work must be strengthened to avoid investigation and capture by the enemy.

Sixth, the party should explain various facts to the masses, pointing out that the party is correct in opposing Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, enumerating its successes in practical work, and indicating that the erroneous opinions of various parties and groups in the same organization should be regarded as friendly criticisms. The danger of erroneous predictions about the future should be pointed out to educate the masses.

Seventh, large numbers of mass activists should be fearlessly cultivated and promoted. They should be frequently approached, helped, and educated so as to turn them into good cadres.

In order to successfully win over the broad masses and develop the work of opposing Japan and Chiang, party headquarters at all levels should, in line with the above principles, conduct a self-examination of their own work. During the examination, their own experiences and lessons should be summarized to effect a thorough change in their work.

To change their own work thoroughly is to carry out a two-line struggle. On the one hand, leftist closed-doorism should be opposed. Its proponents fear difficulties, are unwilling to go deep among the broad masses, and try to isolate the party from the masses. On the other hand, it is also necessary to oppose all those pessimistic elements who, paralyzed by baseless propaganda, only see the enemy's strength but not the power of the broad anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang forces. Thus, they give up the future of the revolution. These tendencies are harmful to the party and the revolution and should be relentlessly combated.

In the past, however, some comrades, even some leading comrades, used the weapon of the two-line struggle in a very incorrect manner. They took the nice-

sounding name of the two-line struggle, flaunted their political mannerisms, abused others to vent their anger (with the upper level venting its anger at the middle level, the middle level at the lower level, and the lower level at individual party members), and even organized sanctions at will. Such methods are not allowed and are firmly opposed by the party. These actions of theirs will only create more confusion among comrades and make them feel hopeless, pessimistic, and disappointed. Therefore, in the future, party headquarters at all levels should put stress on persuasion and education with regard to the two-line struggle. All methods should be used to explain to comrades who have committed mistakes and to enable them to understand their own mistakes. Concrete methods should be used to educate these comrades in the future, and to arouse their interest in party work, and to make them conscientious.

E.7 Resolution of the CC on Strategic Military Issues (23 December 1935)⁷³

I. Strategic Policies

Under conditions where Japanese imperialism is trying to turn China into its colony and where the Chinese Red Army and other revolutionary forces are developing, the party's military strategy, i.e., strategic policies, will include the following:

1) With the general task of resolutely carrying out the national struggle against Japanese imperialism to prevent it from attacking China, it is of prime importance to assert the principle of "combining the Civil War with the national war" in all political and military slogans and in practice. [[Slogans excluded.]]

2) Make a correct estimate of the enemy and ourselves. The party's general principle in military affairs for 1936 should be: "Prepare to engage in direct operations with Japan." Accordingly, the major military target of 1936 for the main forces of the Red Army still should be the troops of the traitors and collaborators. In the Japanese-controlled areas as well as in the autonomous regions, however, great efforts must be made to organize, expand, and unite all anti-Japanese forces—Anti-Japanese Volunteers and guerrilla troops—who can use guerrilla warfare to strike directly at the Japanese troops. At the same time, we must take into account that in the second half of 1936, the First Army is likely to be engaged in partial war against the Japanese troops (in the Shaanxi-Suiyuan-Chahar area).

3) Vigorously enlarge the Red Army. The main forces of the Red Army should reach 200,000, with 50,000 in the First Army.

4) In order to implement firmly the principles mentioned in the points above (combine the Civil War with the national war, prepare to fight Japan, and enlarge the Red Army), the First Army should direct its operational schedule at the two

targets of “Streamlining anti-Japanese channels” and “Consolidating and expanding the existing soviet areas.” The former should be taken as the key link and should be integrated with the latter. The specific steps are to focus the Red Army’s military actions and to expand the soviet area in Shanxi to the east and Suiyuan and other areas to the north.

5) Those apart from the First Army (the Twenty-sixth Army Group and the Fourth Army) that are of strategic importance for weakening and blocking the troops of the traitorous Nanjing regime must be given proper guidance in their actions.

6) Guerrilla warfare plays a great strategic role in defeating Japanese imperialism and its Chinese lackeys. The guiding principles include:

- A) All guerrilla forces should take part in the anti-Japanese war in the name of the national allied forces (called the Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteers in the Japanese-controlled areas, autonomous regions, and nearby provinces; the Chinese anti-Japanese guerrilla teams in other places such as central and south China; and the Chinese anti-Japanese people’s revolutionary army if they are expanded in central and south China). The rural revolution is conducted under the slogan and policies for the national war.
- B) Guerrilla warfare must be waged in all provinces, with priority given to Hebei, Shanxi, Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, the three northeastern provinces, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shaanxi, and Gansu. In the existing soviet areas across the two big rivers, the resumption of guerrilla warfare should be upgraded to that of expansion.
- C) The local party organization is the only leading body in guerrilla warfare in the white areas and offers the major leadership in the soviet areas.
- D) Those white soldiers and students drawn into the anti-Japanese tide should be allowed to participate in guerrilla warfare.
- E) Guerrilla units must have a base area, but protectionism must be rejected (because it is harmful to the guerrilla units).
- F) Guerrilla units must link up closely with the local revolutionary masses.
- G) Guerrilla tactics must be upgraded.
- H) Guerrilla units must be gradually turned into regular armed revolutionary forces.
- I) Guerrilla units are founders of the soviet areas.
- J) Guerrilla warfare must be conducted in a more planned way.

7) Efforts must be made to combine the revolutionary drive among the white soldiers with the anti-Japanese war by the Red Army and guerrilla units operating under the flag of the national war. The following guiding principles must be upheld:

- A) Without support from the soldiers (both Chinese and Japanese), the national war cannot reach final victory.
- B) Support from the soldiers is possible (because of their position as slaves to

foreign powers and their suffering from hunger, cold and fatigue).

- C) Open up the movement to a mass support base, liberate it from closed-doorism, and link open and secret work.

8) Turn the struggle against Japan and the Chinese rulers by the Mongolian and Hui nationalities (first the Mongolians) into an armed struggle. Moreover, their struggle should be integrated with ours.

9) Launch the policy of “Anti-Japanese allied forces” to take advantage of the internal contradictions and splits within the enemy. This will become of benefit to the national united front. Combine our camp with “the third camp,” thus turning it into a unified national camp.

10) Unite the Soviet Red Army and the Chinese Red Army on the basis of combating the common enemy of Japanese imperialism. First, the technical conditions should be linked up.

II. Basic Principles Governing Military Actions

1) During strategic defense:

- A) Pure defense must be opposed and active defense conducted.
- B) Preemptive measures must be discouraged. We should gain control by striking only after the enemy has struck (under normal circumstances). This means that we must lure the enemy in deep rather than following the “opportunist line of pure defense” (Ningdu conference and after). The battle line within is a correct principle.

2) During strategic attack:

- A) An opportunist underestimate of the situation must be opposed in order to expand the victory (both at the time of shifting from strategic defense to attack and during the entire course of strategic attack, efforts must be made to expand our achievements) and to make the best of opportunities in the battle.
- B) Adventurism must be opposed.
 - i) Advance should be halted at the proper moment to protect gains (certainly if the victory is liable to be lost).
 - ii) Transfer the battlefields to new areas so that the Red Army, after two major battles, can afford time for a temporary respite and the soviet areas can be expanded. These tasks must be combined with the opening up of new battlefields and the taking up of new fighting tasks.

Link up two or more soviet areas into one large one; annihilate any white sectors (strike local strongholds) between the soviet areas and the neighboring localities. This is not to engage in “wavering opportunism” (the *Party Paper* [Dangbao], 1932) but is to implement a correct policy.

- iii) The situation demands pushing ahead with policy, developing both the front and the rear wave-on-wave (the so-called “consolidation and development of the soviet areas” and “expanding and deepening at the same time”). Rash advance is opposed except when the difference between our forces and those of the enemy permit.
- iv) When conditions permit, we should attack the cities and the reinforced positions of the enemy. The previous “mountaintopism” and the “northeast line” are wrong [1932].

III. General Principles (Irrespective of Defense or Offense)

1) We oppose the idea of merely “fighting” and not “moving.” Fighting and moving go together. Movement is to facilitate fighting. Our operations take the form of guerrilla warfare. We have no definite battle line, a circumstance that is determined by backward technology and equipment and is characteristic of the fighting of the Chinese workers’ and peasants’ Red Army. This was the strong point of our previous military command. In this case, it is wrong to “oppose guerrilla warfare.” The attempt to build up a consolidated battle line during the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign was defeated. The temporary setback (areas occupied by the enemy) with this battle line brought forth the victory of another, thus leading to the resolution of the battle line (the areas can be recovered).

2) We must strive for the following kind of possibility. The technical quality of the Red Army should be rapidly changed for the better so that the situation of having no fixed battle line can be changed so that we have a fixed battle line. Mobile warfare will remain unchanged, but its guerrilla nature will be greatly reduced. Without such a situation, it is impossible to defeat Japanese imperialism and its running dogs. To resist technological improvement is wrong.

3) Mobile warfare is the main principle. The conservative position of warfare “without giving up one inch of land” should be opposed. Large advances and retreats by the Red Army are unavoidable and are necessary.

4) Concentrate our main forces in one direction. Strategically, we must use one fist to smash the enemy. When fighting inside the battle line, we must also engage in operations outside the line. We must reject the idea of scattering our forces and striking with two fists. Strategically, we must oppose “all-around attack” and “battles in flight” (in both strategic and ordinary battles).

5) Strategically, conduct protracted war; tactically, quick decisive battles. Oppose protracted battles and “war of attrition.”

6) Allow time for complete rest and training. Oppose useless rashness, and learn to lie low when necessary.

7) Prepare fully for each battle.

8) Issue commands in light of the specific circumstances. It is permitted to make unified resolutions, but command should be decentralized.

9) Strategic policies should guide campaigns and military tactics. Today’s plan

should be connected with tomorrow's, the small with the large, and the partial with the whole. We must oppose the notion of taking one step forward and then pausing for reflection.

10) The military committee has full decision-making power in military affairs.

[[The remainder covers detailed information of the three steps to be undertaken to be able to break through to the Soviet Union and consolidating and developing the tasks of the soviet area.]]

E.8 Resolution of the CC on the Current Political Situation and the Party's Tasks (25 December 1935)⁷⁴

[[1. The Characteristics of the Present Situation

A new period in the Chinese revolution is emerging. With the Japanese imperialists turning China into a colony, the revolution is about to become a great national revolution and the whole world is on the verge of war and revolution. The Japanese have taken over the northeast by force and are using lackeys to take over the remainder of China. All Chinese should fight to protect their homeland. The Japanese annexation has led to unprecedented contradictions among the imperialist powers. The Japanese actions have also weakened the rule of the chief traitor, Chiang Kai-shek.]]

This Japanese annexation of China is taking place at a time when the movement of the Chinese Soviet Red Army has entered a new stage. Since withdrawing from the Central Soviet Area, and suffering losses in some soviet areas along the lower Yangtze River, the Red Army in all areas is now winning new victories and creating new bases. The guerrillas in the old soviet areas have also begun counterattacks, thus starting a period of vigorous development of guerrilla warfare. The difficult junctures have passed. The Central Red Army made a long march of 25,000 *li* in twelve months. It defeated the long pursuit by Chiang Kai-shek and showed that the sieges, interceptions, and pursuit by the imperialists and their lackey Chiang Kai-shek were worthless. It exceeded previous long military expeditions. The Central Red Army also played the role of a propaganda team, pointing out to the over 200 million people in the eleven provinces through which the Red Army swept the path which could relieve their misery and save them and the country. Like a sowing machine, it has spread many revolutionary seeds. After the meeting of the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh armies, the total defeat of the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" of the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su] Soviet Area has demonstrated further that a new phase in the soviet movement is approaching. Together with new developments in the current general revolutionary situation, this has become an important factor in the new situation of the Chinese revolution. This demonstrates

that the cast-iron forces of the soviet Red Army are at the core of the great forces of Chinese people, who are saving China from the great perils of subjugation and genocide by opposing the Japanese imperialists' gangster-style annexation.

This annexation by the Japanese imperialists has reawakened the Chinese people, who now understand the dangerous situation caused by the imminent serious disasters of subjugation and genocide. This is creating the upsurge of a new national revolution. This national revolutionary upsurge is the outcome of numerous periods of training during the history of the Chinese revolution. (The main one being the Great Revolution of 1925–27). It is also a product of the existing soviet revolutionary bases in China and the current revolutionary situation. It is happening at a time when a new period of world revolution and war is arriving and when the Soviet Union already has enough strength to defeat the aggressor countries and assist the oppressed nations. Thus, the upsurge has occurred in an extremely broad and resolute way, and it influences and is influenced by the world revolution.

Undoubtedly, the new anti-Japanese national revolutionary upsurge has awakened the Chinese working class and the relatively backward strata among the peasants, enabling them to join the revolution actively. However, it has also enabled the broad petty bourgeois masses and intellectuals to turn to revolution. The general collapse of the Chinese national economy has caused hundreds of thousands of people to lose their jobs and land. Hundreds of thousands of disaster victims and refugees have appeared. This has closely linked the anti-Japanese and national revolutionary upsurge with the masses' daily struggle for survival, thus largely expanding the mass base of the national revolution. The revolutionary indignation of the broad masses is fermenting throughout China and is starting to manifest itself in anti-Japanese demonstrations by students in all major cities. There are new vacillations and divisions within the reactionary ranks. Some national bourgeoisie, many rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside, and even some warlords may adopt an attitude of sympathy, neutrality, and participation. The front of the national revolution has widened.

At present, the world is on the eve of a great revolution and war. The economic crises in all imperialist countries and the resulting revolutionary crises mean that the imperialists have to resort to another war as their only salvation. Undoubtedly, the adventurist large-scale attacks against China by the Japanese imperialists and against Abyssinia by the Italian imperialists entail the danger of a second imperialist world war. Undoubtedly, the national revolutionary wars of China and Abyssinia and the maturing of the revolutionary crises in all imperialist countries and many colonial and semicolonial countries will lead to a great, world revolution. On the present eve of revolution and war, the weakening of the reactionary forces in the world and the strengthening of the world revolutionary forces are very visible. In the future, there will be world wars and world revolutions that will bury all reactionaries throughout the world. This situation has enabled the Chinese revolution to free itself from its past isolation. The world revolution affords great assistance to the Chinese revolution. At the same time, the current Chinese revolution has already

become a great factor in the world revolution. The Chinese revolution with its massed ranks of the whole nation will help the world revolution.

[[The Chinese and Japanese revolutions have combined with the common objective of overthrowing Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Union is ready to attack Japan's brutal imperialism. The Soviet Union has provided the most powerful assistance to the Chinese revolution.]]

The Chinese revolution enjoys favorable conditions and has a bright future. However, the enemy of the Chinese revolution, the imperialists and the ferociously advancing Japanese imperialists in particular, are prepared to meet the Chinese revolution with determination and force and to launch desperate attacks and last-ditch offensives against the revolutionary masses. If we take this in conjunction with the still-existing uneven development of the current Chinese revolution, it is easy to understand that the Chinese revolution has a protracted character. It shows the Chinese revolutionary masses and their leaders that the CCP should prepare for a protracted struggle with the enemy and to work hard for a long time because of the protracted war. Without a revolutionary army of tens of millions, it is impossible to finally eliminate the enemy. All tactics and efforts should be directed at organizing tens of millions of masses to enter the battlefield of the national revolution. The preparation of great forces is to prepare for the victory of the final battle.

2. The Party's Tactical Line

The current situation shows us that the Japanese annexation of China has shaken all China and the whole world. All classes, strata, political parties, and armed forces in Chinese political life have readjusted or are readjusting their mutual relationships. The national revolutionary front and the national reactionary front are in the process of reorganizing themselves. Therefore, the party's tactical line is to inspire, unite, and organize all revolutionary forces throughout China to oppose the main enemy at the present time, the Japanese imperialists and the chief traitor and collaborator Chiang Kai-shek. No matter who they are, which factions, armed forces, and classes they belong to, so long as they oppose Japanese imperialism and the traitor and collaborator Chiang Kai-shek, they should all be united to carry out the sacred war of the national revolution to expel the Japanese imperialists from China, to overthrow the rule of the lackeys of the Japanese imperialists in China, to win the thorough liberation of the Chinese nation, and to maintain China's independence and territorial integrity. Only with the broadest anti-Japanese national united front (at both the upper and lower levels) can the Japanese imperialists and their running dog, Chiang Kai-shek, be defeated.

Naturally, different individuals, groups, social classes, and strata and armed forces have their own different motives and positions in joining the anti-Japanese national revolution. Some want to maintain their original status; others wish to seek the leadership of the movement so that the movement will not develop beyond the limits of their toleration. Still others genuinely desire the thorough liberation of the

Chinese nation. Owing to their different motives and positions, some will waver and betray at the beginning of the movement, some will become passive or withdraw from the battlefield during the movement, and some will be willing to fight to the end. However, our task is not only to unite all anti-Japanese basic forces that can be united, but also to unite all anti-Japanese allies that can be united. Therefore, all Chinese people may offer their labor power, those with money may offer money, those with guns may offer guns, while those with knowledge may offer knowledge. No single patriotic Chinese should be left out of the anti-Japanese front. This is the party's general line of the broadest national united front. Only this line will enable us to mobilize the forces of the people of the whole country to deal with the nation's common enemy, the Japanese imperialists, and the national traitor, Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese working class and peasants are still the basic motive forces in the Chinese revolution. The broad petty-bourgeoisie masses and revolutionary intellectuals are the most reliable allies in the national revolution. The strong and firm alliance of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie is the fundamental force for defeating the Japanese imperialists and the national traitor, Chiang Kai-shek. Some of the national bourgeoisie and warlords, despite their disagreement with the rural revolution and the soviet system, adopt an attitude of sympathy, or friendly neutrality, or direct participation in the anti-Japanese and anti-traitor struggles. They will benefit from the development of the anti-Japanese front. They will have left the general reactionary forces and enlarged the overall revolutionary forces. To meet this objective, the party should adopt all appropriate measures and methods to win these forces over to the anti-Japanese front. Moreover, even among the ranks of landlords and compradores, there is no total unity. The past competition among the many imperialist powers in China has resulted in conflicts and clashes among the various cliques of traitors and collaborators of the imperialist powers. The party should use many methods to prevent some reactionary forces from being temporarily passive and thus opposing the anti-Japanese front. Tactics toward imperialist powers other than the Japanese imperialists should be the same.

In mobilizing, uniting, and organizing the forces of the nation's people to oppose their common enemy, the party should wage a resolute and firm struggle against all tendencies of vacillation, accommodation, surrender, and betrayal. All those who undermine the Chinese people's anti-Japanese movement are collaborators and traitors to the Chinese nation and should be condemned by all Chinese. The CP should use its own correct words and deeds in opposing Japan and the Chinese traitors and collaborators to gain its leadership within the anti-Japanese front. Only CP leadership can ensure a thorough victory of the anti-Japanese movement. Demands by the broad masses in the anti-Japanese war concerning their basic interests should be met (the demand for land by peasants, the demand for an improvement in livelihood by workers, soldiers, poor peasants, intellectuals, etc.). Only by meeting their demands can we mobilize more masses to join the anti-Japanese front, to sustain the anti-Japanese war, and to win the final victory of the movement. And only by so doing can we bring party leadership to bear in the war against Japan.

3) The Government of National Defense and the United Anti-Japanese Army

The broadest and highest forms of the national united front to oppose the Japanese and the national traitors are a government of national defense and a united army. The organization of a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army is not only possible but essential because there are those who disagree with the soviet system and the rural revolution, but who agree with opposition to Japan and national traitors, because of the situation of divide and rule caused by China's uneven political and economic development and the victory of the Chinese soviet regime only in some parts of China, and because of the serious extent to which national reactionaries such as traitors and collaborators have helped the Japanese imperialists.

There are many forms of opposition by the Chinese people to Japan and the national traitors. Also, the level of awareness by the participants varies. CP members must not let go any opportunity to mobilize, organize, and lead all kinds of struggle so that they can be directed toward forming a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army. All those who oppose Japan and the national traitors, regardless of which class, political faction, social group, and armed forces they represent, may participate in the government of national defense. All armed forces opposed to Japan and the national traitors may join the united anti-Japanese army. These are the organizations representing the political power of the united front of all anti-Japanese and anti-traitor forces throughout China and also the unified leading organs of the national revolutionary war against Japan and the national traitors.

From the class viewpoint, they represent the alliance of all classes with the common objective of opposing Japan and the national traitors.

In order to swiftly organize the government of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army, and to provide them with a broad mass base and armed force, the tactics of the CP are not to wait for the spontaneous appearance of anti-Japanese mass organizations and armed forces, but to organize them and direct its own party members to promote social, political, and armed forces of old and new types in all patriotic groups, classes, parties, in production enterprises, in the cultural and educational fields, among students and teachers and in cities and the countryside. The CP's tactic is to mobilize all kinds of anti-Japanese and anti-traitor organizations (i.e., the Anti-Japanese Association [*kang-Ri hui*] and the Anti-Japanese Alliance [*kang-Ri lianhehui*]), organize all kinds of anti-Japanese and anti-traitor armies (i.e., the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, the People's Revolutionary Army, and the new Nineteenth Route Army), governments (the anti-Japanese government in the soviet areas and the People's Revolutionary Government). The alignment of all these organizations, armies, and governments together with the forces of the soviet regime and the Red Army will lead to the organization of the government of national defense and the anti-Japanese united front. After the establishment of the govern-

ment of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army, every day their actions will mobilize new organizations, set up new local governments and new armies. On the one hand, vacillating and traitorous elements will be constantly eliminated; on the other hand, new forces will continuously pour in, thus making the government of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army a decay-resistant, resilient, and strong government and an army with a great fighting force. The party should be similarly active in assisting, supporting, and participating in the spontaneously emerging anti-Japanese governments and united anti-Japanese armies that are not joined by the soviet regime or the Red Army in areas where the party's forces are weak and where the party has not been able to promote and lead them and in areas which are too far away from the soviet areas and the Red Army for them to join these governments and armies. This is the concrete line of work of the CP in the formation of a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army.

The government of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army are the broadest and highest organizations of the national united front against Japan and the national traitors. Therefore, they should have the broadest program of action as outlined below:

- 1) To confiscate all property of the Japanese imperialists in China to finance anti-Japanese activities.
- 2) To confiscate all land and property of national traitors and collaborators to be redistributed among the workers, peasants, victims of natural disasters, and refugees.
- 3) To carry out disaster relief and water control to prevent floods and to provide a peaceful and stable livelihood for the people.
- 4) To abolish all exorbitant taxes and levies and develop industry and commerce.
- 5) To increase wages and salaries and improve the livelihood of workers, soldiers, and teachers.
- 6) To develop education and assist students who drop out.
- 7) To fulfill democratic rights and release all political prisoners.
- 8) To develop production skills and relieve unemployed intellectuals.
- 9) To unite the workers and peasants of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan itself and all anti-Japanese forces to form a consolidated alliance.
- 10) To establish close and friendly relations with the nations and countries that show sympathy, assistance, and friendly neutrality toward the Chinese national movement.

The CP must try to realize this program in the anti-Japanese war and fulfill the party's ten major political aims.

4) The Soviet People's Republic

The broadest united front against Japan and the national traitors has a special mean-

ing today, because the soviet regime has triumphed in many parts of China. It is fundamentally different from the period of the first Great Revolution of 1925-27. The victories of the soviet movement in many areas of China under the leadership of the CP have provided the basic forces for the new anti-imperialist upsurge, given hope to all the Chinese people, set up a living example of gaining freedom, liberation, and independence from the imperialists and national traitors, laid down solid foundations and bases for the broadest national united front, ensured the continuance of the new great revolution and the final victory, and served as a central support to the government of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army.

To build a broad and more powerful base for the national united front, the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic and its central government declare that it shall be changed into a soviet people's republic, and many of its policies will be adapted to opposition to the Japanese imperialists' attempt to turn China into a colony.

These new policy changes, first of all, demonstrate in a clearer way that the soviet regime itself represents not only the workers and peasants, but also the Chinese nation. The basic interests of the Chinese nation lie in China's freedom, independence, and unification. These basic interests can only be achieved and maintained and opposition to these interests by imperialists and the Chinese national traitors can only be defeated thoroughly under the firm guidance of the soviet regime.

The Soviet People's Republic declares that it wishes to unite the broad petty bourgeoisie masses around itself. All the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie will be given the right to elect and be elected by the soviet regime. All small industrial and commercial capitalists under pressure and attack from the imperialists and the Chinese reactionaries will be safeguarded by the soviet regime through their own policies and powers. The soviet regime has abolished all exorbitant taxes and levies by the GMD warlords and announced a long time ago a unified progressive tax favorable to all petty bourgeois elements.

The Soviet People's Republic declares that all intellectuals sympathizing with opposition to Japan and the national traitors, regardless of whether they used to be GMD members or worked in the GMD government in the past, may enjoy favorable treatment by the soviet government. The soviet government will provide them with jobs, provide relief for the unemployed among them, and provide them with the opportunities to develop cultural, educational, artistic, scientific, and technical talents. All intellectuals, writers, artists, scientists, technicians, and journalists who have been expelled, slighted, and maltreated by the Japanese imperialists and the GMD traitor and collaborator government will be granted the right of protection by the soviet regime. All these people can come to the soviet areas. All revolutionary intellectuals, writers, artists, scientists, technicians, and journalists (irrespective of whether they have a family background of landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists) will be granted the right to elect and be elected.

The Soviet People's Republic declares that all white military officers (regardless

of rank) and soldiers who are willing to oppose the Japanese and the national traitors have the right to favorable treatment by the soviet regime. The soviet regime is ready to provide jobs for all veteran soldiers who have been excluded by the GMD traitor government. All their wounded will be given medical attention. All white army officers and soldiers who are willing to serve the Red Army and who are loyal to the cause of overthrowing the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors will be given the right to elect and be elected by the soviet regime.

The Soviet People's Republic and the Red Army propose that individuals, organizations, political parties, and various armed forces that wish to participate in the cause of overthrowing Japanese imperialism and their lackey Chinese traitors form together a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army. The soviet regime and the Red Army wish to reach agreements on resisting Japan and suppressing national traitors with all types of armed forces. An example is the agreement signed between the soviet Red Army and the Nineteenth Route Army on resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang. However, the Red Army did not use its forces to directly help the Nineteenth Route Army (nor did the Nineteenth Route Army actively request it) in order to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's offensives in Fujian in a timely way. This was incorrect. In the future, utmost and effective assistance must be given to all friendly armies resisting Japan and suppressing national traitors. This should include direct coordination on the battlefield. To reach the goal of opposing the common enemy, the soviet Red Army needs not only victories but also development of its friendly allied armies.

The Soviet People's Republic has altered its policies toward the rich peasants. The property of rich peasants will no longer be confiscated. The land of rich peasants, apart from the portion used for feudal exploitation, will not be taken over, irrespective of whether the land is cultivated by the rich peasants themselves or by hired laborers. When all the land is redistributed equitably in the countryside, rich peasants will have rights to share land equal to those of poor peasants and middle peasants.

The Soviet People's Republic adopts more lenient policies as compared to the past toward national industrial and commercial capitalists. Under terms favorable to both sides, they are welcome to invest and open factories and shops in the territories of the Soviet People's Republic. Their lives and property will be protected. Rent and taxes should be as low as possible to promote the Chinese economy. All industrial and commercial enterprises in the Red Army-occupied areas that are beneficial to the movement to oppose Japan and the national traitors should be protected. It is necessary for all the Chinese people to understand that the Soviet People's Republic does not only have political freedom but also is the best place to develop China's industry and commerce.

The Soviet People's Republic declares to all overseas Chinese that it praises their consistent patriotic actions of assisting the Chinese revolution. Although Chiang Kai-shek has long betrayed the revolution, the Soviet People's Republic and the entire Chinese nation have inherited the heroic cause beginning with the period of

the Taipings and are determined to save China from national peril and turn it into a prosperous land of wealth and power. The day the Soviet People's Republic triumphs throughout the country is the day of the liberation of all overseas Chinese. All policies of the GMD government that compel overseas Chinese to degenerate into slaves and beasts of burden should be completely abolished and replaced by policies that actively protect them. The soviet regime now offers the right of protection to all overseas compatriots who have been excluded and expelled by the Japanese imperialists and other imperialist countries and welcomes overseas Chinese capitalists to develop industry in the soviet areas.

All these policy changes are designed to defeat the Japanese imperialists and their lackey collaborators in an effort to gain freedom, liberation, and independence for the Chinese nation and achieve the revolution's victory throughout the nation.

To carry out these policies smoothly, to fight against the Japanese imperialists, and to secure the leadership in the national united front are policies on which the party and the soviet regime have always been consistent and steadfast. However, the party and the soviet regime must redouble their efforts to turn them into policies that are more compatible with the demands of the national united front. The requirement now is to enlarge the anti-Japanese Red Army, the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, and the territories of the Soviet People's Republic as bases for resistance to Japan, to foil the attacks by the traitorous troops, to clear the road to resist Japan, to consolidate the anti-Japanese rear areas, to settle the issue of land once and for all, to win the support of the majority of workers and peasants, to win over soldiers from the traitors' armies and the Japanese imperialist troops, to propose to the national minorities the establishment of an allied struggle, to adopt a flexible foreign policy.

The Red Army is the vanguard of resistance to Japan. The expansion, consolidation, and appropriate use of this vanguard is the sole guarantee for the victory in the war against Japan. Today, the slogan of expanding the Red Army into an army of one million soldiers should be closely linked with the opportunity presented by the urgency of an anti-Japanese war to save the nation from national peril. The defeat of the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors demands an enlarged Red Army of several million soldiers. First, it should be expanded to one million. It is extremely important for every Red Army commander, fighter, local cadre, and member of the soviet staff, as well as people throughout the country, to work actively for this task. The improvement of the technical standards of the Red Army, the progress of technical and tactical education, the depth and breadth of political work, the centralization of the leadership by the revolutionary military committee, the secured provision of goods, and the strategic and battle commands based on correct principles in particular (opposing adventurism in offensives, conservatism in defense, and flightism in transferring troops) are all absolute conditions for the defeat of the enemy.

Guerrilla warfare should be developed all over China, with the emphasis in the areas occupied by the Japanese imperialists and the surrounding areas, traitor

Chiang Kai-shek's areas, and the anti-Japanese Red Army bases (the soviet areas) and their surrounding areas. All guerrilla troops should fight in the name of the national war and should be closely connected with the struggle for land of the peasant masses. To provide the guerrilla warfare against Japan and the national traitors with a major strategic role, the party should ensure that guerrilla troops be used to create anti-Japanese bases (the soviet areas). People's revolutionary governments that are free from the rule of the Japanese imperialists and the national traitors should be set up in the guerrilla areas. (These governments may range from the anti-Japanese governments of the soviet areas to revolutionary committees and even soviet governments). Guerrilla forces should expand rapidly to become anti-Japanese revolutionary armies. Large numbers of young students and revolutionary soldiers in the anti-Japanese movement should be able to participate in the guerrilla warfare. All guerrilla troops with or without party leadership should find a common basis to unite their forces.

It is impossible to defeat the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors without expanding the territories of the Soviet People's Republic, namely the bases of the anti-Japanese Red Army. Only when large areas under the rule of national traitors have been turned into territories of the soviet regime can the Red Army have reliable rear areas for the war against Japan. Much work remains to be done as well as possible in the soviet territories, and correct policies should be implemented so that the soviet territories will become as strong as iron and model places for the people of the whole country to admire, protect, and imitate.

All attempts by the traitorous troops to attack these anti-Japanese war bases and the model areas of the people's government should be counterattacked ruthlessly. To smash and destroy these counterrevolutionary offensives is not only the responsibility of the anti-Japanese Red Army and anti-Japanese people of all soviet areas, but also is the responsibility of all anti-Japanese people throughout the country. The party should urge all those throughout the country and in all soviet areas who oppose Japan to fight to protect their own bases, to combat sabotage by the national traitors in the rear areas, and to prevent the national traitors from blocking the route of the anti-Japanese Red Army. Linking the domestic war with the national war is the party's fundamental principle when guiding the revolutionary war. Without tens of millions of workers, peasants, soldiers, poor people, and the majority of the revolutionary masses under the rule of Japan and its collaborators rising up to wage a resolute struggle, defeat of the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors is out of the question. The party's and the soviet Red Army's national united front against Japan and national traitors should spread wherever there are masses. All mass struggles should evolve from grass-roots levels to higher levels, from localities to the whole country, and from ordinary levels to the level of establishing anti-Japanese and anti-traitor political regimes and armed forces. The convergence of the two struggles inside and outside the territories of the Soviet People's Republic is the only way to thoroughly overcome the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors.

Without the support of the majority of the workers, the struggle against the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese traitors cannot succeed. Every legal and semilegal possibility must be utilized to build solid strongholds in key cities and enterprises and to establish broad mass organizations. The economic and political struggles of countless workers should be promoted, organized, and led in accordance with the evaluation of the specific circumstances and the possibility of achieving success (even when the chance of success is small). Attention should be paid to protecting and educating cadres in enterprises, accumulating strong forces of workers for decisive battles, and winning the right of working class leadership in the Chinese revolution. This is the party's fundamental principle in the workers' movement.

It is impossible to defeat the Japanese imperialists and their Chinese lackeys and collaborators without the participation of the peasantry, who account for 80 percent of China's population at the battlefield. The CP and the soviet regime must satisfy the peasants' demands for land and work for a complete settlement of the land question and the elimination of feudal exploitation in the countryside. This is the only way to mobilize tens of millions of peasants to take up arms and go to the battlefield to resist Japan and eliminate national traitors, thus constantly replenishing our forces for the national revolutionary war. This is the only way to turn the peasantry, the main object of the plunder in China by the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese national reactionaries, into a revolutionary army to fight against that plunder. In the Japanese-occupied territories and their surrounding areas, the land of traitors and collaborators should be confiscated first to be redistributed among the peasants. Then, the struggle can proceed in depth until the land question is finally and completely resolved according to the masses' own experiences. The party's fundamental principle is to link the rural revolution with the national revolution.

Without the help of soldiers, it is unlikely that we will overcome the million-strong armies of the Japanese imperialists and their Chinese collaborators. We must carry out work among soldiers on a broad basis. The party encourages all people in the soviet and white areas, all soldiers in the Red Army, and guerrilla forces to strive for the dissolution of the traitors' armies. Tens of millions of people who refuse to be slaves of a subjugated nation should earnestly persuade hundreds of thousands, indeed millions of soldiers and officers who refuse to be subjugated slaves, asking their relatives and friends to return. They should write to admonish them and inspire them with slogans. These soldiers and officers will surely be moved. Our slogans are that Chinese should not fight Chinese; that workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers should unite and arm to protect China; that the Red Army and the white army should join forces to defeat the Japanese imperialists and national traitors. Those who wish to go home will be given travel expenses, those who want land will be given land, and those who join the resistance may become volunteers in the Red Army.

With its model actions and sincere slogans, the Soviet People's Republic has set an example for the oppressed nationalities such as the Mongolians and the Hui and

shown them that they should also organize their own countries! The Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors are the common enemy of us all. Let us unite and defeat the enemy!

The foreign policy of the Soviet People's Republic is, on the basis of seizing all opportunities to achieve victory in the struggle against the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese national traitors, to reach necessary understandings, to reach compromises, and to establish state relations and treaties and alliances with all countries, political parties, and even individuals who oppose the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese collaborators. The Soviet People's Republic and its government are not without aims. The soviet government is willing to establish friendly relations with all those who wish to fight for their own interests and against the Japanese and the national traitors, thus benefiting the Soviet People's Republic.

All policies and efforts are aimed at defeating Japan and the traitors. All actions contradictory to this goal should be rejected. This is the tactical line of the CP and the soviet regime.

5) The Main Danger Within the Party Is Closed-Doorism

To defeat the common enemy of the Chinese people, the Japanese imperialists, and their lackey Chinese traitors, CP members should go among the masses and participate in and lead all the mass national class struggles. Here, the key is the utilization of a broad united front. The broad united front must concentrate the largest forces to deal with the most important enemy, and enable the broad masses to understand the correctness of the party's position in light of their own political experiences and win them over to the party's banner. The issue of revolutionary leadership must be clearly understood. The party cannot rely on propaganda and agitation alone to achieve leadership of the Chinese revolution. In the everyday struggle, all members must demonstrate through their actual deeds that they are the leaders of the masses. It is not enough to know how to work among the masses at the grass roots (this is the main task). It is essential to conduct negotiations, reach agreements, and make compromises and concessions with other parties, groups, and upper-level leaders who have connections with grass-roots masses. The purpose is to win over possible cooperative elements among them; to finally expose the true features of the vacillating, deceptive, and surrounding elements before the masses; and to use the power of the masses to drive them away.

It is impossible for the party to gain leadership by relying on the activities of the working class alone. (This is a key point.) CP members should carry out activities in the countryside, among soldiers, poor people, petty bourgeois elements, and all revolutionary allies. They should struggle for the actual interests of these masses and convince them that the CP represents not only the interests of the working class, but also the interests of the majority of the Chinese people and the interests of the whole nation. CP members should carry out revolutionary work where there are masses, no matter how reactionary their leaders may be. The CP can only become

the leaders of the Chinese revolution when its party members demonstrate that they are invincible and are the most active and valiant vanguard of the Chinese revolution, but not when they appear as the most "faithful followers" of empty and abstract communist principles.

In order to utilize the broad united front in a bolder way, and to secure party leadership, the party must wage a firm struggle against the tendencies of "left" closed-doorism inside the party. Under the present circumstances, closed-doorism is the main danger within the party. The source of closed-doorism is, first, the lack of understanding of the current political situation that has resulted in an inability to recognize the need to change one's own tactics to cope with the new situation. The second source is the failure to link the party's basic slogans and programs of action with actual deeds. The third source is the inability to apply Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism flexibly to the specific and concrete conditions of China, thus turning Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism into rigid dogmas. These tendencies of closed-doorism are, in fact, reflections of fear of the enemy and the masses and lack of faith in our own forces. The result of these tendencies is the fear of widely employing the tactic of the united front. These tendencies of closed-doorism are, in essence, similar to right opportunism. This is because the inevitable consequence of the continuation of closed-doorism is to isolate the party from the masses and to cause the party to give up the task of seeking leadership of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, the party must resolutely oppose "left" closed-doorism and bravely utilize the broad united front, go deep among the tens of millions of masses, fear no possible mistakes, and learn the art of leading the masses in the struggle. However, the party should not relax its struggle against right opportunism in any way while struggling against "left" closed-doorism. Right opportunists suppress the masses' struggle in favor of their own immediate interests and simply comply with the interests of the national bourgeoisie and rich peasants at the expense of the demands of the peasantry to seize land and of the workers, soldiers, and poor people to improve their conditions. They are afraid to criticize allies and to lead the masses to force them to move toward an even higher stage of the revolution. Right opportunists accept the political influence of the national bourgeoisie, the upper-level petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants in the countryside and regard themselves as their tails. The Chen Duxiuism of the 1927 period may revive among some party members and in some party headquarters in the new Great Revolution. Undoubtedly, the party should carry out a firm struggle against this right opportunism. However, "left" closed-doorism is the main danger for the party. The current opposition to right opportunism is intended to successfully overcome "left" opportunism and thoroughly smash closed-doorism, so that the tactics of the broad united front can be applied in all work in a correct and bold way, that the party will not fall behind the mass struggle, and that the masses will be lifted from seeking their daily and immediate interests to the level of waging a national revolutionary war against the common enemies of the Chinese people, the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chinese collaborators.

6) Fight for the Growth and Consolidation of the CP

To fulfill the CCP's sacred tasks in this great historical period, it must be expanded and consolidated organizationally. In the new Great Revolution, the CP needs hundreds of thousands or even millions of combat-ready party members to lead the Chinese revolution to sweeping victory.

The CCP is the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat. All people who are willing to fight for the CP's positions, regardless of their class origins, may join the CP. All heroic fighters in the national and the rural revolution should be absorbed into the party to take up various kinds of work. Since China is an economically backward semicolony and colony, peasants and intellectuals from petty bourgeois family backgrounds often constitute the majority inside the party. However, this does not in any way weaken the Bolshevik stand of the CCP. Facts show that these elements in the party are capable of fulfilling the glorious tasks given by the world proletarian vanguard, the Comintern, and of fighting regardless of hardship and difficulties. Among the CPs of the world, the CCP stands out gloriously together with the CPSU as the only exceptions.

A struggle must be waged against closed-doorism in the party's organizational development. Whether one fights resolutely for the party's positions is the main criterion for admitting new members. Social origins need to be noted, but they are not the sole criterion. The party should become a furnace of communism, to temper many new party members into Bolshevik fighters with the highest level of class consciousness and who want to realize the CP's standpoints. The inner-party two-line struggle and communist education are the ways and means to reach this objective. The party's strong Bolshevik ideological unity is a concrete manifestation of the party's firm proletariat leadership. It is imperative to smash thoroughly closed-doorism in organizational matters. This is not based on the needs of the revolutionary struggle, but on fear. In the great battles of the national revolution and the rural revolution, numerous activists and mass leaders have emerged or are emerging, and party organizations should open the door to them and provide them with a warm welcome. The party should not fear infiltration by some opportunists. The party needs to use the Bolshevik political line and iron discipline to ensure the consolidation of party organizations. The party should not be worried about imbalance in the level of political consciousness of the nonproletarian members, but should use communist education to make sure they will come up to the level of the vanguard.

Large numbers of cadres must be cultivated. The party needs tens of thousands of new cadres and to send them to various fronts batch by batch. Cadres should not only be given work when they have been taught everything about the art of leadership, but also should be sent down to the struggle in order to learn from it. Cadres and party members should not be used like machines; they must be protected, trusted, and given appropriate jobs in order to give full play to their talents and initiatives. Cadres and party members must not be treated with bureaucratic

attitudes. Party leading organs should link cadres and party members in a lively and flexible way by explaining tasks, by persuasion, and by giving concrete instructions about work. Cadres and party members who have made mistakes in ideology and work should not be readily attacked, have the hat of opportunism placed on their heads, and be punished. They have to be persuaded and educated patiently time and time again. Mistakes in ideology and work are unavoidable, and mistakes can be corrected. The Leninist spirit of study and training in the struggle are the best methods for correcting mistakes. The fire of inner-party struggle should be directed toward comrades who persist with their mistaken views, refuse to study and train, and reject guidance and education. Certain limited kinds of organizational measures are only necessary for comrades who have committed serious mistakes and who do not accept advice. However, all necessary inner-party struggle and organizational measures should have an educational value for the individual concerned and for the whole party. The party should not readily give important work to opportunists who have always followed erroneous lines, simply because they are showing temporary signs of change.

In the period of great struggles, the solid unity of the party's cadres around the party's leading organs is of decisive significance. The party must unite the whole party to lead the broadest masses toward the national revolutionary war and the rural revolution.

Without many excellent cadres, success is out of the question. The preconditions for fulfilling this task are to have a correct organizational line and cadre policy.

The Party Center calls on the whole party and its cadres to resolutely carry out the party's tactical line: Let us set up a united front throughout the whole country, establish a government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army, turn the Soviet People's Republic into a state for the entire nation, turn the Red Army into the armed forces of the whole nation, and turn the party into a great party of the masses. Let us combine the rural revolution with the national revolution and the domestic war with the national war. Long live the sacred war of the national revolution! Long live China's freedom, independence, and unification! Long live the new soviet China!

E.9 Report on the High Tide of the National Revolution and the Party's Tactical Line. *Zhang Guotao* (28 January 1936)⁷⁵

We are in the middle of a new high tide of the national revolution. The Politburo has already adopted a resolution on the current political situation and the party's tactical line.⁷⁶

Today, I shall address the issue of the shift in the current tactics of the party. As with fighting sometimes, in order to concentrate forces to destroy the enemy one by

one, it is necessary to adopt certain strategies to attack its main forces first, to neutralize sections of them and to deactivate others, and even to forge a temporary alliance with some. This is the case militarily, and it holds true politically. Of course, politically it is more complicated.

Under the new national revolutionary high tide, the party should determine a new line of tactics adapted to the current revolutionary situation on the basis of the domestic and international situation and objective conditions, the balance of power of different classes, etc. This change in tactical line by us is based on the instructions of the Comintern⁷⁷ and the in-depth discussions of the Politburo. My report today is to explain to you the content of this new tactical line.

[[1. The Present Political Situation

a) Within China

The main characteristic of the present situation is the intensification of the Japanese aggression against China and its attempts to turn China into a complete colony. The traitorous Nanjing government headed by Chiang Kai-shek is doing its best to sell out China. The Japanese foreign minister has put forward three principles. (1) Eliminate all attitudes and actions by the Chinese people hostile toward Japan. (2) Turn China into a second Manchuria. (3) Chinese communism is the greatest threat, and China should work together with Japan to eliminate it. This aggression has given rise to the new upsurge in the national revolution throughout the country. Most of the petty bourgeoisie have also involved themselves in this struggle. Some members of the national bourgeoisie and many rich peasants and small landlords are wavering. These wavering middle-of-the-road elements should be neutralized. Under such circumstances, the soviet movement has not declined but has witnessed new developments in many areas. However, while rejecting the views of the right opportunists, we must be aware that initial victory in one or more provinces can only be realized after a relatively long period of hardship and war. The current issue is how to combine the rural revolution with the national revolution and how to link class war at home with the national revolution.

b) International

The main developments are the frenzied preparations for an offensive war against the Soviet Union by various imperialist powers, the scramble for colonies, and the simultaneous growth in the war to oppose the imperialists.]]

2. The Party's Current Tactical Line

Now, I would like to address the issue of the party's current tactical line.

"Under these circumstances, the party's tactical line is to unite and develop

further all revolutionary forces throughout China to oppose the main enemy at the present time, the Japanese imperialists and the chief traitor Chiang Kai-shek and his rule. No matter who they are, what factions, armed forces, and classes they belong to, so long as they oppose Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek, they should all be united to carry out the sacred war of national revolution. Only with a united front of the broadest grass-roots strata can we defeat the rule of Japanese imperialism and its lackey Chiang Kai-shek."⁷⁸

At present, the most significant contradiction between the revolution and the counterrevolution in China is that between China's workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and those who refuse to be slaves of a destructed nation, on the one hand, and the rule of the Japanese imperialists and their lackey Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand. Naturally, tendencies of national reformism [*minzu gailiangzhuyi*] will be reflected in the ranks of the united front of the national revolution. The party should lead the masses to fight resolutely against such tendencies and all other tendencies of vacillation, compromise, surrender, and betrayal. Only in this way can we guarantee the victory of the war of national revolution and can the party's leadership in the war be established, strengthened, and consolidated.

Furthermore, the party should obtain leadership over the movement to resist Japan and oppose Chiang Kai-shek through a resolute, active, thorough, and correct tactical line and through concrete actions against Japan and the traitors of the nation. The basic interests and demands of the broad masses in the anti-Japanese front should be satisfied and met. The tendency to sacrifice the interests of the masses can only weaken the strength of the anti-Japanese front.

What are differences between these tactics and those of the past?

It is clear to all that the past revolution was a rural one of the broad peasant masses opposed to imperialism and under the leadership of the proletariat. The soviet regime was an alliance between the vast number of farmhands, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Landlords were our main enemy in the countryside while, at the same time, we also opposed the rich peasants.

In cities, poor people were united with the proletariat as the basis.

What are the current changes?

Now, we say that the main enemies are the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek, that we should unite with all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang forces, no matter to which class, faction, or armed force they belong. They should all be allied with to form a united front of national revolution to resist Japan and oppose Chiang.

What are the differences?

First, we should determine our tactics in light of the current specific conditions. Therefore, we must clearly distinguish the elements in the enemy's camp, namely, those who are the most significant, those who are secondary at the moment, those who are possibly neutral, etc. If when applying tactics we do not understand how to distinguish the current enemies, we know nothing about revolution. Lenin has taught us in his book *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* that absolute rejection of compromise is incorrect and that if the tactic is conducive to class

interests, compromise is permissible and necessary. To utilize correctly the tactical line requires first of all our understanding of the nature and dynamics of the present Chinese revolution.

The Chinese revolution is a rural revolution to oppose imperialism. The two main tasks are the rural revolution to eradicate feudal remnants and the national revolution to oppose imperialism. Have we accomplished the two revolutions? Certainly not. Therefore, the content of the revolution remains unchanged.

The current democratic revolution in China is different from the revolution in tsarist Russia. This is because China is a semicolon and our bourgeois democratic revolution is a rural revolution against imperialism. Have the motive forces of the revolution changed? They cannot be changed. The moving forces of the revolution are still the workers and peasants. To understand this point, we must further analyze the present class divisions in China.

What are the classes in China?

The first class is landlords. They are the main enemy of the rural revolution and also the main foundation of imperialist aggression against China and Chiang's reactionary rule.

The second class is the bourgeoisie. The Chinese bourgeoisie is divided into two groups. One group is the compradores of medium-sized and big enterprises and most of the banks and the businesses of imperialists. They play second fiddle to the imperialists and are their appendages. They are fundamentally counterrevolutionary. Another group is the national bourgeoisie, including capitalists and owners of China's light industries (such as textile, silk, and tobacco factories). This group has conflicts with the imperialists, for they suffer from imperialist oppression in all fields, including the purchase of raw materials and the sale of goods. The collapse of light industry, or at least the collapse of the majority of light industry in recent years, has especially increased their clashes with the imperialists. Are they anti-imperialist forces? They can oppose imperialism to a large extent, but when workers demand wage increases and a reduction in working hours and fight for better treatment, they will ask the armed police of the reactionary imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek to suppress the workers. At the same time, the national bourgeoisie is linked with feudal exploitation and usurer's capital in the countryside. Thus, they oppose the rural revolution. Although the national bourgeoisie has contradictions with the imperialists, they are fundamentally opposite to the proletariat and peasantry. In the Chinese national revolution, they are the vacillating, timid, and compromising elements who are ready to surrender at any time as the revolution advances.

Of course, national subjugation should be opposed. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie will sing some pretty songs to hoodwink the masses in an effort to use the pressure of the masses to gain some concessions from the imperialists. This tendency of the national bourgeoisie is what we call national reformism. Without threatening its class, the national bourgeoisie can even accept nationalist slogans and join the national revolution and spread its influence to petty bourgeois peasants

and even to some workers. It is possible for it to participate in the earlier national revolutionary movements. When the revolution advances and class struggle intensifies, however, it will certainly waver and compromise and finally betray the revolution.

The third class is the petty bourgeoisie, which can also be divided into several strata. In cities, the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie includes owners of handicraft industries, owners of small commercial businesses (excluding some retailers of Japanese goods), and factories. They are going bankrupt and are in decline because of the imperialist actions and the squeeze of their small businesses caused by the imperialists' goods. At the same time, however, they have personal and close connections with China's feudal elements, especially with usurer's capital, and are also hostile toward the workers' struggle. Therefore, while they can be opposed to imperialism in the early stage of the national revolution, they will waver as soon as the rural revolution develops. In Anyang, [name missing in original] followed the national bourgeoisie and opposed the rural revolution and the struggle of the workers.

Still others belong to another stratum of the petty bourgeoisie—students and intellectuals (including petty bourgeois experts, primary school teachers, etc.). Their characteristic is to display extraordinary enthusiasm for the national revolution and to wave their arms, shout, run around crying, and campaigning. However, the family backgrounds of most of this stratum are landlord, rich peasant, and petty bourgeoisie. When the revolution develops in depth, they will talk about "their base being disturbed by workers and peasants," thus causing vacillation. Also, they will become disillusioned and frightened by the iron fists of the workers and peasants and eventually will leave the revolution in great disappointment.

The third segment of the petty bourgeoisie is the lower stratum and the poor people in cities. This includes peddlers and small shopkeepers, unemployed handicraft workers, and small business and factory owners bankrupted by imperialist pressure. They are closest to the proletariat and are the main stratum of the masses that we should try to win over in the cities.

The fourth class is the peasantry. Peasants as a whole do not constitute one class. The farmhands form the proletariat in the countryside, and the poor peasants the semiproletariat. Middle peasants are the petty bourgeoisie. Rich peasants are the representatives of capitalist relations in the countryside. Farmhands are the basic force of the rural revolution. Middle peasants can gain actual benefits through the abolition of the harsh and many taxes and the overthrow of feudal remnants. Rich peasants cannot gain from the rural revolution, and only some are interested in opposing taxation. Some rich peasants and small landlords may participate in the struggle against taxation and warlords and may even demonstrate neutrality and undertake some actions in the national revolution. As the rural revolution develops, however, they will waver immediately and oppose it and therefore they will not fight to the end against imperialism. The fifth class is the proletariat. As everyone knows, this is the most resolute and thorough force of leadership to oppose imperialism. It is the leader of the rural revolution.

According to the above analysis of Chinese classes, the revolutionary class comprises the proletariat, farmhands, poor peasants, and urban poor people.

The reactionary class comprises landlords and the majority of the bourgeoisie. Chiang Kai-shek's base is the reactionary alliance of landlords and the bourgeoisie.

Apart from revolutionaries and reactionaries, there are intermediate forces including petty-bourgeois students, intellectuals, and some of the national bourgeoisie.

What is the recent attitude of the bourgeoisie toward the national revolution? Recently, the bourgeoisie in Shanghai held a conference to discuss how to protect its property within the imperialist concessions. It feels the threat of the Japanese imperialists to its property but does not dare to disperse its goods to other areas. Therefore, it is prepared to surrender to the imperialists at any time in an attempt to share some of the leftovers from the imperialist exploitation of the Chinese workers and peasants. This share will satisfy them fully. This has rendered entirely clear the vacillation and hesitancy of the national bourgeoisie in the present high tide of the national revolution.

We must clearly discern the above class divisions and manifestations, and we should adopt various tactics. However, is it possible to form a united front with the intermediate forces of the national revolution? Yes. Because our current main enemies are the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, we should adopt the tactics of a united front. It is unwise and inappropriate to regard the present intermediate forces as reactionaries.

How should we use the united front specifically? What tactics should we adopt toward each class in our united front? These are issues that I will discuss next.

[[The Comintern, in the resolutions of the Sixth Congress [1928], pointed out two errors. First, lack of understanding of a distinction between the national reformist tendency and national revolution thus leading to "tailism" and lack of distinction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie politically and organizationally. This was the CCP's mistake from 1925 to 1927. Second was the underestimation of the special significance of this tendency. We must understand clearly the national bourgeoisie's reformism and its influence.]]

This is to say that if we are not clear about the national bourgeoisie's very unresolute, wavering, and temporizing nature and its characteristic of being ready to betray the revolution at any time, we will become the tail of the national bourgeoisie. If we do not know how to use the intermediate forces to resist Japan and oppose Chiang, we will become divorced from the masses, and Chiang Kai-shek will use these intermediate forces to form an anti-red united front.

Why are the party's organizational forces in the white areas still so weak? This is owing to the inappropriate evaluation of the question and the failure to organize actively and develop boldly a national revolutionary mass united front.

The basic purpose of utilizing the national revolutionary united front is to gain support from the grass-roots masses. Should we hold the view that it is unnecessary to have a national united front, that it is enough to have workers and peasants, that it is enough to have workers and peasants, and that we do not need capitalists and the

petty bourgeoisie? We should understand that our main enemy, the imperialists, still possess relatively strong forces. Eradication of these forces requires hard struggle. All methods of maneuvering among various political groups must be adopted to utilize every conflict among the imperialists and every contradiction within the reactionary rulers. No matter how temporary, vacillating, and compromising they are, they must be seized on and used so long as they can play a considerable role at a certain time. This is conducive to the revolution.

On the other hand, is it correct to hold that the enemy may play tricks, to fear deception, and to refuse to take bold actions? No, it is not. So long as we have our own strength, we should act boldly. What did Lenin say in *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* about the refusal of any compromises?

[[Lenin criticized traitorous and opportunist compromises but called it naive and foolish to rule out any compromise whatsoever.]]

Lenin's instructions indicate that the tactic of a united front is entirely necessary.

Our present tactics toward rich peasants are to neutralize them, not to confiscate their property and the land they cultivate themselves or by hired laborer. We do not take over the property of rich peasants, but only confiscate the land rented out by them. In case our comrades are against this practice, they should consider where our land would be should the Japanese imperialists subjugate China. To overthrow imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek, it is necessary to adopt such tactics toward rich peasants. This practice is designed to achieve the victory of the national revolution, as well as to guarantee our land. This concession is of great significance for us in the competition for the intermediate forces. If we do not know how to apply these tactics, we shall not be able to seize the leadership of the national revolution. We should also know that if we do not know how to maneuver among the enemies in order to attack them one by one and use all sorts of weapons to fight against them, we shall be like the girl who has never stepped outside and who blushes at the sight of strangers and is very shy. Thus, we shall not be competent to talk about the leadership tactics of the proletariat. The CP is not here to indulge in empty talk; we must resort to all means to defeat the enemy. Only by so doing can we consolidate leadership and achieve the victory of the national revolution. The present motive forces of the Chinese revolution have not changed, and the nature of the revolution will certainly not change. To triumph over the enemy, we must change our tactics. It is absolutely necessary to change the tactics first. At the present stage, it is entirely correct. Inertia, isolation, aloofness, absolute refusal to compromise, and making concessions are all wrong.

Will our suggestions to alter tactics in the high tide of the national revolution be misunderstood as abandoning the weapon of class struggle and the initiation of class struggle? No, absolutely not.

On the basis of the blood spilled over the past few years of class struggle, facts show that there are no contradictions between the Chinese national revolution and class struggle and that the national revolution and class struggle are not opposed to each other. The crux of the present matter is how to combine the national revolution

with class struggle. To achieve this combination requires the establishment of a national revolutionary united front.

Are there internal contradictions within the united front? Of course, there are. Our party must resolutely lead the basic masses of workers and peasants; fight for their basic demands; oppose the tendencies of vacillation, compromise, surrender, and betrayal in national revolutionary united front; always be on guard against our own “brotherly forces” [*youjun*]; organize our own forces well; educate our own class; and prepare our troops for bold implementation of the tactic of a broad united front. This will guarantee our victory.

3) How to Use the Tactics Specifically

Why did not we adopt these tactics in the past and only adopt them now?

The main reason is the change in the situation.

In the past, the Chinese party acted as the tail of the national bourgeoisie during the period of the Great Revolution.

[[After the [Sixth] Congress, the party experienced the Lisan line, which divorced the party from the masses. The Japanese occupation of the northeast witnessed a high tide in the national revolution, but the party’s organizational power in the cities was very weak. The soviet movement flourished only in the rural areas. During this period the party made many tactical mistakes. One example is the Fujian Incident. Its leaders came to see us, but we failed to seize this possibility to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. If we had applied the tactics of a broad united front as instructed by the Comintern, the revolutionary situation would have been different. Mistakes were also made in the white and soviet areas. Facts tell us that we must effect an immediate change in tactics. We cannot fight a war of attrition in limited areas but must form a broad united front. If we understand this issue, we shall realize the mistakes we made during the five encirclements. Concerning the rich peasants, it was wrong to oppose them and not to ally with them.]]

What are the most concrete forms for organizing the national revolutionary united front? The most common concrete form of the national revolutionary united front should be the establishment of a government to resist Japan and save the nation⁷⁹ and of a united anti-Japanese army. In order to overthrow imperialism and destroy the rule of the traitor Chiang Kai-shek, all classes, factions, and armed forces that resist Japan and oppose Chiang may join the anti-Japanese army and the government to resist Japan and save the nation. What are the government to resist Japan and save the nation, and the united anti-Japanese army? They are the leading organs in the war against Japan and the traitor Chiang Kai-shek.

Comrades may ask that since we already have a soviet government, why do we still need a government to resist Japan and save the nation? Because our main enemies are Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. It is not easy to fight the Japanese imperialists, so we must unite with all forces that resist Japan and oppose Chiang and fight together under the leading organs of the united front.

If we cannot form a united front to resist Japan and oppose Chiang, Japan will continue to use its anti-red reactionary united front to deal with us. To unite and fight back against it, we must organize a government to resist Japan and save the nation.

What should be the political program of the government to resist Japan and save the nation? If it were completely the same as the political program of the soviet government, it would not be a government to resist Japan and save the nation. It would be called a soviet, and so why would we need another soviet government? The political program of the government to resist Japan and save the nation and that of the soviet government are different. What is the extent of the difference? If this political program is not lowered to cope with resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang, the government to resist Japan and save the nation cannot be established. At the same time, if we do not put forward a minimum program to meet the demands of the masses, the government cannot be organized. Therefore, the content of this political program should be:⁸⁰

- 1) To confiscate all property of the Japanese imperialists in China to finance anti-Japanese activities.
- 2) To confiscate all land and property of national traitors and collaborators to be redistributed among the workers, peasants, soldiers, poor people, and refugees.
- 3) To grant the masses freedom of speech, assembly, association, and publication.
- 4) To organize a mass army to resist Japan and save the nation and volunteer armies. [This does not appear in the Politburo's December 1935 resolution.]
- 5) To carry out disaster relief and water control to prevent floods and assist people affected by disasters.
- 6) To abolish all exorbitant taxes and levies and develop industry and commerce.
- 7) To increase wages and salaries; improve the livelihood of workers, soldiers, and teachers; promote education and production; assist unemployed intellectuals, students, and experts.
- 8) To realize national self-determination, unite all national minorities at home to resist Japan, and oppose reactionary national minority movements sponsored by Japan.
- 9) To unite with the people of Korea and Taiwan, assist their independent liberation movements, and unite the workers and peasants inside Japan and all other forces against the Japanese invasion to enable them to form a consolidated alliance with China in its war against Japan.
- 10) To establish close and friendly relations with all friendly and neutral nations and countries that sympathize with and assist China's great national movement.

In line with this political program, we should unite the Red Army and the soviet government with all anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang forces either through revolution-

ary mass methods and through mass uprisings, through the soviet government's tactic of the united front, or through the establishment of a government to resist Japan and save the nation set up by the people's congress to resist Japan and save the nation. This is an issue of how to realize the national revolutionary united front.

4) The National Revolutionary United Front and the Soviet Red Army

The difference between the present high tide of national revolution and the first Great Revolution is that the soviets have triumphed in many places in China. The soviet regime and the Red Army are the basic forces opposing the Japanese and the supporting pillar of the government to resist Japan and save the nation and of the united anti-Japanese army. To build a broader and stronger foundation for the national revolutionary united front, the Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Republic and its central government declares:

[[Five main points recap those made in the Politburo's 25 December 1935 resolution [Doc. E.8]. It shall change its name to the Soviet People's Republic; all petty bourgeois elements and intellectuals may vote and be elected; there will be preferential treatment for white army members who will oppose Japan; property of rich peasants will not be confiscated; and more lenient policies will be adopted toward the national capitalists.]]

Why should we adopt these methods?

They are designed to assist the development of the soviet movement. A greater high tide of the national revolution will certainly come about with the meticulous implementation of these tactics.

The difference between this and the first Great Revolution is that we already have quite a rich revolutionary experience, and we must raise the issue of a united front to resist Japan. Therefore, we must change many policies of the soviet regime to be compatible with the current needs of the struggle.

If we keep our original policies unchanged, still oppose rich peasants and refuse to grant the right of election to the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, and if we keep the vacillating intermediate strata outside, the united front will not be realized and the soviet Red Army will not be able to play the main role in resisting Japan and opposing Chiang. In this way, it is very clear that such a government to resist Japan and save the nation is nothing but a propaganda slogan.

Comrades may have problems with this. Now even the name soviet is changed. Policies are also changed to give preferential treatment to soldiers and officers who oppose Japan and Chiang, to grant the right to vote and to be elected to the petty bourgeoisie; to neutralize rich peasants, and even to welcome investment by overseas Chinese. Under such conditions, what is the position of us workers and peasants? This issue should not be misunderstood in this way. To do so is to distrust our own forces, act timidly, fail to understand the teachings of Lenin, and be unable to use proletarian tactics. If our party has a formidable foundation and has adopted Bolshevik means in the struggle, if our party and Red Army have solid foundations

and the soviet regime has quite rich experiences, why should we be afraid? So long as we have this capital, we should conduct business in a bold way. In fact, the enterprise is a profitable one. To defeat our main enemy, this tactic is the only necessary and correct one. We should take advantage of the enemy's internal conflicts and use the vacillation of the intermediate forces. The purpose of applying this tactic is to ally together with the present fraternal armies to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. They are not invited to smoke opium inside the soviet regime and not invited to deal with workers and peasants. If we understand the change in tactics from this point of view, there will be no problems.

For the proletariat to compete for the leadership of the national revolutionary united front, we must double our efforts to expand the Red Army and greatly enlarge the soviet bases because the Red Army is the Red Army to resist Japan, and the soviet regions are bases for resistance. Now we are attacking the enemy because warlord armies are the armies of traitors. Our expansion of the red regions is to consolidate the bases for resistance. At the same time, it is imperative to settle properly the land question by confiscating the land of landlords, realizing the interests of the masses, winning over the majority of workers and peasants, seeking support from soldiers and minority nationalities, and using flexible diplomatic policies to set up a common united front to oppose imperialism.

Comrades may ask why the soviet government is renamed the Soviet People's Republic. The basis for this change is contained in the Comintern's political program: "In advanced colonies, the Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Republic may be established. In relatively backward areas, the Soviet People's Republic may be established." We are in a relatively backward place, and our first and foremost task is to combine the rural with the national revolution.

Why should there be two governments—a government to resist Japan and save the nation and a soviet government? What are the specific relations between the two governments in the high tide of the national revolution and the united front? Which one is superior? What if there are conflicts between the two? We should understand that the two governments exist only during a transitional period. One is in fact a government that is developing, while the other is the leading organ of the united front to resist Japan and oppose Chiang, a government that ignites and leads the masses to fight against Japan. Therefore, the solution of this issue lies in future circumstances and in political and organizational fighting power. If our power is stronger, the government to resist Japan and save the nation may turn into a soviet regime. If our power is quite small, then we will have to bide our time and prepare for the expansion of our forces.

In the soviet areas, there are only soviet governments. The resist Japan and save the nation form of government should not be used. This also applies to the new red areas.

Why should we give the petty bourgeoisie electoral rights? Why should intellectuals be treated preferentially? Are these compromises? Of course they are compromises and concessions. We have already pointed out that absolute refusal to

compromise and make concessions is wrong. Our use of these tactics is to win the victory of the revolution and to help win the victory of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants and the final victory.

How are concrete policies affected by this change?

This change necessitates changes in all areas.

1) On the land question in the soviet areas. On the land question, in the past we distributed land according to the number of family members and able-bodied persons. The land of landlords and rich peasants was confiscated, and it was redistributed on a fair and equitable basis. The main slogan now is to confiscate the land of landlords and redistribute it among the poor peasants.

The change concerning rich peasants is that we no longer confiscate their property and real estate. The land of rich peasants that they or hired laborers cultivate is not to be confiscated. Only the portion for feudal exploitation (or the portion that is rented out) is confiscated. The land of the landlord class will certainly be redistributed among poor workers and peasants (farmhands and poor peasants). The interests of middle peasants should not be encroached on. After confiscation in the past, landlords were left without a means of livelihood. Now they should be given some means of livelihood (such as pots and pans, bowls and cups, and a small amount of grain). This practice is to prevent the vacillation of middle peasants [as in original].

Next, we should make it clear that those who have a few pieces of land to rent out to others or find a job elsewhere or rent out small patches of land owing to a lack of labor power cannot be considered landlords. Land can be rented or sold.

Will farmhands and poor peasants have less land to be redistributed among them? First of all, we should understand that the central issue is whether the revolution can succeed. Only with the victory of the revolution can land interests be guaranteed.

Land belonging to monasteries should be dealt with in accordance with the old practice of leaving them to be settled by clans or by the masses themselves.

Teachers, doctors, other experts in the rural areas, and fair-minded Daoist priests, so long as they are poor and cultivate the land themselves, should be given some land. Married daughters of rich peasants should also share land as poor people.

2) Labor policy. Workers' wages should be increased, and there should be regulations for a minimum wage. Worktime should be reduced and the eight-hour work system should be applied. However, the practice of workers' representatives' negotiating with their bosses should be adopted to avoid the past method of unilateral coercion by trade unions. Work discipline should be strengthened to properly realize the eight-hour day. Worktime should not be reduced at will. Otherwise, employers can file suits in the courts of soviet governments and sue the workers.

The issue of work discipline has been raised in the past by the Soviet Union and the Wuhan government. However, the Wuhan government used work discipline to

oppress workers. Now, the soviet regime will establish work discipline on the basis of protecting workers' interests.

3) *Economic policies.* Feudal remnants should be eliminated, the demands of the masses satisfied, and the needs of the revolutionary war fulfilled in accordance with past principles. Taxes should be imposed on capitalists and the exploiting class. Only that portion of property used for feudal exploitation by merchants should be confiscated. Properties with close ties to the counterrevolution or the reactionary rulers and the usurer's capital, which are extremely resented by the masses, should be confiscated.

Not only should ordinary medium-sized and small merchants be protected, but big merchants who obey the laws of the soviet government should also not have [their land] confiscated.

Houses of medium-sized and small merchants should not be confiscated. Rent should be paid to live in these houses. One should pay rent to a big merchant when one lives in his house. Of course, the soviet government supports the reduction of rent.

Rewarding the operation of factories. The enterprises the government cannot run should hire private citizens to manage them in accordance with the labor law. In the countryside, those who lend water mills should be compensated or paid with grain. They may not be seized without compensation.

Rich peasants may join the cooperatives and organize their own cooperatives. The soviet government should lead workers and peasants to organize industrial and agricultural cooperatives and fight against the manipulation and increase of prices by rich peasants' cooperatives.

To develop and reward commerce, the soviet regime must determine methods to protect merchants while selling their goods in all areas. The past practice of only issuing road permits without protection should be abandoned.

The soviet government is opposed to the speculative actions of raising prices and disrupting the market. Mandatory purchasing may be practiced when necessary, but wide-ranging price regulation should be avoided.

In order to develop commerce, the use of loans and credits should be governed by regulations on maximum interest. Principle as well as interest must be paid on loans (usurer's loans should not be permitted). There must be regulations for litigation concerning credits and loans.

4) *The election of the soviet government.* Landlords do not enjoy the rights of citizens. Generally speaking, rich peasants do not enjoy rights of citizens either. Rich peasants who oppose the soviet regime and actively participate in counterrevolutionary activities do not enjoy such rights. Those who show sympathy to the soviet may be granted the right to speak at the election meetings for the soviet government, but will have no right to vote or be elected. Those individual rich peasants who actively join the resistance to Japan and oppose Chiang and imple-

ment all soviet decisions may be given the right to vote and to be elected. When rich peasants express opinions supporting their own interests, they should not be rebuffed in a simple fashion. Let the masses initiate struggles against their wrong opinions. The method of struggle against rich peasants should not be the common method used by the security bureau.

Revolutionary intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie should be given the right to vote and be elected.

Those low-ranking personnel of the former reactionary ruling organization, including those who worked in the *baojia* system,⁸¹ who actively oppose the soviet regime and resistance to Japan and Chiang, must be treated with the methods of dictatorship. If they adopt a neutral or negative attitude toward us and express a resolve not to encroach on the interests of poor people, they should not simply be arrested but should be sued in the revolutionary court of the soviet regime for their past crimes of harming the poor. The court should demand that they compensate for past damage done to the poor.

Those above the level of a rich peasant who have taken part in counterrevolutionary activities may be asked to surrender on bail (or on condition that poor people provide a guarantee). Those who worked for the reactionary rulers and now have a poor people's guarantee that they will not oppose the soviet regime cannot be arrested simply because they used to be the heads of the *baojia* system. We shall be in an awkward situation if we kill all landlords, rich peasants, and those who worked in the *baojia* system. We should focus on suppressing their reactionary chiefs, and we should neutralize some of them.

The soviet regime generally provides good treatment to teachers, doctors, castrators of pigs and oxen, and grants them the rights of citizens and decides whether to give them land depending on their class status.

Monks and fair-minded Daoist priests should not be driven away and should be given land on the basis of their class status.

It is still permissible to ride in colorful sedans and to invite people to drink at wedding ceremonies. Doctors may ride in sedans as in the past.

Of course, the soviet government opposes slave owners and liberates all uncompensated laborers and others.

The soviet government upholds the freedom of religion and does not destroy monasteries. It should confiscate the buildings, land, and property of Catholic and Protestant churches and adopt the methods of propaganda and education among church followers.

The security forces of the *baojia* system, white army soldiers, and low-ranking officers who oppose Japan and Chiang may be given land and treated preferentially. Those relatives of white army officers who are landlords should have their land confiscated, but it should be explained to them that if their men resist Japan and oppose Chiang, they can come home.

In the future, it is absolutely forbidden to conduct random and wanton searches in the homes of the masses. If people are asked to carry things, they must be paid.

The above are generally applicable tactics; some are aimed at overcoming past mistakes and others are to effect a tactical change. At present, there is a grain shortage in the soviet areas and the following methods may be implemented: (i) donations and fund-raising; (ii) mandatory purchasing (but they must be paid); (ii) loans or lending by receipt. The current difficulties should be dealt with by a flexible use of these methods.

5) Methods for the Red Army. Naturally, only workers, farmhands, and poor and middle peasants can join the Red Army. In the past, there was much confusion about class status and social relations. In the future, those few rich peasant members of the Red Army who perform well in their work over a considerably long period of time should not be faulted. This also applies to social relations. Work performance is the criterion, and fault will be found if their work performance is poor.

In the past, we simply refused those rich peasants who came to join the Red Army, and we did not arrange other appropriate jobs for them. In the future, this practice should be corrected. If they have specialties, they may be introduced to work in other units and organs.

Revolutionary intellectuals who come to join the Red Army should not be rejected out of hand, and efforts must be made to arrange jobs for them.

This is the only correct proletarian attitude toward the intermediate forces. Previously, we always looked at the white officers and soldiers with bad class status as if they were strangers. This is incorrect. We must make it known that they are against Japan and Chiang and bear in mind only the fact that they have a bad class status. We need not consider them strangers. It is extremely important to exert great efforts to publicize at the front resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang and the united anti-Japanese army of resistance.

5) On the Question of Mass Organizations

There are, of course, various kinds of mass organizations under the soviet regime. This issue is easy to understand if we are clear about the significance of the tactics toward rich peasants. We neutralize rich peasants but do not ally with them. We ally with middle peasants. If we were to ally with rich peasants, we would have to neutralize landlords. This is impossible. We cannot regard rich peasants as our basic revolutionary masses. Otherwise, there will be no rural revolution to talk about. However, it is also wrong to oppose rich peasants. We neutralize rich peasants, which means that when a struggle between farmhands and rich peasants is under way, we must unconditionally stand by the farmhands and initiate and stimulate and organize farmhands to wage a relentless struggle against rich peasants. This does not mean, however, that security bureau methods must be used instead of the mass line.

If rich peasants actively participate in counterrevolutionary activities, of course they will be dealt with by the security bureau. Some rich peasants may still participate in the national revolution. If the revolution develops to a higher stage, rich

peasants will naturally rise up to oppose the revolution. We cannot raise the slogan of opposing rich peasants during the bourgeois democratic revolution. Inevitably, the process of revolutionary development will reach the stage of opposing rich peasants. But this is not an issue now.

Therefore, we must carefully distinguish those who can be allied with, neutralized, or opposed. A understanding of this issue is essential for the implementation of the basic line of every mass organization.

i) Trade Unions

In the future, associations of farmhands should not dwell on family backgrounds. All farmhands may join. (It also applies to farmhands from rich peasant backgrounds. Of course, such cases are very rare.) It is all right so long as the person concerned supports the constitution of the trade union, frequently takes part in the meetings, obeys resolutions, and pays union dues. Handicraft workers, regardless of trade, may join trade unions and organize unions of their own trade. Master workers, no matter how many apprentices they have, may also join. Seasonal workers may also join trade unions of their profession. Primary school teachers and shop assistants may also organize trade unions. Of course, bosses and those who directly represent the interests of employers cannot join. They are the appendages of capital.

Ordinary staff of the soviet government should be under a salary system.

We should boldly open wide the trade union gates and ensure that trade unions of important industries become the pillar of the trade union movement. To secure party leadership in the soviet regime, the representatives of trade unions should work not only in the labor committee, but also in all departments. This is the way to guarantee actual proletarian leadership in the soviet regime. However, trade unions do not have the power to represent the soviet government. Trade unions should absorb many nonparty workers to participate in work and join leading organs and to educate them on the job.

The trade union issue is of decisive significance in implementing the party's new line at the present time.

ii) Poor Peasant Leagues

The poor peasant league is extremely important in the rural revolution. If the new tactical guidelines cannot unite and concretely initiate the poor peasant struggle, rich peasants will be able to use all kinds of opportunities to take over or steal the political power of the soviet regime. If there is no party leadership, the intellectuals or rich peasants will be able to manipulate everything.

The trade unions of farmhands and the poor peasant leagues are the main pillars of the CP in the countryside. The poor peasant league should maintain the closest links with the soviet regime in the countryside. The chair of the poor peasant league should be a member of the soviet.

The determined work of the poor peasant league is the main guarantee that the power of the soviet regime will not fall into the hands of rich peasants.

To treat them as objects of an alliance, fail to guard against them at all times, and regard them as one of the basic forces is to abandon proletarian leadership. It is possible that the tendency to make concessions, do anything for the united front, etc., may emerge. This must be resolutely resisted.

Thus, to implement the new tactical line, the party must oppose harmful rightism while fighting against the main tendencies of leftism.

Organizationally, the party should absorb large numbers of members and must expand greatly to have hundreds of thousands, even millions, of new party members. More workers and farmhands should be recruited into the party to become the party's backbone. Efforts at cultivating worker and peasant cadres should be redoubled. Special importance should be given to strengthening the component of proletarian leadership.

In the past, it was quite easy for farmhands and poor peasants to join the party in the red areas, but it was extremely difficult for intellectuals to join the party. Now, although attention should be paid to class status, this is not the most important factor. In implementing the new tactical line, the party must recruit the heroic fighters of the national revolution and the rural revolution. The criterion for joining the party is support for the party constitution and programs and the party's positions and actual work. The revolutionary intellectuals who accept the party's constitution and programs and work actively may join the party. Therefore I suggest that the period of candidacy for party members should be shortened.

In applying the new tactics, the party should pay attention to strengthening proletarian leadership, energetically educating party members and cultivating the enthusiasm, creativity, and initiative of party members. Inner-party democracy should be promoted to encourage discussions without fear of making mistakes. The attitude of education and persuasion should be adopted with the emphasis on ideological struggle. Inner-party struggle should not be carried out with simplistic methods. Naturally, bad behavior should be fought against and opposed. Every party member must realize that communism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. Raising party members' conscientiousness in work and enabling them to apply the new tactical line well is the only way to combine the rural revolution with the anti-imperialist national revolution in a concrete manner and to unite party members and the masses around the party.

At present, one possible tendency in the party is to make a pessimistic evaluation of the current situation, refusing to believe that a new high tide of national revolution has arrived. Another possible tendency is to believe that there will be no strenuous wars in the operation of a new united front and that everything will be fine. Both these tendencies must be opposed.

We must take note of the party's weak organization in the white areas and the continued existence of uneven development of the revolution in the new high tide. It will still take an arduous and relatively protracted period of struggle to overthrow

the main enemies of Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek's rule. We should see clearly that the present period is different in that we have undergone the severe test of the first Great Revolution and have had a prolonged history of the soviet movement. As long as we improve our organizational strength, we will definitely succeed in the implementation of the new tactical line.

Regarding the tactics of a united front, we need to use our own strength to settle all issues. We should not harbor any illusions about the united front. Everything will be decided on the basis of our strength.

Finally, I would like to mention the fact that this resolution accords with the instructions of the Comintern in principle only. We need to understand how the Comintern can give accurate and appropriate instructions based on the changes in the Chinese situation. The principles are undoubtedly correct.

More satisfactory explanation and better realization entirely depend on our actual work in the future. No comrades should think that since these are Comintern instructions they need not be discussed. Everyone should fully express his opinion in the discussions.

Now, the Twenty-sixth Army Corps and comrades in north Shaanxi are all in agreement with this tactical line as instructed by the Comintern.

Past differences on political and organizational matters within the party may be submitted to the Seventh Congress for settlement. We should not follow the comrades in north Shaanxi who maintained an attitude of insisting on the [relevance of] their own practices and making no accommodation toward others. In implementing the new tactical line, it is absolutely necessary for the party's political and organizational unity to present past differences to the Seventh Congress for settlement. Therefore, we now put forward the specific proposal that the solution at present should lie with the establishment of separate centers in the appropriate areas. A northwest bureau should be set up in north Shaanxi, and we should set up a south-east bureau. This is not a concession in the struggle against various tendencies, but a requirement for the implementation of the party's great historical tasks.

Only by uniting as one person and fighting for the party's new tactical line can the party win victory in resisting Japan and opposing Chiang and in establishing a new soviet China.

E.10 Telegram from Zhang Guotao to the Party Center (5 December 1935)⁸²

- 1) Here we assumed the titles of the Party Center, the YL Center, the central government, the Central Military Committee, the General Headquarters, and others. These titles will be employed in drawing up public documents as well as in conducting relations with your side.

- 2) We demand that you stop using the false title of the Party Center and change it to the CCP Northern Bureau, the Shaanxi-Gansu Government and the Northern Route Army.
- 3) The names First and Fourth Front Armies will both be discarded.
- 4) You should immediately send us a report on the conditions of the Northern Bureau, the Northern Route Army, and the governmental systems for our approval.

E.11 Decision Concerning Comrade Zhang Guotao's Establishment of a Second "Party Center" (22 January 1936)⁸³

Recently, after becoming cut off from the CC, Comrade Zhang Guotao publicly established in the Fourth Front Army his own "Party Center," "central government," "central revolutionary military committee," and "YL Center." In setting up these organizations, he has alienated himself from the party and the Chinese revolution. Apart from sending a telegram to order Comrade Zhang Guotao to disband all "centers" of his own and to give up his intention of opposing the party, it has been decided to publicize within the party the resolutions adopted on 12 September 1935 by the Politburo at Ejie.⁸⁴

E.12 Telegram from Mao Zedong to Wang Yizhe and Zhang Xueliang (6 April 1936)⁸⁵

A) Our representatives Zhou Enlai and Li Kenong⁸⁶ will arrive in Fushi [later Yan'an] on the eighth to meet with Mr. Zhang [Xueliang] to discuss important matters concerning saving the country. They are scheduled to leave Wayaobao on the seventh and arrive at Chuankuo, twenty *li* east of Fushi, at 6 P.M. on the eighth. There they will wait for the people sent by Mr. Zhang to take them to the city from Chuankuo. We expect that security arrangements for them after entering the city will be properly arranged by Mr. Zhang.

B) Our side proposes the following issues for discussion by both parties:

- 1) The question of ceasing all civil wars by the armies throughout the country, no matter whether they are red or white, and the question of joint resistance to Japan to save the nation.
- 2) The question of the Red Army throughout the country concentrating in Hebei to stop the advance of the Japanese imperialists.

- 3) The question of allying with the Soviet Union and first sending representatives to Moscow.
- 4) The question of signing a preliminary agreement between our two sides on mutual nonaggression and economic and commercial relations.

C) It is earnestly hoped that Mr. Zhang will inform us of any suggestions as early as possible.

E.13 The Party Center's Guiding Principles for Dealing with the Northeast Army (20 June 1936)⁸⁷

I) Estimation of the Northeast Army

Owing to its current special political status (a slave without a homeland), and the revolutionary influence of the Red Army, the Northeast Army is most likely to be turned into a revolutionary anti-Japanese force.

At present, the Northeast Army is still in the transition phase toward the anti-Japanese revolution. In general, it still is under the control of traitorous leader Chiang Kai-shek. The fascist political section formed by Chiang's lackeys still has the legal authority to conduct propaganda and supervision in the army. On the other hand, the highest leadership in the army and some senior generals are determined to show good faith in the fight against the Japanese. Morale is very high among middle- and lower-ranking officers and soldiers. This makes it easier for us to conduct propaganda and activities to resist Japanese aggression and save the nation.

However, the pace of transition in the army is not well balanced. Some sections are most progressive, some are changing very slowly, while others are directly controlled by Chiang's fascist political section and have experienced no change at all. Therefore, the political consciousness in the army varies greatly. This imbalance by no means negates our basic estimate that the whole Northeast Army could be turned into an anti-Japanese force. On the contrary, it should form the starting point of our efforts.

II) Our Fundamental Principle Is to Win the Northeast Army Over to the Anti-Japanese Front

Whether the Northeast Army can be transformed into an anti-Japanese army depends on our efforts. Our fundamental principle is to urge the army to oppose the Japanese invasion. Our working objectives are as follows:

i) Instead of dispersing and splitting the army, we should present it with thoroughgoing anti-Japanese principles and unite it around these principles to form a strong armed force to oppose Japan.

ii) Instead of turning the army into a Red Army that supports the fundamental political principles of the CP, we should make it a force friendly to the Red Army if it adopts anti-Japanese principles as presented by the CP. At present, anything that goes beyond this should be stopped.

With respect to the Northeast Army, our work method relies mainly on patient political persuasion and explanation to win it over to the anti-Japanese front. Without political effort and by using schemes and intrigues, the army cannot be transformed into a strong armed force to oppose Japan and dedicate itself to the sacred cause of resisting Japanese aggression and saving the nation. However, we do not exclude the possibility of necessary military actions against those sections of the army which lack political consciousness and are conceited and arrogant, repressed and cheated by Chiang Kai-shek and his political section. Under advantageous conditions, our armed forces should strike relentless blows at their hostile attacks. It not only suits our needs of self-defense, but also can teach those sections a lesson and create possibilities for us to perform political tasks smoothly among them later on. Therefore, the purpose of this kind of military action is to assist political persuasion, not to eliminate the Northeast Army.

III) Key Factors for Transforming the Northeast Army

The current key factors for transforming the army into an anti-Japanese force are to break away from the control and influence of the traitorous leader Chiang Kai-shek; openly oppose any of Chiang's actions of national betrayal and humiliation; refuse to obey any of Chiang's orders to attack the soviet area and the Red Army. It is the fascist political section that acts on behalf of Chiang in the Northeast Army.

In front of everybody in the army, we should use all the facts of Chiang's betrayal to expose each lie fabricated by him and his political section. We must react strongly and responsively with ironclad evidence and undeniable facts to any slogans of the political section which are against us. We must concentrate our power on attacking Chiang Kai-shek and his political section, so every man in the Northeast Army is against the fascist political section so that it becomes completely isolated. Only through this process of struggle can the very few elements most loyal to Chiang be seen as traitors and collaborators to the nation and be cast aside by all the people in the army. Only through this struggle can those undecided and neutral elements be merged into an anti-Japanese front. Only through this struggle can the Northeast Army itself achieve a solid political unity.

At the same time, we must not relax our efforts at disintegrating the fascist political section in the antifascist struggle.

The Northeast Army will publicly promote and undertake anti-Japanese actions at a time when the opposition of part of the army to Chiang and his political section changes to open resistance by the whole army.

IV) The United Front Within the Northeast Army

The united front should be simultaneously constructed at both top and bottom levels in order to achieve the same objective, i.e., to make the Northeast Army an anti-Japanese force.

The united front at the upper levels has a particular importance owing to the fact that many officers in the Army are from northeast China. Many have a strong anti-Japanese spirit and will. This makes it easier for us to establish a united front with them. Various methods, either by signing written agreements or without, can be adopted in the united front (ceasing mutual offense, exchanging information, achieving mutual understanding by exchanging views, etc.). It is very important for us to do our best to present our position and method of resisting Japanese aggression and saving the nation, and to answer every question they have with clear, detailed, and honest responses. As a fraternal army, we should help them find proper solutions to their problems through exchange of views and consultation. We should not let some conflicts and misunderstandings stand in the way of forming the united front with them. During cooperation, anti-Japanese principles should be gradually detailed in order to make proper preparations for action to resist the Japanese and condemn the traitor [Chiang Kai-shek].

In order to speed up preparations and to seek proper timing of the final break from Chiang's control, leaders of the army are currently taking orders from the Nanjing government, Chiang Kai-shek, and his political section in a perfunctory manner. This is understandable and necessary before standing up to them. However, the army should not lose its anti-Japanese position before the nation's people. Meanwhile, any problem it has concerning the soviet area and the Red Army should be solved through consultations.

The purpose of the united front at the grass roots is to unite lower-ranking officers and soldiers under the objective of resisting Japanese invasion and recovering the homeland, so that a solid foundation and motive force can be built up in the Northeast Army. If some high-ranking officers become traitors, the lower ranks will not be affected, and soldiers can use their anti-Japanese motivation and feelings to encourage their superiors' determination to resist the Japanese. On the other hand, an anti-Japanese officer can rely on genuine support from the rank and file.

There are also many ways to adopt the united front at the grass-roots level, from not shooting at one another or shooting in the air to establishing mutual contacts. This united front should slow down and perfunctorily carry out any orders to attack the soviet area and the Red Army (e.g., on receiving orders to build fortresses, the soldiers should not take any action; should they do so, they should do a sloppy construction job).

The development and cooperation of the united front at different levels will certainly strengthen the army politically and speed up its process of transition.

V) Establishing a Strong Leadership Core in the Northeast Army

Presently, our party branches are trying to influence the Northeast Army mainly via external means by using leaflets, broadcasting, conversations, get-together parties, shows, etc. This approach is very necessary at the beginning; we also have to use these means to establish a leadership core inside the army so that it will perform tasks internally thereafter.

A very big weakness which the army has at present is that there is no leadership core except for some individual leading figures. During external work, we should help to discover, select, and teach a number of brave activists in the army and make them form a strong leadership core through which the transformation of the army can be pushed ahead. This core can wage organized struggles against the fascist political section and any traitors. Such cores initially should spread to every army, division, and regiment with names such as "The Northeast Anti-Japanese Soldiers' Society," "The Northeast Anti-Japanese Club," "The Recovering the East Group," "The Hope of the East Club," etc. Without the leadership of these groups, the Northeast Army could not be coordinated and a smooth transition would be impossible.

During our external work, we should not only seek out people in the army who are sympathetic to and support the anti-Japanese movement, but also make everyone spread and organize the movement. We should tell these comrades the reasons for and the truth about the movement, as well as ways and means. Everybody should understand that we are only helpers and guiders on these matters, and we should not arrange everything for them. All work should be handled by activists and leaders in the army. Without them, our work would be ineffective and baseless.

VI) Communist Cells and Branches [*xiaozu yu zhibu*] Should Be Established in the Army

We should recruit the most outstanding people in the army into the CP. Willingness to join the CP in the army should be kept completely secret. There should not be, at least in the near future, any connections between the communist cells founded in the army. Except for activities within the cell, however, all other activities by party members should not be secret because their main task is to unite and organize every anti-Japanese activist, and to make the army a strong anti-Japanese armed force. The sole appearance of party members in the army should be as anti-Japanese activists. Communist cells should penetrate the leadership core so that the CP can contribute to every single decision and plan in the army. The more powerful these communist cells are, the stronger the army is. Any idea of excluding the development of the CP will lead to the disintegration of the army.

Under all possible conditions, we should send our best comrades to work in the Northeast Army and develop communist organizations. In fact, we should start now to

teach and train experts capable of working in the army in order to meet future needs.

VII) Where There Is the Northeast Army, There Should Be the Work of the CP

Wherever the army is stationed, the party's central task there is to win it over. The secretariat of the party branch has leadership over the task. In addition, one secretary should be allocated to all levels of party branches from district and county up to province.

Work methods adopted by the local party branches should not be mechanical and identical. Instead, the methods should be developed to suit the special local situations based on the behavior of the army in the area, the activities of its political section, and its relations with local armed forces organized by landlords. If the army creates disturbances, carries out robberies, and arrests people, we should use guerrilla combat techniques to strengthen defense works, evacuate noncombatants, and hide provisions and livestock so that it has continual difficulties, and eventually ceases its nasty conduct. At the same time, we should also keep up our propaganda work (delivering leaflets, writing slogans, broadcasting, etc.). Every disarmed prisoner should be properly treated, released with propaganda materials or letters, and contacted from time to time later on. However, heads of fascist groups and local armed forces of landlords, on capture, should be executed and their crimes should be made public. If the army behaves well in the area, we can use the method of organizing get-togethers of soldiers and local civilians in order to bring the army over to the anti-Japanese forces.

The CP is the leader of Chinese revolution. It is superior to its enemies in the sense that its scope is much wider. No matter how the Northeast Army behaves, the CP cannot give up its work. On the other hand, it is not so foolish that it does not take note of the work of the Northeast Army and deal with the army's behavior, its losses, etc., in a uniform way. It will use a variety of ways and means to deal with the varying conduct of the army.

VIII) The Similarities and Differences Between the Office and the Work Committee *[banshichu yu gongzuo weiyuanhui]*

We should only set up an office where there is a very important station for the Northeast Army and where there is mutual agreement. The office is solely for dealing with the army. It should unite many activists in the army around it so that the office has the clearest picture of the army stationed in that area. It should be organized in a simple, convenient manner with members who are politically strong. The agency is a local organization under the leadership of the local CP. Any unsolvable problems and work progress should be reported to special Northeast Army

work groups at provincial or central levels so that the agency can receive frequent direction.

Besides agencies, under the Northeast Army provincial or central special work committee there should be many small work groups (or specially appointed representatives) which attach themselves to particular troops of the Northeast Army. Wherever troops move to, the work committees should move with them to maintain and develop previous contacts. Where an agency exists, the work committee should work together with it and supervise it.

Work committees should be even simpler than an agency. To avoid attacks from local bandits and fascists, proper disguises should be assumed as necessary. Members in the committee should be politically stronger.

IX) Explain to the Masses in the Soviet Area Our Principles in Dealing with the Northeast Army and Fight for the Interests of People

It is not surprising that many people in the soviet area do not understand our strategy in the Northeast Army because it is the most complicated method and is new to everyone. These people will have more doubts if the troops of the Northeast Army do not behave well in the area.

We must constantly explain to the people that the Northeast Army has a certain political consciousness; it is not the Red Army. We have various ways to deal with it. There are no conflicts between transforming the army and protecting the interests of people in the soviet areas. On the contrary, they are two coordinated tasks. To sacrifice the interests of the people not only is a complete mistake, but also makes it impossible to mobilize people to transform the Northeast Army. Therefore, work in the army is a very important component of protecting the people's interests. Giving up efforts in the Northeast Army owing to its devastation in some areas and trying to retaliate is the same as sacrificing the whole revolution for some regional interests. It is also a mistake.

Under all circumstances, the party should be the leader and should keep the masses under its control. It is necessary under all circumstances to establish and expand mass organizations, mass armed forces, and guerrilla detachments. When there is no fight, these mass organizations and armed forces will work in peace. When the peace is broken, we should arouse them to fight. Any organization and armed force should always prepare itself for any possible emergency. It is most dangerous to be panic-stricken and disorganized when confronted by an unexpected incident.

Now it is wartime. The party and masses in the soviet areas should be prepared for fighting. We will fight to protect our interests and the interests of the revolution.

X) Combat Incorrect Ideas in the Party Concerning the Northeast Army

Concerning the tasks in the Northeast Army, there are two kinds of incorrect ideas in the party which are both contradictory and complementary to each other.

One view is that the Northeast Army has no differences with the Red Army since they are united with us, and they are friendly armed forces. This is obviously wrong because there are fundamental and characteristic differences. The Red Army is a revolutionary armed force founded and developed in the Chinese communist revolution. On the other hand, the Northeast Army is only a mercenary army serving the ruling class, and it has the possibility of turning into an anti-Japanese army (no need to mention many other differences).

This view will certainly lead us to give up the task of pushing the Northeast Army toward the anti-Japanese front, and to treat it in the same way as the Red Army. Comrades holding this view will be depressed and disappointed when the Northeast Army does not behave well (this can be seen everywhere), and consequently they will doubt or even oppose the party's principles concerning the Northeast Army.

The other view doubts or even opposes the party's strategy on the Northeast Army from the very beginning because it sees bad conduct by the army everywhere. They believe that all the united actions of the Northeast Army are phony and for the purpose of attacking and destroying the soviet areas. People holding this view even found supporting evidence in the propaganda of the evildoers in the Northeast Army. This view is also incorrect because it completely denies the possibility of transforming the army to fight against the Japanese, blots out all the facts of its cooperation with the Red Army, and as a result, gives up efforts within the army.

The cause of these incorrect views is that these comrades are misled by transient phenomena and cannot see through the appearance to the essence. When they see some elements of the Northeast Army behave well, they think it is the same as the Red Army. When other elements behave badly, they think that it is totally unchangeable. These continually changing estimates make us unable to find determined working principles for the Northeast Army.

We must firmly implement the consistent policies of the party in the struggle against these incorrect views.

E.14 Report to the Conference of Activists Among the "Party Center" Ranks. *Zhang Guotao* (6 June 1936)⁸⁸

Comrades, first of all let us talk about two pieces of news. First, as everyone probably knows, the troops of the Thirty-second Army led by Comrade Luo Binghui and the front forces of the Sixth Army led by Comrades Xiao Ke and Wang Zhen came together at Jiawa [Lihua] the day before yesterday. (Warm applause.) The great convergence has become a fact. Now, our Second Army has already reached Ba'an, and all the main forces of the Second and Sixth Armies will only need two weeks at the most to reach the area of Zhanhua and Guanzi. This is a great

victory of the soviet movement and will open up the prospect for a greater victory. The commanders and soldiers of the whole army are extremely happy with the excellent news of the great convergence. Indeed, it deserves our great celebration.

It must be understood that while the convergence has become a fact, further heavy fighting tasks still await us. We must mobilize immediately to engage in the practical work of establishing a northwest anti-Japanese base. From this point of view, the meeting shows that we have been successful. To fulfill the present fighting tasks, we must continue to use the spirit of hard struggle in achieving the convergence and give greater play to class friendship and the extremely resolute determination to fight to the end for the creation of a northwest base. This will give our brothers in the Second and Sixth Armies the greatest political encouragement and will unite them into one giant force. Therefore, we must learn the experiences of struggle from each other to increase our fighting power. Further, we must mobilize large amounts of materials to support the Second and Sixth Armies and provide our brothers in the Second and Sixth Armies with great psychological comfort. This requires the mobilization of all commanders, soldiers, and staff members to spin woolen threads, weave clothes, and make shoes and socks, thus initiating greater enthusiasm for the support of the Second and Sixth Armies. It is imperative that no one should overlook the great significance of this work. This work is as important as a change on the battlefield!

The second piece of news worthy of celebration is that our party has reached complete unity not only politically but also organizationally. Last December, we adopted the resolution on the current national revolutionary upsurge and the party's tactical line in accordance with the Comintern's instructions.⁸⁹ The same resolution was also passed by other groups—the north Shaanxi group and the Second and Sixth Army Corps.⁹⁰ During this phase of development, all sections of the party were fighting very hard to realize the spirit of this resolution and achieved remarkable results. Recently, our relationship with the north Shaanxi group has also improved. We not only have unity in political line, but also can take unified action in terms of actual operations and military strategic policies. This is not only demonstrated by the meeting of the Second and Sixth Armies. The actions of the north Shaanxi group are also being coordinated with ours under unified strategic policies. This calls for big celebrations, and it is of tremendous importance for the soviet movement.

It may be recalled that last year when the First Front and the Fourth Front Armies left each other, the enemy was extremely pleased and even said that the CP was "approaching the end of its days." Naturally, this kind of rumor is no longer applicable. The CCP made many mistakes in the past, but it has corrected them through the daily struggle, and it has improved and perfected itself and understood how to overcome such past mistakes. It is not strange for the Chinese party to have internal disputes, because the Chinese proletariat is still immature, the environment of struggle is complex, and knowledge of Marxism and Leninism is relatively lacking. The internal disputes of the CP are entirely different from those within the

GMD. The GMD assassinates its own people and uses the most despicable and sordid schemes and methods. We will never do such things. There may be disputes within the CP, but we can find methods to unite and deal with the enemy jointly. Let the enemy laugh at us as it wishes. Only the one who laughs last laughs the longest. (Loud applause.)

Most comrades have probably read the resolution of the party's leading organs [25 December 1935]. Everyone should read this resolution carefully. It should not be regarded as a simple notice. In the resolution, we point out that we have achieved not only total political unity but also organizational unity. In other words, both sides agree to discontinue simultaneously use of the title "Party Center" and let the [CCP] Mission to the Comintern temporarily exercise the rights and functions of the Party Center. The Mission is headed by Comrade Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming], there are others. Comrade Lin Yuying and others from the Mission have returned to China. On the north Shaanxi side, there are eight CC and seven alternate members; on our side, there are seven CC and three alternate members. There are about twenty comrades in the Comintern Mission. Therefore, the north Shaanxi group is called the Northern Bureau and will direct the party and Red Army work in that area. In addition, of course, there are the Shanghai Bureau and the Northeast Bureau in the white areas, and we have established the Northwest Bureau. All these bureaus are under the leadership of the Comintern Mission. Under the guidance of this decision, we should oppose all those who try to distort it. Our decision is meant to unite the party and enable it to fight as one body for the new tactical line. This represents a major unity of principles and organization and is of enormous importance.

After the five battles and at the time of convergence between the First and Fourth Front Armies, we should have taken the opportunity to rest and reorganize and made great efforts to establish bases in the areas where the enemy's rule was weak. However, there were tendencies of reckless flightism, ideas of abandoning the work among minority nationalities, surrender to the enemy's strongholds, and various vacillations showing no confidence in creating bases. At that time, the solution of the pessimistic and disillusioned comrades was to take some troops and flee. Under the serious circumstances at that time, could we have waited for the Comintern or the Seventh Congress to solve the problems slowly? At that time, we could not hesitate and could only settle the problems by ourselves. The disputes at that time were of a political, principled, and strategic nature. They were correct disputes. Of course, under the new tactical line, these are past disputes. In the future, these disputes can be settled by using the party's Seventh Congress and the Comintern Mission. In principle, we oppose erroneous lines. This must continue.

Since the Shawa meeting [4-6 August 1935], we have been speaking openly. We have pointed out that some comrades at the Party Center, while they meant well, have committed serious mistakes in military affairs, line, and political matters. The consequences were the serious setbacks suffered in the five battles. Of course, from today's perspective, this is not a simple matter, but they represent mistakes of

closed-doorism. It was only in December last year, after the Comintern's instructions arrived, that the comrades in north Shaanxi agreed with this decision. The comrades in north Shaanxi showed that their actions accorded with the overall plan only after having the Comintern's instructions. Meanwhile, the determination of the ordinary commanders and soldiers in carrying out the arduous struggle also made new developments and victories possible for the north Shaanxi group. Of course, we did not overestimate these developments and victories either. However, this has shown that comrades in north Shaanxi have already been fighting resolutely for the implementation of the instructions. Our opposition to the erroneous line was correct. However, as the comrades in north Shaanxi have now returned to the Comintern's line, we should unite and fight the enemy. In the past, our opposition to flightism was based on principle. Now, for the sake of party unity and for principles, we may even make major concessions. Our ideological struggle is aimed at achieving party unity. Thus, there are also two sides to the party's ideological struggle. On the one hand, it is necessary to struggle against the erroneous line, while on the other hand, as far as is possible, we should seek party unity. We often have a mechanical view on this issue. It is incorrect to continue to struggle against comrades who committed past mistakes but who have changed. Now, as the comrades from north Shaanxi have changed and implemented faithfully the Comintern's instructions, we should work together and leave the past disputes for solution in the future. We are now completely in agreement with the Second and Sixth Armies and have also reached agreement with the comrades in north Shaanxi. The significance of this fact should be thoroughly understood by every comrade.

After achieving unity, unified leadership in military affairs remains the same and its organization remains the same as that established at the time of the union of the First and Fourth Front Armies. Comrade Zhu De is chairman of the Military Committee and the commander-in-chief; Comrade Zhang Guotao is vice-chairman of the Military Committee and chief political commissar. Comrade Chen Changhao is director of the General Political Department. Furthermore, three front armies have been organized. North Shaanxi forms the First Front Army with Comrade Peng Dehuai as commander-in-chief. The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first and Thirty-second Armies remain as the Fourth Front Army with Comrade Xu Xiangqian as commander-in-chief and Comrade Chen Changhao as political commissar. The First Front Army comprises Comrade Lin Biao's First Army and Comrade Xu Haidong's Fifteenth Army. As far as the north Shaanxi group is concerned, when it marched north, it used the banner of the Anti-Japanese Vanguard and did not appear to want to establish a military committee or a general political department. Now, we do not necessarily need to use the method of command. The method of mutual consultation can also be adopted. Some comrades may question this organization, in particular how to resolve the question of the First and Third Armies of the old First Front Army, which have gone to north Shaanxi leaving only the Fifth and Third Armies here. We should understand this problem in the following way. Originally, the Red Army was one entity with no artificial barriers. For example, the north

Shaanxi group has many troops belonging to the Fourth Front Army, while Comrade Xu Haidong's Fifteenth Army came from the E-Yu-Wan [Hubei-Henan-Anhui] area. It may be recalled that in the past when we arrived near Hanzhong, we asked them to lead the troops over to meet us. However, when they arrived in Shaanxi, we had already moved west. Therefore, Comrade Xu Haidong's troops combined with the Red Twenty-sixth Army of north Shaanxi to become the forces of the First Front Army. Now, the First Front Army has four divisions led by Comrade Peng Dehuai and two divisions led by Comrade Xu Haidong and many other guerrilla detachments. They are fighting excellent battles. We should analyze this matter from a Bolshevik viewpoint and should not be inhibited by the restrictions of the old front armies. Past shortcomings should be eliminated completely, and the spirit of mutual help, seeking progress, and unity must be promoted. This is absolutely necessary.

This is the significance of establishing front armies. If no one objects to it after its announcement, we will act in line with the new methods. The purpose is to achieve party unity and victories through military unification and to avoid other opinions during future union of forces. This deserves the attention of us all.

Now that we have achieved organizational unity, the task before us is to struggle for the establishment of an anti-Japanese base in the northwest.

We have mentioned above the union of the Second and Sixth Armies, party unity, the soviet regime and military affairs, and the need for a unified struggle against the current enemy and for the creation of an anti-Japanese base in the northwest. Now I would like to address the general political situation. This issue has been reported on by Comrade Zuo Ran, and I only want to add a few points.

[[The high tide of the Chinese revolution is increasing daily with the sharpening conflicts among the imperialist powers. The intensification of the Japanese annexation of China is also aimed at attacking the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's peace policy has improved its international position. However, the Soviet Union has had to change its previous policy and has joined the League of Nations, thus dividing the imperialist ranks into a minority (Italy, Germany, and Japan) that desires war and the rest (Britain and France) that desire peace. The Soviet Union has changed its defensive peace policy to an active peace policy. It has become more hard-line in its policy in the East and is ready to ally with the forces of the Chinese nation to oppose Japan.]]

At present, personages in Shanghai such as Song Qingling and He Xiangning⁹¹ have contacted many petty-bourgeoisie elements to propose an "alliance with the CP to oppose Japan" and an anti-Japanese movement to resist Japan and save the nation. They also run newspapers with a daily circulation of over 200,000 copies. Chiang Kai-shek suffers from enormous internal disputes. The question of a national boycott of Japanese goods has been raised. The general movement of uniting the Communists to oppose Japan is increasing every day. The forces of Chiang Kai-shek are further reduced, and the forces of the national revolution are growing all the time.

Since the current union between the Second and Sixth Armies, the quality of our fighting power has improved greatly. The union is a great victory. It is a great victory for north Shaanxi also. Party unity shows that the soviet movement has embarked on a new road of development. It is now proven that we have smashed the anticommunist united front and have successfully formed an anti-Japanese united front of alliance with the Communists. This is absolutely correct. Just as the Soviet Union dismantled the imperialist united front, China has likewise dismantled the anticommunist and pro-Japanese front of the reactionary classes and has established a united front against Japan and Chiang.

The increasing maturity of the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang front depends on turning the front to resist Japan and save the nation into a front against the traitorous front of Nanjing, and the increasingly decisive role of the Soviet Red Army.

Great events are before us. A revolutionary high tide ten times greater than the current one may soon arrive. Therefore, comrades must pay more attention to this issue. The creation of anti-Japanese bases is closely linked with the movement to resist Japan and oppose Chiang. This is linked to the contents of the new tactical line. The biggest shortcoming in the last debate was the inability to link the movement to resist Japan and oppose Chiang with the task of creating a base in the northwest.

What is the difference between this understanding and the past ones? In our actions, comrades have the viewpoint that the only thing that matters is fighting all those who do not raise the red banners—the reactionaries. Their understanding of the ordinary masses is that only genuine farmhands and poor and middle peasants are revolutionary. Therefore, as soon as one sees a big courtyard, one presumes that it belongs to a rich peasant. They think that discipline is only necessary at the time of confiscation and requisition. All Japanese officers above the level of battalion commander are regarded as reactionary, and soldiers are distinguished by when they joined the army. The same thing happens in expanding the Red Army. The first question is about occupation. Farmhands and poor peasants are all right. Letters concerning small merchants are sent to the General Political Department for its opinion. They are afraid that otherwise they might be criticized as rightists and find themselves in big trouble. Have these opinions disappeared completely? They continue to exist among soldiers and staff members. In creating an anti-Japanese base in the northwest and in our activities there, we must change these ideas and policies. We do not fight with all those we encounter, but should unite all anti-Japanese and Chiang elements to create a unified anti-Japanese base in the northwest. Even as far as the forces that determinedly fight against us are concerned, we attack only the chief traitors among them and propose an alliance with the anti-Japanese forces. Thus, it is essential to unite with all anti-Chiang troops and propose the suspension of the Civil War and gather together all anti-Japanese forces to hold a conference to resist Japan and save the nation. The slogans of general importance are “hold a conference to resist Japan and save the nation together with all anti-Japanese forces,” and “suspend the Civil War and together oppose the chief traitors.” More-

over, we need to form united anti-Japanese armies and grand associations or alliances to resist Japan and save the nation with various anti-Japanese social groups and individuals. Externally, we should unite with Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union; internally, we should put forward the program of ten major points. The objective is to unite all anti-Japanese forces in the common battle against the Japanese imperialists.

Judging from the above, we can discern great differences between this policy for action and that of the past.

In the past, we relied solely on our own forces to fight the enemy. Now our anti-Japanese political programs, handbills, posters of slogans, and diplomatic activities should be added to take advantage of various weaknesses in the enemy and to organize the united front against Japan and Chiang using the methods of maneuvering among various groups. In the fight against the enemy, this force is more important than planes and artillery. Naturally, it takes quite some time to grasp these tactics, but we must always be prepared.

We must bear in mind the major ten-point anti-Japanese program for use at all times. (This program is contained in the previous issue of Required Readings for Cadres [see **Doc. E.9**].)

Restudying the party's tactical line and learning how to apply this program is an urgent current task. There may be differences between north Shaanxi, the Second and Sixth Armies, and us. Yet, we are in total agreement on principles. In the future, we should gather information and materials to complement our own. The second article of the program is to confiscate the property of collaborators and traitors and redistribute it among the masses. Some comrades assume that it is unnecessary to raise the land question. Of course, this question should be decided in accordance with the conditions in the northwest. Naturally, it is still not a dispute over principles.

Is it possible for us to adopt these tactics? Yes. So long as we try hard to persuade the troops of Zhang Xueliang. "Why don't you fight against Japan and take back the northeast?" If we have done systematic and effective propaganda, no one can say that there is no hope at all. Similarly, we can also implore Wu Ma not to believe that the Japanese will not come to the northwest and explain that we still need to unite to fight Japan. To make good use of this weapon, we must oppose closed-doorism. No form of closed-doorism is right. We have to take a roundabout route and adopt various methods in the united front. This is necessary.

There may be a problem. In future developments, we may organize our own revolutionary committees and soviet regimes and unite with other anti-Japanese forces to form an anti-Japanese alliance. Lack of time may also mean that we have to develop immediately and must refer to all those who oppose Japan as anti-Japan. This is also a kind of development with which we have some experience. Regardless of the type of development, soviet policies comprise the new tactics. We are open to participation by the petty bourgeoisie and white army soldiers and should neutralize rich peasants. The confiscation policies are not aimed at people who are

willing to resist Japan and oppose Chiang, but are to help us create new soviet areas. The political program we propose is still new. We must adopt more lenient policies.

When we study these questions, we should not stop with principles, but promote their application in all areas, i.e., in various policies and in various aspects of the political regime. This is the most important issue.

E.15 Politburo Decision Concerning Zhang Guotao's Mistakes (31 March 1937)⁹²

After hearing the report by Comrade Zhang Guotao on the work of the Red Fourth Front Army and carefully examining various documents and materials of the Fourth Front Army, the Politburo holds the following views:

1) Comrade Zhang Guotao has committed many serious political mistakes of principle in leading the work of the E-Yu-Wan [Hubei-Henan-Anhui] Soviet area. Especially in the last period in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet, these have become mistakes in the entire political line. The high point of his right opportunist flightism and warlordism came between the withdrawal from the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet and to the establishment of a second Party Center. This opposed the party line and the Party Center.

2) Because of his right opportunist evaluation of the Chinese revolutionary situation (denial of the upsurge in the Chinese revolution and the theory of an interim period between the two upsurges), Comrade Zhang Guotao has overestimated the strength of the enemy (demonstrated by a total loss in front of the main forces of Chiang Kai-shek), underestimated our own forces (showing pessimism about the breakthrough of the encirclement of the main forces of the Red Army, and lack of confidence in the opposition to Japan by the people of the whole nation). The result is that he gave up confidence in the Red Army defeating the enemy in northwest China, in creating new soviet areas, and in enabling the soviet Red Army to become the leadership core of the national revolutionary war against Japan. Instead, he proposed an unlimited withdrawal to the remote areas of western China. This is the essence of Comrade Zhang Guotao's right opportunist line.

3) Comrade Zhang Guotao ignores the decisive role of the CCP in leading the victory of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, in his work, he neglects the party and the creation of the party's organizations at the local level. In the Red Army, he pays no attention to the establishment of the system of political commissars, political work, and the building up of the party's work. On the contrary, he concentrates all his energy on setting up a personal network. He considers the power of the military to be above the power of the party. His troops cannot be commanded by the Party Center. He has even gone as far as to use his armies to threaten the Party Center. He used military force to demand the reorganization of the Party Center. He openly

opposes the Party Center in the army. Finally, disregarding all orders of the Party Center, he moved south on his own accord, split the Red Army, and set up a second "Party Center," committing unprecedented crimes in the Chinese party and the Chinese soviet movement. During the merger with the Second Route Army, he tried to use arbitrary and deceptive methods, making the Second Front Army agree with his line and join him in opposing the Party Center. However, this attempt was completely frustrated by the resolute rejection by the leaders of the Second Front Army. He has neglected the establishment of the model of the Red Army in obeying discipline, souring the relationship between the Red Army and the masses. Within the Red Army, there still exist such bad warlord army traditions as beatings and abuse. This is the nature of Comrade Zhang Guotao's warlordism.

4) Comrade Zhang Guotao's flightism and warlordism are manifested in all departments. Regarding mass work, he fails to educate the masses politically, to inspire their enthusiasm, to organize and arm them. Instead he threatens the masses with his troops, thus isolating them from the masses. The Youth Leagues, the poor peasant leagues, the trade unions, and other mass organizations have absolutely no real work to do. Regarding the work of the soviet regime, he has not correctly implemented the land and economic policies, and he failed to set up a system of soviet representation or to practice soviet democracy. As for national minorities, he substitutes the policies of Han chauvinism for Leninist policies. In the struggle against counterrevolutionaries, his fears have replaced a clear class and mass line. He has been extremely negative toward work in the white areas, displaying no confidence in the party and in party organizations in the white areas. He uses unprincipled and factional methods to unite cadres, using his personal authority to oppose party authority. He has developed a patriarchal style inside the party, replacing Bolshevik ideological struggle and self-criticism with punishments and threats.

5) The southern move of Comrade Zhang Guotao is not only fundamentally wrong—opposing the party and the Party Center and splitting the Red Army—but is also a complete failure in itself. Despite the fact that the Fourth Front Army gained some tactical victories during its southern move through the hard struggle of the Red Army commanders, it was finally forced to abandon Tianquan and Lushan and moved into the depths of Xikang. The Red Army suffered great losses. The southern move further removed the Red Army from the front of resisting Japan and weakened the Red Army's influence throughout the country and the forces promoting the speedy establishment of a national united front against Japan. Therefore, the Chinese revolution also suffered.

6) Comrade Zhang Guotao verbally accepted the Party Center's resolution of December [1935, see **Doc. E.8**], then abolished the second Party Center and led the Fourth Front Army north, and finally merged with the Party Center. In this way, he moved toward the Party Center's line. However, it must be pointed out that the forces motivating Comrade Zhang Guotao's progress were the victory of the Party Center's line, the patient persuasion of the Party Center, the objective situation at that time, the demands of the broad ranks of Red Army commanders and soldiers,

the pressure of the Second Front Army, and some leading comrades' resolute support of the Party Center and opposition to his mistakes. Comrade Zhang Guotao has always been hesitant toward union with the Party Center in the north. He does not understand the correctness of the Party Center's line. The main reason for the West Route Army's advance to north Gansu and its serious defeat was the failure to overcome the Zhang Guotao line.

7) The Party Center must point out that the Zhang Guotao line is a manifestation of peasant narrow-mindedness, the destruction of the lumpen proletariat, and the thinking of the Chinese feudal warlords within the political party of the proletariat. After a long period of deviation from the Party Center's correct leadership and activities in the economically backward countryside, Comrade Zhang Guotao can neither lead the peasant masses with proletarian Marxism and Leninism and the organizational force of the proletariat, nor reform the lumpen proletariat and raise it to his own level and overcome the warlord mentality. On the contrary, he became their captive and rejected on his own initiative the leadership of proletarian ideology. This mistake of Comrade Zhang Guotao should be a serious lesson for the whole party. This lesson points out once again that without the leadership of Marxism and Leninism, the vanguard of the proletariat, neither the national revolution nor the rural revolution can succeed completely. This lesson has also made us realize clearly that the Zhang Guotao line is closely linked with his Chen Duxiuist mistakes (a manifestation of national bourgeois ideology in the proletarian party) during the period of the Great Revolution.

8) The Party Center expresses its deep respect for the cadres of the Fourth Front Army under the leadership of Comrade Guotao who have been hardworking; feared no sacrifice, danger, or obstacle; and fought heroically, strenuously, and with dedication for the cause of the soviet regime. The Party Center feels greatly relieved and happy at the great progress and correct understanding of the Zhang Guotao line by the cadres of the Fourth Front Army under the direct leadership of the Party Center. Comrade Zhang Guotao should be held most responsible for the past mistakes of the Fourth Front Army. All deliberate interpretations of the struggle against Zhang Guotaoism as a struggle against all cadres in the Fourth Front Army, and all the attempts and conspiracies to bring the cadres of the Fourth Front Army into opposition to the Party Center, must be seriously dealt with. The cadres of the Fourth Front Army are cadres of the Party Center and are not Zhang Guotao's personal cadres. The Party Center calls on the Fourth Front Army and comrades throughout the Red Army to unite as one around the Party Center in the struggle against the Zhang Guotao line and to accomplish the great current tasks of the party.

9) Furthermore, the Party Center calls on the comrades of the whole party to wage a resolute struggle against the Zhang Guotao line. In this struggle, the comrades of the whole party should be taught that under all conditions, resolutely and unswervingly, they should strive for the Bolshevik line. Only the victory of the Comintern and Party Center line can guide the Chinese revolution to its thorough and final victory. After evaluating the seriousness of the mistakes of Comrade

Zhang Guotao and at the same time his history in the party, and with the beginning of his serious understanding of his own mistakes and his statement of absolute loyalty to the party line in the future, the Party Center holds that an organizational resolution by the party should not be made at the present time. This will give Comrade Zhang Guotao and the few resolute followers of the Guotao line an opportunity to carry out thorough self-criticism, expose and struggle with their own mistakes, and prove themselves in practical work.

E.16 Earnest Letter to the Chinese People.
Zhang Guotao (6 May 1938)⁹³

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, the country has faced difficulties every step of the way. Enlightened people have all realized that to prevent subjugation and strive for survival requires the unity of the entire nation, solidarity in good faith, and total resistance. This is the only way to save the situation. The most important condition for attaining this objective is a drastic increase in the national consciousness and the spirit of sacrifice. After I arrived in Xi'an from Fushi [Yan'an] in early April, I read the declaration and the programs of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction by the GMD's extraordinary National Congress⁹⁴ and felt that they most certainly meet the urgent needs of the country and the nation. Their sincerity in calling on the people of the whole country to wage a common struggle was repeatedly evident in their words and expressions. I was deeply touched. Therefore, I left Shaanxi for Hankou, Hebei, for discussions with various responsible persons from the CCP in order to make more and better efforts in the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. I did not expect that before the discussions were over the Party Center would expel me from the party and manufacture various rumors (for example, alleging that I had demonstrated no confidence in the anti-Japanese national united front, abandoned hope in the Chinese revolution, and engaged in sabotaging the anti-Japanese unity). At that time, I made a short statement of my political opinions; the four main points are as follows:

1) I have always had a resolute determination to persist in the War of Resistance and have complete confidence in its final victory. I have never faltered in the belief that the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction will have a bright future. I am ready to contribute all I have to work for the national cause.

2) At this crucial moment of the national crisis, I believe that the nation's interests are above everything else.

3) The Three Principles of the People are necessary for China today; the GMD is the leading core in the great cause of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. Mr. Chiang [Kai-shek] is the supreme and sole leader of the whole country. These three points are also accepted by the CCP. The CCP's proposed policy

for an anti-Japanese united front naturally represents progress by the Party Center. I have also expressed support for this policy, but I feel deeply that it remains insufficient. Therefore, I proposed that the Party Center should make an immediate and more sincere response to the declaration and the Program for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction adopted by the National Congress of the GMD. This would improve the solidarity and strengthen the resistance and National Reconstruction.

4) I wish to conduct most sincere discussions with the various members of the Party Center on the above proposals. If the proposals are not accepted, I still hope that colleagues in the CCP will give them serious consideration in the future.

In my opinion, the above short statement is not incompatible with the current political facts. Recently, the responsible persons of the Wuhan CP have published letters attacking my opinions and actions. In sum, their arguments display nothing but contempt for the truth; they insist on their own views and even fabricate facts and create confusion to suppress political discussion and protect their factional interests. This fully shows that various responsible persons in the CCP have not given the necessary respect owed to members of a modern party and they have ignored political ethics. I deeply regret this fact.

At this crucial moment in the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction, I believe it is necessary for all political soldiers to abandon their past prejudices and rectify their political ideals under the principle of putting the national interest first. People throughout the country should stand closely together to complete the great cause of national reconstruction. On the basis of these opinions, I would like to outline briefly the political differences between the CCP and myself and the disputes derived therefrom for the reference of friends, enlightened personages, and members of the CCP.

A general examination of the CCP's political line is too broad a subject to be dealt with here in depth. I shall only address the basic views on the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. This is needed by the whole nation at present. I am convinced that the occurrence and development of policy mistakes by the CCP are not at all accidental and that the continuation of these mistakes has not ended even today. This is the main reason why I do not wish to work for it.

As a rule, the political line of the CCP has revolved around an erroneous axis. The structure of this erroneous axis is founded on the points outlined briefly below.

First, China has always been an economically backward country suffering from imperialist aggression. The scattered agriculture is the backbone of the national economy, and the proportion to it of pure national industry is relatively small. Therefore, the task of the revolution is to eliminate feudal remnants, rectify land relationships, and accomplish national reunification and externally abolish imperialist economic and political privileges inside China, win territorial sovereignty and integrity, and complete political and economic independence. This should be the main substance of the national revolution. Mr. Sun Yat-sen and Joffe⁹⁵ stated very clearly in their joint declaration, "Dr. Sun is of the opinion that because of the

nonexistence of conditions favorable to their successful application in China, it is not possible to carry out either communism or even the soviet system in China. M. Joffe agrees entirely with this view; he is further of the opinion that China's most important and pressing problems are the completion of national unification and the attainment of full national independence." Generally speaking, the nature of the Chinese revolution is a national revolution by all the people. Its tasks are unification internally and independence externally. The motive force of the revolution are urban dwellers, small landlords, and self-employed farmers. These strata actively oppose aggression and do not represent the feudal forces that hinder unification. Therefore, apart from the old forces of feudalism, the broad masses are the active participants and supporters of this revolution.

The CCP, although it has observed this basic fact, has not understood it properly. Thus, it often substitutes its rash subjective illusions for objective conditions in interpreting Chinese social development. It mechanically believes that those in the democratic revolution should only copy the model of the October Revolution of the Soviet Union. What is even more erroneous is its lack of understanding of the objective revolutionary situation and the many policy mistakes that result from this. This has caused excessive frustration among the broad revolutionary forces. This mistake lasted until the seriousness of the national crisis of 18 September [1931] became evident. Up until now, it still has not corrected the mistakes inside and outside of the party.

The consistent goal of the unification movement led by the GMD is opposition to feudal rule. This is the precondition for the whole nation to deal with the external enemies. The movement should be regarded as a progressive revolutionary step. Ignorant of its significance, the CCP has in a hasty and farfetched manner linked class struggle with national liberation and has stressed the argument that the further class struggle develops, the more likely is the success of national liberation. Everywhere, the CCP has used class interests to negate national interests. Its basic views that contradict the nationalist revolution have been proved to be mistaken in both theory and practice.

Second, the above illustrates the CCP's incorrect understanding of the theory of nationalist revolution. Based on such opinions, the CCP's understanding of the GMD is also very incorrect. In the early days, the CCP held that the Three Principles of the People represented a reactionary system of thought and that the GMD was a political party that only represented the landlords and the capitalist class. Next, it believed that the GMD was a fascist faction and that the nationalist government was a pro-Japanese traitor government. In terms of the nature of the Three Principles of the People, the composition of the GMD, and the past policies of the national government and Mr. Chiang, all these evaluations are obviously incorrect. In fact, the GMD has inherited the excellent traditions of Chinese revolutionary history, overthrown the Manchurian dictatorial government, founded the Republic of China, and gradually completed the task of unifying China in the wake of the Northern Expedition. Now it is shouldering the heavy responsibility of the War of

Resistance and National Reconstruction. In this War of Resistance, the entire nation has struggled together as never before in Chinese history. Over 500,000 officers and soldiers have sacrificed their lives, and people are still increasing their efforts. These obvious facts show that no one can deny the success of Mr. Chiang's leadership and the GMD's full revolutionary spirit. Furthermore, Mr. Chiang is the commonly recognized supreme leader of the whole nation. At a time of national crisis and danger, he has taken on the heavy responsibility of national salvation and has served the country loyally, thus winning admiration within and outside of China. No compatriot should use some minor issue as a pretext and try to find fault to promote self-interest. Therefore, the erroneous opinion that the GMD has two faces—revolutionary during the current War of Resistance and nonrevolutionary after victory—not only denies the brilliant revolutionary prospect opened up by victory in the War of Resistance, but also is severely harmful to the ongoing great task of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. This is predictable.

Third, the CCP's erroneous judgment on the Chinese revolution and its obstinate prejudice against the GMD and its leaders who follow the Three Principles of the People have produced a number of mistakes in its general tactical line. And the organizational weaknesses and degradation of the CCP itself have been fully exposed since it followed this erroneous line.

A specific manifestation of the CCP's line is its struggle to compete for leadership regardless of the objective needs of the revolution. Since 1927, the CCP has put forward the slogan of a soviet regime, using the uprising tactic of encircling the cities with the countryside and seeking so-called initial victory in one or more provinces. Over the past ten years, it has been proved that the so-called soviet slogan runs completely counter to the interests of the nation. As far as the CP's organizations are concerned, they have already withdrawn from the industrial areas and moved to remote areas, thus losing the mass basis that they could have had. It has undergone a qualitative change. It is no longer a so-called proletarian political party, but a petty bourgeoisie group with the peasantry as its majority. It is constantly engaged in military conspiracies and uprisings in a protracted struggle against internal unification and resistance to the external enemy.

Fourth, since the beginning of the War of Resistance, all the Chinese people have urgently demanded absolute solidarity and joint resistance to Japan. The CCP proposed an anti-Japanese national united front, changed the form of the Red Army, abolished the soviet governments, ceased the rural revolution, and pledged obedience to the orders of the central government. However, it continues with its old mistaken thinking, persists in its factionalism, and strictly protects its small group interests, thus weakening the sacred task of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. From the CCP's intransigent viewpoint, the anti-Japanese national united front is a temporary alliance of two or more different political organizations that represent different class interests in light of their different social bases. "The GMD is a political party representing landlords and capitalists, whereas the CCP is a political party representing the proletariat." The interests of the two are mutually

exclusive. Herein lie the seeds for a repetition of history. Recently, we have heard the CCP's propaganda talk about "common leadership, common responsibility, common development, common program," etc. These are nothing but the old ideas of seeking leadership with no farsightedness and express the spirit of regarding the protection of the national interest as one's own. The real objectives are to preserve effective forces and maintain the special status of the border governments and some guerrilla zones so as to boost the development of its own forces. Cooperation for the War of Resistance is merely a propaganda means to reach this goal. According to the CCP, the so-called national united front should exclude and suppress all anti-Japanese elements who hold different views. The so-called cooperation means that it can spread false propaganda at will in the areas under the control of the central government. Yet the north Shaanxi border regions are more restrictive than the foreign concessions. Don't these actions show that they think that they can deceive everybody? I humbly advise various responsible persons in the CCP that if they acknowledge the supremacy of the national interest over everything else, the seriousness of the present national crisis and the necessity of a War of Resistance and National Reconstruction, they should give up these prejudices and actions and be open and aboveboard with the nation's people. It is not too late to mend their ways.

Based on the above analysis, and proceeding from the basic situation of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction, I wish to make the following proposals for my colleagues to consider.

First, the CCP colleagues must, under the principle of the supremacy of national interest, genuinely support the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction led by Mr. Chiang, practice the Three Principles of the People without reservation, act according to their words, and prohibit all propaganda and organization that contradicts these principles. Proceeding from this stand, the CCP colleagues must voluntarily get rid of factional opinions, eliminate barriers, and march forward with the GMD members under the leadership of Mr. Chiang.

Second, under all circumstances, the government and the armed forces must be completely unified. The Eighth Route Army has fought heroically against the enemy and has won the deep appreciation of the nation's people. However, it is hoped that the CCP colleagues will give up the idea of the "united anti-Japanese army" and nationalize the Eighth Route Army. This will increase the strength of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction and eliminate all unnecessary worries. In the process of merging, the exchange of experiences will greatly benefit the forces in the War of Resistance. The border regions should not be treated as CCP bases but made a special region. Moreover, these regions should not follow the example of warlord rule promulgating its own laws, tightly closing the border, and excluding dissidents. In a word, the border governments have outlived their usefulness, and their political power should be returned to the central government in order to win the confidence of the people of the whole country. The guerrilla areas under the CCP should also follow the orders of the central government and give full play to its role in the War of Resistance.

Third, in light of the state of the nation, we must carry out the foreign policy of the central government.

The above three points constitute the concrete elements of my previous statement on "further solidarity in good faith." I have deep historical ties with the CCP. The experiences and lessons of the past twenty years have made me understand deeply the inappropriateness of the CCP's policies. Especially since the beginning of the War of Resistance, I have been even more unwilling to sit and watch the continued existence of these erroneous policies. It may be recalled in particular that when the First Front Army, led by Mao Zedong, and the Fourth Front army, led by me, met in west Sichuan in 1935, there were different opinions. Mao Zedong and others evaluated the Long March as a success and proposed to move north into Shaanxi; form a base in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and reestablish the so-called central government of the Soviet Republic of China. At that time, I felt that the Long March was a failure and that the prospect for an initial victory in one or more provinces had long passed. I felt that first I should seek a ceasefire with the troops of the central government in the areas of west Sichuan, in the Xikang region, and in northwest Gansu so as to reactivate the policy of uniting to resist Japan. Because of an inability to compromise, the CCP split. The Comintern decision for an anti-Japanese united front in December 1935 gradually reduced these disputes. This made an eventual merger between the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies in north Shaanxi possible.

I arrived in north Shaanxi exactly ten days before the Xi'an Incident. The Incident was a result of the CCP's propaganda to "resist Japan and oppose Chiang." It was essentially a military conspiracy. I had not heard about it beforehand. After the Xi'an Incident, responsible CCP figures made emotional proposals; there were some who were especially emotional. The facts are obvious and can be verified. Afterward, I and other CCP responsible persons all supported the policy of peace. The policy of the anti-Japanese national united front brought my views and those of Mao Zedong and others closer together. This is a fact and can be verified in the published CCP documents. The statement that I strongly proposed civil war at that time is an out-and-out lie with ulterior motives. I expressed total support at that time, in principle, for the policy of an anti-Japanese national united front, but believed that only a more thorough implementation could save the nation from destruction. Therefore, I thought that CCP implementation at that time was inadequate.

The policy of the united front enabled the viewpoints of Mao Zedong and others and me to become closer. However, I was very dissatisfied with Mao Zedong's implementation of this policy, which still includes deep-rooted prejudices and insincerity. Especially since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Mao Zedong and others' spirit of monopolizing decision-making power, establishing factions, and ignoring national interest have been the causes for many disputes between me and them. Therefore, my resolute decision to leave Yan'an for Wuhan at that time was entirely based on a strong determination to seek a common solution to the national

disaster and is an open and aboveboard action. It should not be subject to suspicion by CCP colleagues. However, without a serious investigation, the responsible persons of the CCP have launched wanton attacks and reckless slander on my positive move this time to participate in the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. They have engaged in a nonpolitical and self-centered propaganda-laden conspiracies and frame-ups merely in order to suppress criticism within the party and to express hostility to all those who support the leadership of the central government and endeavor to participate in the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. All this shows that the CCP is insincere about unity in the War of Resistance. Regarding the various illegal attempts to kidnap me, they are the unreasonable acts of Chen [Shaoyu—Wang Ming], Zhou [Enlai], Qin [Bangxian—Bo Gu], and a handful of other people. Enlightened people can pass their own judgment; it is not worthy of further comment.

In sum, as I came of age and saw the great dangers in the national situation, I have been fighting to save the country regardless of the costs. I have devoted twenty years to the revolution. Naturally, I have some marginal responsibility for the failure to prevent the formation of CCP policies in a timely way. However, my words and deeds are there for all people to see. My actions are guided by pure patriotic motives. My sincere and courageous viewpoints are intended to protect the CCP colleagues and the Chinese revolution. It is my great hope that people will gain a clear understanding. It is my even greater hope that the CCP colleagues may, in a spirit of self-criticism, abandon the bad habit of covering up their errors and come to see the truth, so as to correct the mistakes in the current general policies. To strive for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction under the principle of national interest is the great cause of the Chinese revolution. The speedy completion of this cause will bring not only personal happiness but also happiness for the whole nation.

E.17 Resolution of the CC Concerning the New Situation of Resistance to Japan and the National Salvation Movement and the Democratic Republic (17 September 1936)⁹⁶

1) Ever since it plotted to separate north China from the rest of the country last year, Japanese imperialism has not suspended its aggression against China for a moment. No matter how the form of its aggression varies in line with the changing situation, its basic policy to occupy China remains unchanged. After sending troops into north China, Japanese imperialism struck a high tone talking about “economic assistance,” whereas in fact, it is an attempt to consolidate its position by means of economic aggression and lay down a foundation for a new attack. The fact that more armed forces have been moved to Beijing, Tianjin, and north Chahar: attacks

have been staged in east Suiyuan and that there have been provocations in Chengdu, Beihai, Haikou, Shanghai, Fengtai, and other places indicates that the Japanese invaders are preparing to begin further aggression. The nation is in an increasingly dangerous situation. This means that safeguarding north China, northwest China, and the whole rest of China and the recovery of the lost territory and driving out Japanese imperialism are the tasks of China's national revolution. This is a task that weighs heavily on the revolutionary parties and the whole nation.

2) Last year's expansion of the nationwide anti-Japanese movement to save the nation from extinction and the beginning of the anti-Japanese united front have delivered telling blows to the aggressive schemes of the Japanese invaders and temporarily checked the implementation of its plan to set up a north China state and a "anti-Communist united front." This is the victory of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese struggle over the past year. It has developed widely, and its power is not so strong, and thus the anti-Japanese united front of all political parties and groups and military units is still in its initial stage. The biggest political party—the GMD—and the army under its leadership have not yet joined this front. Overall, the GMD's policies have not changed. As a result, to date a national revolutionary war has not been launched and we have not stopped the Japanese invaders from pushing ahead with their aggression. Neither have we been able to protect China's sovereignty. On the contrary, the enemy has consolidated its position in north China and seized part of China's territory and is preparing for new attacks. All this shows that Japanese imperialism can be defeated, but joint efforts by all political parties, groups, armies, and all sectors must wage concerted actions and bitter struggles.

3) With Japanese imperialism's increasing aggression, the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese people to save the nation has entered a new stage. This is reflected in the high tide of the movement supported by the broad masses of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeois elements. The ideas of the CCP, the soviets, and the Red Army are appreciated by the people. The major forces of the Red Army have gathered at the battlefronts in the northwest, and part of the national bourgeoisie has turned toward the anti-Japanese front; anti-Japanese feelings are growing daily among most GMD officers and soldiers. This has caused waverings and splits in the GMD and the Nanjing government. The domestic and foreign policies of the GMD Nanjing government are uncertain, their statements and actions are contradictory, and they hold a different opinion from other parties and groups on the anti-Japanese question. All this clearly shows that they are at a crossroads. Therefore, with the continuous attacks of the Japanese invaders, the upsurge in the anti-Japanese movement for national salvation, and the changes in the international situation, it is most likely that the GMD government will eventually end its vacillating position and join the anti-Japanese movement.

4) To draw together nationwide forces to oppose the Japanese invasion and to drive the Japanese invaders out of China, we must not only mobilize more of the public and all real revolutionaries and arouse the resolute elements, but also try to win over as many as possible of those people from the ruling class to the anti-Japanese

struggle. This will enlarge the anti-Japanese united front and reinforce our own ranks. Pushing the GMD Nanjing government and its troops onto the road of the anti-Japanese struggle is a prerequisite for waging a nationwide large-scale armed struggle against Japan. However, this does not in the least mean that we should relax our criticism and struggle against the GMD Nanjing government and its erroneous policies, which are counter to the nation's interests. Only in this way can we enable the anti-Japanese tendency within the GMD Nanjing government to develop day by day, to expand its efforts, to overcome its vacillation, and to defeat those who are close to Japan. This will put them on the great road of the anti-Japanese struggle for national salvation. The CC must stress that while carrying out the struggle under the most comprehensive anti-Japanese united front, the CP must not only wage a serious struggle against all its enemies, overt and covert, but also retain its freedom to criticize anti-Japanese elements who support the struggle in words but show reluctance in deeds. At the same time, the CCP appreciates any anti-Japanese mobilization even if it is only partial. However, it is of the utmost importance to adopt all means to promote a large-scale nationwide anti-Japanese movement as early as possible. To this end, the CCP should uphold its slogan "Stop the Civil War and unite to fight Japan."

5) The Party Center holds that under current conditions, it is necessary to put forward the slogan of establishing a democratic republic. This is the best way to protect the integrity of China's territory and the Chinese people by uniting all anti-Japanese forces. It is also the most appropriate slogan for the united front, which is created on the basis of the demand for democracy by the broad masses of people. This kind of democracy is more universal in areas under the soviet system and is more progressive than in the major part of the country, which is under the GMD's unitary rule. This is a guarantee for a broader mobilization for the anti-Japanese movement and its complete victory. Only a democratic republic can involve the broad masses in political life and raise their consciousness and organizing capability. In addition, it provides a stage for the Chinese proletariat and its political party, the CCP, to launch various activities and struggles for the future victory of socialism. On this basis, the CCP announces that it gives active support to the movement for the establishment of a democratic republic and that after the republic comes into being throughout the country, the soviet areas would constitute an integral part of it. A national congress should be held to which the soviet areas would send representatives. The soviet areas will practice the same system of democracy.

6) The Party Center emphasized that only by keeping up the nationwide anti-Japanese drive; by expanding further the anti-Japanese united front between all parties, groups, sectors, and armies; and by the soviets and the Red Army struggling resolutely against all statements and actions that decrease state sovereignty and weaken the united front can we urge the GMD Nanjing government to become anti-Japanese and to prepare for the founding of a democratic republic. Without a bitter protracted war, a full mobilization of the people, and a revolutionary upsurge, the democratic republic can only remain a statement on paper. In the course of

struggling for the realization of this goal, the CCP should begin the democratic republic with the ten principles for resistance to Japan and national salvation. These basic tasks are fulfilled by the Chinese democratic bourgeoisie.

7) In broad outline, the political line set out in the Politburo resolution of December 1935 is correct [see **Doc. E.8**]. In line with this, the party has achieved much in the last six months or so. This is mainly because of the consolidation of the soviet Red Army, the party's increased political influence and improvement in its work with other parties, groups, sectors, and armies concerning the united front. These achievements should have laid a good foundation for future work. It must be pointed out, however, that a great many party organizations are not good at applying the policies of the united front. It requires great skill to contact different peoples, political groups, associations, troops, classes, and strata and to consult and negotiate with them according to the specific conditions and needs under the general policy on the anti-Japanese struggle for national salvation. This is necessary so that specific programs; local, temporary, or permanent; written or verbal, can be concluded. In this joint struggle to implement these programs, we must lead and organize them and turn to the highest form of the anti-Japanese united front—an anti-Japanese national conference (or national defense conference), a government of national defense, a united anti-Japanese army, or even a democratic republic. Many of our party organizations are not good at doing this and are simply satisfied with a general call to form a united front and with the activities of a few advanced members. They deal with various specific problems in absolute, inflexible, and mechanical ways. Yet where conditions do not allow a united front to be set up at the present time, they appear to be reluctant or not enthusiastic enough to uphold the principle that "CP members must work independently to educate, mobilize, and organize the broad masses in the spirit of communism." These shortcomings are the major subjective reasons why to date the anti-Japanese united front has not won over millions of participants.

8) In the opinion of the Party Center, the idea that mobilization for class struggle would affect the national united front must be corrected. The victory of the national revolution cannot be gained by a small number of people in the upper stratum of society. Without admitting thousands of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie elements to the anti-Japanese united front, strong anti-Japanese forces cannot be formed; nor can the vacillating senior figures be pushed and forced onto the correct path of resisting Japan; nor can a democratic republic be set up. In this respect, the key to settling problems with the livelihood and participation in the united front of workers and peasants and the petty bourgeoisie is leading them in their daily economic and political struggles. In leading such routine economic and political struggles, CP members must also apply the policies of the united front to attract the majority of the masses to their struggle. Also, according to the level of the consciousness and organizing ability of the masses, efforts must be made to intensify their general struggle so as to turn them into forces for the further expansion of and the solid base for the anti-Japanese united front.

9) While establishing the anti-Japanese united front and a democratic republic, the forces of the soviet Red Army must not be weakened. The government for national defense and the united anti-Japanese troops under the united front will be established in accordance with political and military agreements with other powers and armed forces. Both parties to the agreement should place themselves under the command of the government for national defense and the united anti-Japanese troops. However, the independence of the soviet Red Army in terms of organization and leadership must not be eliminated. Full attention must be paid to the expansion and consolidation of the Red Army; it is wrong to admit into the Red Army students and officers dismissed from other troops because this would undermine the unity of the Red Army. We must also be careful with leading figures in the soviet. It is wrong to allow the bourgeoisie to participate in the political and economic management of the soviet area because this could undermine the soviet organization from within. Even after the establishment of the democratic republic, the CP should not give up its absolute leadership over the people of the soviet area and its original troops. On the contrary, while leading the people of the whole country in the anti-Japanese struggle and in the general economic struggle, the party must continue to expand and reinforce its political and military forces, ensure the complete victory of the anti-Japanese struggle and set up a democratic republic, and strive for the fulfillment of a socialist future.

10) We must expand and consolidate the CP to ensure its organizational independence and its internal unity. This is the most fundamental condition for the final victory of the national united front and the democratic republic. Therefore, in the soviet areas and especially in the nonsoviet areas, we must recruit party members in a systematic way. We must avoid wide-scale recruitment, and only those workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals who have been tested should be allowed to join the party. In this sense, the Party Center's December resolution [1935] was incorrect when it stated that "all who are willing to fight for the CP's positions regardless of their class origins may join the CP" and "The party should not fear infiltration by some opportunists" [see above, **Doc. E.8**]. Party organizations at various levels must adopt appropriate and practical ways to train their own cadres. Qualified cadres who can work independently are decisive in carrying out the party political line both in the soviet and nonsoviet areas. Thousands of party members must be mobilized to go among the organized and unorganized masses to unite them around us and establish effective links both overt and covert. This is the most pressing task facing the CP in fulfilling the great political tasks of the anti-Japanese united front. While expanding the united front and struggling for the establishment of a democratic republic, we must rectify rightist tendencies such as neglecting the party's political and organizational independence, consolidating the soviet and the Red Army, leading the routine economic and political struggles of the broad masses at the grass roots and not adequately criticizing our allies. At present, however, "left" closed-doorism is still the major danger in implementing the policies of the anti-Japanese united front. The correct development of ideological struggle within the party is a powerful weapon for fulfilling all the party's political tasks.

E.18 Circular Telegram of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet and the CCP CC Concerning the Xi'an Incident (19 December 1936)⁹⁷

Respected Messrs. Kong Yongzhi (Xiangxi), Sun Zhesheng (Ke), Feng Huanzhang (Yuxiang), Chen Lifu, and others in Nanjing and all the gentlemen of the GMD and the Nationalist government; respected Messrs. Zhang Hanqing (Xueliang), Yang Hucheng, Wang Dingfang (Yizhe), Sun Weiru, and all the gentlemen of the Interim Northwestern Military Committee of the United Anti-Japanese Army:

Since Xi'an put forward an anti-Japanese program, the whole country has been shaken and Nanjing's policy of "putting the house in order before resisting the outsiders" can no longer continue. In all fairness, the patriotic enthusiasm of all the gentlemen from Xi'an takes precedence, and they should stand up and resist Japan. However, the pace of the gentlemen from Nanjing has been rather slow. Apart from the pro-Japanese elements, there are patriots who do not desire civil war. In the present situation, there is no other way to survive than to resist Japan. There is no other way to save the country than to unite. Continuing the Civil War will only hasten our doom. At the crossroads of peril and survival, our party and government wish to make the following suggestions to both sides.

1) The armies of both sides should consider Tongguan as a temporary boundary. Nanjing's armies should refrain from attacking Tongguan, and the Xi'an anti-Japanese army should temporarily halt in the territories of Shaanxi-Gansu and wait for the peace conference to resolve the issue.

2) Nanjing should convene a peace conference immediately. Apart from the representatives of various parties in Nanjing and Xi'an, Nanjing should also notify all parties, groups, social strata, and armies to select representatives to participate in the conference. Our party and government are also prepared to send representatives.

3) Before the peace conference, all parties, groups, social strata, and armies may present draft resolutions on resistance to Japan and salvation and discuss the issue of making arrangements for Mr. Chiang Kai-shek. However, the basic program should be to unite the whole country, oppose all civil war, and resist Japan together.

4) The venue of the meeting is tentatively set as Nanjing. The above proposals are reasonable and effective methods for solving the current crisis. It is hoped that the gentlemen in Nanjing will lay down national policies immediately so as to prevent the Japanese bandits from sneaking in at this time of national confusion! It is also hoped that the people of the whole country and all parties and groups will urge the authorities to convene a peace conference to discuss the formation of national policy and to confront the national disaster together.

The Central Government of Chinese Soviets
CCP CC

E.19 Telegram from the Party Center to Zhou Enlai Concerning a Peaceful Resolution to the Xi'an Incident (21 December 1936)⁹⁸

Comrade Enlai: (a) At present, we face a situation in which Japan and the Nanjing rightist faction are united and plan to seize Chiang Kai-shek's moderate faction and create anarchy. Nanjing and the left factions in each area are thinking of reconciliation. Furthermore, the moderate faction is wavering. (b) We have linked strategy with Xi'an, deciding to support the left faction and to struggle to win the support of the moderates and bring about the downfall of the rightists. We must turn the Civil War into a war of resistance against Japan. (c) We will request Zhang [Xueliang] and Yang [Hucheng] to discuss the immediate adoption of the following measures: (1) seek open negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Cheng, etc., to establish peace on the following basis: (i) increase the number of leaders of the anti-Japanese movement in the Nanjing government, expel the pro-Japanese faction, and carry out initial reforms. (ii) Destroy the power of He Yingqin et al., stop the Civil War, have the warlord armies retreat from Shanxi and Gansu, and acknowledge the Xi'an anti-Japanese army. (iii) Guarantee democratic rights. (iv) Stop the policy of fighting the CP, and unite with the Red Army to resist Japan. (v) Establish cooperative relations with countries sympathetic to China's anti-Japanese movement. (vi) If the conditions are satisfied, Chiang Kai-shek has a good chance of regaining his freedom. Moreover, fulfillment of these conditions will promote Chinese unity and a unified anti-Japanese resistance. (2) We will hold negotiations based on these conditions with Yan Xishan, Song Ziwen, Yu Youren and the Whampoa leftists, and the Chen brothers' faction.⁹⁹ (3) We should express our willingness to consider Yan Xishan's proposal to move Chiang Kai-shek to Shanxi. (4) We invite to Xi'an those who are willing to come and join peace negotiations with us. (5) We invite the British and American advisors to come to Xi'an again, and through them seek to secure British and American support for peace. (6) We must stabilize the Xi'an military base in order to secure its future use while we await the success of political negotiations. (7) We will hold discussions with Shaan-Gan Whampoa military officials: Hu Zongnan, Fan Gaopu, Dong Zhao, et al. (8) Zhou Enlai should, in the name of the CP, openly carry out negotiations based on the above conditions with Chiang, Chen, Song, Yan, Yu, et al., to mediate between the two parties.

Central Secretariat

E.20 The Party Center's Directive Concerning Propaganda Guidelines for the Xi'an Incident (7 January 1937)¹⁰⁰

The guidelines for propaganda concerning the Xi'an Incident are as follows:

- 1) The Xi'an Incident is an internal matter of the GMD Nanjing government.

Our party took absolutely no part in it. However, after the Incident occurred, our party immediately published a telegram proposing a peaceful solution [see above **Doc. E.18**].

2) Our party opposes all actions that could lead to civil war. Therefore, on the one hand, it opposes Nanjing's Civil War policy of suppressing the Communists while, on the other hand, it has not expressed support for Zhang [Xueliang] and Yang [Hucheng] since Zhang and Yang might find better methods for realizing their anti-Japanese position.

3) Our party believes that Chiang [Kai-shek]'s release, Zhang's departure for Nanjing, and the handling of this case by the Nanjing government are also Nanjing's internal affairs. From a position of impartiality, our party supports all methods that may guide the Incident toward a peaceful settlement and opposes efforts that may lead toward conflict beneficial to the Japanese imperialists.

4) To realize the peaceful unification of China and the necessary solidarity to prevent national humiliation, our party holds that after the special amnesty for Zhang, the Nanjing government should immediately order Zhang to return to Shaanxi to lead the entire Northeast Army and all armies in the northwest to the anti-Japanese front to implement the joint view of Chiang and Zhang on national salvation.

5) However, if the Nanjing government, disregarding the nation's interests, still imprisons Zhang in Nanjing after the amnesty order and returns the withdrawn troops in an attempt to dissolve the Northeast Army and the northwest armies, then the disaster of a civil war will certainly arise. The Nanjing government will be solely responsible for such a civil war.

6) Our party will continue to work hard for the basic policies of stopping the Civil War and uniting to resist Japan and of opposing the scheme of the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese factions to provoke a civil war and split China. These positions of our party are supported by the people of the whole country. However, they have already been rejected by the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese factions. Therefore, we have become the target of attacks by the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese factions and have been used as their capital for reaching an "agreement on preventing communism" with the aim of subjugating China.

E.21 Announcement of GMD-Communist Cooperation by the CCP CC. *Zhou Enlai* (15 July 1937)¹⁰¹

Dear Compatriots,

With the greatest enthusiasm, the CCP CC announces to our elders, brothers, and sisters all over the country that to save our motherland at a time when it is faced with a most serious crisis and its very fate is at stake, we have reached an under-

standing with the GMD on the basis of peace, unification, and united resistance to foreign aggression and have joined together with it to meet the crisis. This has enormous significance for the future of our great Chinese nation! For, as we all know, with our nation facing extreme peril today, it is only through internal unity that we can defeat Japanese imperialist aggression. Now that the foundation has been laid for national unity and the basis created for the independence, freedom, and liberation of our nation, the CCP CC salutes the splendid future of our people.

We know, however, that the task of turning bright promise into reality and creating a new China, independent, happy, and free, will demand tenacious, dauntless struggle on the part of our compatriots and, indeed, of every patriotic descendant of our common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor [Huangdi]. On this occasion, the CCP would like to set forth to all our compatriots the general objectives of our struggle. They are as follows:

- 1) To strive for the independence, freedom, and liberation of the Chinese nation. First of all, it is necessary to earnestly and speedily prepare and launch a national revolutionary war of resistance in order to recover our lost lands and restore our territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- 2) To put democracy into effect and convene a national assembly to frame and adopt a constitution and draw up a policy of national salvation.
- 3) To enable the Chinese people to lead a happy and prosperous life. Effective measures must first be taken to provide famine relief, ensure a stable livelihood, develop a defense economy, deliver the people from suffering, and improve their living conditions.

These are China's urgent needs and they constitute the goal of our struggle. We are convinced that they will receive the warm support of all our compatriots. The CCP wishes to attain these general objectives by joint effort with all our compatriots.

The CCP is fully aware that in marching toward this lofty goal, we need to overcome many obstacles and difficulties, and that, first of all, we will encounter obstruction and sabotage by the Japanese imperialists. To strip the enemy of any pretext for his intrigues and to remove any misunderstanding among all well-intentioned doubters, the CCP CC finds it necessary to proclaim its sincere devotion to the cause of national liberation. Therefore, it once again solemnly declares to the whole nation

- 1) that since Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are what China needs today, our party is ready to fight for their complete realization;
- 2) that we shall give up our policy of encouraging insurrection to overthrow the GMD regime, call off the sovietization movement, and discontinue the policy of forcible confiscation of the land of the landlords;
- 3) that we shall abolish the present soviet governments and call for the practice of democracy in the hope that state power will be unified throughout the country; and

- 4) that the Red Army will give up its present name and designation, that it will be reorganized as part of the National Revolutionary Army and placed under the Military Council of the national government, and that it will be ready for orders to march to the anti-Japanese front and do its duty.

Dear compatriots! Before the whole country, our party has long since shown in word and deed an open, selfless attitude and a readiness to compromise for the common good, which has won the commendation of all. Now, with a view to uniting with the GMD in good faith, consolidating the peace and unity of the whole country, and carrying out a national revolutionary war against Japan, we are ready to honor forthwith those of our promises which have not yet been formally carried out—for example, to abolish the soviet areas and to redesignate the Red Army—so that the united strength of the entire country may be used to resist foreign aggression.

The Japanese aggressors have driven deep into our country and disaster is imminent. Compatriots, arise and unite as one! Our great, ancient Chinese nation is indomitable. Arise and fight for national unity! Fight to overthrow Japanese imperialist oppression! The Chinese nation will surely triumph.

For victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan!

For a new China, independent, happy, and free!

CCP CC

E.22 Letter to the Party Center Concerning Past Work in the White Areas. *Liu Shaoqi* (4 March 1937)¹⁰²

Brother X:

I wrote three letters to you in the past week. You must have received them. This is my fourth letter. I want to talk generally about past problems. Since Comrade X came and talked with me, I have felt all the more the need to speak to you.

The problem is this: the task assigned to us by the Sixth Party Congress was to win over the masses, accumulate our strength and prepare for the uprising. This decision by the Sixth Party Congress was correct. Now we should ask: have we fulfilled this task? Where do our successes lie in the past ten years? Where are our failures?

Our arduous endeavors over the past ten years have brought some successes. We have organized and led a great soviet movement, confiscated and redistributed land over large areas, and created a powerful Red Army. Although this movement suffered enormous losses before last year, it has retained its strength and remains powerful. In addition, the party's theoretical level has been raised. The party has

made some progress in the course of Bolshevization. Since last year, the party has carried out effectively the movement of the national united front. These are our successes. Generally speaking, however, between the Sixth Party Congress and the turning point in December two years ago,¹⁰³ we failed to fulfill the task assigned to us by the Sixth Party Congress. In the white areas, in the cities, and among the workers, we have suffered great losses. Not only did we fail to build up our own forces or prepare for the uprising, but we were tremendously weakened organizationally. Hundreds of thousands of party members lost their lives. Moreover, tens of thousands of our people are still imprisoned by the GMD.

We must ask: why did we fail to fulfill the task assigned to us by the Sixth Party Congress? What are the subjective and objective causes?

As for past work experience in the soviet areas, as the Zunyi Conference [January 1935] reached some tentative conclusions, I will not talk about them now. I will only deal with the work in the white areas. Some are of the opinion that past work in the white areas has been a failure. Although I have criticized such views, after careful consideration, [I ask] what constitutes our past work in the white areas? If it is not a failure, what is it? Indeed, there are too few successes in our work in the white areas.

Our work in the white areas has been weakened, objectively speaking, because of the white terror carried out by the imperialists, the GMD, and the traitors. However, the main cause is our subjective mistakes. This is precisely the point I want to talk about now.

I feel that since the defeat of the Great Revolution and the "7 August" Conference [1927] we have continually committed the mistakes of left adventurism and factionalism. Precisely because of such mistakes, we have failed to consolidate, build up, and strengthen our forces despite our arduous and heroic endeavors under GMD rule. On the contrary, our strength has declined. Since these mistakes originated ten years ago, I must now talk about what happened ten years ago. However, I do not have any materials and must rely completely on memory.

The "7 August" Conference is an extremely important meeting in the history of our party. It firmly opposed the right opportunism of Chen Duxiu and launched an ideological struggle throughout the whole party. However, I believe at the same time that the "7 August" Conference contained the following mistakes and flaws: (1) it initiated left blind activism, and (2) it initiated the wrong methods for inner-party struggle.

The defeat of the Great Revolution was caused mainly by rightist Chen Duxiuism. However, before the defeat, there had been serious mistakes that ran counter to right opportunism—"left" mistakes. The "7 August" Conference opposed the previous right opportunism, but sanctioned the previous "left" mistakes. Not only did it approve them theoretically, but also it promoted organizationally a large number of people who had committed "left" mistakes. This is the historical origin of "left" blind activism after the "7 August" Conference. The conference did not wage a fight on two fronts.

During the "7 August" Conference and thereafter, a struggle against right opportunism should have resolutely been waged. However, this was the CCP's first ideological struggle. Because of the immaturity and low theoretical level of the party, we should have adopted more methods of education and persuasion to carry out the struggle. At that time, however, we resorted to the methods used by the old soviet Bolsheviks in their inner-party struggles, intentionally persecuting many and punishing a large number of comrades. This fostered factional conflict within the party, caused serious unprincipled clashes, and damaged the party. This is exactly like someone who, never having drunk before, downs a bottle of brandy the first time he touches liquor. This will damage his health. The popular term is overkill.

As a result, after the "7 August" Conference, Qu Qiubai and Li Wei-han's blind activism and wrong methods in ideological struggle sapped the party's strength.

The Sixth Party Congress is correct. It opposed Chen Duxiu's right opportunism and, at the same time, opposed "left" blind activism and the practice of relying on command and punishment only. However, did the Sixth Party Congress contain any flaws? I think it contained the following flaws: (1) Its criticism of, and opposition to, blind activism was insufficient. This is because, at that time, most of the mistakes committed by the party were of "left" blind activism. However, the denunciation of this by the Congress was insufficient. Later this formed the origin of the Li Lisan line. (2) It did not emphatically attack this blind activism politically, thus definitely turning the party into a secret party. The Congress simply did not raise this issue. Originally, it was the greatest, the most troublesome, and the most difficult task to turn an open party into a secret party. When the Comintern advised the parties in West European countries to prepare to change into secret parties, it raised the issue repeatedly and emphatically. Yet, we never raised it as repeatedly and emphatically. This forced us to commit a series of serious mistakes on the issue of the relationship between open and secret operations. In many places, our party organization was almost permanently destroyed by the enemy. (3) There was no preparation for the long and difficult tasks ahead. It has been nine years since the Sixth Party Congress. It is very clear that at that time nobody thought that there would be nine years of reactionary rule and thus prepared for long-term secret operations. "The new revolutionary high tide is at hand." "The sign of the new high tide has already been seen." These words, used at that time, were not wrong. However, they later formed the basis for the policy of armed uprising contained in the Lisan line and the source of the rash adventurism. Our comrades thought that the revolutionary high tide would arrive soon and so did not prepare or plan for long and arduous work.

The policies of the Lisan line implemented by the Party Center after the Sixth Party Congress violated the resolutions of the Congress. They did not prepare, build up, and increase our strength, but instead greatly weakened the party's strength. This conclusion was made by the Fourth Plenum [January 1931].

The Fourth Plenum opposed the Lisan line. That was correct. However, did the Fourth Plenum have flaws? I think it had the following flaws.

1) In practice it was particularly deficient in opposing the Lisan line. This en-

abled the Lisan line in practice (in party work and among the masses) to continue for a long time, indeed until recently. The Lisan line, to begin with, was built on the basis of the blind activism after the "7 August" Conference and made a deep impact within the party. This line was followed in our work during most strikes, demonstrations, and commemorations and was manifested in most of the documents, declarations, leaflets, and demands of the masses. These are the most important components of the Lisan line. The theory of the Lisan line on the fundamental issue of the revolution—quasi-Trotskyism—was raised by Lisan with the resolution of the eleventh [11 June 1930. See above **Doc. C.18**] and was denounced soon after by the Comintern. It had little influence within the party, and thus it was very easy to eradicate. The Fourth Plenum and the CC formed thereafter opposed and eradicated the second aspect of the Lisan line. It completed this extremely important, but relatively easy, task. However, the Fourth Plenum did not correct or even oppose the first aspect of the Lisan line, which presented enormous difficulties for its rectification. This aspect even continued afterward. This is the grave flaw of the Fourth Plenum. I repeatedly made this point during my stay in Moscow and after my return to this country.

2) Similarly, the Fourth Plenum and the subsequent CC failed to raise emphatically the issue of secret operations or to solve this problem.

3) The methods of struggle within the party during and after the Fourth Plenum meeting contained similar errors. There were excessive factionalist mistakes. Many cadres, especially veteran cadres, were scorned and persecuted. This was wrong. At the same time, the Fourth Plenum was originally designed to oppose "leftism," but the struggle against "leftism" soon stopped while the fire was concentrated on fighting rightism. That was also wrong, because the principal mistake at that time was still "leftism." But we let "leftism" escape.

Because the Fourth Plenum meeting had the above flaws, it consequently helped the Trotskyites and rightists. Now, they are using these flaws to attack and undermine the party.

The flaws and mistakes of the December resolution [1935] were mentioned in the resolution of 15 September.¹⁰⁴ This was appropriate. However, we believe that two more points can be made: (1) [we] have yet to raise, emphatically enough, the issue of the relationship between secret and open operations; (2) there was no criticism whatsoever of the tradition of committing serious mistakes with past work in the white areas. The above two flaws were still present in the 15 September resolution. The resolution did not resolve them fully. This resulted in the lack of a basis for change in the work in the white areas, particularly for changing the past traditions.

Therefore, until now many places have not yet corrected their past mistaken traditions. Some places even do not feel the need to change past traditions. They believe that the current change is only one of strategy following the change in the situation. They are content with shouting a few slogans of the united front. They still do not know that it is impossible to implement the current strategy without changing the past traditions. . . .

From the above facts, [it is clear that] “leftist” mistakes have existed since the “7 August” Conference. Despite many changes in the past ten years, these mistakes basically remain the same and have remained into the present. Such mistakes have persisted. “Leftist” mistakes have been persistently committed in the past ten years and have now become a tradition. Since the “7 August” Conference I have consistently doubted and opposed this tradition.

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What we need to consider now is the Party Center’s work in the white areas between the meeting of the Fourth Plenum and the December resolution [from January 1931 to December 1935].

After the Fourth Plenum, the Comintern assigned China a threefold task: establish a soviet government, strengthen the Red Army, and lead the mass movement in the white areas. The Party Center faithfully implemented this task. An effective soviet government was established; the Red Army was strengthened; base areas were created; work in the soviet areas was greatly improved. These were the Party Center’s greatest achievements. Precisely because of these achievements, we were able to wage a long and hard struggle against the GMD during the fourth and the fifth “extermination campaigns,” to embark on the Long March, and to maintain a powerful strength today. Therefore, one cannot say that the Party Center was generally wrong in its work in the soviet areas. If there had been no such significant improvement in work in the soviet areas after the Fourth Plenum, we could never have fought a long struggle against the GMD, or completed the Long March, or preserved such a powerful strength. However, the Party Center also made extremely serious mistakes in its work in the soviet areas. It also committed strategic and tactical mistakes; it committed “leftist” mistakes on the land issue, in work among the masses, and in inner-party struggles. Therefore, the Red Army and the soviet areas suffered enormous losses.

What should be pointed out is that we implemented the large number of resolutions on the work in the soviet areas passed by the Comintern, though again, we made many mistakes in the course of implementation.

But the work in the soviet areas alone cannot tell us everything about the Party Center’s leadership. In terms of the whole country, work in the white areas occupies the central position. There are no important achievements worth mentioning with regard to the Party Center’s work in the white areas. Therefore, we must comprehensively examine the leadership provided by the Party Center.

Let us start with the September 18 Incident [1931]. The Incident was an extremely important step taken by the Japanese imperialists in colonizing China. Their first bite swallowed up Manchuria as their colony. But how did the Party Center evaluate the September 18 Incident at that time? We said: it was the Japanese imperialists’ attack on the Soviet Union and the Japanese imperialists’ direct suppression of the Chinese revolution. These were the two points particularly stressed

at that time. Therefore, the slogans we raised were: support the Soviet Union and support the Chinese revolution. We did not mention the Japanese colonization of Manchuria and China or emphasize this point. We did not emphasize defending the integrity of Chinese territory and sovereignty. Consequently, on the one hand, it was very difficult for us to lead the widespread anti-Japanese movement after the September 18 Incident. On the other hand, we helped the Japanese imperialists make propaganda. The Japanese imperialists said they occupied Manchuria because they wanted to attack the Soviet Union and because “the CCP has occupied territories seven times larger than Japan itself” (from the speech by the Japanese representative to the League of Nations). Based on the above analysis made by the Party Center, it is natural for Comrade [Mao] Zemin to develop the view that the target of the battles for the Red Army from then on was the Japanese army and that the GMD was only a secondary adversary.

After the September 18 Incident, the objective situation in the country changed drastically—in favor of the revolution. A revolutionary situation quickly arose. It was possible, at that time, to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing government and establish a government of national defense. The Red Army in Jiangxi then smashed three “extermination” campaigns. The Red Army in E-Yu-Wan [Hubei-Henan-Anhui] annihilated the troops of Chen Diaoyuan and others. The Nineteenth Route Army violated its order and marched to Nanjing and Shanghai. The students from Beijing came south to demonstrate in Nanjing, smashing the GMD Central Department and the GMD government’s foreign ministry. The masses in Shanghai destroyed the city’s GMD headquarters and organized a court to put the mayor and police chief on trial. Ma Zhanshan was fighting the Japanese in Manchuria. People all over the country were destroying GMD headquarters. Wang Zhengting resigned; Chiang Kai-shek resigned and went abroad. Sun Ke, Chen Mingshu, and others got into office, declaring that they would seek a compromise with the CP and the Red Army. Later the Nanjing government wanted to move to Luoyang. Although this objective revolutionary situation had many weaknesses, it existed. The masses were unwilling to live the same old life; the ruling Chiang Kai-shek clique that had surrendered to the Japanese could no longer govern in the same old way. Many opposition groups and non-Chiang-controlled military sympathized with overthrowing the previous rulers of the Nanjing government or were neutral and indecisive. All raised the issue of the regime. The government of national defense had already been proposed by someone. At that time, if we had had the correct strategy, if we had formed a united front with all the anti-Chiang groups, if we had allied with and supported the Nineteenth Route Army [in Fujian], if we had raised the slogan of the government of national defense and a united anti-Japanese army, and if we had correctly organized the attacks by the masses, with the Red Army acting in support, it would have been possible to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from coming back to power to organize the government of national defense and lead the anti-Japanese war.

Unfortunately, we did not perceive that the situation was so good at that time. We did not adopt the strategy of a united front, and we rejected the demands and

proposals from various groups for a united front. We were completely isolated and discussed, in a bookish way, such slogans as “people’s government,” “government of national defense,” “the great alliance of workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers.” We unconsciously abandoned the situation. Before long, with the help of the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek allied with the reformists and came back to power. The anti-Japanese movement and the 28 January clash in Shanghai were crushed and destroyed. Chiang Kai-shek reorganized the attacks against the Red Army in E-Yu-Wan. Under the slogan of anticommunism, Chiang Kai-shek formed the counterrevolutionary united front and has maintained his regime ever since.

The previous possibility of overthrowing the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Nanjing was temporarily given up after the Red Army left E-Yu-Wan—when Chiang Kai-shek organized the fourth “extermination campaign” against the Central Soviet Area and the anti-Japanese movement in the country was dealt a blow. However, then the resolution of the Comintern’s Twelfth Plenum arrived. The Comintern said that China was ready for a direct revolution (based on the situation of 28 January); afterward, we parroted this rigidly; we parroted it for many years—without seriously thinking about it.

After the September 18 Incident, the slogans of establishing a united front, fighting the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek, forming a government of national defense, and organizing a united anti-Japanese army should have been adopted. At that time, however, we did not adopt them. The Comintern sent us three conditions for forming the united front. We did not understand them; nor did we persist in implementing them in practice. For a long time, we treated them only as propaganda tools and as weapons for fighting various factions.

Before the 28 January clash in Shanghai, the question of government had become the central practical question among the masses. We should have used the slogan of an anti-Japanese government of national defense to resist the treacherous Chiang Kai-shek government in Nanjing. However, we rejected this slogan. At that time, what was the nature of the government of national defense? It was not the treacherous regime in Nanjing at that time; nor was it a soviet regime. It was a popular anti-Japanese regime of various parties and groups. This was the practical aspect demanded by the majority of the masses at that time. Therefore, it should have become our principal slogan for revolution at that time. But we negated such a regime at that time. What we proposed was: either a soviet regime or a treacherous Nanjing regime. There could be nothing in between. This meant that there could only be opposition between the two regimes; there could be no other regime to oppose the treacherous Nanjing regime. Clearly, this could not satisfy the demands of the majority of the masses. The majority of the people opposed the treacherous Nanjing government, but they did not want to have a soviet regime right away.

I am not saying that it was not true that the two regimes were opposed to each other, or that such opposition was unnecessary. The opposition between the two regimes at that time and later was a fact and was necessary. There is nothing wrong with this. What is wrong is that we neglected the fact that the majority of the people

at that time were still standing between these two opposing regimes. They demanded another democratic, anti-Japanese regime to replace the treacherous Nanjing government. They were not content with the opposition between the two regimes, but urged an anti-Japanese and democratic regime to destroy the treacherous Nanjing government. Our mistake lay in not raising the slogan of using a government of national defense to replace the treacherous Nanjing government. We only pointed out the opposition between the two regimes—of course, this would not satisfy the demand of the masses. In reality, this helped the survival of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's anticommunist camp.

At that time we should have adopted the slogan of an anti-Japanese government of national defense to mobilize the masses and unite all anti-Chiang groups to attack the treacherous central government in Nanjing. However, the task we proposed then was: struggle for the victory of the revolution in one province or in the several provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi and command the Red Army to attack the cities in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. That was insufficient at that time. This let the central government in Nanjing off the hook. It forced the masses and our comrades in the white areas only to watch the Red Army in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi; we mobilized the masses to support and coordinate with the attacks by the Red Army, but forgot to mobilize the masses and organize our forces to prepare for the overthrow of the treacherous central government in Nanjing. It was "leftist" to refuse to recognize the government of national defense, and to mobilize the masses to support the Red Army directly. Because of an insufficient understanding of the situation and of the importance of the work in the white areas, we only recognized the possibility of winning the revolution in such provinces as Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi while denying the existence of a national revolutionary situation and the possibility of overthrowing the treacherous Nanjing government.

Our evaluation and strategy concerning Ma Zhanshan's anti-Japanese endeavors and the anti-Japanese battle of 28 January in Shanghai were similarly wrong.

After the September 18 Incident, the national conflict had begun to take over from the class conflict. When we should have emphasized the national conflict, we emphasized instead class conflict just as before.

In dealing with the Fujian Incident and the people's government, our evaluation was also wrong. We still refused to recognize that such regimes as the people's government in Fujian (which was neither a soviet nor a treacherous Nanjing regime) might have resisted and replaced the treacherous Nanjing government. Therefore, we committed another serious strategic mistake.

After we had adopted the guiding principle of the domestic revolutionary war, we should not have opposed warlord wars that were against the Nanjing government. Instead, we should have used them to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek with us. It was wrong for us not to make use of them.

When the Xinan Incident and the Xi'an Incident broke out, the international and domestic situations had undergone great changes. Japan wanted to swallow up China proper; the policies of the GMD and Chiang Kai-shek wavered, and they

attempted to change their previous persistent policies of betraying the country. At that time, the domestic revolutionary war would help Japan to destroy China. Therefore, the guiding principle of the domestic revolutionary war was to be given up. At that time, we should have opposed warlords' wars. However, we still adopted the principle of the domestic revolutionary war during the Xinan Incident and sympathized with the Xinan faction. During the Xi'an Incident we adopted the correct policy, but we caused great political chaos and misunderstanding about us on the part of the majority of the people.

Judging from the circumstances in which we dealt with the above incidents, we can see that our ability to deal with incidents is still very weak, that our political experience is very little, and our creative capacity and the ability to seek truth from facts is very fragile. We committed extremely serious mistakes at every juncture during such major incidents. After the September 18 Incident, the Comintern assigned us the threefold task; but that was insufficient. However, we had no new enterprise and proposed no new tasks.

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It is not enough to evaluate our previous work in the white areas. We must emphatically point out that we did not correct, but continued, the blind activism and adventurist "leftist" tradition of the Lisan line after the Fourth Plenum.

In general, the Sixth Party Congress wanted us to build up our strength and prepare for the uprising. After the Fourth Plenum, once again we did not treat this decision of the Sixth Party Congress as the objective for all our work. We forgot this goal and regarded direct support of the Red Army as the objective for the work among the masses and the mass struggle in the white areas. The Comintern said, "Each economic strike in the white areas provides the best assistance to the Red Army." We did not really understand this sentence. We always neglected economic struggles. We did not treat preparing and accumulating strength as the goal for all the work in the white areas. Instead of strengthening our forces in thousands of actions and struggles, we seriously weakened it. We had no inkling about this. Our leaders still considered this to be "right" because they raised the slogan of direct support for the Red Army and the Soviet Union. On this issue, after the Fourth Plenum, we failed to implement the important decisions of the Sixth Party Congress. It was the guiding principle of the Sixth Party Congress to "preserve strength" and "do only what is profitable" with the Red Army. If this principle had been followed, the strength of the Red Army would have increased through the struggles. However, in the white areas and throughout the party, this principle was not followed in our work. Therefore, the strength of the masses and the party was progressively weakened through struggle. This is bad for the party's prestige and influence. The more moderate elements have left us; those who suffered during the struggles complained about us; and the bad elements betrayed and turned against the party. In addition, the tradition of blind activism and the Lisan line are concretely manifested in the following issues:

1) *The issue of the relationship between open and secret operations.* We have persistently committed mistakes on this issue from the “7 August” Conference until now. In the beginning, we consistently neglected this problem. The white terror was so horrible to begin with that if we had not correctly solved this problem or made every comrade understand and apply this relationship properly, we would never have been able to do a good job or prepare for the revolution—or even have enabled the party to survive. Solution of this problem is a precondition for revolution in the white areas. However, we have never emphatically raised this issue. This is a huge political error.

We have persistently committed “left” adventurist mistakes in our secret work. We often intentionally use words like “fear of death” and “cowardice” to criticize and persecute our comrades—we have done our best to encourage and even commend our comrades’ adventurist spirit. We deny as legitimate the use of all legal means and regard using legal means as rightist.

Originally, part of our party’s work and program could be carried out through open and legal organizations and publications. Where possible, we should do our best to use open and legal means. For work that cannot be carried out through open and legal means we should adopt secret and illegal methods. However, these latter methods are forced on us; we do not delight in engaging in them. Therefore, the party’s secret operations must be completely separate from the open operations among the masses; it should adopt entirely different methods and be carried out by totally different cadres. At that same time, the two should be linked and support the entire operations of the party. Our mistake lay in abolishing all open operations. Work that could have been performed publicly and legally was assigned to secret agencies. Our mistake lay in confusing open with secret work, in repeating the methods of work within the party in our work among the masses, and in assigning the cadres engaged in open work also work in secret agencies. As a result, we had no open operations, and our secret agencies became bloated to a frightful degree. This helped the enemy investigators; our work among the masses and within the party was equally undermined. In the past ten years, the losses we have suffered on this account are countless.

In the past, we have said that we should transform all the open mass auxiliary organizations into red unions; this was to transform, in effect, all open organizations into secret ones. If the masses do not approve of this change, we cannot force them and violate the principle of democracy.

Lisan said that we should seek open operations; in fact, he wanted to engage openly, under disguise, in those things that cannot be done openly. This was completely reckless, like occupying meeting places, rostrums, and streets.

Someone said: do not lower the party’s program and slogans in order to comply with an open environment. This was applied entirely incorrectly. Based on this, our comrades were forced to transplant, in a wholesale fashion, our party’s entire program and basic slogans into the declarations, programs, leaflets, and demands of those open mass organizations. As a result, these groups were turned into a second

party. Lenin's phrase "Do not lower the party's program in order to be open" is correct when applied to the whole party. But our Leninists applied this sentence to the open operations and wanted the open mass groups to speak of nothing but the party's program. This is absolutely wrong. The CCP is already a secret party; so this sentence should not be applied. The CCP does not have legality because the entire party is illegal.

I raised the above questions in 1928 and argued with many comrades for several weeks; but I ended up being criticized, persecuted, and deposed. I raised the above questions again in Moscow in 1930; but again I ended up being criticized. The resolution adopted only the sentence "The working methods of labor unions should not repeat the party's working methods." In 1931, I openly proposed the organization of mass labor unions; consequently this ended up as "the third type of labor unions." In the past ten years, our mistakes on this issue have been persistent; our losses are the most heart-breaking. These mistakes have not been corrected completely even now and are repeated frequently.

2) *The issue of strategy for the mass struggle.* In order to accumulate the strength of the masses, we must lead the mass struggle. During the period of preparing for the revolution, however, the objective of launching the mass struggle is to accumulate and increase the strength of the masses and raise the consciousness of the masses. It is not to launch a revolutionary attack on, and fight a decisive battle with, the ruling class immediately, but to prepare for the future revolutionary attacks and decisive battles. However, in the beginning we did not have such a clear principle for leading the mass struggle in the white areas. We often organized strikes and demonstrations for commemorative occasions, or directly in support of the Red Army. However, we did not even regret the serious losses incurred in these strikes and demonstrations. We often neglected economic struggles and did not faithfully fight for the economic demands of the masses. We were often content with "launching struggles" but did not care about the victory or defeat of the struggles, or their results and impact. We often persisted in our struggles to the end—with no conditions or objectives; we would persist in them even if the situation was unfavorable. We never knew or spoke of choosing the most favorable opportunity to stop our struggles temporarily. We have a set of mechanical concepts—small struggles are to be developed into great struggles; great struggles are to be developed into armed uprisings. We mechanically wanted to raise every struggle to the highest level. We did not prepare for struggle or choose the opportunity to wage our struggles. As long as it was a commemorative occasion, we would launch a fight without any conditions; anything to the contrary would be "obstructing struggle." We often raised excessive demands and mechanically imposed political demands on the masses' economic demands. We never pursued a united front in our struggles, but we intentionally opposed everything. We purposefully treated as contemptible all legal means of struggle; originally there were many struggles that could have been waged legally, but, by design, we waged them secretly and illegally. In our struggles we always failed to evaluate the balance of power at a particu-

lar time, in a particular place, to determine the strategy and form of struggle. We only blindly wanted to “struggle! struggle!” or emptily analyzed the international situation, the situation throughout the whole country, reaching conclusions, with no connection whatsoever, on launching and persisting in the strike of a certain factory. Many times we worked throughout the year only for those commemorative dates. As a result of these mistakes, which disregarded success or failure, benefits or costs, and considered only the results of the struggle, we often suffered defeats, even tragic defeats. Of course, it is absolutely impossible to build up strength in this way.

I emphatically and systematically singled out and criticized the above mistakes beginning in 1929 in Shanghai and Moscow and before and after the Fourth Plenum. As a result, I was regarded as a right opportunist. All of the above were “correct.” Yet the tendencies have continued down to the present. Naturally, this is a persistent mistake and great efforts are needed to correct it.

In terms of the revolutionary tradition and our work, the north is somewhat backward in comparison with the south. But we denied such backwardness. We suffered heavy losses in the struggle to oppose the “theory of northern backwardness” and organizing the uprisings on the plains of Hebei and Shandong.

3) *The issue of propaganda and agitation work.* Superficiality, exaggeration, formalism, and rigidity in our propaganda is also a long-standing mistake which has yet to be corrected. We often make it difficult to distinguish between propaganda slogans and action slogans, between open propaganda work and secret propaganda work, between propaganda work aimed at the outside and educational work inside. We often unconsciously reveal secrets to the enemy in our publications. We often fail to evaluate the influence of propaganda among the masses. We are often trivial, treating slanders as battles. All of this continues to exist in the white areas.

4) *The issue of inner-party [struggle].* There were many mistakes in past ideological struggles. Right opportunism was exaggerated; we even artificially created a rightist system so that we could oppose it. Thus we neglected the struggle against “leftism.” The methods adopted in ideological struggle have always been excessive. Ideological struggles were even used as the only method of energizing our work, without using education or persuasion to energize our work. Heavy factionalist elements and prejudices were contained in these struggles. It can be said that there is absolutely no freedom of calm discussion within the party. Whenever new and unorthodox views were raised within the party, there was panic, and meetings were called to struggle against them. The democratic spirit was especially lacking in the work of the leading organs. The rights that every party member and cadre should enjoy within the party were frequently not respected. Bureaucratism and individual heroism still exist to a serious degree. The working personnel in secret agencies should never be transferred at random; yet we promoted too many new cadres to work in secret agencies. There was an enormous amount of movement of personnel, while there were no cadres to work openly among the masses. Even when there were a few, they were corrupted. Indeed, there are too many agencies and titles of rank within the party.

The practice of relying on command and punishment has always existed. The original task for the secret leading agencies was to help the comrades who worked openly among the masses. Such help should be best delivered through explanations and suggestions. For example, the forms of the instructions from the Comintern were called "directives," "commands," and "resolutions" only when necessary. Ideally, suggestions should be used often for subordinates. But we use "commands," "directives," and "resolutions" to solve every problem, even the smallest thing. This has weakened the comrades' initiative and the authority of the leading agencies.

Party discipline is necessary. Ideally, however, it is better not to solve all problems through disciplinary and organizational means. They can be used only when necessary and as the last resort. All problems should be solved after a political consensus is reached in terms of principle, but not through disciplinary and organizational means. However, we do just the opposite. We often use disciplinary and organizational means to solve every problem—even the smallest technical problem. This has become commandism and punishmentism. This forces every subordinate to wait for the instructions and orders of the superiors and to reduce initiative and a sense of responsibility to the smallest degree. Subordinates do nothing when their superiors give no orders or instructions; the subordinates do only what their superiors order and instruct. We have not enabled our comrades and cadres to be more active and exercise their initiative within the party. On the contrary, we have created the phenomenon where there is a generalized inactivity among the comrades who are afraid to speak out, commit mistakes, or take responsibility.

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The mistakes in the above four issues, I believe, reflect the tradition of the Lisan line and "left" opportunism. Basically, they have not been corrected since the Fourth Plenum and continue to exist and develop in several respects. These mistakes have the longest and deepest influence within the party and have caused the greatest losses. These mistakes are, of course, persistent and systematic. The origin of these mistakes is, on the one hand, the error in evaluating the situation and, on the other, the error in the method of thinking and in the philosophical method. It is also a question of whether we should still seek truth from facts and evaluate the situation, as well as how we should evaluate the situation once we have a principle for our actions.

Someone said: it is enough that we have a principle for our actions; it is unnecessary to seek truth from facts. For example, slogans like "support the Soviet Union" and "oppose imperialism" are not wrong in terms of principle; but once they are applied to the reality of China, then the slogan "support the Soviet Union" cannot mobilize the majority of the masses, while the slogan of "oppose imperialism" can mobilize them. Then we should use the slogan of opposing imperialism to mobilize the masses, instead of using the slogan of supporting the Soviet Union because opposing imperialism is the same as supporting the Soviet Union. However, we

rigidly insisted on placing the slogan of supporting the Soviet Union in the most important position, while, at the same time, blaming ourselves for neglecting the anti-imperialist movement. Isn't this a mistake in our method of thinking? Another example—persisting in strikes to the end is not wrong in terms of principle; but it is often wrong to insist on continuing to the end some specific strikes. However, we care only about principles and fail to seek truth from facts.

That strikes should be called on commemorative dates and parades and demonstrations should be organized is not wrong in terms of principle. However, if the situation is not good for a certain commemorative occasion, or there is insufficient mobilization of the masses, or the enemy is prepared to resort to bloody repression, it is wrong to insist on strikes, parades, and demonstrations. However, some believed that it was unnecessary to evaluate the situation at that particular time; it was all right to stage strikes and parades.

Deciding whether the strike in a certain factory should be launched or continued depends mainly on the concrete conditions of the factory and that area. Although the international situation and the situation in the country may be very good, they often do not determine whether that factory's strike should be started or continued. However, we often decide our strategies for strikes from the point of view of the international and domestic situations. This is because our comrades do not know how to evaluate specifically the situation on every question or what the determinant conditions are.

There must be tens of thousands of such examples within the party.

In the past, the method of thinking and formal logic within the party occupied an extremely important position and guided our comrades' daily operations. These had a very deep influence among our comrades and thus became the origin of the above mistakes.

The above mistakes have long existed inside the party and have been repeated thousands of times. They are recorded copiously in all the publications and documents and clearly manifested in thousands of strikes and demonstrations. They have caused tremendous losses for the party. Why didn't our comrades responsible for leadership discover them? Why haven't they corrected or opposed them? Why didn't anybody rise to criticize and oppose them, instead of supporting these mistakes? Of course, this cannot be explained in terms of slowness and insensitivity of feeling. The leading comrades have the same erroneous mentalities and make the same mistakes.

Our mistakes in the past ten years have been consistently "leftist." They have been consistent and systematic as well as opportunist, though they are not as completely opportunist as the Chen Duxiu line and the Lisan line. There has been consistent opportunism from every fundamental question in the Chinese revolution down to every concrete issue, though [our mistakes] have not reached such a degree. However, [we] have made serious mistakes both on general questions and on specific issues.

After the Fourth Plenum, the Party Center experienced many changes and inci-

dents. Yet its capacity for dealing with change and creativity was extremely poor; it was most obedient to the Comintern, though sometimes such obedience was mechanical. [Text omitted in original.] Our political experience is immature; we must learn with modesty. We should discuss things thoroughly among ourselves to gain collective wisdom, establish genuine collective leadership, and seek more advice from the Comintern. Only by so doing can we make fewer mistakes and lead the Chinese revolution to victory. Arrogance and self-satisfaction are the worst, most dangerous, and most hopeless diseases among us. Waging factional fights on account of personal prejudice and positions is to deliberately sabotage the party. Now we are required to throw away all personal animosity and engage in sincere and calm deliberation and discussion. The CCP, after all, must be led by people like us; there are no better people.

* * *

The question now is how to turn around the work in the white areas. On the one hand, work in the white areas requires a change in strategy. On the other hand, the tradition of the past ten years needs to be changed. This change will be the most difficult. We have swallowed all the evil consequences inherited from the past. Change has only just begun, and in some places it has not even begun.

In order to change the tradition of the past ten years, past mistakes must be criticized openly within the party. There must be a thorough examination. Many people demand such an examination; some comrades even have expressed indignation about the past. Of course, it is wrong to instigate a great wave of fury from our comrades within the party. We still should avoid excessive shock and take care of the Party Center's authority and of the party's prestige toward the outside, particularly when the united front has just begun. What methods should be adopted now to criticize the past? These methods should attract our comrades' attention and vigilance and need to avoid excessive shock. I feel that it is imperative that you issue a document immediately and send it to all. This will help the current changes.

This letter of mine is nothing but negative criticism. Your document may speak in more positive terms. Some problems may not be discussed for the moment. But the past must be criticized.

Greetings!

E.23 The Tasks of the Conference of CCP Delegates from the Soviet Regions (Draft). *Zhang Wentian* (2 May 1937)¹⁰⁵

[[1] The first stage of the new period of the Chinese revolution has ended, proving the correctness of the party's new policies.]]

2) The Center's 10 February [1937] telegram to the GMD's Third Plenum should not be interpreted as "surrender by the CP." We have only made four promises to the GMD.¹⁰⁶ (a) This is a natural conclusion to the development of our party's position on the national united front over the past two years; (b) the independence and freedom of criticism of the CP organization will not be abolished and reduced, and the party leadership in the army and government will not be abandoned; (c) on the contrary, the purpose is to achieve the possibility for the CP to carry out open activities throughout the country. Therefore the party is entirely correct in making this decision.

3) The party's political line of fighting for a soviet regime over the past ten years should not be considered a mistake because of today's changes. On the contrary, the resolute implementation of this line has enabled us to (a) develop the past glorious tradition of the national revolution; (b) continue to push forward the broad masses in the revolutionary movement; and (c) preserve and train leading cadres and leading organs. These are great achievements and successes over the past ten years. These achievements and successes are first and foremost the result of hard struggle by our party's comrades and their spirit of self-sacrifice.

[[A three-minute silence was held for the fallen martyrs.]]

4) It is precisely the glorious history of the past ten years of hard struggle that has enabled our party today to (a) enjoy such great faith and support of the people throughout the country; (b) have the capacity and right to be the creator and organizer of the national united front and become its vanguard and strong leadership core; and (c) advance and open up a bright future. The efforts of our comrades are not in vain, and their blood has not been shed for nothing. Without the past, we would not have today.

5) We need not deny at all that the Party Center has also committed many serious mistakes over the past ten years. After the Sixth Congress [1927], the Party Center committed the mistakes of the Lisan line. Since the Fourth Plenum [January 1931], though the Party Center's line has been generally correct and has followed that of the Comintern, work among the masses in the white areas has failed to overcome the bad tradition of closed-doorism that has existed for a long time. In the Civil War, we committed the mistakes of military adventurism and conservatism. After the "September 18" Incident [1931], our understanding and utilization of the changes in the newly emerging class forces were inadequate and untimely. We lacked a deep understanding of the protracted nature of the Chinese revolution and made some mistakes in cadre policy. Local party organizations have exhibited various incorrect tendencies and mistakes. Even mistakes such as Comrade Zhang Guotao's antiparty and anti-Center line of opportunism and warlordism have occurred. Under the guidance of the Comintern's line, however, our party has eventually overcome all incorrect tendencies and corrected and learned from its mistakes. Today's achievements and successes are the result of opposing these tendencies and mistakes by the party. Herein lies the party's greatness, and it is the basic reason for the party's

continuous advance. We should admit that the party has become stronger and has improved over the past ten years of arduous struggle. This gives the party greater confidence to lead the Chinese revolution to victory.

6) Since the conclusion of the Civil War, the revolution has embarked on a new stage. The urgent current tasks of the party are to consolidate the domestic peace, attain democratic rights, and carry out the war against Japan. In order to fulfill these tasks, the party must greatly strengthen its organization and leadership in the white areas and turn special districts into model districts of resistance to Japan. Weakness in work in the white areas is the party's greatest weakness at present. Since we have concluded domestic peace, the front line of the battle has moved from the soviet to the white areas. We should (a) carefully summarize the experiences and lessons of work in the white areas, particularly those of the past two years, so as to reeducate and recultivate strong cadres; (b) grasp the central link in the democratic movement to resist Japan and save the nation and be good at utilizing every promise and every legal slogan of the GMD to actively make proposals and organize the masses to push the movement forward; (c) restore, streamline, and rebuild party organizations and strengthen the leadership of existing party organizations; and (d) overcome the feelings of suspicion, vacillation, and pessimism about the current development of the situation. This conference pays respect to all comrades who are waging a hard struggle in the white areas now.

7) To turn special regions into model regions to resist Japan, we still need to work doubly hard to accomplish the following tasks: (a) strengthening cultural and educational work; (b) improving the livelihood of the masses; (c) reforming the mass organizations; (d) establishing a new democratic system; (e) waging a resolute struggle against the destruction, interference, conspiracies, and plots by all traitors and collaborators so as to eliminate serious hidden troubles; and (f) using adeptly various outside relations to carry out the work of the united front and to expand the influences of the special districts.

8) The Red Army must be the model army to resist Japan and the leading core of the War of Resistance. This requires (a) the strengthening and safeguarding of the absolute leadership of the CP; (b) the strengthening of the military, political, and cultural education of Red Army cadres; (c) an increase and improvement in the work of the Red Army among the friendly armies and the residents; (d) a fight against the tendency of [believing there is] nothing to worry about, enjoying oneself, engaging in corruption, and giving full play to the Red Army's spirit of hard struggle and all other strong points and glorious traditions.

9) All the above-mentioned tasks can only be fulfilled through strong party leadership. Consolidation of our party is the core of all work now. This requires (a) strengthening Marxist, Leninist, and Stalinist education inside the party, studying the work-styles of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and fighting for the Comintern's line; (b) promoting inner-party democracy and self-criticism (adapted to the different conditions of the white and soviet areas); (c) effecting a fundamental change in the party's work-style toward the masses; (d) carrying

out correct cadre policies and uniting all cadres who are loyal to the party, having contact with the masses, and obeying discipline because cadres decide everything; and (e) carrying out the two-line struggle against closed-doorism and the growing right-wing opportunism and elimination of the [Zhang] Guotao line.

10) Accomplishing the above tasks so that the CP can gain the leadership of the national united front and the national revolutionary movement is the central task of all work at present. This is a difficult task. We must be aware that there are many difficulties and obstacles before us. First of all, we must concentrate all our efforts to overcome the ferocious Japanese imperialists, the Chinese traitors and collaborators, and the pro-Japanese and Trotskyite groups. Next, we shall continue the struggle inside the nationalist ranks. The suspension of the Civil War is not equivalent to the elimination of class struggle. Class struggle will take complex and more tortuous forms. The class enemy, especially the national bourgeoisie, will employ all means (deception, conspiracy, plots, troublemaking, destruction, assassination, spying, bribery, inducement by women, backward ideas such as the concept of the family) to isolate us, overcome us, weaken us, and compete with us for leadership. We can overcome all difficulties and obstacles and achieve and guarantee our leadership because we have persisted resolutely in the party's correct line, have been good at relying on the masses, leading the masses, and employing all forms of struggle. In this way, we have developed the party's glorious tradition and model role of fighting in a hard and steadfast way and advancing wave upon wave over the last fifteen years. Only with this leadership can the revolution continue to make progress and not fail, in the future when the national bourgeoisie betrays the revolution. Therefore, the new situation will not reduce but only increase our leadership responsibility. We should not relax, but greatly heighten our political vigilance. Any neglect or mistake will frustrate the revolution, leading to its failure.

11) The great past and future of the Chinese nation depends on the CCP. We are the best sons and daughters of the great Chinese nation. We have already fought for fifteen years for the liberation of the Chinese nation, given full play to heroism and the spirit of hard struggle and self-sacrifice of the Chinese nation, and created an unprecedented and praiseworthy cause and a legendary, glorious history. This shows that the party's victory is inseparable from the victory of the Chinese nation. Only with the existence and development of the party can the Chinese nation obtain the reliable guarantee of the final liberation of the Chinese nation. Yet, our objective is still a long way off. We need sufficient patience, and stamina and an increasingly strong force to prepare for the prolonged fighting necessary to win the final victory of the Chinese revolution. We can win the victory and this is the task of this conference.

Long live the final liberation of the Chinese nation!

Long live the CP!

Long live the Comintern!

E.24 Resolution of the CC on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (25 August 1937)¹⁰⁷

1) The war provoked by the Japanese invaders at the Marco Polo Bridge and the capture of Beijing and Tianjin merely highlighted their scheme to take over the Chinese mainland. Japan has started a nationwide mobilization for war. Their propaganda about so-called “unintended expansion” is nothing but a smokescreen to cover their proposed attack.

2) Under pressure from the Japanese invaders and the people's indignation, the Nanjing government has decided to fight Japan. It has begun with an overall military deployment and an anti-Japanese struggle in various localities. A major war between China and Japan is unavoidable. The anti-Japanese war that began at the Marco Polo Bridge marked the beginning of a nationwide war against Japan.

3) The political situation in China has entered a new period, a period of genuine struggle against Japan. The preparatory period is over. In the new period, the most important task is to mobilize all forces for the final victory. In the last period, owing to the GMD's unwillingness and inadequate mobilization, the task of striving for democracy was not fulfilled; it must be accomplished in the course of winning the anti-Japanese war.

4) In the new period, the differences and arguments between ourselves and the GMD do not focus on whether or not to fight Japan but on how to win the war.

5) The key to the victory in the anti-Japanese war is to expand a comprehensive war across the country. Only by conducting such a war can we win in the end. The ten-point program for the anti-Japanese war to save the country from extinction points out the realistic path to final victory.

6) Today's anti-Japanese war entails great risks. These are mainly caused by the GMD's unwillingness to mobilize all the people to take part in the struggle. Instead, they see it as a matter only for the government. They fear and prevent the people, the government, and army from joining forces to that end. They are not willing to grant democratic rights to the people, restructure government organs, and turn the government into one for national defense. In this way, partial victory may be won, but complete victory would be impossible. On the contrary, there exists the danger of failure.

7) Serious weaknesses in the current anti-Japanese struggle mean that it will run into many setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayal, temporary and partial reconciliation, and other unfavorable conditions. Therefore, it must be noted that the anti-Japanese war will be a protracted one with hardships. We are confident, however, that based on a nationwide mobilization and with the concerted efforts of our party and the people, the war is bound to break through all the setbacks and obstacles. We must overcome all difficulties with the implementation of the ten-point program for the anti-Japanese war for national salvation and resolutely oppose all wrong policies against this program and oppose pessimism.

8) Party members and all public and armed forces under party leadership should actively stand at the forefront of the struggle, make themselves the key forces in the nationwide war, and do their utmost to expand the mass movement to fight Japan. No time should be lost, no opportunity missed to propagandize, organize, and arm the masses. Only when thousands and millions of people are organized to join the anti-Japanese united front can we win the final victory in the War of Resistance against Japan.

E.25 Three Telegrams from Mao Zedong on the Issue of Guerrilla Warfare (September 1937 and April 1938)

1) Instruction Concerning the Principle of Independent Guerrilla Warfare in Mountainous Areas (Mao Zedong, 21 September 1937)¹⁰⁸

Yan Xishan is now in a dilemma—if he does not fight a battle he will be confronted by the resentment of the Shanxi people. Yet, if he fights a battle, success is far from guaranteed. This contradiction plaguing him simply cannot be solved. Your assessment that he will give up Pingxing Pass and that his intention to fight a decisive battle at Shahe is shaky is totally correct. His troops have no resolve at all and have lost their fighting ability. Perhaps they will be forced to fight a decisive battle in the general areas of Yanmenguan, Pingxing Pass, or Shahe. As the overall situation shows, however, this fight cannot be sustained. Whatever the results of this decisive battle, the situation at Taiyuan and throughout north China is extremely precarious.

Some comrades do not appear to fully understand this objective, inevitable situation. They are fooled by the present temporary situation. If their views do not change, the Red Army, like that of Yan Xishan, will inevitably become passive and be able to fight only emergency battles hurriedly and without determination, wait to be attacked, and be destroyed one by one.

Although unable to play a decisive role in conclusive battles, the Red Army has one very good trick up its sleeve—genuine independent guerrilla war in the mountains (not mobile war). In order to carry out this policy, we must have competent forces strategically deployed on the enemy's flanks, we must lay emphasis on establishing bases and mobilizing the masses, and we must disperse our forces and not concentrate them to fight battles. If we concentrate our troops to fight battles, we cannot carry out the work among the masses. If we work among the masses, we cannot concentrate troops to fight battles; we cannot do both at the same time. Yet, the one and only way to defeat the enemy decisively and aid the friendly troops is to disperse our troops to work among the masses. If we concentrate our troops to fight battles the results at present will be totally fruitless.

The present situation is fundamentally different from all previous wars in China. We must not emulate our past experiences. I completely agree with the viewpoint of encircling the enemy by guerrilla warfare, even though it has made a deep thrust into Shanxi, as stated in your telegram of 18 September. Please keep to this strategy and consider the future. It is necessary to give a thorough explanation to the very few comrades who hold inappropriate points of view, so that there will be no differences in strategic policy. Comrade Lin Biao has sent a telegram to me completely agreeing with the judgment and disposition I made on 17 September.¹⁰⁹ All he wants to do is to concentrate the strength of the brigade led by Chen and deal the enemy a blow at the first opportunity. He will not disperse his forces for the time being. It is certainly all right to temporarily concentrate this brigade's strength. If after a time it has had no chance to deal the enemy a blow, however, he had better shift the central task to mass work. It is also all right for Wang Zhen to lead a regiment temporarily to Wutai, but you had better see to it that the regiment is sent to northwest Shanxi at an appropriate time. Judging from the situation, even if Lin can lead the Chen brigade in winning a battle or two, they must also head for Wutai. Please act at your discretion.

2) Instruction Requiring That All Our Work in North China Should Take Guerrilla Warfare as Its Sole Orientation (Mao Zedong, 25 September 1937)¹¹⁰

1) All our work in north China should take guerrilla warfare as its sole orientation. All work, such as the movement to do work among soldiers and united front work, should be centered around guerrilla warfare. If regular warfare in north China fails, we are not held responsible; but if guerrilla warfare in north China fails, we must be held primarily responsible.

2) In addition to the disposition in Shanxi, of which you have been told, it is necessary to order the party in Hebei to devote itself to guerrilla warfare. Organize all party organs in north China (including Shandong) to mobilize the masses, incorporate stragglers and their rifles into our armed forces, and organize guerrilla forces everywhere, but in a planned way, with the help of the Red Army's prestige to participate in the War of Resistance. In view of this, it may be necessary for Zhou [Enlai] to have another talk with Feng Zhi'an, Huan Shaoxiong, and others. Please act at your discretion.

3) In view of this, we should pay attention to the assignments of high-ranking cadres and the organization of the collective organs of the party, government, and army, which exercise independent leadership. It is necessary to envisage a situation in which we can persistently wage extensive and forceful guerrilla warfare, even if the enemy should occupy the whole of north China. It is necessary to tell the whole party that from now on there is nothing else to do and that our only work is guerrilla warfare. (It is necessary to mobilize everyone inside and outside the party.) To attain this goal, the Red Army should offer every possible assistance.

4) Please let me know the overall disposition in north China. You should ask Yan Xishan to appropriate 10,000 rifles to arm the people. You should run, at the front, a cadre school attended by 500 to 1,000 people. It should be jointly run by the Red Army and the local party organization to train cadres for guerrilla warfare. In six months most of the first batch of students of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College may be used in Shanxi.

Please carefully study the plan for using the 115th Division, in coordination with two or three GMD divisions, after the enemy makes a deep thrust, to launch a shock attack on Lingqiu, Laiyuan, Guangling, Wei County, and the northern area of these places, which are the weakly defended enemy rear. If this plan is carried out, it will be possible to open a new prospect in a given period, which may temporarily and partially, if not fundamentally, sabotage the enemy's strategic plan. As a result, this will greatly help us build our base areas throughout Shanxi.

3) Instruction Concerning Guerrilla Warfare on the Plains (Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Liu Shaoqi, 21 April 1938)¹¹¹

1) In light of our past experiences in the anti-Japanese war, and under the current situation of the nationwide war of resistance and positive full mobilization of the masses, it is quite possible to expand the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the vast plains of Hebei and Shandong Provinces and to continue guerrilla warfare on the plains.

2) The party and the Eighth Route Army should resolutely adopt the policy of expanding guerrilla warfare as far as possible in the plain areas of Hebei and Shandong and mobilizing to the fullest extent the masses to take part in open armed struggle. Secret struggle against Japan can be the major form adopted only in the cities and along railways under the control of the enemy.

3) In line with the above policies, Hebei and Shandong must be divided into a number of subdistricts for guerrilla warfare, guerrilla headquarters must be set up for each military region, and guerrilla warfare should be conducted in a planned and systematic way with the organization of self-defense teams comprising members not separated from production.

4) A government should be formed in the recovered areas and efforts be made to restore order in the anti-Japanese war in the localities. Such a government should be appointed by the higher authorities or the headquarters or elected by public organizations. They should all act in the same way in organizing and conducting guerrilla warfare, issuing brief announcements and regulations, suppressing traitors and Japanese collaborators, protecting the interests of the public, and helping to collect military supplies.

5) Where the original government still remains with commissioners Fan and Ding, it must be transformed into one in which the people fight against Japan. The anti-Japanese united front should be used so that resolute and capable members can be admitted while the incapable and corrupt are being expelled. The government, army, and people should be linked closely together.

6) Convincing work must be done to take in rifles from the public and admit more people to the guerrilla teams. Contributions of grain and money must be carried out under the principle of willingness and fair levies. Attention must be paid to capturing a large number of Japanese collaborators in the cities and railway stations from whom funds can be collected for our needs.

7) People can be organized mainly in the form of a people's self-defense corps, when possible, or peasant associations and youth leagues.

8) Prudent measures must be taken to cope with and transform reactionary social associations and local bandits in the light of specific conditions.

9) In general, expansion of party organization must be conducted in a secret way.

E.26 The Key to the Salvation of the Nation.

Wang Ming (27 December 1937)¹¹²

[[The CCP CC 25 December [1935] resolution is summarized concerning the need for internal unity.]]

It is clear from the above that the key to saving the present situation is the strengthened unity of all national forces that resist Japan. Meanwhile, facts have clearly shown that the only correct policy for uniting our whole nation's forces to resist Japan is the consolidation and expansion of the national united front against Japan.

How to consolidate and expand the national united front against Japan? First of all, it is essential to consolidate and expand the close cooperation between China's two main political parties, the GMD and the CCP. As is well known, the GMD has already implemented the policy of alliance with the CCP and resistance to Japan. The Red Army has already been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (also called the Eighteenth Army Corps of the National Revolutionary Army), and the soviet areas have been converted into border regions of the Republic of China. Therefore, the basis of the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP has actually been laid down. At the same time, however, it is also known to all that, for historical and other reasons, cooperation between the GMD and the CCP until now has failed to reach the level demanded by China's present situation and by the subjective desires of the two parties. Thus, at the present difficult juncture of the intensification of the national crisis, the issue of how to consolidate and expand the unity between the GMD and the CCP has become an issue for concern not only for the comrades of the two parties, but also for every Chinese who shows concern about the affairs of state and for every friend of China who cares about it deeply.

How to consolidate and expand further the close cooperation between the GMD

and the CCP? On the one hand, it is necessary to clearly explain various basic questions concerning the two-party cooperation. On the other hand, it is necessary to adopt many concrete methods to consolidate and expand the cooperation. It should be pointed out unreservedly that facts have demonstrated that though the leading organ is of the two parties and most party members have the necessary organization and determination to carry out the two-party cooperation, and cooperation between the GMD and the CCP has become a well-known fact, there are still many people in both parties who have no clear understanding of many basic issues about the cooperation.

What are the main issues that these people are confused about?

First, they are not clear about the main reasons for and purposes of the current two-party cooperation. They are not clear that the main reason for such cooperation today is not only based on the painful experiences and lessons of the past ten years, which demonstrate that cooperation between the two parties will lead China to independence and freedom, but also on the fact that the divisions between the two parties have resulted in incessant internal troubles and external difficulties. First and foremost, however, the main reason is the aggression of the extremely ferocious common enemy—the Japanese fascist warlords opposed to the GMD, the CCP, and the Chinese people. Therefore, they sometimes neglect or even forget that the main objective of the two-party cooperation today is to overcome together the Japanese bandits and the national enemy and to achieve and ensure the existence and independence of the Chinese nation. Therefore, they sometimes forget that resistance to Japan is the most important common program of the national united front at present and that resistance to Japan is the most important criteria for distinguishing between friends and enemies. Thus, they ignore the simple truth that “all those who oppose Japan are my friends and all those who surrender to Japan are my enemies” and the principle that “resistance is above everything and everything should serve resistance.” Confusion about the main objective of today’s national united front sometimes results from putting the issue of resisting Japan on the same level as other issues or sometimes by even regarding the issue of resistance as secondary to other issues. This causes unnecessary conflicts and divisions in the ranks of the national united front against Japan.

Second, they do not clearly understand the necessity of adopting appropriate attitudes and policies toward the friendly parties inside the united front. They do not understand clearly that the united front is formed on the basis of the common program of two or more different political organizations that all voluntarily unite to oppose the common enemy and achieve common objectives. They do not clearly understand that weakening the forces of the friendly parties and armies in the struggle against the common enemy is equivalent to weakening its own forces and assisting the development of the enemy’s forces and that this is a matter that “gladdens enemies and saddens friends.” They do not clearly understand that it is difficult to entirely avoid certain conflicts in the united front, but that both sides should try to reduce frictions to increase the effect of common resistance to the enemy and

should not provoke or expand unnecessary frictions deliberately. Therefore, they do not clearly understand that the appropriate policies toward allies are not opposition or surrender but should comprise mutual respect, trust, help, and supervision. Therefore, they do not clearly understand that the appropriate policies toward allies should not be mutual competition, destruction, and troublemaking but should comprise mutual responsibility, development, and victory. Therefore, some consciously or unconsciously use the attitude and method for dealing with enemies to deal with their own friends, and thus willingly or unwillingly act in a way that obstructs the national united front and benefits the enemies.

Third, they are not clear about the future of the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP and the entire national united front against Japan—they do not have a clear understanding of the concrete international environment and China's domestic situation at present. They are confused about the policies of cooperation between the GMD and the CCP and the entire national united front against Japan. Therefore, they are ambiguous about the road China should take in the present historical period and thus often easily believe all kinds of rumors that are deliberately spread by the Japanese bandits and Chinese traitors. Therefore, they are still influenced to some extent by the most baseless so-called argument that "defeat in the War of Resistance leads to Japanese rule over all China and victory in the War of Resistance leads to the rule of the soviet regime organized by the CCP." I remember that after this February's Third Plenum of the GMD there were such rumors. At that time, some people said, "Cooperation between the GMD and the CCP is a temporary tactic. After the establishment of this cooperation or, to be more precise, after the end of, or even during, the struggle against Japan, the CCP members will certainly immediately turn around and oppose the GMD." At that time, our open reply to this argument was, "First, generally speaking, it is certainly no easy matter to expel the Japanese imperialists from China and to win China's independence in a short period of time. Second, CCP members not only hope to cooperate with the GMD in the struggle against Japan, but also are prepared to strive for a happy future of complete independence and freedom for the Chinese people together with all excellent GMD members and followers of Mr. Sun Yat-sen." (See my article "The Key to Salvation of the Chinese People.") Now, to clarify this issue, I believe that two questions must be answered more clearly. The first is the significance of the CCP's abandonment of the slogan of the Bolshevization of China at the present stage of the Chinese people's liberation struggle and the democratic republic as suggested by the CCP. The CCP's abandonment of the slogan of Bolshevization at the present stage and the change of the soviet areas into border areas of the Republic of China are not merely changes of the soviet name and a temporary tactic, but are a genuine change of revolutionary strategic policies at a certain stage of the revolutionary struggle. In other words, in light of changes in the international environment and domestic conditions and on the common political basis of uniting all national forces in China to carry out the tasks of resisting Japan and saving the country, the CCP has voluntarily changed the past strategic policy of fighting for a soviet China to the

strategic policy of fighting for a democratic republic of China. Although the characteristics of the democratic republic proposed by the CCP must be different from the old type of democratic republics in some European countries and the United States formed by the past bourgeois revolutions, they are absolutely not the soviet model or that of the noncapitalist democratic republics. This republic will be and certainly is the new form of democratic republic that will be produced by the victory of the national united front against Japan, the democratic republic in which all forces fighting the Japanese to the end will participate. It is thus evident that those who believe in rumors that "victory of resistance against Japan leads to the rule of the soviet regime of the CCP" do not really understand the essence of the CCP's policies at the present revolutionary stage. The second question to be answered is about the present reality in China. Currently, the Japanese bandits are being expelled by the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP, and the GMD actually proves itself to be the biggest political party fighting for the existence of the Chinese people's national survival and Mr. Chiang, leader of the GMD, and other personalities leading the War of Resistance will become national heroes forever. At that time, who will fight against the will of the Chinese people for the overthrow of the GMD? Of course, at that time, the CCP will similarly become one of the important political parties more cherished and supported by the Chinese people. No one could carry out activities to overthrow the CCP against the will of the people. At that time, the GMD and the CCP will obviously share difficulties and hardship and further join hands in the common work of building up the country. If the War of Resistance unfortunately fails, the two parties will further their mutual assistance in opposition to the deadly common enemy. Thus how could one talk about who would be overthrown by whom? It is thus clear that those who believe in the rumor that "the victory of resistance against Japan will lead to the rule of the whole country by the soviet regime of the CCP" are not only confused about Chinese realities, but also have no faith in the fighting power of the Chinese GMD and in the bright future. This is obviously very harmful.

It is therefore apparent that an accurate explanation of the various basic issues about the two-party cooperation between the GMD and the CCP should enable everyone to understand first that the main reason for cooperation today is to cope with the national enemy and that the main objective of today's cooperation is to resist Japan together. The appropriate attitudes and policies toward the allied armies should be mutual respect, trust, help and supervision, common responsibility, common development, and common victory. The future prospect of the victory of the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP and of the entire national united front against Japan should be based on the common construction of a new, independent, free, and happy China.

What are the major concrete methods to be adopted to further consolidate and expand the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP?

First, a common program for the national united front against Japan must be negotiated and adopted.

Second, an organization should be set up for frequent consultations, negotiations, and discussions participated in by the representatives of the GMD and the CCP.

Third, for things such as military or governmental affairs and mass movements, the two parties should consolidate and then expand the scope and degree of cooperation to reach the objectives of consolidation and expansion of the national revolutionary army for the unification of all of China and should mobilize the labor power and the military, intellectual, material, and financial powers of the whole country genuinely and widely to win the final victory of the War of Resistance against Japan.

Only through the further consolidation and expansion of the close cooperation between the two parties can the national united front against Japan that unites the strength of the entire Chinese people be consolidated and expanded. But it must be clearly and openly recognized that while cooperation between the GMD and the CCP is the foundation and core of the national united front against Japan, it does not constitute the entire national united front. Apart from the GMD and the CCP, China still has several organized parties and groups and the many masses from all walks of life that remain to be organized. Therefore, the GMD and the CCP should work together to enlarge further the national united front against Japan by absorbing and organizing all anti-Japanese parties and groups and the broad masses into the national united front against Japan. How to expand further the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the basis of the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP? Clear explanations should be made of several major related issues, and many effective and concrete measures should be taken.

What are the main issues that must be made clear concerning the expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front?

First, apart from recognizing the GMD and the CCP, other anti-Japanese parties and groups exist. Needless to say, the GMD and the CCP are the political parties with the greatest power, contain the most members, and are the general gatherings for the majority of China's excellent progressive youth. At the same time, strictly speaking, there are indeed no other mass political parties apart from the GMD and the CCP. However, it must be recognized that the GMD and the CCP today have not been able to encompass all the anti-Japanese forces in Chinese society. Apart from the two parties, there are many political organizations that have their origins in various historical conditions of Chinese society. Although they have not formed mass political parties, many have become political groups with considerable strength working for the cause of uniting all national forces in the cause of resisting Japan and saving the country. Both the GMD and the CCP should try to absorb them into the organization of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

Second is the erroneous tendency of calling three persons a faction and five persons a party and even treating traitors and enemy spies (i.e., the lackeys of Japanese special agencies like the Trotskyite bandits) as a political party. It must be clearly realized that the most important content of the slogan of uniting all parties and factions to join in the anti-Japanese united front must be solidarity

with all genuinely anti-Japanese parties and groups. Traitors and enemy spies such as Trotskyite bandits are not objects of unity. Furthermore, they should and must be opposed by the anti-Japanese united front. Moreover, those who join the organization of the anti-Japanese national united front in the name of certain parties and groups should have considerable political influence among the masses. Otherwise, five persons can call themselves a party and three persons can create a group, and the result will be a failure to achieve a unity that effectively helps the Chinese people's resistance forces but with enough forces to increase the difficulties and obstacles to the unity of the anti-Japanese forces.

Third, apart from the parties and factions, efforts should be made to regard the mass organizations of all walks of life as forces of the anti-Japanese united front, pointing out that all mass organizations of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants should be active participants and members in the Anti-Japanese United Front. Only by absorbing various mass organizations into the Anti-Japanese National United Front can the forces of resistance be genuinely expanded and consolidated, on the one hand, and can the close relationship between the political parties, armies, government, and the broad masses be further consolidated and expanded, on the other.

Fourth, all kinds of inappropriate and harmful misunderstandings inside the anti-Japanese forces must be eliminated. First of all, it is necessary to remove some people's misunderstanding about the National Salvation Association and certain individuals inside the GMD. For example, some people insist on calling the anti-Japanese and patriotic personages of the National Salvation Association a faction of the "people's front"; others insist on calling some resistance friends of the GMD "fascists." It is fair to say that there are neither people's front factions nor fascist factions in China. I say that there is no people's front faction in China because friends from the National Salvation Association have repeatedly stated that they do not belong to a so-called people's front but to the national united front against Japan or the front to resist Japan and save the nation. China's historical conditions demonstrate that only a national united front against Japan can exist and that no fronts against the internal enemies of the people can exist. But the national front has a broader social composition compared with that of the people's front, and, in addition, its opposition is directed toward the external enemy and its running dogs. Therefore, I refuse to call some friends of the GMD fascists, not only because of their repeated statements that they have not participated in any fascist organizations and that they still believe only in the Chinese GMD, but also because of the proof provided by China's historical conditions and concrete circumstances that China can only have theories or organizations that oppose the fascist national aggression. There should be no speeches, actions, or organizations assisting fascist national oppression. The bright Chinese youth of today can only follow and believe in the ideologies and organizations that promote social progress and should not fall into the trap of, and mistakenly believe, the isms and organizations that oppose social progress. The GMD members should be loyal students of the revolutionary Three

Principles of the People and of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, and should not betray the prime minister and the Three Principles of the People and become followers of the reactionaries Hitler and Mussolini. The Three Principles of the People and fascism obviously contain fundamental differences. The basic stand of the Three Principles of the People is to gain national independence, to gain democratic freedom, and to improve the people's livelihood, whereas the essence of fascism is indeed to carry out national aggression, destroy democracy, and destroy the people's livelihood. Therefore, no one can believe that any excellent GMD member would be willing to turn from a believer of the revolutionary Three Principles of the People to a lackey of reactionary fascism. We hold that friends from the National Salvation Association and certain youths inside the GMD are all forces for resisting Japan and saving the nation in Chinese society. Therefore, we sincerely hope that they will fight against the traitors' creation of divisions among them and come together at the forefront to oppose Japan and save the nation.

It is evident, first of all, that a clear explanation of the major important issues concerning the enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front needs to recognize that there are other anti-Japanese parties and groups apart from the GMD and the CCP and that it is necessary to absorb them into the organization of the national united front against Japan. Second, it should be realized clearly that traitors and enemy spies are not objects of alliance and solidarity, but are to be opposed by the united front. It is significant to recognize the importance of inviting organized masses and groups and unorganized masses to join the Anti-Japanese National United Front and to dismiss some people's mistaking of the National Salvation Association as a "people's front" faction or some GMD people as "fascists." All these are preconditions for expanding the anti-Japanese national united front on the basis of the cooperation between the GMD and the CCP.

What are the main measures to be taken now to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the basis of two-party cooperation?

First, all parties and groups genuinely opposing Japan and wanting to save the nation, other than the GMD and the CCP, should be absorbed into the organization of the Anti-Japanese National United Front to fight for the common programs.

Second, all existing mass organizations of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants should be given the right to join the organization of the national united front against Japan and to increase the forces to resist Japan and save the nation.

Third, the broad unorganized masses from all walks of life should be organized under organizations of the national united front against Japan to enable them to become the organized main forces in the War of Resistance.

The further consolidation and expansion of the wholehearted unity of the national forces throughout China is only possible if it is accompanied by the consolidation and expansion of the national united front based on cooperation between the GMD and the CCP. The organized forces of 450 million people are an invincible world force and the only one that can finally overcome the Japanese bandits, win

China's national independence, and safeguard China's national revitalization. It must be remembered and recognized that the strong unity of the anti-Japanese forces throughout the Chinese nation is not only the sole basis for overcoming extremely serious internal difficulties of the resistance in China now, but also the most fundamental condition for increasing the deep sympathy and effective assistance to the Chinese people's liberation struggle by the international progressive forces. This is not only the key to saving the present crisis situation, but also a basic guarantee for the realization of the position that "the War of Resistance must be carried out to the end to achieve the final victory."

Hankou, 4 o'clock, 27 December

E.27 Summary of the March Politburo Meeting—The Current Situation in the War of Resistance and How to Continue the War and Gain Victory. *Wang Ming* (11 March 1938)¹¹³

At the beginning of March, the CCP Politburo held a three-day meeting. The agenda was: (1) The current situation in the War of Resistance and how to continue the war and gain victory; (2) the concrete preparatory work for the Seventh Party Congress. During reports and discussions, it was fully demonstrated that the comrades attending the Politburo meeting had the same views concerning the current situation and party work.

1. Evaluation of the Current Situation of the War of Resistance

[[Reports and discussions showed that everybody believed that since the last Politburo meeting [December 1937] progress had been made in both the military and political spheres. This progress, however, has not matched the continued aggression of the Japanese invaders and the deepening national crisis.]]

2. How to Continue the War of Resistance and Achieve Victory?

Our nation's soldiers and civilians should now do all they can to prevent Wuhan from being occupied by the enemy. At the same time, [we] should have the greatest enthusiasm about, and the strongest confidence in, the cause of defending Wuhan. But we should also have a deeper understanding and more long-term preparations. We should realize that if Wuhan does not fall our country can of course continue to fight the War of Resistance and gain final victory. However, even if Wuhan were to fall, although our war [effort] would encounter greater and more difficulties, the basic conditions for continuing a protracted war and gaining final victory would continue to exist.

[[A number of factors indicate that we can win the ultimate victory. First and foremost are the strengths of the Chinese nation itself. Second, the enemy faces many difficulties and has major weaknesses. Third, the international situation is basically favorable to our country's War of Resistance. This is absolutely not to say, however, that ultimate victory is guaranteed. To ensure that the second stage of the war proceeds smoothly the Politburo meeting believes that it is important to speak frankly on a number of crucial issues.]]

First, general views on military issues:

1) Establish and widely implement the strategy of relying mainly on mobile warfare supported by positional and guerrilla warfare. At the beginning of the war, only the Eighth Route Army adopted the strategy and tactics of mobile and guerrilla warfare (the Eighth Route Army cannot fight in mountainous areas because it does not have heavy artillery). In battles such as the Pingxing Fortress and Guangyang, it won stunning victories, smashing and destroying the enemy. In the second stage of the war, most of our country's military formations in the fronts at Shanxi, Shandong, and Henan all began to adopt the strategy of fighting mainly mobile warfare. In the theaters of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, our army and local armed forces also began to extensively adopt tactics of guerrilla warfare. That is why [we] recently made many gains in delivering heavy blows against and destroying the enemy, particularly by winning very important victories at the fronts in south Shandong and Shanxi. To defend Wuhan and deliver even greater blows to the enemy's armed forces at the fronts in Henan, Shanxi, and Shandong, we must firmly establish and extensively implement the strategy of relying mainly on mobile warfare supported by guerrilla and positional warfare. To implement this strategy properly and smoothly, we must (i) organize considerable numbers of field army corps to hit, wear down, and destroy the enemy in mobile warfare, (ii) organize considerable numbers of forward army groups to penetrate deep into the enemy's rear to organize guerrilla warfare, and (iii) defend several important positions to stop the enemy's advance and penetration.

2) Establish a genuinely unified and politically resolute National Revolutionary Army with a strong fighting capacity. In order to defeat the well-armed enemy, [we] must establish a unified national army; the CCP publicly raised this point as early as the 1935 "August 1 Declaration" [Doc. E.5]. The slogan we raised about establishing a completely unified united national army to resist Japan did not advocate abandoning the existing armed forces in China and creating purely new armies. Nor did the slogan call for all armies in China to be linked and unified under the name of anti-Japanese united armed forces. Instead, we were expressing our desire that, first, all kinds of unlinked armed forces throughout the country be united to become a Chinese united army. Second, this united army should take responsibility for providing national defense. Under China's specific current conditions, this means that it must take up the responsibility of fighting the War of Resistance against Japan. What are the basic requirements of a united army? We believe that it must have the following: (i) a united command, (ii) a united establishment, (iii) a united weapons

system, (iv) united discipline, (v) united treatment, (vi) united battle plans, and (vii) united combat.

Now our country has the basis for a united army. This is mainly manifested in the fact that (i) the previous armed forces from different establishments (such as the armed forces of the central government, the Red Army, and all kinds of local armed forces) have already been reorganized into a united National Revolutionary Army and that (ii) these armed forces are under the unified command of the supreme commander and the military affairs committee. These armed forces are doing their best to implement unified battle plans and act in a concerted manner. However, the requirements for unified discipline, unified treatment, unified weapons system, and unified establishment have yet to be met. Unified treatment and battle plans, as the needs of the war itself, have already become the common demand of all the troops fighting the Japanese. Therefore, no further explanation is needed here. On the issue of unified discipline and establishment, we propose that they be set up in line with the needs and interests of combat and the strengths of individual military units. How can we make sure that the troops are politically reliable? Today, at least the following three basic steps should be taken: (i) immediately establish an extensive system of political education. Recently, a political department was set up under the military affairs committee. This is worth noting and praising. We hope that the heads and work personnel of the political department will be able to restore effectively the revolutionary spirit and glorious tradition of the Northern Expedition period in political work. [We hope that they will] copy the experiences of the Eighth Route Army in political work, set up agencies for political work in the military, carefully select work personnel, and seriously carry out the work of political education so as to raise political consciousness and our troops' fighting will establish a close and friendly relationship between the army and the people, and at the same time, achieve the objective of demoralizing the enemy and reclaiming the land occupied by the enemy. (ii) Officers must share weal and woe with the soldiers, live and die with them, in order to achieve solidarity between officers and soldiers. (iii) Quickly improve the system of conscription.

[[3] Several dozen divisions equipped with modern weapons should form the core of our entire armed forces.

4) Quickly construct and expand military industries and speed up military transportation networks.

5) Provide speedy and extensive knowledge for soldiers and civilians with knowledge about and protection against chemical weapons.]]

Second, our views on several urgent issues in domestic politics.

1) The issue of consolidating and expanding the solidarity among the GMD and the CCP and all anti-Japanese forces: freedom of belief and different parties must not be abolished; they should be allowed to continue to exist in order to struggle for national salvation. On this, on behalf of the CC, Comrade Mao Zedong made unambiguous comments in his talk with the reporter of the *New China* newspaper in Yan'an on 10 February this year.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the enlightened leaders and the

majority of the cadres and members of the GMD also share this view. Reality refutes the practice of allowing only one political party to exist legally while refusing to recognize the legal existence of other parties. Reality also refutes the solution of abolishing all the existing parties and merging them into one party. The consolidation and expansion of cooperation among the GMD, the CP, and all the anti-Japanese parties and groups is called for by the wishes of the people and is necessary for the War of Resistance. Therefore, the Politburo meeting unanimously believes that the only correct solution to this issue lies in a certain form of national revolutionary alliance that, following the spirit of Sun Yat-sen, includes all parties and groups. The fundamental principle for establishing this alliance should include the following three points: (i) All parties, groups, and organizations devise a joint program for the united front to be followed by all as the guideline for each party's propaganda and action. (ii) Representatives from each party form a hierarchical organization, from central government down to local governments, for the united front to devise strategies for fighting the Japanese and saving the country, and for mediating relations between different parties and groups. (iii) Parties and groups that join this alliance still retain their political and organizational autonomy. The substance of the program of the united front is to be discussed and determined jointly by the representatives of all the parties and groups (the GMD, the CP, the National Youth Party, the Action Committee for China's National Liberation, the National Socialist Party, etc.). The form of organization of the united front can either be one organized by the representatives from each party and group, or be the form adopted during the first cooperation between the GMD and the CP between 1924 and 1927, or it can take another form. As long as the form contributes to unity in the war, the CCP is willing to discuss and implement it together with the comrades from the GMD and all other anti-Japanese groups.

2) Relations with and hopes for the GMD. The GMD now occupies a dominant position both in the government and in the military; it is the largest political party in our country. Therefore, anyone who sincerely supports the war against Japan and the efforts to save China earnestly hopes that the GMD will improve and strengthen itself. Today, only the Japanese fascists, their running dogs, the traitors of China, and the Trotskyites attempt to overthrow the GMD and create phony organizations in places like Nanjing in order to slander the GMD. Only people like these hope that the GMD's position will worsen. We CCP members are sons and daughters of the Chinese nation; we are profoundly and deeply concerned with the survival of our nation and our country. We harbor an equally profound hatred toward the Japanese warlords. Therefore, we have boundless loyalty to and confidence in the cause of continuing resolutely to fight the War of Resistance against Japan and gaining the final victory for our country and our nation. Precisely because of this, [we] nurture genuine friendship toward, and warm hopes for, the largest fraternal party in our country that is leading the armed forces and the people in fighting the War of Resistance—the GMD. We hope that the GMD will greatly strengthen itself politically and organizationally. The more improved, strengthened, and powerful the

GMD becomes, the more improved, strengthened, and powerful the cause of the War of Resistance will become. Therefore, the further progress and strengthening of the GMD not only benefits the GMD itself, but also the entire nation. At the same time, it benefits the CP and all the parties and groups fighting the Japanese to save our country. Precisely because of this, we sincerely and enthusiastically hope that the GMD will undertake the following to improve and strengthen itself: (i) purge all the corrupt elements and those disloyal to the party and the revolutionary cause of the War of Resistance in order to cleanse the organization of the party. (ii) Recruit a large number of progressive youth and elements into the organization to increase the new forces. (iii) Practice real democratic centralism within its organization (which is: the minority obeys the majority; party members have complete freedom to discuss and criticize before any issue is decided; after it is decided, everyone must implement the decision of the organization no matter what their view; the subordinate must implement the resolutions and directives of the superior; if they have different views about the resolutions and directives of the superior, they may present their views to the superior; but they must still implement these resolutions and directives before they are changed by the superior) in order to establish inner-party life and train a large number of cadres. Democratic centralism does not at all conflict with the authority of the leaders of the party and governing organs. On the contrary, only by practicing democratic centralism can leaders and governing organs have greater authority and play a greater role. At the same time, a complete life within the organization of the party can thus be instituted; and a large number of new cadres will thus emerge; this will be the proof. (iv) Strengthen political and organizational unity in order to consolidate party solidarity. (v) Improve and strictly enforce party discipline so that party members will voluntarily do their best for the party and the revolutionary cause. Enlightened leaders and party members in the GMD, of course, have very intelligent views on the improvement and strengthening of the GMD itself. We offer the above suggestions to the GMD as reference materials from the point of view of a friendly party.

3) Our views on the government of the united front. To guarantee victory in the War of Resistance, there must be a unified government for the entire country; this is a consistent strong belief of ours. Therefore, in the "August 1 Declaration" of 1935, the CP CC raised the slogan of [establishing] a unified government of national defense for the entire country. At the same time, [we have] repeatedly explained that the significance and meaning of this slogan is neither the overthrow of the existing central government nor a demand for the central government to change its name. Rather, this means that the central government should become a unified government and fulfill the task of resisting the Japanese and defending our country. Moreover, we have long since turned the soviet government into a local border area government in order to promote and assist in the establishment of a unified central government of China. The government of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region is one of the local governments of the Republic of China and is subordinate to the central government of the Republic of China; this is a well-known fact. On the issue of the

composition and administrative system of the government of the border area, the representatives of the Party Center have repeatedly explained to the leaders of the GMD and the central government and received permission and replies from Mr. Chiang [Kai-shek]. His announcement will soon be issued. In the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, not only the CP but also the GMD and all the anti-Japanese parties and groups have legal status. Because of its infertile land and the poverty of its people, we are unable to deliver satisfactory results in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. What we can accomplish now is no more than the purge of corrupt local despots, abolition of unreasonable taxes and levies, considerable improvement in the standard of living for the local population, extensive freedom and democracy for the people, and education and organization of the people in terms of giving special treatment to families of the soldiers who are fighting the Japanese. We regard these as not only things that the people of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region warmly welcome, but also things that the people all over China yearn for. These are not only things we the communists should do, but also things all the true believers of Mr. Sun Yat-sen should do. Therefore, these are not only things that the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region should carry out, but also things that should be carried out by all the territories of the Republic of China. It cannot be said that these are things that violate the wishes of the central government. Rather, we think they are exemplary of local self-government and are approved of by the central government. In addition, in over thirty counties reclaimed by the Eighth Route Army in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, all administrative systems and [solutions] of all personnel problems are permitted and authorized beforehand by the commanding officer, the military affairs committee of the central government, and the central government. When there are misunderstandings and conflicts over certain issues, the Party Center always seeks reasonable solutions according to the principle of maintaining unity and continuing the War of Resistance. All this proves, in fact, our CP's honorable and sincere position on the issue of supporting a united government.

This Politburo meeting believes unanimously and resolutely that we are not only doing our best at the moment to support the united government that is leading the War of Resistance, but also doing our utmost to support the united government even as the War of Resistance is becoming more difficult and the situation more complex. This is because when the war becomes more difficult and the national crisis deepens, the need for a united government to rule at home and defend against the outside looms even more urgent and larger. Therefore, a few people have attempted to use the issue of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region to denounce the CCP as "sabotaging the unification of the administrative system," and even slander the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region as a "feudal fiefdom" in order to undermine the unity between the GMD and the CP in [their joint efforts at] fighting the Japanese and saving China. They do so in order to provoke misunderstandings between the central government and local governments. This is not only ordinary dishonest talk that denies iron-clad facts, but a harmful act that ignores the general interest and the entire situation.

4) On the issue of establishing full representative bodies. To increase mutual trust and assistance between the government and the people, to increase the effectiveness of the people and the government in prosecuting the war and building the country, the establishment of full representative bodies has become an urgent task which can no longer be postponed. As for the form of representative bodies, the Politburo meeting believes there must be enlargement either of the national defense senate, or of the national parliament, or of other bodies. The most important factors are: (i) Such bodies should truly incorporate all anti-Japanese parties and groups, all the military forces, the authoritative representatives of mass organizations—in general, the talents that can represent the will of our 450 million compatriots. (ii) These bodies should have not only the function of making suggestions and providing consultation to the government, but also the power to discuss national affairs and make decisions on domestic and foreign policies.

5) On the question of mobilizing and organizing the people. Victory in the national war of self-defense by the oppressed peoples not only requires maximum efforts by the government and the armed forces, but also calls for the total mobilization of, and active participation by, the majority of the people. This is a truth repeatedly tested and proved at home and abroad, at present and in the past.

[[Revolutionary teachers have already pointed out this truth to us.]] Our country's War of Resistance has lasted eight months; we have not yet fully mobilized the power of the people. In order to continue the War of Resistance and gain final victory, the Politburo meeting believes that we should immediately remedy this weakness. We propose organizing workers, peasants, students, and merchants, according to their professional fields, into all kinds of professional associations. We propose organizing the youth, women, and cultural [workers], according to their real interests and special needs, into all kinds of united mass groups, and perfecting and strengthening existing mass groups. We propose absorbing unorganized people into all kinds of mass groups. At the same time, we propose establishing a unified and national-level governing organ in the country and organizing, in all areas, governing organs for all kinds of mass groups. These groups should register with the government organs and accept the leadership of the government. They should carry out the work of mass groups themselves under the principle of resisting Japanese aggression to save China, so as to achieve the unification between the mass movement and mass organization.

In addition, the Politburo meeting especially points out: we should not only pay attention to helping the government to mobilize and organize the people in the areas ruled by the government, but also pay attention to devoting painstaking efforts to mobilizing and organizing the people in the areas occupied by the enemy. The general guidelines for the mass movement within the areas ruled by our government should be to mobilize and organize the people to help the government and its armed forces to prosecute the War of Resistance and achieve victory. The general guidelines for the mass movement within the areas occupied by the enemy are to mobilize and organize the people to fight and overthrow the rule of the enemy and its

puppets, so that they will suffer repeated military defeats. Therefore, the work methods in the mass movement within the areas ruled by our central government should be based on the principles of legality, unification, mutual assistance, and cooperation. The work methods for the mass movement within the areas occupied by the enemy must strictly observe secrecy and the utilization of possibilities of legality to reach the goal of mobilizing and organizing the people to overthrow the rule of the enemy and its puppets.

Third, our views on the diplomatic question. When discussing the international conditions for our country's War of Resistance, we have already pointed out that although the principle of "self-reliance" should first be adhered to in our country's War of Resistance, at the same time we must recognize, internationally, who our true friends are in order to skillfully take advantage of favorable international conditions and seek all the possible and necessary foreign aid. In addition, I want to point out that in terms of our country's foreign policy not only should the government more actively ally with all the friends sympathetic to China's War of Resistance against Japan as our foreign source of support, but also it should mobilize and organize an extensive campaign of citizen's diplomacy. Our country's War of Resistance has been going on for eight months, but our propaganda on the international stage and the ties between all kinds of mass organizations in the country and mass groups in other countries are too weak. We propose: (i) All parties, groups, and mass organizations of our country issue a joint declaration to the world proletarian organizations (the Comintern, the Socialist Democratic International, the International Labor Union in Amsterdam, and the parties and unions it leads), and to all the international organizations that help to maintain world peace (the international antiwar organizations, the Association of the Friends of the League of Nations, etc.), asking that they lend us more powerful moral and material support. (ii) Quickly dispatch a delegation of prestigious representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and merchants and representatives of women, children, and refugees to Europe and the United States to propagandize the details of the Japanese atrocities in China and our country's heroic War of Resistance. (iii) Produce several vivid films that portray the lives of the Chinese people, expose the atrocities of the Japanese, and depict our country's national unity and self-defense against aggression, to be sent to Europe and the United States for public viewing. (iv) Immediately provide all kinds of appropriate books, materials, and pictures to the newspapers, magazines, and news agencies of Europe, the United States, and the countries in the East. (v) For this undertaking to proceed smoothly, the government must cooperate closely with all parties, groups, and mass organizations; establish a united organ to lead, plan, and direct it.

Fourth, finally, the Politburo meeting discussed the strengthening and improvement of the CCP itself. First, the Politburo meeting believes: We must explain extensively both within and outside of the party that, for the great cause of the War of Resistance and striving for victory, the need to consolidate and expand the strength of the CP is an absolute one. This is because the CP is the second-largest

party in China that is firmly committed to fighting the War of Resistance to the end and winning final victory. Therefore, the more the CP's strength increases, the more the strength for fighting the War of Resistance increases. Thus, to consolidate and expand the strength of the CP is not only an enterprise beneficial to the CP and the working class, but also an enterprise beneficial to the entire nation and thus also beneficial to the GMD and all the anti-Japanese parties and groups. Today, only the Japanese imperialists, their running dogs, and the Trotskyites are attempting to destroy the CCP. This is why they do their best to fabricate rumors to slander the CCP. All the people and anti-Japanese forces in the country should and must cherish the CCP even more. Second, the Politburo meeting particularly notes:

1) Numerically, our party today cannot meet the needs of the War of Resistance. Therefore, we demand that all party comrades treat recruitment of members as one of the most fundamental tasks in their daily operations.

2) The quality of our party (or its social content) needs to be changed dramatically. In the past few years, because of all kinds of factors such as the special historical environment, peasants, hired hands and artisans made up the majority of the party in terms of social composition. The ratio of industrial workers from large urban areas is too low. Now we should do our best to overcome this weakness and recruit into the party the progressive workers and intellectuals from important industries.

3) Because of the complexity and tension in the domestic and international political environment, because of the increase in the number of new party members and the theoretical deficiency of our veteran cadres, the strengthening of the regular political education in Marxism-Leninism within the party and the strengthening of the in-depth study of the Three Principles of the People within the party have become critical and urgent tasks for every agency and every comrade within the party.

4) Speed up the selection and training of a large number of new party cadres and nonparty revolutionary cadres to increase our strength in the War of Resistance.

5) To meet the needs of the environment of the War of Resistance, we must establish and improve the independent working capabilities of local party organizations.

6) Strengthen the work of the party's newspapers and enable the comrades throughout the party to understand the significance of party newspapers and pay great attention to the directives published in them.

7) Establish correct ties between open and secret operations; step up secret operations in order to prevent sabotage and harassment by the Japanese and Chinese traitors.

8) Intensify the ideological struggle between two lines. Firmly oppose those leftist and exclusionist elements who do not understand that to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front is the fundamental safeguard for fighting a long War of Resistance and winning final victory. At the same time, ruthlessly attack those who distort the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United

Front as unprincipled surrender, or those rightist elements who have a completely pessimistic and hopeless attitude toward the future of the Chinese revolution.

9) Strengthen education within the party. Maintain party members' glorious Bolshevik style and tradition of austerity, diligence, and self-sacrifice; severely attack those ideologically and morally corrupt elements and even expel them from the party.

10) Raise revolutionary vigilance; tightly watch and smash all the conspiracies by the Japanese aggressors, Chinese traitors, and all reactionaries who conduct sabotage within and outside of the CP.

11) Pay particular attention to consolidating the party's ideological and organizational unity.

3. The War of Resistance and the Issue of the Slogan of the Chinese Democratic Republic

The first thing to be mentioned is the issue of the nature of the Chinese Democratic Republic, which we have already raised—on 17 September 1936, the Party Center passed a special “Resolution on the New Situation in the Movement to Resist Japan and for National Salvation and the Democratic Republic.”¹¹⁵ In this resolution, the Party Center publicly stated: “The CC believes that under the present circumstances there is the need to raise the slogan of a democratic republic because this is the best means of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces to protect the integrity of Chinese territory and protecting the Chinese people from suffering the calamity of destruction of their country and genocide. This, however, is also the most appropriate slogan for the united front, which originated with the democratic demands of the majority of the people.” Some have said that the CP raised the slogan of a united Chinese Democratic Republic to change the name of the Republic of China. Of course, this is nonsense. In itself, there is nothing wrong with the name Republic of China; the issue is not the name of the country, but rather the essence of the Republic of China. According to the meaning of the word and, more importantly, according to the wishes of the founding fathers of the Republic of China and the people of all of China, the Republic of China should be a democratic republic of the Chinese people. However, it is very unfortunate that during the past twenty-odd years, the Republic of China has failed to do what its name implies. Precisely because of this, our party has raised the slogan of establishing a unified Democratic Republic of China so as to indicate the true essence of the Republic of China we hope to see. As for the issue of a united Chinese Democratic Republic and a State of the Three Principles of the People, we have repeatedly said that the new China we hope to see established is an independent nation with democracy, freedom, and a prosperous livelihood for the people. In other words, it is a China of the Three Principles of the People, which Mr. Sun Yat-sen hoped and struggled for all his life but which did not come about in his lifetime.

The second thing to be discussed is the issue of the strategy and tactics of the

revolution in the current stage—in the current historical stage of the development of the Chinese revolution, we have presented our policy of the anti-Japanese national united front and, at the same time, publicly declared our abandonment, during this stage, of the slogan of making China a soviet and our willingness to struggle for the establishment of a united Chinese Democratic Republic. Therefore, this has caused some theoretical disputes among our comrades. Some say this is a change in tactics; others say that this is a change of strategy. How should we understand this issue correctly? First of all, we must understand the strategy and tactics of the revolution as well as the mutual relationship between them. What is the strategy of the revolution? “Strategy determines the proletariat’s main direction of attack on the basis of the stage of the revolution at the time; it sets the plan for deployment of the revolutionary forces (mainly the primary and secondary forces) [who] struggle for the fulfillment of this plan in the course of this stage.” What are the tactics of the revolution? “Tactics are decisions on the line of action of the proletariat during a relatively short period of time, during the rising or receding tide of the movement, and during the rise or decline of the revolution.” What is the relationship between strategy and tactics? “Tactics are part of the strategy, subordinate to and in service of the strategy.” (Stalin, *On Leninism* [Moscow: Workers’ Publishing House, 1935], pp. 87–89.) During the previous stage of the Chinese revolution, which was the stage of the struggle for the establishment of a soviet China, the target to be overthrown by the revolution was all imperialist rule in China and the government of Chinese landlords and the bourgeoisie. The primary force of the revolution was the proletariat; its immediate reserves being the peasantry and the urban poor. The goal of the revolution was to establish a soviet regime of the dictatorship by workers and peasants. In the current stage of the anti-Japanese national united front and the struggle for the establishment of the democratic republic, the target to be overthrown by the revolution is Japanese imperialism and its puppet regime. The forces joining in this democratic revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and all other anti-Japanese forces. The immediate goal of the revolution is to establish a Chinese democratic republic for all classes, parties, and groups who have joined the Anti-Japanese National United Front. In this respect, the CCP has undertaken a change in strategy in the current stage of the revolution. This is to say that it is a fundamental change in the deployment of the major revolutionary forces, and not an individual and partial change in the forms of struggle and organization. Of course, since the strategy has changed, tactics change to serve the strategy.

4. The Issue of the Concrete Preparatory Efforts for the Seventh Party Congress

[[The Politburo meeting agreed with the December 1937 decision that it was very important for efforts to resist Japan to convene the Seventh Party Congress.]]

E.28 On the New Stage (Excerpts). *Mao Zedong*
(12–14 October 1938)¹¹⁶

18) The GMD Has a Bright Future

The Anti-Japanese National United Front has the GMD and the CP as its base, and of these two the GMD is the major party. The development of and adherence to the War of Resistance cannot be imagined without the GMD. The GMD has a glorious history. Of primary importance is the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, the founding of the republic, the opposition to Yuan Shikai, the establishment of a policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and with the CP as well as a worker-peasant policy, and the implementation of the Great Revolution of 1926–27. Today, it is again leading the great War of Resistance against Japan. It has the historical tradition of the Three Principles of the People; it has had two great leaders, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek; and it has a broad mass of loyal and patriotic party members. This must not be ignored by the people; they are the results of the development of China's history. In the course of carrying out the War of Resistance against Japan and in the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the GMD has occupied the leadership position.

Over the past fifteen months, the various anti-Japanese parties and groups have improved and the progress of the GMD has been very clear. It convened the provisional congress, proclaimed the program for the War of Resistance, convened the People's Political Council, began the organization of the Three Principles of the People Youth League, accepted the legal existence of the various parties and groups that resist Japan and carry out national construction together, implemented to a certain degree democratic power, carried out reforms in the military and in political organizations, made foreign policy compatible with the demands of opposition against Japan, etc., all of which are major events of historical significance. Solely on the basis of persisting in the War of Resistance and in the united front, it can be predicted that the GMD's future will be bright.

Up to now, however, there remain many who harbor an incorrect view of the GMD, and they doubt its future. They doubt whether it can continue to wage the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become an ally for opposing Japan and national construction. Furthermore, these problems are mutually connected and inseparable. What is our opinion on this? We hold that the GMD has a bright future. On the basis of various subjective and objective conditions, it is able to continue with the War of Resistance, continue to progress, and become an ally for opposing Japan and for national construction.

[[Rest of section omitted.]]

V) Protracted Warfare and Long-Term Cooperation

Let us now discuss specifically the protracted nature of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and give a complete answer to the many questions raised by those

people who are extremely concerned about the relationship between the GMD and the CP. This has great significance with regard to the consolidation and expansion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the consolidation and expansion of cooperation between the GMD and the CP, and the smooth implementation of the current urgent tasks of transcending the difficult obstacle of war.

The problems are as follows: the protracted nature of the war determines the long-term nature of cooperation; cooperation in the war determines cooperation after the war; the context of long-term cooperation and its chief conditions—the Three Principles of the People and communism; the organizational form of the long-term cooperation, the policy of mutual aid and concession in the long-term cooperation, and the problem of a democratic republic. Many people are concerned about these, and we should give clear-cut answers.

1) The Protracted Nature of the Struggle Determines the Long-Term Nature of Cooperation

Because the War of Resistance against Japan is a protracted one, the entire Anti-Japanese National United Front can and will have to be a long one, and cooperation between the two principal parties—the GMD and the CP—can, and also will have to, be long-term. This is the point from which all policies proceed. Therefore, our policy must at all costs contain a long-term national united front, a long-term cooperation. We must at all costs preserve a united government, oppose division and splits, and thus facilitate overcoming the difficulties of war, oppose enemy sabotage, beat back Japanese imperialism, and accomplish the task of establishing a new China after the war. This is quite different from the GMD-CP cooperation from 1924 to 1927. That was only for a short period, but this is a long-term affair.

2) Cooperation in the War Determines Cooperation After the War

The so-called long-term cooperation applies not only to the war but also to its aftermath. The war against Japan is a protracted one, and cooperation in the war can be said to be long-term. This, however, is not enough; we hope to continue cooperation and are determined to do so. What guarantee is there? The guarantee lies in the fact that cooperation during the war determines cooperation afterward. The principal parties of the GMD and the CP in the Anti-Japanese National United Front must face difficulties together, exist together, or become extinct together. They must strive for progress, and only through prolonged efforts can they beat back Japanese imperialism. Otherwise, this will be impossible. Two progressive parties that will have faced difficulties during such a long period of time, after the war is over, will then form a foundation for continued cooperation. At that time, conditions domestically and internationally will be even more conducive to cooperation. This can be seen even now. There is no doubt that various stages of cooperation in the war will exist, and there will be even more substance to the postwar cooperation. Coopera-

tion in the war, however, will determine that there can be cooperation after the war. This is not a baseless estimation.

3) The Content of Long-Term Cooperation and Its Principal Condition

The so-called long-term cooperation is the long-term national united front. All classes, from capitalists to the workers; all political parties, from the GMD to the CP; all nationalities, from the Han to the Miao and Yao minority nationalities; all troops, from the nationalist armies to the Eighth Route Army; and all governments, from the nationalist government to the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region government, are included, with the exception of national traitors. Furthermore, they will be in the united front for a long time. There are some people who cannot endure the arduous struggle of protracted war. When that time comes, they are apt to place their individual interests over those of the national interest and become national traitors. Therefore, the national united front must continuously weed out these national traitors. This does not, however, alter the national united front. The reason is that the main condition for long-term cooperation is the brutality of the enemy's war and its protracted nature. Because the enemy is waging a barbaric war it gravely endangers the very existence of the various classes of the entire nation. Accordingly, this compelled the higher classes to oppose the Japanese together with the other classes. It is inevitable that a portion of the higher classes will withdraw from the anti-Japanese front. However, the other sections are generally in the same position as the other classes. They are oppressed, and there is no way out except through resistance. Also, because this barbaric war is a long one, it determines the long-term nature of cooperation. But there is another aspect. It requires that the various cooperating parties, mainly the GMD and the CP, adopt a correct policy and carry out necessary work. What kind of policy and work should this be? This should be policy and work carried out on the basis of protracted war and long-term cooperation. It should be policy and work that will take care of the present and the future and all classes, parties, armies, and nationalities. Otherwise, the policy will be incorrect and the work cannot be carried out, thereby creating confusion that makes it difficult for the cooperation to endure. Since the enemy's war is barbaric in nature, and because of the correct policy and the necessary work to be done in the united front, the Chinese national united front should, and must, be a protracted one. It is a national front and not a people's front. It includes the cooperation between the GMD and the CP during and after the war, and it is not a cooperation intended to split into civil war after the war has ended.

4) The Three Principles of the People and Communism

The Three Principles of the People is the political foundation for the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the cooperation between the GMD and the CP. But what is the relationship between the Three Principles of the People and the CP? What

attitude should CP members adopt toward it? Even now, there are still some people who are not clear on this point, and therefore it will be necessary to explain it once more.

The provisional congress of our party held in May 1937 passed the following document on "implementing resolutely the Three Principles of the People."

Does the CP agree with the Three Principles of the People? Our answer is yes. The Three Principles of the People has undergone changes in the course of its history. The revolutionary Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen won the trust of the people through cooperation with the CP and by resolute implementation. It launched the victorious Great Revolution of 1925 to 1927. Because it drove out the Communists (the movement to purge the party) and carried out an opposition policy, however, it lost the trust of the people and brought about the failure of the revolution. Now, the national and social situation is extremely grave, and thus there is an urgent plea for cooperation between the two parties from the people of the nation and patriotic elements in the GMD. Therefore, the spirit of the Three Principles of the People has been revived. Under the principles of nationalism with independence and liberation internationally, the power of the people's democratic freedom domestically, and the increase of the people's happiness under the principle of people's livelihood, the two parties began to cooperate again and led the people in resolutely carrying out these principles. This completely meets the historical needs of the Chinese revolution, and each party member should understand and recognize this. The CP will never abandon its ideals of socialism and communism. These will be attained by going through the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution. The CP has its own party and political programs. The party program is socialism and communism, and it is different from the Three Principles of the People. Its democratic revolutionary political program is more thorough than that of any other parties or groups, but basically it is not in conflict with the Three Principles of the People program proclaimed by the First and Second Congress of the GMD. Therefore, not only do we not reject the Three Principles of the People, but we are willing to implement them resolutely. Furthermore, we ask the GMD to join us in implementing the Three Principles of the People and also call on the people of the whole country to implement the Three Principles of the People so as to enable the GMD, the CP, and the people of the whole country to struggle together for the three great objectives of national independence, freedom of people's powers, and happiness in the lives of the people.¹¹⁷

On 22 September of last year, our CC, in the announcement proclaiming the cooperation between the GMD and the CP, emphasized: "The Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen is necessary today. Our party is willing to struggle for its thorough implementation."

Why did a political party such as the CP adopt this attitude? It is quite obvious that national independence, freedom of people's rights, and the people's livelihood are the general objective that the CP seeks to realize in the national democratic revolutionary stage. It is also the general objective sought by the people of the nation, and it is not a thing sought by a certain party on its own. Understanding will come only if you look at the documents since the founding of the CP and at its

political programs. In the past, therefore, and not only during the first period of cooperation between the GMD and the CP from 1924 to 1927, our party members resolutely implemented the Three Principles of the People. Even after the unfortunate disruption of the two-party cooperation in 1927, none of our actions contravened the Three Principles of the People. At that time, in line with nationalism, we resolutely opposed imperialism. In line with the principle of people's rights, we implemented the political system of people's congresses. Also, in line with the principle of people's livelihood, we initiated the land system of peasants having their own land to cultivate. None of our methods exceeded the basic category of the system of private property of the bourgeoisie and the democratic revolution. The current stage of the War of Resistance and the stage of establishing a democratic republic are, by nature, the stages of the Three Principles of the People and the bourgeois democratic revolution. Undoubtedly, in order to carry out resolutely this task of the democratic stage, all CP members should sincerely implement the Three Principles of the People in accordance with their unwavering general revolutionary policy, as well as with their own resolutions and announcements, and work together with the GMD, other parties, and the broad masses of the people throughout the country. Whoever is not loyal to the beliefs of the Three Principles of the People and does not implement them is a hypocrite, not a loyal Marxist. In China, anybody loyal to Marxism has two responsibilities: one is the current actual task, and the other is the far-reaching ideal of the future. This can only be understood by completing as much as possible of the current and great ideal of communism—the most perfect social system for all humankind. Dr. Sun Yat-sen also understood the necessity of implementing it in order to resolve future social problems. The so-called real task at present is the Three Principles of the People. This is the task of the current stage to “achieve equal status internationally, politically, and economically,” and it is a demand made by the GMD, the CP, and the people of the entire country. Therefore, CP members should study the Three Principles of the People as carefully as they do communism, and apply Marxist precepts to the study of the theories of the Three Principles of the People in order to find out how the Three Principles of the People can be implemented in a concrete manner, and how to use the correct ideas of the Three Principles of the People to educate the masses so as to bring about a transformation from understanding to action, and struggle to beat back Japanese imperialism and construct a new China based upon the Three Principles of the People.

5) The Organizational Form for Long-Term Cooperation

In order to ensure long-term cooperation, it will still be necessary to resolve the problem of the organizational form of cooperation. We have already rejected the idea of one-partyism. Whether it is with respect to past history, to the current task, or to the natural qualities of Chinese society, there is no basis at all for one-partyism. It cannot be achieved; nor can it be implemented. It betrays the major objective

of uniting all to oppose Japan and build up the nation, and it is thoroughly harmful. Is there then a need for a kind of united and common organization for the various parties to coexist and form a national united front against Japan? Yes, there is such a need. Without such a united and common organization for all, it will be difficult to unite and oppose Japan, and it will be even more harmful to long-term cooperation. Therefore, the various parties should earnestly study and find a united and common organizational form which will be most suitable for long-term cooperation. Let us study this now.

The historical characteristics of the various parties and China's politics and economy present three types of organizational forms.

First, the GMD can itself be transformed into a national alliance, with the various parties participating in the GMD but retaining their independent nature. This will be different from the first cooperation between the GMD and the CP. If the GMD agrees to our participation, what attitude shall we adopt? First, we approve of this method, because this is one of the best kinds of united organization for the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and it will be beneficial to national construction. Not only the CP but all other parties should participate in the GMD. As long as the GMD agrees, we will definitely not oppose it. If it is done this way, we can then apply a method different from that used during the three years of cooperation. That is, first, all CP members will openly participate in the GMD and a list of such party members will be provided to the GMD's leading organ. Second, we will not enlist any GMD members into the CP. Those who want to join will be counseled not to do so in order to preserve the general situation. Third, if our young party members have been approved by the GMD to participate in the Three Principles of the People Youth League, this is acceptable. There will be no organization of secret party groups, and we will not accept noncommunist members into our party. The use of this method will provide assurance for everybody, and it will be beneficial to all and without harmful effects. This is the first type of organizational form for the united front.

The second type is for the various parties to organize a national alliance and support Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme leader of this alliance. The various parties, on the basis of equality, dispatch representatives to organize a committee of all parties concerned, from the central government to the various levels of local government, to work for the implementation of the common program and administer common matters. This is also a good form, and we also approve it. We proposed such a form long ago, but unfortunately, it was not implemented.

The third type is the present method. There are no formulated documents, and when problems arise, consultations are held between the two parties to resolve them. This form of organization is too loose, however, and many problems cannot be resolved satisfactorily and in a timely manner. For instance, the implementation of major political policies and the alleviation of friction in lower echelons have been neglected because there was no fixed organization to handle them. Therefore, this method is not beneficial for long-term cooperation. However, if the first and second methods are inapplicable, this method can temporarily remain.

[[6) The Policy of Mutual Aid and Mutual Concession in Long-Term Cooperation]]

7) On the Problem of a Democratic Republic

Although our party, in September 1936, announced the resolution on constructing a democratic republic,¹¹⁸ and comrades from the Party Center have explained this question, there are many outside our circle who do not understand our proposals. This is a problem relating to the future of the War of Resistance. What will be the result of the War of Resistance? With regard to the so-called War of Resistance and National Construction, what kind of a nation should be established in accordance with the CP's ideas? This is a problem that confronts us, and to explain it once more will be beneficial to the consolidation of the confidence of various parties and groups for long-term cooperation.

What kind of nation should be established? The answer, in a word, is the establishment of a republic based on the Three Principles of the People. The democratic republic, as we call it, is the republic of the Three Principles of the People, and its nature is that of the Three Principles of the People. According to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, it is one that "seeks equal status internationally, an equal political status, and equality in economic status." First, it is a country with nationalism. It is an independent nation and will not be subjected to any interference from any country, and at the same time, it will not interfere with any foreign nations. That is to say, the original semicolonial status of China has been changed, and it has become independent. At the same time, regardless of how powerful it becomes, it absolutely will not become an imperialist country, but will have peaceful relations and coexist in friendship in the spirit of equality with all friendly countries that respect China's independence. Equal rights will be given to the various nationalities in the country, under the principle of their own volition, to unite and establish a united government. Second, this country will be a nation based on the rights of the people. The people in the country will all have equal political status, officials at various levels will be elected by the people, and the political system will be that of democratic centralism. National and local assemblies of people's representatives will be established, and citizens over the age of eighteen, with the exception of criminals, will all have the right to elect and be elected, regardless of class, sex, nationality, belief, and education. The nation will give the people the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, belief, residence and change of residence, and protect them politically and materially. Third, it is a country based on the people's livelihood. It does not deny the system of private ownership, but it requires that workers have jobs and that their working conditions be improved. Peasants will have land to cultivate, and excessive taxation and exorbitant rent and usurious interest rates are to be abolished. Students will be able to continue with their education, but it also guarantees that the poor will be able to attend school. In short, it enables everyone to have clothing and food, schooling and jobs. The democratic republic we envisage is precisely such a

nation, a China truly based on the Three Principles of the People. It is not a soviet; nor is it socialism.

With whom must we struggle to transform China into such a country? We must struggle against Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism has deprived us of our independence, and we must get it back from them. Japanese imperialism considers us slaves, and we must demand from it our freedom. Japanese imperialism has brought hunger and cold upon us, and we must demand food from it. How is this to be done? It must be demanded at gunpoint. In brief, driving away Japanese imperialism will give us an independent, free, and prosperous new China based on the Three Principles of the People.

E.29 Political Resolution Adopted by the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the CCP (6 November 1938)¹¹⁹

After listening to Comrade Mao Zedong's report on the work and the current situation of the war against Japan as well as the pressing tasks during the period from the Fifth to the Sixth Plenums [January 1934–October 1938], all participants to the Sixth Plenum have fully agreed with the political line pursued and the specific work done by the Politburo of the CC and at the same time pointed out the progress and achievements made during the period. Under the Politburo's leadership and through the efforts of all party members and the support of the whole nation and army, the party has smoothly completed a change in its policies of historical significance under extremely difficult and complicated conditions—a shift from a phase of opposition among all domestic parties, groups, ranks, troops, and forces to the anti-Japanese united front. The Enlarged Sixth Plenum fully agrees with the report's analysis of the basic trend in the anti-Japanese war and to the estimate of the current war and the most urgent task facing the Chinese nation at present as well as other matters. The Enlarged Sixth Plenum has also put forward the following points to guide all comrades in the party in their efforts:

[[Section I is subsumed in the précis above. The anti-Japanese war of the last sixteen months is a great historical event in our Chinese nation and has created an unprecedented unity. New forces are bringing together the 450 million people of our nation.

II. The Characteristics of the Current Situation of the Anti-Japanese War

The war is now in a period of transformation from the first to the second stage. This transformation is marked by both increased difficulties for our country and by a greater unity and progress.]]

III. Urgent Tasks Facing the Entire Chinese Nation

Based on the foregoing summary and estimate of the anti-Japanese war, the basic tasks facing the Chinese nation are: to persist in a protracted anti-Japanese war, consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese united front so as to tackle difficulties, enhance our strength, stop the enemy's attack, engage in a counterattack, drive the Japanese invaders out of China, and establish a new independent and happy China with the Three Principles of the People as its guiding core. On this basis, the urgent tasks facing the Chinese nation include:

- 1) Display a high degree of self-respect and self-confidence in our nation, resolutely fight the war to its end, eradicate pessimism and oppose reconciliation and surrender.
- 2) Earnestly support Chairman Chiang [Kai-shek], the national government, close cooperation in any form between the CP and all other political parties; oppose any scheme of splittism and any puppet regime formed by collaborators with the Japanese invaders.
- 3) Enhance the fighting capability of the main forces, expand the existing troops, build more armies, improve political work and technical equipment and training of the troops, safeguard the southeast and northwest and counter the enemy's attack.
- 4) Widely expand guerrilla war in the enemy's rear, build and consolidate more anti-Japanese bases, narrow the enemy-occupied areas and cooperate with the major forces in operations.
- 5) Upgrade military technology; set up necessary munitions factories to manufacture armaments for a counterattack.
- 6) Practice centralized leadership with democratic politics, reform the political structure, link the government and the people closer together, and give the fullest play to the anti-Japanese forces.
- 7) Push forward the people's movement and expand mass organizations and associations such as those for workers, peasants, merchants, students, intellectuals, women, youths, and children and mobilize the broad masses to take part in the anti-Japanese war.
- 8) Make necessary improvements in the people's livelihood in order to arouse their enthusiasm for the anti-Japanese war and for production.
- 9) Pursue new financial policies suitable to wartime, increase income, and save on expenditures to ride out hard financial times.
- 10) Carry out the policy on national defense education to make education serve the war of national defense.
- 11) Gather all forces to fight against the Japanese fascist aggressors; step up propaganda work abroad to win foreign aid; and impose sanctions on the Japanese aggressors, cut off military supplies such as armaments, raw materials, medical materials, technicians, and funds and turn them over to China.

- 12) Build an anti-Japanese united front between the Chinese and the Korean, Taiwanese, and other peoples so as to fight against Japan with joint forces.
- 13) Unite as one for war the forces of all nationalities in China (Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Yi, and Fan [non-Han from the north-west Xinjiang region]).
- 14) Proceed with the drive to root out traitors and collaborators, spies, and Trotskyites and consolidate the front and rear.

The above are our specific tasks for overcoming difficulties, strengthening our forces, checking the enemy's attack, and preparing for a counterattack.

IV. Long-Term Cooperation Between the GMD and the CP Will Ensure the Victory of Building Up the New Chinese Republic by Fighting Japan

To fulfill the current urgent tasks facing the Chinese nation and smoothly carry on the anti-Japanese war, the GMD and the CP must cooperate with each other for a long time. Such cooperation is the basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the guarantee for the great victory of defeating Japan and building up China. Therefore, a lengthy cooperation between the GMD and the CP is the common aspiration of not only all members of both parties, but also the entire Chinese people and all our friends. Fighting Japan to build up China is a long-term cause; cooperation during wartime lays down the cornerstone for further cooperation after the end of the war. The existence of a strong enemy, the Three Principles of the People as the political basis for cooperation between both parties, helpful lessons given to members of both parties and the whole people by the relations over the last ten years, the aspiration of both the army and people for long-term cooperation, and with the common goal of the establishment of a new China with the Three Principles of the People as its guiding core—all these provide a scientifically strong basis and rationale for such cooperation. Thus, our great hope can be turned into reality. To this end, the Enlarged Sixth Plenum has made a number of formal resolutions. No secret organization of the CP will be formed within the GMD and its troops. Once again to announce it officially: The CP earnestly supports the Three Principles of the People and supports Chairman Chiang and the national government. Once again it requests all CP members to get close to comrades in the GMD and all other political parties that oppose Japan in the spirit of mutual help and sharing weal and woe, from a stand of respecting the independence of each party [within the framework of] cooperation, and with the work approach of friendship, mutual respect, and consultation. This aims not only to reduce and avoid friction between the GMD and the CP and improve and consolidate their relations but also to attain the goal of a long-term cooperation between both parties. The Enlarged Sixth Plenum announces to President Chiang of the GMD and its CEC: the CCP deems that the best organizational form is for CP members to join the GMD and the Three Principles of the People Youth League and to hand over a name list of [those who join] to the

GMD's leading body, and that no CP members should be accepted from the GMD and the YL. An alternative is that both parties set up a joint committee at various levels to handle matters relating to both sides. The Sixth Plenum holds that a proper solution of the cooperative organizations between both parties has vital significance in furthering the ties between both parties and ensuring long-term mutual cooperation.

With the realization of long-term cooperation between the GMD and the CP and victory in the protracted war against Japan, a new independent Republic of China with freedom and under the Three Principles of the People will be brought into being. The Chinese domestic environment (victory in the anti-Japanese war and the establishment of new China attained by the forces of all parties and classes under the anti-Japanese united front) and the external conditions both show is not a country "under the dictatorship of a sole party," or a country in the form of the soviet, or a country under a socialist system, that should be set up at the current stage. It is rather a new type of republic, i.e., the new Republic of China guided by the Three Principles of the People. This new Republic of China is set up on the firm basis laid down during the bitter anti-Japanese war and expanded after victory in the war. The announcement of the principles for the anti-Japanese war and for the building up of China; the convening of the senators' meeting and those at the provincial and municipal levels; the procurement of the legitimate rights of all parties that oppose Japan; the gradual granting of various rights of speech, publication, meeting, association; the practice of democracy in anti-Japanese bases in the Shaan-Gan-Ning and Jin-Cha-Ji anti-Japanese border areas, as well as in the rear areas; and the improvement of the people's livelihood—all this evidence indicates that the system is turning toward the path of democracy. The processes of winning the anti-Japanese war and of realizing democracy and improving the people's livelihood will rely on and aid each other. Victory in this respect and the realization of China's independence are bound to be the foundation for the setting up of a new type of democratic country. The founding of a new Republic of China guided by the Three Principles of the People will mark unprecedented progress in China's history and play a great role in the cause of liberation of the Chinese people.

V. The CCP in the National War of Self-Defense

The CCP comprises some of the advanced sons and daughters of the Chinese nation who are participating in the cause of fighting Japan and defending their motherland with boundless enthusiasm and bravery; it is the real vanguard of the proletariat engaging in correct work with an internationalist approach. CP members must play an exemplary role in the great struggle of the national war of self-defense and for the founding of a democratic republic guided by the Three Principles of the People. They should first of all take posts in those places—frontier and rear areas—where the Japanese invaders can be struck to the best effect. They should also become model fighters in implementing the anti-Japanese united front. In light of the principle that everything is done in the interests of the anti-Japanese war and for the

anti-Japanese united front, and from the standpoint that the anti-Japanese united front represents the highest interest, CP members should adopt the attitude of earnest unity and mutual help and concession in dealing with all fraternal parties and troops and hold a positive view in carrying out the Three Principles of the People and fighting Japan and building the country. They should also respect the independence of all parties and groups in politics and ideology and become models in respecting the independence of the GMD and other anti-Japanese parties. At the same time, they must maintain the independence of the CP politically and ideologically. In the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army and other armed forces, CP members should become models in bravely fighting the enemy, executing orders, abiding by discipline, fostering good relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, and winning over the enemy troops through political work. In this respect, the Plenum pointed out that CP members, all commanders in the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, have played an excellent and glorious role in the anti-Japanese war and should further display such good traditions. CP members should be honest in performing their official duties and become models free from corruption and degeneration and, in the mass movement, become models in teaching and learning from the masses and work in a democratic and cooperative manner with other people rather than monopolizing everything at their discretion. They should become models in dealing with all noncommunist people with an earnest and heartfelt respect for cooperation. In light of the above, it is an imperative task and a common cause for the entire Chinese nation to expand CP organizations widely so as to make the CP a Bolshevik party representing the broad masses. To ensure that the role of CP members can be brought into full play and to turn the increased number of party members into a great force to participate in the glorious task of fighting Japan and building the country, we must bring up and promote a great many brave and capable cadres from among party and nonparty members and most properly use, educate, and care for these cadres. More efforts must be made to raise the theoretical level of the whole party; to study the theories put forth by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; to learn well to integrate flexibly Marxism-Leninism with each of the concrete conditions in China; to study Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and China's history; to raise the educational level of worker and peasant cadres and ordinary party members; to further improve the contents of such publications as *Xinhua Daily*, *Liberation*, *The Masses*, etc.; to set up more and more schools and run classes to train cadres at various levels. Local party departments that can work independently must be built; talented leaders with prestige and conviction must be found for all kinds of work in the party, government, army, and civil administration. At the same time, struggle must be correctly carried out on the two fronts to oppose the "leftist" tendency which harms the party; the united front and the anti-Japanese cause. Currently, the danger of left closed-doorism lies in that it does not realize that the only way to the liberation of the whole Chinese people is to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese united front, particularly to build up a long-term cooperation between the GMD and the CP. It

also lies in the naïve impetuosity that stems from a lack of knowledge of the situation of the anti-Japanese war. The danger of right opportunism is expressed by the sacrifice of the independence of the party politically and organizationally when implementing the policies of the anti-Japanese united front and distorting such policies so that they become the tail of the proletariat and follow the political party of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, they are disappointed in the face of difficulties and pessimistic about the situation and future of the anti-Japanese war. Zhang Guotao, who is playing a two-faced trick with his opportunism, has turned against the party and its CC, has turned out to be a traitor, and has run away from the cause of communism. It is therefore absolutely correct that the Politburo announced on behalf of the CC Zhang Guotao's expulsion from the party.¹²⁰ The Sixth Plenum fully agrees with the comments expelling Zhang Guotao from the party in the resolution of the Presidium of the Comintern: "Zhang Guotao's betrayal will be spurned and scorned not only in the ranks of the CCP, but also among all faithful supporters of the anti-Japanese united front."¹²¹ Of course, party departments at all levels must warmly welcome and carefully educate those comrades who have made some mistakes in practical work owing to inadequate knowledge of the conditions and lack of experience. Errors of wantonly labeling such comrades as "left" opportunists must be strictly corrected. In the meantime, the most ferocious enemies of Marxism-Leninism—formalism, dogmatism, and opportunism in ideology and work—must be thoroughly eliminated. Finally, the Sixth Plenum gives a special warning to the whole party to maintain revolutionary vigilance and keenly watch over any willful scheme of the Trotskyites, Japanese collaborators, and anti-communist elements to engage in splitting and undermining activities from within the party. Any elements opposing or endangering the party either by overt or covert means (two-faced tricks) must be exposed from a principled Bolshevik standpoint. Each CP member must love the party and the party's unity as he does his own life, earnestly implement the party's democratic centralism—the individual is subject to the organization, minority to majority, the lower to the higher authorities, the CC is the highest leading organ of the whole party. Strict discipline and the party rules must be adhered to so that leading organs at various levels can be united as one, politically and organizationally. The Sixth Plenum calls on all party members to pay attention to the fact that party unity, primarily the unity between the CC and all leading organs at various levels, particularly the unity between leading cadres in the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army and the Central Bureau and provincial committees in all localities, is a fundamental prerequisite for consolidating and developing the anti-Japanese united front and also provides a most important condition for victory in the war and for the establishment of new China.

The CCP's Sixth Plenum points out: the Japanese fascist invaders are not only the fatal foe of the Chinese nation, but also the enemy of the Japanese people and a common enemy to peace-loving and advanced people all over the world. Therefore, "China's war of liberation constitutes an integral part of the entire struggle by the world proletariat and advanced people against barbarous fascism" (see the resolu-

tion of the Comintern).¹²² The Sixth Plenum believes: our great Chinese nation, with a cultural history of 5,000 years and a population of 450 million, can surely surmount difficulties, drive out the Japanese invaders through a long protracted war of self-defense, and found an independent, free, and happy new China under the conditions that the whole nation is united and long-term cooperation continues between the GMD and the CP, and that sympathy and support is received from all peace-loving and advanced people. A bright future is in sight, and the final victory is bound to belong to us, the Chinese nation.

E.30 On the Organizational Question of the
Anti-Japanese National United Front and
the Party. *Zhang Wentian* (15 October 1938)¹²³

Chapter One: Introduction

1) Organizational tasks are subordinate to political tasks. Political tasks depend on organizational tasks for their fulfillment. The origin of bureaucratism in organizational affairs lies in the fact that organizational tasks are divorced from political tasks. Once political tasks are determined, organizational efforts play a determining role. When political tasks cannot be fulfilled with the help of organizational tasks, they become just empty talk.

2) The fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism must be made familiar in the course of implementing organizational work. We must, however, seriously consider China's national, political, cultural and ideological characteristics and customs in order to determine the characteristics of the organizational work, so that it will become Chinese.

3) We must seriously consider the imbalance in the development of China's politics and economy. In today's rapidly changing war situation, we must consider the special environmental characteristics of China's different areas in order to determine the characteristics of organizational work in the different areas and in different periods, as well as [predict] possible changes when the situation alters. All organizational efforts must be made from the starting point of understanding specific situations and from practical objectives.

4) It is necessary to think about and examine experiences in organizational work of other countries and China. At the same time, in practice, we must continue to study and be creative. We should learn all past experiences and lessons, but must not be limited or restricted by the past. In terms of organizational work, we must learn from all party comrades and the masses.

Chapter Two: The Party's Tasks in Organizational Work and Past Achievements and Weaknesses

1) Our party's General Line today on organizational work is: organize the largest number of people possible to join the war of resistance, closely cooperate with the GMD, preserve and develop the Anti-Japanese National United Front, strengthen and expand the party so that it will become a party that belongs to the people of the entire country, which is a mass party and a Bolshevik party, which will play an important, even decisive, role in the war of resistance, and which will guarantee the defeat of the Japanese invaders in a protracted war in order to seek the complete victory of the Chinese Democratic Republic.

The party is completely correct in this General Line for its organizational work. This means that the party's organizational work is subordinate to the party's political tasks.

2) The achievements in today's organizational work are manifested in the united front, the cooperation between the GMD and the CP, and the development of the party and its armed forces (Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army). This proves that the party's organizational policies are correct.

However, the above aspects also reveal the party's weaknesses in its organizational work. For example, in the united front, cooperation between the GMD and the CP is neither extensive nor consolidated. The party's organizational strength lags behind its political influence; it is insufficient.

The objective causes giving rise to these weaknesses are: (i) The slow pace of progress by the GMD; its restrictions on the party and the trouble caused by the stubborn elements. (ii) The aftermath of the previous destruction inflicted on the party (the small size of the organization and the lack of cadres with strong independent capabilities). The subjective causes are: (i) We have not used every opportunity to carry out our work. (ii) The significant remnants of the old organizational methods and the lack of new working experiences.

3) The successes and difficulties in the course of change: (i) the previous political line of struggling for the soviet was basically correct. Therefore, the organizational policies carried out on the basis of this political line were also basically correct. The greatest achievements in organizational work during the past soviet movement were:

(a) we learned how to organize a strong and ironlike army and how to lead a revolutionary war; (b) we gained experience in organizing and administering government; (c) we gained the experience of working in the countryside; (d) we trained a group of cadres who were relatively mature in political and military matters.

4) The tasks for the great changes in current organizational work:

[The task has changed] from opposition between two governments to the peaceful reunification of the country (the Anti-Japanese National United Front and cooperation between the GMD and the CP).

[The task has changed] from the party's illegal and secret activities to legal and open activities.

This change is a great change in our party's history. However, this change has already attained its objective relatively smoothly. Therefore, we have achieved great results.

5) The remnants of past organizational work:

(a) Opposition to the GMD, deep hatred of the GMD, and the inability to cooperate with the GMD. (b) As the result of long isolation from society and hatred of everything that is old-fashioned, we are deficient in contacting the entire society, especially the upper levels of society. (c) The existence of the work-style and methods of the soviet Red Army that were administrative, military, and simplistic prevent us from using democratic working methods. (d) The existence of the secret and narrow-minded work-style suited for the white areas under white terror prevents us from becoming good at open and legal activities. (e) The influence of the long, ugly tradition of left closed-doorism and formalism.

The existence of such remnants obstructs the further development of the united front and party work.

6) The demand for new progress and development in organizational work:

According to Comrade Mao Zedong's report on the political situation and the party tasks [for extracts see **Doc. E.28**], according to past experience in organizational work, according to the results (new experiences) already obtained, the current mission of our organizational work, as well as the mission of this report, is to overcome objective and subjective difficulties to find new progress and development in the organizational work of the united front and the party.

This report is divided into two parts: the organizational work of the united front and the organizational work of the party.

PART ONE: ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL WORK OF THE UNITED FRONT

Chapter Three: On the Characteristics and Work of the United Front

A) The political report has already discussed the characteristics of the current united front; I'll deal with only those points related to organizational work.

Our current united front is, without doubt, different from the united front in France and Spain; it is also different from the united front in the years of the Great Revolution in China [1925–27]. Therefore, it is very important to consider its characteristics.

Its characteristics are as follows:

1) It has developed and expanded during the war against a foreign enemy, so (a) it has an extensive national base and comprises all the people in the resistance. (b) It is marked by its progressiveness during the War of Resistance (the war zones and sectors affected by the war are more progressive than other areas and sectors). (c) It contains within it, however, opposing classes and parties that have experienced both cooperation and conflict. Therefore, (d) during the war against Japan, serious

conflict is also included in progress; that is why progress is slow and difficulties are encountered.

2) The central forces in the united front are the two parties: the GMD and the CP. Its central issue is also the issue of the two parties. (a) A protracted war requires long-term cooperation between the two parties. The fundamental reason for this long-term cooperation is: in the war against the aggression by Japan, the Japanese invaders are our direct enemy; surrender and compromise mean our self-destruction; the Japanese invaders' policy of destroying the GMD; the painful experience and lessons of the past periods of division; the firm position by the CP on continuing the cooperation; the urgent needs by both parties for long-term cooperation. (b) The long conflict in the past, however, has also created very deep prejudices and divisions between the two parties. The CP fears that the GMD will "change back," while the GMD fears that the CP will "seize power." There is mutual suspicion and vigilance between the two, thanks in particular to the contradiction in the GMD's policies of "allying with the Communists" and "guarding against the Communists." On the other hand, the CP also controls armed forces and government. These are the sources of friction.

3) There is no equality within the united front (the cooperation between the two parties). (a) The CP recognizes the Three Principles of the People and the GMD's dominant position and cooperates in supporting Chiang. So-called "legitimate power" is in the hands of the GMD, which is a big party. The CP is a relatively small party. The armed forces of the CP are also smaller than those of the GMD. The border regions ruled by the CP are also smaller than the areas ruled by the GMD. Therefore, inequality in terms of strength produces inequality in the forms of cooperation. In terms of the form, we support it and are subordinate to it. This is the source of the GMD's arrogance and Ah-Q-ism.¹²⁴ (b) However, there is also political inequality between the two parties. [This is shown by the fact] that the GMD [is the only party that] confers legitimacy on the war to resist Japan and save China, and on the CP (its armed forces and government). The government and armed forces of the GMD are corrupt; bureaucratism and warlordism exist. Our government and armed forces are progressive. The GMD is more backward politically. Its progress is passive; it lacks foresight. The CP is just the opposite. In the past ten years, the GMD has left the people with a horrible image while the CP has left a very good image. The CP has a vanguard role in politics. Politically speaking, the GMD should accept the views of the CP. This is the source of factionalism on the side of the CP. This kind of political inequality further complicates the unequal forms of cooperation.

4) The development of the united front (the cooperation between the two parties) is unbalanced.

(a) There is imbalance between the central government and local governments. In some places, the central government is more progressive, while the local governments are more backward. In other places, the local governments are more progressive, while the central government is more backward. (b) There is imbalance

between different local governments. (c) The development of the GMD and the CP is out of balance. Generally, the strength of the CP develops faster than that of the GMD. Moreover, the strength of the GMD in some places (for example, at the enemy's rear) has weakened. The political influence of the GMD and the CP grows simultaneously, with the latter growing faster than the former.

[[5) The overwhelming majority of the Chinese people are not organized.]]

6) The characteristics of the GMD: (a) It is a party composed of many classes but with the big bourgeoisie as the dominant class. It is changing its own class relationships in the course of the revolution. After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the class forces within the GMD underwent change and polarization. Struggles emerged between the progressive and conservative forces. (b) It is a party that is integrated with the government and the military. Within it there are many small factions representing many interests; the major ones include the CC and Fuxing factions.¹²⁵ (c) It has a long history and an ideology. It has its own dictatorial leaders and experience in both revolution and counterrevolution. (d) Its top elites are in charge of different key positions, while its grass roots and ordinary members are generally no more than numbers, in-name-only, or lead no organizational life.

B) Several points concerning these characteristics to be noted in the work suited for the united front:

[[(1) We must be good at grasping the General Line and continuing the policy of long-term cooperation between the GMD and the CP. Fighting the Japanese is first and foremost; democracy and the people's livelihood are less important. (2) We must be good at recognizing inequalities and turning them into equalities. (3) We must be good at turning imbalance into balance. (4) Try to respect the GMD and help it to progress in order to develop the united front. (5) Avoid "unnecessary frictions" but do not fear necessary ones. (6) Adopt open, legal, and democratic forms of struggle in everything. (7) Use soft and tough methods; retreat and attack. (8) Develop skills in organizing the unorganized masses. (9) Fully exercise the party's model role in the war as well as its role as the driving force and organizer of the War of Resistance.]]

Now let me single out the issue of the methods of struggle against the traitors to China and the Trotskyites:

C) Points to be noted in the struggles against the traitors:

(1) Take the position of openly opposing the traitors. Point out that becoming a traitor is the greatest shame for a Chinese. Create popular hatred for traitors. Advocate the elimination of traitors.

(2) But we should take into account different kinds of traitors. For example, (a) Those die-hard big traitors. (b) Vacillating traitors who lean toward both sides. (c) Those who are forced to become traitors but who still love China.

(3) The basic policies for dealing with all kinds of traitors: (a) resolutely exterminate the few die-hard big traitors; openly announce their crimes and confiscate their property. (b) Try to win over vacillating and involuntary traitors so that [they may be] sympathetic to and assist in the resistance against Japan.

(4) Methods for winning over vacillating and involuntary traitors: (a) Adopt the method of trying initially to make all traitors turn over a new leaf. Do not confiscate their property. Rely more on the method of persuasion; give them a route to a new life. Do not force them to become bandits. Thus, the vacillating and involuntary traitors may turn over a new leaf while the diehard ones may develop doubts about their own resolve. (b) Resolutely exterminate the few diehard big traitors in the service of the Japanese invaders. Publicize their crimes and confiscate their property to deter other traitors. (c) The attitude toward those traitors who can be sympathetic with and assist in the resistance: (i) Be secret when we develop relations with them. Do not let the Japanese invaders know. Protect them; do not expose them. (ii) Provide them with ways to deal with the Japanese invaders. To avoid their destruction at the hands of the enemy, we should not create difficulties for them. Do things from a long-term perspective; do not seek a one-time solution. (d) However, do not lightly believe the words of the traitors. Use concrete facts to test whether they are reliable. (e) Secretly keep mutual communications and evidence so that they will not be able to pull back.

(5) Under special circumstances (for example, when the Japanese army has arrived or is approaching, or when one cannot resist or escape), when some local gentry organize liaison associations to deal with the Japanese army, [we] should maintain contact with them in order to receive intelligence.

(6) We should operate within liaison associations.

(7) Do not lightly put the hat of traitor on the heads of those vacillating and compromising elements. There is a process from vacillation, to compromise, to becoming traitors. If we use tactics properly, we may postpone the process of their turning into traitors, or be able to isolate them when they really become traitors.

D) The points to be noted when we struggle against the Trotskyites:

(1) Explain the Trotskyites' counterrevolutionary role in the world and their danger to the peace and revolution of mankind. Expose every fact of their endangering the country and the nation, in order to stimulate the people's hatred of them. Adopt the policy of ruthless extermination.

(2) In solving concrete problems, however, we should refer to the specific conditions of time and place. Adopt different approaches to deal with them. Treat those beyond remedy severely. Help those who can be reformed and turn over a new leaf and serve the country.

(3) There are some differences between the methods of struggle against the Trotskyites in the Soviet Union and those in China:

(a) In the Soviet Union: (i) The CPSU has fought Trotskyism for many years. The counterrevolutionary line of the Trotskyites is well known to the people. Everybody is against the Trotskyites, who have no mass support whatsoever. Their "leftist" capital has been exhausted. (ii) The Soviet Union is a country governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialist construction has won a complete victory. The country has become a classless society. The CPSU under the leadership of Comrade Stalin is supported by all the working people. (iii) The activities of the

Trotskyites who represent the remnants of the reactionary classes must be carried out with the methods of complete secrecy, conspiracy, assassination, spying, hiding, and double-dealing. (iv) The socialist country can and should use the methods of arrest, public trial and execution by firing squad. Such methods are relatively simple. But this is the result of a long struggle.

(b) In China, (i) the history and counterrevolutionary facts concerning the Trotskyites are not known to the majority of the Chinese people. Their “leftist” capital has not been exhausted. In areas where the party’s strength is weak, the party can still deceive some extreme “leftist” and backward elements. (ii) The country is not under our rule. The main areas are under the rule of the GMD. Relying on the strength of the stubborn elements within the GMD, the Trotskyites can still attack us openly and oppress us. The thorough eradication of the Trotskyites in those areas is not an immediate possibility. (iii) We are in a period of fighting a national war of resistance and of all classes cooperating to deal with the outside; class relations are very complex.

(c) Therefore: (i) We should not abandon but, instead, intensify our open, ideological, and democratic struggles against them; expose all of their crimes of sabotaging unity and harmony; expose their true nature as national double-dealers; use all kinds of strategies to isolate them completely. (ii) We should give up winning over to the side of the resistance the elements who have been deceived by them. (iii) As for the diehard Trotskyites in the areas controlled by the GMD, the method of elimination may be used only when it is supported by the masses and approved by the government. This, however, can only be the result of correctly implementing methods (1) and (2). (4) In the areas under our rule, we should eliminate only the worst and make those who have been deceived by them reform themselves. Because today’s Trotskyites are traitors, however, they should be publicly executed. . . .

(4) In general, we should make the struggle against the Trotskyites seem, in the eyes of the people of the whole country, to be a struggle by them against a tiny number of bad elements, rather than being simply a struggle between the CP and the Trotskyites. We should not lightly put the hat of Trotskyite on other people’s heads. We should distinguish between Trotskyites and those having Trotskyite thoughts. We should not hastily place the hat of the Trotskyite on the heads of those concealed Trotskyites, either, if this would obstruct the struggle against them. We should use real evidence to expose them. We should demonstrate, in the struggle, our tolerance and magnanimity for persuading others to be good.

(5) At no time, however, should we easily believe the sweet words of repentance by the Trotskyites who have turned over a new leaf. We should remain extremely vigilant against them and test them through real work for a long period of time.

[[Chapter Four: Different Tasks and Party Work in Different Areas; Chapter Five: Creation of Anti-Japanese Bases Behind Enemy Lines; Chapter Six: Party Work in the Army; Chapter Seven: Party Work in the Government; Chapter Eight:

Party Work Among the Masses; Chapter Nine: Work Among the National Minorities.]]

PART TWO: ON THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATIONAL WORK

Chapter Ten: Consolidate the CP in the United Front

1) As the united front expands and develops, new problems and tasks become more numerous and complex. The work of politically and organizationally consolidating the party becomes increasingly important. However, party consolidation is not only in the narrow interests of the party, or the sectoral interests of the working class, but in the interests of the entire united front. It is also in the supreme interest of the working class. The interest of the united front is consistent with the interest of the party.

2) Maintain the party's independence in the united front. Oppose the tendency of capitulationism. What is party independence? It is insistence on the political line, strategy, and tactics of Marxism-Leninism; it is not concealing our real nature of fighting for the final goal of communism. It is the freedom to criticize all other parties. It is autonomy from the interference of outside forces.

3) The capitulationist tendency to abandon the party's independence. In particular, the big bourgeoisie is now using every method to influence CP members (for example, ideologically—one "ism," one party, one leader; materially—money, position, and women) in order to make the CP a faction of the GMD, dissolve within it and become an appendage. Within the party, this kind of influence represents the capitulationist tendency. It is manifest in neglect of the party's role in the War of Resistance; neglect of the party's consolidation and development, as well as expansion of our own strength. Accommodating allied parties and giving up our own positions. And examples of some elements' vacillation, corruption, and desertion. The party has waged resolute struggles on these fronts and gained great results. The danger, however, still exists. The party must continue to work hard on these fronts.

4) However, the party must fight the proponents of "closed-doorism" who only emptily shout "party independence" and "the party's principled positions" but who are incapable of doing in a serious and solid way the hard work of the united front. This kind of closed-doorism hampers us in fighting for the united front and thus obstructs party consolidation and development.

Where does this kind of closed-doorism manifest itself nowadays?

(a) The inability to understand how to analyze concretely the real conditions in China and the characteristics of the Chinese nation, or how to use different methods to solve extremely complex issues in reality, or how to use complex, roundabout methods to realize one's goal—while remaining satisfied with monotonous formalism and dogmatism.

(b) The inability to understand how to organize into the united front, masses, groups, and classes at different levels according to their political experience and

through the use of all kinds of methods—while remaining satisfied with using empty slogans and abstract propaganda—and the organizational methods suited for leading the vanguard and party organizations to lead the masses.

(c) The refusal to make industrious, patient, persistent, low-profile, one-step-at-a-time efforts to conduct long-term cooperation with the GMD, to help and push the GMD to make progress, to erase mutual prejudices and animosity, to create mutual trust, and to seek practical benefits. Such people remain satisfied with emptily talking about “seizing power,” “sharpness of principle,” and maintaining a high political profile. Everywhere they demonstrate their immaturity, impatience, and lack of substance. In areas where they have already gained the leading role, they practice total control and monopoly, and there is no democracy.

(d) The refusal to work in open, legal mass groups; the fascination with organizing their own secret mass groups with a few progressive elements.

(e) The refusal to study humbly all the practical experience gained in the struggle, or to learn from the masses. Full of arrogance and self-importance.

(f) Narrow-mindedness, pomposity, lack of sophistication, and no understanding of how to deal with people.

5) Only the struggle between the two lines can enable:

(a) The development and consolidation of the united front and the party’s development and consolidation to become mutually interactive factors, so that the congruity between the two may really be demonstrated.

(b) The avoidance of the wavering of leftism and rightism within the party, so that the party line may be correctly implemented to win victories.

6) It must be pointed out:

(a) It is easier to fight rightism within the party because:

(i) subjectively speaking, the party has a long history of opposing rightism, which has created among our comrades a deep hatred and fear of rightism. (ii) Objectively speaking, the difficulties in the War of Resistance and the changes in the situation of the war have increasingly shown the bankruptcy of the wrong theories of the big bourgeoisie, with its strength weakening every day.

(b) We find it especially difficult to fight closed-doorism within the party because:

(i) Closed-doorism within the party has a long history of its own; it has not been thoroughly exposed. The struggle against closed-doorism is often covered up by the struggle against rightism and usually makes the comrades fighting leftism feel the threat of [having to wear] “rightist hats” (for example, utilizing local forms is considered as abandoning internationalism; supporting the Three Principles of the People is regarded as abandoning communism; promoting our nation is treated as narrow nationalism). (ii) Shouting empty revolutionary slogans has its own power of appeal; it has an overwhelming force which makes the others afraid to oppose it. (iii) Closed-doorism does not require our comrades to do long hard real work, which is welcomed by the bankrupt petty bourgeoisie within the party. iv) Closed-doorism makes everything simplistic; it does not require in-depth study of Marxism—

Leninism or penetrating examination of practical experience. Therefore, it is also welcomed by naïve party members. v) There are objective reasons: in the past, the GMD and the CP opposed each other for a long time; the protracted war and the progress of the GMD are both slow. A large number of intellectuals from petty bourgeois and peasant families are party members.

Therefore, we must struggle through to the end against left closed-doorism. This requires more efforts on the part of the leading agencies and leading comrades especially.

7) The goal of the struggle between the two lines is not to create among our comrades a psychology of fearing to make mistakes, but to educate our comrades to be able to implement correctly the policies of the party and apply tactics, so that our comrades may “[understand] the firmness of the principles of the Bolshevik party and the flexibility in the tactics for practical work,” “abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism and concrete experience of practical work,” “unwavering position and quickness to adapt,” and “working with the masses, but leading them forward.” These opposing but related rules should be integrated. Only these efforts may be considered as fighting an effective struggle against [leftist and rightist] tendencies; this will continue to raise the political level of the party and help it progress steadily.

8) The following mistakes should be corrected in the struggle between the two lines:

(a) Seek truth from facts; do not be too sensitive. Do not have too many “principled positions.” Do not encourage, guess at, or develop mistakes or create tendencies. Do not put leftist or rightist hats on the heads of individual comrades who are momentarily afflicted with erroneous thinking. Persist in struggle; do not suffer from the disease of impatience. Do not panic. Nobody can avoid certain kinds of ideological exaggeration or deficiencies in the course of thinking. Only when a certain ideological direction has developed through the many erroneous thoughts that remain uncorrected does it become a tendency.

(b) Continually correct our own mistakes in terms of ideology and help our comrades correct their mistakes. This is the routine work of education within the party, and not “ideological struggle.” Correcting wrong tendencies may be done through peaceful talks or discussions among a very small number of comrades. It doesn’t require so-called struggle (struggle within our party is open criticism of the mistakes committed by our comrades and is called “striking”). Open struggle within the party can be waged only under unavoidable circumstances, such as the struggle against Zhang Guotao.

(c) Leading comrades within the party must take careful care not to put, indiscriminately, big hats such as “tendency” on subordinate comrades to frighten them. They should really listen to the views of our comrades and study the origin of some of the thoughts of our comrades to correct them and to persuade our comrades.

(d) Help our comrades not to fear expressing their views; this will genuinely help them develop and progress in their thinking. This will enable them truly to understand the party’s policies and tactics flexibly and learn how to use them flexibly. This is a necessary condition for strengthening the party.

[[Chapter Eleven: The Question of Cadres; Chapter Twelve: Propaganda and Educational Work.]]

Chapter Thirteen: On the Issue of Leadership

1) The relationship between the CC and local party organizations.

In light of the imbalanced political and economic development in China, its huge territory, lack of transportation, and the war situation, and with reference to the experiences of our previous work, the relationship between the CC and local party organizations should be defined in line with the following principles:

(a) The CC must centralize and unify party leadership throughout the country.

Local party organizations must strictly implement the CC political line, resolutions, and decisions. They must not express views or take actions against the CC. When they have different views from the CC, they should report directly to the CC. They must not propagandize or disseminate such views to their subordinates. Local party organizations must strictly follow the party's iron discipline.

(b) Instructions from the CC to local party organizations, however, must be made in light of all kinds of possible changes. They must have flexibility in order to leave room for adaptation by local party organizations. The CC should pay more attention to national political issues and control over the correct political line. It should study and summarize the work experience and lessons of the party, government, armed forces, and people in different areas of the country. It should provide assistance to local party organizations; it should provide timely correction of local party organizations' mistakes.

(c) The CC should pay attention to training local party organizations' ability and courage to work independently under its leadership so that they may properly combine the party's firmness with its flexibility. The CC should resort more to education and persuasion in dealing with the mistakes of local party organizations. When there is no necessity [for intervention], the CC should leave internal problems of local party organizations for them to solve.

(d) Local party organizations should learn the good traditions of obeying, respecting, and trusting the CC's leadership. They should, under the CC's unified principles, develop skills in devising tasks and work plans suited to local circumstances. They should actively, responsibly, and boldly implement the policies of the CC in their own areas. They should not depend on the CC for everything. Instead, they should spontaneously devise more concrete methods to implement the policies of the CC. They should oppose routinization and tendencies toward formalism.

2) Under the new circumstances, the leadership system of the party [should]:

(a) Organize several CC bureaus throughout the country, such as the Northern, Central, Southeast, Southern Bureaus, and so on, to be placed under the direct leadership of the CC. They represent the CC in providing direct leadership for local party organizations.

(b) In the enemy's rear, provincial party organizations should be changed into

area party committees [*qu dangwei*] (such as party committees for the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] area, the Ji-Jin-Yu [Hebei-Shanxi-Henan] area, Ji-Lu-Yu [Hebei-Shandong-Henan] area, etc.). In the key cities and transportation centers occupied by the enemy, we should organize "point committees" [*dianxian weiyuanhui*].

(c) The Central Bureau directly leads several area party committees or provincial committees. Under the area and provincial committees are district committees, central county committees or county committees, and then subdistrict committees and branches. Branches should be composed of several villages or neighborhoods.

(d) The CC should have all kinds of local work committees to study and take note of the work of all central bureau and their affiliated party organizations. They should frequently put forward their views to the CC and, through the CC, provide all central bureaus with frequent instructions and assistance.

(e) Leadership in all work for the party, government, armed forces, and civilians in all areas should be with the supreme party organization in those areas in order to increase their authority. Comrades working on different fronts should establish the concept that the party is the sole leader of everything. Party organizations are the supreme party organs in their areas; they do not have their own leadership systems (like the previous party organizations on the railways).

3) Leadership methods for superior party organizations over subordinate organizations:

(a) Superior party organs (the CC, central bureaus, area committees, and provincial committees) should have several traveling inspectors in order to understand and represent the concrete conditions of subordinate party organizations and help provide them with specific instructions. The task of the traveling commissioners is generally to relay the instructions of the superiors, examine the conditions of the work of local party organizations, and report them to the superiors. When they represent their views to local party organizations, they should be treated only as recommendations without decisive authority. They have such authority only when they are specially authorized by the superior party organs.

(b) Superior party organs should regularly call together leading comrades from local party organizations to discuss their work. When conditions permit, they should frequently call joint meetings attended by secretaries or department chiefs of local party organizations to review their work and summarize their work experience in order to help their development. Subordinate party organizations are responsible for reporting their work to the superiors. Meetings are not valued for their frequency, but for their ability to solve the problems of subordinate party organizations. There may be a long interval between meetings. However, it is better for each meeting to last longer in order to produce results.

(c) The frequent review of the degree of implementation of [our] work is the main method for advancing our work and ensuring the fulfillment of our tasks. This kind of review requires, first of all, familiarity with cadres and the testing of cadres in practical work. Second, it requires understanding correctly the merits and

weaknesses of the executive agencies. Third, it tests the correctness or incorrectness of party decisions or work plans themselves (Stalin).

(d) After a review of the work, superior party organs' instructions to subordinate ones should be specific, simple, and clear. Avoid lengthy discussion and irrelevancies.

(e) The collective leadership of leading agencies does not hamper the individual actions of certain comrades within a given period. Under the present conditions, however, with many new party members and few cadres, comrades in leading agencies should pay more attention to cadre education (such as running more training courses and preparing for all kinds of meetings).

(f) The work plans for party committees should be very simple. They should include specific tasks that can be fulfilled within a certain period. There must be central priorities—from which other priorities may be developed. There must be a certain sequence. This is a kind of “tempo” in our work.

4) It is necessary to revise the Party Constitution. The CC should be responsible for drafting the new constitution to be passed by the Seventh Congress.

Chapter Fourteen: On Open and Secret Work

1) Since the War of Resistance broke out, the relationship between open and secret work has fundamentally changed. This is seen in that: (i) resisting Japan to save China has become legal; (ii) the CP has gained a basic legal status; (iii) the scope of legality has enlarged while that for secret work has contracted.

2) The different relationships between open and secret work in different areas.

(a) As for the open and secret work in the areas occupied by the Japanese invaders, not only does the party remain secret, but also resistance is secret. In these areas, it is important that we use legal means to infiltrate the organizations of traitors.

(b) In the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, not only is resistance open, but, on the whole, the party is open. However, in some areas, such as the areas neighboring the border region, it is still important to have lean secret party organizations.

(c) In the enemy's rear where the Eighth Route Army operates and in the base areas where the army has an advantage, resistance activities should, without exception, be open. The military and political personnel of the Eighth Route Army should without exception be openly known. Individual leading comrades and party agencies may be open, but it is necessary to keep ordinary party organizations and members secret.

(i) Do not make the party so conspicuous as to frighten away allied parties, armies, or governments. (ii) Prepare for retreat when the situation becomes bad.

3) Open and secret work in the rear proper

The situation in the rear proper:

(a) Resistance work can be done openly. A small number of CC leaders and personnel of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army can operate openly and establish agencies and offices. They can also openly or semi-openly publish agency newspapers.

(b) During mass movements, however, if our party members within their armed forces and government reveal their identities, they will be persecuted and restricted.

(c) There are both enlightened and stubborn elements within the GMD.

4) In terms of the relationship between open and secret work in the rear proper, the following rules should be enforced:

(a) CP members may still use the cover of activist or ordinary people to participate in all open activities without revealing their party identities or organizations. Use the spirit of working hard to carry out long-term work, encourage nonparty progressive elements and activists in the GMD to lead the work. In particular, party members should not reveal their identities in the organizations in which they have already gained the dominant positions.

(b) Try to make it possible for certain party leaders and agencies to become open. This is necessary for expanding party influence and advancing the united front. Those party members who have gained legal status (such as members of the national parliament) should boldly conduct open activities.

(c) There should be a clear division between the party's open and secret work, as well as a clear division between comrades operating openly and those comrades and agencies operating secretly. Correct contacts must be maintained. This requires: (i) Those party members who have attained leadership positions in open organizations not engaging in the party's secret work at the same time. Moreover, the party should devise methods to enable them not to reveal their identities. If they are not assigned to branches, they should maintain contact only with individual responsible comrades. (ii) Responsible comrades doing secret party work should, as a rule, maintain their secret identities, conceal themselves among the ordinary people, and not run any open operations.

(d) Absolutely forbid anybody to pass on inner-party secret information and decisions to comrades not involved. Ban unnecessary contact between comrades (such as correspondence).

(e) The party's top-secret instructions must be conveyed verbally, instead of using mimeographs or carbon copies. The writing of party documents should be done in such a way that their loss will not matter. Under no circumstances should the number of party members, the armed forces, and organizations led by the party be published in party documents or newspapers.

5) In terms of the relationship between open and secret work, we should correct the erroneous view that holds that the party now does not need to pay attention to secret work. We should educate our comrades to obey strictly the rules of secret work. We must educate our comrades to understand that today's secret work is fundamentally different from the previous kind. The main work-style today is open and legal; [it includes] activities of resistance to Japan and for China's salvation. Today, especially in the enemy's rear and the war zones, we must resolutely break the narrow, secret methods of operation in the years when our party was underground.

6) When all party comrades penetrate the mass movement more deeply, they will be more able to unite the majority of the masses around them and identify with the masses (speak the masses' language, live the masses' life, and establish close contact with them). This will help us to keep the party's secrets more easily. Therefore, in terms of keeping party secrets we should emphasize this positive aspect.

Chapter Fifteen: On Expanding Party Membership

1) Expand party membership in a planned way, establish party branches so that the party will become a national, mass Bolshevik party—this is one of the central current tasks.

2) The scale and speed of expansion should be determined according to conditions in different areas. For example:

(a) We should expand and create party [organizations] on a huge scale in the enemy's rear. The speed of expansion should be fast; its scale should be large. Administrative agencies should be larger.

(b) In our own rear, [our organizations] should be lean and effective. The speed of expansion should be slower, with higher quality. Administrative agencies should be streamlined. The previous slogans of "equal development" and "increasing membership 100 percent" are wrong.

(c) Principles for expansion of the consolidation and consolidation of the expansion: (i) Expand the party in the course of expanding our work; expand the party in the course of struggle. (ii) When expansion reaches a certain level, there needs to be a period of consolidation, rectification, and digestion, and then the expansion may continue.

(d) Ensure that within the party, workers, hired labor, artisans, and working peasants maintain an advantage. However, when party organizations are first set up, it is not a bad tendency to absorb more intellectuals. It is, rather, a general rule. As a rule, the party needs the help of the revolutionary intellectuals to penetrate the masses in the lower strata of society.

(e) The two tendencies in the expansion of the party—closed-doorism and involuntary induction must both be corrected.

(f) Whether the party is to be built from top down or from bottom up, and whether the administrative organs should be large or small depends on actual conditions.

(g) The education of, and organizational life for, new party members [must be carried out] through continuous struggle. They should be tested and tempered especially under difficult circumstances.

(h) For young and female party members, it is permissible to set up youth and women's groups within the party branches to facilitate work. Such groups may be administered by the branch secretary for youth affairs or women's affairs.

(i) Special party members are those who occupy a special position and who do not live the party's routine organizational life.

(j) The issue of restoring membership to or admitting anew those members who have lost touch should be studied in terms of concrete issues.

(k) We should guard against letting the enemy's spies infiltrate the party. We should regularly purge bad elements from the party.

[[Chapter Sixteen: Raising Party Vigilance; Chapter Seventeen: Develop Inner-Party Democracy and Consolidate Iron Discipline; Chapter Eighteen: On Complete Party Unity; Chapter Nineteen: Conclusions.]]

E.31 Decision of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the CC Concerning the Work Rules and Discipline of the CC. (6 November 1938)¹²⁶

I. The CC

1) In accordance with Chapter 10 of the Party Constitution [1928, **Doc. C.13**], the CC is the supreme organ of the party prior to and after the convocation of the National Congress. It directs all party work politically and organizationally.

2) Plenary meetings of the CC may be convened only when attended by the majority of the CC members.

3) CC resolutions are adopted by the majority of the CC members present at the meetings.

4) The CC reviews and approves all the work and reports of its Politburo; issues work guidelines, directives, and instructions to the Politburo and all other party organs; and may publish various declarations, documents, and telegrams for the outside.

5) CC resolutions and documents that have not been approved for publication or relayed to lower-level party branches should not be disclosed to anyone by any CC member.

6) No CC member is permitted to make public any opinions contradicting CC decisions to anyone outside of the CC or to engage in any activities contravening these decisions.

7) No CC member is permitted to publish speeches and documents inside or outside the party in the name of the CC without being entrusted [to do so] by the CC, its Politburo, or its Secretariat.

8) All CC members have the right to participate in the work and meetings of the party committees at all levels in all regions and have the right to put forward political, organizational, and work opinions to them and inspect their situation for direct reporting to the CC. However, CC members who have certain responsibilities in local party committees must still obey those party committees.

9) Mistakes of CC members, except for criticism within the CC and the Politburo, are not to be disclosed to anyone inside or outside the party in oral or written form or through newspaper articles prior to the decision of the CC or its Politburo to make them public. No CC member should undermine the authority of other members.

10) For serious mistakes and breach of discipline by CC members, the CC plenum and the Politburo may take appropriate disciplinary actions according to the seriousness of the mistakes.

II. The Politburo of the CC

11) In accordance with Article 40 of Chapter 10 of the Party Constitution [See **Doc. C.13**], the CC elects a Politburo from among its own members. The task of the Politburo is to direct all the party's political and organizational work prior to and after the convocation of the CC plenum.

12) The Politburo meets at least once every three months. Meetings may only be convened when over half the members are present. The decisions and documents adopted are only effective on approval by over half the members. Absent members must be notified immediately.

13) The Politburo has the right to publish declarations and telegrams and establish relations with the units and organs of other parties on behalf of the CC.

14) The Politburo decides and ratifies all appointments of responsible persons for all CC bureaus and subbureaus, secretaries of provincial party committees and area party committees that are equivalent to provincial committees, party members who are responsible for work in the national government and armed forces, and members of the party newspaper committee of the CC. Under special circumstances, various CC bureaus and subbureaus may decide on the appointment of secretaries of provincial party committees and area party committees equivalent to provincial party committees, but must report these decisions to the CC's Politburo for approval.

15) Dismissed Politburo members, except for complaining to the Politburo itself and to the Comintern, must not make public any opinions contrary to the decisions of the Politburo to anyone inside or outside the party, or take any actions contravening the decisions of the Politburo.

16) No Politburo member should, without being entrusted by the CC's Politburo, make speeches and issue documents inside or outside the party in the name of the CC's Politburo or in the name of the entire party.

17) All Politburo members have the right to participate in the work and meetings of party committees at all levels and all other party organs and army units and have the right to make suggestions to all party and army units and investigate various situations for reporting to the Politburo. However, Politburo members who have certain responsibilities in local party committees should still obey those party committees.

18) Issues discussed and decided in Politburo meetings must be kept as strict

secrets by all Politburo members and not be disclosed to anyone outside the Politburo prior to the decision of the Politburo to make them public.

19) Mistakes of Politburo members, except for criticism within the Politburo, should not be disclosed to anyone inside or outside the party in oral or written form or through newspaper articles by any Politburo members prior to the decision of the Politburo and its other members.

20) The Politburo shall take disciplinary actions against the members who break discipline in accordance with the seriousness of the breach or submit the cases to a CC plenum for solution.

III. The Secretariat of the CC

21) The tasks of the Secretariat of the CC are to handle the CC's routine work that is of an organizational and executive nature, be responsible for convening Politburo meetings, prepare agendas of issues that should be discussed by the Politburo, and present work reports to the Politburo.

22) The Secretariat should convene a Politburo meeting, when over one-quarter of Politburo members propose it.

23) The Secretariat must implement Politburo resolutions thoroughly. However, the Secretariat may make new decisions and publish declarations, resolutions, and telegrams in the name of the CC where new and serious situations arise prior to and after Politburo meetings and when it is impossible to convene the Politburo immediately. However, they must be submitted afterward to Politburo meetings for retroactive approval and confirmation.

24) The Secretariat must meet at least once a week to settle collectively issues of routine CC work and handle and reply to questions from various party committees. When meetings of the Secretariat are being held, all Politburo members who are present may attend.

25) All directives, telegrams, and documents issued in the name of the Secretariat must be approved by over half of the members before they are sent out.

26) The work of all CC departments and CC bureaus and subbureaus led by the Secretariat and Politburo members should be reported to the Secretariat frequently. The handling of important questions by CC departments and the appointment and dispatch of important personnel must all be approved by the Secretariat.

27) All CC departments may guide the work of the lower-level party committees of their own departments. However, important issues must be guided by the Secretariat. CC departments and bureaus may exchange information among themselves and make proposals to each other. (The information and proposals may also be transmitted through the Secretariat.) The proposals may not contradict the decisions of the CC Secretariat, however. There should be no relations of mutual guidance.

28) Important documents, public speeches, general outlines of important reports, etc., issued by Secretariat members should be made public whenever possible, if approved by the majority of members.

29) Important documents, general outlines, work regulations, etc., drafted by various CC departments can take effect only on approval by the Secretariat.

30) Issues discussed by the Secretariat must be kept strictly secret by all members prior to the decision to make them public, and no disclosures should be made outside the party.

IV. CC Bureaus and Subbureaus

31) In accordance with Item 7 of Article 14 of the party's Constitution [**Doc. C.13**], the CC may, where necessary, set up bureaus and subbureaus covering several provinces so as to assist the guidance of party work in various localities.

32) Guided by CC resolutions, policies, and instructions, all CC bureaus and subbureaus represent the CC in leading all other work of their respective localities and may, in their own name, establish relations with the organs of other parties in their respective localities.

33) After receiving resolutions and instructions from the CC, all bureaus and subbureaus may, in their own name, publish declarations, resolutions, telegrams, etc., concerning the nation's current situation. However, all bureaus and subbureaus may of their own accord issue declarations and telegrams concerning local issues.

34) All CC bureaus and subbureaus must implement thoroughly resolutions and directives of the CC, its Politburo, and its Secretariat. No speeches and actions are allowed to contravene the CC, its Politburo, and its Secretariat.

35) Members of the CC bureaus and subbureaus must observe the rules, regulations, and discipline of the CC.

36) Members of the CC bureau and subbureaus who have committed mistakes and are incompetent shall be dealt with by a resolution of the CC's Politburo and its Secretariat.

Notes to Commentary E

1. See the Military Council's combat plan of 20 January and the telegram from the Politburo to the Fourth Front Army on 22 January 1935, in *Hongjun changzheng zai Sichuan shiliao xuanji*, pp. 53–55 and 57, respectively.

2. Chang Kuo-t'ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928–1938*, vol. 2, pp. 366–67.

3. Probably the meeting was attended by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Shaoqi, Kai Feng, Deng Fa, Liu Bochong, Li Fuchun, Zhang Guotao, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Lin Biao, and Lin Boqu. Possibly Otto Braun and Xu Xiangqian were invited to attend, and Deng Xiaoping may have been present as minute taker. The keynote report on behalf of the Party Center was delivered by Zhou Enlai. See B. Yang, *From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March*, p. 144, and Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, p. 157.

4. “Zhonggong zhengzhiju jue ding guanyu yi, si fangmianjun huihou de zhanlue fangzhen” (Politburo Decision Concerning the Strategic Policies After the Reunion of the First and Fourth Field Armies), 28 June 1935, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 10, p. 482.

5. Shawo is close to the larger village of Maoergai. As the resolution adopted shows, this

meeting was originally called the Maoergai Conference. Recently, CCP historians have referred to this meeting as the Shao Conference since another Politburo meeting was held at Maoergai on 20 August 1935.

6. The meeting was attended by Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Bo Gu, Zhang Guotao, Deng Fa, Liu Bocheng, and Kai Feng. Apart from Zhang, other Fourth Front Army participants were Chen Changhao and Fu Zhong. Wang Shoudao was present as minute taker. Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, p. 151.

7. In fact, Mao added supplementary comments to Zhang Wentian's presentation before discussion was opened. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 164–65.

8. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, p. 236. It seems that shortly after 18 July the top military leadership was reorganized. The Front Headquarters was to be run by Zhang Guotao's supporters. Xu Xiangqian was appointed general commissar, and Chen Changhao political commissar.

9. The left route was to march from Zhoukeji toward Aba and the right route from Maoergai to Songpan.

10. For the letter disseminating this information to party members see "Zhongyang wei zhixing beishang fangzhen gao tongzhi shu" (Letter of the Party Center Informing Comrades About Implementing the Policy of Moving North), 10 September 1935, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 10, pp. 553–54. It seems that Chen Changhao had toyed with the idea of sending troops to intercept them but Xu Xiang-qian had vetoed the idea, remarking that it was unthinkable for one Red Army to fight another.

11. The meeting was attended by, among others, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Kai Feng, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Fa, Cai Shupan, Ye Jianying, Lin Boqu, Li Weiham, Yang Shangkun, Braun, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Zhu Rui, Luo Ruiqing, Peng Dehuai, Li Fuchun and Yuan Guoping. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 170–73.

12. On this see Shum Kui-kwong, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front (1935–1945)*, pp. 18–27.

13. Shum suggests that this policy derived from Wang Ming's ideas. Shum, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power*, p. 19.

14. Because the announcement had been submitted to and approved by Dimitrov and Stalin at the Comintern Congress in August, it is commonly referred to as the "August 1 Declaration." According to Wang Ming, he drafted the Declaration while convalescing from an illness in June 1935. Wang Ming, *Mao's Betrayal*, p. 68.

15. This probably consisted of several formal and informal sessions beginning on 17 December and ending on 25 December. The Research Department on Party History of the CCP, *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, p. 109. Attending the meeting were Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, Kai Feng, Deng Fa, Li Weiham, Peng Dehuai, Wu Liangping, Yang Shangkun, Braun, Guo Hongtao, and Zhang Hao (Lin Yuying). Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 179. Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, pp. 182–83, excludes Wang, Peng, Wu, Yang, and Braun from his list of participants.

16. The CC had already sent out a circular on developing guerrilla warfare in the Shaanxi-Gansu area on 21 November 1935. "Zhongyang guanyu fazhan Shaan Gan youji zhanzheng de jue ding" (CC Decision on Developing Guerrilla Warfare in Shaanxi and Gansu), 21 November 1935, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 9, pp. 577–79.

17. According to the Chinese historian Xiang Qing, the CCP delegation to the Comintern had already moved to the position of a united front that would include Chiang Kai-shek. Xiang Qing, *Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi shigao*, pp. 187–99. See also

J. Garver, "The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party," *China Quarterly*, no. 113 (March 1988): 29–59.

18. The shift in policy on rich peasants had been decided on at a Politburo meeting on 6 December 1935. The meeting passed a resolution drafted by Zhang Wentian that dealt with this issue. "Zhongyang guanyu gaibian dui funong celüe de jue ding" (CC Decision on Revising the Policy Toward Rich Peasants), 6 December 1935, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 729–31.

19. See Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, pp. 191–92.

20. The names of the members of these organizations have never been published because it would have compromised many of China's later top leaders. The American journalist Harrison Salisbury writes that he was informed that the list included Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and Wang Ming. H.E. Salisbury, *The Long March: The Untold Story*, pp. 311–12.

21. According to Garver, this effort had been endorsed by the Soviet Union. For this point and the complexities of the relationships between the CCP, the Soviet Union, the Northeast Army, and Chiang Kai-shek, see J.W. Garver, "The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 27 (July 1991): 145–75.

22. "Hongjun wei yuanyi tong dongbeijun lianhe kang-Ri zhi dongbeijun quanti jiangshi shu" (An Open Letter to All Officers and Troops of the Northeastern Army Concerning the Red Army's Willingness to Unite with the Northeastern Army to Resist Japan), 25 January 1936, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 746–48.

23. Yang, *From Revolution to Politics*, pp. 211–13.

24. For the expulsion order see "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kaichu Zhang Guotao dangji de jue ding" (Decision of the CCP CC Concerning the Expulsion of Zhang Guotao from the Party), 18 April 1938, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, p. 154. For the inner-party report see "Zhongyang guanyu kaichu Zhang Guotao dangji de dangnei baogao dagang" (Outline of the CC Inner-Party Report Concerning the Expulsion of Zhang Guotao from the Party), 19 April 1938, in *ibid.*, pp. 155–58.

25. "Tingzhan yihe yizhi kang-Ri tongdian" (Circular Telegram on Cessation of the War and Unity to Resist Japan), 5 May 1936, signed by Mao Zedong and Zhu De, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 762; and "Zhonggong zhongyang zhi goumindang erzong quanhuì shu" (Letter of the CCP CC to the Second Plenum of the GMD), 20 June 1936, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 43–47.

26. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhi Zhongguo guomindang shu" (Letter from the CCP to the Chinese GMD), 25 August 1936, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 773–77.

27. However, independent eyewitness accounts state that initially Mao had been in favor of Chiang's execution after a trial. See, for example, O. Braun, *A Comintern Agent in China*, pp. 251–52.

28. "Hongjun jiangling guanyu Xi'an shibian zhi guomindang zhengfu dian" (Telegram Concerning the Xi'an Incident from Red Army High-Ranking Military Officers to the GMD Government), 15 December 1936, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 791.

29. "Zhongyang guanyu Xi'an shibian ji women renwu de zhishi" (CC Directive Concerning the Xi'an Incident and Our Tasks), 19 December 1936, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 792–93. This was drafted by Zhang Wentian.

30. The full text of this telegram can be found in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 1, pp. 281–82.

31. The CCP negotiators were Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Ye Jianying.

32. The white areas was the name given to the areas not under CCP control. In March 1936, Liu had gone to run the party's Northern Bureau in Tianjin.

33. In fact, as early as April 1936 Liu Shaoqi had attacked the problems of “closed-doorism” and “adventurism” and had put forward a new program for work in the “white areas” to overcome what he saw as these continuing influences of “leftism.” See Liu Shaoqi, “Suqing lisan luxian de canyu—guanmen zhuyi maoxian zhuyi” (Eliminate the Remnants of the Lisan Line—Closed-Doorism and Adventurism), originally published in *Huoxian*, no. 55 (10 April 1936), reprinted in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 754–59. For his proposals see Liu Shaoqi, “Guidelines for the Labor Movement in the White Areas,” April 1936, in Liu Shaoqi, *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, vol. 1, pp. 45–51.

34. This meeting is also referred to as the Conference of Delegates from the CCP Soviet Areas (Zhongguo gongchandang suqu daibiao huiyi). It was attended by over 200 delegates who came not only from the soviet areas but also from the white areas and the Red Army. A Presidium of nineteen was elected to run the conference. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 191–94.

35. Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian), “Shinian lai de Zhongguo gongchandang,” 20 June 1937, in Luo Fu et al., *Shinian lai de Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 1–21.

36. For part of Zhang Wentian’s speech see “Baiqu dang muqian de zhongxin renwu” (The Central Task of the Party in the White Areas), 6 June 1935, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 126–44. Chen Yun also delivered a major report to the meeting.

37. The whole of Liu Shaoqi’s speech “Guanyu baiqu de dang yu qunzhong gongzuo” (Concerning Party and Mass Work in the White Areas), May 1937, can be found in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 107–25. Four of the eleven parts of the speech are translated in Liu, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 65–81.

38. The meeting was attended by Politburo members Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Ren Bishi, and Peng Dehuai; alternate members Guan Xiangying and Kai Feng; others were mainly military leaders, Lin Boqu, Zhang Hao, Zhang Wenbin, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Luo Ronghuan, He Long, Liu Bochong, Xu Xiangqian, Xiao Jinguang, Fu Zhong, and Zhou Jianping. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 201, and Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 295–96. The Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, adds Zhou Kun, making a total of 23 people (p. 121).

39. Chang Kuo-t’ao, *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party*, vol. 2, p. 537, and O. Braun, *A Comintern Agent in China*, pp. 211–13.

40. See Mao Zedong, “For the Mobilization of All the Nation’s Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance,” in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 23–28. According to Braun, the ten points had been sent by Wang Ming before the conference. Braun, *A Comintern Agent in China*, p. 211.

41. “Zhongyang geming junshi weiyuanhui guanyu hongjun gaibian wei guomin gemingjun de balujun de mingling” (Order of the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Change of the Red Army to the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army), 25 August 1937, the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 331–32. This order was signed by Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai.

42. Mao Zedong, “The Situation and the Tasks of the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan,” in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 61–70. This was a speech delivered to party activists at a meeting on 12 November 1937.

43. The meeting was attended by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Xiang Ying, Zhang Guotao, Kai Feng, and Lin Boqu. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 205.

44. Only an outline of Wang's speech to the conference has been found, and it mainly consists of a series of topics to be covered. Wang Ming, "Ruhe jixu quanguo kangzhan he zhengqu kangzhan shengli ne?" (How Can the National War of Resistance Be Continued and Victory Be Achieved?), in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 888–95. This is an outline of Wang Ming's speech of 9 December 1937.

45. "Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu Zhonggong zhu guoji daibiaotuan gongzuo baogao de jueyi" (CC Resolution Concerning the Work Report of the CCP Mission to the Comintern), 13 December 1937, in *ibid.*, p. 897.

46. The Politburo comprised Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Wang Jiaxiang, Bo Gu, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai, Xiang Ying, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, Wang Ming, Deng Fa, and Kai Feng. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 296–97.

47. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 207.

48. "Zhongyang zhengzhiju duiyu nanfang youji qu gongzuo de jueyi" (Resolution of the Politburo of the CC Concerning Work in the Southern Guerrilla Area), 13 December 1937, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 896.

49. This meeting is commonly referred to as the March Politburo meeting. It was attended by Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Kai Feng, Ren Bishi, and Zhang Guotao. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 208.

50. See Mao Zedong, "Lun chijiu zhan" (On Protracted War), in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji* (The Collected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 6, pp. 49–146.

51. "Zhongyang guanyu xinsijun xingdong fangzhen de zhishi" (Instruction of the CC on the Policy for Movement of the New Fourth Army) and "Zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang xiangcun youji zhanzheng he chuanli youji genjudi wenti gei Jiangsu shengwei de zhishi" (Instruction of the CC to the Jiangsu Provincial Committee on the Question of Strengthening Guerrilla Warfare in the Rural Areas and the Establishment of Guerrilla Bases), 14 May 1938, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 514–15.

52. "Zhongyang guanyu Xuzhou shibai hou Huazhong gongzuo de zhishi" (Party Center Instructions for Work in Central China After the Fall of Xuzhou), 22 May 1938, in *ibid.*, pp. 518–19. This was sent by the Secretariat.

53. Wang Ming, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu, "Women duiyu baowei Wuhan yu disanqi kangzhan wenti de yijian" (Our Ideas Concerning the Defense of Wuhan and the Third Stage of the War of Resistance), 15 June 1938, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 946–64.

54. The conference was attended by fifty-six delegates and was run by a Presidium of twelve. The Presidium comprised Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Xiang Ying, Wang Jiaxiang, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, Peng Dehuai, Bo Gu, and Wang Ming; Li Fuchun was administrative secretary with Wang Shoudao and Chen Gang as deputies.

55. Wang reported this news to a Politburo meeting on 14 September. The directive also approved of the CCP's expulsion of Zhang Guotao. See "Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui zhuxituan de jue ding" (Decision of the Presidium of the ECCI), September 1938, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, p. 888. See also Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao*, p. 145.

56. In fact, the plenum adopted a resolution calling for the speedy convocation of the Seventh Party Congress to discuss the questions of the united front and how to achieve victory. "Zhonggong kuangda de liuzhong quanhui guanyu zhaoji diqici quanguo daibiao dahui de jueyi" (Resolution of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum of the CC Concerning Convening the Seventh Party Congress), 6 November 1938, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 774–76.

57. “The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front,” 5 November 1938, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 213–17.

58. “Problems of War and Strategy,” 6 November 1938, in *ibid.*, pp. 219–34.

59. Wang Ming, *Mao's Betrayal*, p. 72.

60. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 331. The other two decisions provided details on the organizational structure of party committees and on how work was to be carried out by party offices at all levels. See “Kuangda de liuzhong quanwei guanyu geji dangwei zanzheng zuzhi jigou de jue ding” (Decision of the Enlarged Sixth Plenum Concerning Provisional Organizational Structure of Party Committees at All Levels), 6 November 1938, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, p. 203, and “Kuangda de liuzhong quanwei guanyu geji dangbu gongzuo guize yu jilu de jue ding” (Decision of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum Concerning Work Rules and Discipline for Party Branches at All Levels), 6 November 1938, in *ibid.*, pp. 204–5.

61. Liu was replaced by Yang Shangkun as secretary of the Northern Bureau. For the Politburo directives setting up the Central Plain's Bureau and the appointment of Yang Shangkun, see the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 783–84. See also Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 148–49.

62. “Zhonghua suweilai gongheguo xibei lianbang zhengfu chengli xuanyan,” in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao wenti ziliao*, pp. 449–52.

63. “Zhongyang guanyu yi si fangmianjun huihe hou de zhengzhi xingshi yu renwu de jue yi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 683–90. This resolution was passed by the Politburo. The resolution states that it was adopted at Maoergai, which is the larger city near Shawo where the meeting was actually held.

64. “Zhongyang guanyu Zhang Guotao tongzhi de cuowu de jue ding,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 10, pp. 556–58. This was adopted by the Ejie Conference.

65. “Zhongyang gei Manzhou geji dangbu ji quanti dangyuan de xin. Lun Manzhou de zhuangkuang he women dang de renwu,” in *Douzheng* (Struggle), no. 18 (15 June 1933): 1–5; no. 19 (25 July 1933): 14–16; and no. 20 (5 August 1933): 14–16.

66. The Comintern's Sixth Congress (17 July–1 September 1928) announced that defense of the Soviet Union and resistance to the imperialist war were the main international tasks of the communist movement.

67. This refers to the Tanggu truce agreement of May 1933 between the GMD and the Japanese.

68. “Wei kang-Ri jiuguo gao quanti tongbao shu” is also known as the August 1 Declaration. It was published in the Paris-based journal *Jiuguo bao* (National Salvation News) and was published in English translation in *Inprecor*, vol. 15, no. 64 (30 November 1935): 1595–57. This translation is taken from the Chinese version published in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 679–82.

69. The Blue Shirts were a quasi-fascist, paramilitary organization formed in the early 1930s. They were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

70. “Zhongyang wei muqian fan-Ri tao-Jiang de mimi zhishi shu,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 10, pp. 561–71.

71. This was the party set up by the Nineteenth Route Army during the “Fujian Rebellion” of late 1933.

72. This refers to the *Xinsheng zhouban* (New Life Weekly). It was closed down in June 1935 by the GMD authorities as a result of Japanese protests about an article concerning the Japanese emperor.

73. “Zhongyang guanyu junshi zhanlue wenti de jue yi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 286–89. This resolution was passed by the Politburo at Wayaobao on 23 December 1935.

74. “Zhongyang guanyu muqian zhengzhi xingshi yu dang de renwu jueyi,” in *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 734–45. This resolution was adopted by the Politburo at Wayaobao conference.

75. “Guanyu minzu geming de gaochao yu dang de celüe luxian de baogao,” in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao wenti ziliao*, pp. 479–513. This report by Zhang Guotao to a meeting of party and army activists delivered on 28 January was originally published in *Ganbu bidu* (Required Reading for Cadres), 10 February 1936.

76. This presumably refers to the “Resolution Concerning the Current Political Situation and the Party’s Tasks” adopted on 25 December 1935 by the Politburo. See above, **Doc. E.8**.

77. This refers to the decision of the Comintern’s Seventh Congress (July–August 1935) that called for a united front of all elements, classes, and nations in the fight against fascism.

78. This is paraphrased based on the statement in section two on the party’s tactical line in the 25 December 1935 Politburo resolution on the current political situation and the party’s tasks. See above, **Doc. E.8**.

79. “Kang-Ri jiuguo zhengfu.” This is a different term than a government of national defense [*guofang zhengfu*], used in the Politburo’s resolution on 25 December 1935; see above, **Doc. E.8**.

80. This ten-point program should be compared with that proposed for the government of self-defense as contained in the Politburo’s 25 December 1935 resolution. See Section 3 of **Doc. E.8**. In broad terms, however, the thrust of the program is the same.

81. The *baojia* system was the method of social control in traditional China. Every 100 households constituted one *jia* and ten *jia* were one *bao*. The heads of each section were responsible for tax collection and local law and order.

82. “Zhang Guotao zhi zhongyang dian.” The telegram can be found in the Political Academy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, vol. 7, p. 193.

83. “Guanyu Zhang Guotao tongzhi chengli dier ‘zhongyang’ de jue ding,” in *ibid.* The decision was issued in the name of the Politburo.

84. This resolution had criticized Zhang for his opportunism, for splitting the Red Army, and for his warlord tendencies. At the time it was distributed only to CC members. See above, **Doc. E.3**.

85. This telegram can be found in Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), *Xi’an shibian ziliao*, pp. 41–42.

86. During the Xi’an Incident, Li Kenong was secretary to the CC delegation. He was also the representative of the Red Army’s Northeast and Northwest armies.

87. “Zhongyang guanyu dongbeijun gongzuode zhidao yuanze,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 30–42.

88. “Zai ‘zhongyang’ zongdui huodang fenzi huishang baogao,” in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao*, pp. 580–91. This is part of a speech delivered by Zhang Guotao to party and army activists in the Fourth Front Army on 6 June 1936.

89. This was the Politburo’s resolution of 25 December 1935. See above, **Doc. E.8**.

90. For Zhang Guotao’s report on this, see **Doc. E.9**.

91. Song Qingling was Sun Yat-sen’s widow, and He Xiangning was the widow of Liao Zhongkai.

92. “Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu Zhang Guotao tongzhi cuowu de jue ding,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 164–68.

93. “Zhang Guotao jinggao guoren shu,” in Sheng Renxue (ed.), *Zhang Guotao*, pp. 575–83. The document has the subtitle “A Discussion with CCP Colleagues on the Issues of the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction.” An English translation of this document can also be found in Warren Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, book 3, pp. 417–26. It was originally published in the Hankou newspaper *Zaodang bao*, 2 May 1938.

94. This conference was convened on 29 March at Wuchang. It adopted a “Program for National Resistance and National Reconstruction.”

95. On 26 January 1923, Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet emissary, A. Joffe, signed a joint manifesto outlining the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese text can be found in *Dongfang zazhi* (The Eastern Miscellany), vol. 20, no. 2 (25 January 1923): 10–11. An English translation can be found in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 70–71.

96. “Zhongyang guanyu kang-Ri jiuwang yundong de xin xingshi yu minzhu gongheguo de jueyi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 779–82. This resolution was drafted by Zhang Wentian and passed by the Politburo.

97. “Zhonghua suweiai zhongyang zhengfu ji Zhonggong zhongyang dui Xi’an shibian tongdian,” in *ibid.*, p. 794.

98. “Zhongyang guanyu heping jie jue Xi’an shibian gei Zhou Enlai tongzhi de dianbao,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 139–40.

99. This refers to the CC Clique or Organization Clique run by the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu.

100. “Zhongyang guanyu Xi’an shibian xuanchuan fangzhen de zhishi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 796.

101. A Chinese version of this text can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 844–45. The English version is based on that contained in Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, vol. 1, pp. 93–95. It was drafted by Zhou on 4 July 1937 and sent to the GMD on 15 July but was only published by the GMD’s Central News Agency on 22 September.

102. “Guanyu guoqu baiqu gongzuo gei zhongyang de yifengxin,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 803–12.

103. This refers to the Politburo meeting held at Wayaobao in December 1935. For the political resolution adopted, see above, **Doc. E.8**.

104. This presumably refers to the 17 September 1936 resolution on resistance to Japan and the National Salvation Movement. See above, **Doc. E.17**.

105. “Zhongguo gongchandang suqu daibiao huiyi de renwu (tigang),” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang (neibu ben)*, vol. 10, pp. 201–5. This was Zhang Wentian’s (Luo Fu) opening address to the meeting.

106. The telegram can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 157–58.

107. “Zhongyang guanyu muqian xingshi yu dang de renwu de jueding,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 858–59. This was the resolution of the Luochuan Enlarged Politburo Conference.

108. “Guanyu duli zizhu shandi youjizhan yuanze de zhishi,” in *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily), 7 July 1981. This was a telegram to Peng Dehuai.

109. This was a telegram assessing the enemy’s situation and the party’s strategic plan. It was sent to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, He Long, Xiao Ke, Liu Bochang, and Xu Xiangqian. A copy can be found in *Renmin ribao*, 7 July 1981.

110. “Guanyu zheng ge huabei gongzuo yingyi zhanzheng wei wei yi fangxiang de zhishi,” in *Renmin ribao*, 7 July 1981. This was a telegram to Zhou Enlai and then to Liu Shaoqi, Yang Shangkun, Zhu Rui, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi.

111. “Dui pingyuan youjizhan de zhishi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, p. 307. This was a telegram to Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and Deng Xiaoping.

112. “Wanjiu shiju de guanjian” was originally published in *Qunzhong* (The Masses), vol. 1, no. 4. The translation is based on the version reprinted in Wang Ming, *Wang Ming yanlun xuanji*, pp. 546–54.

113. “Sanyue zhengzhiju huiyi de zongjie—muqian kangzhan xingshi yu ruhe jixu

kangzhan he zhengqu kangzhan shengli," in *Qunzhong*, vol. 1, no. 19, and in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 923–39.

114. This probably refers to "Yu Yan'an *Xin Zhonghua bao* jizhe tanhua" (Interview with Reporter from the Yan'an *New China* Newspaper), dated 2 February in Takeuchi (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 5.

115. "Zhongyang guanyu kang-Ri jinwang yundong de xin xingshi yu minzhu gongheguo de jueyi" can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 92–99.

116. "Lun xin jieduan," in Takeuchi (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 6, pp. 163–240. The extracts translated here are taken from this version. This was Mao Zedong's opening speech to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC. A rough English translation of the entire speech can be found in *U.S. Joint Publications Research Service*, 71911–4, 1 November 1978, *Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung (1917–1949)*, vols. 5–6, pp. 129–88. Section 18 translated here, "The GMD Has a Bright Future," appears in part three of the speech "The New Stage of Development of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance and the Anti-Japanese national United Front"; the remainder appears in part five, "Protracted Warfare and Long-Term Cooperation."

117. This is from Mao's speech on 3 May 1937 to the national conference of party delegates. "The Tasks of the CCP in the Period of Resistance to Japan," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 263–83.

118. For this resolution of 17 September 1936, see the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, pp. 92–99.

119. "Zhonggong kuangda de liuzhong quanwei zhengzhi jueyan," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1001–7.

120. Zhang Guotao was expelled from the party on 18 April 1938, and an internal party report on the matter was issued the following day.

121. This decision of September 1938 by the Presidium of the Comintern can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 11, p. 888.

122. For this assessment by the Comintern see *ibid.*, pp. 889–90.

123. "Guanyu kang-Ri minzu tongyi zhanxian de yu dang de zuzhi wenti," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 168–201. This is an outline of the report delivered by Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu) to the Sixth Plenum on 15 October 1938.

124. This refers to Lu Xun's *The True Story of Ah Q*, originally published in 1921.

125. The CC Clique, or Organization Clique, was headed by Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu. These two brothers used their control of the GMD organization department and internal security apparatus to support Chiang Kai-shek.

The Fuxing society was set up by Chiang Kai-shek in March 1932 as a secret police organization and adopted fascist techniques and ideas. It formally ceased operations in April 1938 but its former members continued to exert considerable influence.

126. "Kuangda zhongyang diliuci quanwei guanyu zhongyang weiyuanhui gongzuo guize yu jilu de juejing," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 206–9.

Commentary F

Problems in the United Front, 1939–1941

In 1939, the better relations between the CCP and the GMD began to sour. As the CCP began to expand its influence, it came into conflict with local GMD troops. This culminated in what the Communists term the “first and second anticommunist upsurges” (December 1939–March 1940 and January 1941). While these incidents did not end the united front, they did reinforce Mao’s view that not all CCP resources should be channeled via the GMD. It is important to remember that for Mao, the united front did not comprise just an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek. While cordial relations with Chiang were important given his position as the figurehead of the resistance struggle, there was more to the united front.¹ Indeed, CCP policy turned back toward isolating Chiang while trying to win over to its side significant sections of the anti-Japanese alliance.

The CCP decided to adopt policies for power-sharing and to moderate economic policy in areas under its control to win over other groups in the united front. Having rejected Wang Ming’s views, Mao was faced with having to provide a viable policy alternative; one that would neither drive away current supporters nor alienate potential new supporters. Mao’s approach to government was summed up in his “On New Democracy” (January 1940). The need to devise a new economic policy was heightened by the economic crisis that faced the Shaan-Gan-Ning region in the early 1940s. The nationalist blockades and the cut in nationalist subsidies to the region began to take their toll.

One final CCP objective for the united front was to prevent the possibility of a rapprochement between the GMD, or any part thereof, and the Japanese invaders. This was no idle fantasy. At the end of 1938, Wang Jingwei, won over by peace terms laid down in Konoe’s New Order on 1 November 1938, went over to the Japanese. On 1 January 1939, Chiang Kai-shek formally rejected the terms and expelled Wang from the party. The CCP strongly defended Chiang to shore up the anti-Japanese alliance and unleashed a campaign to criticize Wang.

a) Wang Jingwei Defects and the CCP Questions Chiang Kai-shek’s Reliability

The CCP was taken with yet another of its optimistic assessments that had marked the First United Front. The Central Secretariat issued a directive stating that the treachery of Wang Jingwei was a positive step since it had separated out the peace

faction from the war faction in the GMD. This action had clearly exposed the former as traitors (**Doc. F.1**). The directive recognized that the departure of Wang Jingwei had not removed the hostility within the GMD toward the CCP.

CCP fears about Chiang's reliability were heightened by his comments to the GMD's Fifth Plenum (21–30 January 1939). Chiang indicated that while he would continue the struggle against Japan, the fight would be to restore the pre-July 1937 situation. This seemed to accept a Japanese presence in Manchuria and might have indicated a willingness to deal with the Japanese.² The CCP's reply was to call on its members to take a differentiated response to Chiang's position. While Chiang's commitment to resist Japan was to be supported, his position concerning Manchuria was to be criticized. Such criticism was to be restrained and "reasonable," however, so that it would enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the people (**Doc. F.2**).

Unknown to the CCP, the GMD plenum also decided to step up its curbs on CCP activities and adopted a series of measures in January and February to this effect.³ During the spring and summer, armed conflicts increased. In addition, the GMD began its blockade of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, and in October 1939 it cut off financial and logistic support. In December, central government forces and local forces under Yan Xishan began to move against the border region. Repressive measures continued with many clashes occurring around the north China base areas. This culminated in what the CCP termed the "first anticommunist upsurge" (December 1939–March 1940).

As the CCP's situation began to deteriorate during the early summer months, a high-level cadres conference was convened in Yan'an to reassess policy. On 10 June 1939, Mao Zedong delivered a report in which he summed up the Party Center's view (**Doc. F.3**). Mao attempted to link all anticommunist activity to capitulation to the Japanese. Mao described the greatest dangers of the present time as "capitulationism" and "anticommunism." In the speech, Mao confirmed his view that the GMD was incapable of leading the revolution and persisting with resistance to Japan. This assessment, however, was not to be taken as signaling a break with the GMD. Mao felt that while some might capitulate, many could be won over to the revolutionary cause. Precipitate action might risk alienating these elements. Thus, the GMD as a whole was not to be attacked for capitulation but rather those "capitulationists" in the "landlord-capitalist class." This meant that as long as Chiang continued to oppose Japan he was to be supported. Party members were to work together with "progressive elements" in the GMD to develop the "anti-capitulationist struggle." The consolidation of the anti-Japanese struggle remained the party's basic task. To prevent repeating mistakes from 1927, however, organizational and ideological independence was to be preserved.

Mao's report also touched on organizational issues arising as a result of the party's development over the previous three years. He reaffirmed the decisions of the Sixth Plenum that the Secretariat would handle day-to-day work but stated that the Politburo would meet on a weekly basis. Mao also felt that it was time to slow down the pace of party recruitment. For the most part, the rapid recruitment drive

was to be stopped. Finally, Mao predicted that the Seventh Party Congress would be held in October and its main task would be to struggle against “capitulation.”

These issues were debated at the Enlarged Politburo meeting held from 3 July to 25 August 1939.⁴ Importantly, the meeting approved the suggestion of stopping the “storm membership drive” that had been in progress since the beginning of the war in 1937. Increases in party membership had been particularly rapid since the decision of March 1938 had criticized “closed-doorism” and had called for a quick expansion because of the new high tide in the opposition to Japan.⁵ It had become clear that many unsuitable elements had come into the party. Now policy was to consolidate and purge the undesirable elements such as landlords, rich peasants, and spies (**Doc. F.4**). The key to consolidating the party was to be ideological education. The meeting called for correct ideological struggles to be waged within the party “to ensure ideological harmony.”

From 9 to 18 September 1939, the National Political Consultative Assembly was due to meet for its fourth session. The CCP’s bargaining position was outlined in a letter of 8 September signed by, among others, Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, and Bo Gu (**Doc. F.5**). The CCP saw the Assembly as providing a chance for the party to defend itself against GMD attacks and to strengthen the anti-Japanese front. It called for measures to be undertaken to stop the anticommunist activities and for all anti-Japanese groups to be granted legal and democratic rights. Further, it called for closer collaboration between the GMD and the CCP. Militarily, it demanded support for CCP tactics; it proposed the use of guerrilla warfare behind Japanese lines and for all anti-Japanese forces to be treated equally, thus raising the status of the CCP’s own troops.

b) Mao Zedong and the CCP Develop Their Alternative to GMD Rule

Not surprisingly, the GMD was unresponsive to the CCP’s position, and it launched criticism of the party’s principal representative, Wang Ming. In the following period, as the GMD stepped up its anti-CCP activities, it became clear to Mao and his supporters that a new policy program had to be put together for the CCP to be successful. This had to be done both to counter the perceived failures of Wang Ming’s approach to the united front and to provide an alternative to GMD rule. With the possibility of the united front’s breakup, the CCP had to offer its own alternative. Articles began to appear and discussions took place about the nature of the Chinese revolution and the similarities and differences between the CCP and the GMD.

An article written in late September 1939 by Wang Jiaxiang is included here as an example (**Doc. F.6**). Wang argues that although the CCP had not given up its principles, Sun Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” provided the political program for the united front. Marxism-Leninism was not to be confused with these principles. All attempts to suggest that the former was not appropriate for China, however, were to be rejected.

Mao made his own views known in two important articles in October 1939 (“Introduction to *The Communist*”) and January 1940 (“New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture”). These outlined Mao’s views on government and the strategy for attaining power. In discussing these two articles it is important to note that “Introduction to *The Communist*” (Doc. F.7) was intended for party members and not for public consumption. By contrast, “New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture” (Doc. F.8) was intended precisely for the public at large to persuade them that the CCP had something to offer them. As a result, the statements in the former are somewhat harsher than those in the latter. Thus, as Stuart Schram has pointed out, while the “Introduction to *The Communist*” does not raise the question of who should exercise hegemony in the united front, simply assuming that it is the CCP, “New Democratic Politics” skirts the issue of communist leadership.⁶

Mao’s “Introduction to *The Communist*” reviewed the history of the party as a prelude to putting forward his new policies. In this review, Mao declared that the Zunyi Conference had set the party on the road to Bolshevization and laid the foundations for forming the united front against Japan. This marks the beginning of the attacks on Wang Ming and his supporters through a reinterpretation of party history. The official party view to date had been that it was Wang Ming and his supporters who had brought about the Bolshevization of the party as a result of the Fourth Plenum (January 1931). This plenum was not yet denigrated but it marked the beginning of the process that would result in its being discredited.

Mao put forward the party’s “three magic weapons” that would help it fight to victory—the united front, armed struggle, and party-building. For the united front, Mao proposed “unity and struggle.” This meant that the alliance with the national bourgeoisie had to be maintained. Failure to do so would result in “left opportunism.” The bourgeoisie was to be struggled against by “peaceful” and “bloodless” means. The CCP had to strengthen itself; otherwise it would commit the error of “right opportunism” and fall prey to those vacillating elements, especially among the big bourgeoisie, who sought to suppress it. Eventually, when the split occurred, the proletariat would wage a “stern and resolute armed struggle against the bourgeoisie.” This was an appeal to all elements in the party. It argued for staying within the united front while holding out the prospect of future revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The “armed struggle” would take the form of guerrilla warfare. Mao went so far as to say that the history of the CCP might be termed a history of armed struggle. This armed struggle was in essence peasant war. Finally, party-building would require the definition of ideological doctrine and the unification and rectification of the party on that basis. Discipline and organization would be tightened and a resolute struggle would be conducted against erroneous tendencies. This would become the major focus of party work during the Rectification Campaign of 1941–44.

Although “New Democratic Politics” had a much more conciliatory tone, it showed that Mao’s views had shifted substantially from his position at the Sixth

Plenum (October 1938) and also reemphasized that the CCP had its own ultimate objectives. Although, as Schram has written, proletarian leadership of the united front was “covered with a rhetorical figleaf,”⁷ for the first time since the outbreak of war, the CCP publicly put forward its claim to lead the revolution. According to Mao, the bourgeoisie had both revolutionary characteristics and a tendency toward compromise. As a result of this tendency toward compromise, the proletariat would have to assume leadership in China’s struggle against imperialism and feudalism by default. During this first stage there would be a “revolutionary democratic dictatorship” of several classes. In the second stage, the nonproletarian classes would be transformed gradually and the new democratic revolution would progress into its socialist stage. Although Mao said that the first phase would take a long time to complete, he was vague about when the change of stages would come about and criticized as “leftist” those who thought that socialism could be implemented before the new democratic revolution was completed. However, the article did return the attainment of socialism to the CCP’s political agenda.

In line with the view that it would be a long time before socialist construction was on the agenda, Mao outlined a moderate economic policy that would appeal to non-CCP elements. Private capitalist production would be allowed so long as it did not dominate the “livelihood of the people on a national scale.” In the countryside, a rich peasant economy was proposed, with only “big landlords” having their land confiscated and redistributed. This economic program was depicted as being in line with Sun Yat-sen’s ideas.

As a political program, “New Democratic Politics” was well designed in its appeal to the party faithful by reasserting socialism as the party’s final goal. At the same time, it sought to isolate the GMD by offering the “intermediate elements” a future stake in the revolutionary struggle.

CCP concern with the possibility of “capitulationism” remained high, and publicly the party devoted its efforts to averting the possibility. In a directive of 23 December 1939, the party warned that the move by the “big bourgeoisie” within the GMD from “political restriction” of the CCP to “military restriction” marked a further step toward ultimate capitulation to the Japanese.⁸ In January 1940, the secret agreement between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese to set up a new “national government” was made public, and in March the government was established. Initially, it won the support of a few influential citizens, including early Communists such as Zhou Fuhai and Chen Gongbo. A favorable peace settlement was not concluded, however, and the fact that the government was so clearly under Japanese control meant that it failed to swing over any significant sections of Chinese public opinion.

The CCP reacted to these continuing threats by issuing a “resolution” on 1 February 1940 warning that capitulation was the main danger at that time. To overcome this danger and improve the situation, the CC put forward ten tasks (**Doc. F.9**). Propaganda about Wang Jingwei was to be stepped up, and again the link between the “capitulationists” and the “anticommunists” was made. At all levels

and in all fields the united front was to be strengthened, and the majority of GMD members were to be united with. Democratic rule was to be argued for strongly. Concerning the CCP itself, the anti-Japanese base areas were to be consolidated and expanded. Within the bases, democratic organs were to be set up on the basis of elections. These would exclude “capitulationists” and “anticommunist” elements. Yet, as the resolution explained, these organs would not be those of the proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie but of an alliance of several revolutionary classes. Finally, the party was to be strengthened, for, according to the resolution, without this no important problems in the anti-Japanese war could be solved.

The question of government in the base areas under CCP control was an important one, and it was a problem which Mao Zedong addressed in March 1940. By March, through its program of expansion of the base areas, the CCP had achieved a firm presence in parts of north and central China. As Lyman van Slyke has noted, geography was more important to the success of a base than its social and economic structure.⁹ The bases tended to be situated in poor, remote areas often on provincial boundaries. By early 1940 the most important of these bases, apart from the Shaan-Gan-Ning, were Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei), Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan),¹⁰ Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suiyuan), and Shandong.

The situation in these base areas was quite different from that in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. Shaan-Gan-Ning, apart from being the home of the Party Center, was beyond the reach of Japanese attacks. Further, having been formed earlier it was almost entirely consolidated. By contrast, the other base areas led a precarious existence always prey to Japanese attack and with significant populations of landlords and other elements who might become hostile to the communist presence. This meant that policies had to be more flexible and accommodating to a wider range of class interests.

The Jin-Cha-Ji, in particular, served as a model for other base areas and also for Yan'an when the Party Center began to formulate its administrative and economic policies.¹¹ In 1939, Mao gave his seal of approval to the base area by writing the calligraphy for, and promoting, an account of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region as part of the development of a policy platform to counter Wang Ming's.¹²

On 6 March 1940, Mao officially put forward the “three-thirds” system of political power in the base areas based on the experiences of the other regions (**Doc. F.10**). In all political organs, Communists were to be restricted to one-third of the positions, with a further one-third for nonparty left-wing progressives and one-third for “intermediate elements” who were neither left nor right. The major threat was identified as “leftism,” which was manifested by the neglect of the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry.

Mao's proposals were discussed, and on 13 August 1940 the CCP's Northern Bureau published the “Current Administrative Program for the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region,” more commonly known as the “Double Ten Policy” (**Doc. F.11**). The program contained significant concessions for the traditional elites in order to gain their support. Only the land and property of the worst “traitors” would be confis-

cated; others could keep it and continue to receive rent. Under the “three-thirds” system, they would be assured of positions in the local assembly so long as they did not transgress the anti-Japanese policy. For others in the base area, the program pledged an eight-hour workday, a progressive tax system and low rents. However, rent strikes were outlawed and payment was to be enforced. This program provided the basis for the May 1941 Shaan-Gan-Ning policy that in turn became the model for the other bases.

In line with Mao’s conciliatory directive, the party began to stress the need for unity and to attack those who were seeking to undermine the united front. On 7 July 1940, the CC issued a decision affirming the need to struggle against “leftism” (**Doc. F.12**). The decision pointed out that the struggle against anticommunists had been necessary but should not be taken too far as the “anticommunist high tide” had now subsided. The GMD had temporarily halted its attacks on the CCP in March. As a result, the emphasis was now to be placed on unity. According to the decision, the “reactionaries” had been prevented from launching an all-out attack on the Communists because of contradictions within the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords and the progressive nature of the majority of the intermediate camp.

c) The “100 Regiments” Campaign—August–December 1940

On 20 August 1940, the Eighth Route Army launched its largest and longest offensive of the anti-Japanese war. It lasted until 5 December; comprising 1,824 engagements, eventually some 112 regiments participated, thus giving the offensive its popular name of the “‘100 Regiments’ Campaign.”¹³ The reasons for its launch have been unclear but it is certain that initially it was conceived of as a limited tactical campaign of sabotage.¹⁴ It is also clear that the initial combat was begun on the orders of Peng Dehuai without the prior approval of Mao Zedong and the Military Affairs Committee.¹⁵ However, this would not have been unusual under the circumstances, given the time that communications could take and the general inefficiency of communication with Yan’an.¹⁶ Peng may well have presumed that no message from Yan’an amounted to acceptance; this idea is supported by Nie Rongzhen, who, in his memoirs, stated that as the initial plan amounted to “routine guerrilla warfare” it had nothing to do with general strategy and thus there was nothing for the central authorities to react to. It was only after it became a major campaign with the name of the “100 Regiments” that Mao Zedong became critical and complained of not being consulted.¹⁷

It seems that political and military leaders in the Eighth Route Army and the Jin-Cha-Ji (Nie Rongzhen, Liu Bocheng, Peng Dehuai, Zuo Quan, and Deng Xiaoping) had become frustrated with the tightening Japanese hold on the area that was radiating out from their control of key communication centers. As a result, it was decided to break through this grip (or “cage,” as they referred to it) and if possible link up the two base areas of Jin-Cha-Ji and Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu.¹⁸ To meet this objective, operation orders were sent out on 22 July calling for actions to begin in mid-August

(later postponed to 20 August).¹⁹ It seems that the enthusiasm engendered by the military leaders communicated itself to the local officers as more and more regiments joined in the operations.

Later, in his memoirs, Peng Dehuai provided further argumentation for why the campaign was launched. He claimed that the actions were intended to prevent the possibility of the GMD's coming to terms with the Japanese.²⁰ It must be noted, however, that the danger had eased at this particular time. It may have been that Peng and Zuo decided to launch the campaign because of GMD criticisms that the CCP was shying away from conflicts with the Japanese in order to protect their forces. If such a view were to have gained credence, it could have undermined CCP support within the united front.

Initially, the campaign went extremely well. Peng Dehuai, in an enthusiastic interview on 31 August 1940, stressed the importance of the campaign as the "first large-scale offensive campaign" launched by the CCP (**Doc. F.13**). Peng particularly stressed the role that the campaign had played in overcoming a feeling of "pessimism and hopelessness" in the face of the Japanese. He predicted that victory would result in a change in the whole military situation in north China. On 25 September, Zhu De gave a similarly optimistic account of the campaign and stressed both its strategic importance and its morale-boosting effect.²¹ Zhu noted, however, that because of insufficient mobilization of the people, the planned sabotage of the southern sections of the Beijing-Pukou and Beijing-Hankou railways, and of the enemy's communication networks on the banks of the Yangtze, had not been carried out. By late October, the tide was turning and the communist forces could not maintain their attacks. While the campaign may have boosted the morale of the resistance in China, it resulted in a major Japanese backlash during the years 1941 to 1944 in north China. In July 1941, General Okamura Yasuji launched the far more wide-reaching search and destroy missions against the communist forces and the local population under their control.

d) The Southern Anhui Incident—January 1941— An Effective End to the United Front

The January 1941 Southern Anhui Incident (also known as the New Fourth Army Incident) is taken by many observers to mark the effective end of CCP-GMD cooperation. Yet neither side was willing to see a public disintegration of cooperation. For the CCP, it was now more important than ever to win over to the communist side the "intermediate elements" in the united front.²² Indeed, the CCP tried to put the Incident to good effect by winning support against its opponents within the national movement. The destruction of the New Fourth Army troops under Xiang Ying's control also provided Mao and his supporters at the Party Center with a convenient reason for reorganizing the central China party apparatus to break up any last vestiges of Wang Ming's influence.

The communist forces that were active in central and south China were attacked

continuously by GMD troops up until the start of open warfare with Japan. In October 1937, Chiang's national government approved the formation of the New Fourth Army in central and south China. It comprised some 12,000 soldiers. The troops operated in the areas of south Jiangsu, south Anhui, and north Jiangxi, all to the south of the Yangtze River, and also in northeast Hubei and north Anhui, to the north of the river. Central and south China were seen as good areas for party expansion in 1939, and clashes with GMD forces began to increase.

By early 1939, the Party Center had decided that it was not worthwhile to expand the bases in Jiangsu south of the Yangtze. Instead, the New Fourth Army was to concentrate its energies northward into central China. A directive of January 1940 confirmed this position by claiming that this central area represented the best area for the expansion of communist control (**Doc. F.14**). It outlined the Party Center's view of how the army should go about expanding its sphere of influence. In particular, it called for the New Fourth Army to cross to the north bank of the Yangtze, an appeal that was to be repeated in February and May.

Although negotiations began in March 1940 between the GMD and the CCP to reduce clashes, in May, Mao was still urging Xiang Ying and the Southeast Sub-bureau of the party to expand the New Fourth Army's sphere of influence. Chen Yi received similar instructions to expand New Fourth Army influence in central Jiangsu. While Chen Yi was able to expand, Xiang Ying, feeling that he could not follow the instructions of the Party Center, offered his resignation.²³ Despite this, by October 1940, the New Fourth Army held all of Jiangsu north of the Yangtze and east of the Grand Canal in addition to large areas in Anhui and Hubei and smaller areas south of the Yangtze.²⁴

Chiang Kai-shek sought to block such expansion. Having restricted the growth of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, Chiang set out to ensure that all communist forces were moved north of the Yellow River. In negotiations that began in June, the issues of the size of the communist armies and operation zones were discussed. The Nationalist position was that communist operations should move north of the Yellow River but that the area under Yan Xishan in southwest Shanxi should be exempt from communist influence. The Seventh Plenum of the GMD's Fifth CEC hardened that position. The Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region was to be restricted to eighteen counties, instead of the twenty-one proposed by the CCP; the size of the communist forces was to be slashed from half a million to 100,000, and within one month communist forces had to move north of the Yellow River. This would mean that the CCP would also have to give up its bases in Henan and Shandong south of the Yellow River. These were the bases which the January directive had picked out as representing the best possibilities for communist expansion.

Because Mao feared that withdrawal to north of the Yellow River would leave communist forces trapped between GMD and Japanese forces and the Yellow River, he and the Party Center offered to withdraw from areas south of the Yangtze (south Jiangsu and Anhui) as a "concession" to the GMD position. In the meantime, on 19 October, He Yingqin, the GMD minister of military affairs, cabled Zhu De

claiming that communist forces were disregarding the designated zones and continuing to arbitrarily expand their armies. When he ordered that all communist forces withdraw north of the Yellow River within one month, Zhu De and the other military leaders rejected this proposal as unreasonable (**Doc. F.15**). On 9 December, Chiang Kai-shek added his voice, calling for all New Fourth Army troops to be out of south Anhui and south Jiangsu by the end of the year. In addition, the Eighth Route Army was to be north of the Yellow River by this deadline to be followed by the New Fourth Army one month later. On 25 December 1940, Mao ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuation immediately.

It was only on 4 January 1941, however, that Ye Ting's and Xiang Ying's forces began to move. While moving, they were harassed by Gu Zhutong's troops, and they moved southwest to Maolin to try to regroup. Here they were surrounded by Nationalist forces and were decimated. Some 9,000 of the New Fourth Army's troops were either killed or arrested. On 13 January, Ye Ting was arrested while trying to negotiate a settlement, and Xiang Ying was killed a few weeks later.

Not surprisingly, each side blamed the other for this disaster. The GMD claimed that the New Fourth Army had engaged in subordination and unlawful expansion, and on 17 January, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it disbanded. Direct contacts between Chongqing and Yan'an were virtually abandoned, and CCP military liaison offices in a number of Nationalist-held cities were closed.²⁵ The CCP claimed that although the GMD orders had been obeyed, while beginning its march north to join the Eighth Route Army it was ambushed by GMD troops.

The CCP assessment of the event differed according to which purpose it was to serve. Publicly, the CCP used the Southern Anhui Incident as a propaganda windfall. Talking to the communist paper *Xin Zhonghua bao* (New China Daily), Mao interpreted the incident as a premeditated act on the part of "pro-Japanese conspirators" and members of the "diehard anticommunist faction" (**Doc. F.16**). Further, he criticized "people in power" who clung to their "ten-year-old anticommunist prejudice" and did not put the national interest and the War of Resistance first. The call to move northward had been nothing more than a "cunning trick" to lure the communist troops into a trap. Finally, Mao raised the specter of a return to civil war.

An internal party directive called for a campaign to protest the Incident in order to push the GMD toward reform and to expel pro-Japanese elements within it (**Doc. F.17**). This internal directive pointed a finger more clearly at those who had engineered the Incident. It was interpreted as a joint effort by pro-Japanese, capitulationist elements under He Yingqin and the CC Clique and pro-American and pro-British elements under Chiang Kai-shek. This latter group was said to have been emboldened by American and British support for their anticommunist struggle. For the party itself, Mao and his supporters also had another message concerning the situation: it was a chance for them to attack "right opportunism" in the party, thus broadening their attack on Wang Ming. In January, the Party Center passed a decision on Xiang Ying's "mistakes" (**Doc. F.18**). The decision declared that from September 1937, Xiang Ying had committed "right opportunist" mistakes in the

united front, in particular, not recognizing the need for CCP independence. Together with the director of the political department, Yuan Guoping, Xiang was criticized for not expanding to the north and behind enemy lines, not expanding the New Fourth Army, and not setting up an anti-Japanese base. The decision, however, noted that the mistakes were not of the same nature as those committed by Zhang Guotao and thus Xiang and Yuan's future behavior would be monitored. As a result, the decision was to be circulated only to higher-level party members.

On 20 January, a new leadership of the New Fourth Army was announced, one that brought it more firmly under the control of Mao and his supporters. Chen Yi was appointed temporary commander with Zhang Yunyi as his deputy. Liu Shaoqi was appointed political commissar, and Deng Zihui was made head of the political department.²⁶

After the Southern Anhui Incident, the worst of the conflicts between the CCP and the GMD were over for the time being. The GMD, however, still maintained its grip on the Shaan-Gan-Ning Base Area. Further, the "'100 Regiments' Campaign" resulted in severe repression by the Japanese that did not decline until the burden of the war against the United States in 1943 began to hamper the Japanese efforts to pacify north China. As a response to this military situation, the CCP adjusted its tactics by redeploying units from Japanese-contested areas to protect themselves against potential threats from the GMD. Similarly, CCP troops were to avoid large-scale conflicts with the Japanese.

The policy toward military forces in the anti-Japanese base areas was summed up in a Central Military Affairs Commission directive on 7 November 1941 (**Doc. F.19**). In the face of the mounting difficulties, the Military Affairs Commission decided to adopt a strategy of preserving military strength. The military forces in each base area were to be divided into three: regular, local, and militia forces. Future expansion of forces was to switch from the regular forces to local forces and militia. This would help with the strategy of guerrilla warfare. To help forge a bond between the local troops and the area where they fought, the directive stressed that their cadres should be drawn from the local area. The influence of the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area in drafting policy is shown by the fact that its regulations on the self-defense teams and young guards were added as an appendix to the directive.²⁷

e) The CCP's Response to the Changing International Environment

Of course, the war against Japan did not exist in isolation; international events also affected the CCP. Just as Mao and the CCP publicly gave full support to the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939, so they supported the neutrality pact that the Soviet Union concluded with Japan on 13 April 1941. Both events, however, allowed the CCP to pursue its own course independent of Moscow's aims. Thus, for example, the CCP's comments on the neutrality pact stated that it marked another triumph of the Soviet Union's peace policy (**Doc. F.20**). It was claimed that this pact had in no way compromised Soviet support of China's war effort, a view

quite different from that of Chiang Kai-shek. However, the CCP used the pact as an opportunity to put forward the view that it was up to China itself to recover all the Chinese territories south of the Yalu River. Despite this, the CCP was being forced into defending a position that clearly was not going to push forward its nationalist claims. From the CCP's point of view, the German invasion of the Soviet Union that began on 22 June 1941 came as a relief. Overnight the Soviet peace policy in the midst of a capitalist war was repositioned to one of the Soviet Union as the leader of the fight against fascism.

Now, the "capitalist powers" such as Great Britain and the United States, which had been "conspiring" to encourage a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union to preempt a Japanese push southward, had to be courted as a part of the international united front against fascism. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war and enabled the CCP to call for international involvement in the war to push forward the united front. The CCP had moved swiftly away from the position of recovering all its territories on its own.

The CCP's 9 December 1941 declaration called for the formation of an anti-Japanese and antifascist front in the Pacific that would include all the governments and peoples who were opposing Japan (**Doc. F.21**). Now the United States and Great Britain were seen as having an important role to play in defeating Japan and bringing about unity in China. "Left" deviation was to be avoided, and all party members were to cooperate with the British and the Americans.

DOCUMENTS 1939–1941

F.1 Central Directive on the Situation After Wang Jingwei's Defection (5 January 1939)²⁸

1) Chiang Kai-shek has denounced the Konoe Declaration²⁹ and the defection of Wang Jingwei and has announced his [Wang's] dismissal from the party. This demonstrates the beginning of the separation in China between those who want to fight and those who want to compromise. Some of the wavering elements in the Anti-Japanese National United Front have transformed themselves from a pro-Japanese faction into a clique of traitors. This marks great progress in China's War of Resistance and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This is a fundamental characteristic of the current situation. This characteristic has been expressed at the meetings of high-level military commanders in the southwest and northwest. It will also express itself at the forthcoming Fifth Plenum of the GMD CC. However, this progress in party and political affairs, generally speaking, lags behind progress in military operations.

2) This is sure to promote continuous progress in cooperation between the GMD and the CP, but it will not abolish the GMD's long-standing policy of containing the CP. Recently, in various newspapers run by the GMD there have been demands that the CP hand over the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, abolish the border regions, and abandon communism. There have also been many instances of friction in the north and northwest of China. These are concrete manifestations of this policy of containing the CP.

3) Our tasks:

a) Firmly support Chiang's principle of continuing the War of Resistance and his recent denunciations of Wang. Support all progress Chiang makes. Support the resolution by the GMD's CC to permanently expel Wang Jingwei from the party.

b) Use all means to strike at the traitor of the country, Wang Jingwei, and his party. Criticize his treacherous theories. Point out that his anticommunist views are part of his treacherous theories.

c) When attacking Wang Jingwei, we should also point out that all current views opposing the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the border regions, and the CP are, in fact, degenerate responses to Wang Jingwei. In reality, such views only help Wang Jingwei and the actions of the Japanese invaders. Thus, we can indirectly respond to the anticommunist activities of the stubborn elements in the GMD.

4) Raise the following slogans:

a) Support the GMD CC's resolution to permanently expel Wang Jingwei from the party.

- b) Down with the traitor of his country and party—Wang Jingwei.
- c) Down with the traitor Wang Jingwei, who wants to make peace compromises.
- d) Down with the traitor Wang Jingwei, who opposes the CP, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Shaan[xi]-Gan[su] Border Region (this slogan should be used according to the conditions in individual areas; it should not be used everywhere).
- e) Support the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Down with the Japanese-German-Italian united front that is invading China and opposes Chiang and the CP.

Central Secretariat

F.2 Central Directive on the GMD's Fifth Plenum (25 January 1939)³⁰

The Center holds the following views on the question of the Fifth Plenum of the GMD's CC [21–30 January 1939]:

- 1) From the opening speech of Chiang Kai-shek, the manifesto of the Fifth Plenum, and materials obtained from various sources, it can be seen that:
 - a) the major guiding principle of the Fifth Plenum remains the continuation of the War of Resistance and alliance with the CP to fight the war. At the same time, considerable efforts have been made to boost confidence in fighting the War of Resistance, defeating pessimism and sentiments of despair, and trying to make the GMD progressive and to expand and strengthen itself. These are the primary and positive aspects of the Fifth Plenum. We should support and expand on them.
 - b) From information from various sources, [it was reported that] Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly declared, both before and after the meeting, that the meaning of fighting the War of Resistance to the end is to restore the status quo prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident [7 July 1937]. At the same time, although the documents released by the Fifth Plenum did not express this view, they actually implied that the supreme objective of the War of Resistance was to restore the status quo prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. They also expressed reliance on foreign aid, rather than on the people. There was nothing in them about the implementation of democracy. Chiang's speech at the National Assembly Conference openly opposed democratic politics. All this is incorrect. The origins of these flaws and mistakes basically lie in the different line and policies among us and Chiang and the bourgeoisie on the question of how to continue the War of Resistance and gain victory. This is owing to their lack of determination in fighting the war and their excessive reliance on foreign aid. It also demonstrates their fear of the growth of the genuinely revolutionary forces in the country. At the same, this was prompted by the current situation of the war, the international situation, and the conditions in Japan.

2) In line with the above analysis, we should support the positive aspects of the Fifth Plenum of the GMD CC, such as [the pledge of] continuing the War of Resistance and alliance with the CP. Concerning the flaws and mistakes, we should, in line with the resolutions of our party's Sixth Plenum [See above, **Doc. E.29**], make verbal or written criticisms and clarifications, in order to use our support and the support of the majority of the people in the country to overcome their irresolute commitment to fighting the War of Resistance. In general, when making our criticisms, we should not raise them in the form of direct criticism of the Fifth Plenum and Chiang's views. Our critical attitude should be friendly and reasonable, positive and serious, to gain the sympathy of the majority of the people throughout the country.

Central Secretariat

F.3 Outline for Opposing Capitulation. *Mao Zedong* (10 and 13 June 1939)³¹

I) The Characteristics of the Current Situation

The characteristics of the current situation are as follows: the possibility of surrender by the GMD has become the gravest danger. Its anticommunist activities are steps taken to prepare for surrender. The possibility of GMD surrender existed at the very beginning of the War of Resistance; it did not happen all of a sudden today. What has become the greatest danger in the current situation, however, is a phenomenon in the political situation. The GMD's anticommunism existed when the united front was established; it did not happen all of a sudden today. However, turning anticommunist activities into direct steps to prepare for surrender is a reality at present.

The current situation is caused by three factors: (A) the Japanese policy of enticing China into capitulation; (B) international pressures; and (C) the wavering of the Chinese landlord and bourgeois classes. They are discussed today below:

A) The historical development of the Japanese policy of enticing China into capitulation

1) Japan's fundamental principle toward China is to enslave it and build a so-called East Asian New Order—this is its firm and unchanging policy. In the view of the Japanese aggressor, this will not change. The 2 January editorial of the *Citizen's News* (the agency newspaper of the Defense Ministry) stated

The situation now no longer permits a single inch of retreat or a moment of hesitation. We have entered a period of cleaning up. If national rulers make a mistake, not only will the gains of the war be lost but the destiny of the country

will be affected. The final period of the war is much more difficult than the early period. There are historical lessons: the tragedies of Germany and Russia during the First World War. This must be deeply understood by politicians and citizens alike. (from *Global Knowledge*, vol. 9, no. 1 [1 February 1939])

In other words, the basic principle of aggression must be thoroughly executed; otherwise, the danger of another German or Russian revolution exists. Thus, we can see that it is mere daydreaming to believe that the Japanese will make concessions and that the status quo prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident [7 July 1937] can be restored, not through fighting a long war, but through applying British-American pressure (Chiang Kai-shek and many people in the GMD think this way).

2) Its fundamental principle (general line) of enslaving China and building an "East Asian New Order" is firm and will not change. The methods (or tactics) applied in the implementation of this fundamental principle, however, are interchangeably soft and hard, as well as flexible. Sometimes, [Japan] may make some temporary, partial, and superficial concessions in order to reach its fundamental objective.

In general, prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, political enticement for surrender was the principal means; between the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and [the fall of] Wuhan, military attack was the primary means; since Wuhan, once again political enticement for surrender has been the chief method.

3) In order to understand that the enemy's fundamental principle is firm and unwavering and that it alternates between soft and hard tactics, we should study the following materials:

a) Prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, [Japan] was determined to follow the hard line; it occupied the three provinces in the northeast, but adopted a diplomatic method of enticing China into surrender in dealing with the remainder of China.

[[Mao refers to various materials and events such as the 25 July 1936 Tanaka letter for Emperor Hirohito stressing the need to conquer China. The 21 January 1936 three principles, Matsumuro's six secret conditions, comments of Tanikawa after the occupation of Nanjing on 13 December 1937, Hirohito's 1937 New Year's Eve speech, Konoe's statements and Sakagaki's hard-line positions, the establishment of the China Cabinet to rule over all of China whether already occupied or not, the Konoe statement of 22 December 1938, Japan's engineering of the "peace movement" in China, the plot of driving a wedge between the GMD and the CP.]]

The twenty-nine pieces of evidence I have cited above explain the historical development of Japan's policy of luring China into submission. They fully explain the following three points. First, Japan's general principle of enslaving China is very firm and will never change. It is bound to turn China into its colony and establish the so-called East Asian New Order.

Second, its methods of implementation are interchangeably soft and hard; it

emphasizes one or the other approach depending on the situation. Before Wuhan, military force was the primary means, but there were also inducements for peace amid war. After Wuhan, its primary means is peace. However, it still launches offensives from time to time to exert pressure for surrender.

Third, Japan is trying to manipulate Britain and France into calling a peace conference in the Far East. The danger of a Far Eastern Munich weighs on the shoulders of the Chinese.

4) In the above three points, the first indicates that Japan's fundamental principle is firm and unchangeable; the second demonstrates that Japan uses soft and hard methods alternately; the third illustrates, by citing the twenty-nine pieces of evidence, the historical development of its switch from hard-line to soft-line tactics and shows that the greatest danger today is capitulation. On this fourth point, the reason for the Japanese peace offer may be found in the enemy's financial, economic, and military situation. It is in enormous difficulties in terms of finance (altogether 12,000 million *yuan* in three years), economy (huge increases in imports and a drastic reduction of exports, military industries overwhelming peace industries, high inflation, deterioration in people's standard of living, exhaustion of its cash reserves, and unstable foreign currency reserves), and military situation (insufficient forces and dispersion of forces). It still has to prepare to cope with an international war, so it tries hard to induce China to surrender, divides the anti-Japanese camp, uses Wang Jingwei, entices Chiang Kai-shek into capitulation, and prepares to use the Three Principles of the People and the GMD. This Japanese plot is very vicious. The enemy's war is not frightening, but its peace offer is very dangerous. The *Dagong bao* newspaper called it a "devil's peace," and, if it was realized, China would cease to be a nation.

5) To demonstrate its sincerity for peace to the GMD, Britain, and the United States, Japan is using major forces to "exterminate" the Eighth Route Army (concentrating fifteen divisions in the north of China) and now is plotting to detach northern Shaanxi as one step to induce the GMD to capitulate to Japan and oppose the CP.

The above is the Japanese policy of enticing China into surrender.

B) The pressures from Britain, the United States, and France

The second factor that makes Chinese surrender the greatest danger at the moment is the pressure exerted on the Chinese government by the advocates of surrender in Britain, the United States, and France.

[[1] In the beginning, they encouraged Japan to go to war yet they also proclaim support for China. They want the war of attrition to exhaust both sides; they indulge Germany's aggressive acts for the same purpose. Their Far Eastern Munich plot is reaching a crucial stage.] The GMD is a party with a backbone made up of the bourgeoisie, and is under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.

2) The GMD After the Fifth Plenum:

a) The main direction of the Fifth Plenum was still alliance with the CP and continuation of the war against Japan; but at the same time it contained elements of anticommunism and capitulation to Japan:

i) [it] decided on the principle of relying on international pressure to solve peacefully the problems between China and Japan;

ii) [it] decided on the principle of guarding against the CP and opposing (but not fighting) the CP, as well as on establishing the “Committee for Preventing Communism.”

b) A propeace atmosphere dominated for a while:

[The GMD] prohibited opposition to the Far Eastern Munich. The *Digest* [Wenzhai] published in Chongqing, which recently arrived here, deleted an article titled “Will Britain Engineer Another Munich in the Far East?”

Many publications ran articles promoting reliance on the sanctions against Japan imposed by Britain and the United States—their intention is to convene an international reconciliation meeting to solve the problem.

Many people in government and party organizations advocate peace; there are such people in the military as well.

“The possibility of a GMD surrender” has always existed, but it has become the greatest danger today. If it is not overcome, China’s War of Resistance will suffer great setbacks.

c) The GMD is already carrying out major preparations for its surrender—anti-communism. Anticommunism is the most important component in the preparation for surrender.

In the past six months, anticommunist activities have been particularly intense in the north, center, south, and northwest. In the north, the Eighth Route Army reclaimed the lost territories from the hands of the Japanese, and the GMD “reclaimed lost territories” from the hands of the CP. In the northwest, the CP did not cross the boundaries of the border region by an inch, while the GMD forcefully invaded many places in the border region (Zhengning, Ning County, Juyi, Jingbian, and Wayaobao Village). This is because the CP is the greatest obstacle to surrender; surrender is impossible without anticommunism.

Everything is a pretext. The real thing is the preparation for surrender.

Fabrication of many false documents.

The three factors and three causes described above define surrender as the greatest danger at the present time in the critical struggle between the advocates of surrender and advocates of war. Anticommunism is a natural step to take in preparing for surrender.

Of the three causes, the wavering of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie is the primary cause. If we ourselves do not waver, the enemy’s policy of enticing China into surrender will be ineffective; nor will international pressures for surrender be of any use.

This situation is different from that of the time of the Sixth Plenum [October–November 1938]. At that time, the war was still at its peak. Chiang’s declaration of 30 October and his 26 December speech refuting the Konoe statement were evidence. Now is the time when the enemy relies on enticing China into surrender as the primary means. This has already produced some effect. Now is the time when Britain and the United States are stepping up their pressure for surrender. This is

after the decision of the GMD's Fifth Plenum to rely on Britain and the United States and to implement anticommunist policies. Therefore, although at that time opposition to surrender was the foremost task, the danger then was not as grave as now.

In the past eight months, the situation has evolved to the most critical stage of anticommunism and surrender. Therefore, a new and concrete task has been added. This is to use all our energy to fight surrender.

[The GMD] has prepared all kinds of pretexts for capitulation:

The first pretext—the CP makes trouble. This is wrong. Fabrication of documents, attacks on the border regions, deprivation of pay to the Eighth Route Army. The whole country implements a good united front policy and supports Chiang and the government. There is no land revolution in the country. The heroic fighting of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

The second pretext—the Soviet Union's conspiracy. This is wrong. [The Soviet Union] helped the Chinese revolution in 1927. The greatest help given to China during the war in the past two years. The Soviet Union has never plotted to invade other countries. All countries are friendly and allied with the Soviet Union.

The third pretext—financial and economic difficulties. This is wrong. Any difficulties can be overcome if the new policies of the Sixth Plenum are adopted. The experience of the Red Army and the Eighth Route Army in overcoming difficulties is the proof.

The fourth pretext—that the people are tired of the war. This is wrong. Japan is now spreading this kind of propaganda. Saying this kind of thing only echoes the Japanese propaganda. The people are dissatisfied with the law of conscription. They hate the wrong methods, but not the war. [The government] represses the popular movement in the extreme.

The fifth pretext—the military is tired of the war. This is wrong. This is to slander the armies fighting the Japanese. The majority of the officers and soldiers fight for our national liberation. The majority of troops are fed up with the Civil War.

The sixth pretext—no international aid. This is wrong. Fighting the War of Resistance depends mainly on ourselves, and not others. The strong support of the Soviet Union and the sympathy from the people in all other countries. Britain, the United States, and France are never reliable.

The seventh pretext—the enemy is too strong. This is wrong. The enemy has already exhausted itself a great deal, spending 12,000 million *yuan* in three years. Its troops are insufficient and spread thin. We have better terrain and higher morale.

There are many other pretexts.

II) The Future of the War (rough estimate only)

The War of Resistance, however, must be preserved at all costs. The Anti-Japanese National United Front and the cooperation between the GMD and the CP must be strengthened and expanded. The flag and slogan of the Three Principles of the People must continue. This is the party's basic mission.

There are two possibilities: GMD surrender or the continuation of the war. There

are advocates of surrender and advocates of war—so there are two kinds of people.

[[Quotation from August 1937 decision omitted.]]

There are two possible futures for the war: first, a complex and long process; second, an equally complex and long process.

We have never imagined that the war could be won quickly and in a straightforward manner. Rather, we have always advocated a long-term and indirect approach. We have never suggested that the people throughout the country should not be mobilized or that the country should not be democratized. [We] can overcome [the danger of] surrender and gain victory.

Overcoming surrender and winning victory will be accomplished by the majority of the people and by all patriotic progressive elements from all parties and groups.

It is impossible to imagine that, without exception, everybody in the GMD will surrender. The failure of the Great Revolution in 1927 [was owing to] the GMD's surrender to imperialism and its launching of the anticommunist war. However, the situation at that time was that: (a) no imperialist country had invaded China; (b) all the imperialists supported Chiang Kai-shek in his fight against the CP; (c) the GMD had not tasted the bitterness of the anticommunist wars and could mobilize troops; (d) the people of the country had not experienced the taste of the anticommunist wars or learned the painful lessons, nor did they have any experience of being deceived; (e) the CP did not have the experience of the failure of the united front or armed forces (all were defeated), and in general we had no experience in war; (f) the world was not in a period of war and revolution but in a period of reaction; (g) the Soviet Union was not as strong as it is today.

However, Song [Qingling], He [Xiangning?], and Deng Yanda persisted in the revolution and did not become traitors. After the September 18 Incident [1931] (Japanese occupation of the northeast), there were Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, Zhao Bosheng, Dong Zhengtang, Ji Zhenqiong, Ji Hongchang, Ren Yingqi, Zhang Xueliang, Yang Wucheng, and Chen Jitang.

Not to mention the fact that today we have two years of history in fighting the war.

China is not Spain or Czechoslovakia.

a) If there are traitors (this is only too natural; there has already been a Wang Jingwei; there will also be Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei), there will also be people opposed to surrender.

b) There are those diehard elements who want to surrender and never come back; there can also be those who surrender only for a moment but want to fight again.

c) There are those who surrender first and fight later on (some people have to be traitors once in order to be good); there can also be those who surrender, fight, and surrender again.

d) There may be people and officers who are deceived, but later are awakened and begin to fight back. For example, "the CP is making trouble," "the mutiny of the Eighth Route Army," "international situation is not good," "state finances are in

an extremely difficult position,” “the Soviet Union wants to make China a red country,” “temporarily capitulate in order to fight back”—such deceptions will certainly be manufactured.

e) The enemy will certainly forbid the existence of a group of surrendered traitors that unify China and are immune to foreign intervention. It will surely resort to the policy of divide and rule. Then, there may be many puppet regimes existing at the same time to facilitate the enemy’s rule. Many surrendered but still armed elements may fight a civil war among themselves—China is where civil war is most probable (huge territory and dispersed economy) and it has the greatest experiences of them.

f) The enemy may make some concessions first and then intervene. When he makes concessions—there may be surrender; when he intervenes—there may be internal division.

g) Franco did not take back the biggest traitor of the Republic; Hitler did not give refuge to the traitor of the Czech people; the Japanese can only collect the likes of Wang Jingwei in the end.

h) Do you all know the experiences of the people and the military in Manchuria?

The Chinese troops cannot be totally destroyed. This is a certainty. Laying down arms will surely lead to war—this is also a certainty.

In general, there will be a confusing situation. It will not be a situation of unity. Then, the CP will become the savior of the people. The people are looking forward eagerly to the CP. Then, the Chinese people will certainly increase their faith in the Soviet Union. Then, the world must be in a situation of war and revolution. Then, conflicts between the Japanese and the British, the Americans, and the French will be possible. If such a situation emerges, it will be because of the complex and long Chinese revolution.

It is hard to imagine that an undemocratic government such as the present one will be able to “fight the war to the end.” We have never once hoped or said that such a government will be able to fight for final victory.

Only a government, including a communist government, that is willing to mobilize the people of the country can win the war against Japan.

The reform of old things must go through a process of rebellion and overcoming of difficulties.

Then, an Anti-Japanese National United Front government (including the CP) may emerge.

Then, there may be three kinds of government in China: a Japanese puppet government; a semipuppet government; an anti-Japanese government. The struggle between these governments will result in a stalemate. The so-called stalemate is simply this kind of situation.

For the same reasons, a quick victory cannot be won.

For the same reasons, the country will not be enslaved. As noted above, the future of the anti-Japanese war will have only two possibilities: (a) the majority fight the war while a minority surrender to the enemy; (b) the majority surrender to

the enemy while a minority fight the war. If the second possibility becomes the future, then probable scenarios will resemble those described above. The first possibility, however, is not to be written off at the moment. The reasons are:

in the country—

(a) the support of the war from many people in the military; (b) the prowar faction in the GMD; (c) the CP's opposition to surrender; (d) the people's opposition to surrender;

in the world—

(a) aid from the Soviet Union; (b) the lessons of Spain and Czechoslovakia; (c) public opinion in Europe and America; in Japan—financial, economic, and military difficulties.

But these can be accomplished only after the United Front is strengthened and expanded.

If the second future becomes reality, then there will be not only the divisions within the government, but also the separation of the Three Principles of the People from the GMD.

The Japanese Three Principles of the People and the GMD—this has already begun via Wang Jingwei; these are the false Three Principles of the People and the false GMD.

The neutral Three Principles of the People and the GMD—they are budding and growing. These are the half-real and half-false Three Principles of the People and the GMD.

The Chinese people's Three Principles of the People and the GMD—this has already happened and is developing. These are the genuine Three Principles of the People and real GMD.

Whether the Three People's Principles and the GMD avoid the divisions as outlined above (division is inevitable) depends on the efforts of the GMD, the CP, and the people of the whole country.

Therefore, the possible scenarios for the stage of stalemate are:

a) a stalemate in which the majority continues to fight while the minority surrenders—this will eliminate the possibility of surrender, gain the majority's participation in the war, continue the war and, aside from subverting the political conspiracy of Japan, stop its military attacks.

This is the first scenario. This is the most ideal and hopeful.

b) The majority surrenders while the minority fights—this stalemate (the CP and all those unwilling to surrender will continue to fight, even if we are the minority) means that the majority has surrendered; only the minority is left to fight the war; but if we can strengthen the minority and the anti-Japanese base areas, we will also be able to keep on fighting the enemy just like the minor units of the Red Army that kept fighting the enemy in the base areas. The difference is that in the past it was a civil war; from now on the war is one against Japan and Chinese traitors, and not a civil war.

In terms of making a stand and not continuing to withdraw, and in terms of being the

only anti-Japanese armed forces in the country, this is also a situation of stalemate.

This is the second scenario.

c) From a small-scale stalemate to a large-scale stalemate—this is the third kind of stalemate.

Because the minority continues to fight the war, persists in the united front, persists in prolonged warfare, persists in cooperation between the GMD and the CP, and persists in the Three Principles of the People—this will divide the camps of the advocates of surrender and win over the majority to join the war. Then, if we are unable to launch a counterattack against the enemy, this will still be a stalemate.

Danger exists, but the overall future is bright.

Those who express despair in a perilous environment and those who cannot see brilliance in the darkness are cowards and opportunists.

[[In the congress of Soviet areas [1937], the August 1937 decision, etc., the CC has pointed out the inevitability of betrayal by the bourgeoisie.]]

We have predicted all this before. Its occurrence is not accidental.

The future of the war is either good or bad; we are fighting for a good future but are so prepared that even if the very bad future comes true, we will have countermeasures.

The overall future is bright. However, [we] must go through long and complex struggles. There are no short-term and direct victories. We have always opposed theories of a quick victory and of the conquest of our nation. We still do so today.

If we think that betrayal by landlords and the bourgeoisie is equivalent to the loss of the country, we will fail to see (a) the existence of the CP, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army; (b) the anti-Japanese sentiments in our anti-Japanese allied forces; (c) the prowar faction in the GMD; (d) those in the bourgeoisie who are unwilling to surrender at the moment; (e) the bourgeoisie who are still oppressed in areas that have fallen to the Japanese; (f) the large number of petty bourgeoisie and peasants; (g) aid from the Soviet Union. It is completely wrong to be blind to these growing forces; it is completely wrong to see only the surrender of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and then conclude that the entire world has become dark. It is completely wrong to panic, waver, and run away.

The Sixth Plenum said that the stalemate was bound to be a stage which was “even more difficult but at the same time more progressive.” More difficult because capitulation and betrayal have occurred. More progressive because the GMD could make more progress through all forms of struggle (including war) and because the GMD persisting to fight the war continues to cooperate with the CP.

Some betray [the country] while the majority fight the Japanese—this situation is what we hope for. We have hoped for this before, and still do so now. We should strive for it. The majority betrays (or for the time everybody betrays) [the country], while some continue to fight—this kind of situation is not what we hope for, but nevertheless possible. If it occurs, we should turn it around, which is also possible. We should strive to do so.

III) The Current Tasks

As we evaluate the above favorable and unfavorable possible situations, particu-

larly the possible unfavorable situation, what are the tasks for the party?

A) The whole party should do its utmost to prepare itself ideologically and organizationally, to prepare public opinion and the masses so that we can cope with any incident at any time—all kinds of unanticipated attacks and all kinds of big and small incidents.

B) The whole party should do its utmost to ally most closely with all patriotic progressive elements and all patriotic progressive members in the GMD (in the upper and middle levels and the masses in the lower level) to mobilize the masses together with them (in the areas ruled by the GMD, we must work together with them, and not by ourselves alone), to wage anticapitulation struggles, and to expose openly the true nature of anticommunism as preparation for surrender so that the procapitulation faction and anticommunist elements may be isolated and the struggle against Japan may be continued.

Here we must strengthen the work on, and personnel in, the united front.

C) No matter what kind of situation may occur, the party's basic task is to strengthen and expand the anti-Japanese nationalist united front and persevere in cooperation between the GMD and the CP and in the Three Principles of the People. We must adhere to this strategy without any wavering.

This is the party's general task.

According to the task described above, the party should pay attention to the following questions, understand and explain [them], as well as do [all the] necessary work:

1) The question whether the general principle of the Sixth Plenum is consistent with the current general principle.

The general principle of the Sixth Plenum is correct. The Sixth Plenum had a great impact on the whole country. Our general principle of actively uniting the whole country and fighting for the victory of the anti-Japanese war had further penetrated the hearts of the people, thanks to the dissemination of the documents of the Sixth Plenum.

At present, the danger of capitulation and anticommunist conspiracies has become the primary danger. Therefore, we must point out that this new situation (it was not a fact before; so we could only generally refer to it; now it has the possibility of becoming a fact, so we must specifically point it out) in order to overcome the danger of capitulation, as well as to prepare timely and necessary policies in response should capitulation evolve from being a possibility to becoming a reality. The basic principle, however, is still that of the Sixth Plenum; if given proper guidance, the actual content of the War of Resistance may be developed to a higher stage.

2) The question of why we should, at the moment, prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally and prepare public opinion and the masses.

Here one needs to understand the experiences drawn from the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927.

At that time, we had no mental preparation. This was the principal reason for the failure. Now we must be prepared.

At that time, there could not be another national united front; we were also too absolute on certain issues; now we must persist in a long-term national united front.

At that time, it was the failure of the entire revolution; the party's political line was first retreat and then attack; now, there is no question of a retreat in our policies. It is a question of partial and temporary tactical conservation during our attacks, or of concealing our forces to prepare for another attack (if capitulation becomes a reality).

At that time, because of the arrival of the reactionary period and the lack of preparation and experience on the part of the party, our ranks were confused, and the steps taken mistaken (like blind actions). Now, we should have an orderly retreat and defense or counterattack (some temporary and some long-term) in the fallen areas and in the areas occupied by those planning to surrender. New party members deserted or betrayed the party in droves; now, such things may happen under certain conditions, so we must be prepared in advance. Historical experience—[at] the turning point in the revolution (even if it is a temporary and partial change) garbage will fall out. This is not a bad thing. However, we must pay attention to the good training of new party members, especially the large numbers of young students; they will be useful in the future.

At that time, the domestic and international situation was dark; at the moment it is basically bright.

At that time, the CC was ruled by opportunists, and the reorganized CC had no experience; this situation does not exist now.

At that time, we did not have a trained large number of cadres; now we have them.

I have made eight comparisons above. Although the situation is thus, [we] must still prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, as well as prepare public opinion and the masses, so that we can triumphantly overcome difficulties and develop the war against Japan and the Chinese revolution to a higher stage while avoiding possible defeat.

3) The question of why [we] should still preserve the national united front, cooperation between the GMD and the CP and the Three Principles of the People, if capitulation has become a fact.

The major reasons were discussed when we talked about the future of the war; here I am going to say only this:

a) The national united front must be preserved through the anti-Japanese war. Although many people from the landlord class and the bourgeoisie leave it through their betrayal and become its enemies, the betrayal of landlords and the bourgeoisie is gradual and not sudden. We have to cooperate with those who remain. If we neglect this point, we will make a great mistake. Therefore, in the entire process of the war, the united front should still be a united front of all parties and factions, all classes, all nationalities, all groups, and all armed forces.

b) It is the same thing with cooperation between the GMD and the CP. Several members of the GMD have left it and become our enemies. But those who have

remained are still cooperative; we should use the real GMD to deal with the false GMD and win over the neutral GMD. There is still a future for an equal alliance between the two parties, the GMD and the CP. Neglecting this point will also cause a major mistake.

c) It is the same with the Three Principles of the People. It is the political basis for the united front and an applicable principle and strategy in the course of the war against Japan. We should use the genuine Three Principles of the People to counter the false Three Principles of the People and win over the neutral Three Principles of the People. This is the policy that should be adopted in the situation where several kinds of Three Principles of the People exist. There is a distinction between the Three Principles of the People and communism in the course of the war against Japan. During the war, however, the two have one thing in common: when the Three Principles of the People are explained as they were at the GMD's first congress [1924], the two do not fundamentally conflict with each other over the political programs at the stage of bourgeois revolution. Therefore, it is wrong for many people both within and outside the party to look down on the Three Principles of the People, treating them as a fundamentally reactionary and deceptive ideology or doctrine. This mentality is caused by the failure to make a distinction between the genuine Three Principles of the People and the false or semifalse Three Principles of the People.

d) On the issue of ideological struggle. In the last two years, and particularly in the last six months, those who write articles for the GMD, including the Trotskyite Ye Qing, have spread "divisive and erroneous thoughts" that are not only against the CP, but also against the genuine Three Principles of the People. These are the thoughts that represent the false or semifalse Three Principles of the People. They must be severely denounced and repudiated. Of these the most blatant are the arbitrary noises about the so-called theories of "national conditions" and "unification." In fact, they claim that only the Three Principles of the People and the GMD suit the national conditions of China; but their Three Principles of the People and the GMD are the least suitable and most false principles and party for China. Communism and the CP completely suit China's national conditions. They allege that the border regions and the Eighth Route Army are not unified [into the government] and, therefore, they are to be abolished to complete the so-called unification. This is the antinationalistic, antidemocratic, and anti-people's livelihood false unification which completely violates the interests of the war. This is arbitrary empty talk that completely violates the historical fact of differences in unification and struggles in unification. Before the old semifeudal regime changes into a real revolutionary democratic regime, the border regions and the Eighth Route Army must exist; only when the revolutionary democratic regime is established and the danger of anticommunism disappears can the two abandon their present special characteristics; otherwise, this is only a counterrevolutionary demand.

4) The question of support for Chiang.

The slogan of supporting President Chiang was correct in the past and is so

today—as long as Chiang leads the war, we will support him (of course, the condition is fighting the war); we should not show any disrespect toward Chiang.

It is possible under certain circumstances, however, that Chiang will not persist in fighting the war. We should seriously study our reaction to this. Of course, there has to be some reaction, but it must be an appropriate reaction, the principle of which is to help unite the majority to fight the war and contribute to the continued cooperation between the GMD and the CP; we should not lightly revive the “anti-Chiang” slogans.

Chiang is hostile to the existence of the CP; this is something that he himself has demonstrated. We must defend against his and his subordinates’ sabotage of our party. There is no doubt about it.

5) The question of struggle against Wang Jingwei.

“It is wrong to think that Wang is finished; Wang can still play a big role.” This is absolutely correct. The traitors in Wang’s network are more harmful to China than other traitors. There is no question about it. Wang has followers and sympathizers in the government, in party organizations, and in part of the military.

The struggle against capitulation must be linked with the struggle against Wang, which is more beneficial and practical.

6) The question of fighting the Japanese and eliminating spies

If a serious incident of betrayal takes place, the party should do its best to consider appropriate countermeasures, in line with the principle of not divorcing itself from the majority of the GMD.

Then, the slogan of fighting the Japanese and eliminating spies is necessary. The War of Resistance against Japan and the war of elimination of spies (fighting the Japanese and eliminating spies at the same time) are also unavoidable. But we must never act lightly or abandon the majority of the GMD. The war against spies can (and must) be launched only when the majority of the people understand and demand it. For example, the anti-Wang movement fits this principle at this moment.

7) The question of democracy and people’s livelihood.

It is impossible to lead the war against Japan to victory without a revolutionary democratic government. The majority of the people in the country have long been looking forward to an anti-Japanese, democratic-centralist, and clean government which gives the people freedom. Therefore, “the struggle for democracy” should be linked with “oppose capitulation and continue to fight the war” in the future.

Similarly, “improving people’s livelihood” is also to be tied to [the war]. Only resisting the Japanese, however, makes democracy possible; only linking up the war against Japan with democracy makes it possible to improve people’s livelihood. This is the reality in the future political situation. We must understand this.

8) The question of friction. Unity is primary but struggle must not be forgotten. “Friction but no splits.”

9) The Sixth Plenum decision not to develop our party among troops that are fighting the Japanese and cooperating with us can be seen as basically correct.

[[10) We must do our best to help progressive elements and help them to fight capitulation.]]

11) The work of CC departments after the Sixth Plenum.

In the last three years, and particularly since the Sixth Plenum, Party Center work departments have been gradually restored and established. In addition to such long-established departments like the military affairs commission, the organization department, the propaganda department, the department for work in enemy-occupied areas, and the youth commission, the newly formed institutions include the united front department, the women's commission, the labor commission, the department of finance and economy, the department for education of cadres, the general political department, the committee for party newspapers, the committee for northern and central China, the northwestern committee, and the southern committee. The secretarial department has also improved its organization. Altogether there are sixteen institutions. The restoration and establishment of these Party Center work departments is a great achievement after the enormous losses during the Long March—this is a great and exciting thing.

12) The question of the organization of the Party Center.

- a) The Politburo should meet once a week.
- b) The Secretariat handles day-to-day affairs.
- c) Announcements: for big events, use the name of the CC; for smaller events, use the name of the Secretariat.
- d) Distribution of personnel is based on ensuring the full staffing of the central leadership while strengthening local leadership at the same time.
- e) The departments of the Party Center are to be both streamlined and strengthened.

13) Cadre education.

In the last two years, the Kangda [Anti-Japanese War of Resistance] University, the Shaanxi Public School, the Party School, the Marxist-Leninist College, the Lu Xun Art Academy, the Youth Training Class, the Women's University, the Workers' School, the Medical School, the Communications School, the Training Class of the Organization Department, the Training Class for Administrators, the Party School for the Border Regions, the Lu Xun Normal College, and the Children's Health Care College—altogether seventeen schools—have been established under the direct leadership of the Party Center. The larger ones have over 10,000 students; the smaller ones have several hundred or dozens of students. Several thousand cadres are engaged in educational work; students who have been trained and are in training total over 30,000. This is a great achievement. This is a phenomenon that is unprecedented in the past eighteen years. The results of the work done by these students are not visible now, but will be in several years.

This policy should continue in the future. For material reasons and owing to enemy dispositions, [schools] are to be set up in the border regions and the north; the jurisdiction and administration of those who go to the north still belong to the Party Center although their supervision is delegated to the Northern Bureau.

14) The study movement.

a) After the Sixth Plenum, the CC launched a study movement for all party cadres to raise their theoretical and cultural levels. This is of foremost importance.

b) Cadres in all kinds of party organs, the government, the military, and the educational establishment should also work and study at the same time.

c) Depending on their level, culture and theory may be stressed equally, or one of them may receive particular emphasis.

d) This is long-term study.

e) The system of two hours of study every day.

f) Work, production, and study at the same time.

g) Stress both spontaneity and compulsion; theory and study must be consistent.

h) Reward the diligent, and punish the lazy.

i) Agencies, schools, and military units at all levels should set up agencies and appoint personnel in charge of cadre education.

15) The production movement.

Wherever and whenever possible, [we] must develop the agricultural, industrial, and cooperative movement of the people, of the government agencies, of the military, and of the schools, using the method of self-reliance to solve all or part of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and commodities. Overcome difficulties and contribute to the war.

This year the production movement in the border regions is carried out seriously. We must continue to sum up experiences to reach our goal of solving difficult problems.

[[16) There has been some improvement in the youth movement.]]

17) The women's movement.

The Party Center has issued guiding principles for the women's movement and begun the work of establishing a women's commission. Local agencies of the women's movement are being set up gradually. We have always lacked women cadres. The experiences of the women's movement have yet to be summed up. This flaw must be corrected. Without a group of competent and professional cadres, it will be impossible to develop the women's movement.

[[18) The labor movement is relatively weak in the popular movement, and workers comprise a small number of party members.

19) The struggle to eliminate spies has increased greatly.

20) The issue of party organization. Generally, party expansion should stop, the party should be lean and competent.

21) Self-reliance.]]

22) The problem in the north.

It is possible that the situation in the north will become extremely grave; there is the possibility that the enemy's main forces will attack the north. Therefore, the Eighth Route Army and the CP in the north must steadfastly watch out for

the possibility of this kind of situation. [We] should prepare [ourselves] in terms of military operations, politics, finance, party organization, and the united front, so that [we] may adjust to the needs of the guerrilla war and cope with the greatest possible difficulties.

The party in the north is responsible for providing the Party Center with the necessary funds. The political significance of such funds is enormous.

23) The problem of central China.

[We] must greatly expand the party and guerrilla warfare and build our own bases in a complex environment, so that it may become a pivotal region in the country's long-term war. There must be excellent work on the united front, which is to be linked with the expansion and progress of the New Fourth Army. The policy is to send most of the cadres in the border regions to central China.

24) Defend the border region.

a) The border region is our essential base—the location of the Party Center and the seat of authority for the country—it must be defended resolutely.

b) The enemy's attack on the border region is a step in forcing China to capitulate.

c) It is possible that the enemy may attack Yan'an.

d) Even if Yan'an should fall, the border region must continue to exist; we must prepare for guerrilla warfare. This is the most difficult but exciting life.

e) Food is the number one problem. Self-reliance will overcome the difficulty.

f) Students and administrative personnel must go to the front in large numbers.

g) Protect well and educate young students, new cadres, and party members.

h) Preserve a group of leaders, a group of educators, and a group of military leaders. Relying on the excellent terrain and on the excellent people, [we] will find a solution.

[[25) Mobilize large numbers of students and administrative personnel to go to the front. Ten thousand people should be sent.

26) The Seventh Party Congress should be held in October with delegates elected by 1 August.]]

27) Struggle on two fronts.

a) Struggle against the right: failure to see the danger of surrender and anti-communism; submission to the pressures of the GMD; pessimism about the current situation (losing sight of the future); loss of class stand; panic and despair in the face of difficult struggles.

b) Struggle against the "left": China is dark, the world is dark, the border regions are dark, we ourselves are dark; preparation to sabotage the united front; negating the cooperation between the GMD and the CP; abandoning the Three Principles of the People; self-imposed isolation and blind action.

c) Veteran cadres should form the backbone and lead the majority of new party members and cadres to march toward the higher stages of the war and attack the difficult positions.

28) Unity conquers all.

a) We must be more united: as long as the Party Center and senior cadres are united, the entire party will be united. As long as the CP is united, it is undefeatable. The savior of the people of the whole country is the CP.

b) We must centralize further: reduce unnecessary democracy; the individual obeys the organization, the minority obeys the majority, the subordinate obeys the superior, the whole party obeys the CC.

c) The whole party is united and harmonious, centralizes its command, and will conquer all.

Concluding Speech (13 June)

A) The Question of the Current Situation

1) It is right to say that the wavering of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie is the main factor of capitulation.

2) We must overcome two factors: (a) partial capitulation and (b) the capitulation of the majority. Scenario (a) is present and occurs under the circumstances in which the majority is fighting the war; scenario (b) is in the future and occurs under the circumstances in which the majority has surrendered. However, present work helps us in future work; the two are unified and cannot be separated.

3) According to the definition of the Sixth Plenum, the balance between our forces and the enemy forces is at the stage of stalemate. Then, we cannot say that the present stage is a stalemate; for example, if a Li Jingwei emerges, the enemy has already organized (it is trying hard to organize) its strategic reserves and is deploying them in combat—encircling our positions from the rear (national counterrevolution is a strategic ally of the Japanese imperialists; this is beyond doubt). Then, there is no longer a stalemate between the enemy and us. Rather, we have suffered a great defeat. The characteristics then are: those attacking us are the Japanese imperialists plus Li Jingwei (the Chinese Franco); this is more serious than the previous strategic withdrawal, and by no means a stalemate.

4) The Japanese imperialists are organizing two strategic allies: one is the international procapitulation faction, and the other is the Chinese procapitulation faction. The former is used to encircle China, while the latter is employed to encircle China from within. The direction of our efforts is to mobilize both international and domestic anticapitulation forces to defeat the strategic allies of these two enemies. Before they are defeated, there is no stalemate.

5) The enemy at the front (the main forces of the Japanese imperialists) may launch another military offensive. It is wrong to say that such a possibility does not exist. Although the enemy is facing financial, political, and economic difficulties and shortages in labor power and military strength, there is still the possibility of an enemy offensive when it is judged on the basis of the enemy's real strength and timing. Therefore, on the one hand, [we] should not only defeat the enemy who is

attacking our flanks, but also, on the other, prepare to continue to defeat the enemy who attacks from the front; only this can produce a balance of strength between the enemy and us, as well as bring about the stalemate.

6) This is not to say that the stalemate will emerge only when [we] have reduced the real strength of the enemies in our front and on our flanks such that it is equivalent to that of our anti-Japanese armed forces in all respects. It is not the equalization of real strength [that we seek], but rather the equation: our real strength, plus the enemy's weaknesses, plus international constraints should equal stalemate.

7) Therefore, the stage of stalemate will emerge under three conditions:

a) [Our] territories are large, our people are numerous, and our positions are strong; this will create a balance between us and the enemy. For example, the midpoint of the Russian civil war and the midpoint of World War I. China, since the beginning of the war, has had a huge territory, many people, but its position is not secure (political corruption and the trouble caused by the procapitulation faction); therefore, there is no stalemate yet. If we can overcome the danger of capitulation and, in the process of overcoming it, reform our politics, our position will be strengthened and the stage of stalemate will occur. This is the first condition.

b) Our territories are small (which means that our directly controlled base areas are small, though our country is large), our people are few, but our position is strong; this will also balance our force against the enemy's. For example, the Red Army fought for ten years and, to a certain extent, resembles the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in the northeast during a certain period. If betrayal by the majority became a reality in the future, and if only the minority continued to fight, the remaining minority would still be able to maintain the stalemate. So long as we can continuously smash the encirclement, this situation of stalemate will be sustained. The situation in the north at the moment can be said to be temporary; the stalemate maintained by a minority can prolong the situation in the north, which in turn can produce a long-term stalemate sustained by the minority.

c) A shift from the balance being maintained by the minority to its being sustained by the majority can be obtained by victories from enlarging the united front and fighting against extermination campaigns. If strategic counterattacks cannot be launched (or during the period of counteroffensive campaigns), then the situation will still be that of stalemate.

8) If betrayal by the majority is inevitable in the course of the war, then there will have to be an entire stage of stalemate according to the following formula: the temporary continuation of fighting by the majority after Wuhan (the current situation may be said to be a stalemate to a certain extent; but because our positions are not secure, it can only be temporary)—the minority continuing to fight sometime afterward—the majority rejoining the war after a certain period.

The chief characteristic of this change is that from an insecure to a secure position. Long-term stalemate requires strong positions; with this condition satisfied, we may be small in number, but we can still go on fighting; without it, even if

we are many, we cannot continue to fight. Therefore, we should strive for large quantities (many people and large areas); but the most important element still remains strong quality. The so-called strong positions refer to the strengthening of the anti-Japanese base areas in addition to the strengthening of the united front.

9) There is indeed a stalemate in the north, but this is only temporary. We have proposed "continuing the guerrilla war in the north" to turn the temporary into the permanent. If all other places had been engulfed by darkness, with only the north left (similarly, the New Fourth Army and the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region), the only anti-Japanese force would have been here. Even though it is a partial area in terms of the extent of territory and numbers of men, it would be as significant as a strategic stalemate. This is a difficult situation, but we should also be prepared for it. Most of the sky has turned black; only the CP is left to fight the Japanese; but we can and will fight on. Three or five years of fighting will awaken the people and attract our allies, thus gradually forming a new and large anti-Japanese camp. We will then become the core and leading force in fighting the Japanese and saving the country.

Therefore, no matter how one puts it, our future is bright, though the path is difficult.

10) Now is the period for reshaping the relationship between us and the enemy (the ratio of forces between us and the enemy). It remains to be seen who can gain a numerical superiority, who has the better quality, who wins and who loses. The question of who wins and who loses has not been solved yet; both sides are preparing for new conditions.

The front certainly will and must be reshaped. Some of our allies (some of the landlords and the bourgeoisie) will become our enemy's allies. However, we will never permit all of them to do so. We must win over some of them. It is possible to win over some of them. We have not yet mobilized the majority of our allies: the Chinese peasantry; the Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers; the international proletariat; and the strength of the Soviet Union. Once we mobilize these resources, we will certainly force the enemy into extinction.

The enemy is counterrevolutionary; we are revolutionary. This difference in nature determines to whom the final victory belongs. The strategies and tactics that command the war, however, particularly determine to whom the victories and defeats belong. Without the latter, or depending only on superior character, victory is unobtainable.

B) The Question of Change

1) We have talked about preparing ourselves to cope with possible situations and to cope with possible traitors. This is under the general line of the Sixth Plenum. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenum, [we] are prepared to deal with potential traitors and to adopt a temporary policy of retreat in the areas occupied by the potential traitors. Until now, it is unimaginable to have a complete change of attitude toward the Sixth Plenum. This is not a change of line, but rather a change in tactics or a partial and temporary change in strategy. This is a defense against surprise attack. This point must

be understood first. We must continue to persist in our previous general line.

2) We must make great efforts and use all the party's energies to overcome the possibility of capitulation; win over the majority to join the war against Japan; support, help, monitor, and criticize the GMD and Chiang Kai-shek, so that through the struggle against Wang he can overcome tendencies to surrender in the future. This is the central task at the moment.

3) Therefore, rather than emphasize other things, we must stress unity, unification, and the long-term cooperation between the GMD and the CP. Only by stressing these can we overcome the crisis of capitulation. Only by stressing these can we prepare ourselves better to deal with possible changes. Everything is for the sake of isolating the procapitulation elements, and not isolating ourselves.

C) Several Strategic Questions

1) The issue of party strengthening (the policy of organizational contraction). After the meeting last March decided to greatly expand the party, it has undergone enormous numerical expansion throughout the country. The task now is to consolidate it. Therefore, in general, we must temporarily suspend expansion. Of course, this does not mean denying everybody admission to the party; in some areas, the party should be expanded. The objective of suspending expansion is to facilitate cleansing and eliminating spies, as well as education. In the future, there will be expansion.

2) The party should properly protect new party members and new cadres. The chief responsibility lies with veteran party members and veteran cadres. The relationship between new and veteran party members and between new and veteran cadres must be made a good one. If this relationship is not good, veteran party members and cadres must bear the responsibility. New party members and cadres may be forgiven but veteran party members and cadres may not. There were incorrect views on this question in the past. On this matter, [the situation] is roughly similar to that between the main forces and local guerrilla forces.

A large number of new cadres are to be promoted from among new party members.

3) Intensify inner-party education; unify class education with nationalist education. However, while class education is to be stressed at the moment, education about the united front should not be neglected.

Intermediate textbooks should be compiled; historical materialist views must be emphasized on philosophical questions.

4) Promote local cadres. Without local cadres—middle and high-level—we cannot build a secure base.

Struggle against the tendencies of “imperial envoy”; struggle against the tendencies of looking down on “country bumpkins.” Abolish the slogan “country bumpkins.”

5) The party should protect revolutionary intellectuals. Do not repeat past mistakes. The revolution will not be victorious without revolutionary intellectuals. The GMD is vying with us to win over the youth and the military. We must gather together large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. We should persuade cadres who are from worker and peasant backgrounds that they should have no fear of

them. Without help from revolutionary intellectuals, the workers and peasants cannot improve themselves. In our work, without intellectuals, [we] cannot run the government, the party, or the army. Revolutionary intellectuals should be assimilated into the government, party organizations, and popular movements.

6) The question of suspending party development in, and withdrawing from, allied parties and armed forces. Suspension and withdrawal are beneficial when viewed from a wider perspective. Otherwise, this one thing could obstruct the entire situation and undermine the united front. The revolution cannot be victorious without winning over the Chinese military. The main way of winning it over now is political; organizing the party [there] will impede our political efforts.

Relying only on words instead of organization (under temporary conditions); relying on the upper level instead of lower levels.

Withdrawing the party, on the one hand, while increasing contact, on the other. Agreeing on a certain kind of independence of work in the united front.

Generally, we adopt a policy of organizational sabotage only toward those troops, governments, and political parties belonging to the real collaborators. For the rest, the policy is political persuasion. In some special departments, the method of withdrawal is not to be employed.

7) It is extremely important not to kill GMD members. This does not mean that we do not kill collaborators or some traitors; nor does it mean that we do not kill those who harm the revolution at critical moments.

8) We should not overemphasize democracy and the people's livelihood. This is inappropriate. At the moment, the emphasis should be on opposition to capitulation (emphasis on fighting the war); we should not emphasize several things at the same time. Rather, it is not emphasizing, but linking them up. Democracy and people's livelihood are propaganda slogans in the GMD areas, but they are not slogans for action.

We should adopt both a supportive and critical attitude toward the questions of conscription, imposition of taxes and levies, and production. We cannot adopt a fundamentally oppositional attitude.

9) Local strategies. There should be clear local strategies that suit local circumstances and all situations. The Party Center should pay attention to guiding [local strategies] in the future.

10) Strengthen the mass movement. What we call preparing the masses refers precisely to this. It is not class struggle. Only correctly waging class struggle in coordination with the united front can overcome surrender. It is dangerous to have only unification but no struggle. The masses are our last reliable resources, as well as those for the war.

11) The question of the Muslims.

12) We should start publishing inner-party publications immediately. Local [party organizations] should also run such publications.

13) Other.

The general conclusion is this: unity can conquer all.

F.4 Politburo Resolution on Consolidation of the Party (25 August 1939)³²

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance against Japan, and particularly since the CC's correct decision of 15 March 1938 on greatly expanding the party,³³ the CCP has indeed expanded enormously, recruited a large number of excellent candidates into the party, and established a basis for a national Bolshevik mass party. Precisely because the party has undergone a tremendous expansion in a short period of time, however, party organization lacks cohesion and strength. There are serious mistakes and weaknesses in the work of recruiting new party members. In some places, local party organizations launched a so-called storm movement to increase the number of party members. There were group inductions into the party, as well as admission of individuals who had not been thoroughly screened. Therefore, many ordinary people who are fighting the Japanese or who have temporarily sided with the party have become members. Members of other classes, opportunists, and even spies have also taken the opportunity to infiltrate the party, thus depriving the organization of its role as the vanguard of the proletariat and seriously undermining the level of solidarity of party organization. In some places, the distinction between party organization and mass groups resisting the Japanese invasion has become blurred. This has provided some opportunities for our national enemy and class enemy to implement their plot to undermine our party. These methods are all wrong. These phenomena demonstrate the serious weaknesses of the party. At the same time, under the present political circumstances, the danger of capitulating to the enemy and of domestic divisions still exist and are developing. Critical and difficult tasks face the party. Therefore, the party's ideological, political, and organizational consolidation have become an extremely crucial task for us today and the decisive factor for fulfilling the party's political mission. This is why the Politburo has made the following special decisions:

- 1) In light of the current status of party organization and the present situation, expansion of the party should generally be suspended. The central task for a certain period in the future is to sort out, contract, tighten, and strengthen party organization. In light of circumstances, directives from above, and practical necessity, in individual areas or departments some sort of expansion may be carried out. However, attention must be paid to the experiences already gained in party expansion. Recruitment of new party members must be implemented on an individual basis and after careful screening. The mistake of focusing on numbers and adopting a rush method, as well as the emphasis on quantity but not quality, should be corrected. We must pay particular attention to our rear areas. All local organizations that already have a sizable number of party members must, without exception, suspend expansion and start the process of consolidation.

- 2) In order to strengthen the party, it is imperative to investigate the class background of party members and purge elements from other classes (landlords, rich

peasants and merchants) who have infiltrated, opportunists, enemy spies, and informers. This kind of investigation, however, should not become a universal movement to purge the party, but should be a detailed and careful evaluation and clean-up conducted on an individual basis. This kind of investigation should be carried out from top to bottom. Party committees in each bureau and district should first investigate cadres at all levels to ensure that leading party organs are in the hands of reliable and loyal cadres who have been checked out. Those who are in reality only sympathizers but who have already joined the party should be persuaded to cut their organizational ties with the party and become sympathizers outside the party. Moreover, all party work should penetrate the masses at lower levels. The work of the party branch must be strengthened; the work of the branch among the masses should also be expanded. The organizational institutions of the party at all levels should be reconstituted so as to ensure that the work of consolidating the party gains maximum results.

3) The central step to be taken in consolidating the party is to step up Marxist-Leninist, class, and party education within the party to enable members to understand the correct relationship between Marxism-Leninism and the Three Principles of the People, between the national united front and class struggle, and between national positions and class positions, as well as to correct all kinds of incorrect leftist or rightist views. Party organizations at all levels must, according to their environment, raise the political and cultural level of their party members and take every measure to carry out systematic and planned educational work.

4) To consolidate the party, we must intensify cadre education at all levels. The CC especially points out: it is of utmost importance for party consolidation to unite new and veteran cadres, promote and educate new cadres, and establish a cordial relationship between new and veteran cadres of learning from and respecting each other. Veteran cadres must use their own examples to educate, lead, and train the new cadres. New cadres must learn from the veteran cadres with modesty, emphasize practical experience, get close to the worker and peasant masses, and work on their own organizational and disciplinary capacities. Any kind of mutual opposition, neglect, and discrimination between new and veteran cadres is harmful and should be corrected. There should be special plans for, and regular implementation of, theoretical studies in Marxism-Leninism for cadres in order to raise their political level and capacity for work.

5) To consolidate the party, we must strengthen party security and the struggle against spies. We must greatly improve education for purging spies and raise vigilance within the party so that the task of safeguarding the party and the struggle against spies can become work for the entire party. At the same time, party organizations at all levels must assign special personnel to be responsible for security and moreover, whenever possible, should establish special departments to train the cadres responsible for security. In our regular work of investigating party members and particularly when investigating cadres, we should uncover and purge enemy spies, Trotskyites, traitors, and corrupted elements who have infiltrated our party. Indiffer-

ence to, and neglect of, the struggle against spies, indulgence and tolerance of such elements, and possible panic and helplessness are all extremely harmful. They must be corrected quickly.

6) To consolidate the party, we must intensify its secret activities, so that they may be properly linked to open activities. On the one hand, the party's open agencies and secret organizations must be strictly distinguished and clearly separated. There must be a clear division of labor between open and secret party members. Open party members should not take on any secret party work. On the other hand, secret party members must have excellent ties with the masses, as well as having a legitimate status. All kinds of discipline and regulations concerning the party's secret activities must be strictly observed. Any unauthorized actions, neglect, and procrastination are disadvantageous and must be fought resolutely.

7) To consolidate the party, we must improve discipline and strengthen party unity. Correct ideological struggles must be waged within the party to ensure ideological harmony, strengthen the party's iron discipline, and guarantee harmonious actions. Only through making all efforts to consolidate party organization, to fortify party ranks, and to unite the party as one can the party be prepared to overcome the current difficulties, oppose the danger of domestic surrender and division, unite all the people of China, and guide the War of Resistance to its final and complete victory.

F.5 Our Opinions Concerning the Past Work of the Assembly
and the Current Situation. *Mao Zedong, Wang Ming,*
Bo Gu, Li Zuhan, Wu Yuchang, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao
(8 September 1939)³⁴

The National Political Consultative Assembly was established one year ago on the first anniversary of the war against Japan.

When we took up our invitation to join the assembly, we issued the statement "Our Views on the National Political Consultative Assembly." We pointed out,

In the current situation, with the war against Japan being fought fiercely, the establishment of the National Political Consultative Assembly obviously represents progress toward democracy in the political life of our country. It clearly demonstrates progress in the unity of all parties, groups, nationalities, classes, and regions in our country. Although the National Assembly is not yet a satisfactory people's representative organ with full powers in terms of the method by which it was established and the definition of its powers, this does not imply a decrease in its role and meaning today—the role of further uniting all kinds of forces throughout the country to strive for the continuation of the war and our nation's salvation, and advancing national political life toward a genuine democracy. Therefore, we

Communists will adopt the most positive, enthusiastic, and sincere attitude to taking part in the work of the National Political Consultative Assembly. Further, we will do our best to promote the establishment of a popularly elected people's representative organ in the future with full powers.

In the past year, the National Political Consultative Assembly has convened three times. A general review of its work shows that the Assembly's greatest achievement lies with today's most pressing and central political question for China—persisting in fighting the war of national self-defense to the final victory and suppressing all kinds of tendencies and criminal activities of making halfhearted compromises. This represents the genuine demand of the largest majority of the Chinese people. The Assembly's first meeting solemnly declared, "In representing the nation's people, the Chinese nation must preserve its indomitable spirit and mobilize all its material resources and labor power, in the spirit of self-defense and humanitarianism, to fight a prolonged war against the savage aggressor and win the final victory." The second meeting also passed a unanimous resolution, "Support the government's determined policy as decided by President Chiang to fight a total and a prolonged war to gain the initiative." The meeting called on compatriots to "fight the war resolutely, never capitulate, defend the country together, and fulfill the mission of fighting the war and building the country." The third meeting also resolved that "the determined national policy of fighting the war against Japan must be carried out to the end" and called on the people to "firm up their determination, unite together, and consistently [fight to] recover our nation's sovereignty and the integrity of our national political administration, thus completing the great enterprise of fighting the war and building the country." Moreover, at the third meeting, participants presented over 300 proposals covering all manner of concrete questions about fighting the war and building the country. They deal with both urgent and less urgent matters; some of the proposals were well thought out while others were less so. Everyone, however, put much thought into their proposals, hoping to contribute to fighting the war and building the country. Regrettably, the government has not been able to implement effectively most of the resolutions of the National Political Consultative Assembly, thus reducing the desired effect of the Assembly's work. At the same time, this has failed to meet the people's enthusiastic hopes for the Assembly.

In taking part in the work of the Assembly in the past year, we communist members, in line with the positions outlined in our 5 July statement last year, have followed the CCP CC's instruction for a "clear political stand and sincere spirit of unity."³⁵ In line with this instruction and monitoring by progressive elements throughout the country and together with other Assembly members, we have been striving to realize the Chinese people's will and their demands. We firmly believe: the people's noblest will and highest demand today is the struggle for the final victory of the war against Japan and the safeguarding and expansion of the national unity and progress, which are indispensable to reaching and securing victory in the war against Japan. Therefore, in the past three sessions of the Assembly, we have

successfully proposed “the resolution on supporting the government to implement the policy of fighting the war against Japan and building the country,” “the resolution on supporting President Chiang and the GMD government to improve national unity and fight the prolonged war to the final victory,” and “the resolution on supporting President Chiang to reject the Konoe statement and on using this as the only criterion for the national policy of fighting the war in the future.” We were supported by all the members of the Assembly, and these resolutions were passed. In addition, we proposed special resolutions on other basic issues about fighting the war, such as building up the army, conscription, developing a guerrilla movement in the enemy’s rear, implementing democratic politics, and protecting people’s rights. In the work of the past year, we have firmly adhered to our position:

We represent the CCP in participating in the National Political Consultative Assembly; we are sincerely willing to work closely together with comrades with no party affiliations or the comrades from the GMD so that in a friendly manner we can discuss and decide on all concrete measures and methods of implementation that are beneficial to victory in the war and the success of building the country.

At the same time, we have been firmly opposed to, and have ruthlessly exposed and attacked, all erroneous statements harmful to our war efforts and the support of peace and capitulation. In the first and second sessions, the treacherous views of Wang Jingwei and his follower Li Shengwu, though disguised, were severely denounced and rejected by us and most of the Assembly members. In the past year, although we regret that we have not produced more results in the work of the National Political Consultative Assembly, we are confident that we have not deviated even slightly from our clear principles and positions on unity and on continuation of the war, as well as from the people’s will and wishes.

Now that the government has publicly announced its decision to extend the term of office of the Assembly members by one year, we, as members, are willing to state our views to the Assembly and the people of the country on the current situation and the strategies about how to win future victory in the war.

The characteristics of the war at the moment are: on the one hand, the enemy is facing growing difficulties after two years of fighting its war of aggression, and a victorious, though distant, future of the war against Japan is becoming increasingly clear. On the other hand, the Japanese aggressor has not changed its policy of destroying the Chinese nation. Indeed, it has become even more devious and savage; it is implementing its long-standing and determined policy of destroying our country more viciously; it is more insidiously carrying out its policy of using Chinese to fight Chinese and using war to support the war. Militarily speaking, it is suspending its large-scale frontal offensives, but is instead concentrating all its forces to “clean up” the areas of guerrilla warfare in its rear. In this way, it hopes to sap our will to continue the war and consolidate its bases in the occupied areas. Politically speaking, the enemy is doing all it can to support and use the traitor

Wang Jingwei, propagandizing his absurd anti-Chiang, anticommunist, and pro-capitulation view; intensifying its activities in manufacturing a traitors' party, a puppet regime, and turncoat armies; and carrying out anti-Chiang and anticommunist activities in terms of sowing seeds of discord within the anti-Japanese camp, in an attempt to create a situation which forces China to capitulate. Economically, it plunders and squeezes our country, dumping its goods on us and exploiting our resources, in its execution of its vicious policy of using war to support the war and using Chinese resources to slaughter the Chinese people. At the same time, within the anti-Japanese camp, there are indeed some people who do not have a correct view of the current situation: either they believe that the Japanese aggressor has softened up its policy of destroying China, or they think that the forum of an international conference can solve the Sino-Japanese problem. As a result, they give up the correct view of self-reliance and do nothing concrete about preparing for counterattacks. There are even those who neglect the danger of the enslavement of the Chinese nation but espouse using our main energies to deal with the domestic situation. They do all they can to instigate anticommunist activities and engineer plots to undermine the unity between the GMD and the CP. They attack all the progressive forces and oppress many idealistic youths. The impact of such internal conflicts and self-inflicted wounds not only undermines the people's confidence in winning victory in the war, but also dampens the international sympathy for the Chinese nation. The difficulties in recruiting conscripts and the devaluation of the government's currency have fostered some people's belief that [we] have the determination, but not the brains, to fight the war. All this has exacerbated the national crisis in China. The development of the current international situation has created great changes in the environment of our country's War of Resistance. Because of the signing of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany,³⁶ the anticommunist axis has disintegrated, thus further isolating Japan diplomatically as well as jolting its domestic politics. This has a beneficial impact on the situation of the war in our country. At the same time, because of the European war caused by the German fascists' invasion of Poland, the Japanese aggressor is encouraged to take advantage of the tension in Europe to concentrate all its efforts on destroying China. This has also encouraged the procompromise faction in England to attempt to seek a possible English-Japanese compromise with the condition of sacrificing China. Such a situation will create many new difficulties for our country's War of Resistance. Therefore, both the domestic and external environment in our country's war are in the midst of drastic changes. Under this new domestic and international situation, the important task for all the people of China is to understand clearly all the characteristics and possible trends of the new domestic and international situation, to persist in the national policy of fighting the War of Resistance to the end, to oppose the danger of halfhearted compromise, to strengthen national unity, to oppose all kinds of plots to divide us, to seek the nation's progress, and to oppose all reactionary phenomena. At the same time, we should make great efforts to seize on every incident and factor in the dramatically changing

international situation that benefits us, so as to increase foreign aid to our country, overcome all dangers and difficulties, increase our own strength, and prepare to counterattack.

In order to overcome the present difficulties and dangers, in order to seriously prepare our country's strength for counterattack, we believe that at present efforts should be made in the following respects:

A) The Political Aspect

1) Mobilize all the forces in the country to oppose compromise and capitulation, expand the anti-Wang movement, eliminate the concealed remnants of Wang's faction and all the procompromise and procapitulation elements within the anti-Japanese camp.

2) Strengthen the wartime government, unify military and political leadership, incorporate the talents from all parties and groups, and increase the efficiency of the governmental institutions during the war.

3) Establish wartime democracy. Severely punish any acts that illegally oppress the people and the youths; truly protect the people's rights of speech, publication, assembly, association, and armed resistance against the enemy.

4) Carefully punish and depose corrupt officials and government workers; establish local self-government.

5) Establish agencies of arbitration between labor and capital, and between landlords and tenants in all areas, and significantly improve the lives of poor workers and peasants, so as to boost popular enthusiasm for fighting the war and facilitate the mobilization of conscripts.

B) The Military Aspect

1) Develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear—turn the enemy's rear into the front and accumulate minor victories so that they become major victories. Thus, we must:

a) According to the principle and policies of fighting the war and building the country, define and implement political programs for guerrilla bases.

b) Unify military and political power in the guerrilla bases under the command of experienced main forces that have achieved outstanding results in those areas.

c) [See to it that] the Central Government regularly supplies the anti-Japanese forces in those guerrilla bases with the necessary weapons and economic assistance.

d) Expand guerrilla warfare by sending to the enemy's rear those units that have the determination and the ability to persist in fighting such warfare and that possess firm political qualifications and good discipline.

e) [See to it that] all personnel and units sent to the enemy's rear are able to take unity and defeat of the enemy as the central task, as well as faithfully execute the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, instead of manufacturing incidents of friction that harm us and help the enemy.

f) [See to it that] the personnel and units sent to the enemy's rear are able to execute democratic policies and establish anti-Japanese local governments that are genuinely elected by the people themselves and approved by higher-level govern-

ments. At the same time, they should implement policies that improve people's livelihood, unite the majority of the people to destroy the traitor's government, and divide the traitor's army, so that our own labor power and material resources will not be used by the enemy, but by us.

2) Train new national defense forces—in order to persist in fighting the War of Resistance and, in particular, prepare to launch a counterattack to drive the enemy out of the country under favorable circumstances. We must train new national defense forces to be the backbone of our future counterattack. Therefore, we must:

a) Select certain divisions from the front that have established an outstanding battle record, regardless of their party affiliations, as the basis for the new army.

b) Determine a unified size for the establishment of national defense divisions.

c) [See to it that] the officers of the national defense divisions are, according to the original specialties of the individual units selected, provided with modern military training and firm political education. At the same time, the newly formed units are to retain the good traditions of their former units.

d) [See to it that there is] absolute equality in terms of equipment, treatment, and supplies among the national defense divisions. However, they should be superior to those given to ordinary units.

e) [See to it that] the training of the national defense divisions is carried out within a defined period and according to a definite plan; the instructors should be capable battle heroes; the training is to be done in individual areas and in concentrated groups.

C) The Economic Aspect

Undermine the enemy's efforts at development and exploitation while working toward our own production and frugality. Therefore, we must:

1) Destroy the enemy's economic development and material exploitation in its occupied areas; mobilize the people to boycott completely the goods produced by the enemy; ban local producers from providing for the enemy. If there are some special military goods that must use goods produced by our enemy, they should be procured by the state in line with uniform regulations.

2) [See to it that] the state provides assistance and encouragement to private individuals to expand the cooperative movement in industry and agriculture. Extensively develop all kinds of practical industries and increase agricultural production.

3) Encourage the frugality movement among the military, governmental institutions, and private individuals.

D) The Financial Aspect

Firmly change the previous style; thoroughly implement the wartime financial policy. Therefore:

1) The printing of the government's paper currency should be suitably coordinated with the circulation of capital, so as to avoid the situation of imbalance in the value of the paper currency in the coastal areas and in inland areas.

2) The management of foreign currency should be strictly centralized. The National Political Consultative Assembly should set up a special committee on foreign

exchange. The committee should regularly review whether the finance ministry appropriately authorizes and spends foreign exchange, thus eliminating all corruption and private gains.

3) Audits should be stepped up and private control of finance and the undermining of the government's paper currency forbidden, particularly by public officials who seek private gain and are engaged in speculation. Violators must be severely punished.

4) [There should be] authorization to issue a certain amount of local paper currency and coupons in the war zones, and particularly in the provinces that have fallen.

5) The country's gold-backed bonds must be extensively marketed among the overseas Chinese and domestic banking community. The bonds are to be covered by actual funds and given priority for investment in the country.

6) The state's tax policy should be reformed to levy separately, according to local circumstances, business tax, income tax, progressive inheritance tax, and land improvement tax in order to eliminate the multiplication of all kinds of taxes.

7) The properties of traitors must be confiscated without exception. As for the landlords who have fled to the areas occupied by the enemy, the state should collect, on their behalf, money and grains temporarily as state direct revenue, the amount of which is to be smaller than that collected before.

8) The government's budget should be redevise from the central government down to local governments. Appropriations related to fighting the war should be increased, those unrelated to the war should be cut as much as possible, and those that can be done without should be eliminated.

9) The benefits given to the government's administrative personnel and particularly to senior officials must be cut without exception and be lower than those of the military officers at the equivalent rank. Eliminate special payments and double salaries; eliminate borrowing from the state and collecting commission from state purchases.

E) The Diplomatic Aspect

We should do our best to isolate the Japanese aggressor and increase foreign aid. Therefore, we must:

1) Earnestly unite with all the peoples and governments who support and sympathize with our country's War of Resistance and try to seek increases in their material and psychological support.

2) Firmly oppose any plot by any national government to sacrifice China and compromise with the Japanese aggressor; insist on the principle of diplomatic independence and autonomy.

3) Assist the National Political Consultative Assembly and all parties and mass groups to send all kinds of delegations abroad to carry out extensive people's diplomacy and to increase our support from the forces of democracy and peace.

F) Cooperation Among Parties

Strengthen the unity among all anti-Japanese parties, particularly the friendship

between the GMD and the CP—these are the basic guarantees for implementing the above methods, overcoming the danger in the current situation, and defeating the Japanese aggressor and the traitor Wang. Therefore, we must:

1) Issue public guarantees on the legal rights of all anti-Japanese parties; genuinely abolish all kinds of so-called methods of guarding against the activities of nongovernment parties.

2) Strictly ban discriminatory and oppressive acts against the CP and other anti-Japanese parties. Ban impingement, perpetrated on the grounds of so-called questions of party affiliation and thoughts; on the protection of the professions and human rights of workers, peasants, soldiers, students, merchants, people from all walks of life, and the young, so that a situation of tight unity throughout the country may be created.

3) Broadly invite people from all parties to participate in all tasks of the war. Do not discriminate against useful talents in the country under the pretext of party prejudice.

When the disaster brought on us by the Japanese aggressor is growing more dangerous, and when the international situation is changing rapidly, it is the demand and wishes of the people of the country to fight the war to the end, to strengthen internal unity, to seek progress in the country, to increase concretely the anti-Japanese forces, and to prepare for counterattack against the enemy. As Assembly members who are representatives and emissaries of the people, we are issuing this joint statement on the eve of the Assembly's fourth session, in the hope that the people of the country and our colleagues in the Assembly will be able to provide us with instructions, encouragement, supervision, and criticism. At the same time, we hope that this will be the direction in which our colleagues in and outside the parliament and the people of the whole country will struggle together.

F.6 On the Three Principles of the People and Communism.

Wang Jiaxiang (25 September 1939)³⁷

“Communists despise concealing their positions and views.” Similarly, the Chinese Communists make no attempts to conceal their position and views on the Three Principles of the People.

The Chinese Communists will believe forever in communism, in Marxism, in the ideology of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. They will never, for any reason or for a moment, abandon the ideals and ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

What is Marxism? Marxism is scientific socialism, an ideology of the proletarian revolution and the most progressive thought of humanity. “Marxism is the commonly recognized successor to the representatives of German philosophy, British political economy, and French socialism of the nineteenth century” (Lenin). Marxist

ideology—dialectical materialism, political economy, and socialism—is not only a scientific explanation of the world but a science for changing the world. Marxist ideology has also undergone new developments through Lenin and Stalin. “Marxist ideology is all-powerful because it is correct. Marxist ideology both completely and rigorously provides people with a world view—this world view can never be similar to or reconciled with any religious belief, or any reactionary, probourgeois oppression” (Lenin). “The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are theories that are ‘universally true’ ” (Mao Zedong, in *On the New Stage*).³⁸

The Chinese Communists recognize the Three Principles of the People as the political program for the national united front. What are the Three Principles of the People?

Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People form the political program for the national liberation of and democracy in semicolonial and semifeudal China. They demand the overthrow of imperialist rule in China and the realization of national independence and liberation. This is their nationalism. They demand the overthrow of the feudal system and the establishment of democratic politics. This is their democracy. They demand the control over capital and equalizes land rights. This is their doctrine of people’s livelihood. In the Western capitalist countries, the bourgeois revolution has long been a thing of the past; the struggle there is a struggle waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and a socialist struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. In the colonial and semicolonial countries in the East, the question on their agenda is a bourgeois revolution to overthrow imperialist and feudal systems. “In Asia there is a bourgeoisie that will faithfully fight to the end and that genuinely represents democracy. There are loyal comrades of the great political leaders of the Great French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century” (Lenin). Precisely because of this, when Lenin was discussing Sun Yat-sen’s program, he said, “Before us there has emerged the truly great thought of a truly great nation.”

Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine is a revolutionary and combative democratic doctrine. The Chinese democrats sympathize with the poor masses and hate the oppressors and exploiters. Once they have witnessed the capitalist oppression of the workers and poor masses in Western Europe, they begin to hold the view that China should avoid the stage of capitalism. They begin to develop their sympathy with socialism and their subjective socialism. Chinese democratic thought is integrated with another school of thought, the pure-people doctrine, in China. It proposes a radical land program, on the one hand, while avoiding the stage of capitalism, on the other. In fact, a radical land program can only get rid of feudal exploitation, but cannot eradicate or avoid capitalist exploitation. On the contrary, it only encourages the budding development of capitalism. This is the character of the combination of radical Chinese democracy and subjective socialism. The Chinese democrats truly and sincerely sympathize with socialism, but the result of the realization of their program is just the opposite of their intentions. Instead of avoiding capitalism, it develops capitalism.

The Chinese Marxists-Leninists declare their support of the Three Principles of the People. “The Three Principles of the People are essential to China; our party is

willing to struggle for their realization.” “The Three Principles of the People are the political basis and common program of the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front.” “Struggle for a New China governed by the Three Principles of the People.” Have we violated our Marxist-Leninist principles and positions? No. By no means.

In order to fulfill its class liberation and realize socialism, the Chinese proletariat must first seek the national liberation of China. In semicolonial China, the overthrow of imperialist rule and eradication of the remnants of the feudal system are the precondition for the proletariat’s class liberation. Therefore, the proletariat not only generally takes part in the struggle of national liberation, but is the most active, resolute, and committed force in the national liberation movement. No other class (neither the bourgeoisie nor the petty bourgeoisie) can be compared with it.

In the course of national liberation, or a revolution of a bourgeois democratic nature, the proletariat has a certain political program, the primary content of which is the overthrow of imperialist rule, the realization of national independence, the overthrow of feudal rule, the establishment of democratic politics, the eradication of the feudal system, and the solution of the land problem. These questions have long been explained in the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. After its founding, the CCP immediately declared its political program for the national democratic revolution (see the Manifesto of the CCP’s Second Congress) [July 1922. See above, **Doc. A.12**]. Therefore, the complete program of the CCP has two parts. First, the maximum program, which is the overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat and the establishment of socialism to seek a complete liberation of the proletarian class as well as the elimination of all classes. The other part of the program is the current program, the proletariat’s program in the national democratic revolution; this is also called the minimum program.

Those who participate in the national democratic revolution include not only the proletariat but also the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Each class that participates in the national democratic revolution has its own political program. Although the ideology and program of each class differs, they have basic common demands in the national democratic revolution. This is precisely the objective basis for the national united front; this makes possible the emergence of a common program of the united front.

The Three Principles of the People are the program for the Chinese national revolution and democratic revolution. As a political program, the Three Principles of the People do not conflict with the Marxist-Leninist program for the national democratic revolution (the CP’s minimum program) in terms of their primary and fundamental slogans and demands. Rather, they are generally consistent. Precisely because of this, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists believe that the realization of the Three Principles of the People is what China needs today. They believe that the Three Principles of the People form the common program in the national united front and the political basis for cooperation between the GMD and the CP. Precisely because of this, [we] call on all the people of China to struggle for the realization of a republic based on the Three Principles of the People.

We say that the Three Principles of the People are the common program for the united front; but this does not mean that, in the course of the national democratic revolution, the program and proposals of the proletariat are completely identical to those of the revolutionary and radical bourgeoisie. Neither does this mean that once the proletariat recognizes the common program of the national united front, it has abandoned its own program and proposals. No. The programs of the two classes are, on the whole, consistent only in their primary slogans and main demands, but they are not completely identical. Because of its historical position and its program and proposals that have been devised according to the needs of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese revolution during the national democratic phase, the proletarian program is more thorough and determined than the program and proposals of the more radical bourgeoisie. Now let us briefly compare these two programs.

On the national question, both classes advocate the overthrow of the imperialists and seek China's national independence. This is similar. However, the teachers of the proletariat—Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin—have written many works on the national question and the question of colonial and semicolonial countries; they have systematic theories. The proletariat in the colonial and semicolonial countries links patriotism with internationalism according to Marxist-Leninist theory; its program and proposals during national liberation are both resolute and complete, with no elements either of national compromise or of national aggression; it also has exhaustive proposals and practical actions on the question of minority nationalities.

On the question of democratic politics: the revolutionary-radical bourgeoisie and the proletariat both advocate the overthrow of the authoritarian political system and feudal and semifeudal rule, and the establishment of modern democratic politics. This is similar. However, there are differences. Although the representatives of the radical bourgeoisie are basically fighters for democracy, in their theory of democracy they regard the people as "fools." Instead of emphasizing a "plebeian" style in eradicating feudal relations and establishing brand new democratic politics, they believe that they must first give the people a period of tutelage and then practice democratic politics. Therefore, they have a proposal for practicing democratic politics in several stages. In addition, their political program for democracy does not have as its basis a practical economic program. This means that the political program for democracy will be very difficult to realize fully. The proletariat's political program in the national democratic revolution is thorough and, moreover, uses a "plebeian" revolution to create democratic politics. Moreover, its economic program thoroughly eradicates feudal relations and forms the economic basis of democratic politics.

On the question of the economic program or people's livelihood, the situation is this: the representatives of the proletariat, the Marxist-Leninists, clearly distinguish between the bourgeois national democratic revolution and the proletarian socialist revolution. In colonial and semicolonial countries, only by first launching a national democratic revolution to drive out the imperialists and eradicate the feudal system can there be a transition to the proletarian socialist revolution. Therefore,

Marxist-Leninists do not attempt to implement any socialist economic program during the national democratic revolution, but firmly insist on completely driving out the imperialist economic forces and on the land program that will thoroughly eradicate feudal land ownership. The more thorough the national democratic revolution, the more beneficial it is to the proletariat. However, the thinking of the representatives of the radical bourgeoisie is characteristic of that of pure populism. They dream of avoiding capitalism in China, believing that the principle of people's livelihood that equalizes land rights and controls capital is socialism. In fact, this is only a subjective socialism that objectively promotes the development of capitalism. On the other hand, the land program of the representatives of the radical bourgeoisie, though revolutionary in its proposals, is reformist in nature (the state buys the land) regarding the execution of its proposed radical land program, thus making it very difficult to carry it out.

From the above, one can see that the Three Principles of the People are consistent with Marxism-Leninism during the national democratic revolution only in terms of their primary slogans and demands, but they are not entirely identical. Precisely because of this, the Three Principles of the People constitute the common program and political basis of the national united front.

The program and proposals of Marxist-Leninists and Communists in the national democratic revolution are more complete and determined than those of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninists and Communists are also more loyal, determined, and committed when they support and execute the common program of the national united front—the Three Principles of the People.

Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are a revolutionary radical program; precisely because of this, they can become the common program of the national united front. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, however, suffer from their own particular historical mission. During the Sun Yat-sen era, the development of capitalism in China had just begun; the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was not very developed. The proletariat was just beginning to emerge as an independent political force. Therefore, at that time the program of democracy in China could be very radical, combative, and revolutionary. This is the historical environment in which Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three Principles of the People crystallized and developed.

Afterward, as capitalism progressed in China, and class polarization became increasingly obvious, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat became more intense. The proletariat had also grown into a strong independent political factor causing the bourgeoisie to make compromises with the imperialists and feudal forces, in order to oppose especially the proletariat and its allies—the peasantry. As a result, they abandoned Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and breached his revolutionary proposals. This is proved by the historical facts of the past ten years of civil war.

After the July 7 Incident³⁹—after the beginning of the great war of China's national liberation, the situation, of course, changed a great deal. The Communists

and progressive democrats all urged the restoration of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary proposals and revolutionary spirit. The historical environment of contemporary Chinese society, however, is different from that of the Sun Yat-sen era. On the one hand, Wang Jingwei and the Wang clique emerged; they betrayed Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and promptly surrendered to the Japanese imperialists; they even attempted to appropriate the Three Principles of the People as the basis for their surrender. Of course, this is a defamation of Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary Three Principles of the People. On the other hand, the Chinese bourgeoisie and its representatives revised the entire program and proposals of Sun Yat-sen, though they now still support Sun's nationalism and the continuation of the War of Resistance. Therefore, the Three Principles of the People of the revisionist bourgeoisie have emerged.

Now let us make a brief comparison of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three Principles of the People and the revisionist Three Principles of the People of the bourgeoisie.

Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three Principles of the People are, first and foremost, the overall program of the national democratic revolution, while the revisionist Three Principles of the People turn them into one people's principle (nationalism) and abolish Sun's democracy and the people's livelihood.

Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary democrat, but the revisionists of the Three Principles of the People are dictators, militarists, and one-party dictators. They use every means to oppose the practice of democratic politics, but make compromises with feudal forces to limit the people's democratic rights.

Sun Yat-sen sympathized with workers and peasants. When he mentioned the miseries of the masses of workers and peasants, he showed boundless sympathy with them, but the revisionist Three Principles of the People clearly represent the exploiting class and despise the struggle of workers and peasants.

Sun Yat-sen sympathized with communism and Marxism-Leninism. Although he himself was not a Communist or a Marxist-Leninist, he said: Communism is a good friend of the Three Principles of the People, and "Marxism synthesizes human thought of several thousand years." He said: Lenin is a revolutionary saint, but the revisionist Three Principles of the People hate communism and Marxism-Leninism. They raise the slogan of monism to eradicate and dissolve communism; they want to change the Three Principles of the People from being a friend to being an enemy of communism (Marxism-Leninism). Such revisionist Three Principles of the People cannot become the common program for the united front or for national unity. Rather, they will become tools for anticommunism and division.

Sun Yat-sen supported the cooperation between the GMD and the CP. He personally convened the GMD's first congress and reorganized it [January 1924]; he believed that the CP was a great revolutionary force and approved the admission of CP members into the GMD. The revisionist Three Principles of the People, however, raise the slogan of a single party, advocate a one-party system, disapprove of the cooperation between the GMD and the CP; instead, they implement the so-

called policy of dissolving the CP and regard the CP not as the friend, but as the enemy of the GMD.

Sun Yat-sen sincerely sympathized with socialism, though his socialism was at best subjective. The revisionist Three Principles of the People are completely hostile to socialism and support the capitalist system. People like Ye Qing talked about "the theory of one revolution" or [said] "the principle of people's livelihood is Chinese socialism," etc., in a clear attempt to oppose the theories of communism and manufacture erroneous "theories" which have only elements hostile to socialism, but none in sympathy with socialism. Sun Yat-sen had ideas of pure populism; his subjective ideas were revolutionary. But Ye Qing and company's "theories" that claimed "the Three Principles of the People constitute socialism and Marxism in China" are both subjectively and objectively counterrevolutionary.

From this simple comparison one can see that the representatives of the bourgeoisie have revised the Three Principles of the People because of the development of capitalism in China and because of the changes in the relationship between different classes in China. These revisionists, of course, do not dare to revise openly Sun Yat-sen's theories and proposals. Instead, they do their best to demonstrate that they really support Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Sophism, however, does not triumph over facts. The above contrast has clearly shown that the revisionist Three Principles of the People have indeed abandoned Sun Yat-sen's basic revolutionary proposals and, on the most important questions, revised and distorted Sun Yat-sen's fundamental positions.

Without opposing the revisionist Three Principles of the People, it is impossible to strengthen the national united front or win the victory of the national revolution because the revisionist Three Principles of the People, instead of guiding us to national unity, will lead us to national division; instead of leading the Anti-Japanese National United Front to victory, they will lead it to defeat. Therefore, it is the task of all the parties in the national united front to oppose the revisionist false Three Principles of the People and restore Sun Yat-sen's genuine revolutionary Three Principles of the People. In particular, this is the task for the loyal followers of Sun Yat-sen. We Communists completely support and are willing to help this.

When the Chinese Communists declared that the Three Principles of the People are the common program of the united front and that they thus would support and fight for the realization of these principles, the anticommunists joyfully spouted the nonsense that since the Communists declared their support for the Three Principles of the People, they must have abandoned and betrayed communism; if the Communists do not give up communism, then, the Communists' support for the Three Principles of the People must be insincere and false.

We want to tell these anticommunist gentlemen: the Communists have long declared that they will never abandon the great long-term goals of the ideology and theories of Marxism-Leninism. The terminology of communism may be used to refer to a future society or, more precisely, to a communist society; this is precisely the final objective of the struggles of the Communists. This is a fact known to all;

communism may also be a school of thought, ideology, and science. This is precisely Marxism-Leninism. The Communists recognize that the Three Principles of the People are the common program of the national united front and thus support the Three Principles of the People. This does not violate the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism but, on the contrary, is the correct conclusion derived from the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism.

Of course, Sun Yat-sen's doctrine is fundamentally different from the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. For example, the former is subjective in philosophical terms, while the latter follow dialectical materialism; in sociological terms, the former denies class struggle and the materialist conception of history, while the latter are the creators of the theories of class struggle and the materialist conception of history; in economic terms, the former has not escaped the limitation of bourgeois economic theories, while the latter are the economic scholars of the proletariat: the author of *Capital*. In terms of the ideals of future societies, the former proposes subjective socialism, while the latter propose scientific socialism. In general, the former is the doctrine of the radical democrats, while the latter represent the doctrine of the proletariat, the scope, sophistication, and historical position of which, of course, are incomparable.

Clearly, the Chinese Communists are believers in the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. They recognize the Three Principles of the People as their common program and struggle for their complete realization. They have not, however, thus accepted such views in Sun Yat-sen's doctrines as his world view, conception of society, and subjective socialism. This is a true, fair, and scientific attitude. This is the attitude of dialectical materialism. A political program is one thing; doctrine is another. They must be distinct. As for the question of whether the Communists' support for the Three Principles of the People is sincere or true, practice provides the best evidence and witness. The irony of history is precisely such: those who loudly sing about the Three Principles of the People and most actively oppose communism and Marxism-Leninism are those very revisionists and false disciples of the Three Principles of the People. On the other hand, those who most completely and firmly practice the revolutionary political program of the Three Principles of the People are the Chinese Communists and Chinese Marxist-Leninists.

In summary, the Three Principles of the People are the common program for the national united front and, therefore, the common program for cooperation between the CP and the GMD. Marxism-Leninism is the ideology and belief of the CP. Although the program of the Three Principles of the People is not completely identical with that of the Communists in the national democratic revolution, they are fundamentally similar, so the Three Principles of the People can become the common program for the national united front.

Therefore, the following points become very clear:

- 1) Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People are the program of the national united front; so all the parties who have joined the national united front must support and practice these principles in order to strengthen the Anti-Japanese Na-

tional United Front and fight to win the victory of the war of national revolution. Any views that disparage the Three Principles of the People—the truly great thought of a truly great nation—are all erroneous, whether they exist among CP or GMD members, since such denigration can only weaken the national united front and national unity, and affect the destiny of the Chinese nation.

2) Support Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. Oppose the bourgeoisie's revisionist Three Principles of the People. Such revision has violated and defamed the revolutionary spirit of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, transforming Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three Principles of the People into anticommunist reactionary doctrines. Without fighting such revisionist Three Principles of the People, it is impossible to revive the true revolutionary spirit of Sun Yat-sen or strengthen the united front or lead the great nation to the victory of liberation. The works of Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the manifestos of the first and second congresses of the GMD are the classic arguments for opposing the false Three Principles of the People.

3) Oppose all attempts to mix the Three Principles of the People with communism-Marxism-Leninism, whether such attempts come from the right, from the faction of Ye Qing (who said the Three Principles of the People are Chinese Marxism), or from the camp of the Marxists (for example, making the Three Principles of the People sound almost like Marxism). The scientific attitude is to explicate the objective relationship between the Three Principles of the People and Marxism-Leninism. Any exaggeration of their similarities or differences is not an objective or truthful attitude. Only such a scientific attitude can avoid either harming the Three Principles of the People or damaging communism, as well as improve the cooperation between disciples of the Three Principles of the People and the Communists.

4) Any attempt to prove the view that only the Three Principles of the People suit China while Marxism-Leninism is not appropriate to China is both wrong and reactionary. Any hope or attempt to use the Three Principles of the People to dissolve and eradicate communism and Marxism-Leninism is unscientific and counterrevolutionary. Since China has the proletariat, it has the ideology, doctrines, and movement of the proletariat—Chinese communism and Marxism-Leninism. The important characteristic of Marxism is dialectical materialism. Truth is concrete. The Chinese Marxists, using the basic doctrines of Marxism, concretely analyze the historical, economic, and class environments in China and formulate their programs and proposals for each stage of the Chinese revolution. It is not Marxism, but simplistic mechanism, to transfer to China programs and proposals suitable to capitalist countries in Western Europe. "CP members are international Marxists, but Marxism can only be realized through national forms; there is no abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism" (Mao Zedong, *On the New Stage*). The Chinese proletariat is not enormous in terms of size and "class self-consciousness." Its political role and its "class self-actions," however, are extremely important because of various historical, international, and domestic conditions. The Chinese Communists will never force others to believe in communism and Marxism-Leninism, but they firmly oppose the representatives of the bourgeoisie in any of their plots and attempts to

use the Three Principles of the People to dissolve, eradicate, and sap communism.

From what has been said above, our positions are very obvious. They were very clearly explained, a long time ago, by Comrade Mao Zedong in his article "Tasks of the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front at the Present Stage," published in May 1937.⁴⁰

The CP will never abandon its socialist and communist ideals, which they will attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution. The CP has its own party program and political program. Its political program for the democratic revolution is more complete than that of any other party in the country, but does not fundamentally conflict with the program of the Three Principles of the People as declared at the GMD's first and second congresses. Thus, we do not reject the Three Principles of the People, but are willing to implement them resolutely and demand that the GMD practice them together with us. We call on all the people throughout the country to implement the Three Principles of the People, so that the CP, the GMD, and all the people of the country may struggle together to attain the three great goals of national independence, democracy and freedom, and people's livelihood and happiness.

F.7 Introducing *The Communist*. Mao Zedong (4 October 1939)⁴¹

The Party Center has eventually realized its plan to publish an internal party publication. Such a publication is necessary for the construction of a nationwide and mass-based Bolshevik CCP that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. In the current situation, such a necessity is becoming increasingly apparent. The current situation is characterized, on the one hand, by the ever-increasing danger of capitulation, splits, and retrogression in the anti-Japanese national united front and, on the other hand, by the fact that our party has moved out of its narrow confines to become a large, nationwide party. Meanwhile, the party's task is to mobilize the masses, to avoid the danger of capitulation, splits, and retrogression, and to prepare to cope with any possible sudden incidents that may cause unexpected damage to the party and the revolution. Under such circumstances, the publication of this internal party organ is of vital importance.

Now what is the task of this internal party publication, which is named *The Communist*? What does it cover? And how does it differ from other party publications?

[[Its task is to help consolidate the party ideologically, politically, and organizationally. To a certain extent, we have become a nationwide, mass-based party that has been consolidated. Thus, what are the new tasks? And what is the reason for the new task we propose? The reason is that we have many new party members and

organizations that must be consolidated and Bolshevized as well as many old members and organizations that need to be improved. The current situation is much more complicated, while the task is more formidable. We must strive for a consolidated, Bolshevized party. To understand what we can achieve we must look at the eighteen years of the history of our party. The revolution is a bourgeois democratic one and our party's history can be described as one of armed struggle. Armed struggle refers, in fact, to peasant war and the relationship of the party to this war can be said to be a relationship between the party and the peasantry.]]

Thus, matters concerning the united front, armed struggle, and party construction constitute the three basic questions for our party in the Chinese revolution. The entire Chinese revolution will be properly led only when we can make a correct judgment on these questions and the interrelationships among them are fully comprehended. Based on our rich experience of failure and success, retrogression and progress, and contraction and development over the past eighteen years of our party's history, this is something we are now in a position to do. That is to say, we now have the competence to deal accurately not only with the question of the united front but also with matters concerning armed struggle and party building. In other words, we have come to understand through eighteen years of experience that united front, armed struggle, and party construction are the three magic weapons of the CCP that will defeat the enemy in the Chinese revolution. These three principle magic weapons mark the great achievements of the CCP as well as those of the Chinese revolution.

Now let us here describe briefly the three magic weapons, the three issues, respectively.

During the past eighteen years, the united front between the Chinese proletariat and the bourgeoisie and other classes has evolved under three different conditions and during three different stages, namely the Great Revolution in China, the ten years of Civil War and the War of Resistance against Japan. During the three phases, the following tendencies were shown to exist: (1) The fact that the strongest oppression in China is national oppression makes possible, at a given time and to a certain extent, the participation of the Chinese national bourgeoisie in combatting imperialism and the feudal warlords. Therefore, the proletariat should, during this period, seek to establish a united front with the national bourgeoisie, and maintain the front for as long as possible. (2) The political and economic weakness of the national bourgeoisie means that under different historical circumstances it may be disturbed and renounced. Consequently, the context of the Chinese revolutionary united front maintains a constant coherence, and changes are bound to occur, with the bourgeoisie participating on some occasions and not on others. (3) Because of its vacillating nature, the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie) also regards the ideological, political, and organizational development of the proletariat and its party as detrimental to itself even while it is participating in the united front and, together with the proletariat, fighting the enemy. It seeks to constrain such development by adopting the destructive policies of deceit, enticement, disintegration and

attack and uses these policies as preparation for capitulating to the enemy and splitting the united front. (4) The firm allies of the proletariat are peasants. (5) The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. These tendencies not only have been borne out during the First Revolutionary War, but also are being shown to be true since the start of the War of Resistance against Japan three years ago. Therefore, as far as the issue of forming the united front is concerned, the political party of the proletariat must fight resolutely and seriously the struggle between the lines with the bourgeoisie (especially the big bourgeoisie). On the one hand, emphasis should be placed on fighting against the negligence of the possible limited participation of the bourgeoisie in the revolution at any given time. This view fails to distinguish the bourgeoisie in China from that in capitalist countries and consequently overlooks the possibility of establishing and maintaining the policy of the united front with the bourgeoisie. This view is “left” closed-doorism. On the other hand, attention should be devoted to combating the tendency of treating as equal the revolutionary character of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as well as their revolutionary guiding principles, policies, ideologies, and practices. This view neglects the differences in principle between the two and ignores the fact that the bourgeoisie has been trying to influence not only the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry but also the proletariat and the CP in an effort to eliminate their ideological, political, and organizational independence in order to turn them into the tail of other political parties. This will enable the single party of the bourgeoisie to pluck the fruits of the revolution. When conflict arises between the revolution and the self-interests of the single party of the bourgeoisie, it will betray the revolution. If we overlook this aspect, we engage in right opportunism, a feature of the Chen Duxiuism that attempted to lead the proletariat into meeting the self-interests of the single party of the bourgeoisie. This was the subjective reason for the failure of the First Revolutionary War. The dual nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois democratic revolution has had a significant impact on the political line and construction of the CCP. Unless this dual nature is appreciated, the political line and construction of the CCP cannot be understood. An important element of the CCP’s political line is to unite with the bourgeoisie while fighting against it. A significant aspect of the CCP’s construction is that the party has been developed and tempered through this type of unite-and-fight with the bourgeoisie. The so-called unity means the united front while the fight refers to, at the time of unity, the “peaceful” and “nonbloody” ideological, political, and organizational fight. This turns into an armed struggle when a split with the bourgeoisie is brought about. Only if we realize unity with the bourgeoisie at a certain time can the party move forward and the revolution progress; only if we realize a resolute and serious “peaceful” struggle during unity with the bourgeoisie will the party not disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and will the revolution not fail; similarly, only if we carry out the armed struggle resolutely and firmly with the bourgeoisie once a split is forced will our party not collapse, and will the revolution not be defeated. All this has been proved by the past eighteen years of history.

The CCP's armed struggle is essentially a peasant war under the leadership of the proletariat. Its history can be also divided into three stages. The first period is the Northern Expedition participated in by the bourgeoisie. During this period, although our party was just beginning to comprehend the importance of armed struggle, it had not fully understood its significance and come to realize that armed struggle ought to be the major form of the Chinese revolution. The second period is the ten-year Civil War, during which our party established independent armed forces, mastered the art of war on its own, built base areas of people's power, and became capable of combining directly or indirectly the main form of struggle—armed struggle—with other necessary forms of struggle. In other words, throughout the country, directly or indirectly, struggles of workers, peasants (the major one), youths, women, all kinds of people as well as power, economic, and ideological struggles and the elimination of traitors were incorporated into the armed struggle. This type of armed struggle represents the rural peasant revolution under the leadership of the proletariat. It constitutes the second stage of our party's armed struggle. The third stage is the current War of Resistance against Japan in which we are able to utilize the experience of armed struggle from the first, and especially the second, stage and to apply the experience of incorporating armed struggle with other necessary forms of armed struggle. The general concept of this kind of struggle is guerrilla warfare. What then is guerrilla warfare? It is simply the inevitable and therefore the best form of struggle by which, over a lengthy period of time, the armed forces of the people can defeat the enemy and establish their position in a backward and large semicolonial country. Over the past eighteen years, our party's political line and construction have been closely linked to this form of armed struggle. Without this and guerrilla warfare, neither our political line nor party-building can be understood. Armed struggle has been an essential part of our political line. Over the past eighteen years, our party has gradually learned and adhered to the line of armed struggle. We have come to understand that in China the status of the proletariat, the people, the CP and the victory of revolution will be possible only if armed struggle is maintained. Over the past eighteen years, the development, consolidation, and the Bolshevization of our party have gone hand in hand with guerrilla warfare. The CCP would not have become what it is today if armed struggle and guerrilla warfare had not been adopted. All party comrades should bear in mind that this experience was acquired at the cost of blood.

As far as the building, development, consolidation, and Bolshevization of the party are concerned, there have been three stages. The first stage saw the party in its infancy. The party's line had been correct during the beginning and the middle part of this stage, characterized by the extremely high revolutionary enthusiasm of the party rank and file and cadres, and subsequently by the victory of the First Revolutionary War. Yet, the party remained immature, having no experience with respect to the three basic issues—the united front, armed struggle, and party construction—possessing little or no knowledge of the characteristics and patterns of the Chinese revolution as well as of Chinese history and society, and lacking an understanding

of the theories of Marxism-Leninism properly integrated with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, at the critical juncture—toward the end of the first stage—the dominant element in the party's leading organ failed to lead the whole party in consolidating the victory of the revolution and was deceived by the bourgeoisie. Consequently, the revolution ended in failure. During this period, despite development, party organization was not consolidated. Party members and cadres and the organization were not consolidated ideologically and politically. There were numerous new party members who did not receive the necessary education in Marxism-Leninism. Further, much work experience was not summed up properly. At the same time, a great number of opportunists sneaked into the party and were not weeded out. The enemy and its allies engaged in a conspiracy to try to stab our party in the back. We failed to guard against this. Although there were many activists within the party, they did not become a firm backbone for the party. The party had some revolutionary forces, but was not in a position to control them. All this resulted from the lack of experience and inadequate understanding of the revolution as well as of the integration of Marxist-Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution. This is the first stage of party-building.

The second stage covers the ten-year Civil War during which we were able to carry out a victorious soviet struggle because of the experiences we took from the first stage, because we understood better the characteristics and patterns of the Chinese revolution and had a better knowledge concerning Chinese history and society, and because we further applied the theories of Marxism-Leninism to the practice of the Chinese revolution. Although the bourgeoisie ended up betraying the revolution, the party was still able to rely closely on the peasantry. Party organization was not only revived but also consolidated. In spite of the enemy's intrigue to constantly harm our party, the party drove out the conspirators, and a large number of cadres came to the fore within the party who later were made its backbone. The party learned to master the art of running the country and providing people with peace and security by opening up the way to people's power. Further, by establishing resolute armed forces, the party mastered the art of warfare. All these mark the great progress and success of the party. During this great struggle, however, some party members fell into the quagmire of revisionism. This is because they were not modest enough to learn from past experiences, lacked knowledge of characteristics and patterns of the Chinese revolution, were extremely ignorant of the Chinese history and society, and failed to have a consistent understanding of issues relating to the connection between the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. This, consequently, led to the failure of some of members of the party's leading organ to grasp entirely the correct political and organizational lines at all times throughout the whole period. At one point, the party and the revolution were the whole period. At one time, the party and the revolution were jeopardized by the "left" opportunism of Li Lisan, and by "left" opportunism in the revolutionary war and in work in the white areas (the GMD-controlled area). Nonetheless, all these [tendencies] were successively defeated during the two historic meetings—the

CC's Fourth Plenum [January 1931] and the Zunyi Conference (January 1935, Zunyi, Guizhou Province), after which the party was put soundly on the Bolshevik road. This provided the basis for the later defeat of Zhang Guotao's right opportunism and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This covers the second stage of the party's development.

The third stage of the party's development, the stage of Anti-Japanese National United Front, has witnessed its first three years. The struggle of the past three years is of great significance. Based on the experiences of the two previous revolutions, its organizational and armed forces, its high political prestige among the people of the country, and its even deeper and more consistent understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese revolution, the party not only formed the Anti-Japanese United Front but also carried out the great War of Resistance against Japan. The party's organization has moved out of a narrow circle to become a major nationwide party. Through the struggle with the Japanese invaders, the party's armed forces have been reestablished and become even stronger. Meanwhile, the party has increased its influence among the people of the nation. All these are great achievements. However, a great number of new party members and many new organizations have not been consolidated despite the fact that the party has progressed. There remain many differences between the new members and organizations and the old ones, characterized by the fact that they [the former] still do not possess adequate knowledge about the revolution, lack, or have very little, understanding of the patterns of the Chinese revolution and knowledge concerning Chinese history and society, let alone comprehend fully and consistently theories of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution. In the past, although the CC in developing its organization put forward the slogan "Greatly expand the party but never allow in a single wrongdoer," a great many opportunists and enemy conspirators actually did sneak into the party. Although the united front has been established and maintained for three years, the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, has been continually seeking to sabotage our party. The serious struggle by the capitulators of the big bourgeoisie and the diehards is taking place nationwide, and the voice of anticommunism can be heard everywhere. At the same time, the capitulators of the big bourgeoisie and the diehards are using this to prepare to capitulate to the Japanese imperialists, split the united front, and set China back. The bourgeoisie tried to dissolve communism ideologically, abolish the CP politically and organizationally, eliminate the border areas, and disband the party's armed forces. It is apparent that our task, under such circumstances, is to avoid the danger of capitulation, division, and retrogression and to maintain the united front and cooperation between the CP and the GMD insofar as it is possible, with a view to ensuring the continuation of resistance against Japanese aggression, maintaining unity, and making progress. At the same time, we must be prepared for any possible sudden incidents in order to avoid the party and the revolution suffering any unexpected damage. To do this, the party must be consolidated, its armed forces strengthened, and the people of the nation mobilized to carry out resolutely the

struggle against capitulation, division, and retrogression. Such a task will have to rely on the efforts of the entire party, all its members, its cadres, and all its organization in all areas to conduct the struggle unyieldingly and unremittingly. We are convinced that the CCP, with its eighteen years of experience, the cooperation between its old and experienced members and cadres and the newly recruited and vigorous ones, the combined efforts of the long-tested Bolshevik CC with the local organizations, and the assistance of its strong armed forces and the progressive rank and file, will attain these targets.

This concludes the major experiences and questions concerning our party over the past eighteen years and during the three stages. We have learned from our eighteen years of experience that the united front and armed struggle are the two fundamental weapons for defeating the enemy. Armed struggle is applied in the united front and these two weapons are controlled by the party organization, as is the heroic soldier who charges and shatters enemy positions. This is the relationship among the three issues.

How do we want to build our party today? How can we construct a “nationwide, mass-based CCP that is entirely Bolshevized ideologically, politically, and organizationally”? We will understand these questions by studying the history of our party, by relating the issues of party construction and the united front to that of armed struggle, by connecting the issue of party-building to that of unity with and struggle against the bourgeoisie, and by integrating the issue of continuing guerrilla warfare conducted by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army with that of establishment of anti-Japanese base areas.

Based on the consistent understanding of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and their relationship to the practice of the Chinese revolution, the eighteen years of experience should be combined with the new experiences and transmitted throughout the party, in order to firmly consolidate the party and to avoid committing the previous historical errors. This is our task.

F.8 New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture (Excerpts). *Mao Zedong* (15 January 1940)⁴²

I

Since the beginning of the war against Japan, a lively atmosphere has prevailed throughout the country. The people believe that a way out of the impasse can be found, and their anxiety and pessimism have been dispelled. However, the recent atmosphere of compromise and a tide of anticommunism are in the ascendant, and this perplexes the people. Most susceptible, and the first to be affected, are the intellectuals and the young students. Once again the questions arise: What is to be

done? Whither China? Therefore, on the occasion of the publication of *Chinese Culture* [Zhongguo wenhua], it may be beneficial to clarify the trends in Chinese politics and culture. I am an outsider as far as culture is concerned and have only just begun to study it. Fortunately, there are many comrades in Yan'an who have written at length on the subject. My rough and ready words may thus serve the same purpose as the gongs and drums announcing a theatrical performance. Our words may contain a grain of truth for the nation's advanced cultural workers, and we hope they will participate in discussions and help us to reach correct conclusions that will meet our national needs. The scientific approach is to "seek truth from facts." Adopting arrogant attitudes of "self-righteousness" or "treating oneself always as other people's teacher" can never solve any problem. Our national disaster is extremely serious; only a scientific approach and spirit of responsibility can guide our nation onto the road of liberation. There is only one truth and, moreover, the truth does not depend on subjective boasting but on objective practice. The only criterion for testing the truth is the revolutionary practice by millions of people. This, I think, can be regarded as the attitude for the publication of *Chinese Culture*.

[[We Communists are fighting for a cultural revolution in China as well as a political and economic one.]]

IV

The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in its division into two phases: democracy and socialism. The first stage comprises not democracy in general but democracy of a special Chinese type—new democracy. Then, how has this historical characteristic come into being? Has it been in existence for the past hundred years? Or did it come into existence more recently?

Any study of the historical development of China and the world will show that this historical characteristic did not emerge after the Opium War, but took shape later, after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution in Russia. Let us now examine the process of its formation.

[[The first step is to change China from a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society into an independent, democratic society. The second step is to continue the revolution and establish a socialist society. The first step began with the Opium War and is still in progress. The 1911 Revolution was a more concrete event but was a bourgeois democratic, not a socialist, revolution. After the October Russian Revolution of 1917, the revolution moved from being old bourgeois democratic to being new bourgeois democratic. As far as the alignment of the revolutionary camp is concerned, it forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution. The October Revolution has changed the direction of world history.]]

The first step or the first stage of this kind of revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries are basically still bourgeois democratic in terms of social character; their objective mission is basically the elimination of obstacles on the road of capitalist development. This kind of revolution, however, is no longer a

revolution of the old type led entirely by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It is a new type of revolution that has the participation or the leadership of the proletariat and the objective of which is to establish, during the first stage, a new democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. During the process, this revolution may be divided into a number of stages because of changes in the enemy's situation. The fundamental character does not change, however, until the stage of the socialist revolution is reached.

This revolution is one that completely undermines imperialism and, therefore, is not tolerated but opposed by the imperialists. However, it is supported by socialists and by the socialist lands and the socialist international proletariat.

Therefore, this revolution inevitably becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

[[There are two kinds of world revolution. The first belongs to the bourgeois or capitalist category. The era of this world revolution is long gone. With the October Revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution has begun. The main force in this revolution is the proletariat in capitalist countries, with the oppressed peoples in colonial and semicolonial countries as its allies. The significance of the Chinese revolution has increased enormously and is a major component of the world revolution. The CCP, the Chinese proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie have become a great independent, political force.]]

The first step or stage of this revolution will never—can never—establish a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but will result in the establishment of a new democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes of China to complete the first stage. The revolution will then be carried forward to the second stage in order to establish a socialist society in China.

This is the most fundamental characteristic of the Chinese revolution of today, of the new revolutionary process of the past twenty years (from the May Fourth Movement [1919]). This is the concrete living essence of the Chinese revolution of today.

[[After the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese proletariat joined the bourgeoisie in the political leadership of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Unlike the Russian bourgeoisie, the Chinese bourgeoisie has a certain revolutionary spirit because it is oppressed by the imperialists. The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, is weak economically and politically and is liable to compromise with the enemy. This is especially true of the big bourgeoisie. Whoever overthrows imperialism in China will win the people's trust. If the bourgeoisie can do this, it should be admired. If not, responsibility will have to be placed on the shoulders of the proletariat.

The numerous types of state system in the world can be reduced to three according to the class character of their political power: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship (the old democratic states); (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat (the Soviet Union); and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes (the transitional state to be adopted in the revolutions of colonial and semicolonial countries).]]

As for the question of "the system of government," this is a matter of the form of the composition of political power, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself. There is no state without an appropriate apparatus of political power. China may now adopt the system of people's congresses, from the national people's congresses to the provincial, county, and district people's congresses with also a village residents' conference. All levels will elect their governmental bodies. However, if there is to be proper representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, a proper expression of the people's will, a proper direction for revolutionary struggles, and a proper manifestation of the spirit of new democracy, then a system of genuinely universal and equal suffrage irrespective of sex, religious belief, property, or education must be introduced. This system is democratic centralism. Only a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight the enemies of the revolution most effectively. The spirit of "privately owned by the few" in the government and the army must be resisted. If there is no genuine democratic system, this goal cannot be attained and the government system and the state system will be out of harmony.

The state system—the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. The system of government—democratic centralism. These constitute the politics of new democracy, the new democratic republic, the republic of the Anti-Japanese United Front, the republic of the Three Principles of the People with the Three Fundamental Policies, the real Republic of China. Today, we have a Republic of China in name but not in reality, and our present task is to create the reality that will fit the name.

Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting the Japanese, should and must establish without fail. This is the only correct orientation for our current work of "national reconstruction."

VI

This republic to be established in China is, both politically and economically, a new democracy.

The state will own large banks, industries, and businesses. "Enterprises, such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic or too large to be run privately, shall be managed by the state, so that the system of private capital will not dominate the livelihood of the people, thus regulating capital." This is another solemn declaration in the Manifesto of the GMD's First National Congress [January 1924], and it is the correct policy for the economic structure of the new democratic republic. At the same time, however, this does not entail a general confiscation of capitalist private property or prevent the development of capitalist production that will not "dominate the livelihood of the people." This is because the Chinese economy is very backward.

The republic will adopt certain necessary steps to confiscate the land of big landlords and distribute it to landless peasants and those with little land, thus fulfill-

ing Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "land to the tillers" and eradicating feudal relationships in the countryside. However, this will not establish a socialist culture; rather, the land will become the peasants' private property. The economy of the rich peasants is allowed to exist. This is the policy of "equalization of landownership." The correct slogan for this policy is "land to the tiller."

The Chinese economy must develop along the path of "regulation of capital" and "equalization of landownership." There must be no "ownership by the few" or "domination of the livelihood of the people" by a few capitalists and landlords. A capitalist society modeled on Europe and America must not be established; it cannot be an old semifeudal society, either. Whoever dares to violate this policy will not succeed and will only suffer a bloody defeat.

Such are the internal economic relations which a revolutionary and anti-Japanese China must and will establish.

Such is the economy of New Democracy.

The politics of New Democracy is the concentrated expression of the economy of New Democracy.

VII

This republic of new democratic politics and new democratic economy is supported by more than 90 percent of the people in the country; it is "in accordance with the law of nature, with the will of the people, with the trend in the world, with the needs of the people, and determined by the will of the sages—it will succeed" (Sun Yat-sen). There is no other alternative.

Should we travel the road of establishing a capitalist society under a bourgeois dictatorship? Of course this is the old road traveled by the bourgeoisie in Europe and America. But domestic and international environments do not permit China to do so.

From the perspective of the international environment, this road is a dead end. The international environment is now, basically speaking, an environment in which capitalism fights with socialism, and an environment in which capitalism is declining while socialism is ascending. Therefore, first, international capitalism, or imperialism, would not allow this. The history of the imperialists' aggression against China, their opposition to China's independence and to the development of capitalism in China is the modern history of China. The previous failures in the Chinese revolution were all caused by the suppression by the imperialists. Countless revolutionary martyrs have thus sacrificed their lives with immortal hatred. Now the situation is that the powerful Japanese imperialists have invaded us and want to turn China into a colony. Now the Japanese imperialists are developing their capitalism in China, but they are not developing Chinese capitalism. Now the Japanese bourgeoisie are dictators in China, but the Chinese bourgeoisie are not. It is true that the present is the period when imperialism is putting up its last struggle; it is dying; "imperialism is the dying capitalism." But precisely because it is dying, it relies

even more on the colonial and semicolonial countries to survive and will not permit any colonial and semicolonial countries to establish a so-called capitalist society under a bourgeois dictatorship. Precisely because Japanese imperialism is bogged down in a deep pit of economic and political crises, which is to say that it is about to expire, it is bound to attack China and turn China into its colony; so it has cut off the road for the establishment of a bourgeois dictatorship and the development of national capitalism in China.

Second, socialism will not allow this to happen. In this world all the imperialists regard us as their enemy; if China wants to be independent, it can never be so without the aid from the socialist countries and the international proletariat. This is to say that China cannot be without the support from the Soviet Union, or without the victories by the proletariat in England, America, France, and Germany in their struggles against capitalism in their own countries. Their victories give us support, although it cannot be said that China's victory will perforce follow the victory of the revolution in Japan, England, America, France, Germany, and Italy or the victory of the revolution in one of two countries among them. But it must be added that victory can be won only by including their strength; there is no doubt about it. In particular, the aid from the Soviet Union is an indispensable condition for the final victory of the war against Japan. If the aid from the Soviet Union were rejected, the revolution would fail. Isn't the lesson from the antisoviet movement in China after 1927 very obvious? The world today is in a new era of revolution and war; it is an era during which capitalism will die and socialism will prosper. In this situation, isn't it a pure fantasy to establish a capitalist society under a bourgeois dictatorship after China wins its anti-imperialist and antifeudal victory?

If we say that owing to special conditions (the bourgeoisie defeated the Greek aggression because the strength of the proletariat was insufficient) there was a Turkey ruled by a small Kemalist bourgeois dictatorship after the first imperialist [world] war and the October Revolution, then there will never be another Turkey during World War II and after the Soviet Union has completed its socialist construction. Particularly, there will not be a Turkey of 450 million people. Because of the special conditions in China (the bourgeoisie's propensity to compromise and the firm commitment of the proletariat), China has never witnessed such a cheap thing as happened in Turkey. After the failure of the Great Revolution in China in 1927, didn't the bourgeois elements in China sing loudly about so-called Kemalism? But where is the Chinese Kemal? Where is the Chinese bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society? Not to mention the fact that Kemalist Turkey, in the end, had to throw itself into the arms of the English and French imperialists and increasingly become a semicolonial country as well as part of the imperialist reactionary world. In the international environment of the 1940s and 1950s, any heroes of the colonial and semicolonial countries will become part of the world counterrevolution if they stand on the side of the imperialist camp. If they stand on the side of the anti-imperialist camp, they will become part of the world revolution. One of the two has to be chosen; there is no other alternative.

From the perspective of the domestic environment, the Chinese bourgeoisie should have learned its necessary lesson. The Chinese bourgeoisie kicked away the masses and monopolized the fruits of revolution simply because the strength of the proletariat, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie gained the initial victory of the revolution. Moreover, they spent enormous efforts to carry out ten years of "extermination of communism." But what have been the results? Now, after a powerful enemy has penetrated deep into the country and the war against Japan has been going on for two years, do they want to copy the dated charter of the bourgeoisie in Europe and America? The previous "ten years of extermination of communism" did not produce any capitalist society under a bourgeois dictatorship. Do they want to try it again? It is true that "ten years of extermination of communism" has produced a "single-party dictatorship." But this is a semicolonial and semifeudal dictatorship. After four years of extermination of communism (between 1927 and 1931), they produced a "Manchuria"; in another six years, up to 1937, their extermination of communism brought the Japanese imperialists into China. If someone wants to carry out another ten years of extermination of communism from now on, then there are, after all, some differences between the new model of exterminating communism and the old one. However, hasn't somebody already been the first to take over the responsibility of this kind of enterprise of exterminating communism? He is Wang Jingwei. He is already a famous new anticommunist. It is all right for anybody to join his group. But isn't it more shameful to sing for the so-called bourgeois dictatorship, capitalist society, Kemalism, modern state, one-party dictatorship, or monism? If one does not join Wang Jingwei's group, one may join the anti-Japanese group; but isn't it another dream, after the victory of the war against Japan, to kick out the people who fought against the Japanese, monopolize the fruits of the war against Japan, and produce another round of "long live the one-party dictatorship"? Who is contributing to the war against Japan? You can't move a step if you abandon the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie. Whoever dares to use his foot to kick them will find his foot smashed to pieces. Hasn't it become something within the realm of common sense? But elements among the Chinese bourgeoisie (I refer to the stubborn elements) seem to have learned no lesson over the past twenty years. Don't you see that they are still shouting "contain communism," "melt communism," and "fight communism"? Don't you see that they produced "Methods of Handling the Question of the Opposition Parties" after concocting "Methods of Limiting the Activities of Opposition Parties." Good heavens, if such "limiting" and "handling" continues, who knows where they place the destiny of the nation? Who knows where they place themselves? We sincerely advise these gentlemen: you should also open your eyes to take a look at China and the world, at what is happening domestically and internationally, and at the reality at the moment. Do not repeat your mistakes. If you continue to err, the destiny of the nation will certainly suffer. We see that your own business is quite tough. This is certain, sure, and real. If the stubborn elements among the Chinese bourgeoisie refuse to wake up, their business is not going to be

wonderful. They will have a future of self-sought destruction. Therefore, we hope that the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front will persist and avoid being monopolized by one party. Only cooperation with all and the winning of the victory of the war is the wise policy. Everything else is imprudent. This is the sincere advice from us Communists: "Don't say that we haven't told you so."

Here is an old saying by the former president of the Republic of China Li Yuanhong: "If there is food, all will share it." There is a lot to this saying, since if we attack the common enemy, we should share our food, do everything together, and read our books together. The style of "monopoly" and "persecution" is an old trick of the feudal lords and cannot operate in the 1940s and 1950s.

We Communists will never discriminate against any revolutionary elements (as long as they do not capitulate or oppose communism); we will persist in the united front and the long-term cooperation with all the classes, social strata, political parties, political groups, and individuals that will fight the Japanese to the end. But if others want to discriminate against the CP, that won't do. If others want to split the united front, that won't do, either. China must persist in the war, unity, and progress. We cannot tolerate anybody who wants to capitulate, split, or regress.

VIII

If one does not travel the capitalist road of bourgeois dictatorship, can one travel the socialist road of proletarian dictatorship?

One cannot.

Without a doubt, the present revolution is the first step and will develop to the second step, that of socialism, in the future. Only when China reaches the era of socialism will it attain true happiness. However, now is not the time to practice socialism. The current revolutionary task for China is to fight imperialism and feudalism. Before this task is fulfilled, there is no prospect for socialism. The Chinese revolution must be completed in two stages: first new democracy, then socialism. Moreover, the first step will be very long, and success cannot be won in a day or two. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us.

Some ill-intentioned propagandists purposefully confuse these two distinct revolutionary stages and propose the so-called theory of a single revolution to prove that the Three Principles of the People apply to all kinds of revolutions and that communism has lost its *raison d'être*. They use this kind of "theory" to aggressively oppose communism, the CP, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. Their objective is to eliminate thoroughly any revolution, oppose the bourgeoisie's commitment to the democratic revolution and the commitment to fighting the Japanese, and prepare propaganda for capitulation to the Japanese.

[[The Japanese have consciously tried to tempt people into capitulation through political offensives and economic enticements. Some capitalists, with Wang Jingwei as their leader, have already capitulated.]]

IX

The diehard elements among the bourgeoisie have come forward and said: all right, since the CP has postponed the socialist system to a later stage, and since you also propagandize that "The Three Principles of the People are what China needs today, and our party is ready to fight for their complete realization," then, please fold up your communism for the time being. A fearful hullabaloo has been raised with this sort of argument in the form of the "one doctrine" theory. In essence, this is the clamor of the diehard elements for bourgeois despotism. To be polite, however, we will call it nonsensical.

Communism is at once a complete ideological system of the proletariat and a new social system. This ideological and social system is distinct from any other. It is the most progressive, revolutionary, and rational system since the beginning of human history. The ideological and social system of feudalism has a place only in the museum of history. The ideological and social system of capitalism has also become a museum piece in one part of the world (the Soviet Union), while in other countries it is "like the sun setting in the west and a dying man that may not see another morning," and is about to enter the museum. Only the communist ideological and social system is emerging in the world as a powerful, irresistible, and overwhelming force of perpetual vigor. Since the introduction of scientific communism in China, new vistas have opened up for the people, and the Chinese revolution has changed its character. Without communism to guide it, the Chinese democratic revolution will never succeed, let alone move on to the next stage. This is why the diehard elements among the bourgeoisie are shouting so loudly about "folding up" communism. In fact, it must not be folded up. Once communism is folded up, China will be destroyed as a country. The world today depends on communism as its savior; China is no exception.

Everyone knows that the CP has both an immediate and a future program—a minimum and the maximum program—for the social system it advocates. At present, it is new democracy, and for the future, it will be socialism. These are two parts of an organic whole, guided by the ideological system of communism. Because the CP's minimum program is basically similar to the political principles of the Three Principles of the People, isn't it absurd to shout loudly about "folding up" communism? It is precisely because of this basic similarity between the two that we Communists find it possible to recognize "the Three Principles of the People as the political basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front" and to acknowledge that "the Three Principles of the People being what China needs today, our party is ready to fight for their complete realization." Otherwise, no such possibility would exist. This is the united front between communism and the Three Principles of the People during the stage of the democratic revolution which Sun Yat-sen had in mind when he said that "communism is a good friend of the Three Principles of the People."⁴³ To reject communism is to reject the united front. The diehards are practicing their one-party doctrine and rejecting the united front. This is why they have concocted absurdities that reject communism.

The "one theory" doctrine won't work. So long as classes exist, there will be as many doctrines as there are classes, and even different groups in the same class may have their different doctrines. Since the feudal class has feudalism; the bourgeoisie, capitalism; the Buddhists, Buddhism; the Christians, Christianity; and the peasants, polytheism; and since in recent years some have proposed Kemalism, fascism, vitalism,⁴⁴ the "doctrine of distribution according to labor," why then can't the proletariat have its communism? Since there are countless doctrines, why talk about "folding up" as soon as communism is sighted? To tell you the truth, "folding it up" will not work. It is better to have competition. If communism is beaten, then we Communists will only curse our bad luck. Otherwise, it would be better if the anti-democratic, so-called one doctrine theory were "folded up."

To avoid misunderstandings and for the edification of the diehards, it is necessary to point out clearly the differences and similarities between the Three Principles of the People and communism.

When the Three Principles of the People are compared to communism, there are similarities and differences.

First, the similarities. They are to be found in the fundamental political program of the two doctrines during the stage of the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution. Sun Yat-sen's 1924 reinterpretation of the three political tenets of the Three Principles of the People of nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood are basically similar to the communist political program for the stage of the democratic revolution in China. Because of these similarities, and because of the practice of the Three Principles of the People, there is the united front between the two parties. It is wrong to ignore this aspect.

Second, differences. (1) There is a difference in part of the program for the stage of the democratic revolution. The communist program for the entire democratic revolution has the system of an eight-hour working day and a thorough land revolution, whereas the Three Principles of the People do not. If they are not added or there is not a readiness to carry them out, we can only say that the two are basically similar, but not completely identical. (2) The differences between two stages. Communism envisages the stage of the socialist revolution beyond the stage of the democratic revolution. Thus, beyond the minimum program, there is a maximum program, i.e., the program for the realization of the socialist system. The Three Principles of the People only envisage the stage of the democratic revolution and not the stage of the socialist revolution; therefore, they have only the minimum program, but no maximum program, i.e., they have no program for the establishment of the socialist system. (3) Differences in world outlook. The world outlook of communism is dialectical and historical materialism. The world outlook of the Three Principles of the People uses the historicism of civil life and the theory of the people's livelihood. The two are opposed to each other. (4) Difference in the degree of commitment to the revolution. Communism is consistent in terms of theory and practice, which means it has a firm commitment to the revolution. Followers of the Three Principles of the People are inconsistent in terms of theory and practice, with

the exception of those most loyal to the revolution and truth, theory and practice do not go together, which means that they have no firm commitment to the revolution. The above are the differences between the two. Thus, there are dissimilarities between communism and the Three Principles of the People. It is undoubtedly very wrong to ignore these distinctions and see only the similarities and not the contradictions.

After we have understood all this, we may understand the meaning of the demand of the diehard elements among the bourgeoisie for the “folding up” of communism. If it does not mean bourgeois despotism, then there is no sense to it all.

[[The diehards know the difference neither between communism and the Three Principles of the People nor between the new and old Three Principles of the People. The new principles are the political basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front; these principles were expounded by Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the GMD’s First Congress [January 1924]. This manifesto distinguished two historical periods: before, the principles belonged to the bourgeois democratic revolution in a semicolon; afterward, they were principles of the new bourgeois democratic revolution in a semicolon—the new Three Principles of the People of New Democracy.]]

The Three Principles of the People of this new period—the new or genuine Three Principles of the People embody the three fundamental policies of alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the CP, and assistance to the workers and peasants. Without all three fundamental policies, the Three Principles of the People will become either false or incomplete.

First, the revolutionary, new, or genuine Three Principles of the People must include alliance with the Soviet Union. The situation now is very clear. If there were no policy of alliance with the Soviet Union, with the land of socialism, there would inevitably be a policy of alliance with the imperialists and with imperialism. Don’t you see that this is what happened after 1927? In the first two years of the war against Japan, the conflicts between Japan, on the one side, and England and the United States, on the other, could be taken advantage of because the imperialist world war had not yet broken out. Since the outbreak of the imperialist world war, though these conflicts have not been eliminated, they have decreased greatly. If we don’t make good use of the conflicts, Britain and the United States will demand that China join the anti-Soviet camp. If China submits to them, then it will stand on the side of the reactionary camp of the imperialists, and national independence will be abandoned. Once the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist Britain and the United States grows more acute, China will have to take sides. This is an inevitable trend. Is it possible for China to maintain a neutral stand? This is an illusion. The whole world will be dragged into one or other of these. “Neutrality” will be merely a deceptive term. Moreover, China is fighting an imperialist country that has penetrated deep into her country. Without help from the Soviet Union, ultimate victory is unthinkable. If we abandon the alliance with the Soviet Union and side with the imperialists, the word “revolution” will have been expunged from the Three Principles of the People, which will then become reactionary. Ultimately,

there can be no “neutral” Three Principles of the People; there can only be revolutionary or counterrevolutionary [principles]. Would it not be more heroic to “fight against attacks from both sides,” as Wang Jingwei once remarked, and to have a kind of Three Principles of the People that serves this fight? However, even its inventor, Mr. Wang himself, has abandoned (or “folded up”) this kind of Three Principles of the People; instead, he has adopted the Three Principles of the People of alliance with the imperialists. If it is argued that there is a difference between Western and Eastern imperialism, and that we are doing just the opposite by allying with some of the Western imperialists to march eastward and attack, then would not such conduct be quite revolutionary? The Western imperialists, however, are determined to oppose the Soviet Union and communism, and if you ally with them they will ask you to march in a northward direction and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. These circumstances make it essential for the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three Principles of the People to include alliance with the Soviet Union; they must never be the principles of alliance with the imperialists.

Second, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three Principles of the People must include cooperation with the CP. If they do not cooperate with the CP, then they will certainly oppose it. Opposition to the CP is the policy of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Jingwei, and if that is what you want, very well, they will ask you to join their anticommunist company. Yet does this not seem treacherous? You can say, “I am not following the Japanese, but some other country.” Isn’t this strange? No matter whom you follow, as long as you are anticommunist, you are a traitor because you cannot continue to fight the Japanese. It is fanciful to say that one is an independent anticommunist. How can the “heroes” in a colony or semicolony undertake such great anticommunist activities without relying on the power of the imperialists? For the past ten years, the power of virtually all the imperialist countries in the world has been mobilized to oppose the CP, but in vain. How can you oppose it independently? Some people outside [the border region], we are told, say, “opposing the CP is good, but it cannot be exterminated.” This remark, if it is not hearsay, is only half wrong, for what is “good” about opposing the CP? However, the other half is correct: the CP cannot be “exterminated.” Basically, the reason does not lie with communism itself, but with the people, because the people like the CP and do not want to oppose it. The people will never tolerate this. If you oppose the CP at a time when the national enemy has driven deep into our country, the people will kill you. This is certain. Whoever wants to fight the CP should be prepared to be ground into dust. If you do not wish to be ground into dust, then it is not a good idea to fight the CP. This is our sincere advice to all the anti-CP heroes. Thus, it is as clear as can be that today’s Three Principles of the People must include cooperation with the CP; otherwise, the Three Principles of the People will collapse. This is a life and death question of the Three Principles of the People. Cooperation with the CP means survival of the Three Principles of the People; opposition to the CP will kill the Three Principles of the People. Can anyone prove the contrary?

Third, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three Principles of the People must include the policy of assisting the workers and peasants. Rejection of this policy, failure to assist fully the workers and peasants, or failure to carry out the behest in the Premier's [Sun Yat-sen] testament to "arouse the masses of the people" amounts to preparing the way for the failure of the revolution, and also one's own defeat. Stalin said, "In essence, the national question is a peasant question." This means that the Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant revolution, and that essentially the war against Japan is one of peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of new democracy means granting power to the peasantry. The new and genuine Three Principles of the People are really principles of a peasant revolution. Essentially, mass culture means raising the cultural level of the peasantry. The war against Japan is essentially a peasant war. We are now living in a time when the strategy of "going up the hills" applies; meetings, administration, classes, publications, writing, drama are all done on the hilltops and all essentially for the benefit of the peasantry. Everything in the war against Japan and in our lives is, in fact, provided by the peasantry. When we say "in fact," we mean "basically"; this does not neglect others, as Stalin himself has explained before. Every schoolboy knows that 80 percent of the Chinese population are peasants. After the fall of big cities, this percentage increased. Therefore, the question of the peasantry has become the fundamental question in the Chinese revolution. The strength of the peasantry is the main strength of the Chinese revolution. In the Chinese population, the workers rank second to the peasants in number. There are several million industrial workers, [and] tens of millions of handicraft workers and agricultural laborers. China cannot exist without these workers, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. Without them, the revolution cannot succeed, because they are the leaders of the Chinese revolution and are the most revolutionary. Under these circumstances, the revolutionary new and genuine Three Principles of the People must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Any other kind of Three Principles of the People without this would not assist wholeheartedly the peasants and workers, and would not really "arouse the masses of the people" and would certainly perish.

Thus, it is clear that there is no future for any Three Principles of the People that abandon the three fundamental policies of alliance with the Soviet Union, cooperation with the CP, and assistance to the peasants and workers. Every conscientious believer in the Three Principles of the People must seriously consider this point.

[[The old Three Principles of the People are from a time when Soviet Russia did not exist, when there was no CP, and when the workers and peasants had not fully demonstrated their political importance. The old principles were revolutionary in the old period, but it would be reactionary to follow them in the new era.

A given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economy of a given society. An imperialist culture as well as a semifeudal culture exists in China. With the capitalist economy and the new political forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, a new culture is emerging. New Democracy is

the characteristic of the last twenty years, while old democracy is the characteristic of the previous eighty years. The turning point is the May Fourth Movement [1919]. Before this time on the cultural front, the struggles were between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class. After the May Fourth Movement, a completely new cultural force emerged in China—communist culture and ideology under the guidance of the Chinese Communists and also the communist world view and theory of social revolution. The natural sciences are dominated by the bourgeois world view, but the proletariat and the CP have made great strides in the social sciences. Lu Xun was the most courageous standard-bearer of the new cultural force, and the road he followed was that of China's new national culture. Before May Fourth, China's new culture was a culture of the old democratic kind and part of the capitalist cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. Since then, it has become new democratic and part of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat. The new democratic culture is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and can be led only by the culture and ideology of the proletariat, by the ideology of communism.

A cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political and economic revolutions and is in their service. In China there is a united front in the cultural as well as in the political revolution. The history of this cultural united front of the last twenty years can be divided into four stages. First, 1919 to 1921; second, 1921 to 1927; third, 1927 to 1937; fourth, 1937 to the present.

The May Fourth Movement was an anti-imperialist and antifeudal movement that was part of the world proletarian movement even though there was no CCP at the time. The weakness of the movement was that it was limited to intellectuals and workers, and peasants did not participate. The movement paved the way for founding the CCP both in terms of ideology and in the matter of cadres. The second period continued and expanded the united front of the three classes (communist intellectuals, revolutionary petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and bourgeois intellectuals) formed during the May Fourth Movement. The cooperation of the GMD and the CCP spread the new Three Principles of the People across the country. The united front was one of three classes (the proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie). The workers and peasants helped the bourgeoisie into power, and the latter immediately put an end to the great revolution. With the desertion of the bourgeoisie, only two of the original three classes in the revolutionary camp were left, the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. Now the CCP had to lead the revolution alone.]]

The fourth period is that of the present anti-Japanese war. Pursuing its zigzag course, the Chinese revolution has again arrived at a united front of three classes; but the scope of this front has expanded.⁴⁵ The upper stratum includes members of the ruling class, its middle stratum includes the petty bourgeoisie, and its lower stratum comprises the proletariat. Thus, all the classes in the country have become members of this alliance and firmly oppose the Japanese imperialists. The first stage of this period lasted until the fall of Wuhan. During that stage, there was a lively atmosphere throughout the country; politically there was a trend toward democrati-

zation and culturally there was widespread activity. The second stage began after the fall of Wuhan. The political situation changed a great deal. A section of the big bourgeoisie capitulated to the enemy, and another section was thinking of ending the war against Japan. In the cultural sphere, this situation was reflected in the reactionary activities of Ye Qing, Zhang Junli et al., and in the absence of freedom of the press.

To overcome this crisis, [we] must wage a resolute struggle against all the ideas that oppose fighting the war against Japan and undermine unity and progress. Without defeating such reactionary ideas, victory in the war against Japan is impossible. How will the struggle turn out? This is a big question in the minds of the people of the country. Judging by the domestic and international situation, the Chinese people will win in the end no matter how many difficulties they meet while fighting the war against Japan. The progress achieved in the twenty years since the May Fourth Movement exceeds not only that of the previous eighty years but is greater than that [achieved] in the thousands of years of Chinese history. Can one imagine what further progress China will make in another twenty years? The violence of the domestic and international forces of darkness has created a national catastrophe. This violence, however, represents their death throes rather than their strength. It shows that the people are approaching victory. This is the case in the East, as well as throughout the world.

XIV

Everything is toughened through difficult struggles; so, too, is the new culture. There have been three setbacks in the zigzags of the last twenty years. Everything good or bad has been tested.

The bourgeois diehards are as hopelessly wrong on the question of culture as on that of political power. They do not understand the historical characteristics of China's new era; nor do they recognize the new democratic culture of the masses or the culture of the new Three Principles of the People. Their starting point is bourgeois despotism, which in culture becomes the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie. A section of the so-called European-American school⁴⁶ (I mean a section), who once supported through their actions the government's extermination of communism on the cultural front, now seem to be supporting the so-called policies of "restricting communism" and "corroding" the CP. They do not want to see workers and peasants become politically liberated; nor do they wish to see them culturally liberated. There is no future in this cultural despotism of the bourgeois diehards. As with the issue of political power, domestic or international support is lacking. Therefore, this kind of cultural despotism had better be "folded up."

At present, the guiding principle for the national culture is not that of a socialist culture. Furthermore, it is wrong to believe that, at present, the people's culture is or should be a socialist culture. This would amount to confusing the dissemination of communist ideology with the implementation of a program of action and to confus-

ing the application of the communist standpoint and method in investigating problems, undertaking research, and conducting work with the guiding principle for national and popular education in the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. A national culture with a socialist content must reflect the politics and economy of socialism. At present, we do not have socialist politics and economics, and thus such a national culture cannot exist. Since the current Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian socialist revolution, the new Chinese culture is also part of the world proletarian socialist new culture and its great ally. Yet this part does not participate as a socialist culture, but as the anti-imperialist and antifeudal new democratic culture. Since the current Chinese revolution cannot do without the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, the current new Chinese culture cannot be divorced from the leadership of proletarian culture and ideology, of communist ideology. This kind of leadership, however, means leading the people in an anti-imperialist and antifeudal political and cultural revolution, and not in a socialist political and cultural revolution. Therefore, the nature of the new culture at present is that of new democracy, not socialism.

Beyond all doubt, now is the time to expand propaganda about communism and strengthen the study of Marxism-Leninism. Without this, we shall not only be unable to lead the Chinese revolution forward to the future stage of socialism, but we shall also be unable to guide the present democratic revolution to victory. However, the fundamental character of the current national culture is not socialist but new democratic, since it is a people's culture that opposes imperialism and feudalism, and not an anticapitalist proletarian culture. Therefore, we must keep the spreading of communist ideas and propaganda about the communist social system distinct from the execution of the new democratic program and action; we must also keep the communist theory and method of investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work distinct from the new democratic policies for carrying out popular education. It is undoubtedly very inappropriate to mix the two up.

Thus, it can be seen that the content of China's culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie nor the socialism of the proletariat, but the anti-imperialist and antifeudalist new democracy of the masses under the ideology of the proletariat.

XV

The new democratic culture is national. It opposes the oppression by the imperialists and advocates the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It is our own national culture and has its own special national characteristics. It will never ally with the imperialist culture of any other nation, because our culture is a revolutionary national culture. To nourish its own culture China needs to assimilate a good deal of progressive foreign culture, not enough of which has been done in the past. This includes not only today's socialist culture and new democratic culture but ancient foreign culture; for example, the culture of the Age of Enlightenment in

capitalist countries. Anything that we can use today should be assimilated. We should not, however, swallow this foreign material uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food—first putting it in the mouth and chewing it, then submitting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and separating it into nutrient to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded. We must not absorb it uncritically and completely. The so-called proposition of “wholesale Westernization” is a mistaken view. China has suffered a great deal in the past from the mechanical absorption of material from the West. Chinese Communists should have the same attitude toward the application of Marxism in China. They must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, that is to say, that it will be useful only in a national form. It must not be applied subjectively and as a mere formula. Those subjective Marxists who use it as a formula are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in China’s revolutionary ranks. Chinese culture should have its own form. National in form and new democratic in content—such is our new culture today.

New democratic culture is scientific. It opposes all feudal and superstitious ideas and advocates “seeking truth from facts” and insists on objective truth and on the unity of theory and practice. On this point, an anti-imperialist and antifeudal united front is possible between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and the materialist and natural-scientific thought of the Chinese progressive bourgeoisie, but under no circumstances is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealist theories. CP members may establish a united front for political action with some idealist believers, but may never approve of their nonmaterialist theories or religious doctrines. Centuries of feudal society in China have created a splendid ancient culture. Therefore, in the process of cleaning up the ancient culture and developing a new national culture it is necessary to reject its feudal class dress and assimilate its democratic essence. However, we must never assimilate anything and everything uncritically. We must distinguish between all the decadence of the ancient feudalist ruling class and the excellent old popular culture, which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character. China’s current new politics and economics have evolved from the ancient, old politics and economy, and the new culture has also evolved from the old culture. Therefore, we must respect and never reject our own history. This means according it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development and not eulogizing the past or criticizing the present or praising every drop of feudal poison. Therefore, the main task is to lead the people and young students to look forward and not backward.

This new democratic culture is a popular culture and serves over 90 percent of the toiling masses of workers and peasants throughout the nation. Moreover, it should gradually become their own culture. There is a difference of degree, as well as a close link, between the knowledge imported to the revolutionary cadres and that which is used to educate the revolutionary masses, between the raising of cultural standards and popularization. Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolu-

tionary weapon for the masses. It is an ideological preparation for revolution and is an important, indeed essential, fighting front of the general revolutionary front. People engaged in revolutionary cultural work are commanders at various levels on this cultural front. "Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement."⁴⁷ This shows how important the revolutionary cultural movement is to the practical revolutionary movement. Both the cultural and practical movements must be of the masses. Therefore, all the progressive cultural workers should have their own cultural armies during the war against Japan; these armies are the masses of the people. Cultural workers and cultural thought, if they are not close to the masses, will be like a commander without an army, whose firepower cannot bring the enemy down. To attain this objective, the written language must be reformed and given the requisite conditions, and our spoken language brought closer to that of the people; for the people, it must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture.

A national, scientific, and popular culture is the people's anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture; it is the new democratic culture. It is the culture of the new Three Principles of the People. It is the new culture of the Chinese nation.

Combine the politics, the economy, and the culture of new democracy and you have the new democratic republic, the real Republic of China, the new China we want to create.

The New China is within sight. Let us hail it.

The masthead of the New China has appeared on the horizon. Let us all cheer in welcome.

Raise both hands; New China is ours.

F.9 Resolution of the CC on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks (1 February 1940)⁴⁸

1) The characteristic of the present situation is a period of strategic stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. An increasingly obvious and acute two-sided struggle is produced by the tendency of the big bourgeoisie toward capitulation and the tendency of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the middle class toward resistance. The anti-Japanese progressive forces at home are still insufficient to overcome the forces proposing capitulation and retreat. Therefore, the serious danger of capitulation and retreat still exists and remains the main danger at the present time. However, the opposition from the CP, from the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army from the majority in the GMD, and from the entire people of the whole country; the resolute Japanese policy of destroying China; the considerably aggravated contradictions between Britain, the United States, France, and Japan; the weakened position of Britain and France as the result of the European war; the strong power of the Soviet Union and its policy of active assistance to China; and other international and domestic conditions

make the quick convocation of a Far Eastern Munich Conference very difficult. This situation has created the current situation of an acute struggle between the anti-Japanese progressive forces and the forces of capitulation and retreat. As a result of the struggle, the situation will either improve or become worse, although chances of a turn for the better remain. Indeed, correct policies and the efforts of the whole nation can change the current situation for the better. Our basic tasks are to consolidate the anti-Japanese progressive forces, to fight against the forces proposing capitulation, and to retreat so as to create a favorable situation and prevent the situation from worsening. It is a clear mistake to believe that there is no chance of improving the situation and only a chance of it worsening, and thus to stop trying to turn the situation in our favor and only preparing passively for unexpected national events.

2) The recent revelation of the agreement between Japan and Wang [Jingwei], the preparations for the establishment of a puppet central government, and the publication of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Wang declaration have dealt new blows to the diehard, capitulationist anticommunist forces at home and provided new impetus for the forces of resistance, for alliance with the Communists, and for the progressive elements. This is conducive to improving the situation. However, the current forces proposing capitulation and retreat have not been dealt a decisive blow, and the chance remains that they may become even more ferocious. Unexpected regional and local unexpected events may still occur. The reason is that the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie led by Wang Jingwei are coordinating with the domestic forces proposing capitulation and retreat and that the anti-Japanese progressive forces cannot unite together rapidly enough to prevail over these former forces. While Chiang Kai-shek's declaration stressed the War of Resistance, it did not stress unity and progress. Yet without national unity and progress, it is impossible to persevere in the War of Resistance and achieve the ultimate victory. Therefore, improving the situation rather than watching it worsen remains an arduous struggle. Meanwhile, it is necessary to heighten our vigilance and to be ready to cope with sudden events. (At present, isolated or local events may occur.)

3) Improvement rather than worsening of the situation demands that the three inseparable elements of resistance, unity, and progress be stressed. On this basis, the following ten tasks should be carried out resolutely. First, propaganda against Wang and the Chinese traitors and collaborators should be widely expanded, and all conspiracies proposing capitulation and the sowing of discord should be exposed. The forces of proposing capitulation and retreat should be attacked ideologically and politically. It should be clearly, resolutely, and concretely shown that anticommunism is a preparatory step by the capitulationists for counterrevolution. Second, vigorous efforts must be made to develop the united front in all forms, encompassing parties, government, armies, people, and students, in order to organize progressive forces and closely cooperate with the majority of the GMD and to deal with the capitulationists and anticommunist forces. Third, the constitutional movement needs to be widely promoted to bring about political democratization. Without democratic politics, victory in the resistance to Japan will remain an illusion. Fourth, all attacks by the capitulationists and anticommunist forces should be resisted. In mounting

resolute resistance to attacks by the diehard, capitulationist anticommunist forces, we should follow the principle of self-defense: we will attack only when attacked. If these forces are allowed to run amok, the united front will break down and the War of Resistance will fail. Fifth, the mass movement to resist Japan should be promoted and great efforts made to unite all anti-Japanese intellectuals and to link them with the mass resistance movement and the anti-Japanese guerrilla war. Without this, there will be no force to fight the diehard, capitulationist anticommunist forces. Sixth, serious attention should be paid to carrying out the work of reducing rent, interests, and taxes and improving the workers' livelihood. Only by providing economic assistance to the masses can their enthusiasm to resist Japan be mobilized. Otherwise, this will be impossible. Seventh, the various anti-Japanese bases need to be consolidated and enlarged. In these bases, there should be an anti-Japanese democratic government elected by the people and without the participation of any capitulationist anticommunist elements. These governments are not those of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, but of all those who support resistance to Japan, democracy, and a democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes. All conspiracies to undermine the anti-Japanese bases must be resolutely dealt with. All concealed traitors, collaborators, and anticommunists must be eliminated from the anti-Japanese armed forces, governments, and organizations. Eighth, progressive armed forces should be expanded and consolidated. Without such troops, China will be subjugated. Ninth, the anti-Japanese cultural movement should be promoted broadly to raise the cultural and theoretical levels of the people, armies, and cadres who oppose Japan. The anti-Japanese struggle on the cultural front must be linked with the general struggle for the resistance to Japan to succeed. Tenth, CP organization must be consolidated and party organizations should be developed where no such organizations, or only weak ones, exist. A strong CP is necessary to resolve any important issues concerning resistance to Japan and national salvation. Resolute, correct, and concrete implementation of the above ten major tasks will certainly consolidate the anti-Japanese progressive forces, overcome the forces proposing capitulation and retreat, improve the situation and avoid its worsening, and smash the conspiracy of the big bourgeoisie to sabotage the War of Resistance and the united front.

[[Fourteen slogans for propaganda and agitation are included.]]

F.10 On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Bases. *Mao Zedong* (6 March 1940)⁴⁹

1) This is a time when the anticommunist diehards in the GMD are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in northern and central China and other places, while we for our part

must set them up, and in the major anti-Japanese base areas it is already possible for us to do so. Our struggle with the anticommunist diehards over this issue in northern, central, and northwestern China can help to promote the establishment of united front organs of political power over the whole country, and it is being followed attentively by the whole nation. Therefore, this issue must be handled carefully.

2) The political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese war has the character of a united front. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. It differs from the counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie as well as from the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship of the period of rural revolution. A clear understanding of the character of this political power and conscientious efforts to put it into practice will greatly help to spread democracy through the country. Any deviation, either to the "left" or the right, will create a very bad impression on the whole nation.

3) The convening of the Hebei Provincial Assembly and the elections to the Hebei Administrative Council, preparations for which have just been begun, will be of exceptional importance. Equally important will be the establishment of the new organs of political power in northwest Shanxi, in Shandong, in areas north of the Huai River, in the counties of Suide and Fuxian, and in eastern Gansu. We must proceed according to the united front principle and do our utmost to avoid any right or "left" tendencies. At the moment the "left" tendency of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger.

4) In accordance with the united front principle concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for nonparty left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate elements who are neither left nor right.

5) We must make sure that the Communists play the leading role in the organs of political power; therefore, the party members who occupy one-third of the places must be of high caliber. This will be enough to ensure the party's leadership without a larger representation. Leadership is neither a slogan to be shouted from morning till night nor an arrogant demand for obedience; it consists, rather, in using the party's correct policies and the example we set by our own work to convince and educate people outside the party so that they will willingly accept our proposals.

6) The nonparty progressives must be allocated one-third of the places because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. This will be of tremendous importance in winning the latter over.

7) Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Winning over these elements is an important step in isolating the diehards. At the present time, we must not fail to take the strength of these sections into account and must be circumspect in our relations with them.

8) Our attitude toward the noncommunists must be one of cooperation, whether or not they have party affiliations and whatever these may be, so long as they favor resistance to Japan and are willing to cooperate with the CP.

9) The allocation of places described above represents the genuine policy of the party, and we must on no account be halfhearted about it. To execute this policy, we must educate the party members who work in the organs of political power, overcome the narrowness manifested in their reluctance and uneasiness in cooperating with noncommunists, and encourage a democratic style of work, that is, consultation with the nonparty people and winning majority approval before taking action. At the same time, we must do all we can to encourage nonparty people to express their views on various problems and must lend an attentive ear to their suggestions. We must never think that because we hold military and political power we can force unconditional compliance with our decisions and on that account shun the effort to win the nonparty people over to our views so that they carry them out gladly and wholeheartedly.

10) The above figures for the allocation of places are not rigid quotas to be filled mechanically; they are in the nature of a rough proportion which every locality must apply according to its specific circumstances. At the lowest level, the ration may be somewhat modified to prevent the landlords and evil gentry from sneaking into the organs of political power. Where such organs have been in existence for some time, as in the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] Border Region, the central Hebei area, the Taihang Mountains area, and the southern Hebei area, there should be a reexamination of policy in light of this principle. And this principle should be observed whenever a new organ of political power is set up.

11) The united front policy on suffrage should be that every Chinese who reaches the age of eighteen and is in favor of resistance and democracy should enjoy the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, sex, creed, party affiliation, or educational level. The organs of political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front must be elected by the people. Their form of organization should be based on democratic centralism.

12) The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper balancing of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and suppression of traitors and reactionaries.

13) The nonparty people who work in our organs of political power should not be required to live, talk, and act like Communists; otherwise they may feel dissatisfied or ill at ease.

14) All regional and subregional bureaus of the CC, all area party committees, and all heads of army units are hereby instructed to give a clear explanation of this directive to party members and ensure that it is fully carried out in the work of our organs of political power.

F.11 The Current Administrative Program for the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region (13 August 1940)⁵⁰

To consolidate and develop the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] Border Region, to persist in the War of Resistance against Japan in the enemy's rear area, the Current Administrative Program is hereby presented on the basis of our Party Center's "Anti-Japanese National United Front Policies" and "Ten Great Policies for Opposing Japan and National Salvation" and the national government's "Program to Oppose Japan and Build the Country," and the actual situation of the border region. We want to implement it together with all border region parties and groups, all elements of the people, and our fellow compatriots of all nationalities.

1) To make GMD-CCP cooperation more intimate; to continue to unite against the Japanese; to firmly defend and develop the border region; to eliminate all agents and spies damaging solidarity against the Japanese and damaging the border region; to crack down on the compromisers and capitulators.

2) To destroy the enemy and the puppet regime; to confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists and use it to cover war expenses against the Japanese.

3) To support the people's army of the border region; to fully ensure its provisions and full strength; to destroy the enemy and puppet forces; to win over the puppet army to join us; to give favorable treatment to the captured personnel of the enemy army.

4) The entire nation should be armed and ready for self-defense, carry out mass guerrilla warfare, and gradually establish compulsory military service.

5) Thoroughly complete the construction of democratic politics; strengthen popular and government organizations at all levels; ensure in these organizations that CCP members comprise one-third and other anti-Japanese parties and nonparty personages two-thirds of the total number. All people in the border region who are not capitulationists or anticommunists may participate in government work.

6) All those who are anti-Japanese enjoy freedom of speech, assembly and association, the press, and religion; in order to ensure civil rights, any organization, association, or person, without the permission granted by government decree and legal procedure, must not be involved in any act which humiliates human dignity and reputation.

7) Guarantee the property rights of all people who oppose Japan. Apart from payment by the people of the annual unified progressive tax and import and export trade tax, no organizations or associations may extort or impose a fine, under any name. After the reduction of rent and interest, tenants should pay rent in accordance with a contract, and debtors should repay capital and interest according to a contract. Contracts should be entered into on the basis of voluntary participation by both parties, and when the contract expires, either side has the right to terminate it in accordance with the law.

8) Implement the unified progressive tax with exemption of taxation points and

the highest progressive rate (payment in the three forms of grain, food, and money); institute the import and export tax, stop the feudal land tax, and abolish other kinds of tax; without the permission from the senate meeting of the border region, the government must not increase any tax; arrange village finances, establish a strict economic system, eliminate corruption and waste.

9) Clean up the currency issued by the enemy and puppet government, strengthen the border region currency, and maintain the paper currency issued by the GMD; balance the circulation of the border currency, strengthen the border region bank organizations, stimulate the border finance, and firmly control foreign currency.

10) Develop agriculture, actively open up virgin soil, prevent land from being wasted, and extend the cultivated areas; protect and breed livestock, improve seed, fertilizers, farm tools, and other agricultural technologies; dig wells and canals, build dams, and improve the soil. Develop the military industry, public mining industry, manufacturing and handicraft industry; encourage cooperative and private industry; aim at self-sufficiency in industrial products, so as to eliminate the Japanese products. Develop forestry, livestock husbandry, and household sideline production. Develop trade, and ensure the normal freedom of trade within the border region; firmly control foreign trade; forbid the export of necessities and the import of nonnecessities; ban unscrupulous merchants; combat speculation, manipulation, and adjustment of grain and prices.

11) Establish special organizations to provide disaster relief and water control, and carry on the noble national traditions of mutual aid and cooperation to establish organizations for salvation and disaster relief in units by county-district, or by village. Advocate the sanitation movement, improve public hygiene, and take precautions against disease.

12) Carry out a general two-five rent reduction, ensure that the rent does not exceed 37.5 percent of the total harvest; the interest should not exceed 10 percent; land deposited to cover debts should be cleared legally when the debts cannot be repaid. The organization of anti-Japanese duties should be reasonable.

13) Reduce working time, implement the system of an eight-hour working day in the industrial departments; increase workers' real wages, implement the system of paying half of the wages in kind; improve working conditions and treatment of workers; stimulate workers' enthusiasm and production efficiency; arrange for the unemployed; the employer should not break a contract and fire people; female workers may have five weeks paid maternity leave; forbid the employment of youngsters, women, and children in work harmful to their health and ensure equal pay for equal work.

14) Ensure that women enjoy an equal position in society, politics, economics, and at home, that they have the right to inherit property according to law; both men and women have freedom of marriage; we oppose mercenary marriage and polygamy, as well as adopting child brides, infanticide, and the custom of marrying early, which damages the development of the young; be strictly on guard against licen-

tious habits in the enemy-occupied areas encroaching on the border region; establish good home schooling to enable children to cultivate good habits; practice mother and child care.

15) Reduce the burden of our fellow compatriots in the enemy-occupied areas; strive to protect their life, property, and political rights; oppose kidnapping, rape, blackmail, conscription of able-bodied men, and enforced education by the enemy; compensate families whose members have been killed by the enemy. Those who mistakenly violate the "Regulations on the Punishment of Traitors" may be given an opportunity to correct their errors; resolutely punish diehard traitors.

16) Treat favorably anti-Japanese families; compensate the families of anti-Japanese martyrs, wounded, and invalids.

17) Firmly put down the Wang [Jingwei] clique, Trotskyites, and traitors. The land and property of the most heinous traitors should be confiscated by the government above the prefectural level, at the request of the local people; the land and property of anticommunists, of diehards, and of puppet army officers and soldiers should not be confiscated; the land and property of suspected traitors who have fled to the enemy area may be confiscated temporarily by the government, and returned to the owners on their return to the border region. All the land and property confiscated permanently and temporarily should be rented at a low price by the government to peasants, or distributed to peasants who have been devastated by the enemy, or used as anti-Japanese public land. When bringing traitors to trial there should be sufficient evidence, and family members who have not behaved treacherously should not be involved, and their property should be guaranteed by law. If the criminal or traitor does not accept the judgment of the initial trial, he or she may appeal to the highest judicial organ of the border region.

18) With the aim of improving the standards of national education and consciousness, implement universal compulsory free education and establish and strengthen school education; at least one primary school should be set up in each administrative village, one complete primary school or higher primary school in each administrative area, one middle school in each prefecture; the higher primary and middle schools should accept students for part work and part study; establish and improve colleges and special education; strengthen education in the natural sciences; give favored treatment to scientists and specialized scholars; develop mass literacy movements and cultural entertainment activities; and gradually eliminate illiteracy.

19) Protect the educated youth, take care of the students in exile from the enemy-occupied area, assign all the anti-Japanese intellectuals proper work, improve the quality of primary school teachers, and improve their living conditions.

20) All nationalities in the border region should respect each other's way of life, customs, and religion; on the basis of equality, unite closely to fight against the Japanese. In democratic elections, Muslims, Mongols, and Tibetans should be accorded favored treatment; and relief should be provided for the poorest.

F.12 Decision of the CC on the Current Situation and Party Policy (7 July 1940)⁵¹

I) The Current Situation

[[The current international and domestic situations are experiencing great change. Now there is a struggle between three great camps: the German, Italian, and Japanese imperialists; the British, French, and American imperialists; and the peaceful Soviet Union. The latter has succeeded in staying out of the imperialists' war. This war seems to be spreading throughout the world. The war is causing the rapid revolutionization of the masses in the capitalist countries and oppressed peoples in the colonial countries. In China, capitulationist tendencies have declined, and the emergence of another Wang Jingwei is unlikely. Among other factors, the enormous growth in our party's strength during the war is the primary and decisive factor in overcoming the danger of capitulation. Divisions among the big landlords and bourgeoisie and their conflicts with the middle class and petty bourgeoisie make it impossible for the former group to unite to fight the Communists and pursue capitulation. The coming year will be extremely difficult, and the party must become a center for rallying all the anti-Japanese forces.]]

II. Party Policies

In line with the above analysis of the international situation, the entire party must implement the following party policies:

1) Our principal task is not to emphasize the danger of another Munich policy in the East by Britain, the United States, and France, but to emphasize the danger of some people who, under Japanese pressure, become pessimistic and hopeless. We should not act like those in the GMD who cover up the truth and facts, saying something like "everything is favorable to China," but rather point out the unprecedented difficulties in fighting the war and the danger of surrender. We must call on the people to fight to overcome these difficulties and dangers.

2) Point out that the reason for the defeat of the British and the French is their anti-Soviet and anticommunist policies. Point out that the tragic lesson of the surrender of the French government will certainly be repeated in the future if China becomes anti-Soviet and anticommunist. The previous anticommunist policies have already seriously weakened the forces for fighting the War of Resistance. If such policies are not changed, victory cannot be expected.

3) Emphasize the favorable conditions for fighting the war. Especially stress the great power of the Soviet Union. Stress the favorable situation in the world revolution. Emphasize that the French can never be compared to the Chinese forces in fighting the War of Resistance. Propagandize the achievements of the Chinese people over the past three years of heroic struggle in order to combat the feelings of pessimism and hopelessness and to isolate the procapitulation elements.

4) Emphasize self-reliance. We must demand that the GMD change its mode of

operation in the war. For example, a democratic national conference should be called immediately. Abolish anticommunist policies. Stop relying on tactics of espionage. Change the incorrect financial and economic policies, as well as cultural, educational, and conscription policies. Propagandize model examples of Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army soldiers who have relied on the people or their own strengths.

5) Emphasize unity and harmony. It was absolutely necessary for us to stress self-defense in the previous period. Only this could defeat the rising tide of anti-communism at that time and wake up the diehard elements. At present, the anti-communist tide is on the wane, and thus we should stress unity once again. The previous struggles were fought for the sake of unity. We must make party members realize: the emphasis on unity now does not mean stopping all struggles. As long as the GMD continues its anticommunist policies, our self-defense struggle cannot stop. At present, we should concentrate our fire on the real capitulationists rather than the ordinary diehards. When anti-communism is waning and some diehards have shown an initial change for the better, we should increase our efforts to unite with them, so as to prolong the duration of our cooperation.

6) The development of our military forces (this is absolutely necessary) is to be limited to within the war zone, the enemy's rear, and the borders of the twenty-three counties in the border region of Shaan-Gan-Ning. [We] should not launch any operations in the GMD's rear that might cause conflicts. Some units are not willing to infiltrate deep into the enemy's rear, but want to operate in the GMD's rear when the situation is grave. They want to relive the guerrilla warfare of the Civil War era. This kind of thinking is mistaken.

7) We must persevere with the policy, clearly and unreservedly outlined at the Sixth Plenum [September–November 1938], of not developing party organizations within all the allied armies (including the armies not controlled by the government). The original party members must, without exception, cease their organizational activities, so that the party's credibility may be established, the work of making friends may be expanded, and the two million allied troops may be kept in the war. Those areas where the work of making friends has achieved no results must be seriously reprimanded.

8) Proclaim to the GMD and the whole country: we have not violated our declaration of 22 September 1937 (struggle for the complete realization of the Three Principles of the People; cease the land revolution; abolish the policy of armed uprising; reorganize the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army; reform the soviets into local democratic governments).⁵² We have fulfilled this promise in the past, are fulfilling it now, and will continue to fulfill it in the future. The GMD, however, has broken its promise on the questions of, for example, the legal right of existence of parties, the recognition of the border regions, the implementation of the programs of the Three Principles of the People, the prosecution of the War of Resistance, and the construction of the country. On all these issues, the GMD has violated every one of its promises. We should demand that the GMD fulfill its promises and

thus expose the deceptive propaganda that "the CP has broken its promises."

9) Correct the leftist mistakes in the implementation of the policy of the united front. In the past year, there have been many leftist mistakes in the struggles against friction. For example, in military conflicts, some areas were unable to stick to the principle of self-defense; there were blind attacks on traitors, and there were excessively leftist policies in financial and economic spheres such as impingement on the property of merchants and excessive levies and fines. Some did not follow the principle of the united government of all classes, but passively resisted the CC's directive on establishing the "three thirds" governments [see **Doc. F.10**]. They did not have long-term plans for the base areas, and they surrendered labor power and material resources. They expressed doubts about, or refused to implement, the CC's directive on "recruiting intellectuals in large numbers." They only knew how to fight the diehard [anticommunist] elements, but not how to unite with them. They saw every GMD member as a diehard element, without understanding that most were neutral or that many were progressive and that the diehard elements comprised only a very small minority. They even viewed the diehard and neutral elements as traitors and demanded that the neutrals behave like progressives. They did not recognize the position of the neutrals. They expressed distrust in, and refused to get close to, nonparty cadres; they did not develop the habit of working together with nonparty cadres. They even killed captured diehard elements and spies. These are manifestations of leftist mistakes committed because of a narrow point of view. If they are not properly corrected, the party's united front policy will be harmed. At the same time, however, we should not relax on rightist mistakes such as pessimism about the current situation, unprincipled concessions to the GMD, a negative attitude toward establishing anti-Japanese base areas and developing anti-Japanese forces, lack of vigilance against the GMD's policy of planting spies among us, confusion about the fundamental differences between communism and the Three Principles of the People, the idea among the cadres of making a fortune, embezzlement and corruption, bureaucratism and formalism in administration, and fear of self-criticism within the party. If these problems are not corrected, the party's independence and the future of the revolution will be lost.

10) Step up education within the party about the united front. Party members must be made to realize that education about the united front is an important part of class education. Party members must understand how to realize proletarian independence as well as how the proletariat can form a united front with other classes to oppose the common enemy. These are two inseparable aspects in the education of the party. We must never abandon either aspect without serious thought. Even today many party cadres still do not understand the question of tactics in the united front. They oversimplify complex issues and, as a result, all kinds of mistakes occur. Therefore, the entire party must step up education within the party on tactics and on the cadres' tendency toward oversimplification. This kind of education on tactics should be included in the formal curriculum for cadre education and treated as an important criterion in evaluating grades.

11) Continue the work of party strengthening. At present, the basic organizational principle is still consolidation and not expansion, an emphasis on quality and not quantity. We must strictly screen cadres and purge internal spies, so as to foil effectively the GMD's policy of planting spies among us. We must purge from the party three types of people: spies (sent or bought by the enemy and the GMD), opportunists (those elements who infiltrated the party for personal gain and who have engaged in serious embezzlement or corruption and who have become separated from the masses), and excessively backward elements (those in-name-only party members who do not attend meetings, or pay party dues, or do anything). We must intensify efforts to educate other elements. We must make party members realize the two different principles of "being strict within the party but relaxed toward the outside." However, these two different principles are mutually supportive. At the moment, the opposite holds sway: there is relaxation within the party but strictness toward the outside. This phenomenon must be corrected.

12) Intensify the organizational work in the interior. At the moment, there is excellent organizational work being done in some base areas, such as the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. In such areas, military, political, financial, economic, cultural, and educational efforts are on the right track. In many other areas, however, because of the long-standing lack of understanding about persevering in a long-term struggle, there are major weaknesses. [We] must realize that the future struggle is going to be extremely arduous. If we want to wage such a long struggle, we must change our previous rough and careless work-style, and replace it with planned and meticulous organizational work. Moreover, we must also implement the party's correct policies in all aspects; otherwise, we are bound to fail.

13) We must continue to expand and strengthen the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and anti-Japanese guerrilla forces; these are the basic forces that will guarantee victory in the war against Japan. We must expand in the direction of the areas occupied by the enemy. Our primary principle is consolidation in the areas where there have already been difficulties in labor power and material resources, while, in other areas, the primary principle is expansion with consolidation during expansion.

14) In all the battle zones of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, we must firmly implement the CC's directive on demoralizing and dividing the enemy and traitorous troops. Within the coming year, we must demonstrate results with this policy. It must be recognized that the results in this area have been meager over the past three years.

15) Our party [organizations] in the GMD territories must strictly implement the party's policy of organizational secrecy and compactness, while implementing the policy of an extensive united front toward nonparty people, in order to expose the isolationists and the capitulationist faction.

16) We must earnestly establish our party organizations in the areas occupied by the Japanese and similarly implement the policy of organizational secrecy and compactness. Outside of the party, we should carefully organize the masses, strengthen

the labor movement, actively demoralize and divide the enemy, and win over two-faced traitors, so that the Japanese invaders and traitors can be isolated and finally driven out.

17) Strengthen our work among the overseas Chinese; try to establish ties with the movement for national independence in India, Burma, Dutch Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines; give them as much support as we can and make it possible for their struggles to be coordinated with ours.

The CC calls on all party comrades to strive for the resolute implementation of the policies outlined above. If this can be done, it will guarantee that the difficulties and the danger of capitulation can be overcome and that the current situation will be improved.

F.13 Deputy Commanding Officer Peng Discusses the Great Significance of the "100 Regiments" Campaign. *Peng Dehuai* (31 August 1940)⁵³

Question: What is the significance of the "100 Regiments" Campaign in the war against Japan in north China?

Answer: This "100 Regiments" Campaign and the victories gained from it both occupy very important places in the history of the war against Japan in the north, indeed even in the history of the war against Japan throughout the country. It is the first large-scale offensive campaign initiated [by us] in the enemy's rear. Before this campaign, over the past three years, under the leadership of President Chiang we had fought countless battles with the enemy, preserved the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear in the north, weakened the enemy through continuous battles, and used sabotage as our principal method [of war] against the Japanese invaders. Although these battles had dealt the enemy many heavy blows, they were not, militarily speaking, "large-scale offensive campaigns initiated [by us]." Such a situation was caused by the previous objective and subjective conditions. The "100 Regiments" Campaign has changed this situation. Our army has taken the complete initiative. We drew together over 100 regiments of the troops from the Eighth Route Army and fight-to-death columns and launched a large-scale offensive campaign against the enemy's communications arteries such as the Zheng-Tai [Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan], Tong-Pu [Datong-Tongguan], Jing-Han [Beijing-Hankou], Jing-Sui [Beijing-Suiyuan], and Bei-Ning [Beijing-Tianjin] railways. This offensive campaign is unprecedented in the history of the war against Japan in the north and a rare phenomenon in the history of the war against Japan throughout the country. Because this offensive campaign will reduce the size of the territories occupied by the enemy while enlarging our own territory, this is also the turning point in the situation of the war in the north. Victory in this offensive campaign will create a new

situation in the north. This new situation will tie down even more enemy forces and prevent or slow down the enemy from launching a frontal attack on our own rear. The initial victories in this offensive campaign have already produced many significant results: the entire Zheng-Tai Railway is under the control of our forces; most of the important buildings, tunnels, bridges, stations, and water towers have been sabotaged; 100 kilometers of railway track have been thoroughly destroyed; many of the enemy's critical communications links across the Taihang Mountains have been cut off; the communications between the enemy's Jing-Han Railway and Tong-Pu Railway, between Hebei and Shanxi, have been severed. This has put the enemy in a difficult situation where it has been unable to establish links between its front and rear. Our army also attacked simultaneously along the Jing-Han, Tong-Pu, Jing-Sui, and Bei-Ning railways, and launched large-scale raids and engaged in sabotage, delivering the enemy a series of blows. These victories, however, are only the initial results of this campaign. The battles on individual fronts continue to develop. Thanks to the heroism of our officers and soldiers and the active participation of the people, our gains will surely expand; our initiative will be greater while the enemy's trouble will multiply. This will further reduce the size of the territories occupied by the enemy while enlarging our own territory. It is just this kind of victory that is an important sign that the situation of the war against Japan in the north is beginning to change. In terms of the entire situation of the war against Japan in the north, this is a manifestation of our increased efforts in this area. The "100 Regiments" Campaign has already gained important results.

Question: What kind of international and domestic impact will this victory have?

Answer: Since the beginning of the "100 Regiments" Campaign, a great deal of attention has been aroused among the people at home and abroad. For example, the American UPI correspondent in Beijing was able to send out dispatches reporting our successes despite the tight Japanese surveillance. In our rear proper, the majority of the armed forces and civilians have expressed tremendous excitement over the victory of the campaign. All our allies have sent telegrams of congratulation. All this is very moving. In general, the victory of the "100 Regiments" Campaign has had the following impact at home and abroad:

First, the victory has greatly boosted the confidence of the armed forces and people in the country in fighting the war against Japan. It has dealt a severe blow to the spirit of pessimism and hopelessness. This victory has proved that our forces engaged in fighting the war against Japan are growing daily, while the enemy is being weakened every day. This has proved that our country has enormous strength, enough to avert the present dangers and overcome the present difficulties. At the same time, the victory of the "100 Regiments" Campaign has inspired the armed forces and the people in the country. The forces fighting the war against Japan are bound to expand and become more resolute. This will further help us in overcoming the current difficulties in fighting the war against Japan. The victory of the "100 Regiments" Campaign has undermined significantly the enemy's plot to sow dis-

cord among us, and further strengthened national unity within our country. Facts have proved that only under conditions of national unity can we achieve such a victory. In expanding this victory, our national unity will be further strengthened. The victory is the result of our repeated efforts at making progress in the enemy's rear in the north over the past three years. Without the progress made in military, political, and economic affairs and the mass movement in all the anti-Japanese base areas, this victory would have been impossible. Therefore, the "100 Regiments" Campaign has shown the people the following truth: striving for progress is the correct path for winning victory. The campaign's victory will push further progress throughout the entire country. The general impact of the "100 Regiments" Campaign within our country is that it has further inspired the armed forces and people to fight the war against Japan more resolutely, to be more united, and to make more progress; it has played a great role in overcoming the current danger of capitulation and the difficulties in fighting the war against Japan.

Second, the victory has had a major impact on the areas occupied by the enemy and deep in the enemy's rear. Initially, the victory influenced the people living in the areas occupied by the enemy to wage a fierce struggle against the enemy. For example, the struggle is continuing to expand along the Zheng-Tai Railway. Some of the enemy and traitorous organizations in the areas occupied by the enemy have begun to waver further because of the victory. This will help us to divide these traitorous organizations and win back to the motherland every Chinese who is unwilling to become a homeless slave. This will make enemy rule in the occupied areas even more difficult and shaky while helping us to expand our work in these and the anti-Japanese base areas. In this way, we can encircle the Japanese invaders and smash their poisonous plots of "using Chinese to subdue Chinese" and "using war to support war." Deep in the enemy's rear, such as in the northeast, our anti-Japanese volunteer army has fought continuous battles in the face of enormous dangers and difficulties. The victory of this "100 Regiments" Campaign greatly inspired the Northeast Volunteer Army when the news arrived, thus helping our people in the northeast realize that their struggle is not being waged in isolation, but that they are a part of the anti-Japanese forces in the north. On the other hand, the activities of the volunteer army deep in the enemy's rear will also provide effective support for our war against Japan in the north.

Third, the "100 Regiments" Campaign has had a great impact on the enemy invader's domestic problems. The victory not only has dealt a blow to the enemy's frontal assault and designs on the northwest, but also has foiled its political plots to entice us into submission. The heavy blows from our iron fists have given the enemy enormous difficulties in its attempts to "solve the China Incident." This will cause contradictions within the enemy's territory to intensify; the people's antiwar movement there will be advanced greatly by the impact of our victory. Such a situation will create more difficulties for the enemy in implementing its southern push. Although the enemy has now begun to invade Vietnam, the continued expansion of our victory, the intensification of the contradictions within the enemy's own homeland, and the rise of the people's antiwar movement will certainly multiply the

enemy's anxieties. Therefore, our victory is a great inspiration for the struggles in Vietnam and other Pacific regions. Our people's sacred national War of Resistance is part of the international war against imperialist robbers; China's War of Resistance is closely related to the international revolutionary movement. The victory of the "100 Regiments" Campaign will certainly promote the further development of the international revolutionary movement and gain greater sympathy from the people of all countries for China's War of Resistance. Thus, our victory once again has demonstrated to the world the Chinese people's strength in their struggle. This is a warning to those who are plotting to sell out China and pressuring China into capitulating to the Japanese imperialists. This has also demonstrated to those countries that are willing to assist China in its War of Resistance that the Chinese nation has great strength and a bright future. Therefore, this will have a beneficial impact on the country's diplomacy in its War of Resistance.

[[*Question:* What about the impact of the "100 Regiments" Campaign on the Eighth Route Army itself?

Answer: Because the Eighth Route Army is an army of the people, it has been able to expand greatly since it was dispatched to the north to fight the war. It firmly implements the Three Principles of the People. Victory will enable the army to continue to grow, thus helping it to gain even greater victories.]]

Question: The "100 Regiments" Campaign has already won many victories. How is the battle developing in terms of your view of the current situation?

Answer: The victories won by the "100 Regiments" Campaign are only initial ones. We are trying to expand the results and the great victories won on the Zheng-Tai Railway to all fronts and to all aspects of the struggle against the enemy. Together with the military offensives and attacks on communications, we will launch political, economic, and cultural offensives to win greater and more victories and defend all our anti-Japanese base areas. If we continue to win enormous victories in our attacks on communications, we will be able to maintain an advantageous position on the battlefields in the north and deliver the enemy heavy blows. However, the enemy will never die this way. Because of our heavy strikes, the enemy will certainly organize more brutal, cruel, and vicious attacks and "extermination" campaigns to retaliate against us. Recently, enemy planes have been savagely bombing our troops and dropping poison gas along the Zheng-Tai Railway. This is one obvious case. Therefore, after the victory, the War of Resistance in the north will certainly enter a more violent, intense, and fierce environment. We must step up preparations to deal with new battles. We must never be arrogant or underestimate the enemy because of the current victories. Any arrogance or underestimation will cause serious losses. If, however, we can step up our preparations, do our best to consolidate and expand our current victories, actively launch attacks on the enemy, and rely on the power of the majority of the people to attack the enemy, we will always be in a position where we will never be defeated.

F.14 Central Directive on Policy for Developing the New Fourth Army (19 January 1940)⁵⁴

Comrade Xiang Ying and other comrades in the Southeast Bureau:

1) The northward expansion of the New Fourth Army was decided on collectively as early as during the Sixth Plenum [September–November 1938]. Later, when Zhou Enlai came to the New Fourth Army, a unanimous decision was reached to consolidate [the army] in the south, fight in an eastward direction, and expand toward the north. The central part of China is the most ideal region in the country for our expansion. We can expand our forces in the central part of China (Peng Xuefeng's units have expanded from three to twelve regiments; Li Xiannian's units have expanded from several hundred men to 9,000). When the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze was threatened and constrained by over ten divisions of allied forces, we proposed the transfer of one or two regiments from south of the river to the north, thus expanding greatly our forces in the central part of China.

2) Even if a serious incident occurs in the country, whether the New Fourth Army can expand southward, or whether it should cross the river and move north depends on the future situation. If [the GMD] begins to "exterminate the reds" throughout the country, we can move south. If in the future the country is divided and governed by the GMD and the CP, we should not expand south but move north, so as to seek a natural division of territory between [us] and Chiang along the Yangtze River. Therefore, there are two routes of retreat for the New Fourth Army: first, the northern parts of Anhui and Jiangsu; second, the border regions between Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian. Now we should prepare both routes of retreat. However, the route finally taken can be decided only at the last moment.

3) Before open surrender is proclaimed throughout the whole country, or if the current situation persists with the continuation of the anti-Japanese war and anti-communism, the New Fourth Army on both sides of the river should seek expansion within its present areas. Naturally, such expansion will cause friction. However, we can only strengthen ourselves, defend our own positions, and avert the danger of capitulation by expanding our own forces, counterattacking those who cause friction, and striking back at our armed attackers. To struggle against friction is to struggle against the anticommunist and procapitulationist factions. This struggle does not promote division, but is an effective means to postpone and prevent divisions and capitulation. Without this struggle, we cannot ensure harmony and unity, or persist in our War of Resistance.

4) Since we cannot transfer troops from the south to north Anhui, we agree not to transfer any more troops. We completely agree to the plan of expanding, as far as possible, the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui and south of the river. Please consider the transfer of troops from south of the river to southern Anhui, since we feel that it is more difficult for us to expand in southern Anhui, while it is easier to

expand south of the river. Comrade Chen Yi to the south of the River should do his best to expand into northern Jiangsu.

5) We allow the fourth and fifth columns to be under the command of the Central Bureau. However, the units in Yangzhou in northern Jiangsu are still under the command of Xiang Ying and Chen Yi.

The Central Secretariat

F.15 Telegram from Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi on Saving and Protecting the General Situation (9 November 1940)⁵⁵

Chongqing, Chief-of-Staff of the Eighteenth Army Group Ye Jianying to Chief-of-Staff He Yingqin and Deputy Chief-of-Staff Bai Chongxi:

Your telegram (19 October) was received, delivered to us by Chief-of-Staff Ye. This matter is extremely grave. At the moment, our national crisis has reached a critical juncture. To avert the danger to our nation, we have reached a consensus on a telegram of reply. Please read our telegram and deliver it to the commander-in-chief [Chiang Kai-shek].

1) On the issue of those responsible for the actions [in dispute]. The only mission of all our troops is to implement the national strategy, to follow orders and persevere in prosecuting the war. In the past four years, they have fought off large numbers of enemy troops, recovered huge lost areas, and achieved excellent results. This has been seen by the nation's people. The commander-in-chief has commended them many times. For example, the "100 Regiments" Campaign, which started at the beginning of August, has been in progress for two and a half months and has now entered a second stage. Our troops were publicly commended and encouraged by the commander-in-chief. Another example is that in the battles in east and south Anhui, we foiled the enemy's offensive. This was also a recent event. We do not make this list in order to boast about our achievements, but to express our determination to carry out national strategy, obey orders, and fight to the end to defend our country. This policy has been faithfully followed by our entire army; there has been no deviation. Some units of our army were involved in conflicts with units from other armies, just as your telegram pointed out. We deeply regret this. We have made suggestions about the causes for such incidents and measures for eliminating them; they are on record. Concerning the recent incident in north Jiangsu, we contacted Commander Chen immediately. The incident in south Shandong had complex causes, which deserve a great deal of attention. Apart from ordering the units in those areas to strictly follow orders and restrain their actions, we request that the central government send objective emissaries to investigate

these incidents. If the responsibility is found to lie with our army, we will never shield the culprits and will turn them over to be punished in accordance with the laws of the state. Likewise if others are found to be responsible, we will request that the government resolve the case according to the circumstances so that the culpability may be clarified. The ancients said: listen to both sides and you will be enlightened; heed only one side and you will be benighted. A fair resolution of these incidents is extremely valuable precisely for the fairness and justice administered. Moreover, in fighting in an enormously difficult environment in the enemy's rear, the greater the friction, the greater the difficulties for us. This is because those who care nothing about the national crisis and specialize in causing friction are also those who are unwilling to eliminate conflicts or seek unity in fighting the enemy. Therefore, we suggest that a thorough investigation be carried out to establish the truth and responsibility, so that conflicts will be eliminated for good, thus contributing to our war efforts. If you accept our proposal, please seek its implementation.

2) On the issue of defense zones. After Comrade Zhou Enlai transmitted the methods listed in the proposal of the central government during July and August, we complied with the central government's proposal. However, we should convey to you the complaints from our subordinates. It is extremely difficult to order our units in the enemy's rear in the central part of China to transfer to the north since that is where their ancestral tombs, land, property, houses, parents, and wives are. They cannot bear the thought of exposing them to the brutality, slaughter, and lust of the enemy. We have adhered sincerely to the president's talk at Lushan and his letter to the people who have fallen under Japanese aggression. We have not deviated in the slightest from them. Now, all of a sudden, we have been ordered to leave our homes and land and are forced to go elsewhere. How tragic this is. Since the slaughter at Pingjiang and Queshan, everywhere in the rear of the New Fourth Army, such as south Jiangxi, west Fujian, the border regions between Hunan and Jiangxi, east Hubei, west Anhui, and south Hebei, the families and garrison personnel of the New Fourth Army have been subject to persecution and destruction. In fact, they have no protection whatsoever. Today, you are planning to transfer our units in the central areas to the north; all our soldiers very much fear that these tragedies will be repeated. They tremble at the mention of your order. Furthermore, the areas in the north have been devastated by the five disasters of flood, drought, wind, insects, and the Japanese; people are eating tree leaves for food and are on the verge of death. The soldiers and civilians in those areas are already experiencing enormous hardships and some are asking to be sent south, while others are requesting transfer to another area. Only through the greatest efforts has this been averted. These areas have exhausted their resources and really cannot support and take on additional troops. Thus, we have asked Zhou Enlai to report all these difficulties to the central government and request that all our units on the both banks of the Yangtze River be permitted to remain where they are to fight the war. As soon as the enemy is driven out of the country and the war is won, they will be moved out automatically and concentrated in their defense zones. Your telegram set a deadline

for transferring these troops to the north. After much serious deliberation, we have concluded that executing the order is contrary to the people's wishes here and ask that the central government understand and give its permission [for them to remain where they are]. As for our troops south of the Yangtze, we are doing our best to persuade them to move to the north for the sake of unity and in accordance with your order. Yet, we request the central government to relax its deadline in order to prevent unforeseen incidents that might bring countless accusations against us. As for the troops north of the Yangtze, we request that they not be transferred for the time being but, instead, that they be ordered to tighten their military discipline, develop friendly relations with allied forces, and step up counterattacks against the enemy to support our frontal attacks. In this way we can avoid sudden drastic actions and unnecessary trouble. We have given a great deal of thought to this matter; we want to take into consideration the needs of those areas, but are afraid of violating the order of the central government. We want to obey the order, but are afraid of losing popular support in those areas. However, victory depends entirely on those the people give their support to. The two of you possess great foresight and thus we need not expend more words on this matter. At a time when traitors are spreading all kinds of rumors, we need to reconcile all parties and unite to fight the enemy. This will prevent the enemy from profiting from our differences, as well as the disaster of an internal split. Heavy pressure must be avoided at all costs; agitated feelings of mutual antagonism will lead to a situation in which both sides are the losers. This is neither the intention of the central government, nor our wish. If we fight each other and let the enemy reap all the benefits, this will run contrary to our objectives. It will be too late even to express regret. For our part, these words are said sincerely, and we hope that they will be taken sincerely by the two of you. You have great breadth of vision and the interests of the whole country at heart; we are sure that you will certainly mediate and overcome the current difficult situation; we do not need to repeat this again.

3) On the issue of our military establishment. Our army, fighting alone deep in the enemy's rear, hopes to achieve great results in destroying the enemy, thus fulfilling the strategic mission assigned by the commander-in-chief. We have been faithful to the Three Principles of the People and those of fighting the war and building the country. We have mobilized the people, organized guerrilla forces, and thus increased the size of our forces. The relationship between our mission and our organization is inseparable. However, our force of half a million people now receives pay for only 45,000. Despite our skillfulness, we cannot produce miracles, and thus have to rely on the people for assistance. Therefore, in the areas in the enemy's rear where there are enemy troops but no allied armies, we establish anti-Japanese regimes after driving away the Japanese. We give the people clothing, food, and weapons to defend against the savage enemy and defend their homeland—there is really very little to blame. Although they are meagerly clothed and fed, they fight fierce and difficult battles; they have experienced all the hardships known to man, but they are not legally recognized or supported by the rear. This

seriously weakens morale. Therefore, we request that the central government permit us to expand the size of our military establishment. We would be extremely gratified if the central government could authorize this expansion, as outlined in our proposal, for the sake of fighting the war. We urge you to satisfy our requests as soon as possible and increase appropriately the quota of our forces to boost the morale of the soldiers at the front and to train a reliable anti-Japanese fighting force for the country. It is not true that we gain from our armed forces or have ulterior motives; on the contrary, we are genuinely intent on defending the country and have to rely on our own armed forces.

4) On the issue of supplies. The hardships we endure in the enemy's rear have been described above. In particular, there is a serious shortage of ammunition and medical supplies. Our army has not received a single round of ammunition in the last fourteen months; there are cases where one rifle has only four or five rounds of ammunition and where wounds are dressed only once or twice. Thus, fighting is hand-to-hand and the wounded have to be left to take their chances. Of course, we know the difficulties facing the central government, but we have to report the special hardships of our army and hope, amid all these adversities, to receive assistance from you. Items of other necessary supplies have been listed and requested; please authorize their delivery.

5) On the issue of the border regions. Over the past four years, the case of the twenty-three counties in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region has not been resolved. Moreover, you have stationed 200,000 troops along the borders of the region, mobilized civilian labor, and built five blockade rings: west from Ningxia, south from the Jing River, east from Hebing, crossing several provinces. The scale of this blockade and the expenditures incurred can build another Great Wall. Young students from afar and personnel of our army are often detained and murdered, or jailed in labor camps. Such practices have caused a great deal of suspicion that you are either going to launch a major attack on the region very soon or are preparing to compromise with the enemy. It is no surprise that your actions have left much room for such suspicion. Therefore, we earnestly request that the central government solve this long-standing issue and stop the blockade, so that the suspicion of our people and armies may be dispelled and that the basis for our cooperation may be strengthened. This really requires little effort.

6) On the strategy of unity and war. We believe that the current stage of the war provides a rare opportunity for us to fight for final victory. With the arrival of an extensive and prolonged imperialist war, the Japanese are busy coping with the grave situation in the Pacific. If we can persist in the national strategy of unity and war, if we avoid the tragedy of compromise and internal division in the middle of the war, we, the Chinese nation, will certainly be able to seek independence and liberation under the leadership of the Supreme Leader and the central government. In recent months, however, we have heard so much about all kinds of conspiratorial activities both at home and abroad that we are sincerely compelled to report to you. We have learned that the Japanese invaders are urging China to capitulate; they use

both soft- and hard-line tactics, alternating between enticement and pressure. Germany is pursuing a policy of brokered peace, trying to entice China into joining the Axis alliance. At the same time, some people in the country are plotting another anticommunist wave, in an attempt to pave the way for capitulation. We also hear that domestic and international enemies are colluding with each other to launch a so-called Sino-Japanese joint extermination of communism in order to end the war, replace the anti-Japanese war with a civil war, independence with surrender, unity with division, and brightness with darkness. The danger of such a plot, its viciousness and its threat to our current position, as we have been informed, are unprecedented and frightening. We fight from north to south and from east to west, and have shed our blood across the country. We are always ready to serve the nation and are never hesitant to give up our lives. What we are asking for is domestic unity, prevention of division, continuation of the war, and consistency in national strategy. Therefore, we have always done our best to follow your instructions and correct the weaknesses of our own troops. We are also asking the central government to clarify its position on the current situation, reject international conspiracies, punish and repress domestic reactionary actions, and denounce the rumors about joint extermination of the Communists, the Civil War, and surrender to the Japanese, so that the soldiers and civilians of the whole country may be reassured. We hope that the government will reform its politics, rid itself of corruption, improve the livelihood of the people, implement the Three Principles of the People, and base the center of gravity of the war on self-reliance. These matters all concern victory or defeat for our nation, as well as the lives of our offsprings in generations to come. We have felt this danger and must report to you. We respectfully request that you deliver this letter to the president and adopt effective measures at once.

F.16 Talk by Spokesperson for the CC on the Southern Anhui Incident. *Mao Zedong* (18 January 1941)⁵⁶

This tragedy did not happen by chance, but was the product of the plan by the pro-Japanese conspirators and diehard anticommunist elements. Shortly after the beginning of the war and mobilization, the Red Army guerrilla forces in the southern provinces were reorganized into the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In the past three years, this army has fought on both sides of the Yangtze River, battled against a powerful enemy and made spectacular contributions. This is known not only to the people of the country but to the people of the whole world. This meritorious army that has been fighting the Japanese should, according to reason, be cherished. However, there are those in the government who, in face of the foreign aggression and deepening national crisis, not only fail to act in

the primary interest of the nation and the War of Resistance, but cling to their ten-year-old anticommunist prejudices and always treat as unfriendly the troops led by the CP. There are countless incidents of humiliating, ill-treating, encircling, and attacking our troops [by the GMD armed forces]. Their attitude toward the New Fourth Army is no exception. The New Fourth Army units in central Hubei under Li Xiannian's command have been attacked by Cheng Ruhuai and others many times. Chen Yi's column in south Jiangsu has been subject to the repression of Ling Xin. Guan Wenwei's units are oppressed by Han Deqing, while those under Ruo Binghui in east Anhui and those under Pang Xuefeng are subject to the oppression of Li Pingxian. The garrison troops, wounded officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army left in Pingjiang and west Henan, were mercilessly slaughtered. There was the infamous massacre of Pingjiang and the slaughter of Queshan. Even the wife and child of army Chief-of-Staff Zhang Yunyu were arrested. These are the facts of the last few years; they are witnessed by and known to all. In recent months, [such repression] has become worse. Large-scale assaults, in the name of eradicating bandits, have been launched [against the army] in north Jiangsu, east Anhui, and central Hubei. The areas along the Yangtze and Huai Rivers have long been subject to a reign of terror. On 19 October last year, however, He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, in the name of the chief- and deputy chief-of-staff, cabled Commander Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander Peng [Dehuai] of the Eighteenth Army Group and Commander Ye [Ting] and Deputy Commander Xiang [Ying] of the New Fourth Army. They ignored facts, stressed the so-called military administration and command, and imposed a deadline on moving and concentrating all the units of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army to the north of the Yellow River. For the sake of unity, Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang agreed to move the units of the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze to the north; they sent a reply [to He and Bai] [**Doc. F.15**]. Toward the end of December, Commander Ye [Ting] of the New Fourth Army completed preparations and was about to begin the transfer of his troops when, unexpectedly, the GMD publicity organs openly announced news of the transfer of these troops to the north. In fact, this was intended to tip off the enemy. At the same time, when we learned about the government's order to Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yun-xiang⁵⁷ to "annihilate the New Fourth Army and capture Ye and Xiang," [the GMD authorities] were still saying that their troops would render assistance to the passage [of the New Fourth Army] and would not cause difficulties. As these promises were made by the government, Commander Ye believed them and thus ordered the troops to move on 4 January of this year. In total, there were some 10,000 troops including the army headquarters. Unexpectedly, as soon as they began to move, they were attacked. When they traveled to Maolin Village, between Jing County and Taiping, they were suddenly encircled and savagely attacked by over 70,000 troops from Tang Yunshan's Fifty-second, Wu Jiwu's 108th, Duan Baoling's Seventy-ninth, Fan Ziyong's 144th, Zhan Zhongyan's Fortieth, Tian Zhongyi's New Seventh, and Wang Jingxiu's Tenth divisions—under the command of Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang. On the one hand, Commander Ye had

simultaneously to fight a hastily prepared counterattack and withdraw; on the other hand, Ye cabled the GMD authorities demanding an explanation. The authorities, however, during the seven days and nights of bloody battles that engulfed these troops, consistently pretended that they had cabled Gu Zhutong to ask for information and claimed that they had ordered Gu to lift the siege and permit the passage. In fact, the authorities secretly ordered all units to execute the plan to annihilate the New Fourth Army. By 13 January, the bloody battle had entered its eighth day; our New Fourth Army, which had obeyed orders to move north, was out of ammunition and food; all our troops were lost. This satisfied the objective of the authorities! Yesterday, the military council of the national government formerly issued an order declaring that the New Fourth Army was treasonous and directly acknowledged having annihilated the troops of the New Fourth Army in south Anhui;⁵⁸ the announcement also said that the commander of the army, Ye Ting, was wounded and captured while the deputy commander, Xiang Ying, was still at large and being sought. It declared the abolition of the title of the New Fourth Army and turned over Ye Ting to be tried by the military court. This pretentious announcement has nakedly exposed to the people the GMD's true design and plot of wiping out the anti-Japanese forces. It also happens that on the exact same day [17 January], the Japanese news agency sent an astonishing dispatch from Nanjing, reporting,

The Chongqing government has strictly ordered the communist troops along the lower reaches and south of the Yangtze to move to the north of the river before 26 December. To force the communist troops to move north as quickly as possible, the commander of the Third War Zone began to attack the New Fourth Army and all communist troops in the Dongliu area. One section of the communist troops was routed near Digang and withdrew to the north of the river. Since 14 January, units of the Japanese army have begun to attack the New Fourth Army units in Xuancheng and Jingtan, while the units assigned by the "national government" to suppress Communists are also supporting the Japanese troops in battle.

This lays bare the truth about the huge conspiracy and massacre of anti-Japanese armed forces and non-government-controlled forces. The so-called move north before the deadline is merely a trick to entice our troops into a trap where they will be decimated. So-called military discipline and national law are merely a charade so that traitors to be tried by the military court can be turned over after the destruction has been completed. In the past, [the GMD] has sung loudly about iron military discipline and sacred national law. Yet these are simply words to conceal the murderous conspiracies. The New Fourth Army is an anti-Japanese force; its northern transfer was an act authorized by orders; but it met a tragic fate by being encircled and decimated. Where is the military discipline? Where is the national law? Those who violate the orders are those who give them; those who break the law are those who write it. There is no room for argument.

When the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze River was attacked and destroyed, the GMD authorities again ordered over 200,000 troops commanded by

Tang Enbo, Li Pingxian, Li Xianzhou, Wang Zhonglian, and Han Deqing wantonly to attack the New Fourth Army north of the Yangtze in execution of the so-called plan of total destruction. Thus, this is not limited to only one incident south of the river. At the same time, in the northwest, over 200,000 troops are encircling the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. Apart from blockading and harassing the mission of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in Xi'an, the northwest spy agency even abducted the mission's water-man a few days ago and forced him to poison the water on his return. The military police authorities in Guilin expelled effective immediately the mission of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. [The GMD authorities] have prepared a list of CP members and progressive elements throughout the country; are they going to engineer another "total destruction"?! These facts show that it is possible that the past tragedies of the Civil War are about to repeat themselves. There is the possibility that the heroic achievements of all people in fighting the war may be lost in mid-course. The shameless crime of destroying the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui is only the tip of the iceberg; it is only the beginning of the public execution of the entire plot by the conspirators in the pro-Japanese faction and the diehard anticommunists who want to replace the war against Japan with a civil war and substitute unity with division. Such brazen public crimes by the enemy cannot be tolerated. They are unacceptable to the hundreds of thousands of CP members and the over 100,000 officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, as well as to all the soldiers, civilians, and patriots throughout the country, and just people throughout the world. We call on all patriotic soldiers, civilians, and compatriots throughout the country and on just people throughout the world who sympathize with the cause of China's national liberation to unite with us and fight together to attain the following objectives:

- 1) Severely punish the leading criminals who plotted to destroy the New Fourth Army forces in southern Anhui.
- 2) Release all the captured officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army; guarantee the safety of Commander Ye and other military and political cadres.
- 3) Compensate all the officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army who were wounded and the families of those who were killed in southern Anhui.
- 4) Stop the anticommunist war pursued by the over 100,000 troops in the central part of the country.
- 5) Demolish the anticommunist blockade line in the northwest.⁵⁹
- 6) Stop the criminal activities of murdering and arresting CP members and patriots throughout the country; release all patriotic political prisoners.
- 7) Remove He Yingqin and all other pro-Japanese elements.
- 8) Oppose all conspiratorial plans that undermine the war against Japan and damage unity.
- 9) Strictly reform the anti-Japanese camp and pursue in the anti-Japanese war to the end.

We firmly believe that all parties in the country and the majority of nonpartisan

soldiers and civilians will cherish the destiny of their nation and their country, stand with us on the same battleline, oppose the few pro-Japanese elements and the scum of our nation, and smash their shameless plot of waging war within while making peace without, capitulating to the enemy, and betraying the country. The Chinese nation is facing the most serious crisis since the beginning of the War of Resistance. We Communists and the majority of soldiers and people know full well the responsibilities we should shoulder and the measures we should adopt during this difficult and dangerous period.

F.17 Central Directive on the Southern Anhui Incident (18 January 1941)⁶⁰

1) Beginning on 4 January, the army headquarters and the main forces of the New Fourth Army, about 8,000 people, began to move toward the north of the Yangtze River in compliance with the CC's decision to make concessions to the GMD by obeying Chiang Kai-shek's order. Unbeknown [to them], the GMD authorities had a long-term plan for "encirclement and suppression." When our forces traveled between Jing County and Maoling, they were closely encircled by seven divisions of GMD forces; after seven days and nights of fierce fighting, all our forces were lost. Since the beginning of the war, this is an unprecedented incident between the GMD and the CP and within the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This must receive serious attention from the whole party and the people of the country. Now the GMD has publicly announced the treason of the New Fourth Army and put Ye Ting on trial in a military court. This political step by the GMD shows that it is preparing a break with our party. This indicates the first important political change by the GMD since war broke out on 7 July 1937.

2) The causes of this change are:

First, the conspiratorial activities by the pro-Japanese faction of He Yingqin and Chen Lifu's CC Clique,⁶¹ which plots to use anticommunism in order to surrender.

Second, the rising arrogance and hostility of the diehard anticommunists and representatives of pro-British-American factions as the result of the deterioration of the conflict between the British-American camp and the German-Italian-Japanese camp, as the result of the active efforts by the British and the Americans to befriend China, and as the result of the fact that Japan's offensives in China are being constrained by the British and the Americans. Thus, they believe that this is a favorable opportunity to consolidate their rule by launching an attack on our party. The Southern Anhui Incident is the continuation of a series of anticommunist incidents engineered by the pro-Japanese faction in collusion with the pro-British-American factions within the GMD since the formation of the triple alliance.⁶²

3) The Southern Anhui Incident and the GMD's public handling of it have

exposed, before the people of the whole country and all just people throughout the world, the GMD's true intention to undermine the war and unity. They also have exposed the GMD's deviousness and viciousness, lack of credibility and morality. This will greatly damage the GMD's prestige and expose the total hypocrisy of its propaganda about unifying military and political commands. Therefore, the Southern Anhui Incident has simultaneously created favorable conditions for us to respond politically and forcibly to attacks on us by the pro-Japanese and pro-British-American factions. The New Fourth Army has been actively fighting the Japanese; its northern transfer was in compliance with orders. But now it has been wiped out, declared treasonous, and put on trial in a military court. All reason is on our side.

4) To counter the GMD's attacks, the CC has decided [the following]:

a) Use publications, newspapers, meetings, and mass meetings in all anti-Japanese base areas to launch serious protests about the destruction of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui through the collusion of the pro-Japanese and pro-British-American factions and the diehard anticommunists in the GMD. Moreover, the following slogans must be raised:

i) Release immediately the commander of the New Fourth Army, Ye Ting; release all the captured officers and soldiers; pay compensation for the wounded and killed; punish the culprits of this incident.

ii) Stop immediately the 200,000 troops in central China from moving to fight the Communists; oppose civil war; Chinese do not fight Chinese; GMD troops at the front should unite with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; all our guns should be pointed at the Japanese!

iii) Stop immediately building the blockade line around the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region; use the 100 million *yuan* needed to construct the blockade to build up national defense and to improve the people's livelihood!

iv) Abolish the one-party dictatorship and reform political institutions; institute democratic politics; convene a national assembly that truly represents the will of the people; release Zhang Xueliang, Yang Wucheng, Ma Yinchu, and all political prisoners who want to fight the Japanese and save the country. Protect the freedom of speech, assembly, and publication!

v) Persist in fighting the war, in unity, and in progress. Expel the ringleaders of the pro-Japanese faction—He Yingqin and Chen Lifu!

b) Our propaganda and agitation should ruthlessly expose the GMD regime's merciless oppression and slaughter of the people and revolutionaries since the beginning of the War of Resistance, while it deals so passively and generously with the Japanese invaders and Chinese traitors. It penalizes the meritorious and rewards the guilty. Expose all such illogical, dark, and reactionary aspects. We must point out that final victory in the war can be attained only by reforming the political institutions and instituting democracy.

c) The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army must heighten fully their political and military vigilance and be completely prepared to fight.

d) In the rear proper [Chiang's areas], we must mobilize public opinion and the masses by utilizing all manner of roundabout and indirect methods, provided that our party organizations are not damaged. In particular, we should seize on inflation to raise the people's dissatisfaction to the point of demanding the expulsion of the pro-Japanese faction, the reform of the GMD government, and the introduction of democracy to fight the Japanese.

F.18 Decision of the Party Center on the Mistakes of Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping (January 1941)⁶³

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Comrade Xiang Ying has had differences with the CC on issues of political principles and military policies. Xiang Ying's speech in September 1937 during the anniversary week of the GMD provincial group in Nanchang deviated from the standpoint of a CP member. Ever since then, his understanding of the united front has exhibited right opportunism. He does not realize the need for the CP's independence and struggle in the united front. He has never led opposition to the GMD's anticommunist policies and has long surrendered psychologically to the GMD, thus causing the lack of preparedness on the part of our troops in southern Anhui. On this issue, Comrade Yuan Guoping, director of the political department of the New Fourth Army, is in complete agreement with Xiang Ying. Political work under his leadership has lost sight of the party's independence and made the New Fourth Army adapt to the demands of the GMD. Over the past three years, Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping have paid lip service to CC directives and have always been accommodating to the GMD. They opposed expansion to the north and in the enemy's rear, enlargement of the New Fourth Army, and establishment of anti-Japanese bases, asserting their own opportunist line. They rarely report to the CC. The internal situation of the party, government, and army under their leadership is completely self-contained. Over the past three years, their disrespect for the CC has developed to an extremely abnormal extent. Since last summer, the CC has on several occasions seriously criticized their mistakes of principle. Xiang and Yuan appeared to accept these criticisms, thus encouraging the CC to believe that they would change their position. Yet the facts to date show no change on their part. Other New Fourth Army units commanded by Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and other comrades have either made changes, i.e., in east Anhui and south Jiangsu, or have never been influenced by the erroneous leadership of Xiang and Yuan, i.e., in central Hubei and to the north of the Huai River. The New Fourth Army units in these areas, which account for one-third of the old units and one-ninth of the entire armed forces, provide a sharp contrast with the southern Anhui units under the direct command of Xiang and Yuan. This time, the southern Anhui units in their move north avoided losses. Xiang and Yuan, however, were

initially hesitant and wavering, and then sought their own defeat by throwing themselves against the encirclement of Chiang Kai-shek's anticommunist troops. They stopped after marching only 15 kilometers, hesitated in Maolin Village, south of Jing County, and were gradually encircled by the anticommunist troops. Finally, the 7,000-strong main force was annihilated, with the exception of the units under the leadership of Comrade Fu Qiutao, which broke out of the encirclement. (They have not yet been able to break out of the wider encirclement.) The main force reached Maolin on 3 January and the encirclement of the 70,000-strong anticommunist forces commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang caused them to engage in a fight for which they were not prepared. Apart from Xiang Ying, Yuan Guoping, and a few others who still demonstrated shameful timidity and hesitance, all other officers and soldiers led by Ye Ting, army commander, and Rao Shushi, deputy secretary of the Southeast Bureau, displayed the heroism of party members and revolutionary soldiers. They fought for seven days and nights with great ferocity against the anticommunist forces. However, the erroneous leadership of Xiang and Yuan, which was responsible for the lack of advance psychological preparedness and of determination and command in maneuvering the troops during the fighting, was responsible for the final defeat. This defeat was the consequence of Xiang and Yuan's longtime opportunism and is no accident. This cannot be compared with any ordinary military defeat. Further investigation is necessary to discover whether the defeat was the result of internal treachery and conspiracy. Many facts give cause for suspicion. There were members of the military commission's subcommission in the New Fourth Army and members of the Southeast Bureau who were dissatisfied with, or were opposed to, the consistent opportunist policy line of Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping. There were many in the party who did not agree with Xiang Ying's patriarchal attitude in suppressing cadre initiative. One obvious example is provided by the fact that when Comrades Hu Fu and Chen Yi delivered the CC's directives and corrected work in east Anhui and south Jiangsu, respectively, all local comrades resolutely opposed Xiang Ying's mistakes and enthusiastically supported the CC's policy line. To ensure implementation of the correct policies for the united front against Japan and to carry the struggle against the Japanese and their Chinese collaborators to victory, the CC has adopted the following decisions concerning the mistakes made by Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping.

- 1) The dispersion of forces over a long period of time during the guerrilla war, which is a characteristic of the Chinese revolution, has provided military leaders, especially those in areas of independent work, with independent decision-making capabilities. These capabilities should not be allowed to develop into noncompliance with CC leadership and the command of the party's Central Military Commission. This would be extremely dangerous. Zhang Guotao in the past and Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping in the present suffered defeat because they refused to submit themselves to the CC. The entire party and army should be aware of these facts and learn their lesson. Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping also participated in the struggle

against Zhang Guotao's right opportunism. However, they still followed a disastrous road similar to Zhang Guotao's. In particular, all comrades and military leaders who have a tendency toward self-glorification or weak party spirit should undertake serious self-examination. They must understand that armed party members will suffer eventual defeat if they do not accept CC leadership and the command of the party's Central Military Commission. This will happen, no matter how much confidence they have in their own judgment and capabilities. At present, we do not regard Xiang Ying as a traitor like Zhang Guotao and will wait to observe his future behavior. If Xiang Ying has not died in the battle, or did not break through the encirclement but has been captured by the anticommunist forces, we still hope that he will demonstrate the revolutionary spirit of a captured CP member. However, Xiang Ying's opportunist mistakes must be pointed out. We can expect that, in the future, people such as Zhang Guotao and Xiang Ying may still emerge in the environment of guerrilla warfare. This kind of situation places a heavier burden for education in party discipline on the entire party and especially on the cadres and party members in the armed forces. This is an issue of paramount importance and should not be neglected in any way. Precautionary steps, transfers, and arrangements should be made for those who have already made serious mistakes and refuse to obey the CC and their superiors. This is another lesson learned from the defeat suffered by Xiang and Yuan.

2) At a time when the war and national united front against Japan are in serious difficulties and Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD are conducting resolute anti-communist policies, the entire party and army should learn the lesson of Xiang's and Yuan's mistakes. Our anti-Japanese position and our party's and army's psychological, political, military, and all organizational aspects should be strengthened. This is the only way that we can smash the anticommunist offensive of Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD and win the war against Japan.

3) This CC decision should be made known to high-ranking cadres of the party and army so as to unfold the struggle against Xiang and Yuan. However, the decision should not be transmitted to the lower levels for the time being. In particular, it must not be made public outside the party.

4) The mistakes of Xiang and Yuan will be discussed and dealt with by the Seventh Party Congress.

F.19 Directive on the Military Buildup in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (7 November 1941)⁶⁴

A) General Problems

1) The enemy is conducting savage "extermination" operations against our anti-Japanese base areas. The attrition of our army's labor power and material and

financial resources, and the loss of territory have forced our struggle against the enemy in the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear to enter a new and more critical stage.

2) During this new stage, our guiding principle should be to wage a prolonged and time-consuming struggle, fight dispersed guerrilla war, and adopt all forms of struggle (from waging the fiercest armed struggle to acting as the most peaceful double-faced revolutionaries) to frustrate the enemy, so that we may conserve and preserve our strength (armed strength and popular strength), and wait for favorable opportunities. Therefore, we must oppose rightist views of pessimism, despair, fear of difficulties, a negative attitude toward guerrilla warfare, and submission to the enemy. At the same time, we should also oppose "leftist" views that mouth empty slogans about mobile battles (before our weapons situation changes, the possibility of fighting mobile battles is decreasing and is perhaps even nonexistent) and about fighting the decisive battle, and that propose rash and blind actions, and that lack patience and endurance.

3) During this new stage, the military buildup of our base areas must fit with the new objective environment. The military structure of each base area must be made up of: (i) regular forces, (ii) local forces, and (iii) people's armed forces (self-defense teams and militia who do not give up productive activities). During the establishment of the base area, it was correct to concentrate attention on expanding and strengthening the regular forces. The balance between the enemy and us has changed recently, however, and thus the main focus of military buildup at the present time should be placed on expansion and consolidation of local and people's armed forces. This is precisely where our weaknesses lie. Our attitude is still focused on the previous stage (the war against Japan is different from the Civil War; there is no possibility of concentrating large forces to annihilate the enemy). Limitations in labor power and material resources, as well as the decreasing possibility of mobile warfare, mean that the regular forces should be appropriately streamlined. The focus of their work is to raise political and military technical qualities and concentrate and use to the fullest their existing establishment. Xiang Ying's proposal for streamlining the military in the previous stage was mistaken. However, we will make the same mistake now if we do not propose streamlining the military.

4) Regardless of major changes in the future, the numerical ratio between the regular and local forces in mountain base areas (excluding people's armed forces) should generally follow the principle of two to one. In base areas on the plains, the principle is one to one. In some most difficult areas (for example, east Shandong, the Daqing Mountains, south Jiangsu), the distinction between regular and local forces should be broken down with all armed forces being turned into local ones. The people's armed forces (self-defense armies that do not abandon productive activities) should include the largest majority of the people. In these forces, the number of activists (such as the militia, model self-defense teams, Youth-Against-Japan teams, young people's self-defense teams, etc.) should exceed the total number of local forces and regular forces. However, the total number of those who leave

productive jobs (including personnel in the party, government, military, civil administration, and schools) should account for 3 percent of the total population in areas under our rule. Of course, these ratios are approximate and should be made concrete according to the specific conditions of each area. In order to persist in the struggle against the enemy, all kinds of party, governmental, civil administrative, and educational organizations in our base areas should work together to carry out the above military buildup.

B) The Question of Local Forces and Military Districts

1) Although there is a distinction between the regular and local forces, there is no unbridgeable gap. The distinction between the regular and local forces lies in the fact that the former is a compact regular force responsible for fighting relatively large battles while the latter is a regional force responsible for the task of fighting a dispersed guerrilla war. The former has a unified command and is not limited to localities; the latter has a dispersed command and is limited to certain localities.

2) During the stage of establishing and expanding base areas, all energies should be concentrated on expanding regular forces; the command of the local forces that simultaneously comprise military districts also belong to the regular forces. This is necessary. Now the situation has changed, however, and thus the relationship between the two forces should also change. Local forces should have an autonomous establishment and command structure, which is the military district or subdistrict. However, the responsibility of the regular forces to help local forces not only remains the same but should be emphasized more than before. When the regular forces are undergoing retrenchment (not expansion and retrenchment) and replenishing their strength, [we] should comply with the ratio outlined above (General Problems), converting a sizable portion of the regular forces into local forces (but the name of the units involved do not have to change); the regular forces should provide local forces with more cadres, weapons, ammunition, etc. During battles, regular forces should assign routine battle missions to the local forces. In this respect, local forces come under the command of regular forces. Regular forces should help local forces to train troops. However, the establishment of the two forces remain independent of each other. Regular forces should never swallow up local forces. When losses mean that the regular forces need replenishing, the new recruits should be selected, after mobilization, from self-defense teams, the militia, and local forces. However, the ratios between the different troops should be maintained.

3) Local forces should be developed in line with the above ratio. However, it is necessary to provide special instructions on their minimum number. A guerrilla group in a district should comprise fifty people and rifles; a county guerrilla battalion should have 200 people and rifles; a subdistrict should have an independent battalion or regiment with 2,000 people and rifles. The district party and administrative agencies command the district guerrilla group; the county party and administrative agencies command the guerrilla battalions; command headquarters should be

established in subdistricts. This headquarters is not to be supervised by the regular forces and the district party secretary should be commissar of the subdistricts. Command of the military district belongs to the regular forces, or it can be established independently. Regardless of whether the regular forces control the military district, however, regular and local forces are still established independent of each other. In localities where there is frequent fighting, district armed forces should keep fighting in their own districts; county armed forces should fight in their own counties; subdistrict armed forces should fight in their own subdistricts. Oppose escapism [flightism] (those who move temporarily because of a genuinely unfavorable situation should not be considered escapists) and random transfer. Deep within the base areas, district and county guerrilla forces should be commanded by the subdistrict simultaneously to operate in guerrilla war zones in order to train themselves and prepare for the future. In the center of mountainous regions where the enemy has rarely shown up in the past, we should prepare for its certain arrival in the future. Here, we must immediately establish district and county armed forces; there must be no postponement. However, the number of troops and weapons may be smaller than on the plains and in the border areas.

4) Local forces must be genuinely localized. In particular, the cadres should be drawn from local areas. Therefore, the most important task is to train cadres from local areas and send excellent local cadres from local party organizations to the local forces. The method of struggle, political work, and uniforms for local forces should all suit local conditions (i.e., respecting the nature of guerrilla warfare in that particular region). Thus, shouting empty slogans and mechanically transplanting the style of the regular forces to local ones are inappropriate methods. Further, it is not right to limit the independent activities of local forces or adopt the style of command that assigns them battle tasks they are not capable of fulfilling.

C) The Question of Self-Defense Teams and the Militia

1) To increase the self-defense capabilities of the people in all base areas and adapt to the new situation in the war, [we] must take establishment of self-defense teams and the militia more seriously; this is an extremely important question for the military buildup in base areas in the enemy's rear. But in all base areas (except the base area of Jin-Cha-Ji), this work has not produced the required results. The future task is to intensify our efforts to attain this objective. If this is not done, all areas will suffer enormous losses.

2) Self-defense teams and the militia (including model self-defense teams and Youth-Against-Japan teams) are armed self-defense organizations through which the majority of the people can defend their homeland and the anti-Japanese base areas and maintain production. The tasks and scope of the two are different, however. Inside the base areas, all those between sixteen and fifty-five, regardless of class, sex, race, religion, or belief, should register and be classified as members of general self-defense teams and members of women's self-defense teams (of course,

attention must be paid to political mobilization; we cannot rely on compulsion alone). The basic task of these self-defense teams is to fight a mass guerrilla war, maintain order inside the base areas, and fulfill logistic tasks in the war (i.e., transportation, stretcher-carriers, messengers, cutting the flow of information, and hiding away supplies).

3) The militia is the backbone of the self-defense team; it is a higher form of organization among the lower-level people's armed forces. It is an organization encompassing two mass organizations: the model self-defense team and the Youth-Against-Japan team. It is organized on a purely voluntary basis. All able-bodied men willing to kill the enemy may join on a voluntary basis. Its task is to reconnoiter enemy conditions, conduct battles autonomously, support the regular forces in battle, harass the enemy, cut off and besiege enemy strongholds, sabotage enemy transportation, and attack small groups of enemy troops and armed traitors. When the enemy attacks, the militia supervises the self-defense teams in protecting the masses' withdrawal.

4) The self-defense team is a mass organization of all the people, formed in line with residence. The team is divided into medium brigades, small brigades, and small teams. The number of each does not have to be fixed. When possible, however, the militia should contain relatively uniform numbers of people in all units, thus facilitating future combat and training.

5) The self-defense teams and the militia should be under the unified leadership of the committees for people's armed forces at all levels (from border areas to counties). Such committees are democratic centralist organizations elected by conferences of representatives of the people's armed forces at all levels. They should not be appointed. Within border areas, under the unified leadership of the committees, the militia should have its autonomous organizational structure. Separate units should be organized at all levels, from county to district to village. Democratic principles should regulate internal affairs, and leaders at all levels should be elected, not appointed.

6) All the people's armed forces should have independent organizational structures and a democratic system for internal affairs. Military and administrative agencies are not allowed to interfere with or replace them. In the process of implementing individual basic tasks, however, [they] should be commanded by troops at the same level via the government. In normal times, the militia should be commanded by the government under the general guiding principle of implementing independent activities. When they support regular forces in battle, they should accept the command of the regular guerrilla forces. The committee for armed forces at all levels is not permitted to interfere with the autonomy of any kind of people's armed forces. Its power only includes unifying command, distribution of weapons, unifying budgets, and education.

7) The weapons of the self-defense teams are mainly knives and swords. The weapons of the militia are mainly all types of new and old rifles (rapid-fire and bird-shot guns), hand grenades (each base area and even each county should estab-

lish a hand-grenade factory to mass produce hand grenades; each militia member should receive two to four hand grenades), mines, locally produced artillery pieces, etc. At the same time, the militia should receive special technical training in sabotaging railways, mines, trains, highways, and factories, thus opening up a mass sabotage drive. The regular forces should provide a certain quantity of rifles, according to plan, to arm the militia; they must never be stingy about this. The two main weapons, hand grenades and land mines should be produced in mass quantities and distributed widely.

8) The cadres of self-defense teams and the militia should be drawn from the locality and have close relations with the masses. All localities should make a planned transfer of large numbers of local cadres for special training. Branches of Kangda [Anti-Japanese War of Resistance University] and other military schools in all areas should take on this responsibility.

9) Finally, the Central Military Affairs Commission emphasizes once again that the pivot in building up the militia and the self-defense teams is the establishment of democratic centralism. Any kind of appointment by officials will be detrimental to their growth and to the exercise of their own spontaneity and initiative. At the same time, it should be pointed out that when tasks are being assigned, it should be taken into account that the militia is the backbone of the people's armed forces and should be deployed in fighting the enemy, while as many routine tasks as possible in the war should be given to self-defense teams.

[[D) On the Question of Weapons for the Army and Militia

The GMD has not issued ammunition for two years, and provision is becoming very difficult. We must not neglect the production of primitive and relatively low-grade materials. This entails the mass production of hand grenades and land mines. We should not concentrate exclusively on the production of advanced weapons.]]

F.20 Statement of the CCP on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (16 April 1941)⁶⁵

1) The Soviet Union, in pursuance of its long-standing policy of peace and neutrality, signed a treaty of neutrality with Japan on 13 April. This is another great victory of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. First, the significance of this treaty is that it has secured peace on the Soviet Union's eastern front and has guaranteed the peaceful development of socialist construction. Such peaceful development in the Soviet Union is in the interests of all the working people and oppressed nations in the world.

2) The Soviet-Japanese treaty has greatly elevated the Soviet Union's interna-

tional position. The Soviet Union has increased its authority both in the east and in the west. This is detrimental to all reactionaries, but beneficial to all peace-loving people and oppressed nations.

3) The Soviet-Japanese treaty does not limit the Soviet Union's support for China in its independent and just War of Resistance against Japan. As long as the policy of the Chinese government is to persist in its independent war of national liberation, as long as the Chinese government uses Soviet aid in fighting the Japanese aggressor instead of our compatriots (as occurred, for example, with the destruction of the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhui in January this year and the current large-scale attacks on the New Fourth Army units in Anhui and Hubei), as long as [the Chinese government] does not do such things, we deeply believe, in light of the national policy of the Soviet Union, that it will continue to support China. The Soviet Union's foreign policy is independent; it will never bind itself hand and foot in supporting the just actions of oppressed nations in the interests of the imperialists. The Japanese did not attain their goal of limiting Soviet aid to China. They expressed disappointment. For foreign aid, the Chinese people place their hopes, first and foremost, on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has not disappointed China with this treaty. It will never disappoint China.

4) The clause in the Soviet-Japanese declaration about never invading Outer Mongolia or Manchuria is subtle. This is because the so-called Manchurians have long since become tools of the Japanese in harassing the borders of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The two battles fought at Zhanggaofeng and Nuomencan are evidence of this. In signing the peace and neutrality treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union would have to settle this problem at the same time. In pursuance of its policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union, whether it has a treaty with Japan or not, is not prepared to invade the four northeastern provinces [Manchuria]. Japan, however, has repeatedly invaded Outer Mongolia, even though Outer Mongolia has a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Japanese declaration guarantees that Outer Mongolia will not be violated. This benefits not only Outer Mongolia, but also China's efforts to seek liberation. Recovery of the four northeastern provinces is our own business. We should never, as some opportunists do, dream of a war between the Soviet Union and Japan that will enable us to reap the benefits without making any efforts of our own. Such people blame the Soviet Union when they hear that it has promised not to invade Manchuria. Such people lack guts. We must recover all our own lost territories by fighting to the banks of the Yalu River and driving the Japanese imperialists out of China. This is the sacred task of the Chinese people. The socialist Soviet Union is certain to support this task of ours.

5) After the signing of the treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, China must continue to observe the three principles for fighting the War of Resistance, seeking unity and progress. First, no wavering about fighting the War of Resistance is tolerated. Second, cooperation between the GMD and the CP must continue. Divisive acts such as disbanding the New Fourth Army must stop and never be

repeated in the future. Third, all kinds of reactionary domestic policies must cease. Only if we follow these principles can we rely on foreign aid and expect to win the war against Japan. To act contrary to this would be to betray our country and people and would lead to foreign enslavement. We, the CP, sincerely hope that the GMD authorities will conduct a searching self-examination and properly handle the current situation. This is not only in the interests of the GMD but also for the tasks of national liberation.

F.21 CCP Declaration on the War in the Pacific (9 December 1941)⁶⁶

On 8 December, the Japanese fascist government declared war on Britain and the United States, bombed Hawaii, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore; its army landed on the northern part of Malaysia. After the Japanese declaration of war, the United States and Britain similarly declared war on Japan. The Pacific War has commenced. This Pacific War is an unjust war started by the Japanese fascists in their aggression against the United States and other countries. For the United States, Britain, and other countries who have risen to resist this aggression, it is a just war of liberation in defense of independence, freedom, and democracy. This aggressive act by the Japanese fascists is identical to their aggression against China over the past ten years, and to the German-Italian fascist aggression against Europe and the Soviet Union. Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, all democratic countries throughout the world have been subject to the aggression of the fascist countries. At the same time, all the democratic countries have risen up in resistance. All countries and nations throughout the world have been divided into two camps: the fascist camp that has launched the wars of aggression and the antifascist camp that is fighting wars of liberation. This situation has finally been crystallized. After the victory at Rostov, the great Soviet Red Army has moved to the phase of counterattacking the Germans. In light of this change and the fact that the two great powers, Britain and the United States, possess enormous resources and military power, because China has fought heroically against the Japanese for five years, and because Germany, Italy, and Japan have nearly exhausted their resources and are facing domestic demoralization, the final defeat of the fascist camp and the final victory of the antifascist camp are now certain. This is certain even though Hitler and Mussolini might keep going for a while and the Japanese fascists might win many victories in the initial stage of the Pacific War, or might cut off the Burma Road, or might launch another cruel war against us. The Chinese government and people should continue the five-year-old heroic war, firmly take the side of the antifascist countries, mobilize all our strength, and struggle for the final overthrow of the Japanese fascists. To reach this sole objective, the following important tasks must be fulfilled.

1) China must establish a military alliance with Britain, the United States, and other anti-Japanese allies, coordinate our battles, establish a united front of all anti-Japanese nations in the Pacific, and persist in fighting the war against Japan until victory is complete.

2) Military forces throughout the country must actively attack the enemy and prepare for a large-scale strategic counterattack.

3) The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should continue to endure hardships, persist in the war in the enemy's rear in central and north China, smash the enemy's extermination operations, and tie down large numbers of the enemy's troops.

4) Carry out extensive anti-Japanese, antifascist propaganda and agitation among the Japanese army; the Japanese people; the peoples of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Chinese people in the areas that have fallen to the Japanese; and those struggling for the establishment of an antifascist front inside Japan.

5) Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the cooperation among the GMD, the CP, and other parties; solve the disputes between the GMD and the CP; restore the New Fourth Army; and supply the Eighth Route Army with pay and ammunition.

6) Punish pro-Japanese and pro-German cliques and eliminate the enemy's fifth column.

7) Establish democratic politics so that representatives from all parties and non-party people can take on the political and organizational responsibilities of fighting the War of Resistance and building the country.

8) Strengthen the internal unity of the overseas Chinese in [the countries of] South Asia and elsewhere; oppose the acts of division engaged in by some elements; at the same time, the overseas Chinese should work with all the friendly governments and local peoples to fight against the Japanese attacks.

Notes to Commentary F

1. On this point see L. van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945," in J. K. Fairbank and A. Feuerwerker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 13, *Republican China 1912–1949*, Part 2, p. 667. See also Shum Kui-kwong, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front (1935–1945)*, p. 147.

2. On this point see Shum, *The Chinese Communists' Road to Power*, p. 149.

3. See *ibid.*, and L. van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History*, pp. 96–97.

4. Zhou Enlai reported on the last two years of the war, Bo Gu on work in the south, and Zhang Dingcheng on the New Fourth Army. Mao provided the summary. This meeting was attended by, among others, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, Li Fuchun, Li Weiham, Zhang Jie, Kong Yuan, Lin Boqu, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Xiaoping, Gao Gang, Tan Zheng, and Teng Daiyuan. The Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, pp. 140–41.

5. See "Zhongyang guanyu daliang fazhan dangyuan de jueyi" (Resolution of the CC Concerning Expanding Greatly Party Membership), 15 March 1938, in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 150–51.

6. S. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung's Thought to 1949," in Fairbank and Feuerwerker (eds.), vol. 13, *Republican China, 1912–1949*, Part 2, p. 857.

7. Ibid.

8. See the Secretariat of the CCP CC, "Zhongyang dui shiju zhishi" (Central Directive on the Current Situation), p. 23, December 1939, in the Central Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 1077.

9. Van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War," p. 652.

10. In January 1938, the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region was formally established. It was the only base area apart from the Shaan Gan-Ning to receive recognition from Chiang Kai-shek's government. For an analysis of the Jin-Cha-Ji see K. Hartford, *Step By Step: Reform, Resistance and Revolution in Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, 1937–1945*. The headquarters of the Eighth Route Army moved to the Taihang section of Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu in October 1937. Although the Border Region was formally proclaimed on 7 July 1941, it was never coherently united. See S. G. Goodman, "JinJiYuLu in the Sino-Japanese War: The Border Region and the Border Region Government," *China Quarterly*, no. 140 (December 1994): 1007–24. See also T. Saich, "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and the Anti-Japanese War Base Areas," *China Quarterly*, no. 140 (December 1964): 1000–06.

11. This idea is developed by C. Dorris in "Peasant Mobilization in North China and the Origins of Yanan Communism," *China Quarterly*, no. 68 (December 1976).

12. See Nie Rongzhen, *Kang-Ri mofan genjudi—Jin Cha Ji bianqu* (A Model Anti-Japanese Base Area—The Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region).

13. See Jiang Jie, "Guanyu baituan dazhan wenti de tantao" (An Inquiry into Questions Concerning the "100 Regiments" Campaign), in *Jindaishi yanjiu* (Research on Modern History), no. 1: 164–75.

14. Nie Rongzhen, in his memoirs, wrote that initially the campaign was not referred to as the "100 Regiments" but was seen as a sabotage operation on the Zheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan) Railway. Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen*, p. 426.

15. In his memoirs, Peng Dehuai admitted that he had not received specific approval from Mao before launching the military strikes. Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu*, pp. 236–37.

16. For examples of the chaotic communications system see M. Lindsay, *The Unknown War: North China, 1937–1945*, *passim*.

17. Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star*, p. 438. According to Nie, Mao criticized the campaign during the Rectification Campaign in Yan'an.

18. Ibid., p. 426.

19. Although the order was signed by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan, it is unlikely that Zhu De knew much about the actions as he was in Yan'an at the time. See "Order on Preparation for the Large-Scale Sabotage Operation on the Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan Railway," in the Yan'an Revolution Memorial Hall (ed.), *Ziliao xuanbian*, vol. 3, pp. 11–13; see also Nie Rongzhen, *Inside the Red Star*, p. 426 ff.

20. Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu*, pp. 234–36.

21. Zhu De, "Kuo Zhang baituan dazhan de weida shengli" (Expand the Great Victory of the "100 Regiments" Campaign), 25 September 1940, in *Balujun junzheng zazhi* (Military and Political Journal of the Eighth Route Army), vol. 1, no. 9 (1940).

22. On this point see van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War," p. 667, and Shum, *The Chinese Communist Road to Power*, p. 184.

23. For Mao's instruction see "Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaught of the Anti-Communist Diehards," in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2, pp. 431–36. For Xiang Ying's reply see "Guanyu zhongyang dui xinsijun celue zhishi Xiang Ying fu zhongyang dian" (Xiang Ying's Telegram in Reply to the Party Center Concerning the Party Center's Directive on the Tactics for the New Fourth Army), 12 May 1940, in

Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, vol. 2, p. 296. The importance of the destruction of the headquarters of the New Fourth Army in boosting CCP prestige is stressed by C. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power*, p. 140. For an account of the events see Chen Yung-fa, *The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China*, pp. 64–77. For the background to the origins of the New Fourth Army, see Gregor Benton, *Mountain Fires*.

24. J. Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72*, p. 305.

25. Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War,” p. 667.

26. Yuan Xu et al., *Dierci Zhong-Ri zhangzheng jishi*, p. 263. See also “Xinsijun jiangling jiuzhi tongdian” (Open Telegram from the New Fourth Army Military Leadership on Assuming Office), 23 January 1941, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 11, p. 592.

27. These regulations can be found in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 349–56.

28. “Zhongyang guanyu Wang Jingwei chuzou hou shiju de zhishi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1008–9.

29. These were the peace proposals put forward by Konoe in November 1938 that were accepted by Wang Jingwei.

30. “Zhongyang guanyu guomindang wuzhong quanwei wenti de zhishi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, p. 1014.

31. “Fan touxiang tigang,” in *ibid.*, pp. 1023–47. On 10 June Mao delivered his report and on 13 June his concluding speech to the high-level cadres meeting held in Yan’an.

32. “Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu gonggu dang de jue ding,” in *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 213–14.

33. This resolution can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 150–51.

34. “Women duiyu guoqu canzhenghui gongzuo he muqian shiju de yijian,” *Xin Zhonghua bao* (New China), no. 69 (3 October 1939).

35. These comments on the GMD political assembly were published in *Jiefang* (Liberation), vol. 3, no. 47, on 8 August 1938. They are republished in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, vol. 11, pp. 528–32.

36. The nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany was signed on 23 August 1939.

37. “Guanyu sanmin zhuyi yu gongchan zhuyi,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1061–67.

38. This was Mao’s report to the Sixth Plenum, 12–14 October 1938. For extracts, see above, **Doc. E.28**.

39. This refers to the fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops on 7 July 1937 at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) outside Beijing.

40. This was Mao’s report delivered on 3 May 1937 to the National Conference of the CCP. The full text can be found in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 5, pp. 189–205.

41. “Gongchandangren fakanci,” in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 7, pp. 69–83. *The Communist* (Gongchandangren) was established in Yan’an on 20 October 1939 and ended publication in August 1941. A total of 19 issues were published.

42. “Xinminzhu de zhengzhi yu xinminzhu de wenhua,” in *Zhongguo wenhua* (Chinese Culture), no. 1 (February 1940). *Chinese Culture* was issued as a monthly and ceased publication on 20 August 1941.

43. This was in 1924 in *Lectures on the Principles of People’s Livelihood*.

44. Vitalism was a doctrine proposed by those such as Chen Lifu who were on the right of the GMD. It was closely associated with the flirtation with fascism.

45. In the version of this article contained in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, the three classes have been increased to four.

46. The main figure in this group was the liberal intellectual Hu Shi.

47. This is taken from Lenin's essay "What Is to Be Done?"
48. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu muqian shiju yu dang de renwu de jue ding," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1087–89.
49. This is taken from the version in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2, pp. 417–19.
50. "Jin-Cha-Ji bianqu muqian shizheng gangling," in *Jin-Cha-Ji bianqu xingzheng weiyuanhui xianxing faming huiji*, pp. 1–5.
51. "Zhongyang guanyu muqian xingshi yu dang de zhengce de jue ding," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1109–13. The decision was adopted to mark the third anniversary of the war against Japan.
52. On 22 September 1937, formal cooperation between the CCP and GMD was established with each party issuing a statement.
53. "Peng fuzong ciling tan 'baituan dazhan' de weida yiyi," in *Balujun junzheng zazhi* (Military and Political Journal of the Eighth Route Army), vol. 1, no. 9 (31 August 1940). This was an interview with a Xinhua correspondent.
54. "Zhongyang dui xinsijun fazhan fangzhen de zhishi," in the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao*, vol. 4, pp. 136–37.
55. "Wei guquan daju wanjiu wei wang Zhu, Peng, Ye, Xiang fu He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi jiadian," in *ibid.*, pp. 204–8. The telegram was originally published in the weekly journal *Jiefang*, no. 120. The journal was originally published in Yan'an on 24 April 1937 and ceased publication in May 1941. A total of 134 issues were published.
56. "Zhonggong zhongyang fayaren dui wannan shibian fabiao tanhua," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1145–48.
57. Gu Zhutong was commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone; Shangguan Yunxiang was commander-in-chief of the Twenty-second Group Army.
58. The order of 17 January was issued by Chiang Kai-shek in the name of the military council of the national government.
59. This blockade line was built around the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, and it continued from Ningxia in the west, along the Jingshui River in the south, and ended at the Yellow River in the east.
60. "Zhongyang guanyu wannan shibian de zhishi," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1143–45.
61. Also referred to as the Organization Clique. It was run by the brothers Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu.
62. The tripartite pact among Germany, Italy, and Japan signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940.
63. "Zhongyang guanyu Xiang, Yuan cuowu de jue ding," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang. (neibu ben)*, vol. 11, pp. 599–601.
64. "Guanyu kangri genjudi junshi jianshe de zhishi," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 344–49. The directive was issued in the name of the Central Military Affairs Commission.
65. "Zhongguo gongchandang guanyu Su-Ri zhongli tiaoyue fabiao yijian," in *ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 1161–63. The statement was originally published in *Jiefang*, no. 127, and *Xin Zhonghua bao* (New China Daily), 16 April 1941. It was a Xinhua News Agency press release. On 29 January 1937, the paper *Hongse Zhonghua* (Red China) changed its name to *New China Daily*.
66. "Zhongguo gongchandang wei Taipingyang zhanzheng de xuanyan," in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), 10 December 1941.

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Commentary G

Establishing the Orthodoxy, October 1939–April 1945

Toward the end of 1941, the CCP leadership faced major problems, and it seemed as though yet another crisis would have to be weathered. Militarily, except for the Shaan-Gan-Ning the base areas were being squeezed by the Japanese troops. This, in turn, had economic repercussions. The Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region was still suffering from the effects of the GMD blockade. Within the party, Wang Ming's organizational power base had been undercut but his influence had not been completely eroded. Further, the expansion of party membership and the existence of Yan'an as a focus for resistance to the Japanese had brought its own problems. Many intellectuals and patriots had come to Yan'an because they wanted to wage war against Japan, not because they were attracted by communism. The "storm membership drives" brought many new recruits into the party without proper screening. Many of these were not well versed in Marxism-Leninism or about the party's ultimate aims. To Mao and his supporters it was clear that if the CCP was to remain a coherent fighting unit a certain degree of ideological orthodoxy was necessary.

(a) Party History and Party Education— The Background to Rectification

First, an orthodoxy had to be defined and a basic set of policies laid down. If the new orthodoxy could be defined in such a way as to give Mao a central role in the CCP's revolutionary history, this would provide him with the legitimacy necessary to secure an unchallengeable leadership position. Mao as the correct interpreter of the past would become the ideological authority defining the present and future course of the revolution. In this endeavor, he was supported by other influential leaders such as Liu Shaoqi. It was necessary to define a common party history around which party members could rally. For the present, it was necessary to devise a common policy program that was flexible enough for party officials working in a variety of environments to be able to apply it. These processes culminated in the Rectification Campaign (*Zhengfeng yundong*, September 1941 to 1944).¹

As has been already noted, the rewriting of party history had already proved to be a contentious issue with the clash between Liu Shaoqi and the Party Center in mid-1937 (see above, **Doc. E.22**). At this time, the suggestion to revise the official view that the political line during the period 1931–34 was correct was resisted. By the end of 1939, Mao was willing to accept Liu's criticisms, and on 4 October Mao

wrote that there had been problems with “left” opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the white areas (see above, **Doc. F.7**). It is unclear whether Mao had not shown approval of Liu’s position earlier because it was not politically opportune. However, the usefulness of such a position was now clear to Mao so long as the Party Center was blamed and not his “local” leadership in Jiangxi. Liu repeated his criticisms in a speech on 20 October 1939 (**Doc. G.1**). In a wide-ranging speech on the questions of open and secret work, Liu criticized those who after 1927 had pursued “leftist” policies and failed to protect the party’s strength. The mistakes had devastated the party’s organization and led to a feeling of pessimism in the party.

On 25 December 1940, Mao drafted an inner-party directive summarizing current policy in which he repeated more forcefully his criticisms of leftist mistakes during the later Jiangxi period. In particular, he highlighted the mistaken policies toward landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists; the attacks on intellectuals; the monopolizing of organs of political power by Communists, etc. He characterized the policy as “all struggle and no alliance.”² Clearly, a major component of Mao’s purpose in pointing out these problems was to prevent them from recurring during the renewed phase of collaboration with the GMD. However, it was also useful to him in his struggle to discredit Wang Ming and to install himself as the correct interpreter of the CCP’s revolutionary history. That many party leaders realized that this was also Mao’s objective is shown by the fact that although the draft directive was passed by the CC, the view that Wang Ming’s “political line” was wrong met opposition.³

The existence of such opposition caused Mao to organize a program of study for high-level cadres to impart to them the “correct view” of party history. Some 120 cadres began study of “line” and “rectification.” To give the process direction, Mao personally began to edit a collection of documents summing up his view of theory and party history. Apart from the twenty-two study documents that formed the basis of the Rectification Campaign, Mao also supervised the editing of two collections of documents on party history. *Liuda yilai* (Since the Sixth Party Congress) was published in December 1941, and *Liuda yiqian* (Before the Sixth Party Congress) was published in October 1942. These comprised important reading material for senior cadres during the coming Rectification Campaign.⁴ The materials contained in the two volumes were already being circulated before the formal publication of the collections, and this provided important preparatory work for the September 1941 Politburo meeting.⁵

On 5 May 1941, Mao delivered a speech to these high-level cadres at a study conference in Yan’an (**Doc. G.2**). In his speech, Mao pointed out that the party still suffered from “very great shortcomings” that had to be redressed.⁶ Mao highlighted three areas that needed study: current affairs, history, and the practical application of Marxism-Leninism in revolutionary work. The last area posed the greatest problems. According to Mao, especially with respect to the application of theory, the returned students and middle- and high-level cadres were the most susceptible to a

“subjective attitude.” This criticism was clearly addressed to Wang Ming and his supporters. There was still opposition to Mao’s ideas, and the speech was not published until 27 March 1942.

However, the speech was not without effect as it set the political terrain for the ensuing period. To celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the party’s founding (July 1941), *Liberation Daily* (Jiefang ribao) published an editorial on the subject of combining the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the realities of China’s situation. The article also referred to the undaunted leadership of Mao Zedong over the last twenty years!⁷ On the same day, the CC adopted a decision on strengthening party spirit (**Doc. G.3**). The decision stated that unless the party was “strengthened, unified, and centralized,” it would be unable to fulfill its mission. The dispersed nature of the party as it engaged in guerrilla warfare in the countryside meant that many “small producers and intelligentsia” had joined the party. This made it easy for tendencies such as “individualism,” “heroism,” antiorganizational attitudes, “independence,” and “anticentralism” to develop. Such tendencies could be seen in the following: independent political action, the creation of personal loyalty systems, and the development of a petty bourgeois individualistic ideology. To overcome these tendencies, it was necessary to emphasize the importance of the spirit of party unity and central leadership. All resolutions and decisions were to be properly observed, and errors were to be corrected quickly. Finally, party discipline was to be strengthened since it was seen as a necessary condition for victory.

A clarion call for unity had been made, and it had been made clear that ideology would provide the basis for it. It was not yet clear, however, what the content of this ideology would be or what policy actions would flow from it. These would be settled in the next phase of the movement.

Starting on 10 September 1941, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo was convened, and this marked the effective launch of the Rectification Campaign.⁸ The meeting discussed the question of how genuine party unity could be achieved. In this respect, two major issues were debated: first, how cadres could grasp the linking of Marxist-Leninist theory with the concrete situation in China, and second, the correct interpretation of party history and “political line” during the 1927–37 period were discussed.

In his speech to the meeting, Mao referred to the Li Lisan and the “left” opportunism of the later soviet period as representing examples of subjectivism (**Doc. G.4**). Mao claimed that the latter had inflicted the greater damage on the movement. He felt that despite the corrections introduced at the Zunyi Conference, subjectivism in the ideological sphere still influenced work in Yan’an. Mao traced this subjectivism to three factors: “leftism” in the Chinese tradition, the influence of people such as Bukharin and Zinoviev within foreign traditions that had influenced the movement, and the petty-bourgeois nature of China that derived from a lack of scientific development. Rounding off his speech, Mao outlined the methods that would be used in the Rectification Campaign such as recognizing the seriousness of subjectiveness, clarifying the difference between Marxism and dogmatic Marxism, expos-

ing the qualifications of those whose theory was divorced from practice, and dealing with sectarianism.

Mao was supported by Wang Jiaxiang, who pointed out that in the past Mao had upheld the dialectical materialist viewpoint in the party at large while Liu Shaoqi had done so in the “white areas.”⁹ The meeting made three decisions relating to the early 1930s, but they were not made public: first, that from the Fourth Plenum (January 1931) until September 1931 the political line of the Party Center had been basically correct although there had been serious mistakes; second, from 18 September until the Zunyi Conference, the Party Center had pursued an incorrect line whereas, third, after Zunyi, the line had been correct.¹⁰ The decisions thus ducked the key question of the role of the Fourth Plenum itself, the focus of the wrath in the resolution on party history adopted in 1945.

In line with Mao’s comments to the meeting, the “education” of high-level cadres was stepped up and formalized. On 26 September 1941, the Central Secretariat published a decision on organizing study for high-level cadres.¹¹ This decision outlined the objectives of the study, the scope and number of those who should participate, the method of study, and the contents of and the relations between the leading and the locally set up study organizations. It suggested that some 300 cadres from the CC, central departments and bureaus, regional or provincial party committees, and leaders of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should participate. One-third of those engaged in study would be in the Yan’an. Finally, it confirmed that Mao Zedong would head the central study organization with Wang Jiaxiang as his deputy. All the other study organizations were to come under the jurisdiction of this central organization.¹²

On 17 December 1941, the Politburo passed a decision concerning the Yan’an Cadres School.¹³ It pointed out that the main problem with the school was “the discrepancy between what is studied in theory and applied in reality, and the grave errors of subjectivism and dogmatism.” To resolve these problems, the decision stressed the need for students to learn how to apply Marxism-Leninism to the practical problems of the Chinese revolution. This required further study of China’s own history. Furthermore, the decision outlined precisely the role of the different schools in Yan’an. Finally, the decision stated that its general principles were valid for all the base areas. The movement had now identified its first set of targets and established an organizational structure for study with Mao Zedong in control.

(b) Peng Zhen’s Report on the Jin-Cha-Ji—September 1941— The Formation of a Moderate Economic Policy

While these moves were being undertaken to tighten up party education, new economic and administrative policies were being developed. Mao still needed a set of concrete policies to implement in the base areas. In his search he was greatly aided by Peng Zhen. Sometime in September 1941, Peng Zhen presented a detailed report to the Politburo on the situation in the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) Border

Region (**Doc. G.5**).¹⁴ This no-nonsense report by Peng was divided into two sections, the first on policy questions and the second on party construction. The report is a careful analysis of the situation in the region and provides the basis for policy formulation. Peng's report shows how the policies such as rent and interest reduction and popular elections had allowed the party to penetrate into local society and increase its influence. The extract included here is taken from the first part of the report and addresses the issue of the construction of political power in the base area. In addition, Peng's comments on the general characteristics of people from different classes are included.

Peng's main concern was the problem of how to build political power in the base area in such a way that party committees would be able to retain control of the policy process in the decentralized and fragmented situation. His intention was to break up the old power structure but to do so without alienating the powerful traditional elite. It was necessary to give it a stake in the running of the base area while at the same time making sure that the party could guide the political process. The old system was to be replaced with a system of village councils. These councils would then provide the local administrative officials. This indirect system would prevent the traditional village leaders from automatically ensuring their election to official positions. They would be forced to ally with others within the councils, where the CCP would have an automatic one-third representation.¹⁵ However, this system of popular elections to village councils required a widespread expansion of party organization in the villages combined with well-organized, politically aware masses. Further, by abolishing the requirement that candidates for positions as district or county head have at least two years' administrative experience, Peng opened up candidacy to a wider group than the old administrative elite. Peng was quite aware, however, that the "three-thirds" system of government could not be rigidly applied. Rather, it was to form a general guideline for political power. Indeed, Peng even suggested that in those areas where CCP members won over one-third of the seats, a number of them should resign.

Peng Zhen also provided a great deal of detail on economic policy in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. He stated that the clear intent of economic policy, at that time, was to fulfill fully the needs of the people and the military. This had the consequence that the "only correct policy" was to "inspire the initiative and spontaneity in production on the part of small producers and private entrepreneurs." Thus, agriculture, industry, and commerce would be privately managed by small-holding peasants, artisans, and merchants. State-owned industry, with the exception of the armaments industry, would only play an extremely small role. In fact, Peng graphically dismissed developing a huge number of state-owned industries as trying to build a "skyscraper on shifting sands" or "painting a cake to prevent hunger." Thus, Peng warned against applying Soviet-style "planned" and "organized" economic laws. Peng suggested, however, that cooperatives should be expanded greatly. This was a line of argument that Mao would later reinforce. Cooperatives were described as an "economic pillar" to "smash the manipulation of speculative mer-

chants" and were seen by Peng as the way to gain dominance in the economic sphere.

Peng Zhen's report provided just the kind of "local proof" that Mao needed. Unlike the harsher atmosphere that was to reign within the party, economic policy showed continued commitment to building alliances with nonparty elements. The more moderate approach to economic affairs was reinforced by the harsh economic difficulties facing the border region by the end of 1941. Radicalization within the party was not allowed to spill over to economic policy. On 28 January 1942, the Politburo approved a CC decision on land policy in the base areas (**Doc. G.6**), which was designed to appeal to all classes in the rural areas. Although the peasants were described as constituting the "basic strength" of the resistance effort, most landlords were described as being anti-Japanese, and even some of the gentry were said to be sufficiently enlightened as to support democratic reform. After rent and interest reduction had been completed, landlords were to be assured that they would receive outstanding monies. The decision pointed out that in areas where this policy had been carried out more extensively, participation by the local population in the War of Resistance had been greater. Further, the decision recognized that the capitalist mode of production was "the more progressive method" in China and that the bourgeoisie, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, was a relatively progressive force. In short, the decision was an appeal for even-handed treatment by local officials of the different classes in the base areas under CCP control. Excesses such as those that had occurred in the Jiangxi Soviet were to be avoided.

On 6 February 1942, the CC issued a directive on how the decision should be implemented, explaining to party members why the current policy was necessary.¹⁶ The directive acknowledged that current economic policy was essentially capitalist in its direction. In addition, it suggested that some landlord powers should also be protected. The policy was summed up as being 70 percent capitalist and 30 percent feudal. Politically, the "three-thirds" system of government was to be used to assure the landlords and capitalists that they would have a future. Alliance with the landlords and war with Japan were described as the party's strategic policy. The party felt that the landlords had to be given a stake in the base areas to prevent them from allying with the enemy and diehards. Finally, these new policies were seen as a way of giving the party a chance to win back those elements that had already gone over to the other side.

Mao Zedong had paid very little attention to economic affairs in his own writings. He set this to rights with a major report to the senior cadres' conference of the CCP's Northwest Bureau in December 1942 (**Doc. G.7**).¹⁷ The report provided a summation of economic work to date, and based on those experiences it set forth the principles for future work. The section included here is taken from the chapter on the development of cooperatives. In general terms, the report was a response to the economic crisis that was facing the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, and in line with the united front approach, Mao sought to bring together all groups to play a role in strengthening the local economy. As Mao acknowledged, improving the standard of living of the local population was the key to engaging its help in the War of Resistance.

According to Mao, the only way in which living standards could be raised was through the development of the private sector, essentially the agricultural, handicraft, and commercial sectors. Thus, the positive role that rich peasants could play was acknowledged, and previous "leftist" deviations that had frightened the peasants into not producing for fear of being labeled as enemies was criticized. Party officials and the army were to cease to be a burden on the local economy by trying to achieve self-sufficiency in production by running their own agricultural, industrial, and commercial undertakings. As Watson notes, this program did not amount to a "fundamental transformation of the structure of the economy but rehabilitation, growth and limited reform."¹⁸

Thus, Mao followed Peng Zhen's reasoning in his September 1941 report by stressing that policy was to promote a mixed economy that would even acknowledge a certain level of exploitation. Rich peasants would be able to employ immigrants as hired hands, which was justified by the overwhelming stress on the need to develop production. Mao hoped that, in turn, these hired hands would accumulate enough capital to begin farming for themselves. To raise productivity, Mao sanctioned the use of mutual-aid teams for exchange and contracting of labor. These teams were to build on the traditional methods of cooperation such as pooling of labor or animals or the hiring of labor teams. They were to evolve voluntarily and were not to be forced on the peasantry. However, the party sought to draw this form of cooperation out from short-term, seasonal cooperation to broader-based long-term cooperation.

For the most part, while the party simply tried to ensure that the market operated smoothly, it did try to stimulate the development of consumer and producers' cooperatives, a measure that had been proposed by Peng Zhen. As his model, Mao put forward the Southern District Cooperative. The ideal form was for the cooperative to be owned and controlled by peasant shareholders. Mao saw this form of economic organization as linking the activity of the government and that of the people, with their management expected to look after the interests of the shareholders and find ways to implement government policy. As Mao pointed out, the cooperative, in the midst of a small-scale peasant economy, was to play a pivotal role in implementing the government's economic policies and in organizing and encouraging people to develop the economy.

Finally, Mao stressed the need for party, army, and government to strive for self-sufficiency. Mao noted that the army was the best in self-sufficient production because of its labor power and organization. As a model, Mao put forward the experience of the 359 Brigade and its Nanniwan farm to the south of Yan'an. Mao's report included detailed outlines of the 359 Brigade's experience to date and its plans for 1943 for other units to study. According to Mao, the brigade had grasped the primary importance of agriculture, thus ensuring that the economic base would rest on a secure foundation. This base had been used to develop industry and handicrafts, transport, and a commercial outlet. The experiences of the 359 Brigade were promoted as a model in the communist press.

(c) The Campaign to Reduce the Administration

The economic blockade also led to a campaign to try to reduce the size of the bureaucracy and the regular military organizations while improving their overall quality. With the base areas shrinking, it was not possible to maintain such a large administration. This campaign was known as “Better Troops and Simple Administration.” The policy itself was adopted by the Border Region Assembly of Representatives in November 1941 and promoted throughout the administration from December onward.¹⁹

On 4 December 1941, the border region sent out a directive to all counties concerning the movement (**Doc. G.8**). The directive highlighted two main problems in the administrative structure. First, it was top-heavy. It was claimed that at the top there were too many people and organizations while at the lower levels the quantity and quality of cadres was lacking. This meant that in some places good policies were not being implemented. This top-heavy structure was to be corrected by transferring down senior personnel and decentralizing some decision-making powers. The directive pointed out, however, that only a limited number should be transferred from the county level to the village level. In the military, the surplus officials could be transferred to production work as a part of the drive for self-sufficiency. Second, the directive stated that government work at all levels had to be systematized in order to improve it. The lack of a clear system was creating problems. To guide the movement, a rectification committee (*bianzheng weiyuanhui*) was set up to be in charge of the investigation and rectification of government organs, the merging or abolition of superfluous organs, and cadre reallocation.

It proved difficult to reduce the size of the bureaucracy and the number of officials. As a result, the official media published frequent reminders on the importance of the campaign.²⁰ In January 1944, Li Dingming summed up the campaign to the Border Region Assembly of Representatives (**Doc. G.9**). In addition to the successes, Li outlined various problems that would require further attention. In particular, he highlighted the need to strengthen political power and to create more model villages. Also, he called for better supervision of cadres working in financial and judicial departments, as this was a relatively weak link in government work and had been disrupted by traitors and spies.

(d) February 1942—Study Broadens to Rectification of the Party

In the early months of 1942, the education campaign was broadened from a study movement for senior cadres to the Rectification Campaign for the whole party. The signal widening the movement was given in two speeches by Mao on 1 and 8 February 1942 to the Central Party School in Yan'an. These two speeches identified three mistaken tendencies within the party: subjectivism, sectarianism, and formalism. Included here is the speech of 1 February that dealt with the problems of subjectivism and sectarianism (**Doc. G.10**). The two speeches criticized two

groups in Yan'an: first, the intellectuals who had recently come to Yan'an and lacked practical revolutionary experience and, second, and initially more importantly, Wang Ming and the Russian returned students. This latter group, despite having substantial revolutionary experience, derived authority from its understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory. Although Wang Ming's organizational base had been effectively destroyed, many of his supporters remained in key positions in the propaganda apparatus. Mao had to neutralize their possible challenge by putting forward a view of revolutionary theory that would deemphasize "pure book knowledge" and stress the application of theory to the practical tasks of the Chinese revolution. This would enable Mao to present himself as the revolution's foremost source of theoretical wisdom. At the same time, Mao sought to end the intellectual diversity in Yan'an by proposing obedience to a new orthodoxy. The party under Mao would provide the direction for the revolution, and the role of its intellectuals would not be to examine it critically but to proselytize it faithfully.

Mao began this process with his 1 February opening address to the Central Party School in Yan'an. He asserted that recently the party's general line had been correct but that problems remained because "progress" on the theoretical front had been "extremely inadequate." Mao outlined three incorrect tendencies within the party: subjectivism in learning, sectarianism in party work, and formalism in propaganda and literary work. Mao saw subjectivism as the core of these problems; indeed the other two faults could be traced directly back to it. There were two types of subjectivism, namely, dogmatism and empiricism. Mao clearly did not wish to be accused of rejecting theory. He acknowledged that one's "immediate perception" was limited and thus only through theoretical study could experiences be raised to "the level of reason and synthesis, the level of theory." Of the two types, however, Mao identified dogmatism as the most dangerous tendency.

This line of attack was clearly directed against Wang Ming and his supporters. In the same talk, Mao claimed that it would be irresponsible to call oneself a Marxist if one had only studied the Marxist classics and had not used them as the basis for understanding China's specific conditions and to "create our own specific theory in accordance with China's practical needs." China needed the kind of theorist who could apply the standpoints, concepts, and methods of Marxism-Leninism to China's actual problems. "The arrow of Marxism-Leninism," to use Mao's classic phrase, "must be used to hit the target of the Chinese revolution."

In the second part of the talk, Mao turned to the problem of sectarianism. He criticized those party members who put their own particular interests above the party's. Subjugation of one's own interests to those of the party would ensure unity of action and help the party achieve its "fighting objectives." This led Mao to argue that while the party needed democracy, it needed centralism even more urgently. For Mao, the spirit of unity was necessary for "the people of the entire nation." Only if this were achieved would it be possible to defeat the enemy.

Finally, Mao put forward the principles to be observed when attacking erroneous tendencies. Criticism of the past was to serve as a warning for future actions. Mao

likened the process to a doctor curing a disease; the objective was not to kill the patient but to cure the symptoms so that the diseased party member would be able to become a good comrade once again.

In his talk on 8 February, Mao took up the issue of party formalism in a clear attack on Wang Ming and the returned students.²¹ According to Mao, those guilty of subjectivism and sectarianism used party formalism as their propaganda tool and form of expression. Mao traced the three incorrect tendencies within the party to a petty-bourgeois mentality that had penetrated it from society at large. In his attack on party formalism, Mao highlighted the problem of “foreign formalism.” He claimed that although the eradication of “foreign formalism” and “dogmatism” were called for at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC (October 1938), “some comrades” were still advocating them. In May, Mao would return to the broader question of the relationship between intellectuals and the party and that of the correct policies for art and literature.

Through the remainder of 1942, the scope of the movement was gradually broadened and resistance to proper study in the Rectification Campaign was challenged. On 28 February, the CC issued a resolution dealing with those cadres who could not attend the party schools. This resolution pointed out that although the call had been made in 1938, the training of the 90 percent of cadres who could not attend party schools had not begun in some localities and departments. To give them a proper education, the Propaganda Department under Kai Feng was called on to devise procedures for party, military, and political organizations to “carry out the education of cadres on the job.”²²

On 3 April, the Propaganda Department published a report on the Rectification Campaign (**Doc. G.11**). The report raised the campaign to a new level by organizing the study program providing precise timetables and a list of recommended works for study. The report again highlighted the resistance to carrying out the movement properly. The report noted that the CC had stipulated a three-month period for study by all organizations with the exception of the party schools, where the period was only two months. This was to be followed by a period of investigation, criticism, and self-criticism. During the final stage, conclusions, reports, and recommendations were to be made. Importantly, for the first time it was officially recommended that works by Mao Zedong form a core component of the study materials. Of the twenty-two documents approved for study, six were by Mao. This was the same number as the materials by the Soviet writers Lenin, Stalin, and Dimitrov. While this marked a considerable increase in Mao’s influence, it did not indicate sole control by Mao over the movement. The report stressed the primary role of the CC, the Politburo, and the Northwest Bureau of the party. As is discussed below, however, the Northwest Bureau had become a key institutional support for Mao.

Materials chosen for study written by Chen Yun and Liu Shaoqi instructed party cadres on basic facts about Leninist organization, the rights and duties of party members, and questions of party struggle. On the whole, the fact that such basic information needed to be conveyed showed the low level of knowledge of most party cadres.

Included here is Liu Shaoqi's important speech of 2 July 1941 to the central China branch of the party school (**Doc. G.12**). Following his letter of March 1937, Liu had devoted considerable attention to the question of how inner-party struggle should be conducted. Given the increasingly heterodox nature of the party, Liu sought to reaffirm the correct Leninist form of the party by explaining to members what the proper role of inner-party struggle was. Liu highlighted the need for "rigorous self-criticism" and "continuous inner-party struggle on two fronts" against right and left opportunism. This would purify and strengthen the party. According to Liu, the highest leading organs of the party had corrected their errors, but certain middle- and lower-level organizations were still prey to incorrect tendencies. In this sense, inner-party struggle was not a search for truth *per se* but a way to rid the party of contaminating bourgeois, liberal, and other incorrect ideas. Given the precarious situation in which the party found itself, however, it could not allow this ideological tightening up to break out into open warfare, and thus Liu sought to outline the pitfalls and excesses to be avoided in the process of inner-party struggle. The matter only concerned the party, and thus dirty linen was not to be washed in public. The struggle was to concern principles, not personalities, and basic principles, not just tactics, where there was legitimate room for disagreement. To push struggle so far would be to commit "left deviation." By contrast, burying away differences would lead to "rightist deviation." The program outlined by Liu, while pointing out the need for orthodoxy, was mild in its remedies. Persuasion was to be used to win waverers over to orthodoxy. Interestingly, Liu describes party education as a comparatively mild form of inner-party struggle.

On 8 June 1942, the Propaganda Department issued a supplement to the April directive on how the Rectification Campaign had proceeded to date and how it was to be developed (**Doc. G.13**). Summarizing the experiences of the study program in Yan'an, the directive concluded that it was "extremely necessary" for the whole party to engage in study of the twenty-two documents. To help, the directive put forward a number of supplementary measures. The Center was to set up a general study committee to guide all study in Yan'an. Each department and unit was to set up a study branch. The general study committee was to be headed by Mao Zedong, with Kang Sheng as his deputy. The committee was to convene a study meeting for senior cadres in Yan'an either weekly or fortnightly. All who could read were to participate in the study movement by attending small groups. The importance of the twenty-two documents was indicated by the fact that all other study in cadre schools was to be stopped temporarily. To facilitate study, work hours were to be reduced. For example, in Yan'an, mornings were set aside for such study. The directive made it clear, however, that this could only be arranged in accordance with local conditions. It was not to be forgotten that a war was being fought! Finally, the study period was to be increased from four to five months, again in accordance with local conditions. It was expected that this new organization would enable some 10,000 people to participate in the study.

A number of problems arose in the study movement, and these were highlighted

in a *Liberation Daily* editorial of 5 June 1942 (**Doc. G.14**). Among the problems singled out were: the tendency to focus on particular words and sentences in the documents rather than seeking to understand them as a whole; not engaging in self-examination; trying to hide from rectification; senior leaders not paying enough attention to study. In summarizing experiences to date, the editorial noted that the “most important factor” was leading cadres. It was claimed that only if they studied seriously could the movement be carried out properly.

With party rectification broadening its scope, on 1 September 1942 the CC issued a resolution to try to reassert party control over the other organizations in the areas under its jurisdiction (**Doc. G.15**). During the phase of rapid expansion, an *ad hoc* government structure had grown up, mass organizations had expanded, and military committees had increased their power. The overriding need was now to provide “unified leadership” in the base areas by asserting overall party leadership. “Unified leadership” was essentially a code word legitimizing party domination of all other structures. The resolution outlined new organizational measures to overcome “subjectivism and sectarianism” and the insubordination of local units that “interfere with the maintenance and establishment of anti-Japanese war bases and with our party’s progress in Bolshevization.” To that extent, the resolution abolished all former local party political and military committees, leaving the party committee at each level as the highest leading authority. The hierarchical chain of command within the party was stressed to ensure that lower-level party organizations would obey the higher. To ensure party control over the military, secretaries of local party committees were to serve concurrently as political commissars of the local military districts or subdistricts.

In governmental affairs, the “three-thirds” system was reaffirmed. Party leadership was to cover matters of principle, policy, and political orientation, but the party was not to monopolize affairs. Party committees and organs were not allowed to give direct orders to representative assemblies and government organs. As the resolution made clear, the purpose of this “unified leadership” was to make the fight against the Japanese more effective—“everything bows to the demands of war” was defined as the highest principle of unified leadership.

The party not only needed to rectify its organizational structures, but also needed to propagandize its policies to the populations under its control. To realize this dissemination, the party needed literate and dedicated propagandists. By early 1942, however, even the left-wing intelligentsia in Yan’an was proving to be just as lacking in unity as the local party committees.

(e) Wang Shiwei Writes Critically on Yan’an—Mao Zedong Lays Down Policy for Literature and Art—March–June 1942

In May 1942, Mao outlined his views on the problematic relationship between the party and the intellectuals with his talks on party policy for art and literature. Yan’an had experienced an influx of intellectuals who saw the CCP as providing

the best vehicle for national salvation but who were not necessarily willing to commit themselves to the party's ideological rigor. Many wanted less interference by the party in cultural and intellectual activities, more opportunities for debate, and greater tolerance of differing viewpoints. They also wanted greater freedom to criticize publicly the malpractices they witnessed in Yan'an than the party was ultimately willing to accord them. A group of party intellectuals spoke up in March 1942 and published their views in the Yan'an press, and during April–June 1942, the party leadership under Mao had to shift the focus of its criticism away from Wang Ming and the returned students toward these independent-minded writers.

While Ding Ling attacked male dominance and sexism in Yan'an society, Ai Qing confessed that he could not describe "ringworms as flowers." The main critic was Wang Shiwei, who published two articles that drew the wrath of the top party establishment for their exposure of the habits of the new ruling elite in Yan'an.²³ In his article "Wild Lilies," Wang attacked the inequalities that were being perpetuated in Yan'an and were leading to the undermining of the enthusiasm of the youths (**Doc. G.16**). In this, and his other contemporary writings, Wang clearly saw himself as contributing to rectification by exposing the defects in Yan'an.²⁴

While Wang recognized that life in Yan'an was still "superior" to that in the "outside world," he felt that it could and should be better. He chided the authorities that it was not enough simply to say that Yan'an was better than the world outside and that the problems were "nothing to worry about." The particular focus of this attack was the ranking system in Yan'an and the structural inequalities which it produced. Wang felt that it was unnecessary and irrational to divide clothing into three and food into five grades. It simply created resentment. According to Wang the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his worth" meant that those with greater responsibility should consume more. Wang suggested that an "ironlike unity" and a more "profound love" would be produced if cadres were willing to share weal and woe with the ordinary rank and file. Similarly, Wang opposed making the income differentials too great for those serving in government under the "three-thirds" system. While nonparty members should have slightly better treatment, party members should shun this and by example draw more people over to the revolutionary cause.

Such attacks drew the wrath of the party elite, and the intellectuals came under attack for their "petty-bourgeois mentality." Almost all of the writers attacked renounced their previous views, the one notable exception being Wang Shiwei.²⁵ Indeed, Ding Ling and Ai Qing even denounced Wang. Wang was attacked in the communist press and was put on quasi-trial for his views. Eventually, Wang was executed during the forced evacuation of Yan'an in 1947.²⁶ It had not been easy to get people to criticize Wang immediately, however, and there were difficulties in arranging meetings. Even Mao admitted in April 1945 that Wang's views had had a powerful impact in Yan'an.²⁷ Wang became the focal point of a strong campaign by the party leadership to eradicate his influence. However, it was more than just an attack on an isolated individual. As Cheek notes, Wang was one of the "last speak-

ers for the cosmopolitan strain of May Fourth intellectual experimentation inside the CP.”²⁸ His purge and public humiliation was thus necessary as his approach clashed with the party’s drive to create a new orthodoxy.

Wang was attacked both in the press and in struggle meetings at his place of work, the Yan’an Central Research Institute. The press article included here is by Chen Boda and is interesting not only because Chen was Mao’s secretary and thus probably reflected his views, but also because he was a colleague of Wang’s and the two had already clashed in 1941 over the appropriate form of literature for the party to promote.²⁹ The attacks on Wang were also important as they established the prototype for the form of denunciation that culminated in the Cultural Revolution in China (1966–76). It was not enough just to attack a person’s ideas; it was necessary to show that the person concerned was thoroughly evil and had always been so.

Chen Boda’s article of June 1942 provides a good example of this kind of attack (**Doc. G.17**). Chen claimed that while Wang liked to use high-sounding phrases about himself, the truth was the opposite. Wang was said to have a “very dirty soul” and to exhibit “all the filthy ingredients found in humankind.” Referring to “Wild Lilies,” Chen claims that Wang’s true intent was not to propose genuine equality but to use this as a way to pull others down while promoting himself. Using character assassination, Chen began to discredit the ideas of Wang. Finally, Chen linked Wang to the mythical demons of the revolution—the Trotskyites. For Chen, Wang did not represent the power of light but the forces of darkness, and he sought to lead the youths of the revolution astray.

Wang was also attacked through struggle sessions attended by his colleagues. The contemporary account by Wen Jize outlines the process of the struggle session held at the Central Research Institute from 27 May until 11 June 1942 (**Doc. G.18**). This account provides a perfect description of what was to become a standard form of meeting to denounce and humiliate enemies of the party leadership. The thrust of the criticism was that Wang’s actions had been anti-party and that his views were Trotskyite. On 10 June, Wang’s case was turned over to the party committee of the Central Research Institute with the recommendation that he be dismissed from the party. The coup de grâce was delivered the following day when his former colleague the critical intellectual Ding Ling denounced Wang and made a self-criticism of her own outspoken views. Wang was thus turned into an outcast and made an example of for other writers who might challenge the emerging party ethos.

The campaign to silence the writers had to be accompanied by delineation of a “correct theory” for the party on the role of art and literature. This was unveiled by Mao Zedong in his opening and closing address (2 and 23 May 1942) to the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art (**Doc. G.19**). The speeches were not published, however, until 19 October 1943, thus indicating that opposition to his policy may have persisted within the party at large.³⁰ According to Mao, literature and art were not independent of politics. As the party decided correct politics, this effectively meant that literature and art would have to serve the revolutionary tasks prescribed by the

party at any given time. For Mao, there was no abstract love, freedom, truth, or human nature. Those who believed this had been deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie. There were only specific forms belonging to specific classes at specific times. Thus, “art for art’s sake” that could transcend the class or party or be independent of politics did not exist. It was subordinate to a class or party in society. The role of literature was to reflect these differences and not to cloud them over by writing about universal qualities. Literature and art were primarily for workers, peasants, and soldiers and secondarily for the petty bourgeoisie. In the situation in which the party found itself in the base areas, the writer’s task was not to show up its negative side but rather to extol its virtues. The shortcomings in the party’s work would be dealt with by the organization itself and not through a public airing in the press. Criticism should be reserved for the Japanese and the areas under GMD control. Further, Mao effectively identified the party’s leaders with the masses. The leaders could collect the masses’ opinions, distill them, and present them to the masses in an acceptable and practical form. Thus, an attack on party leaders was an attack on the masses. Mao stripped Wang Shiwei of his idea that the politicians should look after the revolution’s material forces while the artist should look after the revolution’s soul.³¹

**(f) The Northwest Bureau Conference—
October 1942 to January 1943**

During the critical years while preparing and launching rectification, Mao received strong institutional support from the CCP’s Northwest Bureau and personal support from its key figure, Gao Gang. Mao had already spoken favorably of Gao Gang’s knowledge of local conditions when launching the Rectification Campaign.³² From 19 October 1942 to 14 January 1943, the Northwest Bureau convened an important meeting for some 267 leading cadres from various organizations. The ground had been well prepared, and as Gao Gang’s summary report showed, the conference made decisions that reinforced Mao’s view of party history, exerted his supremacy over Wang Ming, and supported his view of economic and administrative affairs (**Doc. G.20**).³³

The conference was addressed by nearly all the CCP’s top leaders with the exception of Wang Ming and his supporters. On 17 and 18 November, Gao Gang delivered his report on the question of party history in the border region.³⁴ The conclusions drawn were a vindication of Mao’s position over Wang Ming’s, and Gao’s approach served as a model for the general task of revising party history.³⁵ An important part of Mao’s “revision” of party history was to establish that errors of political line had been committed in the period prior to the Zunyi Conference, a point first made by Liu Shaoqi.

During the early and mid-1930s, Gao Gang, Liu Zhidan, the head of the local movement, and the other local party comrades had found themselves in a position similar to Mao’s in Jiangxi. Gao and Liu had clashed with the emissaries from the

Party Center, Guo Hongtao and Zhu Lizhi, who had tried to force on them a change in their guerrilla tactics and to submit them more tightly to Party Center control. This clash came to a head in the summer of 1935, when the local party and military organizations were shaken up and the local comrades excluded from top leadership positions. In the ensuing arguments, 100 locals were purged and many were imprisoned, including Liu and Gao. When Mao and the other Long March survivors arrived on the scene, an investigation was ordered and Gao, Liu, and the others were released.

In his speech, Gao sought to vindicate his previous policies and to denigrate those of the representatives from the Party Center. The charges made by Gao were almost identical to those that Mao would level against Wang Ming and his supporters. Gao accused Guo and Zhu of committing the mistake of "left deviation" prior to 1935 and then "right opportunism" after the united front policies went into effect. Gao thus forged an identification of interest between the history of the Shaan-Gan-Ning area and Mao's own experiences in Jiangxi. With the Northwest Bureau as a very powerful organizational base in the party, Mao could push ahead with his rectification policies.

In the spring of 1943, Mao was able to consolidate his power in the top party leadership, and in July campaigns began to promote Mao as the supreme leader, a tendency that was already signaled in Gao Gang's report. From 16 to 20 March the Politburo met to discuss the question of strengthening party centralized leadership and adopted the "Decision on the Adjustment and Simplification of Central Organs."³⁶ The meeting decided that between CC meetings, the Politburo would lead party work and would have the power to decide on major questions. All questions concerning ideological, political, military and organizational policy had to be discussed by the Politburo. The Secretariat was subordinated to the Politburo and was to carry out its day-to-day work. The Secretariat had the power to make decisions on problems that came up in this work so long as the decisions were in line with Politburo policy. Mao Zedong was made chair of the Secretariat, with Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi as the other members. Crucially, the meeting also decided that the chair would have the final power of decision on matters to be discussed at Secretariat meetings. Mao was also made chair of the Politburo. Considerable formal power was now placed in his hands.

To concentrate and solidify power further, the meeting made the decision to set up a propaganda committee and an organizational committee under the Politburo and its Secretariat.³⁷ Mao was appointed secretary of the propaganda committee³⁸ with Wang Jiaxiang, Bo Gu, and Kai Feng as the other members; the administrative secretary was Hu Qiaomu. The secretary of the organization committee was Liu Shaoqi with Wang Jiaxiang, Chen Yun, Zhang Wentian, Deng Fa, Yang Shangkun, and Ren Bishi as the other members. Mao now had a dominant position in the party with powerful organizational support from the Northwest Bureau and the "white" party apparatus and key supporters such as Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi in leading positions.

**(g) The Abolition of the Comintern—May 1943—
Underlines the Independence of the CCP**

The adulation of Mao that was launched from July 1943 onward, however, also owed its origins to external factors as well as to the dominance of the party apparatus by Mao and his supporters.³⁹ By February 1943, the war in Europe had turned a vital corner; the German assault on the Soviet Union had been halted and repulsed. This seemed to indicate that the war would ultimately be resolved in favor of the allied forces with obvious implications for the war with the Japanese in China and the Pacific region.

In this changed international environment it seemed necessary to begin to think about a postwar China and who would be running it. Chiang Kai-shek made his bid for further international recognition as the leader of the nationalist cause in China with the publication of his *China's Destiny* on 10 March 1943. Perhaps some of the CCP leaders were swayed to the idea of building a cult of Mao to counter that being created around Chiang Kai-shek. Finally, the dissolution of the Comintern freed the CCP from any need to bow in its direction and reaffirmed what was already a reality for Mao and his supporters: that the CCP should get on with creating its own revolution on its own terms. Also, it undercut any last possible support base for Wang Ming and his followers. On 15 May, as a goodwill gesture to the Soviet Union's allies in the war, the Comintern was dissolved. It would have appeared unseemly to have an organization dedicated, on paper at least, to mobilizing the national CPs to overthrow the governments of its allies.⁴⁰

On 26 May, after the CCP had received the news, the Politburo met to discuss it and in the name of the CC issued a decision on the matter (**Doc. G.21**). Not surprisingly, the decision wholly agreed with the abolition of the Comintern, pointing out that this would strengthen the local CPs by making them “even more nationalized.” Such a leading center was no longer considered necessary and, interestingly, the decision pointed out that the Comintern had not interfered in CCP affairs since 1935. The need to assert the continued and strengthened role the CCP would play without the Comintern was further necessitated by the calls by some CCP domestic critics that it could now disband.

**(h) The Seventh Plenum—May 1944 to April 1945—
The Maoist Reassessment of History Accepted**

The twenty-second anniversary of the founding of the CCP provided the opportunity to launch two initiatives that would dominate the ensuing period. These were the public building up of the person of Mao Zedong and the revision of party history to show the central and correct role Mao had played in that history. These two initiatives were signaled by Liu Shaoqi in an article published on 6 July 1943 (**Doc. G.22**).

Liu attacked what he termed “false Marxists” (“Mensheviks”) and praised “true

Marxists" ("Bolsheviks") and called for an eradication of the influence of the first group through the provision of a "correct," Marxist-Leninist interpretation of CCP history. Liu criticized the tendency of some only to "learn the lessons of the revolutionary experience of comparatively distant foreign countries." As bad examples in the past Liu lists Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi, and the Chinese Trotskyites, the Li Lisan line, the "left" opportunism of the Civil War period, and dogmatism. Instead, he called for a Marxist-Leninist summary of China's own revolutionary experiences. Central to this process was Mao Zedong, whose "guidance" was to "penetrate into all working sections and departments." The future task was to "take stock of the party's historical experiences, especially of the struggle between two lines to teach our cadres and comrades." In a eulogy that placed Mao at the center of China's party history, Liu stated that all party members should "diligently study and master Comrade Mao Zedong's doctrines of the Chinese revolution and other subjects. They should arm themselves with Mao Zedong's thought and use Mao Zedong's system of thought to liquidate Menshevik thought in the party." Now that Mao had been placed at center stage in CCP history, it remained to lay down exactly what that history had been.

During 1943, party rectification intensified and fused with the movement to investigate the background of cadres. In December 1942, party organs were to have begun with the "investigation of cadres' histories" but the work only formally began in April 1943.⁴¹ This investigation was concerned with protecting the party against presumed GMD and Japanese supporters who had used the CCP's more relaxed policies to infiltrate the movement. In the summer, when the GMD began what the CCP termed the "third anticommunist upsurge," the movement intensified.

The August 1943 CC decision on "cadre screening" formally linked this movement with rectification (**Doc. G.23**). The decision called for the two campaigns to run until 1944 and noted that about 2,000 Nationalist agents or other hostile elements had been investigated in the "cadre screening" movement in Yan'an and some 4,000 in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. While some do seem to have been executed and torture was used in extracting confessions from others, it was not a wide-scale bloody purge.⁴² Indeed it seems that despite calls for the carrying out of rectification and "cadre screening" in the other base areas, the effect was very limited by comparison with what happened in Yan'an.

From 21 May 1944 until 20 April 1945, the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth CC was formally in session, although it only met on eight occasions.⁴³ The Plenum was to prepare the long-postponed Seventh Party Congress. To this end, it set up three drafting committees for the political and military report and the report on the revision of the party Constitution. The Plenum adopted two important resolutions; one concerning party work in the urban areas and, by far the more important, one on party history.

In a speech to senior cadres in Yan'an on 12 April 1944, Mao summarized his, and the party leadership's, views on the questions of work in the cities and party history.⁴⁴ In anticipating the end of the war, Mao called for work to be stepped up in

the urban areas and along the main lines of communication. Unless the people in these areas rallied around the party and preparations for insurrection were made, Mao felt that the army and the rural base areas would be confronted by many problems in the future. According to Mao, the insurrection policy called for at the Sixth Party Congress (1928) would be carried out after the forthcoming Seventh Party Congress.

The Seventh Plenum of the Sixth CC issued an instruction on this problem on 5 June 1944 (**Doc. G.24**). That same day, the plenum set up a fourteen-person urban work committee.⁴⁵ The instructions put forward two key tasks. First, the CCP had to take over the leadership position in the large cities and along communications lines in order to expel the Japanese invaders. Second, work in the urban areas had to be united with that in the base areas. In the urban areas, the masses were to be prepared for armed insurrection. Investigation and preparations were to begin immediately so that by the second half of the year or by early 1945 “outstanding achievements” would be made. Further recognition was given to the importance of work in the urban areas in a CC instruction of 4 September on the establishment of urban work departments at all levels above the local party committee. This instruction placed work in the base areas and the urban areas on an equal footing.⁴⁶

Mao’s view of party history had gradually been gaining ground in the party apparatus through the education and rectification campaigns. A Politburo meeting, or series of Politburo meetings, held from early September to November 1943 marked the final phase of Mao’s attempts to have a new party history accepted.⁴⁷ Now the focus of criticism was made clear: Wang Ming and Bo Gu. To facilitate intensified study, new collections of materials were produced, and key figures delivered speeches that both outlined the framework of the resolution that was adopted in April 1945 and that distanced themselves from Wang and Bo.⁴⁸ At the end of the year (28 December), directives went out to senior leaders on the question of Wang’s and Bo’s “sectarian, opportunist mistakes of line.”⁴⁹

It is important to note that in official documents the origin of Wang Ming’s “leftism” was now pushed back to the Fourth Plenum rather than adhering to the previously accepted date of 18 September 1931. How easily this new assessment was accepted by veteran cadres is difficult to assess. However, those veteran cadres who may have harbored doubts would have kept them to themselves. For the large number of cadres who had joined the party since the beginning of the Second United Front, it was in a sense prehistory. Having undergone the Rectification Campaign, they were probably quite willing to accept Mao Zedong’s guidance on historical matters. The dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 aided this reassessment. No longer was there an organ in Moscow to which dissenting party members could address an appeal.

In his speech to the senior cadres’ conference, Mao summarized the winter discussions of the senior party cadres. His comments provided the basis for the resolution on party history adopted at the Seventh Plenum. While critical of Wang Ming and his supporters, Mao accepted that their leadership at the Fourth Plenum

(January 1931) had been legally established and that therefore they would not be criminally punished. Mao was careful not to emphasize individual responsibility for these mistakes. Mao reaffirmed that the party had taken the correct path since the Zunyi Conference and that, at the present time, there were no major deviations from the party line. The only major problem was the “mountain-stronghold” mentality that still persisted in some areas. Mao noted that from 1935 to 1937, there had been a struggle to overcome “left deviation,” while in the following period until 1940 it had been necessary to overcome “right deviation.” During the years 1941–42, the main problem had been “ultraleft deviation.” In his speech, Mao noted that the Politburo was primarily concerned with reviewing party history before Zunyi. In fact, the resolution adopted at the Seventh Plenum only concerned the pre-1935 period and stated that decisions on post-Zunyi history would be decided at an appropriate date.

On 21 May, at the opening session of the Seventh Plenum, a special committee to draft the resolution and take care of any necessary revisions was ratified. This committee had already been appointed by the Secretariat on 10 May. Initially, it comprised Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, and Ren Bishi.⁵⁰ On 19 May, Bo Gu was added while Hu Qiaomu also helped in the work of preparation.⁵¹ Ren bore the prime responsibility, and the draft was revised fourteen times during the second half of 1944.⁵²

The final version of the resolution was passed by the Plenum on 20 April 1945 (**Doc. G.25**). The resolution analyzed party history up until Zunyi, but unlike Mao’s speech of 12 April did not venture any opinion on affairs after that date. While the resolution identified three “left lines” in the period from 1927 to Zunyi, it is clear that the major focus of attack was the third “left” line said to be in operation from the Fourth Plenum until the Zunyi meeting. For the first time in such an official document, Wang Ming and Bo Gu were named as the “two dogmatists” leading the mistaken line. In the interests of party unity, it was important that Bo Gu and Wang Ming be seen to agree to the contents of the resolution. While Bo had joined the drafting committee, Wang was sick and therefore marginal to the discussions. However, he did send a letter to the Plenum accepting the resolution.⁵³

After a historical review, the remainder of the resolution is devoted to a criticism of the political, military, organizational, and ideological line of Wang and his supporters. The errors outlined are contrasted with the correct line developed by Mao Zedong. Their mistakes in their political, military, and organizational lines were deemed to derive from ideological errors based on their subjectivism and formalism and in the even more pronounced form of dogmatism. Politically, they were said to have been confused about the different stages of the democratic and socialist revolution. This meant that they underestimated the role to be played by the peasantry and often proposed an attack on the whole bourgeoisie, including the petty bourgeoisie. In fact, the third “left line” was even said to put the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In military affairs, they were said to have rejected guerrilla warfare as the

correct form of struggle in favor of positional warfare. In general, the “left” lines were said to have created a sectarianism that alienated the masses within and outside the party.

The resolution thus served to demonstrate the correctness of Mao’s principles and line vis-à-vis his opponents throughout the crucial years of the early 1930s. It also cemented the alliance between Mao and Liu Shaoqi. While Mao was praised in general and specifically for his line developed in the base areas, Liu Shaoqi’s line was hailed as the model for work in the white areas, marking the vindication of Liu’s criticisms of eight years earlier.

By the end of the Rectification Campaign, a stable and unified leadership had been created, something that was essential for a vanguard Leninist party. This unity was no longer based on an abstract theory but on a theory that Mao felt suited Chinese realities and that could provide party cadres with a guide to action. It provided a system capable of maintaining central control combined with sufficient flexibility to encourage the local initiative essential for the fragmented existence of the CCP and the Red Army.⁵⁴ Finally, the movement had left Mao with unprecedented power. It now remained for Mao’s leadership and his views to be accorded legitimacy through acceptance by a full party congress.

Note: I would like to thank the University of Washington Press for permission to use their translation for the basis of the texts produced in documents G.2, G.3, G.11, G.12, G.15, and G.22; I would like to thank Harvard University Press for permission to use the text for documents G.6, G.10, and G.19; I would like to thank Professor Andrew Watson and Cambridge University Press for permission to reprint the text in document G.7; and I would like to thank Gregor Benton and the editors of Pluto Press for permission to reprint the text in document G.16.

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DOCUMENTS OCTOBER 1939—APRIL 1945

G.1 On Open and Secret Work. *Liu Shaoqi* (20 October 1939)⁵⁵

I. The Origins of Open and Secret Party Operations

Our party represents the most progressive class in history—the proletariat. The classes that have lost their historical, progressive significance are our enemy. Since we are progressive, we do not need to deceive the masses and can tell them the truth. We do not, however, yet possess an advantage in terms of strength. Our enemies must deceive the masses, but they enjoy an enormous advantage in political, military, economic, and cultural spheres. Thus, although it is advantageous for us to undertake open work, the enemies' strength forces us to adopt secret work and even to go underground. Party activities should be as open as possible, and secret activities are only conducted out of necessity. Our party's purpose is to defeat the enemy; both open and secret work are needed and thus they are inseparably connected and must be coordinated.

II. Open and Secret Operations in Different Periods

At different stages and in different places these two kinds of operations enjoy a different relationship. Three periods: (1) the party operates underground when it is illegally suppressed. While secret activity is the main form, we should pay attention to the possibilities for legal and semilegal work. (2) The party operates legally when it is recognized despite having the status of an opposition party. Some operations are legal and open, some illegal and secret. The former are the main form. (3) When the party is the ruling party, its existence, organizations, and operations are all legal. Some legally sanctioned secret activities may still be necessary because domestic and external enemies continue to exist. (1) In areas ruled by the Japanese imperialists and Chinese traitors, the party works in absolute secrecy but, where possible, open and legal operations should be conducted. (2) In areas ruled by allied parties today our party's activities can be legal. Yet, we do not have complete, legal status. (3) In areas like the Shaan-Gan-Ning, our organization and operations are all legal and open. Because of enemies without and spies within, some departments must still conduct secret operations.

III. The Distinction Between Open and Secret Work and Their Interaction

The party's tactics during a given historical period may change even though the strategic task remains the same. It must "adapt to practical situations," maintain

maximum flexibility, and oppose rigidity and formalism. We should study the concrete situation to see which kind of work we should adopt. Then we can decide which kinds of activity can be conducted openly and which secretly. The limits on legality of the activities of the oppressed revolutionary classes and parties can be altered: they may be changed by the rulers, and the revolutionary forces may increase in strength (the greater the strength, the larger the scope of legality). The situation can change rapidly and unexpectedly. Mass struggles also change frequently in character. The shift from secret to open operations is usually made under favorable circumstances, while the reverse is generally made under unfavorable circumstances. It is easier to shift from secret to open operations.

IV. How an Illegal Party Can Make Use of Legal Possibilities

Even during a reactionary period, individual party members can participate in all kinds of legal activities while the party itself operates in secrecy. This will help us maintain contact with the masses and retain our influence and enable us to strengthen and consolidate the secret party. A secret party that hides itself away is the party that is most easily defeated. Comrades working in legal groups, etc., must not reveal their party membership, must use appropriate identities, and must retain the necessary ties with the party's secret organization (unnecessary ties should be cut).

V. Rules for Secret Operations

When the party works underground, party membership is secret and must keep in touch with the party's leading organs secretly. In addition to joining open and legal groups and agencies and working among the masses, however, there must be one group of party members especially responsible for secret operations, the organization of the party's secret organs and their establishment (for example, running secret publications, communications, and the party's leading organs). These aspects of secret operations must be carried out by special personnel (mainly professional revolutionaries) and not by the party members responsible for open operations. The style for secret operations is completely different from that for open operations. The work-style for open operations among the masses must never copy that used for secret party work. Generally, secret operatives should not reveal themselves among the masses or directly command the mass struggles, but should work hard in secrecy over the long term. While it is extremely important to distinguish, both in terms of personnel and work-style, between these open and secret operations, there should be certain forms for linking them. Mixing up personnel and work-style will create enormous dangers for an underground party. Not only will it damage secret operations and party organs, but it will also harm open operations and organs.

The rules for the party's secret operations, secret organs, the mutual links between personnel and their relationship with open organs and personnel must strictly

adhere to given regulations. Moreover, there must be strict discipline to ensure the enforcement of these regulations. Because of the enemy's presence and the existence of spies within party organizations, any negligence of secret operations will cause the party enormous losses. There must be strict discipline to ensure the complete implementation of all regulations and the appropriateness of the secret operations.

Regulations for secret operations include the following: (1) all party members and cadres should only know what it is necessary rather than what it is possible to know. [The party] is not allowed indiscriminately to pass on party secrets to comrades to whom they are not relevant or to try to find them out when it is not necessary. (2) There must be detailed regulations concerning the relationship between a certain party organization or member and his superior or subordinate organizations or other members. Except when necessary, there must be no horizontal relationships. (3) There must be regulations governing various secret codes, substitute words, marks, time, and other technical aspects. (4) Participants must not leak matters discussed at party organization meetings except to those who must be informed. (5) No personal or geographical names or numbers may appear in written reports and documents. There should be no list of party members and cadres. When records must be made, substitute terms are to be used. (6) As a rule, there need not be any documents about secret party work. If they are necessary, the documents should not leak concrete details about the party's secret operations. They must be burned immediately after being read. No party secrets must be revealed in party publications and propaganda. (7) As a rule, the party's secret organizations should be compact; they must never be bloated and disorganized; unnecessary acquaintance among comrades should be avoided. (8) All party members should do their best to maintain their individual legal status and let the smallest possible number of people know that they are party members; this also applies to details about family and personal background. (9) Specific methods for the party's secret operations should not, in general, be communicated within the party.

Strictly distinguish between open and secret operations, and strictly regulate the links between them. Strictly implement all manner of regulations for secret operations and raise inner-party vigilance to the highest levels. This will make it difficult for the enemy's spies to operate within the party. Thus, sabotage in the party will not involve the entire party.

The objective of secret operations is to preserve and consolidate the party during the reactionary period, to evade spies and the attention of the reactionary forces on the practical work of our individual departments, and to prepare for victorious revolutionary raids. In secret operations, therefore, we must avoid making those empty "revolutionary" calls (verbal and written) that are devoid of any practical meaning. Such calls only raise the vigilance of the reactionary forces and their level of attention, thus damaging our secret operations and achieving nothing of real practical revolutionary importance. We must never treat such empty and meaningless calls as propaganda work intended to disseminate our party's political views.

The former should be opposed, while propaganda is absolutely necessary insofar as it does not compromise our party's secret operations.

When the party's secret organizations are directing comrades involved in open operations, they must clearly understand the position and difficulties of these comrades. They should only be given tasks that are manageable and that can be fulfilled. These comrades face one major difficulty. There is a contradiction between the illegal nature of their work and the legal forms adopted, and there is an indispensable connection between their public positions and their secret party organizations. Therefore, there must be a limit to the tasks given to them by an illegal party to be fulfilled in a legal manner. If excessive tasks are handed down, they will not be able to use legal means to fulfill them.

Where the environment demands absolute secrecy, the party should transfer the bulk of its work to the party's secret branches in factories, workshops, agencies and rural villages. We should do our utmost to send competent comrades to these secret party branches and reduce our dependence on guidance from superior secret agencies. Thus, the task of preserving and consolidating the party may be fulfilled more easily, and party operations may be expanded in a significant way.

VI. The Struggle Between Two Lines on This Issue

When the revolution develops to a critical stage and the party organizations have gone underground, there will be no new revolutionary high tides. This raises the issue of preserving and consolidating the party. In distinguishing between open and secret operations, we must observe a strict division of labor and follow regulations. Frequently in this period two incorrect tendencies occur within the party: one is right liquidationism—legalism; the other is "left" liquidationism—illegalism.

What is legalism? Those who propose legalism believe that during this period of suppression, the party should not conduct an illegal struggle and activities, but should only conduct a legal struggle and activities. Within the legal scope allowed by the enemy forces they limit the activities of the party and the mass revolutionary struggles; they abandon and reject operations using secret methods and illegal struggles. They are frightened by the enemy's policy of terror and become its captive. They engage in illegal activities to gain a legal status for the party. During the periods of white terror, however, it is impossible to legalize a revolutionary political party of the working class; this would be a total fantasy. For an underground party, such legalistic thinking is a kind of liquidationism. As the principal form of the party and the revolutionary classes' struggle are illegal during this period, the rejection of secret operations and illegal struggles is tantamount to abolishing not only party work but even the party itself.

These legalists do not understand that the party's original tasks, programs, and fundamental revolutionary slogans should not be abandoned or reduced when its struggles do not bring about the revolution's victory, or before the revolutionary tasks have been fulfilled, or when the party has entered a long period of secrecy. We

need to change only the party's work-style—the means and concrete ways to fulfill these objectives, programs, and basic slogans. Legalists, however, are unwilling to change the party's work-style or conduct secret operations; they are only willing to abandon and diminish the party's programs and slogans and to accept the laws of the reactionary forces. This is to abandon the revolution. In this way, they turn into liquidationists of the revolution.

What is “leftist” liquidationism—illegalism? The opposite of legalism, it is another extreme of legalism. Those who propose this think that all the work of an underground party must be carried out secretly under all conditions; all the activities of party members should be illegal ones. They think that no legal struggle during this period is possible, that for the party to adopt legal forms of struggle under certain conditions or for party members to join and organize legal groups and publications amounts to “opportunism and legalism” and “a form of struggle that conceals class consciousness.” Even though they also join or organize some legal, gray groups, their objective is to overthrow and subvert these legal, open groups, turning them into illegal, secret organizations. During this period they oppose the utilization of legal possibilities and all kinds of open operations and legal forms of struggle. They restrict the work and activities of the party and the revolutionary classes within narrow, secret scopes, severing the ties between the party and the masses and depriving the party's secret organizations and agencies of the protection of open agencies and mass organizations. This makes it easier for the enemy to compromise the party. Therefore, such illegalism is another form of liquidating the party and the revolution, as well as a kind of “left” liquidationism.

Such “leftist” liquidationists do not understand that when the party is forced to go underground for a long period, although the unfulfilled basic revolutionary tasks of the party remain unchanged, the party's work-style must change—specific methods and courses of action must be adopted to fulfill these tasks. They do not change the form of struggle and the party's work-style, while insisting that only the one illegal and secret form of struggle should be waged under all kinds of conditions. They oppose and undermine those open and legal groups that become, during the reactionary period, the critical leverage points and strongholds of the party. Thus, apart from sabotaging party work, they are incapable of fulfilling any of the tasks of the party and the revolution. Therefore, they are “left” liquidationists.

Lenin, in his writings, fought a two-line battle to preserve and consolidate the party. According to Lenin, everything else had to be subordinated to this task. Both “left” and right liquidationists seek to limit the activities of the revolutionary classes and their political parties. Lenin expelled both right and “left” liquidationists from the party.

VII. The Experience and Lessons of the Chinese Party on This Question

Apart from guerrilla warfare, the Chinese party also has many experiences derived from the long period of underground operations. The Chinese party also once raised

the principle of the line between open and secret operations. It opposed legalism and liquidationists; but within our Chinese party two erroneous ways of thinking—right and “left” liquidationism—also arose.

Chen Duxiu’s liquidationists and some legalistic Marxists represent right liquidationism. They believed that after the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the Chinese bourgeoisie had won “victory” in the revolution and that the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution had been completed, thus accomplishing the old revolutionary task. They thought that anti-imperialism and antifeudalism were no longer the central tasks of the Chinese revolution and that China was going to embark on a long period of peaceful development of capitalism. During this period, the proletariat would mainly wage legal struggles; the main form of struggle was participation in the reactionary national assembly, forming the opposition. They opposed illegal forms of struggle and even objected to revolutionary guerrilla warfare at that time. Other legalistic Marxists refused to take part in any illegal struggles or secret operations. They only did some editorial work within very strict legal confines. Our party once expelled such liquidationists; now many of them have become vicious counterrevolutionaries.

On the other hand, some comrades within our party made the mistake of “left” liquidationism. The origin of such mistakes is the disease of petty bourgeois rashness and a mechanical rigidity within the party, as well as the incorrect estimation of the revolutionary situation and the current balance of power between the classes. Because of the deficiency of the ideological struggle against such “left” liquidationism within the party, such mistakes persisted for a long time and caused the party severe losses. How does one determine the viewpoint of such “left” liquidationists?

A) When the party goes underground for a period of time, they deny that preservation and consolidation of the party is the basic task. Further, they deny the necessity of conserving and accumulating revolutionary strength. Before each mass revolutionary action, they deny the necessity of seriously evaluating the balance of power between the classes and the relations between them.

B) They oppose all legal forms of struggle and open operations. They view all legal forms of struggle and open operations as “legalism.” They believe that the party should adopt illegal forms of struggle and secret operations and that all its actions must be illegal regardless of the actual circumstances. They oppose making use of legal possibilities. They wage a struggle against legalism within the party. Usually, what they oppose is not genuine legalism, but the utilization of possibilities of legality which the party must emphasize at that time.

C) They believe that under the white terror, legal forms of struggle are impossible or that there are very few opportunities to make use of them and thus they are not worth emphasizing. They do not realize that the fewer such opportunities for legal actions, the more they should emphasize the use a secret party should make of them. [[Lenin is quoted in support of the criticism.]]

D) In fact, they oppose using the clauses beneficial to the party in factory and labor union laws drafted by the government. They deny that such beneficial clauses

have been won by the workers through their long bloody struggles (though small, they are very important to the working class). Instead, they raise the slogan of "oppose the factory laws and implement the soviet labor law." They do not understand that, at the time in question, the call to implement the soviet labor laws in large cities amounted to an empty and ridiculous slogan (please note that this amounts to propagandizing, not implementation). Further, even where possible, they oppose organizing open groups of the workers, regarding and rejecting such open groups as "the fence-sitting labor union that is neither yellow nor red, nor the third kind of union." They have an unusual distrust of the working class and fear that if the workers and the masses wage a joint struggle, organize and participate in legal groups, the class consciousness of the workers will be reduced. [[Lenin is quoted in support of this criticism.]]

E) They very mechanically and erroneously apply the saying "we should not lower the party's programs and slogans in order to become open" to the public and legal mass groups and publications. Instead, they demand that these groups and publications raise the same illegal programs and slogans as those of the party, and adopt the same illegal attitude, language, style, and working methods as the party to conduct their business. This turns these public and legal groups into a second party. Moreover, they demand that all public, legal, and neutral mass organizations without exception be turned into illegal red labor unions. On this point, they do not understand the difference between the party and mass organizations, or between openness and secrecy.

F) They deny the difference between secret and open operations and mix and equate them. They appoint heads of secret agencies to positions in open agencies; they work in the open agency in the morning and in the secret agency in the afternoon. Many mass organizations and operations that can be openly organized they make secret and force them to copy the party's work-style. This expands the secret agencies while leaving none that are really open and legal. In the party's publications, they publicize various kinds of secret activities conducted by the party among the masses. This proves a help to spies and informers and provides the enemy with countless opportunities to compromise the party. After completing the abolition of open operations and turning mass organizations into secret ones, the party's secret operations become "open secrets." Open and secret operations and the party and the mass movement will all be destroyed.

G) They never compare secret operations with open ones, but only do so with our work among the masses. They say, "Only when the mass movement is well organized can secret work be done well." They never think about how to organize the mass movement properly under the prevailing conditions. They do not understand that though secret operations are closely connected with the mass movement, they are after all two distinct matters. They have their own course of development; the two are not completely identical. If the party's secret operations are poorly conducted, they may, under certain conditions, undermine open operations among the masses. At the same time, when open operations among the masses develop to a

certain stage, they may also compromise secret operations. Sometimes, to preserve our party's strength and its secret fortresses among the masses, we must set considerable constraints on our work among the masses.

The above shows that, although the Chinese and Russian "left" and right liquidationists have their own distinct characteristics, they have many things in common. The difference is that the Chinese party has failed to overcome swiftly the mentality of "left" liquidationism. This should be a serious lesson. As Lenin said, such mistakes mean that "it is absolutely impossible to preserve the backbone of the proletarian revolutionary party." This is precisely one of the principal reasons for the sacrifice of the majority of the party in the white areas.

The Chinese "left" liquidationists also formally oppose legalism and right liquidationists, but they do so (i) from the incorrect standpoint of "left" liquidationism; and (ii) therefore, they oppose not only legalism, but mainly such actions and thoughts that correctly support coordination between open and secret operations. Apart from their various incorrect "leftist" actions, not only are they incapable of opposing legalism in practice, but they also greatly help the legalists and right liquidationists, thus providing them with all kinds of excuses to attack and slander the party. Under certain conditions, their extreme "leftist" thinking can transform into extreme rightist thought. In the previous period with the conflict between the two regimes and the white terror in China, they even thought that it was impossible to preserve and consolidate the party. A large majority of the party organizations in the white areas were destroyed and countless comrades lost their lives. Yet, this was not inevitable and could have been avoided. They were caused entirely by objective difficulties. Therefore, their mistakes may also be unaccountable. Of course, this amounts to an extreme rightist position. The nature of this rightist tendency can also be exposed when party members are forced to wage an extensive and cruel armed struggle. At this time, the previous "leftist" characters again demonstrated that they did not have sufficient confidence or guts to define and lead this kind of truly great mass revolutionary struggle. This was proved again in the party work after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war.

VIII. Some Conclusions

It is extremely important and critical for every underground party to make use of legal possibilities and coordinate correctly open and secret operations. Numerous mistakes of principle on this issue not only fail to help the party prepare effectively for the revolution under conditions of secrecy, but also make the preservation and consolidation of the party impossible. Today, there are many comrades within the Chinese party who do not sufficiently understand the importance of this issue. They often treat this critical question as a technical one. The Chinese party has already paid an enormous price on this question. However, the importance of the issue has not been reduced within the Chinese party. Every cadre must carefully study this issue, not only to understand past lessons, but, more importantly, to better carry out

future operations. We rarely see documents that systematically study this issue either at home or abroad. Thus, it is very important for us to study it systematically both in theory and in practice.

G.2 Reform Our Studies. *Mao Zedong* (5 May 1941/1 February 1942)⁵⁶

I propose the reformation of the method and system of study in the entire party. Here are my reasons:

1) During the twenty years of the CCP's existence, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has been brought into an ever-closer relationship with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution. In retrospect, we see that in our party's first period our knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was extremely superficial and meager and that it is now a great deal more profound and a great deal richer. While the Chinese people have experienced deep adversity during the past 100 years, outstanding personalities have struggled and sacrificed, stepping forward to take the places of those who have fallen, groping for the truth which would save the nation and the people. The story is both sad and glorious!

It was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia, however, that the highest truth of Marxism-Leninism was found and fashioned into a surpassing weapon for the liberation of our people, and that the CCP took up this weapon as leader, propagandizer, and organizer. Once the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism was brought into a relationship with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution, the Chinese revolution was given a new face. Since the War of Resistance began, our party, on the basis of the universal truths of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, has progressed in its research on the concrete realities of the War of Resistance and on China and the world of today; there have also been the beginnings of research on the China of yesterday and the day before. All these are excellent signs.

2) We still have shortcomings, however, and these shortcomings are very serious. In my opinion, if we do not correct these shortcomings, there will be no way for our work to progress and no way for us to progress in our great task of relating the universal truths of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution.

I wish to speak first on the study of current affairs. Despite the fact that ours is a political party of great size and that it has made certain achievements in its study of current domestic and international affairs, the materials collected are still fragmentary and our research work is unsystematic in regard to domestic and international affairs, domestic and international politics, military affairs, economics, and culture. Generally speaking, during the last twenty years we have not done a systematic and thorough job of collecting materials and emphasizing research on these topics, and

we have lacked the substantial spirit of investigation and research on objective conditions. “Closing the eyes and grabbing at sparrows,” “blindly groping for fish,” finishing work in a crude manner, chattering boastfully, feeling satisfied with incomplete comprehension—these evil tendencies, which are in complete opposition to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism, still persist with many of our party comrades. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us to study conditions conscientiously and to take real, objective conditions and not subjective hopes as a starting point. Many of our comrades, however, act in direct opposition to this truth.

Next, let us discuss historical research. Although a few party members and a few of our sympathizers have done work of this type, they have generally not done it in an organized manner. No matter whether the subject is Chinese history of the last 100 years (yesterday’s history) or of ancient times (history of the day before yesterday), many comrades’ minds are still shrouded in darkness. When many scholars of Marxism-Leninism speak, they must talk about Greece; they can only repeat quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from memory, but about their own ancestors they have to apologize and say they’ve forgotten. It is not only the spirit of study on contemporary affairs which is insubstantial, but also the spirit of historical research.

Next, in regard to the study of international revolutionary experience and the study of the universal truths of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, many comrades act as if it were for the sake of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin that we study Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and not for the sake of the reality of the Chinese revolution. They therefore study a great deal, but fail to digest; they are very capable of quoting Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as evidence, but they are unable to use the standpoints and methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for concrete research on contemporary Chinese affairs or Chinese history and for concrete analyses of the problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude toward Marxism-Leninism is extremely harmful; the damage is especially great for cadres above the middle level and for students.

The three conditions I have described above—failure to emphasize the study of current affairs, failure to emphasize historical research, and failure to emphasize the application of Marxism-Leninism—are all extremely harmful tendencies. If tendencies of this type spread, they will harm a great many of our comrades.

At present there are actually many comrades in our rank and file being ruined by such tendencies. They are unwilling to do systematic and thorough investigation and research on concrete national or international conditions, or on concrete conditions within or outside of the province, county, or district, yet they command and issue orders based on nothing more than half-knowledge and “probabilities.” Doesn’t this subjectivist tendency still exist among many of our comrades?

They are not ashamed but proud when they understand very little or nothing about their own history. They really understand very little about the especially important history of the CCP or Chinese history for the 100 years since the Opium War. Simply no one has moved a muscle to do research on the economic, political, military, or cultural history of the last 100 years. Many are ignorant of anything

which is their own, yet hold on to Greek and foreign tales (they are nothing more than tales) which are pathetically abstracted and presented from a pile of old foreign papers. For the past few decades, many returned students have been making this mistake. They return from Europe, America, or Japan, and all they know is how to recite a stock of undigested foreign phrases. They function as phonographs but forget their own responsibility to create something new. The CP is also infected with this disease.

We study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, yet the methods of many of our comrades in studying Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are in direct opposition to those of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. That is to say, they violate a fundamental principle of the repeated warnings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin: the union of theory and practice. Since they violate this fundamental principle of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, they therefore advance an opposing principle of their own: the separation of theory and practice. In school education and the education of cadres in service, they do not instruct students of philosophy to study the logic of the Chinese revolution, they do not instruct students of economics to study the characteristics of the Chinese economy, and they do not instruct military students to study the military characteristics of China; it is the same in everything, and as a result, mistakes are spread far and wide. What is learned in Yan'an cannot be applied in Li County. If a teacher of economics cannot explain the border region currency or national currency, it is only natural that his students cannot explain them either. Seventeen- and eighteen-year-old babies are taught to nibble on *Das Kapital* and *Anti-Dühring*. Thus many students develop an abnormal outlook; they have no interest in Chinese problems and pay no heed to party instructions. Their inclination is to regard what they have learned from their teachers as never-changing dogma.

Naturally, the cases I have described above are extreme, and I do not mean to say that they apply universally. Yet the cases do exist, and, what is more, they exist to a considerable extent; the harm they cause is quite extensive, and they cannot be treated lightly.

3) In order to clarify this thought further, I would like to compare two mutually contradictory attitudes.

First is the subjectivist attitude.

Those who maintain this attitude fail to carry out thorough, systematic research on their environment; they merely do their work with subjective enthusiasm, paying no special heed to present-day China. Those who maintain this attitude fragmentize history; they do not understand China, but only Greece. They are completely in the dark about the China of yesterday and the day before. Those who maintain this attitude study the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin abstractly and aimlessly, and do not inquire about their connection with the Chinese revolution. They do not seek their standpoints and methods in Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the purpose of resolving the theoretical and strategical problems of the Chinese revolution; it is merely theory for the sake of theory, Marx and Lenin for the sake of Marx and Lenin. This is not shooting the arrow at a target, but shooting it without a target.

Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us to start from objectively existing reality, to extract the regulating laws therefrom, and to make them a basis for our actions. In order to attain this objective, we have to obtain an intimate knowledge of the material and submit it to a scientific analysis and synthetic research. Many of us do not do this, but instead do the very opposite. In this group are many engaged in research, but they are, on the whole, not interested in research on the China of today and yesterday but show their interest in ready-made books. Many who are engaged in practical work do not give their attention to a study of objective conditions and as a rule rely only on their enthusiasm and make their impressions a guiding policy. Both types rely on subjectivity and disregard objective fact. If they make a speech, it is a string of A-B-Cs and 1-2-3s. If they write an essay, it is a lot of hot air. They fail to seek truth from facts, try to gain favor by rousing the mob, are all ornament and no substance, brittle and nondurable, are always right, the world's best, imperial commissioners with the power to soar through the heavens.

These are the tendencies of some comrades in our rank and file. If you let these characteristics regulate your conduct, you do yourself harm. If you adopt them in teaching, you harm others. If they are adopted in leading the revolution, the cause of the revolution is harmed. In short, this antiscientific, anti-Marxist subjectivist methodology is a great enemy of the CP, the proletariat, the people, and the nation. It is the expression of an impure party spirit. When we are faced with great enemies, we must annihilate them. Only if subjectivism is annihilated can the truth arise, the revolution triumph, and the party spirit be strengthened. If there is not a scientific attitude, or if there is not a completely scientific attitude, i.e., if there is an attitude which does not, or does not completely, unite Marxist theory with reality, then there is no party spirit or the party spirit is not complete.

There is a couplet which accurately describes this type of person:

On the wall, the reeds—heavy heads, light feet, shallow roots;
In the mountains, the bamboo—sharp mouth, thick skin, hollow inside.

Look at those with nonscientific attitudes, those who only know how to recite dogma, those who are students in name only, and those who make a joke of Marxism-Leninism. Do they resemble you? If any of you actually intend to cure your own illness, I advise you to remember this couplet, or, if you're a little more daring, paste it on the wall of your room. Marxism-Leninism is science, and science is serious learning; there is no getting around it, we still have to be a bit more serious.

Second is the attitude of Marxism-Leninism, the attitude of dialectical and historical materialism.

Those who maintain this attitude carry out thorough systematic research on their environment. They do not rely on their own enthusiasm in their work but unite revolutionary enthusiasm with a practical spirit. Those who maintain this attitude do not fragmentize history and want to understand not only Greece but also China, not only the history of the revolutions in foreign countries but also the history of the

Chinese revolution. They want to understand not only today but yesterday and the day before. Those who maintain this attitude have a goal in studying Marxism-Leninism; they want to relate it to the actual Chinese revolutionary movement in order to solve the theoretical and strategical problems of the Chinese revolution, and in Marxism-Leninism they seek their methods.

To maintain this attitude is to shoot the arrow at a target. The "target" is the Chinese revolution; the "arrow" is Marxism-Leninism. We Chinese Communists have no other purpose in seeking the "arrow" than to strike at the "target" of the Chinese revolution and the revolution in the East. Otherwise, this "arrow" would be nothing more than a curio which serves well as a plaything but has no practical use whatsoever. Those who maintain this attitude seek truth from facts. "Facts" refers to objectively existing reality. "Truth" refers to the inner relationships in objective reality, that is, its subjection to law. "To seek" means to study. We should start with actual conditions within and outside of the country, province, county, and district and derive, not concoct, the inherent regulating laws, which means that we should find the inner relationships in the events around us and make them our guide to action; if we are to do this, we must not rely on subjective thought, enthusiasm, or books, but on objectively existing facts and on an intimate knowledge of materials, drawing correct conclusions from these facts and materials. These conclusions are not an A-B-C-D arrangement of phenomena; nor are they essays of excessive length filled with hot air; they are scientific conclusions.

The idea behind this attitude is to seek truth from facts; it does not try to gain favor by rousing the mob. This attitude amounts to the "party spirit," to a Marxist-Leninist union of theory and practice; it is the attitude in which a CP member has to be proficient from the start. Those who have this attitude do not have "a heavy head, light feet, and shallow roots"; nor do they have "a sharp mouth, thick skin, and a hollow inside."

4) In accordance with the above views, I now make the following proposals:

a) To point out to the entire party the task of systematic, thorough research on surrounding conditions. On the basis of the method of historical materialism, to carry out detailed investigation and research on all economic, financial, political, military, cultural, and party affairs of the enemy, our allies, and ourselves, and then to derive the proper and necessary conclusions. To attain this objective, we must turn our comrades' attention to the investigation and study of actual facts. We must make our comrades understand that the basic mission of CP members and the leading organs lies in the two great tasks of understanding conditions and grasping policy: the first is the so-called understanding of the world, and the second is the so-called reconstruction of the world. We must make our comrades understand that there is no right to speak if there has been no investigation, that bombast and a 1-2-3-4 arrangement of things are of no use. For example, if in the work of propaganda we do not understand propaganda conditions among the enemy, our allies, and ourselves, we have no way of correctly deciding our propaganda policy. Work of any kind can be done well only if there is first an understanding of existing

conditions. The implementation of the policy of investigation and research by the entire party is a fundamental condition for the modification of the party's tendencies.

b) For research on the history of China in the last 100 years, we should gather together men of ability and proceed through division of labor and cooperation, ridding ourselves of disorganization. Only if analytical research is done first on economic, political, military, and cultural history can the work of synthesis be carried out afterward.

c) For the education of cadres in service and in schools, research should be focused on the actual problems of the Chinese revolution, and then on the study of Marxism-Leninism; the method of static and isolated study of Marxism-Leninism should be eliminated. The *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* is the highest synthesis and summary of the world communist movement in the last 100 years, a model for the union of theory and practice; in the whole world, this is still the one perfect model. By observing the way in which Lenin and Stalin took the universal truths of Marxism and related them to the concrete reality of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we can understand the manner in which we should carry out our work in China.

We have committed many errors, but error often precedes the correct solution. Considering the vitality and richness of the environment of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, we can be confident of the good results which our reconstruction in this problem of study will produce.

G.3 Decision on Strengthening Party Spirit (1 July 1941)⁵⁷

1) In twenty years of revolutionary tempering, the CCP has become an important and all-decisive factor in the political life of the nation, yet we are still confronted with a great and arduous revolutionary mission. We must therefore demand that our party continue to progress and become, in thought, political activity, and organization, a completely consolidated Bolshevik party; we must demand that members of the entire party and all the party's organizational units consolidate with united will, united action, and unified discipline to become a united whole. Without a party thus strengthened, unified, and centralized, we will be unable to fulfill the great historical mission we have taken on our shoulders. As a consequence, the principal task at present in consolidating the party is to demand that all party members, especially party cadres, further strengthen their own party spirit, subordinate their individual interests to the interest of the entire party, and subordinate the interests of the various organizational units of the party to the interests of the entire party, so that the entire party can be consolidated as one person.

2) Although our party has a twenty-year history of heroic struggle, and although our party has already become a Bolshevized party closely linked to the masses, it must still be pointed out that ours is a broad rural environment, an environment

characterized by long-range, dispersed, independent, guerrilla warfare, that the specific gravity of small producers and the intelligentsia in the party is very high, and that it is consequently easy for certain party members to develop "individualism," "heroism," antiorganizational attitudes, "independence," "anticentralism" and other tendencies counter to party spirit. If allowed to develop, these tendencies can destroy the party's united will, united action, and unified discipline; can produce clique activities, sectarian struggles, and eventual open rebellion against the party; and can cause great damage to the party and the revolution. Individuals with these tendencies who do not reform may also meet with failure and see their reputations ruined. The case of the traitor Zhang Guotao is a clear historical lesson. Although these tendencies, which show a lack of party spirit, are not universal within the party today, they actually exist in certain individual sections and among certain comrades. The tendencies described above have the following concrete manifestations:

a) Independent political action, failure to seek the direction of central or higher-ranking organs, failure to respect the decisions of central or higher-ranking organs, opinions expressed at random, improvisation, personal feelings in place of policy, independent decisions and independent actions, shirking duty on false pretexts, a two-faced attitude, open obedience and hidden insubordination, and deception of the party.

b) The creation of lines of personal dependence and personal systems in organization, emphasis on independent action, opposition to centralized leadership, particularism, opposition to the transfer of personnel, disregard for organization, concentration on the individual, the practice of paternalism, the belief that discipline need only be observed by subordinates and not necessarily by oneself, opposition to the CC, disregard of higher echelons, bypassing directly superior leading organs in making decisions, the belief that majority decisions need not be followed, personal attacks, promotion of one's own interests, complete lack of principle in cadre policy, capricious promotion and demotion, random attacks, pulling strings, mutual covering-up, hidden connections, and clique activities.

c) The development of a petty bourgeois individualistic ideology, opposition to proletarian collectivism; taking the individual as the point of departure in all matters; individuality in everything; the complete supremacy of individual interest; self-glorification; considering oneself special; making a display of oneself; promotion in one's own position; delight in flattery, boasting and exaggeration; exhibitionism; failure to gain an understanding of concrete conditions through observation of fact; failure to handle problems in a serious and careful manner; striving for superficial appearances; distaste for hard work; and a failure to establish truly close relations with the masses.

3) The following methods must be adopted for the correction of the foregoing tendencies in opposition to the party spirit:

a) The spirit of unity in the party, party centralization, and the importance of submission to central leadership should be further emphasized. No party member or local cadre is to be allowed to improvise, to create lines of personal dependence, or to make random proposals outside the party on national questions. It is required that

all leaders of independent work districts pay special heed to the fact that the central leadership must be given trust and obedience now more than ever, and that the inner-party struggle against “diffusionism,” “independence,” and “individualism” must be developed.

b) The execution of all resolutions and decisions must be more thoroughly observed. The two-faced spirit of seeming obedience and hidden insubordination must be completely eradicated.

c) Only if errors are immediately corrected when they arise and only if the continued development of errors is not tolerated can cadres be saved and damage to [party] work prevented. We oppose the attitude which couples courtesy to the face with slander behind the back; all criticism should be given to the face, frankly and sincerely, for its purpose is to save, not to attack. Solidarity and mutual assistance should be emphasized in the party; cadres should be esteemed and assisted in their political progress. However, immediate precautions must be taken against those who fail to reform after constant warnings, and disciplinary punishment must be meted out.

d) Disciplinary training must be reinforced throughout the party, for unified discipline is a necessary condition for victory in the revolution. Strict observance of the following [rule] is demanded: the individual must obey the organization, the minority must obey the majority, lower echelons must obey higher echelons, and the entire party must obey the basic principles of the CC. All must comply with this rule, whether they are ordinary party members or party cadres.

e) Personal reform with the weapon of self-criticism and the method of intensified study must be adapted to the demands of the party and the revolution. It is required that all party members, especially responsible and leading cadres, reflect deeply on their own shortcomings and place party interests above all. No one should be self-satisfied or self-seeking. All should promote the tendencies of regard for the common good, loyalty, simplicity, hard work, a down-to-earth attitude, seeking truth from facts, and eliminating pride and superficiality. All factors which completely separate theory and practice or study and work must be corrected. In this manner, our own class standpoint, party standpoint, and party spirit are made more resolute.

f) In conclusion, it is resolved that in order to strengthen their own party spirit all responsible leaders, from CC members down to leaders of individual local party offices, must participate in cell organizations, engage in the life of a specific party organization, and listen humbly to the criticism of party members and the masses.

G.4 Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism. *Mao Zedong* (10 September 1941)⁵⁸

For a long time in the past, our party was ruled by subjectivism. The Lisan line and the “left” opportunism during the later period of the soviet movement were both subjectivist. The subjectivism in the later part of the soviet movement was the most

serious, its form was more perfected, the period of its dominance lasted longer, and the result was more miserable. This was because these subjectivists called themselves [followers of] “the International line,” and they wore Marxist clothes even though they were false Marxists.

In the later period of the soviet movement, the spirit of the Fifth Plenum [January 1934] advocated socialist revolution and rejected [the view that] the revolution develops in an uneven way. It recognized that the contemporary struggle amounted to a decisive battle between two roads [the revolutionary and the colonial roads]. In the political sphere, in comparison with the “left” Lisan line, this was the expression of an even more perfected form.

In the military sphere, the Lisan line did not entirely affect the soviet area, but the “left” opportunist line of the later soviet period completely influenced the soviet area, causing the Red Army to suffer a major defeat.

In the organizational sphere, the attacks on cadres, the random elimination of counterrevolutionaries, etc., etc., during the later soviet movement were more evil and calamitous than under the Lisan line.

The subjectivists proposed impractical tasks for the current situation such as expanding the Red Army in 100 ways in order to attack key cities.

We have not summed up the party line in the three years from 1932 to December 1935. Now we should prepare such a summary for the Seventh Party Congress.

The Politburo resolution of 11 May 1932 is entirely subjective.⁵⁹

In fact, the 1933 article on opposition to the “right opportunism” of Deng [Xiaoping], Mao [Zetan], Xie [Weijun], and Gu [Bo] is a form of misdirected criticism [literally: pointing at a bird to abuse the dog].⁶⁰ At the same time, they thought that the “Luo Ming line” in Fujian and Jiangxi and [the party organizations] of Jianning, Ninghua, and Taining had pervaded the whole of the Central Soviet. The main mistakes with this kind of programmatic article opposing the “Luo Ming line” are: (1) the canceling of the anti-imperialist movement; (2) the abandoning of the soviet areas; (3) the rich peasant line; (4) bureaucratism.

In practice, the Zunyi Conference modified the political line. While after Zunyi the previous political line did not affect politics, the military, and organization, in the realm of ideology the evil legacy of subjectivism is still present.

The Sixth Plenum [September–November 1938] struggled against subjectivism. However, a few comrades still suffer from subjectivism, and this is most strongly seen in all kinds of work in Yan’an. Subjectivism and sectarianism are present in the schools and among the cultural personages in Yan’an. This kind of subjectivism is opposed to the Marxist [principle of] seeking truth from facts. Its origins are:

- 1) The Chinese tradition, the “left” tradition [*Zhongguo de chuantong*, “*zuo*” *de chuantong*];
- 2) The foreign tradition, the influence in the past by people such as Bukharin and Zinoviev in the Comintern;
- 3) Science in China is not developed; there exists a broad-based petty bourgeois country.

Now there is subjectivism in the style of study and sectarianism in the party [work-] style.

The methods to overcome these incorrect styles are:

1) The seriousness of subjectivism must be recognized. Apart from Yan'an, in the rear areas with a peaceful environment, the manifestation of subjectivism is serious and subjectivism exists throughout the country.

2) A clear distinction must be drawn between creative Marxism and dogmatic Marxism.

3) Propagate creative Marxism.

4) Our opposition to subjectivism must elevate theory and not lower Marxism. We must Marxify [*makesi zhuyi hua*] the bountiful practice of the Chinese revolution.

5) We must destroy the qualifications of those "theoreticians" whose theory is divorced from practice. We can only use the Marxist viewpoint to research problems of fact and resolve practical issues. Only in this way can one be counted as a theoretician of practice. Stalin said that theory divorced from practice was empty theory [*On Leninism*]. I think that empty theory is utterly absurd theory.

We must provide payment for articles that research practical problems. One can only be counted as a teacher when one is a teacher who has sinified Marxism. Only then can one be given a subsidy.

6) There are also sectarians. In Yan'an, only after becoming a leading cadre does one get along all right; many scientists and artists look down on others. Sectarianism is a kind of wind that pushed aside nonparty cadres; immediately [it leads to] exclusivism. At the same time, there is insiderness. The phenomena of refusing to obey the leadership [*nao dulixing*], not obeying resolutions, and having no discipline must all be rectified.

Line is "benevolent government" [*wang dao*]; discipline is "rule by force" [*bao dao*]; these two cannot be minimal.

In the past, a responsible person in the sanitation department opposed professional policy, [a case of] selfish departmentalism [*benweizhuyi*]. [Having] violated communist morals, [the person] was dismissed.

7) The struggle to oppose sectarianism and selfish departmentalism must advance from principles. Two-line struggle must be implemented to combat subjectivism and sectarianism and to oppose dogmatism and routinism [*shiwu zhuyi*].

8) Newspapers should publish more short articles, articles propagating dialectical materialism and opposing subjectivism.

9) Implement reform of the system of study; smash a part of it into pieces. Research the ideological methodology of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, take *The History of the CPSU* as the core of study, and look more at speeches opposing subjectivism.

Organize study groups for ideological methodology. Begin with comrades in the Politburo.

Take ideology, politics, policy, military affairs, and organization as the five basic vocational tasks of the Politburo.

Politics must pay attention to the trends of the current situation; CC members must increase their political knowledge.

Military affairs; the vocational task is to research the current battle situation.

Grasping ideological education is our number one professional task.

10) We must use the analytical method to resolve problems. This is the scientific method proposed by the bourgeoisie in the past, but [it] still must be synthesized. We must use the methods of analysis and synthesis. In each case where a problem arises, we must analyze and then synthesize.

11) Study the resolutions from the Sixth to the Seventh Party Congress.

On the one hand, the Central Study Group studies the ideological methodology of Marxism, while, on the other, it studies the resolutions [adopted] since the Sixth Party Congress. Mao Zedong is the head, with Wang Jiaxiang as deputy.

12) The work of the education committee (with Zhang Wentian as its head) must first carry out investigation and then carry out reform.

13) Yan'an must convene a large mobilization meeting; all Politburo members must go into action; everyone must come and give a speech to focus our strength on opposing subjectivism and sectarianism.

14) Beat down the two isms but let the people remain. In opposing subjectivism and sectarianism, allow the cadres who have committed mistakes to remain unharmed.

15) Telegraph [Liu] Shaoqi and [Zhou] Enlai and consult [them] for their opinions.

16) Carry out mobilization of the entire party. A few articles should be written in addition to the "Decision on Strengthening Party Spirit" [1 July 1941; see above, **Doc. G.3**] and the "Decision on Investigation and Research" [1 August 1941].⁶¹

G.5 Report on the Work of the Party and Specific Policies in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region. *Peng Zhen* (September 1941)⁶²

2) The general characteristics of people from different classes.

a) The landlord class.

Quite a few among the minority of big landlords, particularly disgraced warlords and bureaucrats who have large landholdings, have already gone over to, or have begun to sympathize with, the enemy.

"Small landlords" own a very small amount of land and cannot make ends meet even if they till the land themselves. Some cannot till the land themselves as they are old, weak, disabled, widowed, or orphaned. Some are small vendors, workers, or artisans, or even hired hands. In fact, most of these people are poor peasants and are not really landlords. Even in Russia there were instances of treating as landlords those poor peasants who rented out parcels of land. Lenin, however, in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, regarded them as poor peasants rather than as the landlord class.

If we exclude a tiny minority of big landlords and some “small landlords” who are really poor peasants and not landlords, then the attitude of the landlord class is, on the whole, as follows:

On the issue of fighting Japan: in the initial stage of establishing the anti-Japanese base areas, a large number of them were irresolute; some, under the leadership influence of relatively big landlords, adopted a double-dealing attitude. They even publicly or secretly connived with the enemy and organized the so-called associated villages or society zones, shakily sitting on the fence between us and the enemy. They thought it was possible to maintain a neutral position between us and the enemy. Objectively, they helped the enemy. When the base areas were gradually consolidated and our rule and the superiority of our masses were established, and when various party policies had been implemented, the attitude of the landlord class changed. Almost all of them switched or became sympathetic to the anti-Japanese camp. Only individual landlords still took the side of the enemy or publicly became traitors. This question is very interesting. Since they own land, landlords do not like revolutions; some of them are even stubborn. However, their land is located in the countryside. In a situation where the enemy occupies the cities and we the countryside, our anti-Japanese base areas and anti-Japanese democratic government stand on the landlord's land. Naturally, all landlords have the freedom to escape to the enemy-occupied cities, but they cannot move their land. They have the freedom to be traitors, but once they do so, they face the danger of completely losing their land or rent; land and rent are their lifeblood. Moreover, after the landlords escape to the enemy-occupied areas, they have to pay taxes to the enemy and suffer the enemy's extractions; even their wives and daughters are raped by the enemy; they lose their personal dignity. All this makes the landlords think twice before going over to the enemy. Thus, they have no alternative but to join the anti-Japanese resistance. The history of the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war has proved this simple truth.

In terms of democracy, the dictatorship of the landlord class has not been destroyed, and democratic politics has not been established. In particular, our masses have not attained superiority. Therefore, before the consolidation of the base areas, the landlord class opposes, hates, or at least has no good feelings about the democratic movement because the fight for, and establishment of, democracy requires the destruction of the feudal state and the dictatorship of the landlord class. Thus, their opposition is natural.

Our masses, however, have risen up. They have seized the weapons of the landlord class for their own troops. They have smashed the dictatorship of the landlord class and have established a new democratic government on the rubble. This new government treats equally and democratically all anti-Japanese landlords. However, the landlords long accustomed to their own dictatorship are extremely unaccustomed to this [new government]. Therefore, like cornered beasts, they fight savagely to obstruct the progress of the democratic movement that is needed for the nation's War of Resistance. This renders the problem increasingly severe. Provoked

by the landlord class, the majority of the masses begin spontaneously to teach the diehards a lesson. They even violate their political power, financial assets, and civil rights. Local despots who have long exploited and bullied villages begin to reap what they have sown. The oppressors are beginning to be oppressed. In other words, the dictatorship of the landlord class has been smashed; their so-called order has been shaken. Therefore, the landlord class generates an enormous amount of anger, fear, and self-doubt. What angers them is that the previous lamblike "ignorant peasants had the guts to rebel." Confronted by the new democratic order, they are like ships lost in a great ocean. Since they are not sure how we and our basic masses will handle them in the end, they suddenly feel the bleakness of their future. Consumed with anger, terror, and anxiety, they are hesitant and wavering.

However, we swiftly proposed the "three-thirds" system of government that strictly protects the political, civil, and economic rights of all those who anti-Japanese. This makes them visibly happy and realize that, under these circumstances, supporting and joining the anti-Japanese democratic governments is much more beneficial to them than blind opposition. Thus, they turn to supporting democracy. Some happily and loudly sing "even the best of dynasties is inferior to us"—this is the concrete attitude of the landlord class on the question of democracy. If one asks the landlord class why its attitude toward democratic politics is "opposition first and acceptance second," then its answer will certainly be, "Now I have lost my previous dictatorship and the new government treats me decently."

On the question of people's livelihood. The nature of the landlord class is not to "give even a penny that will benefit others." Of course, they are opposed to reduction of rent and interest, but this is the case only during the initial period of the founding of the base areas and before our masses rise up. When the peasants arose, they reduced rent and interest, or even went so far as to refuse to pay any rent or debts. The landlords were not even allowed to take their land back. Of course, the landlords are not good-natured people; they have tried everything to retaliate and resorted to all kinds of means to punish the peasants. With their dictatorship gone, however, the landlords, after a spell of boiling rage, always find themselves disarmed of the weapons needed to oppress the peasants. Then they gradually become frightened, worrying that the peasants will confiscate their land. Since it is too dangerous for them to run over to the enemy and become traitors to China, they begin to think about retreating, recognize rent and interest reduction as reasonable demands, and collect rent and interest according to contracts. Some say, "It is united front policy to reduce rent or interest, but once rent and interest are reduced, the [peasants] should pay them. It is a violation of the united front not to do so." In general, at this time they are powerless to oppose rent and interest reduction and care only about whether peasants should pay rent and interest after they are reduced. Their brains have "cleared" and [they] "ask for fairness."

On the question of improving the standard of living for workers, however, aside from those commercial landlords, the attitude of some landlords seems to be quite enlightened. Some generously squander others' resources, thus showing how sym-

pathetic they are toward the proletariat in order to mitigate our masses' disdain toward them and divert the focus of the masses' struggle. Sometimes, however, they take the opportunity to ally with rich peasants and the middle bourgeoisie to resist together the struggle to improve the life of the masses. Particularly, during the fair distribution of burdens and collection of grain for the state, landlords and rich peasants often take the same position, hoping that "burdens will be fairly distributed" and the number of people shouldering the burdens will be "expanded."

Generally speaking, the "enlightenment" of the landlord class in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region began only after our masses rose up, after the establishment of democratic policies, and after the destruction of the landlords' dictatorship. With the expansion and deepening of the mass movement, the landlord class has no alternative but to make concessions. Experience proves that without the necessary struggle and conflict between peasants and landlords, the enlightenment of the landlord class is impossible. It is also difficult to readjust the relationship between landlords and peasants.

2) The attitude of the rich peasants and the middle bourgeoisie—inside the borders of the base area there are hardly any big bourgeoisie; as for rich peasants and middle bourgeoisie, they not only actively support the War of Resistance, but enthusiastically support the implementation of democracy. Whenever the issue of improving people's livelihood is raised, however, complications arise. Their attitude is different from that of the landlord class, and there are often significant divisions among the rich peasants and middle bourgeoisie. Take rent-reduction for example; those rich peasants or commercial owners who rent out parts of their land are alike opposed to rent-reduction as landlords, while rich peasants who rent land to till (tenant-type rich peasants) or industrial and commercial owners actively support such reduction. At the same time, the middle bourgeoisie in agriculture, industry, and commerce who have made some high-interest loans are vigorously opposed to this reduction; some debtors (some rich peasants and shopowners go into debt in order to maintain or expand their businesses) express their support for such reduction. Regardless of their different attitudes on this issue, however, their position immediately becomes unified and they put up joint and stubborn resistance as soon as one raises the issue of improving the life of workers, increasing pay, and cutting down working hours. They resort to every means to obstruct [such reduction] and are hostile to it—this is a sketch of the political trends among rich peasants and middle bourgeoisie.

3) The political attitudes of middle peasants, poor peasants, rural workers, and all poor people (except drifters) may be divided into several phases.

During the founding period of the base areas, their political and organizational independence was not yet formed, and they did not really exercise their political initiatives. Therefore, generally speaking, they were not yet free from the control and influence of landlords and rich peasants. At that time, they supported both resistance against Japan and democracy; they supported improvement in people's lives. But except for some activists, they hesitantly looked at the situation, full of

fear and indecision, displaying cowardice. Sometimes they seemed to miss the chains that had been broken; they also seemed to miss very much the exploitation that had been eliminated, showing much anxiety about and appearing very unaccustomed to, its absence. Such a view appears unreasonable. However, the existence of this phenomenon is an iron fact. Even after rent and interest had been publicly cut according to law, many peasants secretly returned the full amount of their rent and interest payments—the so-called nominal reduction but secret restoration. After having their wages increased, some workers secretly reached an agreement with their employers on “nominal pay increases but no increase in reality.” Some workers and poor peasants had already been elected village mayors, but they surreptitiously consulted with landlords, gentry, and employers on every matter, putting on a pitiable face to beg favor or forgiveness. Although this situation was not widespread at the time, there are countless examples. Of course, this does not mean that they really do not welcome an improvement in their standard of living. They are afraid of retaliation from landlords and employers. Owing to ignorance and lack of experience, they did not have class consciousness and independence; nor did they realize their own strength.

Similarly, rural workers are also peasants. After they have truly experienced some struggles (beginning with the ones started from above), they gradually become genuinely conscious and organized. Then they “dare to rebel.” Their heads are held high; they grow bolder. Some peasants paid no rent or debts at all after rent-and interest-reduction. They even loudly accused landlords of messing up their accounts when landlords tried to collect from them. They even claimed that landlords owed them. Some publicly denounced and humiliated landlords at meetings of villagers and completely deprived them of the right to elect and be elected. Some peasants have begun to provoke ferocious landlords; some hired hands demanded that their employers vote for them during election in the so-called name of “cooperation between labor and capital.” . . . In general, they are employing the same methods as those used by the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the past to deal with them. Such examples are too numerous to describe here. In a word, everything has been turned upside down; everyone is thinking a step ahead. This represents one stage in the mass movement.

However, such struggles that exceeded the scope allowed by objective conditions did not last long. Soon facts proved that such worthless conflicts in which “both sides are hurt and die together” should be ended quickly. Workers and peasants should give consideration to the entire situation. After they have gained the upper hand and have risen up, they should quickly readjust the interests of different classes. They should limit the struggle between two sides to within given parameters as, at the moment, a fully armed alien enemy is threatening the coexistence of the people of all classes; there will be no unbroken eggs under an overturned nest. In this respect, landlords and peasants, capitalists and workers are completely equal. This forces the attitudes of our masses, landlords, and capitalists to gradually become compatible with the environment and policies of the united front and suit the

needs of the current anti-Japanese war. This stage began last year when we received the CC's directive on the third anniversary of the "July 7" Incident [1937], and the publication of the twenty-point political program, or the so-called double-ten policy.⁶³

4) The tendencies of the drifter class—there are many drifters of various kinds within the base areas: village policemen, township clerks, retired policemen, policemen, retired county government clerks (popularly called dog's legs), jailers, jail guards, hoodlums, gamblers, thieves, prostitutes, promiscuous women, drug runners, beggars, deserters, traffickers in human beings, funeral musicians, charlatans, witches, fortunetellers, traveling monks, professional hitmen, etc. In sum, they rely on the "so-called dishonorable or illegitimate professions for a living." Their conduct is held in contempt by landlords and the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, a tiny minority of them are also maintained by the old forces of landlords and local despots to bully and exploit villagers. Therefore, ordinary peasants are disgusted by them and fear them. With the beginning of the war against Japan and the founding of the base areas, this class has undergone enormous changes. A very small number of them have surrendered to the enemy and become puppet soldiers and traitors. Most of them have actively joined the anti-Japanese movement. Particularly during the initial period of the founding of the base areas, while ordinary people were still hesitant and indecisive, many drifters were well-informed, sensitive, responsive, free of family responsibilities, and free from any nostalgia about the present society. They played an undeniably active role in the opening up of the base areas.

With the development of the base areas, most of the drifters became part of the anti-Japanese masses, soldiers, and even cadres. A small minority of them, however, ran away or surrendered to the enemy after being purged from [the revolutionary ranks] because they could not perpetrate dishonest deeds, or embezzle and waste funds at will after all kinds of operations, particularly financial and economic systems, became institutionalized.

As a rule, the social status of this class makes it "shaky" and two-faced. On the one hand, their extremely insecure and semistarved social status means they do not miss much in the current situation and they may even be dissatisfied with it. Thus, a significant revolutionary potential is latent in this class, which makes it easy for revolutions to draw them into mass movements and for them to become activists. On the other hand, because they lack specific and clear objects of struggle, they do not possess clear class consciousness or revolutionary constructiveness and determination. This is shown by the fact that they "do more than sufficient damage and insufficient construction" and by the characteristic of "obeying whoever feeds them." Therefore, a very small number of them are easily bought off by the reactionary forces. However, there are enormous differences in their dualistic nature and these change with changes in the entire revolutionary situation. During the rise and high tide of the revolution, and under the circumstances of a victorious revolutionary struggle, almost the entire drifter class has become quite revolutionary and is involved in the revolutionary movement, standing at its front. Conversely, during an

ebb in the revolutionary tide, particularly when there is a retreat and defeat [of the revolution] and a temporary consolidation of the reactionary old regime, some of them again are easily bought off by reactionary forces to engage in counterrevolutionary activities. But regardless of the actual situation, the ones bought off make up only a tiny part of this class. Reactionary rulers cannot and need not buy off the majority or all of them.

Within our anti-Japanese base areas, there is a progressive regime, sufficient political conditions, and material resources to overcome their two-faced nature and lack of commitment, and to try to educate and thoroughly transform them. At the same time, we must patiently educate and remold them. Otherwise, we cannot truly and smoothly consolidate the anti-Japanese base area; some drifters may be bought off by the enemy and may become their vicious instruments. [[Section on the attitude of each class during the high tide of anticommunism omitted.]]

II) The Question of Constructing Political Power

1) Construction of the base area is the first step in the construction of political power.

The question of political power in a country is “the fundamental question of all revolutions.” It is the goal sought by both sides in a revolutionary struggle. It is also the sharpest fighting weapon. This point has been proved in the course of the creation of the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy’s rear. This point has also been proved by the current struggles in the areas near the enemy lines and strongholds. Whoever neglects or relaxes on this issue fails to understand the fundamental question of the revolution, abandons their fighting weapons, and surrenders them to the enemy. This is true in a class struggle as well as in a national struggle. Therefore, we believe that the construction of political power is the primary question in the construction of the base areas—of course, its construction should rely on the masses as its basis and the armed forces as its backbone.

2) Several stages in the reform of political power in the border region [Jin-Cha-Ji].

The first stage—the stage of two political powers, which may also be called the stage of mobilization committees. This was the stage before the establishment of the political power [government] of the border region in January 1938. The characteristics of the border region’s political power in this period were quite numerous; but the most fundamental characteristic was the existence of two different political powers.

At that time, remnants of the old political power of the landlords and bourgeoisie, like county governments, district governments, . . . etc., still existed in some places in the border region. However, because in the past they were nothing but agencies that oppressed and exploited the people and treated them as enemies, they only had experience in oppressing and exploiting the people, but no experience in mobilizing, organizing, and arming the people at the critical moment to meet the needs of the current war against Japan. Therefore, these regimes composed of

“farsighted geniuses” could be called experienced hands in oppressing and exploiting the people, but became worthless and useless appendages only capable of “waiting for order.” Thus, they became obstacles to mass mobilization.

Then, the semimass and semigovernmental war zone mobilization committees were created as a response (they were called associations for saving the country in central Hebei, and self-defense associations in some counties of west Hebei . . .). They were bodies that mobilized, organized, and armed the masses to fight the Japanese. They were also political administrations that determined and collected fair shares of the burden [of war], provided supplies to the armed forces, arrested and interrogated traitors, issued orders for rent and interest reduction and improved the lives of workers. They performed all the emergency functions that should be performed by a government but that the remnants of the old regime were not capable of performing.

While the existence of the dualistic regime at that time caused some administrative confusion, its necessity proved its correctness. Yan Xishan negotiated with us at the time and even issued organizational regulations on the war zone mobilization committees because he really felt that such organizations were truly needed to resist the enemy and defend Shanxi. At that time, similar organizations were organized spontaneously in central and west Hebei and east Shanxi. The majority of the masses regarded them as indispensable at the time. After the establishment of the mobilization committees, within an extremely short period of time they met some pressing needs of the War of Resistance. This proves that at the time they were both necessary and correct.

The problem was very obvious. At that time the masses had not yet arisen, while our cadres, especially administrative cadres, were so few that we did not have the resources to reform thoroughly the old regime within a short period of time. A former opposition party that inhabits a country where there is no democracy to speak of in ordinary times faces many difficulties when it elevates the people to the position of the ruling class. In addition, the authorities refused and strictly guarded against our participation in the regime or the carrying out of this reform. (At that time, Yan Xishan once said that we were not to be feared since we were the “powerless class.” He did not know then that mobilization committees were real political powers.) Thus, the existence of two political powers became necessary, a course of action that had to be allowed for mobilizing for total war.

How could the existence of two political powers be possible in a semicolonial, semifeudal country ruled by the single-party dictatorship of the GMD? This is because the gravity of the national crisis and external contradictions have become the principal contradictions, and a situation in which the entire nation has joined the war against Japan has materialized in the country. This was especially the case during the anti-Japanese high tide throughout the country before the fall of Wuhan. In terms of the domestic contradictions in the Chinese revolution, it was situated in an environment of “peaceful development.” Therefore, “the policy of peaceful development of the revolution” was relatively successful. Nevertheless, the situation

of the coexistence of two political powers can only be a transitional one. They cannot coexist peacefully for a relatively long period of time; nor can the so-called balance of power be maintained. On the contrary, one of them must be negated or transformed into a new integrative object. (The old regime must be thoroughly transformed into a democratic administrative agency. The mobilization committees above the level of district will be transformed into full-powered representative entities. At the village level, mobilization committees became an agency that combined an elected body and an administrative body. That was possible at that time.)

The second stage—the stage of the unification of political powers in the border region and popularly elected village mayors (from the establishment of the government of the border area in January 1938 to the party congress of the branch bureau in February 1939). This stage had two main characteristics:

a) There was an administrative and regional unification of the political power in the border region—as the congress of representatives of the military, government, and people decided to abolish mobilization committees, and reform and strengthen governments at all levels, the command structure of the border region became totally unified. This is the precondition for the unification of revenue and expenditures of the base area, and of all the policies and systems. It is also the precondition to the long-term prosecution of the war in the enemy's rear. An anti-Japanese base area far in the rear of the enemy is impossible without a centralized and unified political power to resist highly organized Japanese imperialists, who act in a coordinated way.

b) The popular election of village mayors. At that time, there was punishment of wrongdoers in the village. Old corrupt village mayors who used to exploit villagers were fired and new mayors elected; this became a very extensive mass movement.

During this period, the primary characteristic of the political reform was the transformation of the old regime through an elective change of personnel. [We] did not really understand that the revolutionary people could not “simply seize ready-made state agencies and use them to reach their own goals”; nor did [we] understand that a regime of a given nature needed an organizational structure fully compatible with it. The old village mayor system was the basic organization of the feudal state system and the limb of the feudal state, which could not be cut off piece by piece and grafted onto the body of the new democratic regime. But facts soon taught us and made us realize that without fundamentally changing the organizational structure of village governments reelection of mayors was completely useless. As a result of speedy reelection of village mayors, those elected still came from among the evil gentry and local despots. Therefore, we began to pay attention to class background; but then the hoodlums maintained by the gentry, local despots, and landlords often stepped forward as candidates and were elected. It is true that the majority of those newly elected were genuine revolutionary masses, or even poor peasants and hired hands. Before long, however, it was discovered that some of them were repeatedly bought off by the landlords and local despots. In retrospect, this seems very natural. The village government was not administered by a repre-

sentative body or protected by a collective leadership based on democratic centralism, while the majority of the masses, lacking experience in political struggle, did not know or were incapable of spontaneous and active supervision [of the village government]. Under these circumstances, it was inevitable that some newly elected village mayors became new local despots bullying and exploiting villagers or were bought off by local despots and landlords. After many twists and turns, we gradually understood that the “precondition to fundamental reform of political power is the undermining and destruction of the existing state machine,” and that this could not be achieved by simply firing or reelecting one or two administrators of the government.

The third stage—the stage of beginning the reform of the organizational structure of the political power.

While experience in the area of governmental operations in the previous period began to prove that the organizational structure of the political power had to be reformed further, [we] did not know how to reform the organizational structure of political power. During the Sixth Plenum in Yan'an [September–November 1938], we discovered the two articles by Comrade Mao Zedong, “Investigation of Changgang Township” and “Investigation of Changxi Township.” This provided us with much inspiration and enabled the reform of the political power in the base area to enter a new stage. The characteristics of this period are:

a) Establishing district and village congresses [*qu cun daibiaohui*]—the village government is the basic organization of political power; its importance relative to political power is equivalent to that of the branch organization to the party. If village governments are not reformed, all good policies and systems will become rotten when they penetrate to the village level. The best policies become the worst ones. Yan Xishan was very clear about the importance of the village governments. He proposed so-called village-based politics. GMD spies were equally aware of this. When we established district and village congresses in central Hebei, the GMD in one county wrote in a document, “It doesn't matter if the CP fires commissioners and county magistrates. Such firing can be done as soon as the government's army comes here. It will be a disaster if villages and districts all have established democratically elected congresses; they are not so easy to get rid of.” In addition, the GMD emphatically spread the *baojia* system throughout all areas. This also proves that they fully understood the importance of village governments. However, we did not begin to establish village congresses widely, or partly set up district congresses in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region, until 1939. Even village mayors are still elected by villagers' meetings.

b) From the border region to the village, complete administrative agencies were established in all departments, eliminating, in terms of governmental agencies, organizational forms conducive to bureaucratism. The old organizational structure of the government was extremely top-heavy. The Nationalist government had an extremely complex, complete, and huge division of labor and organizational structures, while at the village level there was only one mayor, and at the district level,

there was only the district mayor and a few assistants. Therefore, all the administrative orders of the Nationalist government were “dead on arrival” and became waste paper as soon as they reached the county or district level. In order to thoroughly eliminate such age-old flaws, we have established five working departments—civil affairs, finance, education, industry and commerce, and the judiciary—from the border region government to the village government, and set up a complete administrative system from top to bottom. In particular, [we] set up, at the village level, five committees in charge of civil affairs, finance, education, production, and mediation (or the judiciary agency of the village government). Thus, the work departments and the effectiveness of the government structure became stronger at the lower levels. Moreover, this can also attract the participation of activists from all classes throughout the village, making it easier for work to be completed and every administrative order and directive of the border region government to be implemented at the village level.

c) The old administrative district (below the county level) was huge. The number of villages under the jurisdiction of one district was so large (as many as several hundred villages) and the area under its jurisdiction so huge (mountainous) that it was impossible for the district government to exercise effective leadership or inspect the work of village governments; nor could villagers easily exercise their democratic rights. Even villagers who went to meetings at the location of the district government could not return home on the same day and had to stay overnight. This turned it into an enormous undertaking. Therefore, we have set up a system of smaller districts. A county used to be divided into four or five districts; now it is divided into six to ten districts. Thus, it is easier for the district government to administer villages; it is also easier for villagers to understand everything about the district government and the district itself. When people go to the district government to get things done, or when personnel from the district government go to work in individual villages, they can return on the same day. Thus, the efficiency and speed of work has greatly increased, and it is easy for people to run the district government; this has the same importance as the establishment of district and village congresses.

d) Establishing public security bureaus—the old police system was abolished in the previous period, and people’s self-defense teams were widely organized—which can also be somehow called “people’s police.” Before long, however, this was found to be inadequate. Revolutionary order could not be fully maintained by relying only on self-defense teams. There must be a specialized public security agency to cooperate with the “people’s police.” Therefore, governments at various levels set up public security bureaus. These are work departments of government at every level; they are security agencies specialized in purging traitors, maintaining local security, and protecting the civil rights and property rights of all the people who resist the Japanese. Their working basis is not built on the lackeys of the old gendarmes, police, or security teams. Instead, they rely on the majority of the people, on the (open) antitraitor leagues that do not leave productive posts or receive pay,

on the (secret) political police, and on the majority of the self-defense teams and militia. They lead these organizations and closely cooperate with them to conduct operations.

The fourth stage—the current stage in the reform of the political power of the border region. The above reforms naturally enabled the construction of the political power in the border region to move forward. Nevertheless, there are many serious weaknesses:

a) The border region and counties do not have formal representative bodies. The administrative committee of the border region, county magistrates, and district mayors are not yet popularly elected on a regular basis. As a result, the old bureaucratic oppression of “lording it over the people” and the custom of restricting the people are being invisibly revived and are growing.

b) As a result of the coexistence of the remnants of the feudal political system, like village mayors, neighborhood chiefs and clan leaders, *and* the democratic village congresses, it has been proved that such feudal corpses obstruct and restrict the village congresses, prevent them from performing any role, and nearly reduce them to a mere form.

c) Redundant agencies in the administration of government still exist or are being formed. The size of the bureaucracy is growing. Consequently, paper chases and formalism are becoming increasingly serious—bureaucrats eat but do nothing, specializing in playing word games and perfecting meaningless forms.

The eradication of such weaknesses and the further reform of the governments and representative bodies at all levels in the border region have propelled the construction of political power in the border region into the fourth stage, which began last summer.

3) Some problems in the construction of political power in the border region during the current period.

The first question is the relationship between representative bodies and administrative agencies, or what Sun Yat-sen called political power and administrative power, or what the Soviet Union calls the question of the relationship between the agencies of state power and state management or administrative agencies. Initially, it was proposed that both be elected and removed from office by all the people via ballot, and that the relationship between the two should be a parallel and equal one. This was, in fact, a relationship of checks and balances. This system is, on the surface, democratic; but in reality, it stealthily deprives the people of their real democratic rights under the cover of extreme democracy. It was thought that this was the most democratic political system. In truth, this is the old and decadent form of the bourgeois state exercising its class dictatorship; it is a form of dictatorship behind the mask of democracy.

The enlarged cadres meeting we held in April last year (1940) repudiated and rejected this view and decided that the representative body should be the fully empowered representative body. The administrative committees of governments at all levels or their leaders should be elected or removed by the representative bodies.

The government has the duty to obey absolutely the decisions of the representative bodies (the border region assembly, county congress, etc.). Representative bodies not only have the right to elect and remove administrative personnel of the government, they also have the right to create and reconfirm. They should be the "superior" organ of the government at the same level.

The second question is one of political structure and democratic centralism. Someone has copied the GMD's old song and suggested that "political power lies in democracy; administrative power lies in centralization." In fact, all representative bodies with democracy but without centralization can only become decorations for a single-party dictatorship. Government administrative agencies with only centralization but no democracy are, no doubt, the most dangerous governments and most readily become bureaucratized, separated from the masses, and even betray and oppress the people.

We insisted on democratic centralism as the fundamental organizational principle for the representative bodies and government administrative agencies. We insisted on the directives on the question of political structure presented in the book *On New Democracy* [see above, **Doc. F.8**].

The third question is one of citizens' rights. At that time someone suggested that diehard elements be deprived of their voting rights. In some counties (counties where the work on the zone of guerrilla warfare is better), "teams of diehard elements" were selected during village elections. This is obviously wrong. It is said that a "three-thirds" system of government does not require anticommunists but this does not mean that we can deprive diehard elements of their citizen's rights and rights to vote and be elected. We are merely saying that we may not elect them. If they are campaigned against on the principle of democracy, the majority of the masses will not really vote for them. If they win the election, we should not only allow them to participate in a "three-thirds" system of government, but also recognize their rights; even if they become part of the four-by-four system, or one-quarter, we should also respect their views. Generally speaking, as long as we and the progressive elements maintain superiority, the election of a few diehard elements does not do us much harm.

It has been suggested that those who are elected district mayor or county magistrate must have more than two years of administrative experience. This is also wrong. The essence of this qualification is to deprive the majority of the people of their right to be elected because most of the workers, peasants, youth, and women do not have more than two years of administrative experience. Those without more than two years of administrative experience cannot be elected; if they cannot be elected, they will not have administrative experience, so the government has to be monopolized by a bunch of old bureaucrats . . . therefore, in essence, this suggestion is extremely vicious.

Others have suggested that soldiers should not have the right to vote; some have suggested that opium addicts be deprived of citizens' rights, or have only the right to vote and be voted for. Some others have even suggested that citizens' rights be

limited to the length of residence. All of these ideas were inappropriate and have been vetoed. Finally, we decided that, except for mental patients and those whose citizens' rights are deprived by the governments of the border region at various levels, all citizens eighteen years of age or older have the full right to vote and be elected.

The fourth question is the regular reelection of representative bodies and administrative agencies so that the people may regularly reevaluate and elect their public servants, that the elected will not dare violate the people's will and govern with a single mind, and that [the officials] will not forget their past as a result of an overly long term of office and turn into old bureaucrats who ride roughshod over the people.

The fifth question is that representative bodies at each level (from village representatives to senators of the border region government) should all be directly elected by the people according to the principle of equality. Administrative agencies are elected by representative bodies; the right should also be established for the electors to recall and remove the representatives they have elected at any time and for the representative bodies to recall and remove the administrative personnel they have elected. Moreover, it should be specified that such recall and removal do not need a separate legal basis or justification; they become valid when they are passed by half the original electors or electing bodies.

The sixth question is the abolition of the old household-based village administrative system because these old household-based systems—like the mayor, clan leader, neighborhood, special household—are all remnants of the feudal traditional society. They are feudal systems that denied democratic rights, with the exception of heads of household, to all family members and particularly women and young family members. There will be no real equal citizens' rights without abolishing such systems. In order to avoid a radicalized form, we retain the title of village mayor, but the nature of the position is completely different from the old one.

The seventh question is that, according to the principle of simplicity, clarity, and ease of learning and implementation, scientific and new forms of documents are to be redefined by thoroughly eliminating old formalism and throwing away complicated and aristocratic forms of documents. Such glamorous but useless waste is the instrument the old bureaucrats used to obstruct excellent new cadres and the majority of the people from participating in government. It makes the promotion and election of a large number of new cadres difficult and slows down work and lowers administrative efficiency.

The eighth question is the merger and abolition of all redundant agencies. This not only saved a large number of cadres but also made the relationship between superiors and subordinates more direct, greatly increased work speed, and reduced the opportunities for the growth and development of bureaucratism within government agencies.

4) On the organizational structure of political power at each level in the border region at the present time.

According to the principles defined above, we now stipulate the relationship

between the organizational structures of the governments at various levels in the border region, and mainly between representative bodies and administrative agencies at various levels.

Organizational structure at the level of the border region:

a) The highest organ of political power of the border region government is the border region assembly [*bianqu canyihui*]. Members are popularly elected (it has already been elected but is not yet in session). When the assembly is not in session, resident assembly members will be appointed (president, vice-president, and secretary of the assembly are permanent resident assembly members) to take charge of routine matters. In effect, they form the assembly's presidium.

b) The administrative committee of the border region (the border region government) is the highest administrative organ of the border region government. It is elected and removed by the border region assembly and must follow all the resolutions of the border region assembly.

County-level political power—a county congress is established for each county; the relationship between the county congress and the county magistrate is equivalent to that between the border region assembly and the border region administrative committee. The county magistrate is elected and removed by the county congress; department chiefs are appointed by superiors because the cadres of the county government today are very mobile, particularly department chiefs. The better ones are continuously promoted to the position of the county magistrate, and unqualified ones need to be removed (at the moment there are not many qualified department chiefs). Therefore, in addition to appointing congressmen for the county congress, the county government, the magistrate, and department chiefs form an administrative council to discuss and handle administrative matters where no county administrative committee has been established.

Special districts and districts under the jurisdiction of the county—a special district does not constitute a level of government, and thus no representative body is established at this level. A special commissioner is appointed by the superiors. As for districts under the county that have already established representative bodies and the district congresses, the question of whether such congresses should continue to exist was raised by the party congress of the branch bureau in April last year. At that time, because of our limited experience, it was decided that a final decision would be made after the tasks of the current district congresses had been fulfilled and experience of their work in different areas had been summarized. Perhaps in the future there need not be any representative bodies at the district level. Perhaps the district representative bodies may be merged with the governmental agencies, with the chair of the district congress also occupying the post of district mayor—it is difficult to make a decision now.

Organizational structure of village-level political power—the cell and the basic organization of political power.

a) We established a village council in each village. Representatives to the council are elected directly by citizens' groups at villagers' meetings. Each citizens'

group may remove its representative at any time. However, the elected representative is the leader of the citizen's group that has elected him/her. Citizens can go directly to their representative for any matter. Sometimes old ladies have land but are incapable of tilling it; families of the soldiers now fighting the Japanese do not have draft animals; poor peasants do not have seed; daughters-in-law are mistreated by their mothers-in-law. . . . For these matters people go to their representatives for a solution. In fact, the system of the village council is not only a village representative body but at the same time a fully popular form of organization. The citizens' groups in each village number between fifteen and forty-five people. In a village, if the size of the group is fifteen, then all groups should have fifteen people each; if the number is forty-five, then all have forty-five people in them. The rights of each citizen are completely equal.

b) We established the post of the village mayor and that of deputy mayor, which were assumed by the chair and vice-chair of the council. In addition, five committees on civil affairs, finance, education, production, and mediation were set up, and recently a committee for security was added. The chair of each committee are elected by the representatives, but the candidates are not limited only to the representatives. Thus, we can extensively recruit the activists from all classes in the village (including enlightened gentry).

c) The village administrative office is composed of the mayor, the deputy mayor, the chairs of the committees, the head of the self-defense team, and clerks. In reality this is the village administrative committee, an organization that functions on the basis of democratic centralism.

d) After abolition of the system of neighborhood chiefs, neighborhoods are retained as administrative zones under the jurisdiction of the village. Representatives from each neighborhood form a representative group and elect a director of representatives. The village administrative office contacts the director for any business and, through individual representatives, leads the citizens in the village. Citizens contact their representatives if they have any problems, which should be solved through the same system. With the exception of the collection of funds and materials on the basis of household, all the administrative operations of the village must be conducted through the above representative system and based on the unit of individual citizens, thus completely abolishing the feudal administrative system based on the household unit.

e) Is it better for the village representatives to be elected by the meeting of the village citizens, or to be elected by separate citizens' groups during the meeting of the villagers? This issue has caused some debate. We now believe it is better for them to be elected by separate citizens' groups so that people may more easily exercise their right of recall and people of all classes may have the opportunity to elect their representatives, as well as exercise their citizens' will and rights. This is the same with the elective units of the border region and counties.

5) The struggle of people from different classes in popular elections.

[[a) The competition and struggle between different classes of people during this

popular election were extraordinarily fierce. Participation ratios are given for seven counties in central Hebei: Dingnan, Shenji, Anping, Raoyang, Boye, Qingwan, and Chong. In these counties, the commodity economy is more developed and the cultural level is relatively high. Over 80 percent of the women voted; younger citizens had the highest participation rate; workers' participation is the highest, with poor peasants third; the second-highest participation rate was for landlords. The last fact shows that landlords have shifted from struggling against us to participation in government using only legal methods. Merchants are the least active. The higher the cultural level, the lower the level of participation.]]

b) In terms of the forms of struggle during elections, in general we are able to observe the principle of democracy and carry out legal competitive elections. In the course of preparing for popular elections, many landlords eagerly demonstrate their enlightenment, or even temporarily launch charitable enterprises that benefit the public (like poor relief and donations for repairing irrigation systems, dikes, opening schools, etc.). Landlords also anxiously express their desire to move closer to district and village cadres and profess a desire to fight and sacrifice for the nation and the people in order to soften people's hearts and mitigate the ill-feeling created among the masses by their previous deeds. In order to compete in an election, some landlords even canvass in over ten villages, conducting campaign activities and making speeches. During election meetings, some ask worker and peasant candidates to make an *ex tempore* report on the situation at home and abroad, or explain organizational clauses in the government or election laws. They do this to find fault with them and to make fools of these leaders in public; they also publicly or secretly attack some of the previous indiscretions of the worker and peasant leaders to make them lose the election. Sometimes, when they see clearly that they will be defeated, they move swiftly to seek the cooperation of the middle elements to help their campaigns. This is because, from the perspective of the landlord class, the election of the middle elements, even the "most leftist" or most enlightened gentry, is far more desirable than the election of CP members and progressive elements. In some places, when the landlord class has lost the election, it concentrates its votes on electing to office the so-called smart and effective diehard elements. This is in preparation for launching a fierce struggle in the representative bodies. Only a very small minority of diehard elements secretly obstruct and sabotage the movement of popular elections, or collude with the enemy to harass and destroy them.

Since our masses enjoy a numerical majority, they have no fears and strictly obey [election rules]. In areas where the struggle is fierce, however, there are sometimes stories of instances of illegal manipulation and control [of elections]. In some areas, when people found they had lost at the end or in the middle of counting up the votes, they immediately declared the election an experiment. Some did not announce the date of election beforehand and only secretly informed the masses in all organizations and conducted a sudden election during market-days and meetings, or when the landlords and the gentry were not home. This is using the trick of "diverting the tiger away from the mountain" to defeat the diehard elements in the

elections. Some unexpectedly implemented prepared plans and undemocratically divided citizens into small groups, thus disbanding groups of diehard elements. This method of "spreading around" the diehards made it impossible for them to respond. Some intentionally made mistakes on the ballots and in counting them; some hired hands even forced their employers to vote for them in the name of so-called cooperation between labor and capital. These were all individual phenomena, however. Although waging an improvised struggle against the diehard elements during pre-election and election meetings is not illegal, it should not be conducted at those times (it should be conducted during ordinary times). This is because if we conduct popular elections, we should seriously follow democratic principles and the spirit of rule of law in doing so. This can consolidate and expand the united front and more closely unite the entire nation. We can use iron-clad actions to prove that the politics of new democracy is far superior to that of the GMD one-party dictatorship. This will enable the majority of the people to experience and understand, from their own political lives, that democratic politics is far better than authoritarian politics. Further, there are many landlords (who are not necessarily diehard) who happen to doubt whether we will genuinely institute democracy or whether we will use a one-party dictatorship of the CP to replace that of the GMD, thus failing to protect their civil, political, and economic rights. Therefore, in the popular elections within the base area, we must strictly follow the spirit of rule of law and democracy. We should not dwell on temporary setbacks, but should improve our mass work during ordinary times. On the other hand, the sudden use of conspiratorial means will lose us mass sympathy and affect unity in the war against Japan.

Our popular elections began with village elections and then proceeded to district, county, and border region elections. When the village elections began, our masses had a very narrow attitude and a very strong tendency to monopolize them. They greatly feared the election and restoration of the landlords, particularly the diehard elements among them, which would lead to a reimposition of oppression (they were not even sure about the middle elements). At the same time, the initial campaigning, particularly campaign speeches, was a very unfamiliar and difficult thing for the worker and peasant masses. As a result of the village elections, however, our masses still maintained an absolute advantage and accumulated experience in campaigning (there were many village elections; but the first genuine popular election took place last year). Therefore, [our] work and the competition in all the elections improved.

6) The political status of different classes judged by the election results.

Based on the statistics from the seven counties cited above, the results of elections are as follows (see tables):

a) In terms of class relations, before the establishment of our anti-Japanese base area, its government was a government of the dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie. It was a government under the GMD's one-party dictatorship; but now fundamental changes have taken place.

The workers and peasants, who form the rural proletariat and semiproletariat,

Table I

Village Elections

	Population	Percentage of voters (100%)	Participation based on class	Winning ratio	Village chair & secretary	Committee directors
	100	83.9	100	100	100	100
<i>by sex</i>						
male	48.2	49.9	84.9	78.7	92.9	92.8
female	51.8	50.1	82.9	21.3	7.1	7.2
<i>by age</i>						
youth		26.1	90.7	28.5	30.6	27.6
middle-aged	25.1	42.3	87.6	55.2	51.5	55.2
elders	25.3	31.6	74.9	16.3	17.9	17.2
<i>by class</i>						
workers	4.7	6.9	93.1	7.5	5.9	7.6
poor peasants	46.8	47.9	85.5	41.7	39.2	40.1
middle peasants	38.6	37.3	82.7	37.9	45.8	40.2
rich peasants	6.3	5.6	83.7	7.8	7.4	6.7
landlords	0.2	0.1	90.7	0.3	0.2	0.1
merchants	3.4	2.2	56.7	4.8	1.5	5.3
<i>by education</i>						
illiterate	54.1	55.3	86.2	37.0	19.0	17.6
primary school	44.7	44.2	81.8	60.8	75.6	80.0
middle school	1.1	0.4	60.2	2.1	5.1	2.3
college	0.1	0.1	60.9	0.1	0.3	0.1

won 49.2 percent of the seats in the village council, 44.6 in the district congress, and 30.5 in the county congress. The statistics show that while the workers and poor peasants make up 54.8 percent of the total population, the ratio of seats won ranged only from 49.2 to 30.5 percent. This means that the ratio of seats won, their status in the government, is lower than their ratio to the total population. Yet, it is very clear that the workers and poor peasants have already elevated themselves to part of the governing class.

**Results of the village, district, and county elections in seven counties
of central Hebei—Dingnan, Anping, Shenji, Raoyang,
Boye, Qingwan, and Chong**

Judging from this evidence, however, one cannot explain the changes in terms of the political status of different classes in popular elections. One must look at the position occupied by the middle peasants and typical rural petty bourgeoisie in the representative bodies in relation to the positions occupied by the workers and poor peasants; only then does the problem become more obvious. Elected representatives

Table II

District Elections

	Percentage of voters (100%)	Participation based on class	Winning Ratio	Chair & secretary	District mayor
overall	100	81.99	100	100	100
<i>by sex</i>					
male	50.58	83.10	87.2	84.35	94.12
female	49.42	80.89	12.8	15.65	5.88
<i>by age</i>					
youth	25.29	91.79	32.8	47.61	21.58
middle-aged	42.08	86.58	56.9	46.28	76.48
elders	22.36	71.24	10.3	6.13	1.94
<i>by class</i>					
workers	7.06	94.23	6.2	4.76	3.18
poor peasants	49.49	85.92	38.4	35.37	35.29
middle peasants	36.52	79.02	47.0	53.06	58.89
rich peasants	4.93	72.56	7.1	6.3	1.94
landlords	0.15	84.60	0.6	0	0
merchants	1.84	50.02	0.7	0	0
<i>by education</i>					
illiterate	55.46	84.05	17.4	4.76	3.88
primary school	44.06	79.85	75.2	79.59	74.54
middle school	0.39	60.02	7.1	15.65	21.58
college	0.09	58.92	0.3	0	0

or county congress members who are middle peasants make up 37.9 percent of village councils, 47 percent of district congresses, and 51.6 percent of county congresses. If we put together the elected representatives who are workers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, their presence in representative bodies at various levels accounts for 87.1 percent in village councils, 91.6 percent in district congresses, and 82.1 percent in county congresses—this is an absolute majority.

Elected landlords, rich peasants, and merchants in these counties make up 12.9 percent in village councils, 8.4 percent in district congresses, and 17.9 percent in county congresses. However, they account for only 7.9 percent of the total population. Obviously the ratio of those of them elected [to the total elected] is much higher than their ratio to the total population. At the same time, the knowledge, experience, and capacities of their representatives or congress members far exceed those of workers and peasants. Nonetheless, it is an undeniable fact that the dictatorship of the few has been destroyed. The fact that there are fewer elected workers and peasants at the higher levels of government is because we try to realize the “three-thirds” system of government. The educational level of workers and poor

Table III

County Elections

	Percentage of voters (100%)	Participation based on class	Winning ratio	Congress president & secretary	County magistrate
overall	100	78.3	100	100	100
<i>by sex</i>					
male	50.3	79.1	84.1	85.7	100
female	49.7	77.6	15.9	14.3	0
<i>by age</i>					
youth	25.5	88.6	37.8	38.1	42.8
middle-aged	42.9	84.3	50.6	57.1	57.2
elders	31.6	65.5	11.6	4.8	0
<i>by class</i>					
workers	7.1	90.5	4.1	0	0
poor peasants	50.3	83.3	26.4	14.3	14.4
middle peasants	35.8	74.1	51.6	61.9	42.8
rich peasants	4.8	67.0	14.6	23.8	42.8
landlords	0.2	78.4	3.1	0	0
merchants	1.8	48.5	0.2	0	0
<i>by education</i>					
illiterate	55.6	80.3	5.6	0	0
primary school	43.8	76.1	56.8	33.3	0
middle school	0.4	58.6	33	61.9	100
college	0.2	58.1	4.6	4.8	0

Remarks: (a) this table is based on statistics from seven counties in central Hebei. (b) These seven counties in central Hebei are those where our work is done quite well and where the commodity rich-peasant-economy is more developed. Thus, the proportion of the landlord class here is relatively small, and as such the statistics are not representative.

peasants makes it more difficult for them to be elected at higher levels of government and to become competent. Further, from the point of view of workers and poor peasants with relatively low levels of political consciousness, the village government seems to be more important to them, so that during village elections they are extremely unwilling to give their votes to neutrals, let alone see their leaders lose (an additional point to be made here is that all of the seven counties are areas in which class struggle is quite fierce).

b) In terms of age, during the era of the GMD's dictatorship, the status of the elders and middle-aged was higher, with the youth having no status to speak of. Today the situation is just the opposite. In village elections, the elders make up 31.8 percent of the electorate, but the ratio of elected elders to various government

bodies is only 16.3 percent in the village council, 10.3 percent in the district congresses, and 11.6 percent in county congresses. They account for only 4.8 percent of congress presidents and vice-presidents; none has been elected county magistrate (of course, this has something to do with the hardship of the work in an environment of war and with the poor physical condition of the elders). The situation of the young is totally different. They make up only 25.1 percent of the electorate in village elections, but their presence and status in the government is: 28.5 percent in village councils, 30.6 percent of village chairs and secretaries, 32.8 percent of district representatives, 47.61 percent of chairs and secretaries of the district congresses, 21.8 percent of district mayors, 37.8 percent of county congress members, and 42.8 percent of county magistrates. This is also one of the phenomena marking the beginning of the destruction of the feudal political system and social traditions.

c) "The liberation of women is a sign of the liberation of society" because their liberation is the most difficult [to achieve]. This point is made very clear in these popular elections. While women comprise 50.1 percent of the total citizenry, their representation amounted to only 21.3 percent in village councils, 12.8 percent in district congresses, 15.65 percent of chairs and secretaries of district congresses, 5.88 percent of district mayors, 15.9 percent in county congresses, 14.3 percent of presidents and secretaries of county congresses. This demonstrates that the status of women in government is still very low. However, in comparison with the fact that women had no political status prior to the establishment of the anti-Japanese base area, their status has been elevated considerably.

7) On the question of the implementation of the "three-thirds" system of government.

a) The "three-thirds" system of government is a political provision for the organizational composition of the government of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It is the party's policy on this issue; it may be publicized as a political program or in other forms, but must not be set in the explicit terms of the laws of the state. It violates the democratic principle of genuine equality and popular election to define the "three-thirds" system in legal stipulations.

b) It is relatively easy to implement the "three-thirds" system in sloppy popular elections or indirect elections. There are enormous difficulties in trying to fully realize this system in equal, direct, and genuine democratic popular elections, in which case a full implementation of this system can only be accidental. The problem is obvious. Since we cannot choose or appoint [representatives], we must let the majority of the citizens decide freely by their votes. The result of the vote is an unknown quantity before the ballots are counted. In the popular elections of last year, we expended considerable (though insufficient) efforts to realize the "three-thirds" system. However, the election results indicated that there were very few—or no—places where the system was implemented 100 percent. Let us take a look at the statistics for the congresses of the thirteen counties in the Beiyu District—the Wutai District.

Background of County Congress Members in the 1940 Democratic Elections (statistics from thirteen counties)

County	No. of county congressmen	CCP members		Progressive elements		Neutrals	
	No.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Wutai	60	27	45	24	40	9	15
Tang	63	25	39.68	22	34.92	16	25.4
Mancheng	45	26	57.8	8	17.8	11	24.4
Dai	45	27	60	9	20	9	20
Guo	35	20	57.1	7	20	8	22.9
Dingxiang	33	12	36.36	12	36.36	9	27.28
Quyang	56	28	50	12	21.43	16	28.57
Wan	44	15	34.09	15	34.09	14	31.82
Pingshan	67	27	40.29	33	49.25	7	10.45
Jianping	72	25	34.72	25	34.72	22	30.56
Fuping	36	22	60	7	20	7	20
Laiyuan	49	34	69.38	8	16.32	7	14.28
Hangtang	51	38	74.5	4	7.84	9	17.65
Total	656	326	49.7	186	28.35	144	21.95

None of the thirteen county congresses have fully realized the “three-thirds” system. The percentage of the party members in county congresses varies from 34.09 percent (Wan County) at the lowest to 74.5 (Hangtang) at the highest. The percentage of progressive elements ranges from a high of 40 percent to a low of 7.8 percent. The percentage of neutral elements in county congresses is generally lower than one-third; the average is only 21.95 percent, with a high of 31.82 and a low of 10.45 percent.

According to the statistics of the county congresses of the seven counties in central Hebei cited above, workers and poor peasants account for 30.5 percent of the congress members; landlords, rich peasants, and merchants account for 17.9 percent. This further confirms that the composition of the congress members in the seven counties is not in line with the “three-thirds” system.

Again, let us look at the statistics of the district congresses of the twelve counties of the Beiyu District.

From the table below it can be seen that the “three-thirds” system has not materialized in the district congresses. In terms of the overall statistics of the twelve counties, party members account for 46.94 percent of the district representatives; progressive elements account for 41.57 percent; neutrals account for only 11.49 percent. The percentage of seats in the district congresses held by party members ranges from 90 (Fuping), at the highest, to 12.7 (Mancheng, an area where our work was backward at that time), at the lowest. The percentage of seats held by progressive elements ranges from 81.6 (Mancheng) to 5.2 (Fuping); the lowest percentage of seats held by neutrals is only 1.17 (Laiyuan).

The 1940 Democratic Elections at the District Level in the Beiyu District of the Jin-Cha-Ji: The Composition of District Representatives in the 12 Counties

County	No. of district representatives	CCP members		Progressive elements		Neutrals	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yi	384	107	27.86	255	66.14	22	5.7
Mancheng	402	50	12.7	329	81.6	23	5.7
Wutai	488	155	31.76	311	63.73	22	4.5
Guo	225	104	46.22	109	48.46	12	5.33
Ding	292	125	42.8	102	34.91	65	22.25
Wan	341	139	44.98	96	30.75	106	23.93
Tang	543	285	52.49	198	36.46	60	11.05
Hangtang	417	216	51.8	164	39.3	37	8.4
Jianping	156	72	46.15	42	26.92	42	26.92
Fuping	331	298	90	17	5.2	16	4.8
Laiyuan	256	181	70.7	72	28.12	3	1.17
Pingshan*	396	255	64.39	64	16.16	77	19.44
Total	4,231	1,987	46.94	1759	41.57	485	11.49

*(total no. of reps. in Pingshan may be wrong)

If we cite the statistics of the district congresses in the seven counties in central Hebei, the ratio is: workers and poor peasants account for 44.6 percent of the seats, while the seats held by landlords, rich peasants, and merchants account for only 8.4 percent.

In general, the result of popular elections seldom corresponds completely to the three-thirds system. In fact, this system does not exist anywhere (administrative personnel appointed by superiors can, however, completely follow the system).

c) However, does this mean that one should conclude that the three-thirds system is wrong or unnecessary? No. It is very necessary. It provides the entire party with a clear direction in the popular elections, as well as preventing and correcting the factional tendency on the part of party members in government to exclude nonparty cadres and neutrals—the tendency of the workers' and peasants' dictatorship that runs counter to the party's policy of the united front. Although the election results have failed to realize the three-thirds system, the ratio of nonparty, and particularly neutral, elements has increased greatly. Moreover, the number of elected party members may be reduced through resignation so as to remedy the flaws in the elections. This will make it easier for landlords and the bourgeoisie to shake off the influence of the reactionary propaganda by the Japanese aggressor and the sowing of discord by diehard elements, so that they may be more reassured in cooperating with us to fight the war and support the constructive cause of the base

area. Because a political provision like the “three-thirds” system is expressed in terms of simple numerical figures, it is extraordinarily clear and definitive. This enables the party members and people from all walks of life to understand and implement it and evaluate its strength and weaknesses by contrasting it with the GMD’s one-party dictatorship. Therefore, even though the percentage of elected neutrals falls far short of one-third, the significance and the role of the “three-thirds” system of government can still be appropriately utilized. At the same time, the party’s definition of the “three-thirds” system of government is not an absolute, rigid, and orthodox formula—it is a guideline for practical action.

d) It is not possible for the “three-thirds” system to be implemented widely. When party members exceed one-third, however, some may tender their resignations to produce an approximate realization. However, we must explain that its realization is very difficult.

i) Party organization must undergo widespread expansion. In particular, the realization of the “three-thirds” system of government in villages requires at least that each village have a party branch and that each branch have a considerable number of party members (only the village administrative office and five or six other committees have more than thirty administrative personnel).

ii) It requires that the masses already be mobilized and have risen up, as well as having considerable organization, political consciousness, and their own leaders. Otherwise, as a result of the elections, particularly village elections, the government will remain in the control of landlords and local despots, or diehard elements will tip the balance of power against us, making the “three-thirds” system of government impossible. In order to implement this system, sometimes we must first concentrate our strength to destroy the old dictatorship of the landlord class and the GMD’s one-party dictatorship.

iii) The superiority of the masses has been established; after appropriate improvement is made in the lives of workers and peasants, class relations need to be readjusted properly (such as rent- and interest-reduction and payment of rent and interest). Otherwise, it is difficult [for new class relations] to materialize. Fuping is a county where work by the border region party is quite good. As a result, party members account for as many as 90 percent of those elected at the district level. The reason is not that subordinate party organizations did not implement resolutely the policy of the “three-thirds” system, but that during last year’s election, rural class struggle was extraordinarily fierce in that county and was not appropriately adjusted. In addition, because of the neutral elements’ usual deficiency in their conduct of serving the people, the conduct of the party members committed to serving the people had already gained the enthusiastic support of the people. That is why the masses were unwilling to vote for neutral elements. Consequently, in some areas, although party members voted for neutral elements, almost all the masses voted for party members.

e) Enormous results have been achieved since the implementation of the “three-thirds” system; many landlords who previously opposed us have begun to change

their attitudes. Some landlords said, "Only this has given us our world; there is now hope for us." Some said, "In the past the village administrative office was imperialist; now it is benevolent." Some landlords said, "The border region has moved onto the right track." Some said, "The constitution of the border region is getting better and better." Some landlords energetically sang, "Even the best of the golden age is not better than today." . . . Facts have shown that the "three-thirds" system of government is an effective weapon in strengthening unity for fighting the war against Japan and in consolidating the anti-Japanese areas and their governments. It is indispensable today; it is completely correct.

8) On concrete work in popular elections.

The concrete work in popular elections is very complicated and time-consuming. Take village elections for example; this involves how to carry out widespread political mobilization, how to conduct registration of citizens, how to approve and publicize the rights of citizens, how to divide up citizens' groups, how to nominate candidates, how to call primary meetings, how to convene a formal meeting for election, how to call meetings of representatives after the election has been conducted, how the outgoing village mayor should transfer his power and administration, how the new village mayor should announce his work plans, where he should start, etc. These are extremely complicated matters. In order to save space, they are omitted here.

9) Conclusion on the question of political power—we have completely destroyed the feudal state system.

a) "Special armed forces" and "a regular army and police are the principal instruments of the state." Today, in the border region, except for the army drawn from the sons of the border region, there are no other special armed forces of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, and their party. The public security bureau is totally under the control of the people; the old police establishment and security teams have been abolished and replaced by a "people's police" whose members do not give up their productive roles (like self-defense teams and antispy teams).

b) Every country controlled by the exploiting class allows only the ruling class to monopolize special armed forces, while denying the people their "self-organized armed forces," let alone special armed forces. Now the arms of the landlord class within the border region have been seized and used to arm the people; the people's special armed forces have been established, as have revolutionary "self-organized armed forces of the people." In all the counties controlled by the exploiting class, their "special armed forces . . . are in direct conflict with the armed people and the armed organizations of the people." Engels once said, "After every revolution in France . . . the first problem to be solved by the capitalists controlling the instruments of the state was to dissolve the workers' armed forces." On the same question, Lenin said, "Whether the oppressed classes have their own armed forces is the essence of the question of the state." Now, within the border region, we have used the arms of the landlord class to arm all the people. Moreover, the people's special armed forces have been combined with the self-organized armed forces of the

people; they rely on each other. This is also iron-clad evidence proving that the nature of political power has been fundamentally changed.

c) Revolutionary classes “cannot simply seize the existing agencies of the state and use them to reach their own goals.” “The precondition of every genuine people’s revolution is to undermine and destroy the existing agencies of the state.” Only after suffering many setbacks have we gradually realized that the governmental agencies left behind by the landlord class are suitable only to the implementation of the dictatorship of the landlords and bourgeoisie and to the GMD’s one-party dictatorship, but not to the implementation of the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. In line with CC policy, we have now adopted a method of gradual reform, destroyed in essence the organizational structure of the old feudal government, established a new relationship between popular will and administrative agencies (of course, there are many flaws), and implemented a joint dictatorship of all the anti-Japanese classes.

d) In terms of the organization of political power, party members and progressive elements account for over half the personnel in administrative agencies at all levels. In representative bodies, according to statistics for the seven counties given above, workers and poor peasants account for 49.2 percent in villages, 44.6 percent in districts, and 30.5 percent in counties. If we add middle peasants, they jointly account for 87.1 percent of village [representatives], 91.6 percent in districts, and 92.1 percent in counties. It is clear that the organization of political power has undergone a qualitative change. The masses of workers and peasants have elevated themselves to the position of the ruling class, which administers the political power and affairs of the state jointly with leftist landlords and the middle bourgeoisie; they have already destroyed the system of the feudal state and established a new government.

e) The above facts conclusively demonstrate not only that a democratic revolution to overthrow the feudal political system is needed for the war against Japan, but that it may be gradually carried out in the course of the war against Japan and in the areas where our army has the advantage. However, we should adopt a policy of gradual reform, and not one that aims for an instant overthrow.

f) The democratic political power established during the war can only include the democratic political power of all those who are anti-Japanese. More specifically, these are political powers based on the “three-thirds” system; the order they establish can only be the order of the anti-Japanese united front. This order exercises dictatorship over all traitors and the opposition, but exercises democracy over all those who are anti-Japanese and protects their human, political, and, in particular, economic, and land rights. Only this can enable all the classes involved in fighting the Japanese to avoid self-destructive and worthless struggles. Instead, this can unite them closely together to fight the Japanese.

g) Although the anti-Japanese democratic governments [political powers] are part of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and are based on the “three-thirds” system, this does not mean that the real power of each class within the government

must be balanced. In practice, a balance of power is impossible. Consolidation of the united front requires that the masses maintain an advantage within it. Only this can help us win over the landlords and the middle bourgeoisie to cooperate with us in fighting the Japanese and to support the democratic governments in a committed way. This will make gradual and peaceful reform of political power possible. Although reform of political power in the base area—destroying the old system of the feudal state and establishing a new democratic political power—may be accomplished through a policy of peaceful reform in the course of the war against Japan, the struggle remains very intense. The so-called peaceful means refers only to the form of struggle.

h) The political power of the anti-Japanese united front that is based on the “three-thirds” system is a weapon in the national struggle as well as a weapon for crushing the activities of the enemy and traitors and for resisting the aggression by an alien people. However, can we say that this kind of political power does not have any significance in dealing with the struggle between various anti-Japanese classes? Or is it only a neutral thing that maintains the balance of power between different classes? It definitely is not. We say merely that its principal role is as a weapon for national struggle (in the broad sense of the class in the world revolution; the anti-Japanese war similarly has its significance in class struggle). In fact, if one or several classes achieves an advantageous position in the government, it [they] naturally will use the weapon of the state to carry out class struggle. This is both possible and permissible. However, we must explain that today the narrow role of the state as a weapon for class struggle is subordinate; it should not be impeded from becoming a weapon for national struggle. The former must be subordinate to the latter; otherwise, it will not benefit the nation’s war against Japan; nor will it benefit the class that has the advantage in the government. However, we are only saying this in terms of the role of the government in the war against Japan and the main responsibilities it assumes at the moment. We are not saying that the anti-Japanese democratic government we lead has only this function or can only assume the responsibility of fighting the Japanese. Real advantage is something that determines the nature [of political power]. If one class or several classes (workers and peasants, or landlords and the bourgeoisie) achieves superiority in a government, it [they] will still make the government perform its function of class oppression and, under certain circumstances (when necessary), it may be turned completely into a weapon for class oppression to solve once and for all some domestic contradictions.

G.6 Decision of the CC on Land Policy in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas (28 January 1942)⁶⁴

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance [1937], the land policy carried out by our party in various anti-Japanese bases has been a land policy based on the Anti-

Japanese National United Front, i.e., a land policy involving reduction of rent and interest rates, on the one hand, and the guarantee of rent and interest collections, on the other. Since its implementation in various base areas, this policy has secured the support of the broad masses, rallied people of different classes, and sustained the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear. In the areas where rent and interest rate reductions have been carried out more extensively, more rigorously, and more thoroughly, together with the guarantee of rent and interest collections, the enthusiasm with which the local people have participated in the anti-Japanese struggle and in democratic reconstruction also has been higher than elsewhere; furthermore, in these areas conditions of work are being maintained at a normal level, life is more stable and orderly, and the bases are generally more firmly consolidated. In many base areas, however, this policy has not yet been carried out extensively, rigorously, or thoroughly. In some base areas, rent and interest rate reductions have only been carried out in certain limited areas, and in other base areas the rent and interest rate reductions are only taken as propaganda slogans, unaccompanied by any concrete rule of implementation, to say nothing of actually carrying out the policy. Sometimes, laws on rent and interest rate reductions are promulgated by the local governments as a pure formality without being strictly observed, thus resulting in ostensible but not actual reduction. In these areas, the enthusiasm of the masses cannot be developed, and consequently they cannot be effectively organized to form an active base for the struggle against the Japanese. In these areas, it is impossible to consolidate the anti-Japanese bases, which have become soft and weak spots and cannot survive enemy attacks. In a number of other places, on the other hand, leftist mistakes have been committed. Though these mistakes have occurred in only a small number of districts and have generally been corrected on the basis of directives from the CC, it is still necessary that the attention of comrades in all areas be called to it. At a time when the path of resistance is advancing to a more difficult stage, the various bases must be called on to mobilize the broad masses more extensively and to heighten their morale for the struggle against the Japanese, for the struggle for production, and for the rallying of all anti-Japanese classes to engage in relentless, sustained warfare in the enemy's rear. As the result of a careful study of experiences in various areas, the CC has arrived at certain conclusive decisions on the matter of land policy. The detailed rules for carrying out the land policy are attached herewith as an appendix transmitted together with these resolutions, for adoption in the various areas. It is hoped that the comrades of all areas will study these decisions and carry them out diligently.

- 1) Recognize that peasants (including hired farmhands) constitute the basic strength of the anti-Japanese way as well as of the battle of production. Accordingly it is party policy to assist the peasants, reduce feudal exploitation by the landlords, carry out reductions of rent and interest rates, and guarantee the civil liberties and political, land, and economic rights of the peasants, in order to improve their living conditions and enhance their enthusiasm for the anti-Japanese war and for production.

2) Recognize that most of the landlords are anti-Japanese and that some of the enlightened gentry also favor democratic reforms. Accordingly, party policy is only to help the peasants in reducing feudal exploitation but not to liquidate feudal exploitation entirely, much less to attack the enlightened gentry who support democratic reforms. Therefore, after rent and interest rates are reduced, the collection of rent and interest are to be assured; and in addition to protecting the civil liberties, political, land, and economic rights of the peasants, we must guarantee the landlords their civil liberties, political, land, and economic rights in order to ally the landlord class with the struggle against the Japanese. The policy of liquidating feudal exploitation should only be adopted against stubbornly unrepentant traitors.

3) Recognize that the capitalist mode of production is the more progressive method in present-day China and that the bourgeoisie, particularly the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, represents the comparatively more progressive social elements and political forces in China today. The mode of production of the rich peasants bears capitalistic characteristics; they are the capitalists in the rural areas and are an indispensable force in the anti-Japanese way and in the battle for production. The petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, and rich peasants not only want to resist the Japanese but also are demanding more democracy. Therefore, party policy is not to weaken capitalism and the bourgeoisie, or to weaken the rich peasant class and their productive forces, but to encourage capitalist production and ally with the bourgeoisie and encourage production by rich peasants and ally with the rich peasants, on the condition that proper improvements are made in the living conditions of the workers. Nevertheless, part of the income of rich peasants does represent feudal exploitation, which is resented by the middle and poor peasants. Thus, when rent and interest rates are reduced in rural areas, the rent and interest [payable] to rich peasants should also be reduced. After such reductions, the rich peasant should be guaranteed his right to collect rent and interest as well as his civil, political, land, and economic rights. Landlords who partly employ capitalist methods in cultivating their land (so-called managing landlords) [i.e., landlords who employ hired farmhands] should be granted the same treatment as rich peasants.

4) The above three basic principles constitute the point of departure of our party's anti-Japanese united front and land policy. The experiences of the past four years prove that only insistence on these principles can consolidate the Anti-Japanese National United Front, correctly settle the land problem, and rally all the people to support our movement of national resistance to isolate completely the Japanese bandits. Any extreme leftist or rightist tendencies will not achieve this goal.

5) On the rural front, contradictions between the landlord and the peasant which manifest themselves in the form of opposition or obstructionism on the part of the landlord to peasant demands for democracy, better livelihood, etc. must be settled appropriately in accordance with the above principles. The reasonable demands of both sides should be satisfied, but both sides should bow to the overall interests of national resistance. In settling rural disputes, the working members of the party and government should base themselves on the above basic principles and follow a

policy of adjusting the interests of both sides. They should not take a one-sided stand either for the landlord or for the peasant.

6) The "three-thirds" system in political administration is a reasonable political formula for adjusting the internal relationship among various anti-Japanese classes. This system must be carried out resolutely, strictly, and extensively in councils and governments of various levels. The view that such a system is only an expedient measure for appeasing nonparty elements is erroneous.

7) Government regulations should include arrangements for both sides and not be partial. On the one hand, legislation should provide for the reduction of rent and interest rates by the landlord without delay. He must not resist the implementation of these laws. On the other hand, it should already be stipulated that peasants are obliged to pay rent and interest. They must not resist collection. On the one hand, the government should stipulate that title to land and title to property still belong to the landlord, who has the right to sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and otherwise dispose of his land in accordance with existing legal provisions. On the other hand, legislation should provide that the livelihood of the peasants must be taken into consideration when the landlord makes these dispositions (of his land and other properties). All contracts concerning land and debt should be concluded at the free will of both parties. When a contract expires, either party is free to abrogate it.

8) Expenses for fighting the Japanese are to be borne by all classes except paupers and are to be paid to the government according to the principle of progressive taxation. There should be no unfairness in applying this principle, or any refusal to pay.

9) The implementation of laws regarding reductions of rent and interest rates is a prerequisite for an increase in agricultural production, which is the major production of the anti-Japanese bases. The officers of the party and the government should do their utmost to promote and develop agricultural loans, in order to solve their difficulties in obtaining credit.

10) The task of the Peasant Association for National Salvation, in the matter of rent and interest rate reduction, is mainly to assist the government in carrying out the laws concerning the reductions of rent and interest rates. After the rent and interest rates have been reduced, its major task is to assist the government in mediating rural disputes and increasing agricultural production. It shall not, however, substitute its own decisions for government laws and orders, or take the place of the administration. In its task of settling rural disputes, methods of mediation, rather than that of arbitrary decision, should be used. In the task of developing agricultural production, all members of the peasant associations should be mobilized to become models and leaders.

11) Reduction of rent and interest rates and the protection of the peasant's civil, political, land, and economic rights are the first aspect of our party's land policy. However, many sectors within the anti-Japanese base areas have not yet carried out rent and interest rate reductions on any extensive, rigorous, or thorough basis, either because of resistance on the part of the landlords or because of the indifferent

attitude or bureaucratism of the cadres within the party and the government. Officers of the party and the government in the various base areas must, therefore, strictly check their own work, dispatch agents to inspect the results in the villages, investigate and study the situation carefully, summarize the experiences of various areas, praise the examples of correct achievement, and criticize cases of bureaucratism. One must realize that there generally exists a wide gap between the laws and slogans and the implementation of such laws and slogans. If bureaucratism is not punished harshly and rightist tendencies are unopposed, we will not be able to implement our laws and slogans.

12) The guarantee of rent and interest collection and the protection of the landlord's civil, political, land, and economic rights are the second aspect of our party's land policy. But certain leftist mistakes of neglecting this factor have occurred in various bases, either because of a misunderstanding of our party's land policy on the part of the peasants, or because of the partial or complete misunderstanding of our party's policy by cadres of our party and government. We must therefore explain clearly the party's policy, both within the party and among the peasant masses in order to understand that the land policy of the party in the Anti-Japanese National United Front differs in certain basic respects from the land policy of Civil War days. They must be made to realize that they cannot limit their view to their own immediate interests with their future interests, and local interests with national interests. After the reduction of rent and interest rates, and the realization of the peasant's civil, political, land, and economic rights, peasants should be advised to pay rent and interest as well as to protect the civil, political, land, and economic rights of the landlord. Similarly, the landlord should be advised not to limit his view to immediate, narrow interests but to take into consideration future interests and the national welfare in the matter of rent- and interest-reductions as well as in the matter of the protection of the peasant's civil, political, land, and economic rights.

Appendix

Since conditions in various base areas differ and since there are different conditions existing even within a given area, no single set of rules can be applied uniformly as detailed provisions for the solution of the land problem. The CC has laid down certain broad general principles on land policy for uniform application. In this appendix some concrete provisions, based on these general principles, are presented for adoption in the various areas. The provisions in this appendix, if applicable to local conditions, should be decisively implemented. If adjustments have to be made, owing to their incompatibility with local conditions, such adjustments may be made; but they must be reported to the CC, and approval must be obtained therefrom.

1) On rent and tenure

1) In the areas where rent has not been reduced, rent should, in principle, be reduced by 25 percent, i.e., a reduction of 25 percent from the prewar rate for rent. No

matter whether it be public land, private land, rented land, or shared land, and no matter whether it be cash rent, rent in kind, unfixed rent, or fixed rent, this rule applies to all. For land shared under various forms, it should not uniformly be ruled that the landlord is to obtain no more than 40 or 60 percent, but there should be a 25 percent reduction of the former percentage in rent, based on a consideration of the labor, animal power, tools, fertilizer, seed, and grain contributed by the two parties. In guerrilla areas or places near enemy [Japanese military] strongholds, rent-reduction may be less than 10 percent, to be decided in accordance with the general goal of increasing the enthusiasm of the peasants for the struggle against the Japanese and rallying different classes for the War of Resistance.

2) All rents are to be collected after the harvest, and those who rent out land shall not collect the rental from the tenants in advance; nor shall additional payments be demanded.

3) The payment of fixed rent may be postponed or reduced if all or a part of the produce is destroyed by natural or manmade disasters.

4) Rent in arrears for many years is to be exempted from payment.

5) Public grain and public levies are to be paid according to a progressive schedule by both parties (landlord and tenant). The land tax is to be paid by the owner of the land.

6) If disputes arise regarding a cash rent contract, owing to the depreciation of the paper currency, the government should summon the two parties concerned for discussion and mediation and may convert the entire or a part of the payment of the cash rent into payment in kind.

7) If a mediation organ such as a rent commission is set up, peasant, landlord, and government should all have representatives on it; but the final power of decision shall rest with the government.

8) Permanent tenancy, when stipulated in the rent contract or based on [local] custom, should be maintained. If the system of permanent tenancy does not prevail in an area, however, no compulsory enforcement of such tenancy should be carried out. Both parties shall instead be encouraged to sign long-term contracts, for example, for five years or more, to enable the peasants to increase production with a feeling of security.

9) In areas where there is no permanent tenancy or when a contract expires, the landowner has the right to dispose of the land in accordance with the stipulations of the contract, including the right to rerent, mortgage, sell, cultivate it himself, hire laborers to cultivate it, etc. However, during wartime, any landowner who wishes to take back the land from a tenant must consider the livelihood of the peasants and must inform the tenant three months before the harvest. If the tenant is too poor, the government should call on the two parties to renew the tenancy or for the return of only part of the rented land.

10) When a landowner, at the expiration of the rent contract, wants to rerent, mortgage, or sell his land, the original tenant has the priority, if other conditions are equal, in renting, buying, or taking the mortgage on the land in question.

11) When a landowner sells land rented out on the basis of permanent tenancy or before the contract expires, the original tenant has the right to continue his tenancy; the new owner cannot rent out the land to another party until the contract has expired.

12) If a tenant gives up cultivating the land for two years without reason or deliberately refuses to pay rent even though capable of doing so, the owner of the land has the right to take the land back.

II) On the problem of indebtedness

1) The policy of reduction of interest rates on debts contracted before the war is a necessary policy to meet the needs of the debtors as well as to rally the creditors in the fight against Japan. One and a half percent [per month] is to be the rate in calculating interest. If the total payment of interest exceeds the amount of the original capital of the loan, interest is to stop; [only] the capital is to be repaid. If payment of interest is double the amount of the capital, payment on both capital and interest are to be suspended. As to the interest rate for the loans contracted since the war, it can be freely decided locally in accordance with local social and economic conditions. The government should not stipulate too low an interest rate, for it may result in a slowdown of credit and harm the people's welfare.

2) Creditors are not to cancel loan contracts because of the reduction of interest rates, and debtors are not to refuse to pay interest after the reduction. The creditor has the right to sue for overdue debts in accordance with the law.

3) If a debtor is unable to pay either the interest or the capital on debts newly contracted since the war, the creditor has the right to dispose of the collateral according to contract. All disputes are to be adjudicated by the government. When only collateral is used to cover several loans, the income from selling the collateral is to be distributed proportionally according to the priorities of the contracts. If the collateral is land, the same provision applies.

4) If land is mortgaged but not yet sold, the party that mortgages it may redeem the land by paying the original mortgage according to the contract; there must be no confiscation of the land or change of contract. If the mortgage has turned into a sale, the land cannot be redeemed. Disputes arising from the depreciation of paper currency, when the mortgaged land is redeemed, are to be settled by the government.

5) When a debtor is unable to fulfill his contract signed since the war as a result of natural or manmade disasters or other unavoidable causes, he may ask the government to mediate for a certain reduction of interest or for the payment of capital without interest.

6) Disputes arising as a result of the repayment of a loan in depreciated paper currency are to be suitably settled by the government.

III) On the settlement of certain special types of land problems

1) Land belonging to the most criminal and notorious traitors is to be confiscated and managed by the government and then rented out to the peasants to farm, as a measure

of punishment. If members of a traitor's family have not participated in any treacherous activities, or if the case is minor in nature, this provision is not applicable.

2) Land belonging to those who are forced to become traitors is not to be confiscated, in order to show leniency and encourage their repentance. If there is no one to look after the land in question, the government will manage it and rent it to peasants, and then return the land to the owner when the person in question returns to fight the Japanese.

3) Land belonging to a landlord who has fled from a given area is not to be confiscated, no matter where the landlord in question may be. If there is no one to look after the land, the government will manage it on his behalf, get persons to till the land, receive his rent in custody, and pay the land tax and public grain for him. When the owner returns, the land will be handed back to him together with the rent that is his due.

4) "Black land," i.e., land that has evaded taxation or the title deeds of which are not taxed, is not to be confiscated, but the owner shall be ordered to pay taxes and public grain levies that are in arrears. If the obligations are not met within the stipulated time limit, the government shall settle the case in an appropriate manner.

5) Clan land, and society land, are to be managed by a control commission organized by the clan, or society, concerned. The income from such land will be used for the benefit of the clan, or the society, or the local community.

6) School land shall be reserved as a source of educational funds, to be managed by an educational fund committee set up by the government or the local inhabitants.

7) Land that belongs to a religious group (Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, Daoist, or other sects) will undergo no changes.

8) Uncultivated public land is to be distributed by the government to families of Red Army personnel, refugees, and poor peasants for cultivation, and the landownership goes with it. Within a stipulated period it may be exempted from taxation in toto or in part.

9) Uncultivated private land, no matter whether it had been under cultivation or not, should be made available first to the owner. If the owner is unable to cultivate it and leaves it unattended, the government may advertise for persons to till it and, within a stipulated time, exempt or reduce the taxation [on the land]. The ownership of such land still belongs to the original owner, but the tiller has a right to permanent tenancy.

G.7 Economic and Financial Problems. *Mao Zedong* (December 1942)⁶⁵

On the Development of Cooperatives

There were already cooperatives in the border region during the Civil War period. Since the War of Resistance began, the border region government has continued to

promote them, and after five-and-a-half years of hard effort they have gradually expanded.

In the four years from 1937 to 1941 the number of consumer cooperatives increased from 130 to 155, and the number of cooperative members from 57,847 to 140,218. The share capital grew from 55,525 *yuan* to 693,071 *yuan*. The value of sales increased from 261,189 *yuan* to more than 6,008,000. Profits rose from 4,800 *yuan* to over 1,020,000 *yuan*, and the public accumulation fund increased from 3,500 *yuan* to over 173,000 *yuan*.

If we compare the October 1942 statistics for the nineteen county capitals with those of 1941, the number of cooperative members has increased from 97,297 to 115,899. The share capital has risen abruptly from over 712,900 *yuan* to more than 6 million *yuan*, and the profit has also increased from 858,000 *yuan* to more than 3,398,000 *yuan*.

The largest amount of share capital owned by the individual members of consumer cooperatives is around 10,000 *yuan*, and the lowest is around 4 or 5 *yuan*.

The distribution of consumer cooperatives at the end of 1941 was as follows: Yan'an, twenty-eight; Ansai, twelve; Yanchang, eight; Gulin, eight; Dingbian, eight; Qingyang, Huachi, Quzi, and Yanchuan, seven each; Anding, Fuxian, and Wuqi, six each; Ganquan, Jingbian, and Heshui, five each; Yan'an city and Mizhi, four each; and Suide, two. There are still no statistics for the other counties.

Turning to producer cooperatives, ten were established in 1939 with the support of the government and the assistance of the northwest office of the Chinese Industrial Cooperative. Thereafter some consumer cooperatives with large amounts of capital also ran producer cooperatives. By October 1942, the number of producer cooperatives had increased from ten to fifty. The number of employees engaged in production had increased from 199 to 563. Share capital had grown from 11,130 *yuan* to 2,491,600 *yuan*, and the total value of monthly production from 60,000 *yuan* to over 2,300,000 *yuan*.

According to this year's statistics, the distribution of producer cooperatives is as follows: Suide, sixteen; Yan'an, seven; Gulin, five; Yanchang, five; Yanchuan, five; Ganquan, three; Ansai, three; Jingbian, two; Qingyang, one; Jiaxian, one; Mizhi, one; Anding, one.

Among the fifty producer cooperatives there are 27 large and small textile cooperatives: thirteen in Suide, four in Yan'an, two in Gulin, and one each in Ganquan, Fuxian, Yanchang, Yanchuan, Ansai, Anding, Jiaxian and Mizhi. Altogether they employ 497 people, and their share capital is 1,700,000 *yuan*. Six have twenty-five or more employees, the rest ranging from three to over ten. If these twenty-seven cooperatives were working at full capacity, they could produce 30,000 bolts of cloth annually (each bolt 100 feet). At the moment, they are only producing around 22,000 bolts, 6,000 woven blankets, 4,152 dozen woolen towels, and 8,400 dozen pairs of woven socks.

There are five dyeing cooperatives: two in Yanchuan, two in Suide, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of thirteen people, their share capital is 128,000

yuan, and each year they can dye over 7,000 bolts of cloth. There are five producer cooperatives pressing cottonseed oil. Of these, two are in Gulin, two in Jingbian, and one in Yanchang. They employ a total of nineteen people, their share capital is 245,000 *yuan*, and each year they can press 10,000 *jin* of cottonseed oil. There are nine flour mills: two each in Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Yanchuan, and one in Gulin. They employ a total of twenty-four people, and their share capital is 262,000 *yuan*. There are four blanket-making cooperatives: two in Yan'an, one in Qingyang, and one in Suide. They employ a total of forty-two people, and their share capital is 152,000 *yuan*. Each year they can produce 7,600 blankets. There is one pottery cooperative in Yan'an County. It employs seven people, its share capital is 3,000 *yuan*, and each year it produces six kiln-loads of pottery.

The above statistics show us that both consumer and producer cooperatives have expanded greatly in terms of membership, share capital, profit, and undertakings. However, this development has been uneven. In the past five years it has gone through three stages. Moreover, qualitative development only began to advance rapidly during 1942. Before 1939, cooperatives everywhere were based on share capital from the government with the addition of some share capital assessed from the masses. At that time, their nature was basically that of publicly run enterprises, and for the most part they became shops publicly run by the county and district governments. The cooperative enterprise was not facing the masses, but was chiefly facing the government. It was providing funds for the government, and all decisions were made by the government. This was the first stage. After 1939, the slogan "Popularize the Cooperatives" was put forward. However, most places still used the old method of assessing share capital from the masses to carry out this so-called popularization. Thus the masses still regarded the cooperatives as a burden pressed on them and not as something of their own. Cooperative personnel were still the same official personnel. They ordered the masses to do substitute farmwork on their land on their behalf. The masses could not see the great benefits of the cooperatives for themselves; on the contrary, they considered that the cooperatives increased the labor burden they had to bear. After 1940, the duty of all the local governments to achieve self-sufficiency in production was increased. Thereafter, the large shareholders in many cooperatives were not the people but government organs. It was thus even more difficult for the cooperatives to give due consideration to the interests of the masses. This was the second stage. It was only in January 1942 that the Reconstruction Department put forward the strategy of "overcome the desire to monopolize everything; implement the policy of the people in control and officials as helpers," based on the experience of the Southern District Cooperative of Yan'an County. It was only by implementing this strategy that cooperatives everywhere did away with the method of levying shares by assessment, and gradually built up close relations with the masses and experience in being concerned for the interests of the masses. Thus, in merely ten months the share capital has risen sharply by more than 5 million *yuan*, and undertakings have also expanded. This has played a major role in organizing the economic strength of the people, reducing middleman exploita-

tion, and developing the people's economy. This is the third stage. It is only in this stage that the cooperatives of the border region have, in general, begun to follow the right path.

The above outlines the path of development of most cooperatives. However, there have been exceptions. For example, the Southern District Cooperative of Yan'an County got on the right path somewhat earlier. Through several years of hard experience, this cooperative has become a model cooperative truly supported by the people. During 1942, cooperatives from the counties of Suide, Anding, Ansai, Ganquan, Yanchang, Wuqi, etc., have advanced by studying this model cooperative.

What, then, are the special features of the Southern District Cooperative? It has the following good points:

1) It has smashed the dogmatism and formalism of cooperatives, and it does not cling to old ways and regulations. The Southern District Cooperative began as a consumer cooperative. However, its undertakings have extended into every aspect of the economic life of all the people of Southern District. It does not just manage consumer undertakings but handles supply and distribution, transport, production, and credit. It has organized six producer cooperatives for textiles, oil-pressing, blanket manufacture, and so forth, and one transport team with over 100 animals. It has become a comprehensive cooperative. It does not concentrate on the percentage of income that should be devoted to the cooperative's own public accumulation fund and public welfare fund, but strives to share out its profits to the members. It does not place a limit on the share dividend, and each member receives a return on his shares regardless of the number held. It does not limit the right of members to dispose of their shares, and each member has the freedom to withdraw his shareholding at any time. Nor does it limit the nature of the membership. People from all social strata can join. (Since Yan'an is a region that has gone through land revolution, allowing people from all classes to join is no hindrance to CP leadership of the cooperative.) They can also belong to the organs of the cooperative. Moreover, it is not necessary to have ready cash to become a shareholder. Before the cooperative won complete confidence among the masses, it permitted them to become shareholders, using government bonds and savings bonds. In this way, the share capital was increased. When the cooperative came to have the confidence of the masses, it allowed them to use any articles of value such as grain, livestock, eggs, and firewood to buy shares. Therefore, all the people praise it.

2) It has smashed formalism in cooperatives and conscientiously carried out the policy of facing the masses and working for the benefit of the people. It has therefore gradually come to be loved and respected by the masses. For example, every year during spring plowing, it makes early arrangements to transport shovels from Hancheng and other places, selling them to the peasants at a price lower than the market price. It organizes various productive enterprises, which not only absorb unemployed workers, take on apprentices, and employ the family dependents of working personnel, but also expand profits, guarantee the supply of daily necessities

to the people of the area, and increase the income of the people. The Southern District Cooperative has organized more than 800 women to spin yarn. Each month, they can spin 1,400 *jin*. This has increased the monthly income by 70,000 *yuan*. The managerial policy of the consumer cooperative is to ensure fully the supply of necessary commodities for the people, not only letting them make fewer trips for their purchases but also charging prices cheaper than those found in shops of large towns.

3) It uses the policy of benefiting both the public and the private sectors as the bridge between the economic activity of the government and the economic activity of the people. On the one hand, it carries out the financial and economic policies of the government and, on the other, it adjusts the burdens of the people so as to raise their income, increase their enthusiasm, and make their burdens more acceptable. For example, in 1941, when the government was mobilizing for the salt-transport levy, the Southern District Cooperative got the people of the district to hand over a money substitute, and its transport team transported the salt for the government on behalf of the people. Before the government collects the tax grain, the cooperative mobilizes the people to pay it to the cooperative itself in accordance with the amount of tax collected in the previous year. The cooperative guarantees to pay the tax grain for the current year on behalf of the cooperative members and also accepts the tax grain handed over as share capital paid in by people to join the cooperative. Thus, on the one hand, the cooperative acts on behalf of the government, ensuring the payment of tax grain but using it to make a profit before it is finally paid over. On the other hand, the people not only pay their tax grain but also get some share capital. As a result some households with surplus grain have even asked to pay two years' worth of tax grain to the cooperative. No matter what the increase in tax grain the following year, the cooperative undertakes to pay the difference. Over forty households in the district have done this. In this way the burdens of the peasants have been fixed, their income has increased, and their enthusiasm for production has also been raised. Another example was when the government of the county and district wanted the people to pay educational expenses and expenses for the guard posts of the self-defense army. The cooperative again paid these for the people from its profits. In this way the government was saved the trouble of collecting the expenses and the people were not burdened with the payment. The government policies of encouraging immigration and assisting refugees can also be carried out by the cooperative (it can give credit to the refugees and immigrants and so forth). In all these ways, the interests of the government, the cooperatives, and the people are closely united with the interests of the individual and the collective.

4) It changes the organizational structure of the cooperative according to the wishes of the people. It does not hold congresses of all the cooperative members, but allows the members to elect delegates from each village. It does not use the method of assessment for raising share capital, but rallies groups of activist cooperative members to go and encourage the people to take out shares. It does not limit the share capital of the cooperative members, and it divides the profit according to

shares held. In solving the cooperative's problems, however, it does not consider the number of shares owned. Each shareholder has equal rights.

The above are the features of the Southern District Cooperative. As a consumer cooperative, its characteristics conform to the basic spirit of consumer cooperatives and grow out of the life, culture, economy, and politics of the people of the border region. As a producer cooperative, while not a cooperative of the producers themselves but an enterprise where shareholders hire labor, its present structure is a means of absorbing unused rural capital to develop handicrafts and corresponds to existing conditions in the border region, where handicrafts are not developed and handicraft workers are few.

Since 1936, the Southern District Cooperative has gone through six to seven years of trial and hard struggle. Now it has grown from 160 members to include more than 90 percent of the households of the Southern District. The number of voluntary members is 1,112. The amount of share capital has risen from 159 *yuan* to 2 million *yuan*. It has grown from one cooperative to sixteen cooperatives. The net profit has risen from several tens of *yuan* to 1,620,000 *yuan* for the first ten months of 1942. It has developed the agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises of the people of the district and looked after the people of the Southern District.

In the large but underpopulated border region, where the economy is almost entirely a small-scale peasant economy, it is necessary to rely on truly popularized cooperatives to play a pivotal role in implementing the economic policies of the government and in organizing and encouraging the people to develop the economy. Thus, the road of the Southern District Cooperative is the road for all the cooperatives of the border region. A movement to develop cooperatives in the style of the Southern District Cooperatives is a major item of work for expanding the economy of the people of the border region.

For this reason, the party and government should carry out the following work in cooperatives throughout the border region in 1943.

- 1) The Reconstruction Department should be responsible for studying the experience of the Southern District Cooperative and for compiling a small handbook as educational material for the fourth section of all county governments and for the personnel of all cooperatives. Furthermore, we should use the opportunity presented by holding meetings in Yan'an to take working cadres from all parts of the border region on a tour of the Southern District Cooperative.

- 2) All the enterprises run by the Commodities Bureau should help successful consumer and producer cooperatives with supply and distribution. They should sell commodities to the consumer cooperatives and supply raw material to, and guarantee the purchase of products from, the producer cooperatives. The government should issue 3 million *yuan* to the Commodities Bureau in 1943 to help in adjusting the cooperatives' supply and distribution.

- 3) In order to stimulate cooperatives, the government must clearly stipulate and conscientiously carry out a reduction in the cooperatives' tax burden.

- 4) The border region government and the governments of all the counties should

seek out students educated to the upper primary school or higher level for training as accountants or managers so as to ease the difficulties of all cooperatives in these regards.

5) The personnel of the cooperatives must implement the policy of "popularization" and adopt the wage system, doing away with the system of substitute cultivation organization for cooperative personnel. They must improve cooperative organization and simplify administration. They must make them into proper enterprises and not official organs. They must reduce the working personnel and reduce expenditures.

G.8 Directive Letter of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government to Each County on Implementing Better Troops and Simple Administration (4 December 1941)⁶⁶

Commissioners, County Heads, and Mayors:

Since its establishment, this government commission has made detailed plans and comprehensive arrangements for the future work of the government in the border regions on the basis of instructions and resolutions of the second session of the Border Region Assembly of Representatives [November 1941]. Priority has been accorded to the "simplification of administration" because this constitutes the most effective program for improving administrative organs and raising administrative efficiency. This would constitute an essential step guaranteeing the thorough implementation of the "May 1 Program for the Work of the Government" and other important resolutions.

We should point out that since the first session of the Assembly of Representatives, the efforts over the past three years have enabled the organization of the government of the border region at all levels to realize some achievements. However, the organization is not flexible enough and is inadequate. There are two main defects:

The first is the phenomenon of being top-heavy. There are many people and large-scale organizations at the upper levels. Both the quantity and quality of cadres at the lower levels are inadequate. The overstaffing of the upper levels means there are more people than needed. The shortage at the lower levels means that all orders and instructions are carried out with some reservation, with the consequence that many good policies have not been properly implemented in some places.

Second, the work rules and systems of the governments at various levels have not been fully systematized, and the "old-fashioned" style of guerrilla warfare has persisted. This is because some rules and systems only exist on paper. Further, we should not ignore the fact that the formalization of rules and systems is unavoidably affected by the still improper assignment of personnel at all levels.

Border regions are model bases of anti-Japanese democracy and a stronghold for

persevering with the War of Resistance against Japan throughout the entire country. Their tasks are extremely onerous and important. To accomplish these great tasks properly and more efficiently, it is essential to improve the administrative organs and regularize the system. Only in this way can we do a better job in all fields, further promote democracy, strengthen the ties between the government and the people, and give further play to the great forces in the War of Resistance and the construction of the nation. Therefore, today it is most necessary to implement immediately the resolution on better troops and simple administration.

To execute this significant resolution, the first meeting of the government's political affairs committee has decided to set up a rectification committee charged with inspecting the organizations and assigning cadres at all levels to reduce excessive staff at all levels (particularly those at the upper levels), and abolish, cut, and combine redundant units in line with the principle of compactness, competence, and flexibility.

It is hoped that government units at all levels will effectively retrench in accordance with the quotas decided by the rectification committee. All personnel made redundant after the adjustment should be treated on the basis of the following principles:

- 1) All cadres who have a good education and capabilities and are able to work should be sent down to the lower levels as far as is possible with a view to strengthening the organs at the county, district, and township levels. (Some county cadres should also be transferred to the district and township levels.)

- 2) Cadres who require further training or advanced studies may be sent through the approved channels to study in the schools in Yan'an through specified channels.

- 3) Cadres who are definitely ill and cannot work or study should be given all opportunities by their original units to recuperate, so that they may continue to work for the revolution competently and happily.

- 4) General staff who are physically strong should be dispatched to participate in the production of the various factories under the construction department. This will promote production in the border regions.

- 5) Very backward elements and very old and weak general staff members should be helped to go home if they need to return to engage in agricultural production.

The objective of the various methods above is to put each in its proper place.

Nevertheless, in the process of reorganization and resettlement, serious attention should be paid to the following points.

First, administration chiefs at all levels must relay in the most effective way the great significance of "creating better troops and simple administration" to all their subordinates. This will enable everyone to understand that "creating better troops and simple administration" is not the same as passively trimming personnel. On the contrary, it is to positively raise administrative efficiency and build up the cause of the border regions, thus further improving and consolidating them.

"Simplifying administration" is not equivalent to cutting back government business, but doing all jobs in a less complicated but precise manner and enabling all

work to penetrate to the lower levels and the masses deeply and quickly.

Second, careful explanations should be made to the cadres who are transferred to the levels of county, district, and township. Every revolutionary cadre should face the masses and work among the masses. In our democratic regime, a cadre's transfer to the lower levels does not mean "demotion." On the contrary, to work at the lower levels should be regarded as the most glorious cause.

Third, patient persuasion should be used on the few who must be reassigned to work in production units but who are unwilling to do so. They should understand that the development of production in the border regions is the most important cause at the present time, a cause that will improve our livelihood, promote the economy of the border regions, and increase the forces for the War of Resistance and construction of the nation.

Fourth, those who must be sent to recuperate or study, or to return home, must be handled in a proper and patient way. Careless and rash handling is not permitted. This should be considered important work, and everyone should be able to feel happy, at ease, and contented.

Fifth, in the wake of the reorganization based on the new principles, administration chiefs at all levels must pay special attention to the immediate establishment of regular work rules and systems in conjunction with the principles of "simplifying administration." The rules and systems established should be constantly inspected and always adhered to. It is imperative to avoid making a lot of noise and failing to establish them in practice. The result of this would be huge losses in our work.

It is hoped that the above instructions will be carried out effectively. It is important to submit reports at all times.

G.9 Summary of Simplifying Administration in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government (Abstract). *Li Dingming* (7 January 1944)⁶⁷

A great deal of work has been done ideologically and organizationally for the implementation of the policy of simple administration.

First, I shall talk about the issue of simplification.

We have simplified our vocational work. Production has been put first, and agriculture has been given priority in production. The party, the government, and the people have all worked together to accomplish these goals. Education has been put in second place, with the priority given to the education of cadres. Similarly the party, the government, and the people have all participated in this work. As a result, the production movement, and the production movement in agriculture in particular, has developed broadly. The education of cadres and the rectification of cadres in particular have day-by-day unfolded in depth. All this has greatly improved the work

situation and the border regions. Moreover, all departments of the border region governments have seized the key link of work in certain periods, and the lower-level governments have also paid attention to the key tasks of vocational work. In the nine months from March to November, for example, the district of Wubaofen held sixteen joint meetings of township heads among which fourteen meetings were for the special purpose of discussing production work. The work-style of "the higher level substituting for the lower" has been basically overcome, and the initiative of the lower-level cadres has been greatly enhanced.

We have also accomplished simplification of organization. One-quarter of the units of various departments, sections, and administrative councils have been either reduced or combined, i.e., the secretarial offices of all departments and councils, the administrative section in all departments, and the research office of the bank have been abolished and three or four sections of the Civil Affairs Department have been merged to form two sections. The organs directly under the government of the border region have been reduced from thirty-five to twenty-two. Tax bureaus and offices have been cut from ninety-five to sixty-five. Nine bank branch offices have been abolished. The customs organs in all systems have been merged with security sections and inspection organs. The original eight or nine internal units of prefecture or county governments have been reduced to four or five units. The result is that we have avoided the accumulated shortcomings of a top-heavy system and achieved the objective of simpler administration and making life easier for the people.

We have also simplified our personnel. Government below the prefecture level has generally adopted the simplification plan. An exception has been the addition of two persons for the food and fodder section of the prefecture commissioners' offices and the addition of a deputy brigade leader and a deputy battalion leader for county and district governments caused by demands of the prevention of famine and self-defense, respectively. The number of cadres of all departments, sections, and councils of the government of the border regions and the organs attached to them have been cut according to the quotas and a few organs are even short of staff. For example, the establishment of the general office of the government of the border regions and the merger of the work of various departments have not only strengthened unified leadership and links among the various departments, but have also saved cadres. Before the merger, there were 469 persons working for the general office and for the civil affairs, finance, construction, education, and materials and goods departments. After the merger, there are only 297 persons, a reduction in over 40 percent of the original personnel. The original quota for the departments, sections, and councils (except the materials and goods bureau, the bank, and the administration academy) was 261 persons. Now there are only 246 persons, fifteen under the quota. The original quota for subsidiary organs (communication stations, sanitary offices, clinics, the border region hospital, the medical school, the first and second sanatoriums, the foster care committee, hotels, the food bureau, the tax bureau, the salt bureau, the police school, security bureau, etc.) was 197 persons. Now, there are only 190 persons, seven below the quota. It should be pointed out,

however, that there are still many dependents who have not been assigned. Therefore, we have not completely simplified matters as far as sundry people are concerned. What measures have been used for nonquota personnel? Two have been used: they are either sent to engage in production or to attend school. The majority of those in the government of the border regions may be sent to attend schools with the minority engaging in production. Below the prefecture level, the majority should turn to production or be used to strengthen the lower levels and the minority should be sent to schools. Generally speaking, the organization of the whole system of the government has been basically simplified. Owing to the fact that dependents have not been assigned and that comrades in schools are still counted as government staff, however, there are still 1,000 to 1,200 personnel who are not part of the quota but who still consume government grain.

We have made some readjustments among cadres, promoting some cadres to work in departments and the border region government. For example, the border region government has promoted five county heads to be section leaders and sub-section leaders. Many effective cadres have been selected to strengthen the lower levels, i.e., ten cadres at the county level have been sent to the districts and twenty cadres at the district level have been sent to the townships. Liulin County appointed all four assistants to be township heads, and much of its work provides an excellent model. Adjustments have also been made among county heads, among section chiefs, and between administrative and production cadres. For example, Yan'an County has dispatched many administrative cadres to work in transportation teams and cooperatives. This has forged timely and necessary links. Apart from these, we have also sent over 150 senior and middle-level cadres to study in schools so as to improve them and for them to become more cultivated. A number of ideological and politically unsound cadres have been sent to school for rectification in order to educate them better and reform them. What do all these measures mean? They show that our policy of simplifying the upper levels and strengthening the lower levels and production departments have been basically realized.

However, we should not believe that simplification of the government system has been thorough and that there will be no future problems. To improve the work of simplification, we still need to settle the following issues:

- 1) Continue to strengthen township government and create more model villages.
- 2) Pay attention to improving cadres in some financial, judicial, and education departments. These have been the relatively weak links in government work and are also the links that traitors and special agents are most likely to sabotage. We must increase the number of cadres to ensure the progress of this work.
- 3) Encourage dependents to participate in production.
- 4) Inspection should be carried out to find units and personnel that have not carried out the simplification plan or that have implemented the plan but can simplify further because of changed circumstances.

These are our achievements in the work of simplification and the direction of our future efforts.

Next, I shall address the issue of unified leadership.

Politically, policy ordinances have been completely unified, and orders and instructions are also basically uniform. Generally speaking, the lack of uniformity in policy ordinances, orders and instructions, systems and disciplines experienced a year ago in government work is a thing of the past. Our unification is based on "adherence to the system of democratic centralism." It is unification based on democracy. Decisions on policies, laws and decrees, and orders and important instructions are made on the basis of preliminary informal discussions, consultations, and discussions. Thus, our unification is voluntary and avoids the adverse phenomenon of complying in public but opposing in private. On the contrary, we are all of one mind and heart in implementing unification.

It must be pointed out, however, that a few departments and units still issue at will some instructions and orders that have not been reviewed, approved, or discussed properly. This is incorrect and runs counter to the principles of unification. On the other hand, there are a few departments and units that do not understand that the basis for the unified leadership is personal responsibility and that believe that the adoption of unified leadership will reduce their own responsibilities and duties. They do not consider matters carefully before they send them on up, and they lack the spirit of shouldering responsibility independently. This is also wrong and should be corrected.

Organizationally, the past situation of departments, sections, councils, and bureaus commanding the subsections at the lower levels directly, bypassing commissioners and county heads, or of opposing each other rather than cooperating have been basically overcome.

As far as personnel is concerned, the appointment and dismissal at will of important cadres has also been corrected. The management of cadres is, on the whole, under the unified control of the Civil Affairs Department. One problem is that, on occasion, readjustment of cadres in the various systems is not made after consultation with the Civil Affairs Department or is not reported to it for future review.

We should not believe, however, that our leadership has been completely and thoroughly unified and that we will have no problems in the future. To improve unified leadership, the following issues must be settled:

1) The subsidiary organs, state-run shops, and other enterprises that are scattered over the various regions should be under the complete leadership of the local governments. All local governments have the responsibility to ensure the implementation of the policies, guidelines, systems, and ordinary tasks for the border region government. Apart from mandatory approval by the border region government for changes in key responsible persons, the transfer of ordinary cadres only needs to be reported for future reference.

2) There must be consultation with the Civil Affairs Department over the transfer of cadres within various systems.

3) Financially, there must be auditing procedures and regulations for expenses and budgets.

4) Closer ties should be established between the general office of the government of the border region and the various departments, sections, councils, subsections, and bureaus.

5) Special attention should be paid to furthering education about democratic centralism, unified leadership, and administrative discipline among all administrative personnel and strengthening the spirit of independent responsibility under unified leadership.

These are our achievements in unification and the direction of our future efforts.

Next, I shall talk about the issue of opposing bureaucratism and of improving our leadership style in opposing bureaucratism.

Bureaucratism is the worst work-style for a leader or a leading organ. China was governed by such a system for several thousand years. We came from a bureaucratic cradle and continue to be surrounded by it. Therefore, it is not surprising that we have been affected to varying degrees by the habit of bureaucratism. The crux of the matter is whether we are resolved to wipe it out completely once it has been pointed out.

Should [village] heads work with the masses or should they be officials who are isolated from the masses? This is a key distinction between bad and good styles of leadership. Last year, we took this as our starting point and waged a struggle. As a result, from top to bottom, there has been progress.

The facts mentioned above demonstrate the improvement in the leadership style. Much concrete work has been done to implement the program of simple administration, to streamline the institutions and personnel, to establish the system and discipline of unified leadership, and to readjust cadres. The conference on factories inspected work and improved leadership in industry. Problems were exposed, rotten eggs were discovered, and guidelines and measures were decided. In the future, all responsible units should send people to the factories and carry out wide-ranging inspection and management. This will enable the movement of Zhao Zhankui to unfold successfully, industrial output to rise dramatically, and production costs to decline drastically. The formulation of the tentative regulations on an agricultural progressive tax has undergone repeated investigation and research. After a trial run in the district and township of Luxian and Ansai, it was amended. Now further trials are being conducted in the three counties of Qingyang, Suide, and Yan'an. The conference on reforming education in middle schools has lasted half a year. Conclusions have been drawn, and the direction of reform was suggested only after comprehensive investigation and study of the history and the present situation of middle schools in the border regions. What deserves special mention is the confession movement by cadres in all departments of the border region government. We have all adopted the leadership style of leading cadres taking responsibility, participating in work themselves, and combining closely with the masses. The mass movement led by the security organs to guard against spies has adhered to the mass line and lenient policies and only relies on the few people in the security organs. The routine guidance of prefecture commissioners' offices by the border region government

should provide ample opportunities for discussion first by the commissioners.

The leadership style of the various lower-level governments has also witnessed great improvements. The most obvious improvements are twofold. The first is with leadership in production. Everyone should participate in organizing work exchange teams, reforming idlers, drafting peasant farming plans, constructing water conservation projects, organizing transportation teams, rebuilding inns with sheds for carts and animals, improving the methods for making salt, growing cotton and animal husbandry, reforming the cooperatives, etc. The second aspect is leadership in the work of guarding against spies. Everyone should participate in the investigation, persuasion, interrogation, and initiation of the confession movement and the organization of cadre meetings. There have been many newspaper reports concerning the specific details of these two aspects. I shall not dwell on them here.

This does not mean, however, that all the links in our work and the work-style of all cadres have progressed. There are still some cadres who have failed to take their responsibilities seriously and to participate actively. They work as usual, shift responsibilities, and pay no attention to inspecting implementation [of policy] and actual results. They tower above the masses, lack the mass viewpoint, refuse to conduct investigation and research, and never learn from the masses. They want to be officials and not engage in the work of leading the revolution.

We have seen with our own eyes that all the places where leading cadres take responsibility, link with the masses, and reject bureaucratism have vitality, creativity, and with each passing day witness improvements. All places where leading cadres do not take responsibility, are divorced from the masses, and hold to their bureaucratic ways have no vitality, creativity, or achievements in any respect. For example, the leader of Chunrao County has acted in the former manner and won the support of the people. Not long ago, when he was transferred, all the people there wanted him to stay and to stop him from leaving. His predecessor provides an example of the latter situation; he was very bureaucratic. he calculated how to do business for himself and become rich and paid no attention to the affairs of the masses. Therefore, his work was not successful and was very much opposed by the masses. Now that our various policies and guidelines are very clear, the tasks have been defined and, especially, the masses have been mobilized. The enthusiasm and conscientiousness of the masses and cadres have been strengthened as they were with last year's production enthusiasm, mobilization for self-defense, guarding against spies, and reducing land rent. All this has narrowed the scope of bureaucratism. The bureaucratic style in our government's work has been basically overcome. However, bureaucratism still exists. Therefore, our fighting slogan remains that leading cadres take responsibility, link with the masses, and oppose bureaucratism; this will always remain our fighting slogan.

These are our achievements in opposing bureaucratism and should still receive attention in the future.

[[Concerning the improvement of efficiency. Since the beginning of the Rectification Campaign and the movement against spies, the situation has changed completely

and efficiency has improved. Work has been improved through the elimination of spies and hidden elements and by galvanizing those who were halfhearted. To face the new challenges, we must continue to raise efficiency.

On practicing economy. We have mobilized fewer civilians for labor. In Yan'an, 110 percent fewer and in Suide over 8,000 percent fewer. This is because we have promoted the movement in the army to support the government and cherish the people. The troops, displaying their love of the people, have carried out all kinds of tasks such as transporting grain and fodder themselves rather than burdening the people. This also saves money in transportation expenses. Some units, armies, and schools have begun to practice economy in the consumption of grain, fuel, and daily necessities and have enjoyed some success. Considerable savings have been made in factories. Overall, however, the work has not been done in a very satisfactory manner. We have forgotten that the material base for sufficient food and clothing is not just practicing economy but is also a question of production and broadening the sources of income. Two measures should be taken immediately. First, since most units, schools, and armed forces have set up businesses, new guidelines for provisions of supplies should be drawn up and expenses reduced. Second, they should practice economy and develop production at the same time.]]

There used to be some people who were very scared of this policy. They knew that this was an important policy and one of the ten policies of the border regions. Therefore, they spread rumors everywhere, alleging that "the CP's policy of simplification is intended to squeeze out nonparty personages and to prepare for the imposition of one-party dictatorship." Their intention was to kill two birds with one stone by undermining our unity and our policy of simplification. However, facts have demonstrated the futility of this attempt. As I have mentioned above, we have already firmly implemented the policy in accordance with the will of the people. To meet future demands, however, we must take the policy of simplification a step further, link it with the three central tasks of developing production, improving military affairs, and continuously guarding against spies, and connect it with various other policies. Above all, we must see the policy through to the end in the government system and hope that, at the same time, the army, other organs, and schools will continue to carry it out. To overthrow fascist bandits throughout the world and to overthrow the Japanese imperialists in China, our work must be strengthened. Work that has not been carried out thoroughly in the five areas of simplification, unification, efficiency, economy, and opposition to bureaucratism must be completed.

G.10 Correcting Unorthodox Tendencies in Learning in the Party, and Literature and Art. *Mao Zedong* (1 February 1942)⁶⁸

Today is the opening day of the party school. I congratulate the school on the success [of its establishment].

Today I wish to discuss the problem of our party spirit.

Why must there be a revolutionary party? There must be a revolutionary party because our enemies still exist; furthermore, there must be not an ordinary one, but a communist revolutionary party. For if there were no such revolutionary party of the nature of the CP, the complete overthrow of the enemy would be impossible. For the overthrow of the enemy, our ranks must be in order, we must all march in step, our troops must be seasoned, and our weapons must be fit. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the enemy will not be overthrown.

What problems still face our party? It is a fact that the party's General Line is correct and unquestionable, and that our party work has produced results. We have several hundred thousand party members; in complete unity with the people, they are engaging in a bitter and decisive struggle against the national enemies. Such a spirit of heroic sacrifice, as well as our achievements in the service of the people, can be seen by all and cannot be doubted.

Well, then, does our party still face problems, or have shortcomings? I say that there are still problems, still shortcomings, and that in a certain sense these problems are rather grave.

What are these problems? They arise because, in the minds of some comrades, several points are not entirely correct or orthodox.

What are these points? There is the question of thought, the question of the intraparty and extraparty relations, and the question of speech and writing. In these three respects some of our comrades have still not eliminated unorthodox tendencies. This is to say, our spirit of learning, our party spirit, and our literary spirit are still not correct. We call the incorrect spirit in learning, subjectivism, the incorrect spirit in the party, sectarianism, and the incorrect spirit in literature, party formalism. These incorrect tendencies do not fill the heavens like the north wind in winter, and at present subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism are no longer the ruling tendencies. They are merely adverse and deviational drafts of air out of the air-raid shelters. (Laughter.) However, that we still have these tendencies in our party is bad. We must plug these shelters, and the entire party must do the work of plugging them up. Our party school must also participate. These three deviational trends, subjectivism, sectarianism, party formalism, all have their historical origins. Although these views do not rule the entire party, nevertheless they still constantly vex and harass us. Therefore, we must reform and resist them; we must analyze and clarify them, and we must study them.

These, then, are our duties: antsubjectivism to reform the tendencies in education, antisectarianism to reform the tendencies in the party, and antiformalism to reform the tendencies in literature.

If we are to accomplish the task of vanquishing the enemy, we must complete the task of reforming these tendencies within the party. Tendencies in education are at the same time tendencies in party education; tendencies in literature are at the same time tendencies in party literature. Thus, both are party tendencies. If our party's tendencies are completely orthodox, the people of the entire nation will learn from

us, and the people outside the party with these tendencies, if only they are of good will and will learn from us, and the correction of their mistakes will influence the entire nation. Only if the ranks of the CP are in good order, if we are all in step, if our troops are seasoned, and our weapons are fit, then no matter how powerful the enemy, he cannot escape defeat at our hands.

I shall now discuss subjectivism.

Subjectivism is an unorthodox tendency in learning. It is anti-Marxist-Leninist and cannot coexist with the CP. What we need is a Marxist-Leninist spirit in learning. This spirit in learning is a spirit not only in the schools but in the entire party as well. It is a problem of the mode of thinking in the leading organs, all the cadres, and among all party members. It is a problem of the orientation of the comrades throughout the party. Since it is of this nature, the problem of the spirit in learning is of exceptional and primary importance.

At the present time, confused concepts are prevalent on questions, for example, as to what is a theorist, or what is an intellectual, or what is the relation between theory and practice, and so forth.

The first question is whether the theoretical level of the party is high or low. A large number of books on Marxism-Leninism have been translated recently and also read. This is excellent. But can we therefore say that the party has attained a high theoretical level? Certainly our level is somewhat higher than it was in the past. Yet in view of the rich experience of the Chinese revolutionary movement, progress on the theoretical front has been extremely inadequate. Comparing the two, the theoretical level is unusually low and backward. In general, our theory has not kept pace with revolutionary experience, which is not to say that theory should have run ahead of it. We have not yet raised this rich experience to its necessary theoretical level. We have not yet raised all or even the most important practical questions of the revolution, through examining them, to the theoretical level. Look at Chinese economics, politics, military affairs, and culture. How many of us have created theories (concerning these fields) which are worthy to be called theories, which possess a scientific form and closely knit structure, which are not mere skeletons of theories?

This is especially true in economic theory. One hundred years have elapsed since the Opium War, yet in regard to the development of Chinese capitalism, no theoretical work which is truly scientific and in accord with the realities of Chinese economic development has been produced. In the matter of Chinese economics, can we say then that the theoretical level is already high? Can we say that our party already has economic theorists who are up to standard? This truly cannot be said.

Can we claim that we possess theoreticians just because we have read a great many books on Marxism-Leninism? We cannot say this either. Marxism-Leninism is the theory Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin created on the basis of actual facts, and it consists of general conclusions derived from historical and revolutionary experiences. If we have only read this theory, but have not used it as a basis to study historical reality and revolutionary reality and have not created our own and specific theory in accordance with China's practical needs, then it would be irresponsible to

call ourselves Marxist theorists. If one acts in the role of a CCP member, but is so accustomed to looking at Chinese problems that one cannot see them, looks every day and still sees nothing, if one sees only the complete works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the shelf, then one's achievement on the theoretical front is poor indeed. If we only know how to recite Marxist economics or philosophy, reciting from the first to the tenth chapters until they are overcooked (laughter), but are completely unable to apply them, can we then be considered Marxist theorists? I should say not. It would really be better if there were fewer such "theorists." If someone read 10,000 volumes by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and read each volume 1,000 times so they could recite every sentence from memory, they still could not be considered a theorist.

What type of theorist do we need? We need theorists who base their thinking on the standpoints, concepts, and methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; who are able to explain correctly the actual problems issuing from history and revolution; who are able to give a scientific interpretation and theoretical explanation to the various problems of Chinese economics, politics, military affairs, and culture. Such is the type of theorist we need. To be this type of theorist, one must truly understand the substance of Marxism-Leninism and its standpoints, concepts, and methods. One must be able to apply them in profound and scientific analyses of China's actual problems so that one can discover the laws of their development. This is the type of theorist we really need.

The CC has just issued a resolution summoning our comrades to learn first the application of Marxism-Leninism's standpoints, concepts, and mode of thinking; then to engage in serious research on Chinese history, in research on Chinese economics, politics, military affairs, and culture; and then to create theories, after examination and research have been done on each problem. This is the responsibility we shoulder.

Our party school should not be content merely to read the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, but should be able first to master, and then to apply them. Application is the object of this mastery. Now that we use percentages to calculate grades, what grade should you be given if you read 10,000 books 1,000 times each but were completely unable to apply them? I would say that not even one percent should be given. (Laughter.) However, if you are able to apply the concepts of Marxism-Leninism in explaining one or two actual problems, you should receive commendation as having accomplished something. The more numerous, the more universal and profound your explanations, the higher your achievement. Our party school should now adopt this standard in judging a man's observations on Chinese problems after he has studied Marxism-Leninism. There will be some who see clearly, some who do not, some who are able to see, some who are not; superior and inferior, good and bad should be classified according to these distinctions.

What about the problem of the so-called intelligentsia? Because our China is a semicolonial, semifeudal country and its culture is undeveloped, the intelligentsia is of special value. The CC has passed a resolution on intellectual elements in order to

win over the great number of intelligentsia. It is quite correct that an attitude of welcome be adopted toward them, but only if they are revolutionary and willing to participate in the War of Resistance. As a result of this welcome, however, the intelligentsia has been glorified and the local bumpkins are handicapped. We consider it entirely necessary to hold the intelligentsia in esteem, for without a revolutionary intelligentsia, the revolution cannot succeed. We know, however, that there are many intellectuals who consider themselves very learned and who make a great display of their knowledge, and do not realize that this attitude is harmful and obstructs their progress. One truth that they should realize is that a great many so-called intellectuals are actually exceedingly unlearned, and that the knowledge of the workers and peasants is sometimes somewhat greater than theirs. At this someone may say, "Aha! You're turning this upside-down. It's a mass of confused words!" (Laughter.) But, comrades, don't get excited. What I say is to a certain extent reasonable.

What is knowledge? From ancient times down to the present, there have been only two types of knowledge: one type is knowledge of the struggle in production; the other is knowledge of the class struggle, in which is included knowledge of the national struggle. What knowledge is there aside from this? There is none. Natural science and social science are nothing but the crystallization of these two types of knowledge. Philosophy is a generalization and summary of natural science and social science. Aside from these, there is no other type of knowledge.

Now we shall take a look at those students who graduate and leave their schools, where they have been completely isolated from the practical activities of society. In what position do they find themselves? A person studies from grade school through to university, graduates, and is then considered learned. Yet, in the first place, they cannot till the land; second, they have no trade; third, they cannot fight; fourth, they cannot manage a job—in none of these fields are they experienced; nor do they have the least practical knowledge. What they possess is merely book knowledge. Would it be possible to regard such a person as a complete intellectual? It would be very difficult, and at the most I would consider them half-intellectuals, because their knowledge is still incomplete. What is comparatively complete knowledge? All comparatively complete knowledge is formed in two stages: the first is that of knowledge through immediate perception; the second is knowledge through reason. Knowledge through reason is a higher stage of development of knowledge through immediate perception. In which category does the book knowledge of students fall? Even if we suppose that book contains nothing but truths, it is still theory drawn from the experience of one's predecessors in the struggle of production and the class struggle, and not knowledge drawn from one's own personal experience. It is absolutely necessary that students obtain this theoretical knowledge, but they should realize that, for them, this knowledge is inverted, backward, one-sided; it has been proved by others, but still not verified by them. They should know that it is not at all difficult to obtain this type of knowledge, that it is even extremely easy. In comparison, the cook's task in preparing a meal is difficult. To create something ready to

eat, he must use a combination of wood, rice, oil, salt, sauce, vinegar, and other materials. This is certainly not easy, and to cook a good meal is all the more difficult. If we compare the tasks of the cook at the northwest restaurant and the cooks in our homes, we find a great difference. If there is too much fire, the food will burn; too much salt, and it will be bitter. (Laughter.) Cooking food and preparing dishes is truly one of the arts. But what about book knowledge? If you do nothing but read, you have only to know 3,000 or 5,000 characters, to learn to thumb through a dictionary, to hold some book in your hand, to receive millet from the public. Then you nod your head contentedly and start to read. But books cannot walk, and you can open and close a book at will; this is the easiest thing in the world to do, a great deal easier than it is for the cook to prepare a meal, and much easier than it is for him to slaughter a pig. He has to catch the pig . . . the pig can run . . . (laughter) . . . he slaughters him . . . the pig squeals. . . . (Laughter.) A book placed on a desk cannot run; nor can it squeal. (Laughter.) You can dispose of it in any manner you wish. Is there anything easier to do? Therefore, I advise those of you who have only book knowledge and as yet no contact with reality, and those who have had little practical experience, to realize your own shortcomings and make your attitudes a bit more humble.

How can half-intellectuals be transformed into intellectuals with a title corresponding to reality? There is only one way: to see that those with only book knowledge become practical workers engaged in practical tasks, and see that those doing theoretical work turn to practical research. In this way, we can reach our goal.

On hearing this, some people will lose their tempers and say, "According to your interpretation, Marx was also a half-intellectual." I would answer that it's quite true that, in the first place, Marx could not slaughter a pig and, second, he could not till a field. But he did participate in the revolutionary movement and also carried out research on commodity production. Millions see and use these commodities every day, but overlook them. Only Marx studied them in every aspect and scrutinized them from all angles, exhibiting none of the carelessness we show in reading the *History of the CPSU*. He analyzed the actual development of commodity production and derived a theory from observations of universally existent phenomena. He did personal research on natural science, history, and the proletarian revolution and created the corresponding theories of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and proletarian revolution. Thus Marx is to be regarded as a complete intellectual. The difference between him and the half-intellectual is that he participated in an actual revolutionary movement and carried on research and investigation by turning to a reality which was all-inclusive. This type of all-inclusive knowledge is called theory. Our party needs a great many comrades who can do this type of work. At present many of our comrades are capable of doing such theoretical research, and for the most part they are intelligent and able and promising. We should prize these comrades and value them highly, but their orientation must be correct, and past mistakes must not be repeated. They must cast off dogmatism and not stop at reading books.

There is only one type of true theory: that which is derived from the observation of objective reality and proved by objective reality. Nothing else can measure up to the theory of which we speak. Stalin has argued that theory divorced from reality is empty. An empty theory is useless, incorrect, and must be rejected. We must single out those who delight in discussing such empty theories and put them to shame. Marxism-Leninism, derived from objective reality and tested by objective reality, is the most correct, scientific, and revolutionary truth. But many read Marxism-Leninism as dead dogma, thereby obstructing their own theoretical development and harming themselves and their comrades.

On the other hand, mistakes are also apt to happen if those comrades who are engaged in practical work make an incorrect application of their experience. It is quite true that such people have had a great deal of experience and should be valued highly. But there is great danger if they are satisfied with their experience. They should realize that the greater part of their knowledge is gained from immediate perception and is limited, and that they fall short when it comes to reasoning and universal knowledge, that is to say, they fall short in theory. Thus, their knowledge too is also comparatively incomplete. Yet without comparatively complete knowledge it is impossible to accomplish the revolution.

Seen in this way, there are two types of incomplete knowledge. One is knowledge taken ready-made from books, and even Marxist-Leninist books can leave a person empty in his thinking. Another type of knowledge is weighed too heavily on the side of immediate perception and is limited; it has not developed into something rational and universal. Both types are one-sided, and only if they are combined can something worthwhile and comparatively complete be produced.

However, if our workers and peasants' cadres are going to study theory, they must first study culture, for if there were no culture, Marxism-Leninism could not be absorbed. At the appropriate time, after culture has been studied thoroughly, they can study Marxism-Leninism. When I was a youth, I did not attend any Marxist-Leninist school; I studied a mass of things like "Confucius said, 'Is it not pleasant to study your lessons and practice them constantly?' " (Laughter.) I learned to read in just this way. For example, I learned the characters for "to study" and can now use them in "studying" Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, people do not study Confucius now, but the new vernacular literature, history, geography, and general knowledge in the natural sciences. Studied thoroughly, these cultural lessons are applicable everywhere. Our party's CC is now vigorously urging the workers and peasants' cadres to engage in cultural studies, because after these are studied, politics, military affairs, and economics can all be studied. Otherwise, even though they have a wealth of experience, the workers and peasants' cadres still will not be able to advance to the stage where theorizing is possible.

Thus, if we are antisubjectivist, we must see that the two types of persons described above develop in those spheres where they are deficient; we must see that these two types combine. Only if those with book knowledge develop in practical spheres will it be possible for them to go beyond their books; only then will it be

possible for them to avoid the error of dogmatism. Men with working experience have to study theory and take their reading seriously; only then will it be possible for them to raise their experience to the level of reason and synthesis, the level of theory. Only then will it be possible for them to avoid classifying their partial experience as universal truth and avoid the error of empiricism. Dogmatism and empiricism are both forms of subjectivism, though they arise from two different extremes.

There are thus two types of subjectivism in our party. One type is dogmatism, the other empiricism. Both see only one side and not the entire picture. If you ignore this one-sidedness, if you do not understand its shortcomings, or make reforms, it will be easy for you to travel the path of error.

Of these two types of subjectivism in our party, the one which is most dangerous now is still dogmatism. For it easily assumes the guise of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalinism, frightens the workers and peasants' cadres, and captures the local hayseeds for service as personal servants, and it is difficult for the workers and peasants' cadres to see through its mask. It can also frighten innocent youths and make them captive. If we conquer dogmatism, we can see to it that cadres with book knowledge develop a willingness to associate with cadres with experience and engage in the study of practical matters. It will be possible to produce many good workers who can combine experience and theory, and it will be possible to produce many true theorists. If we conquer dogmatism, comrades with experience can obtain good teachers and rise to the level of theory, thus avoiding the error of empiricism. In addition to the two muddled terms, "theorist" and "intellectual," there is a phrase we read every day, "the union of theory and practice," which still has a confused meaning for many of our comrades. Every day they speak of "union," when they actually mean "separation," for they take no steps toward "union." How can Marxist-Leninist theory and the reality of the Chinese revolution be united? Take the common saying, "To shoot an arrow, have a target." Arrow means arrow, and target means target. [Mao here gives the colloquial words for a classical quotation.] In shooting the arrow, you must have a target to aim at. The relation between Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese revolution is the same as that between the arrow and the target. Some comrades, however, are shooting arrows without a target, shooting them at random. Such people can easily harm the revolutionary cause. Some comrades merely take the arrow in hand, twist it back and forth, and say again and again in praise, "excellent arrow, excellent arrow," but are never willing to shoot it. This type of person is an antiquarian who has hardly any relationship with the revolution. The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese revolution. If it were otherwise, why would we want to study Marxism-Leninism? Is it because we have not digested our millet that we read a book to relieve indigestion? If this problem is not clearly understood, the theoretical level of the party can never be raised; nor can the Chinese revolution succeed.

Our comrades must understand that we do not study Marxism-Leninism because it is pleasing to the eye, or because it has some mystical value, like the doctrines of

the Daoist priests who ascend Maoshan [Jiangsu] to learn, so they can subdue the devils and evil spirits. Marxism-Leninism has no decorative value; nor has it mystical value. It is only extremely useful. It seems that right up to the present quite a few have regarded Marxism-Leninism as a readymade panacea: once you have it, you can cure all your ills with little effort. This is a type of childish blindness, and we must start a movement to enlighten these people. Those who regard Marxism-Leninism as religious dogma show this type of blind ignorance. We must tell them openly, “Your dogma is of no use,” or to use an impolite phrase, “Your dogma is less useful than excrement.” We see that dog excrement can fertilize the fields, and man’s can feed the dog. And dogmas? They can’t fertilize the fields; nor can they feed a dog. Of what use are they? (Laughter.) Comrades! You know that the object of such talk is to ridicule those who regard Marxism-Leninism as dogma, to frighten and awaken them, to inculcate in them a correct attitude toward Marxism-Leninism. Marx, Lenin, Engels, and Stalin have repeatedly said, “Our doctrine is not dogma; it is a guide to action.” Of all things, these people forget this most important sentence. Theory and practice can be combined only if members of the CCP take the standpoints, concepts, and methods of Marxism-Leninism, apply them to China, and create a theory from conscientious research on the realities of the Chinese revolution and Chinese history. If we merely verbalize about union but do not practice union in our actions, we can talk for 100 years and still not benefit. Since we are opposed to subjective and *ex parte* views on problems, we must break through the subjective and one-sided nature of dogmatism.

This is what I have to say today about antisubjectivism as a means of reforming the entire party’s educational tendency. Now we come to the problem of sectarianism.

After twenty years’ tempering, our party now is not dominated by sectarianism, but remnants of intraparty and extraparty sectarianism do exist. Intraparty sectarianism tends to produce internal friction and hinders the unification and consolidation of the party. Extraparty sectarianism tends to produce friction with the outside and hinders the party’s task of consolidating the entire nation. The party’s great task of consolidating the comrades of the entire party and the people of the entire nation cannot be carried out freely without obstruction unless the evil roots of these two tendencies are removed.

What are the remnants of intraparty sectarianism? The following are the principal types.

First is the clamor for independence. A group of our comrades see only particular interests and fail to see the interest of the whole. They invariably lay special and inappropriate emphasis on the particular work under their own management and expect the interest of the whole to bow to their particular interest. They do not understand the system of party democratic centralism. They do not realize that a CP not only requires democracy, but it requires centralization even more. They have forgotten the system of democratic centralism in which the minority obeys the majority, the lower ranks obey the higher ranks, the particular obeys the universal, and the entire party obeys the CC. Zhang Guotao clamored to the CC about inde-

pendence; his clamoring led to a rebellion against the party and his joining the GMD secret police. Li Lisan clamored to the Comintern about independence and as a result committed the error of the "Li Lisan line." Although what we speak of here is not as extreme and serious as the sectarianism of Li Lisan and Zhang Guotao, it is still something to be guarded against. We must eradicate all tendencies toward disunity. If party members are to promote a sense of concern for the whole, each one of them must take the interest of the whole party as a point of departure in every specific task and every time they speak, write, or act. Absolutely no opposition to this principle is to be tolerated.

It is often impossible to divorce these men who clamor for independence from their "individual-firstism." They are often incorrect on the question of the relationship between the individual and the party. Although they speak with respect for the party, they actually place the individual first and the party second. Comrade Liu Shaoqi speaks about the type of person with especially long hands who is quite able to look after his own interests. But what about the interests of others and of the entire party? This is a matter of no great concern to him, and he says, "What is mine is mine; what is yours is also mine." (Laughter.) What do such people clamor about? About their reputation, their positions, and their vanity. When they manage a particular enterprise, they clamor about independence, and with these objectives in mind form close relations with some people and create friction with others; they boast, adulate, and pull strings, thus injecting the vulgar spirit of the political parties of the bourgeoisie into the CP. Such men suffer from the effects of hypocrisy. I think that we must do things with complete sincerity; it is fundamentally impossible to accomplish anything in this world without a sincere attitude. What is a sincere person? Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are sincere people; scientists are sincere people. What is a hypocrite? Trotsky, Bukharin, and Zhang Guotao were great hypocrites; Li Lisan was also hypocritical. People who clamor about independence for the sake of their individual and particular interests are also hypocrites. All who are crafty, who manage things with an unscientific attitude, or who consider themselves calculating or clever are in fact exceedingly stupid, and all come to no good. Students in our party school certainly must give their attention to this problem. We must not fail to establish a centralized, unified party, purified of fractional or unprincipled struggles. We must see to it that the marching order of the entire party is regular and uniform, and that it struggles toward a common objective. It is absolutely necessary that we oppose individualism and sectarianism.

Relations between the cadres who came from outside districts and local cadres must be consolidated, and both must oppose factional tendencies. Because a great many of the anti-Japanese war bases were established only after the arrival of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the work in many places was developed only after the arrival of the "outside" cadres. Because of this, great attention must be paid to the relations between "outside" and local cadres. It must be understood that under such conditions the war bases can only grow strong, and our party can only take root in these bases, if there is solidarity and unanimity between the "outside" and

local cadres and only when the latter are trained on a large scale and promoted; otherwise it will be impossible. Both "outside" and local cadres have their merits; both also have their defects. They must learn each other's merits and so rectify their own shortcomings; only then can there be progress. The "outside" cadres must certainly be somewhat inferior to the local cadres in their detailed knowledge of (local) conditions and their relations with the masses. Take my case as an example. I came to north Shaanxi five or six years ago, yet I cannot compare with comrades like Gao Gang in my knowledge of conditions here or in my relations with people of this region. No matter what progress I make in investigation and research, I shall always be somewhat inferior to the north Shaanxi cadres. Those of our comrades who go to Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and the other anti-Japanese war bases must certainly pay attention to this problem. What is more, there are also distinctions between "outside" and local cadres within one section of a single war base because of the different stages of development of the regions within the base. Cadres from comparatively advanced regions who go to comparatively backward regions are a type of "outside" cadre for that area and must pay special attention to the problem of assisting the local cadres. Thus, generally speaking, wherever "outside" cadres assume the responsibility of leadership, they should receive the greater part of the blame if poor relations develop with the local cadres. Thus, the responsibility of the most important leaders is all the greater. At present, not enough attention is being paid to this problem. There are some comrades who regard the local cadres lightly and laugh at them. "What do the local people understand? The bumpkins!" Such people, completely misjudging the importance of the local cadres, could never understand their merits; nor could they understand their own shortcomings, and therefore they adopt the incorrect attitude of sectarianism. All the "outside" cadres must cherish, protect, and give constant assistance to the local cadres. They must not ridicule or attack them. Naturally, the local cadres must study the merits of the "outside" cadres; they must rid themselves of unsuitable and narrow points of view in order to find complete, undivided unity with the "outside" cadres, to become one with them, and to avoid the tendencies of sectarianism. The same applies to the relations between the cadres working in the army and the local work cadres. Both must be in complete and consolidated unanimity and oppose sectarian tendencies. The army cadres must assist the local cadres, and the local cadres must assist the army cadres. In case of conflict, each must make allowances for the other, and both must engage in exacting self-criticism. Under ordinary circumstances, in cases where the military cadres actually occupy a leading position, primary responsibility must rest with the military cadres if poor relations develop with the local cadres. The problem is very important. The military cadres must first be made to understand their own responsibilities, and then they will take a humble attitude toward the local cadres. Only then can smooth progress be made in the military and developmental work in the war bases.

The same also applies to relations between various army units, localities, and work departments. Here also the particularistic tendency to consider only oneself and disregard others must be opposed. This "particularism" has the following char-

acteristics: not sending cadres on request, or sending inferior men as cadres, exploiting one's neighbors, and completely disregarding other organs, localities, and people. This shows a complete loss of the spirit of communism. "Particularism" is characterized by a disregard for the overall picture and a complete lack of concern for other organs, localities, and people. Those who have this attitude must receive intensive education if they are to understand that it is a factional tendency and will be a danger to the party if it continues to develop.

The relations between old and new cadres present still another problem. Since the War of Resistance began, our party has experienced a vast expansion and large numbers of new cadres have been produced. This is excellent. At the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU, Comrade Stalin said in his report, "The old cadres were invariably few in number, too few considering the number necessary. Moreover, as a result of a natural law of the universe, they have gradually begun to wither and die." Here, on the one hand, he is explaining the circumstances affecting the cadres and, on the other hand, he is explaining natural science. If we do not have unanimous cooperation between the old and numerous new cadres in our party, our task will not be completed. Old cadres must therefore welcome the new cadres with great earnestness and give them their attention. Certainly the new cadres have defects. They have not participated in the revolution for long and lack experience. There are still those among them who have not stopped dragging in the tails of undesirable concepts of the old society, the remnants of liberal concepts of the petty bourgeoisie. But these defects can be gradually eliminated through training and revolutionary conditioning. Their [the new cadres'] merit, just as Stalin said, is that they have a sharp and sensitive perception on new matters, and consequently a high degree of enthusiasm and spirit. It is in just these respects that some of the old cadres are lacking. The old and new cadres must respect one another, learn from one another, firmly maintain their merits, and remedy their shortcomings so they can unite and consolidate as one team and carry out their tasks together. Sectarian tendencies must be opposed. In ordinary circumstances, in those cases where the principal responsibility for leadership is assumed by the old cadres, they must accept principal blame if poor relations develop with the new cadres.

The relations referred to above, between parts and the whole, individuals and the party, "outside" and local cadres, army and local cadres, army unit and army unit, locality and locality, this work department and that, are all intraparty relations. In all these relations the spirit of communism must be promoted and sectarian tendencies opposed, so that the ranks of the party may be in good order, our steps uniform, and our fighting objectives attained. This is an extremely important problem, which must be thoroughly resolved if we are to reform party tendencies. If we do not want to be subjectivistic, but wish to apply the Marxist-Leninist spirit of seeking truth from facts, we must sweep aside the remnants of sectarianism in the party and advance the party to a position of complete and consolidated unity, taking as a point of departure the election of party interests above individual and particular interests.

The remnants of sectarianism must be destroyed in intraparty relations, but they

must also be destroyed in the party's external relations, for this too is a tendency which needs correction. It is not possible to defeat the enemy by merely uniting the comrades of the entire party. The people of the entire nation must also be united. Only then will it be possible to defeat the enemy. For twenty years we have been engaged in the vast and arduous task of uniting the people of the nation. Since the War of Resistance began, our achievements in this task have been even greater than before, but this is not to say that all comrades have a correct spirit or that all are free of sectarian tendencies. It would be untrue to say this, for a group of our comrades possess this tendency, some of them to a serious extent. Many comrades delight in speaking to nonparty people with an exaggerated air of self-importance. They look down on others and belittle them, and are unwilling to respect others or understand their merits. This is a sectarian tendency. These comrades grow proud instead of modest after learning a few Marxist-Leninist phrases, invariably claiming that others are worthless, not realizing that they themselves really only half understand. There is one truism our comrades must grasp: the number of party members is always small compared with the number of people outside the party. If there is one CP member to every 100 people, then the whole country of 450 million would have 4.5 million party members. Granting that such a large membership could be attained, the CP members would still constitute but 1 percent of the population, and 99 percent would be nonmembers; so on what grounds can we not cooperate with nonparty people? We have an obligation to cooperate with all who are willing and able to cooperate with us; we have absolutely no right to reject them. Yet some party members do not understand this principle. There are no grounds whatsoever for looking down on and even rejecting those who are willing to cooperate with us. Did Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin give us such grounds? No, on the contrary, they invariably exhorted us not to cut ourselves off from the masses, but to ally ourselves closely with them. Has the CC of the CP given us such grounds? No, not one of the resolutions passed by the CC states that we may isolate ourselves by cutting our ties with the masses. On the contrary, it has always called for closer relations with the masses, not alienation. There is therefore no basis whatsoever for any action leading to alienation from the masses. The source of trouble is the sectarian thought created by some of our comrades. Because this type of sectarianism is still a serious problem with some of the party members and still obstructs the execution of party policy, we must carry out a large-scale program of intraparty training. We must start with our cadres, making sure that they truly understand that it will be absolutely impossible to defeat the enemy and attain our revolutionary objectives if Communists do not ally themselves with cadres and persons outside the party.

All sectarian thoughts are subjective and incompatible with the actual needs of the revolution. Thus, in opposing sectarianism, we must also oppose subjectivism.

The problem of party formalism will be discussed at another meeting. Party formalism is something which conceals filth. It is the cause of the revolution. It must therefore be wiped out. Today I cannot discuss it in full, but I shall discuss it next time.

If we are going to oppose subjectivism, we must propagate materialism and the dialectic method. Yet there are still many comrades in the party who pay no attention at all to the propagation of materialism or dialectics. Some even remain at ease while others spread subjectivism. These comrades think they believe in Marxism, but still make no effort to propagate materialism. When they see or hear something subjective, they do not think it over and criticize it. This is not the attitude of a CP member; this is the reason why many of our comrades take in the poison of subjective thought and develop signs of numbness. We must therefore initiate a movement of enlightenment in our party which will liberate our comrades' spirits from the darkness of subjectivism and dogmatism, and summon them to resistance against subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism. These things are a great deal like Japanese goods, because the enemy, hoping that we will continue to be shrouded in darkness, is the only one who wants us to keep these undesirable products. We must therefore call for resistance against them as we do against Japanese goods. We must resist everything characterized by subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism. We must not allow them to take advantage of the low theoretical level of the party to put their wares up for sale; we must make it difficult for these tendencies to sell their commodities on the market. To attain this objective we have to sharpen our comrades' sense of smell; each article must be smelled to see if it is good or bad. Only then can a decision be made whether to accept or reject it. CP members must ask "why?" about everything, examine it carefully in their minds, and ask whether it conforms with reality. They certainly must not follow blindly. They must not promote servitude.

Last, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism, two principles must be observed. The first is "Punish the past to warn the future," and the second, "Cure the sickness to save the patient." Past errors must be exposed with no thought of personal feelings or face. We must use a scientific attitude to analyze and criticize what has been undesirable in the past so that more care will be taken in later work, and so this work will be performed better. This is the meaning of "Punish the past to warn the future." But our object in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings is like that of a doctor in curing a disease. The entire purpose is to save the patient, not to cure him to death. If a patient has appendicitis, the doctor performs an operation and the patient is saved. If a person who commits an error, no matter how great, does not bring his disease to an incurable state by concealing it and persisting in the error, and if in addition he is genuinely and honestly willing to be cured, willing to make corrections, we will welcome him so that the disease may be cured and he can become a good comrade. It is certainly not possible to solve the problem by one flurry of blows for the sake of a moment's satisfaction. We cannot adopt a brash attitude toward diseases in thought and politics, but must have an attitude of "cure the illness to save the patient." This is the correct and effective method.

I have taken the opening of the party school today as an occasion to speak on many things, and I hope our comrades will give them their consideration. (Great applause.)

G.11 Decision of the Propaganda Bureau of the CC on the Discussion in Yan'an of the Decision of the CC and Comrade Mao Zedong's Report on Rectification of the Three [Unorthodox] Work-Styles (3 April 1942)⁶⁹

Since July 1941, the CC resolutions on the party spirit, investigation, and research and other resolutions, together with Comrade Mao Zedong's recent report condemning subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism [**Doc. G.10**], have caused a revolution in party thought and have served as a sharp weapon for the correction of the thought of cadres and party members and for the alteration of work-styles. In order that cadres fully grasp the spirit and substance of CC resolutions and the report of Comrade Mao Zedong and utilize these weapons in their work, it is necessary that they recognize the problem to be one of practical activity and long-term education in thought. The problem is not so simple that it can be resolved after one discussion.

The experience of previous discussions concerning CC resolutions on strengthening party spirit and on investigation and research has revealed that very few leading organs of the party or administration at any level have shown preparation and planning in organizing discussions, and few have allowed the branches to carry on discussions of their own. As a result, most branches have merely limited themselves to discussing documents with the aid of documents and have not understood the spirit and substance of these documents; still less have they applied the documents, that is to say, investigated the work of their own departments and the work and thought of each comrade according to the spirit and substance of the documents, bringing achievements to light, correcting mistakes, strengthening the party's internal cohesiveness, and creating a correct work-style. If this is to be done, it is not possible to rely merely on the discussions carried on by the ordinary branches; nor is it possible to reprimand the branches alone; responsibility must first of all be assumed by responsible members of the leading organs of each department in the party.

Although individual organs have been subject to administrative guidance in their discussions and investigations, there has not been preparatory research among the cadres which would lead to clarification, or deliberation which would lead to mature judgment; nor has there been close consideration of all factors involved; the result has been the occurrence of irregularities. In the future, such conditions should be avoided. Accordingly, this department issues the following decisions concerning the method for studying and discussing the resolutions of the CC and Comrade Mao Zedong's report:

- 1) All organs and schools must engage in thorough research and lively debate on CC resolutions, Comrade Mao Zedong's report, and the other documents designated by the CC. They should first of all gain a thorough comprehension of the spirit and substance of these documents and make them their weapon. With this object in

mind, all comrades must read each document, take notes, and afterward debate the separate documents or several documents together in small committees. When necessary, CC representatives or representatives of this office will be dispatched to make reports. In reading and in debate, all must deliberate deeply and thoroughly, examining their own work and thought and their own life history in its entirety. In examining others, the procedure should also entail a complete examination of the person's past, so as to avoid harmful *ex parte* judgments. It is incorrect to calculatingly protect oneself and fail to speak out; it is also incorrect to avoid attacking one's own faults, while only attacking others.

2) When there is study or debate on CC documents, responsible persons in the departments (either party or governmental) should, after planning and preparation, take a position of leadership in the process of study and debate. Afterward, they should give careful thought to the work of their own departments and to their own work and, in addition, should exchange opinions with others and determine a plan of investigation. They should then begin to investigate the work of their own departments and of each cadre. Afterward, conclusions should be drawn for the improvement of work. This is the indispensable process of proceeding from research to investigation to conclusions. In investigating work, they must not be superficial, but accurate. They should investigate below and on all sides, not only exposing and correcting defects and errors but bringing to light and reinforcing achievements and correct aspects. Moreover, they must calculate which aspect is important and which aspect is secondary. Only in this way can they apply the spirit and substance of CC documents so as to alter completely and change the work of their own departments and the work-style and thought of all comrades.

3) In methods of debate and investigation, equal importance should be given both to guidance from above and to the development of democracy. One cannot be put above the other. If there were only guidance from above, with no development of a positive spirit at the lower levels, thorough discussion of documents and investigation of work would not be possible. The existence of a positive spirit only at the lower levels, with no guidance from above, could also cause discussion and investigation to deviate from a correct course. The extent of the development of democracy should be dependent on circumstances arising from the differing natures of [party] organs.

In certain organs, it is necessary to organize investigation committees. Included in the committees should be the leading comrades from these organs and members drawn from the working personnel. In certain schools, aside from the leaders who should naturally participate and take responsibility for guidance, the elective method can be used to select a certain number of students to join the committees. In discussion, contending views should be developed. During the stipulated investigation period, opinions, whether correct or mistaken, should be allowed free expression and should not be curbed. However, leaders should skillfully direct their attention to guiding mistaken opinions in a correct direction, and should not allow opinions to become conclusions.

4) The objectives of research, discussion, and investigation are a thorough understanding of the contents of CC documents; the earnest and sincere reform of styles in education, the party, and literature; the reconstruction of work, the consolidation of cadres, and the consolidation of the entire party. Any discussion or activity contravening these objectives is incorrect. Thus, the attitude in discussion and criticism must be severe, thorough, and pointed. On the other hand, it must be sincere, straightforward, truthful, and based on fact. Cold ridicule and hidden invective, slander and calumny, and abuse based on hearsay and exaggeration are all incorrect. During discussions, Comrade Mao Zedong's warnings "don't repeat past mistakes" and "cure the sickness to save the patient" should be constantly heeded. Of the comrades who commit errors, those who intend to correct themselves and who progress should be encouraged and assisted, even though they are still unable to avoid error during the course of their advance. The slightest advance by a comrade should be welcomed as a starting point in the struggle for the completion of his progress. Comrades should be made to understand that it is with this objective that the weapon of criticism is used.

5) The time period for the study of documents designated by the CC is stipulated to be three months for all organs and two months for schools. After that the investigation of work will commence. The period for the investigation of work is to be determined by the organs and schools themselves, with the approval of their superior organs. This regulation does not apply to those particular organs and schools which have already carried out the investigation of work and obtained CC approval.

6) During the period of discussion and investigation, wall posters may be published. Wall poster committees may be formed for guidance.

7) In organs where work is done in cooperation with nonparty people, these people should be included in the discussion and investigation.

8) Final conclusions on discussions and the investigation of work in all organs and schools must be approved by superior organs. Important conclusions must be approved by the CC. After conclusions have been reached by the organs and schools, but before the approval of the superior organ or the CC, anyone with an opinion differing from the conclusions will be allowed to present his or her opinion to the superior organ or to the CC. Once the conclusions are approved, they must be followed.

9) These decisions apply universally to the methods of research on, and discussion of, CC documents by party organs in the administration and army. But the extent of democratic procedure in the investigation of work must vary with circumstances. The method is to be decided by the Northwest Bureau and the general political bureau.

10) Participation in the discussion of documents and the investigation of work is limited to cadres and to those who have read the CC documents. In the schools, this group includes the students.

11) In order to ascertain whether or not cadres and students have correctly

understood the contents and meanings of the CC documents and these decisions, this department has decided to hold one general examination. Special arrangements are to be made for its conduct.

12) Below are the eighteen documents designated as the scope of the cadre examination (which will include students):

1. Mao Zedong's [1] February report at the party school
2. Mao Zedong's report to the 8 February cadre meeting
3. Two reports by Kang Sheng
4. The CC resolution on strengthening party spirit
5. The CC resolution on investigation and research
6. The CC resolution on the Yan'an Cadre School
7. The CC resolution on the education of cadres in service
8. Mao Zedong's address to the Border Region Assembly
9. Mao Zedong's report on the reconstruction of study
10. Mao Zedong, "Oppose Liberalism"
11. Mao Zedong's second preface to *Village Investigations*
12. "Conclusion," from *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*
13. Stalin, "The Bolshevization of the Party"
14. Liu Shaoqi, *The Training of the CP Member*, chapter 2, sections 2, 3, 4, 5
15. Chen Yun, "How to Be a CP Member"
16. Ninth Representative Assembly of the Fourth Red Army on incorrect tendencies within the party [Gutian Resolution]
17. Handbook for guidance in propaganda
18. "Report of the Propaganda Bureau of the CCP CC on the CC Resolution Concerning the Discussions at Yan'an and Comrade Mao Zedong's Report on the Reform of the Three Styles"

Propaganda Bureau Circular

1) Added below are four documents which stand as the nineteenth to twenty-second items of the materials on the discussion at Yan'an and the reform of the three styles.

- Stalin, "Leadership and Inspection"
- Lenin and Stalin, "Party Discipline and Party Democracy"
- Stalin, "Egalitarianism"
- Dimitrov, "Cadre Policy and Cadre Educational Policy"

2) The period for study and discussion of the materials designated by the CC is stipulated to be from 20 April to 20 June for schools, and from 20 April to 20 July for party organs.

16 April

G.12 On Inner-Party Struggle. *Liu Shaoqi* (2 July 1942)⁷⁰

I. Introduction

Comrades! Recently we have raised in the party the problem of strengthening party spirit among party members. I have heard that the CC has passed a resolution on this question and that we shall be able to obtain it before long. In order to strengthen party spirit among party members, we have to develop a series of concrete ideological struggles so that all types of undesirable tendencies transgressing that spirit will be opposed. But what is the correct method of developing the ideological struggles within the party and what is to be considered the incorrect method? This is the question I would now like to discuss.

Everyone knows that our party is a proletarian party that leads the broad masses to battle. If the party is to fulfill the historical tasks it has shouldered, it must fight against the enemies of the revolution at various periods and must unite with the various revolutionary strata and classes.

From the day of its founding, our party has never for a single moment lived in any environment but that of serious struggle. The party and the proletariat have been constantly encircled by the power of the nonproletarian classes: the big and petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and even the remnants of feudal forces. These classes, either struggling against the proletariat or in alliance with it, have infiltrated, through the unstable elements within the party and proletariat, to its heart, and constantly influenced it in ideology, living habits, theory, and action. This, then, is the source of all erroneous, evil tendencies within the party. It is the social origin of all opportunism within the party and also the source of the inner-party struggle.

Inner-party struggle is a reflection of the struggle outside the party.

Since the day of its origin, the party has not only fought enemies outside the party, but has also fought the nonproletarian influences of enemies within the party. The two struggles are to be distinguished, but both are necessary and, in class substance, they are the same. If the party does not engage in the second struggle, if it does not constantly carry out a struggle to oppose all undesirable tendencies within the party, does not constantly reject all nonproletarian ideology and overcome “left” and right opportunism, then nonproletarian ideology and “left” and right opportunism will be able to develop in the party and influence and guide the party. [[This is what happened to the social-democratic parties in Europe, and therefore inner-party struggle is necessary.]]

Inner-party struggle is primarily ideological struggle, the contents of which are divergences and mutual opposition in matters of ideology. In the party, even though divergences can lead to political divergences and even, under certain conditions, unavoidably lead to divergences concerning party organization, ideological inner-party struggle, which does not contain divergences in matters of ideology but only embodies unprincipled personal attacks among the comrades, is a struggle without

principle and without content. Within the party this type of struggle—unprincipled and without content—is entirely unnecessary. It harms the party and should be carefully avoided by party members.

Inner-party struggle is absolutely necessary to maintain the party's purity and independence, to guarantee that party activities are carried out on the line which represents the highest interests of the proletariat, and to maintain the party's proletarian character. With this aim, inner-party struggle must proceed in two directions, advance on two fronts. This is because enemy thought influences the party from two directions, because it attacks the party with the right and "left" opportunism. Therefore, in inner-party struggle, we must struggle against both, and only then will we be able to maintain the proletarian character of our party.

[[A one-sided attack will encourage the enemy. Stalin is quoted in support.]]

Here then lies the necessity for the inner-party struggle.

II. Special Conditions in Which the CCP Was Founded and Tendencies in Its Inner-Party Struggle

[[Lenin's Bolshevik doctrine on party building was developed in the struggle against right opportunism by the parties of the Second International. The conditions facing the CCP were different from those facing Lenin.]]

First: The CCP was established after the [Russian] October Revolution and after the Russian Bolshevik [Party] had already achieved victory and become a living model. Therefore, from the beginning, it was under the guidance of the Comintern and was established according to the principles of Lenin.

Second: From the beginning, in ideology and in organization, the CCP has not been influenced by the Second International of the European social-democratic parties.

Third: China has not gone through the period of the "peaceful" development of capitalism, such as was experienced in Europe and which allowed the working class to engage in a peaceful parliamentary struggle; nor does China have Europe's class of labor aristocracy.

Fourth: A comparatively large segment of the membership of the CCP comes from the petty bourgeois class and the peasantry, and there are also some idlers. This is the social foundation for "left" and right opportunism in the CCP.

Because of the above four conditions, our party's development has, in the subjective sense, been, from the beginning, according to the principles and path of Lenin. A great many party members can recite the organizational principles of the Bolshevik Party from memory. The traditions and practices of the social-democratic parties are not to be found in our party. As a consequence, we have traveled a straight path. From the time of its organization our party has had self-criticism and ideological struggle, democratic centralism, and strict ideological organization and discipline. It has not allowed the existence of factions and has rigorously opposed liberalism, autonomous unionism, the tendencies of the Economists, etc.

Because of this, a systematic theory of right opportunism in organization has not yet been raised openly in the party. [[Ideological struggle in the party is inadequate.]]

However, the special conditions and circumstances of the period in which the CCP was established gave rise to two influences; one was good and enabled us at the very beginning to establish a Leninist CCP which, subjectively, strictly followed the principles of Lenin, for from the outset party growth was accompanied by rigorous self-criticism and inner-party struggle, which enabled it to progress rapidly and acted as a force motivating the party's progress. But there was another influence which often caused our comrades to go to another extreme and commit another error, an influence which frequently caused inner-party struggle to become violent and excessive, to go beyond limits and move toward "left" deviation.

A great many comrades mechanically and erroneously conceive of the principles of Lenin as absolutes. They think that a high degree of centralism in party organization precludes democracy within the party, that the necessity for inner-party struggle precludes peace within the party, that the party's position as the highest form of proletarian organization, leading all other proletarian mass organizations in political affairs, precludes the independent nature of trade unions and other organizations of the workers and toiling masses, that unified, iron discipline destroys the individuality of party members and their initiative and creativity. [[Many comrades memorized Lenin's principles as if they were dead things and saw themselves as "100 percent Bolsheviks" and carried out unprincipled struggles within the party.]]

Many comrades do not understand that inner-party struggle is a struggle in principle; a struggle to uphold one principle or another, to establish one battle objective or another, to select one method or another of attaining the battle objective. They do not understand that in questions of everyday administrative affairs, in questions of a purely practical nature, compromises can and should be made with those in the party holding different views. They do not know or understand that in questions of selecting battle objectives, and in questions of the selection of methods for the attainment of these battle objectives, they should struggle uncompromisingly with those in the party holding different views. [[This is the traditional party work-style of Lenin and Stalin.]]

Many comrades do not understand the nature of principles or questions of principle, or the nature of questions of the party's strategical plan and tactical line, or how to grasp these principles and the difference in questions of strategic plan and tactical line to carry out the struggle. Their theoretical level and political experience are still extremely low, and they cannot grasp these highly important questions and fight for them. They mechanically remember, however, that it is necessary to carry out struggle within the party and that it is wrong not to struggle. Although they cannot grasp these important questions or raise a question from principle, they still want to struggle. Accordingly, able only to grasp individual phenomena and individual questions, they proceed to carry on a struggle and argument without principle or content with those in the party holding different views, and thus create disunity,

mutual opposition, and organizational divergences among our comrades. This undesirable condition in inner-party struggle exists in our party.

What has been described above is a deviation in the struggle within the CCP; in our party it is a deviation of special seriousness (although it also exists in foreign parties). It is a case of inner-party struggle being carried too far, going beyond limits, traveling to another extreme—"left" opportunism in inner-party struggle and in party organization (precluding democracy in the party, precluding a harmonious peace based on principles in the party, precluding the relative independence of trade unions and other mass organizations, and denying the party member's individuality, initiative, and creativity). It has been produced under the special environment and special conditions of the CCP.

[[Many comrades have not taken notice of Lenin's principled struggle against "left" opportunism.]]

Thus, the following three deviations may be said to exist in CCP inner-party struggle: (1) liberalism and reconciliationism; (2) mechanical and excessive inner-party struggle, "left" opportunism in party organization and in inner-party struggle; and (3) unprincipled disputes and struggles within the party. These are all manifestations of opposition to Marxism-Leninism.]]

III. Manifestations of Mechanical and Excessive Inner-Party Struggle

Comrades! Today I shall not speak on liberalism, the first of the three deviations in the party struggle described above. [[This does not mean that I do not find it important.]] I only wish to point out that the tendency toward liberalism in the party has recently had an appreciable development, that in many respects it has already become a principal tendency in inner-party struggle, and that the development of ideological struggle in the party has been insufficient. Thus, many erroneous tendencies and undesirable phenomena have not received timely correction, and party discipline has gradually relaxed. This is very undesirable. It is to be attributed to the fact that recently a great number of intellectual elements and new party members have entered the party, bringing with them strong bourgeois, liberal ideas.

Ideologically, politically, and organizationally, they have not been tempered by the iron discipline of the proletariat. At the same time, some comrades, who have in the past committed the errors of "left" deviation and carrying inner-party struggle to excess, now turn around and commit the errors of right deviation and liberalism. During the long period of the united front, the possibility of the bourgeoisie influencing the party has also increased. Counterrevolutionary elements hidden in the party have used every method to develop and support liberalism within the party, and as a consequence the tendency toward liberalism developed. It is a tendency which must be strictly opposed in the struggle to strengthen the party spirit. [[Examples are given of bourgeois liberal behavior.]]

Where is mechanical and excessive struggle in the party manifested? It is manifested in the following instances:

First: In local and army party units, "struggle meetings" are frequently held. They are even held in such nonparty bodies as government organs and mass organizations. These meetings are arranged beforehand so that the principal object is not to discuss work, but to attack certain people; not to struggle primarily against "issues," but against individuals; not to struggle against incorrect thoughts and principles, but against certain persons. The object of the so-called struggle against Mr. X or Mr. Y is to attack certain comrades who are in error. The "struggle meetings" are in essence courts of justice for comrades in which the principal object is not to resolve questions on the basis of thought, but, through organizational processes, to suppress those comrades who dare to hold divergent views of their own (without any certainty that these views are really incorrect), or those comrades who upset the apple cart. In a great majority of the cases where attacks are launched against individuals in "struggle meetings," organizational conclusions are the result. It is quite clear that such a method of struggle is incorrect.

[[The very term "struggle meetings" makes no sense at all. Are there also any "nonstruggle meetings"?]]

Second: The mechanical and excessive form of inner-party struggle is also manifested in the following conditions: some comrades think that the more savage the inner-party struggle, the better; the more grave the manner in which the questions are raised, the better; the more mistakes discovered, the more names called, the more blame laid on others, the sharper the criticism, the more severe and rude the method and attitude of criticism, the better; . . . and if the words are louder, faces longer, and fangs sticking out farther . . . they are considered better and "most revolutionary." In inner-party struggle and self-criticism, [such people] do not endeavor to do what is suitable, do not weigh their opinions or stop when they have gone far enough; they struggle on with no limit. It is clear that this attitude is also entirely incorrect.

Third: Some comrades do not yet understand that inner-party struggle is basically an ideological struggle, and that only if unanimity is obtained in thought can it then be maintained and strengthened in political affairs, organization, and activities in the party. Only after questions are resolved on the basis of ideology and principle can they then be resolved in organization and party activities. It is not an easy matter, however, to obtain unanimity and resolve questions in thought and principle, to overcome the false principles held by others, to correct their false principles, to transform their thoughts and correct their long-cherished principles, views, and prejudices. Nor can this end be reached by simple means, whether they be a few words, the struggle meeting method, or simply coercion and force. This end can be achieved only through persevering in persuasion and education, and complex struggles by rather prolonged education, struggle, and actual revolutionary work. [[Some comrades do not appreciate this.]]

Fourth: [The fourth case] is a failure to distinguish between the methods to be employed in the struggles within and outside the party. Some comrades take the methods of inner-party struggle and use them mechanically in mass organizations

and organs outside the party and use the methods of inner-party struggle in the struggle of nonparty cadres and masses; some other comrades use the methods of the struggle (which is carried on) outside the party, the methods of struggle against the enemy and oppositional elements in struggling with their own comrades; they use the methods used against the enemy and opposition and apply them against comrades in the party. All incitements to dissension and cunning schemes are used. Administrative procedures—investigation, arrest, imprisonment, and trial—are also put to use in inner-party struggle. For example, the “ultraleftist” errors committed by some comrades engaged in the liquidation of traitors were mostly the result of failure to distinguish strictly between the struggles within and outside the party, a confusion of inner-party ideological struggle and the work of the liquidation of traitors. There are frequently enemies cunningly hidden within the party; to expose and expel this hidden enemy from the party it is necessary to carry on a struggle based on actual facts. But this struggle and the educational struggle which must be carried on against CP members who commit errors are two entirely different matters. The struggles within and outside the party are closely connected, but the methods and forms are different.

There are also some comrades (as a matter of fact, they can no longer be called comrades) who openly avail themselves of and rely on resources outside the party to engage in inner-party struggle and threaten and blackmail the party. For example, some rely on certain of their achievements, on the troops they command or their weapons, on their mass support, or on certain of their connections in the united front to carry on a struggle against the party and higher organs and threaten them so as to make them accept their demands and views; they propagandize and agitate for independence from the party. Or some take advantage of nonparty, and even bourgeois and enemy, newspapers and magazines and various conferences to criticize the party and carry on a struggle against higher party organs and certain comrades and cadres. Obviously this error is as grave as that committed by those who rely on the power of the party to coerce, dominate, and oppress the nonparty masses and engage in extortion and blackmail against people outside the party. Such people struggle against the party from a position outside the party; although they still bear the name of CP members, they have already completely divorced themselves from the party stand and become party oppositionists.

Fifth: Within our party a great many questions are being, or have been, settled in conferences; this is an excellent thing. Yet, in individual organizations, many conferences are held for which the work of preparation, investigation, and research has not been done beforehand, and many controversies and arguments often spring up. Also in all conferences, the task of forming conclusions invariably falls on the highest responsible person attending, and these conference conclusions amount to resolutions; here a great many defects also often arise. In some conference debates I have seen, the commissars or secretaries of the cells, or other responsible comrades, eventually had to form the conclusions [of the discussion]. Yet some responsible comrades themselves have neither a grasp of the situation nor a clear understanding

of the issues; however, they are compelled to form the conclusions; if they do not, they cannot hold that responsible post. Since these responsible comrades have to form the conclusions, there are some who become extremely distressed, break out in a sweat, and make very rough conclusions; these conclusions then amount to resolutions and determine events. This procedure naturally gives rise to a great many errors. Some comrades who do not yet have a firm grasp of questions are still unwilling to make this fact clear when they make decisions, unwilling to request a period for consideration and research or time to ask higher echelons for instruction. In order to save face and maintain their position, they claim that they do have a firm grasp of the situation and make decisions carelessly, and the results are often incorrect. Such a situation should also be corrected. [[Problems with the party cannot be settled in an arbitrary manner.]]

The above are some of the important manifestations of the mechanical and excessive forms of inner-party struggle.

I have naturally cited the worst examples above, and I do not mean to say that they have been universally prevalent in the past and present inner-party struggle. Yet these forms certainly do exist in inner-party struggle, and at one time in the past they dominated the party and were the principal forms of inner-party struggle.

What have been the results in the party of this type of incorrect and inappropriate inner-party struggle? The following unfavorable results have been produced:

First: It has stimulated the development of patriarchalism in the party. Under this form of inner-party struggle, individual leaders and leading organs have oppressed many party members so that they did not dare speak or criticize. It has created a dictatorship of individuals or minorities within the party.

Second: On the other hand, it has stimulated the development of extreme democratic tendencies and liberalism with the party. A formal kind of peace and unity have been manifested in the party, for many comrades ordinarily do not dare speak or criticize. But once the continued concealment of contradictions becomes impossible, once the situation becomes serious and mistakes are exposed, they criticize and fight recklessly; opposition, schism, and organizational troubles develop in the party, and it is difficult to settle them. This, then, is the reverse side of the system of party patriarchalism.

Third: The influence (of this type of struggle) has been to make the correct establishment of inner-party democratic centralism difficult, and inner-party democracy abnormal, irregular, or extremely deficient.

Fourth: It has obstructed the development of enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity on the part of party members and has weakened their spirit of responsibility toward the party and their work. Comrades under its influence do not dare take positive responsibility, do not dare work or create freely, and do not examine and study problems and conditions carefully. It cultivates their tendency to depend on bureaucratic procedure and to be yes-men.

Fifth: It has stimulated the development of party sectarianism, the development of an unprincipled factional struggle among party members, and the creation of a

state of mind which fears criticism and conflict. In certain party members it has cultivated the attitude of “taking care of oneself” and the attitude that “the less trouble the better.”

Sixth: It gives Trotskyite spies and counterrevolutionary elements all the more opportunity to destroy the party and gives the counterrevolution all the more excuses with which to attack the party. Trotskyite spies take special advantage of contradictions in the party and incorrect inner-party struggles to further their activities for the destruction of the party and to try to win over those who have been reprimanded and are dissatisfied with the party. [[Counterrevolutionaries take advantage of the struggle against opportunism.]]

For a rather long period, these excessive and mechanical forms in inner-party struggle have been creating abnormalities in party life and causing the party great losses. Despite the fact that the highest leading organs of the party have already corrected their errors and these forms do not now dominate the struggle being conducted throughout the party, these forms still have not been corrected in certain middle and lower-level or in certain individual organs; they are still more or less common. [[Therefore we must draw attention to them.]]

IV. Unprincipled Struggle Within the Party

Comrades! I am now going to speak on another deviation in inner-party struggle—the unprincipled struggle within the party. The prevalence of this phenomenon is especially common and grave within the CCP. Although the so-called gossip movement exists in foreign CPs, I think it probably is not so serious abroad as in the CCP. [[Thus, we must make our comrades fully aware of this.]]

What are the unprincipled disputes and struggles in the party?

I consider the following instances of dispute and struggle within the party to be without principle; that is, they run counter to those common stands and principles which promote the interests of our party and the proletarian revolution.

First: Some comrades do not raise questions and struggle with other comrades from a party standpoint or for the sake of the interests of the entire party, but do so from the standpoint of individual or fractional interests. This is to say, the stand from which they engage in inner-party struggle is incorrect. As a consequence, their views are also incorrect. Only if their individual or minority interests benefit do they give approval or support in dealing with a matter. If their individual or minority interests do not benefit, they stand in opposition and do not give their approval. They are unconcerned with the interests of the party or the revolution and put these in a place of secondary importance. [[Thus, their principles are personal and not those of the party. Examples are given.]]

Second: Some comrades provoke conflicts and disputes within the party, not to improve the party, but with the opposite purpose or other motives in mind. This purpose is incorrect, and the struggle they provoke is also without principle. For example, some comrades foment disputes in the party and struggle with their com-

rades to show off, to improve their position, to save face, or even to vent their hatred and seek revenge. They upset their comrades' work and plans and wreck the order and solidarity of the party, but fail to give their attention to prevailing circumstances and conditions. Such are the characteristics of this form of unprincipled struggle.

Third: Some comrades do not start from a basis of principle in raising questions for acceptance or rejection by the party. It is only on the basis of their own feelings, likes and dislikes, that they raise questions and struggle, only for the emotional release of the moment or for the soothing of their ruffled tempers that they revile others and give vent to their anger. This is also a form of unprincipled struggle. Some comrades, because their experience is limited or their theoretical level low, cannot raise questions for debate on the basis of principle. It is only on particular or miscellaneous questions, questions of a purely practical nature, or everyday administrative questions which do not involve principle that they debate with absolute obstinacy. But since this does not involve general questions of principle it is also an unprincipled form of struggle which should not be insisted on. [[Examples are given.]]

The fourth (instance) is to engage in inner-party struggle unscrupulously or without observing organizational procedures, to befriend or attack comrades in an unprincipled way, provoking dissension, betraying, or secretly scheming against comrades, or not speaking to a person's face but speaking wildly behind their back, irresponsibly criticizing the party, spreading unfounded opinions, circulating rumors, telling lies, and calumniating others.

The cases cited above are all examples of unprincipled struggle. Next, there are also some comrades who infuse certain elements of unprincipled struggle into the struggle concerning principles, or who, under the protective banner of a struggle concerning principles, engage in unprincipled struggle. In addition, there are some comrades who pay special attention to the quarrels between certain persons, or to the discordant relations between certain persons, instead of to the substance of their controversy.

[[What is meant by principle is the general laws governing the development of things. If errors occur in principle, then not only individual errors but also errors of a systematic and persistent nature, affecting a series of practical problems, will occur.]]

What are the origins of the unprincipled and the mechanical and excessive struggle within the party? They spring from the following sources:

First: The generally low theoretical level of comrades in the party and, in many respects, the insufficiency of their experience. For a long time, a leadership and "center" for the entire party have actually not materialized, and the leadership and the "center" in the various localities have, up to the present, materialized to only a very slight degree.

Second: The petty-bourgeois elements within the party are strong, and the rashness and madness of the petty bourgeois, and the peasant petty-bourgeois spirit of revenge, have constantly influenced the inner-party struggle.

Third: Democratic life within the party is not normal; a spirit of objective, mutual discussion of problems among the comrades has not developed; and the tendency to judge and decide problems in a crude, subjective manner is still prevalent to a serious degree.

Fourth: Opportunist elements have infiltrated the party, and a certain opportunist psychology exists in a group of comrades within the party. In order to prove their own "Bolshevization," they often intentionally go a little to the "left," thinking that "left" is better than right, or they attack others in order to raise their own prestige.

Fifth: Trotskyite spies and counterrevolutionary elements have infiltrated the party, making use of inner-party struggle to sabotage the party. Under the cover of the party banner, traitorous Trotskyite elements often deliberately attack certain comrades, and after the attack still other traitorous Trotskyite elements absorb the comrades who thus have been attacked into the Trotskyite group as traitors. [[Such are the origins of the various deviations in inner-party struggle.]]

V. How to Conduct Inner-Party Struggle

Comrades! The question before us now is already quite clear, that is, what is the correct and appropriate way to carry out inner-party struggle? [[The CPSU and CCP have much experience on this question.]]

First: Our comrades must realize at the outset that inner-party struggle is a most serious and responsible matter. It must be carried out with a grave and responsible attitude and certainly not in a slipshod manner. In carrying out the struggle, we must first of all base ourselves completely on a correct party stand, a public-spirited, unselfish stand which is completely in the interest of the party, for the progress of party work, and of assistance to other comrades in correcting their errors and understanding problems. We ourselves must first see things clearly, see the problems clearly, carry out systematic investigation and research, and at the same time carry out the struggle in a well-organized, well-guided, and prepared manner.

Our comrades should know that you can only correct others' mistakes if you yourself first adopt a correct stand, and you can only rectify the heterodoxy in others if you yourself are first completely orthodox. "You must first rectify yourself, then you can rectify others." [[Inner-party struggle must be conducted with the greatest sense of responsibility to the party and the revolution.]]

Second: Comrades should understand that inner-party struggle is the struggle between different ideologies and differing principles and [comes from] the mutual opposition between ideologies and differing principles in the party. It is completely necessary that clear boundaries be drawn in ideology and principles. But in organization, in the methods of struggle, in attitudes of speech and criticism, there should be the least possible opposition and the greatest possible use of moderate forms in discussion and debate. [[Only where unavoidable should militant forms of struggle be adopted.]]

Opposition in matters of ideology and principle, and the least possible opposition

in questions of organization and method: this is the correct way, which we should adopt in inner-party struggle. A great many comrades' errors consist of the following tendencies: on the one hand, they do not develop clear-cut opposition and divergence in ideology and principle, and, on the other hand, they oppose and struggle confusingly on questions of organizational operation and on the methods of the struggle.

Third: Criticism of party organization, party members, and party work should be appropriate and measured. Bolshevik self-criticism has its Bolshevik toleration. Excessive criticism, the exaggeration of others' mistakes, and baseless accusations are all wrong. It is not true that the fiercer the inner-party struggle, the better; it should have appropriate limits and seek a suitable level. Both "excessive" and "insufficient" struggle are undesirable.

Fourth is the general cessation of the holding of struggle meetings both within and outside the party. We should point out defects and errors through the summation and checking of our work. We should first direct our energy "against things," and afterward "against persons."

[[*Fifth:* We should not begin by inquiring as to who is responsible for these mistakes and errors. Our policy is mutual assistance and mutual examination between comrades.]]

After debate has been concluded on questions of ideology and principle it is possible to pass a majority decision even if final unanimity has not been reached in the party. After majority decisions have been made, minority comrades who still hold different views have the right to maintain these views under the condition that they follow the majority strictly in matters of organization and action. If a certain number of low-ranking party committees or comrades request that higher-ranking party committees or leading organs call an appropriate meeting for the examination of work, the higher party committees should call the meeting and carry out the examination if possible.

Sixth: A clear line should be drawn between inner-party and extraparty struggles; yet at the same time an appropriate relationship should be established. The methods of inner-party struggle should not be carried over to the struggle outside the party, and the methods of extraparty struggle should not be carried over to inner-party struggle; even less should forces and conditions outside the party be used to struggle within and to intimidate the party. All party members must be strictly attentive and cautious lest hidden Trotskyite spies and counterrevolutionary elements take advantage of contradictions and the struggle within the party to carry on activities ruinous to the party. In inner-party struggle, party members should take care not to be utilized by these elements. This can be avoided only if all strictly observe party discipline and engage correctly in inner-party struggle.

Within the party, only a legal struggle is permitted; only an ideological struggle is permitted. Any type of struggle contrary to the party Constitution and party discipline is not to be tolerated.

Seventh is the prohibition of unprincipled inner-party disputes.

1) If party members have an opinion on the leading organs of the party or on any party organization, they can raise the issue and criticism only to the proper party organization. They are not permitted to speak irresponsibly among the masses.

2) If party members have an opinion on another party member or on a responsible person in the party, they can only express criticism to their faces or in certain organizations. They are not permitted to gossip loosely.

3) If party members or low-ranking committees have an opinion on a high-ranking party committee, it can only be expressed to high-ranking party committees, or a request can be made to call a meeting for examination, or a charge can be made to the higher-ranking committees. They are not permitted to speak wildly or to transmit the controversies to the lower ranks.

4) If party members discover that another member is acting incorrectly and in such a way as to endanger party interests, they must report to the proper party organization; there may be no covering up or mutual screening.

5) All party members should support correct influences and orthodoxy and oppose incorrect influences and all heterodox speeches and actions. They should seriously reprimand those party members who like to gossip, broadcast, discover people's secrets, or spread rumors. Leading organs of the party should issue orders as the occasion demands, forbidding party members to discuss certain questions.

6) As the occasion demands, leading organs at every level should talk with those comrades who like to gossip or engage in unprincipled disputes, and correct, issue warning, or [mete out] other punishments.

7) Party committees at all levels should respect the opinions raised by every comrade. They should call meetings regularly, discuss questions, investigate work, and give party members the opportunity to fully express their views.

Unprincipled disputes should generally be forbidden, without a judgment as to which is right and which is wrong. Because they are without principle, there is no right or wrong involved which can be judged.

When we endeavor to settle an unprincipled dispute among our comrades, we should certainly not be content to make a decision based on the dispute itself, but should examine and summarize the relevant work and indicate future tasks, direction of work, the general line, plans, etc., directly and on principle. Within the framework of these summaries, tasks, courses, lines, and plans, we should criticize the comrades' incorrect views, then afterward solicit their views to find whether or not they still differ. If they still differ, it has become a dispute in principle, and an unprincipled dispute among comrades has been raised to the level of principle. If the comrades have no difference of opinion on principle, then they should be requested to unite under these summaries, tasks, and courses and struggle unanimously for their complete fulfillment. Comrades should be asked to avoid all other questions that are without principle. They should settle unprincipled disputes by starting from a summary of past work, solving the present tasks, then promoting the work at hand. Unprincipled disputes cannot otherwise be settled. We certainly should not adopt the attitude of judges in deciding unprincipled disputes, which will

not be solved in this manner. If the decision is not made appropriately, both sides will be dissatisfied and the dispute will continue. [[We must prevent a principled struggle from turning into an unprincipled one.]]

In brief, inner-party struggle consists basically of divergences and struggle in ideology and principle. All in the party should reason, clarify the issues, and have some line of reasoning to speak about. Otherwise it is wrong. If lines of reasoning are thrashed out, there is nothing which cannot be done well and easily. In the party, we should cultivate the spirit of reasoning. The standards by which to judge the correctness or incorrectness of a line of reasoning are the interest of the struggle being carried on by the party and the proletariat, the submission of the partial interest to the interest of the whole, and the submission of the short-range interest to the long-range interest. All reasoning and all proposals which are in the interest of the struggle of the party and proletariat—in the long-range interest of the struggle of the entire party and proletariat—are correct. Those which are detrimental to these interests are all incorrect.

A Bolshevik is reasonable, a supporter of the truth, a person who understands reason and is able to be reasonable with others in an agreeable manner; he is not an aggressively unreasonable, irrational fighter.

Comrades! These are the methods I have proposed for conducting inner-party struggle.

I believe that our comrades should follow these methods in conducting inner-party struggle, in opposing the various incorrect tendencies within the party, and in examining the party spirit of individual party members and especially of party cadres. The further strengthening of our party in ideology and organization: this is our goal.

G.13 Directive of the Propaganda Bureau of the CC Concerning Implementation of the Rectification Movement of the Three [Unorthodox] Work-Styles Throughout the Party (8 June 1942)⁷¹

The movement to rectify the three work-styles and study has achieved great successes since its inception in Yan'an on 20 April. (See the summary of the one-month study movement in Yan'an already broadcast.)⁷² In light of the Yan'an experience, it is most necessary to carry out a study movement to rectify the three work-styles throughout the party. This is also of great significance in ideological reform and in the improvement of work for all party cadres and members. Therefore, it has been decided that the whole party should conduct the study movement to rectify the three work-styles and party committees and propaganda departments at all levels and in all localities. Existing high-level study groups should lead this study movement in a planned way in line with the twenty-two documents assigned by the Center.

With regard to the implementation and planning of the rectification and study movement, apart from using the 3 April decisions of the Central Propaganda Bureau [Doc. G.11] for reference, the following methods should be adopted in light of the experiences in Yan'an.

1) High-level leading party organs must form general study committees, and all departments and units must set up subcommittees for study.

2) All those who can read documents should be allowed to participate and should be divided into small groups.

3) All those who can study documents in cadre schools should temporarily stop all other courses (military schools should reduce the number of military courses for the time being) to concentrate on the study of the twenty-two documents.

4) All those who can study documents in government organs and the armed forces should reduce their worktime and increase study time as far as is possible. Yan'an has decided to use every morning for study. All localities should make their decision in light of concrete conditions. However, we must not forget the war environment and the possibility of enemy attacks.

5) If conditions permit, newspapers for the study (either mimeographed or printed) and questions and answers may be printed for discussion. If conditions permit, all government organs and schools should put up wall posters.

6) During study of the twenty-two documents, all other studies should temporarily stop.

7) The study period is four to five months. Various localities may decide when to start and the study period can be longer or shorter in light of different conditions.

8) In those areas where study of the twenty-two documents has already started, if the leadership methods are in line with this instruction and the "April 3" decision, they can be adopted as originally planned. If not, they must be changed.

9) Appendix I is the study plan for institutions directly under the Center [[excluded]]. Appendix II is an outline of the organization of study in Yan'an. Both are reference materials for all localities to lead the study.

Appendix II. Outline of the Organization of Study in Yan'an

The Center has formed a general study committee [*zongxuexi weiyuanhui*], chaired by Chairman Mao with Kang Sheng as his deputy, to lead study throughout Yan'an. The Center's general study committee holds a study meeting of senior cadres in Yan'an once a week or once a fortnight to discuss matters related to study and to provide information about current affairs and work problems. The organs directly under the Center have formed a study subcommittee, with Comrade Kang Sheng and Comrade Li Fuchun as the responsible persons. Various organs have also set up study subcommittees. The organs directly under the Military Commission have set up the first district study committee, with Wang Zhuren and Chen Yun as the responsible persons. Under the committee, there are several central study groups such as the central study group for the chiefs-of-staff department, and the central

groups for the political department, for the logistics department, for the experts, etc. Various government organs and armed forces units also formed study sub-committees. The border region has formed a region study committee, with Ren Bishi and Gao Gang as the responsible persons. The senior cadres of the various organs and schools have formed central study groups (group A) to properly study the documents themselves in order to lead the study by other cadres. In addition, there are middle-level study groups (group B) and ordinary study groups (group C). Although there are few people in group A, it does form the leading core. The groups in category B contain the largest number of people, all of whom are middle-level cadres and the targets of attention in the study movement. Comrades in group A should participate in them individually. There are fewer people in the groups in category C. Their level of education is low, but they must study the documents. As a result, lecturing should be adopted as the main method. Altogether at this time, there are 17,098 persons participating in rectification and study in Yan'an.

G.14 Summary of One Month of the Study Movement in Yan'an (5 June 1942)⁷³

A. The Condition of the Movement

Within one month since the Party Center and Comrade Mao Zedong's call for rectification of the three work-styles and the beginning of the movement on 20 April to study the twenty-two documents throughout Yan'an, unprecedented enthusiasm for study has been created. This is a big event never before seen on the party's ideological front. The study movement is under way on five fronts: (1) the organs directly attached to the Center; (2) the organs directly attached to the Central Military Commission; (3) the Central Party School; (4) the four schools under the central propaganda department and cultural department; (5) the border region system. Current statistics reveal that the total number of participants is some 9,000 including party members and nonparty personages.

The enthusiasm for study is quite high, and achievements are also significant. Some comrades have changed their outlook during the one month of study. Many comrades have also begun to change their outlook. This enthusiasm has spread to the whole party and will spread to the people throughout the country.

Yet, examination of the one month of study in Yan'an reveals that, apart from the achievements, there are still some unorthodox tendencies in study. Appropriate corrections should be made on an individual basis, so that future study can reap greater successes.

- 1) Paying excessive attention to words or only showing concern for words

and sentences. Where it exists, this deviation must be corrected. People should pay attention to the spirit and substance of the entire document, not to individual words and sentences. It is a different matter if there are real problems in understanding the meaning of the works.

2) Concentrating on the documents without self-examination. Those who exhibit this deviation should be called on to move beyond the study of the documents to an examination of their ideas and work. The documents should be used as a reference and studied one by one, paragraph by paragraph.

3) Examining oneself only and setting aside the documents. Those who commit this deviation should be asked to pay attention to the documents and to examine themselves in light of the documents. If one departs from the documents, no correct examination of one's ideas and work can be made.

4) Ignoring rectification of the work-styles, arguing, "Would I not be a revolutionary without rectification?" There are a few who practice this deviation. The necessity of rectification should be patiently explained to them. It must be known that everyone has a share in rectification and everyone should participate.

5) Fear of rectification of the work-styles and trying to "hide from rectification." They ask to "go to the countryside" or make excuses that they are sick, or they sit in front of the clinic in the morning playing poker and complain that it is not open at that time. There are even fewer who have this deviation. It should be explained to this minority that it is useless and unnecessary to hide. The purpose of rectification is to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and cure the sickness to save the patient. There is nothing to be afraid of.

6) Excessive enthusiasm about study, reading documents and thinking about them day and night, and becoming ill as a result. We should persuade these people not to be overzealous and ask them to rest and reassure them.

7) Some take long notes; notes on one document can run to 5,000 or 6,000 words. These comrades should be persuaded to write shorter and more precise notes. Taking notes that are too short. Some write only 28 characters in the whole notebook. These comrades should be persuaded to write longer notes, making them about each document.

8) Reluctance to temporarily stop work that can be set aside and therefore having no time to study. These comrades should be persuaded to drop such work. Naturally, vital work should not be set aside.

9) Lack of planning and inappropriate arrangement of one's own worktime, meaning that there is no time for study. These comrades should improve the planning of their work so that they can take care to study, lead, and work at the same time.

10) Some administrative leading personnel do not pay enough attention. These leading comrades are not resolute enough about rectification of work-styles. They are timid and afraid of problems. These comrades should be encouraged to promote resolutely this study movement on a large scale.

B. Future Methods

Generally speaking, the initial stage of the study movement has been concluded, and it has been successful. Future guidelines are to consolidate the already heightened enthusiasm and to pay attention to deepening the movement. For this purpose, the Center has decided to set up a general study committee personally led by Comrade Mao Zedong as chairman. This will provide leadership for the study movement throughout Yan'an in a more detailed and timely way. At the same time, it has been decided to extend the period of study from two to four months for schools and from three to five months for government organs. Study will be extended to 20 August for schools, and to 20 September for government organs. Since senior cadres' own study and their leading role are the key factors determining the results of the movement, the Center has also decided to pay close attention to study by these cadres.

On the basis of the one month of the study movement, the following experiences and lessons in study methods have been drawn up to guide future study methods:

1) The most important factor for the success or failure of the study movement is the administrative leading cadres themselves. If the administrative cadres themselves do not study, they cannot lead the study. Therefore, special attention must be paid to the core study group of responsible persons in all big or small units. In the past, some groups received enough attention and some did not. The latter should follow the example of the former.

2) Comrades in high-level study groups (or central groups) must participate in middle-level study groups separately and play the leading role in them.

3) As far as is possible, it should be possible to express erroneous opinions, and refutations should be organized at an appropriate time. In the past, some units only "allowed expression" but did not "organize refutation." Some units did not even "allow expression." It is wrong to forbid expression. It is also irresponsible to preside over incorrect expressions and refuse to make forceful refutations. This is not an attitude for a CP member. Party members not only should improve themselves but also should use all opportunities to publicize Marxism and Leninism and actively promote their influence. This is the correct attitude.

4) All methods such as meetings and informal and formal discussions should be adopted. Informal discussions may be on a small scale with three to five participants or on a large scale with over ten persons. Location and time need not be specified strictly. Free discussion of the documents should also be organized. Formal discussion of the documents should be organized. Formal discussions and relatively formal meetings must have leadership, preparation, and enlightenment, and conclusions should be drawn. None of the elements should be missing.

5) Everyone must take notes. This will prevent indulging merely in empty talk. First, specially appointed persons should take turns revising the notes and, second, senior comrades should read the notes of subordinates. When they cannot read all of them, they should select some to read and help the subordinates to improve [their

understanding]. This is one of the best ways to maintain the link between superiors and subordinates. Third, people should exchange notes. Fourth, the best notes should be circulated. Fifth, after reading notes of subordinate comrades, superiors should conduct individual talks with them when necessary. Sufficient paper, pens, and ink should be distributed for note-taking.

6) Joint meetings of group leaders should be held. In small units, such meetings should be held frequently. Meetings of the five big systems should also be held according to circumstances.

7) For major events, such as mobilization and summing up, large seminars with as many as 200 participants can be organized. Important responsible comrades should give reports or chair the seminars, and everybody should register to speak to ensure a lively discussion.

8) The general study committee and the study committees of various systems should send observers to help study at the lower levels.

9) It is not necessary to gather questions that require resolution. In solving questions, various methods may be adopted on the basis of the seriousness and importance of the questions. Small group meetings, central groups, large seminars, study committees at all levels, and publications on study should all try to answer the questions raised.

10) Wall posters are a significant instrument in study. It is necessary to pay close attention to the leadership over wall papers.

11) The main content of the documents should be relayed by responsible persons to help comrades better understand the documents. This should be done after comrades have read the document and before it is discussed.

12) Correspondence and written replies: In studying the documents, comrades may express their opinions in the form of letters written directly to their own leaders or to district study committees or even to the Center whenever it is deemed necessary. Leading comrades should make appropriate replies when receiving such letters.

14) Those who study hard and have achieved results should be encouraged, and those who do not study hard and have not achieved results should be criticized. Those who become ill because of excessive study should be helped.

* * *

As pointed out by Comrade Mao Zedong, the essence of the movement to rectify the three work-styles is the struggle between proletarian ideology and petty-bourgeois ideology. This movement is intended to overcome petty-bourgeois ideology with that of the proletariat. This will eliminate not only the remnants of the former three incorrect work-styles but also will overcome the new and incorrect petty-bourgeois thinking. Not only should old cadres and party members get rid of these noncommunist ideas, but also new cadres and party members should eradicate this thinking. Therefore, this is a great struggle on the ideological front.

A tail of petty-bourgeois ideology has sprouted on many comrades. They do not think that they have petty-bourgeois ideas, and they express petty-bourgeois ideology in the name of the proletariat. They attempt to build the party and reform the world in line with their own outlook. Only by overcoming these erroneous thoughts can the party be built up and the world be reformed according to proletarian ideology and the outlook of the proletariat.

This time, rectification of the three work-styles has taken the form of a big inner-party debate. The form of debate is very complicated, ranging from oral battles to written battles, from speeches to big meetings, from small to large broadcasts, from wall posters to the *Liberation Daily* [Jiefang ribao]. The debate has unfolded everywhere.

Our party has 800,000 members, many of whom come from nonproletarian backgrounds. This large-scale ideological reform is indispensable.

We must carry out to the end this work of ideological reform. Energy, time, and expenses should not be spared to reach the objective of allowing proletarian ideology to triumph throughout the party over petty-bourgeois ideology.

G.15 Resolution of the CC on Unified Leadership in the Anti-Japanese War Bases and Rectifying the Relationship Between All Organizations (1 September 1942)⁷⁴

Since the start of the War of Resistance, party leadership in the bases has been generally unified, and relationships among party, governmental, military, and popular (mass) organizations have been basically integrated. Because of this we have stood firm in the face of several years' bitter struggle and coordinated the resistance of the entire nation. However, because of the poisonous influence of subjectivism and sectarianism, and because certain political views and organizational relationships have still not been clearly understood or properly settled, a number of instances of discord still exist in certain districts in the relationships among the party, government, army, and people (actually, in the relationships of party members and cadres within the system of party, government, army, and mass [organizations]). For example: there is too little spirit of unity; there are no marching orders; all regard themselves as the authority; the army shows a lack of respect for local party units and local governmental authority; party and governmental [functions] are not separated; party members and cadres in the government agitate for the independence of party leadership; party members dominate mass organizations; particularism; sectarian prejudices, etc., etc.

These expressions of discord interfere with the maintenance and establishment of the anti-Japanese war bases and interfere with our party's progress in Bolshevization. For the establishment of the war bases and the implementation of a democratic system, the leadership in each war base must be unified. The ruthless Japanese

"mopping-up campaigns," the strengthening of the blockade and strong points, the difficulty of relations between higher and lower echelons, and the increase of local and guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance call for a greater elasticity in relations of subordination between higher and lower echelons, an increase and strengthening in each district (military districts and subdistricts) of an active spirit of independence, as well as an active and general unification of leadership and a greater degree of coordination among all organizations in every district, so that none will provide the enemy with an advantageous loophole. To attain these objectives, the CC specially issues the following resolution:

1) The party is the vanguard of the proletariat and the highest form of proletarian organization; it should lead all other organizations, whether military, governmental, or mass. The unity and centralization of leadership in the war bases should be expressed in each war base in the existence of a united party committee with overall leadership (CC bureaus, subbureaus, district committees, and local committees). Consequently, it has been decided that organs representing the CC (CC bureaus and subbureaus) and party committees at each level (district and local committees) are to be the highest leading organs in the districts; that they are to unify the leadership in all party, governmental, military, and mass work within a district; and that all former local party political and military committees are to be abolished (the establishment of party political and military committees during the founding period in a war base is necessary and correct).

The character and composition of party committees at all levels must be changed; party committees at all levels should not merely be committees which guide local work, but also be unified organs for party, governmental, military, and mass leadership in that district (they should not, however, be joint conferences). For that reason, they must include the principal responsible party members and cadres in party affairs, the government, and the army (the standing membership in party committees should also include responsible cadres in party affairs, the government, and the army), and neither all nor the great majority of committee members should be party workers. In their work, party committees at all levels should take all fields into consideration, discussing and investigating all aspects of party, governmental, military, or mass work. They should not merely limit themselves to local work.

2) Decisions, resolutions, and directives of organs representing the CC and district and local party committees must be unconditionally carried out by lower-level party committees, as well as by party groups at the same level in the government, military, and mass organizations; and relationships of subordination between higher and lower levels should remain unchanged. Resolutions, orders, and regulations from higher-level governmental [organs], orders and instructions from the higher levels of military leadership, and resolutions of higher-level mass organizations (of the above documents, the more important must pass through the party member responsible for that organ, to be delivered to the party committee at the same level for approval, or they can be discussed and confirmed by the responsible members in the party committees, then afterward issued as orders; however, not all need be

approved) must be unconditionally carried out by not only lower-level governmental, military, and mass bodies, but must also be unconditionally carried out by lower-level party committees; they must not be opposed or shelved under the pretext of lack of instruction from the higher-level party committees.

If lower-level party committees have views differing from the resolutions of higher-level governmental, military, and mass bodies, they can report to a higher party committee. If disputes arise with a party committee when deciding concrete problems according to a resolution of the organization's higher echelon, they must be resolved according to the principle of majority rule. Even if responsible persons in governmental, military, or mass organizations do not agree with the majority opinion, they must still carry out the decision of the party committee at the same level, but they can report their opinion to the higher organ concerned.

3) CC bureaus and subbureaus are the representative organs of the CC and are under its direction. Party district committees and local committees are selected by the representative assembly of military and local party organizations, subject to higher-level approval. District and local party committees should include responsible persons from the local party organization, party cadres in the army, and party groups in the government. Whether the main armed forces should participate in county committees is to be decided according to the concrete situation in the locality. County committees (in which the main armed forces do not participate) and district committees should include only responsible party persons from the local party [unit], from the garrison troops, and from the government. As secretaries of party committees at all levels, comrades should be selected who can assume responsibility for any aspect of party, governmental, military, or mass work. Secretaries of party committees must thus understand not only party affairs but also military and governmental work. Secretaries of district party committees are to be selected by decision of the CC bureaus and subbureaus and approved by the CC. The secretaries of local party committees are to be selected by the district party committees and approved by the subbureaus and bureaus of the CC.

For the unification of local party leadership and party leadership in the army, secretaries of subbureaus and district and local committees are to serve concurrently as political commissioners in the military districts or subdistricts (or divisions thereof), and assistant secretaries are to be appointed to be in charge of party work. If the political commissioner for a military district is selected as secretary of a subbureau, a district party committee, or a local party committee, an assistant political commissioner can then be appointed to deal especially with military work. The secretaries of subbureaus, district party committees, and local party committees should give attention to every aspect of work and, except for concurrent service as political commissioners, should not be concurrently responsible for other concrete work. When, under particular and special circumstances, it is not feasible for the secretary of a party committee to act concurrently as political commissioner, or for a political commissioner to act concurrently as secretary of a party committee, the approval of the higher-level party committee or CC must be obtained.

Military administrative committees and political departments in the army are to become departments of party committees at the same level (CC bureaus, sub-bureaus, party district, or local committees), are to have privileges and duties equal to those of the other departments (such as organizational departments, propaganda departments, etc.), and are not to be subordinate to other departments and committees; however, they differ from other departments in that they retain the precious direct relationships of subordination and leadership between higher and lower levels. Military policy (such as the principles of the expansion or establishment of armies, political work, etc.) and the broad political aims of military action (such as the strategy and planning and summarizing of military service in counter-mopping-up campaigns) must be submitted to party committees for discussion, but military commanders and political commissioners (i.e., secretaries of party committees) are to make the decisions on concrete military action (the final power of decision of military commanders and political commissioners on military affairs depends on the work regulations of the political departments); unlimited democratic discussion can only lead to defeat in military activities. The appointment and dismissal of important military personnel must still pass through the military organs and be handled according to already existing regulations.

4) The main armed forces are armed units under party leadership and serve as a powerful support in establishing war bases and carrying on the struggle. The main armed forces are definitely of a national character, yet at the same time they are local. The most important reason that past leadership in certain war bases has not been unified has been that the comrades leading the main armed forces in those areas have not had a correct and integrated understanding of the establishment and maintenance of their war base. As a consequence, certain policies they have carried out (such as arming the local population and expanding the army in the military establishment, overall planning and distribution in questions of financial and economic policy, etc.) have merely concentrated on the main armed forces and have ignored the integration of the overall tasks of the war bases; as a consequence, disputes have arisen with the party and the government of the locality. At the same time, the leading organs of the party and the government in some localities and districts have not had a real understanding of the fact that everything is subordinate to the demands of the war, have not been capable of fulfilling the necessary responsibilities in questions of reinforcements for the main armed forces, the guarantee of supplies and materials, the privileged treatment of the families of resistance fighters, and the counteracting of desertion and have thus brought about discordant relations between the army and the local party and government.

In the future, for the realization of unity in the leadership of the war bases, there must be, in addition to the establishment of party committees as unified organs of party leadership in the district, correction of several errors in the thought and policies of the main armed forces and of certain leaders of local party and government organs, and the implementation of CC policies on the war bases and of the various directives of the Military Commission on the military establishment. In the future,

the main armed forces must carry out the decisions and resolutions of party committees at all levels and the laws of all levels of government. The main armed forces must also carry out the resolutions of the lower-level party committees and lower-level governmental units (i.e., county, district, and locality) of the area where they are stationed. If there are differences of opinion, reports can be made to higher-level party committees or to higher governmental levels. In addition, both should regularly communicate with and assist each other.

Manifestos of the main armed forces—such as orders regarding military movements, troop deployment, martial law etc.—must be respected and carried out by local party, governmental, and mass organs. The main armed forces should be responsible for the protection of party, governmental, and mass organs. In all instances where party, governmental, and mass organs have been needlessly harmed because of carelessness or lack of attention on the part of the army, responsible military [leaders] are to be punished. If disputes arise in the future, there should first be a lower-level compromise solution; then the dispute and the solution are to be reported to a higher level; the method whereby each organization merely makes accusations to higher levels and fails to achieve a negotiated solution to the problem on the spot is to be opposed.

5) Organs in the political system (representative assemblies, governmental organs) are authoritative, and their ordinances are of a compulsory character. The relationship between party committees and the political system must be clearly defined. A monopoly of management in the political system by party committees, lack of distinction between party and government, disobedience by party members and cadres within the political power system to party committee resolutions, and actions which are contrary to party discipline must all be corrected. In order that the “three-thirds” system be carried out, leadership of the party within the political system should exist in matters of principle, policy, and overall political orientation, but [the party] should not intervene everywhere or monopolize affairs. Lower-level party committees do not have the power to change or to refuse to carry out the resolutions and ordinances of higher-level representative assemblies and the government, and party organs and party members should become models of adherence to the ordinances of representative assemblies and the government. The party should advance its political work by promoting the actual authority of representative assemblies and the government. When party cadres or members disobey the ordinances of representative assemblies or the government, they should be severely punished by party organizations. The leadership of the party in representative assemblies and the government can only work through its respective party members and party organs.

Party committees and party organs have no right to give direct orders to representative assemblies and government organs. Party groups must obey party committees of equal rank, yet the work-style of party groups must be reformed; they cannot force the obedience of people outside the party, but must operate through personal persuasion and political work. If the party group fails to persuade the majority in the representative assembly or governmental [organ] and the opinion of the party group

is not adopted by the representative assembly or the government, the minority must submit to the majority, and the principle of democratic centralism must not be opposed. But if comrades in party groups do not firmly uphold the resolutions of equal-ranking party committees because their own views differ from those of the party committee, their action is contrary to party discipline, and they should be reproved and punished.

The party must delegate competent cadres to work in representative assemblies and the government; all concentration of cadres in party organs to the neglect of political work must be corrected. When the "three-thirds" system is carried out, the number of party members in the political system will be decreased, but the quality of the party members in the political system must be greatly improved. Party members and cadres working in the political system must obey the decisions, resolutions, and discipline of party committees and party groups, and must not take advantage of their own position for independent action. In this respect, it should specially be pointed out that for the practical realization of the leadership of the party in the "three-thirds" system the party relies on the unanimity in speech and activity of party members and party cadres in the political system and their absolute obedience to party resolutions; strict party discipline among party members and party cadres in the political system is of grave significance.

Party committees must be careful in transferring party members within the political system; the procedure must involve the party member's formal resignation from the political organ. Relations between the government and the army must be improved; in the army, instruction should be given on the protection of the government; the government must guarantee supplies and transportation for the army; military commanders must be elected as government commissioners and assembly members. The army should be a model of respect for the government and the execution of ordinances. Illegal acts committed by soldiers must be severely punished by military organs. Except for the expression of opinions to assemblies or the government by soldiers in their capacities as citizens, government commissioners, or assembly members, soldiers and military organs do not have the right to intervene in the internal work of assemblies or the government. However, political organs of the army must give all possible assistance to governmental work.

6) Mass organizations are bodies organized on the initiative of the masses themselves, and the party, government, and army should not directly intervene in their internal activities. The party's leadership of mass organizations is exercised through its own party members and groups, but the [errors of a] failure to distinguish between party and people, monopolization, and complete uniformity must be corrected. To the greatest extent possible, the membership of committees of mass organizations at all levels should include more than half nonparty people. The problem of party groups in mass organizations is the same as that of party groups in government. The government should respect the independence of mass organizations and give them whatever assistance is necessary, but it should demand that mass organizations carry out government ordinances. Mass organizations should, in

accordance with law, petition the government for registration and thus attain a legal status. When mass organizations break government laws, the government can punish and even dissolve [the organization]; aside from this, it cannot in any case interfere with the activities and work of the mass organizations. Mass organizations should rally the masses, support the government and army, and assist participants in mobilization work in the War of Resistance. But mass organizations are by no means political organs; they must not take over administrative functions from the government by making arrests, examinations, and judgments or by other actions. The army and mass organizations should assist each other, but should not intervene in each other's [affairs].

7) Because of the special nature of the guerrilla areas, the unification of leadership should not merely be limited to mutual relationships; there must also be unification, when necessary, of party, governmental, military, and mass structures. The organs of party committees, the government, and mass organizations can be amalgamated with military and political organs. Party, governmental, and mass cadres in army or guerrilla units are responsible for specific tasks; for example, they may be superior and subordinate military commanders or workers in political committees and political departments; when there are hostilities, they are to participate in the work of the army and the guerrilla units; when there is a lull, they are to carry out their former tasks in party, government, or mass organizations (as secretaries of party committees, county magistrates, or labor union leaders).

8) On the one hand, the unity of party leadership is to be expressed in the mutual relations between party, government, and mass organizations of the same level; on the other hand, it is to be expressed in the relations between upper and lower levels. In this sphere, strict adherence to the principle of obedience of lower to higher echelons and obedience of the entire party to the CC is of decisive significance in unifying party leadership. In carrying out policies and regulations, the leading organs in each war base must follow CC directives. When deciding new questions of a general nature which [affect] the entire country, party, or army, they must ask for instructions from the CC; they must not endanger the unified leadership of the entire party by setting up strange new standards and making decisions on their own. (This does not pertain to decisions of a local nature or those which are not contrary to higher-level or CC decisions, resolutions, orders, or directives, compliance in appearance only, failure to ask for instructions from higher levels of the CC for the solution of new questions of principle or questions which should, according to their nature, not be decided independently—these are expressions of an impure party spirit and the destruction of unity.)

In this respect, the attention of leading comrades of the party, the government, the army, and mass organizations in the war bases should again be drawn to the fact that responsible party members in party committees, the government, the army, and mass organizations at all levels must not make statements, engage in discussions, or make broadcasts which have national significance without obtaining CC permission. The writings of leading comrades at all levels should be examined by party

committees or appropriate members of party branches at the same level. The principal contents of the writings of individuals with rank higher than subbureau commissioner or army commander, which have national significance or significance for the entire party, should first be submitted to the CC by report or telegram. Localities should not make direct broadcasts to the outside world; this [function] should be centralized in the Xinhua News Agency in Yan'an. It should be thoroughly understood that the action of responsible higher-level party cadres who take it upon themselves to express political views without obtaining the approval of a specific organization at an equal level or higher is a major transgression of party organizational principle and an evil obstruction to unity!

9) In order to unify leadership in the war bases, and in order to improve relations among the party, the government, the army, and the people, ideological education must be given to party members and party cadres within the system of party, government, army or mass [organizations]; the three tendencies must be reformed and the poison of subjectivism and sectarianism wiped out. In cadre meetings, on the basis of CC resolutions and Comrade Mao Zedong's report, cadres are to be taught to recognize the larger aspects and consider situations in their entirety; cadres are to be summoned to carry out criticism and self-criticism; cadres are to be made to understand situations in their entirety and not to succumb to partial or particular biases, and to understand the correct relationships between the part and the whole, between higher and lower levels, and between various aspects of the situation. If we are to strengthen educational work in the various party, government, military, and mass organizations, we must see that all comrades recognize the importance of unified leadership and the revolutionary program and laws in the war bases.

In this respect, military cadres should be specially warned that when discordant relations exist among the party, the government, the army, and the people, the greatest responsibility should generally fall on the military cadres. Since the army is in possession of weapons, it is easy for it to act single-handedly, disregard the government and the party, break discipline, act independently, and harm the interests of the masses. As a consequence, political cadres in the army in particular must restrain their commands and hold themselves in check. They must call on their commands to support party leadership, support the government, and rigidly uphold party leadership and government laws. At the same time, there is the false view of certain party members and cadres that only the work done in party committees or party organs can really be called party work; military work, mass work, economic work, technical work, or cultural work is also to be considered party work. The work done in party organs is only a part of the party's work. (It is work in party affairs.) In following party leadership, party members must follow the party line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and discipline. Certain party members only follow party leadership in their slogans or distort it and as a result do not earnestly study and carry out the party line, policies, resolutions, decisions, directives, and discipline. Such an attitude is incorrect.

10) The object of increasing the unification of leadership in the anti-Japanese war bases is greater facility in the conduct of the war against the Japanese bandits. "Everything bows to the demands of war" is the highest principle of unified leadership. The entire party must understand that if the army is weak and if the war is lost, it will be impossible for the war bases to exist, and the party, government, army and people will collapse. It is thus the duty of party committees, the government, mass organizations, and all the people to strengthen the army and increase its fighting power. Party committees, the government, and mass organizations all have a constant responsibility to solve the problems of army recruitment, provisions, and clothing; to supply and transport ammunition, to provide quarters, to transport the wounded and disabled, to provide nursing and care for them, to give preferential treatment to families of anti-Japanese soldiers, etc. Any carelessness [in these matters] is extremely mistaken and harmful. Within the army, it should be thoroughly understood that without the integration of the party, government, and mass organizations, the army by itself would not be able to fight on in the War of Resistance for a single day; we must therefore intensify education in the army, so that [the army] will protect the war bases, conserve human and material resources, respect the party and government, strengthen discipline, and give the party, government, and people the necessary assistance. Recruitment and transportation for the army, and the preferential treatment of the families of resistance fighters, must be worked out according to government orders and regulations; irregularities are harmful to the war effort and disadvantageous to the army itself.

11) On the basis of the principles contained in this resolution and the concrete conditions in each locality, leading organs in the war bases are to decide the various relevant detailed provisions, and carry them out through governmental ordinances, army regulations, the bylaws of mass organizations, or other means, in order to solve the many concrete problems of unified leadership. Decisions must be reported to the CC.

G.16 The Wild Lily. *Wang Shiwei* (13 and 27 March 1942)⁷⁵

While I was walking alone along the river bank, I saw a comrade wearing a pair of old-style padded cotton shoes. I immediately fell to thinking of Comrade Li Fen, who also wore such shoes. Li Fen, my dearest and very first friend. As usual my blood began to race. Li Fen was a student in 1926 on the preparatory course in literature at Beijing University. In the same year she sacrificed her own life in her home district of Baoqing in Hunan Province. Her own uncle tied her up and sent her to the local garrison—a good illustration of the barbarity of old China. Before going to her death, she put on all her three sets of underclothes and sewed them tightly together at the top and the bottom. This was because the troops in Baoqing often incited riff-raff to debauch the corpses of the young women Communists they had

shot—yet another example of the brutality, the evil, the filth, and the darkness of the old society. When I got news of her death, I was consumed with feelings of deep love and hatred. Whenever I think of her, I have a vision of her pure, sacred martyrdom, with her three layers of underclothes tied tightly together, tied up and sent by her very own uncle to meet her death with dignity. (It seems rather out of place to talk of such things in tranquil Yan'an, against the warbled background of a Yutangjun and the swirling steps of the golden lotus dance; but the whole atmosphere in Yan'an does not seem particularly appropriate to the conditions of the day—close your eyes and think for a moment of our dear comrades dying every minute in a sea of carnage.)

In the interest of the nation, I will not reckon up old scores of class hatred. We are genuinely selfless. With all our might we are dragging the representatives of old China along the road with us toward the light. But in the process the filth and dirt is rubbing off on us, spreading its diseases.

On scores of occasions I have drawn strength from the memory of Li Fen—vital and militant strength. Thinking back on her on this occasion, I was moved to write a *zawen* under the title "Wild Lily." This name has twofold significance. First, the wild lily is the most beautiful of the wildflowers in the hills and countryside around Yan'an, and is therefore a fitting dedication to her memory. Second, although its bulbs are similar to those of other lilies, they are said to be slightly bitter to the taste, and of greater medicinal value, but I myself am not sure of this.

26 February 1942

I. What Is Lacking in Our Lives?

Recently young people here in Yan'an seem to have lost some of their enthusiasm, and to have become inwardly ill at ease.

Why is this? What are we lacking in our lives? Some would reply that it is because we are badly nourished and short of vitamins. Others that it is because the ratio of men to women is high and many young men are unable to find girlfriends. Or because life in Yan'an is dreary and lacks amusements.

There is some truth in all these answers. It is true that there is a need for better food, for partners of the opposite sex, and for some interest in life. That is only natural. But one must also recognize that young people here in Yan'an came with a spirit of sacrifice to make revolution, and not for food, sex, and an enjoyable life. I cannot agree with those who say that their lack of enthusiasm, their inward disquiet even, are a result of our inability to solve these problems. So what is lacking in our lives? Perhaps the following conversation holds some clues.

During the New Year holiday I was walking home in the dark one evening from a friend's place. Ahead of me were two women comrades talking in animated whispers. We were some ways apart so I quietly moved closer to hear what they were saying.

“He keeps on talking about other people’s petty-bourgeois sectarianism; but the truth is that he thinks he is something special. He always looks after his own interests. As for the comrades underneath him, he doesn’t care whether they’re sick or well, he doesn’t even care if they die, he hardly gives a damn!”

“Crows are black wherever they are. Even Comrade XX is like that.”

“You’re right! All this bullshit about loving your own class. They don’t even show ordinary human sympathy! You often see people pretending to smile and be friendly, but it’s all on the surface, it doesn’t mean anything. And if you offend them, they stare at you, pull their rank, and start lecturing you.”

“It’s not only the big shots who act that way, the small fries are just the same. Our section leader XXX crawls when he’s talking to his superiors, but he behaves very arrogantly toward us. Often comrades have been ill, and he hasn’t even dropped in to see how they are. But when an eagle stole one of his chickens, you should have seen the fuss he made! After that, every time he saw an eagle he’d start screaming and throwing clods of earth at it—the self-seeking bastard!”

There was a long silence. In one way, I admired the comrade’s sharp tongue. But I also suddenly felt depressed.

“It’s sad that so many comrades are falling ill. Nobody wants people like that to visit them when they fall ill; they just make you feel worse. Their tone of voice, their whole attitude—they don’t make you feel that they care about you.”

“Right. They don’t care about others, and others don’t care about them. If they did mass work, they’d be bound to fail.”

They carried on with their conversation in animated whispers. At this point our ways parted, and I heard no more of what they had to say. In many ways their views were one-sided and exaggerated. Perhaps the picture they drew does not apply widely; but there is no denying that it is useful as a mirror.

II. Running into “Running into Difficulties”

On “Youth Page” no. 12 of this paper, I read an article titled “Running into Difficulties,” which aroused my interest. Here are two passages from that article.

“Recently a middle-aged friend arrived from the GMD rear. When he saw that young people in Yan’an were incapable of putting up with anything and were constantly grumbling he raised his voice: ‘What is this about? We people in the outside world have run into countless difficulties and suffered constant ill-treatment . . .’”

“He was right. Life in Yan’an may anger or offend you. But in the eyes of someone who has run up against countless difficulties and who has experienced the hardships of life, they are mere trifles. But it is an entirely different matter in the case of immature young people, especially those of student origin. Their parents and teachers coddle them into adulthood, whispering to them about life with love and warmth and teaching them to imitate pure and beautiful emotions. The ugliness and bleakness of their present situation is entirely new to them, and it is not surprising that as soon as they come up against difficulty they begin to bawl and to feel upset.”

I have no idea what sort of person this author's "middle-aged friend" is, but in my view his sort of philosophy, which is based on the principle of being contented with one's lot, is positively harmful. Young people should be treasured for their purity, their perceptiveness, their ardor, their courage, and their energy. They experience the darkness before others experience it; they see the filth before others see it; what others do not wish or dare to say, they say. Because of this they are more critical, but this is by no means "grumbling." What they say is not always well-balanced, but it is by no means "bawling." We should inquire into problems that give rise to "grumbling," "bawling," and "disquiet," and set about removing their causes in a rational way. (Yes, rational! It is completely untrue that young people are always engaged in "thoughtless clamor.") To say that Yan'an is superior to the "outside world," to tell young people not to "grumble," to describe Yan'an's dark side as some "slight disappointment" will solve no problems. Yes, Yan'an's dark side is superior to the "outside world," but it should and can be better still.

Of course young people are often hot-headed and impatient—an observation that appears to be the main theme of "Running into difficulties." But if all young people were mature before their time, how desolate this world would be! In reality, young people in Yan'an have already seen a great deal of the world—after all, the grumbling conversation between the two women comrades that I quoted earlier was held in whispers in the dark. So far from resenting "grumbling" of this sort, we should use it as a mirror in which to inspect ourselves. To say that youth "of student origin" are "coddled into adulthood, whispered to about life with love and warmth and taught to imitate pure and beautiful emotions" is very subjectivist. Even though most Yan'an youth come from "a student background," are "inexperienced," and have not "seen more than enough of life's hardships," most arrived in Yan'an after a whole series of struggles and it is not true to say that they experienced nothing but "love and warmth"; on the contrary, it was precisely because they knew all about "hatred and cold" that they joined the revolutionary camp in the first place. From what the author of "Running into Difficulties" says, all the young people in Yan'an were brought up pampered, and "grumble" only because they miss their candied fruit. But it was because of "evil and coldness" that they came to Yan'an in search of "beauty and warmth," that they identified the "evil and coldness" here in Yan'an and insisted on "grumbling" about it in the hope of attracting people's attention and reducing it to a minimum.

In the winter of 1938, our party carried out a large-scale investigation of our work and summoned comrades to "unfold a lively criticism" and to "give full vent to their criticisms, no matter whether they were right or wrong." I hope we have another such investigation and listen to the "grumbles" of the youth.

III. "Inevitability," "the Heavens Won't Fall Down," and "Small Things"

"Our camp exists amid the darkness of the old society, and therefore there is inevitably darkness in it too." Of course, that's "Marxism"! But that is only one-

sided Marxism. There is an even more important side which the “masters of subjectivist factionalism” have forgotten, i.e., the need, after having recognized the inevitability of such darkness, through Bolshevik activism, to prevent its emergence, to reduce its growth, and to give full play to the ability of consciousness to transform objective reality. Given present conditions, to clean out all traces of darkness from our camp is impossible. But to destroy as much of it as we can is not only possible, but necessary. The “great masters,” however, have not only failed to emphasize this point, but have scarcely even mentioned it. All they do is point out that it is “inevitable” and then doze off to sleep. They use “inevitability” as an excuse for self-indulgence. In their dreams they tell themselves: “Comrade, you are a product of the old society, and there is a tiny spot of darkness in your soul. But that is inevitable; no need to get embarrassed about it.”

After the “theory” of “inevitability” comes the “national form theory” known as “the heavens won’t fall in.” Yes, it is impossible for the heavens to fall in. But what of our work and our cause? Will they suffer as a result? The “great master” has given little or no thought to this problem. If this “inevitability” is “inevitably” allowed to pursue its course, then the heavens—the heavens of our revolutionary cause—will “inevitably” fall in. I suggest we should not be so complacent.

The so-called small things’ theory is linked with this. A criticizes B. B tells A he shouldn’t waste his time on “small things.” Some “great masters” even say: “Damn it! It’s bad enough with the women comrades, now the men are spending all their time on trivia too!” It is true that there is probably no danger in Yan’an of such big problems as treason against the party or the nation. But each individual through the small things he does in the course of his everyday life, either helps the light or helps the darkness. And the “small things” in the lives of “great men” are even more capable of calling forth warmth or desolation.

IV. Egalitarianism and the System of Ranks

According to what I heard, one comrade wrote an article with a similar title for his departmental wall newspaper and as a result was criticized and attacked by his department “head” and driven half-mad. I hope this story is untrue. But since there have been genuine cases of madness even among the “little devils,”⁷⁶ I fear there may be some madness among the adults. Even though the state of my nerves is not as “healthy” as some people’s, I still have enough life in me not to go mad under any circumstances. I therefore intend to follow in the footsteps of that comrade and discuss the question of equality and the ranking system.

Communism is not the same as egalitarianism, and we are not at present at the stage of communist revolution. There is no need for me to write an eight-legged essay on that question, since there is no cook crazy enough to want to live in the same style as one of the “heads.” (I don’t dare write “kitchen operative,” since it sounds like a caricature; but whenever I speak to cooks I always address them in the warmest possible way as “comrade kitchen-operatives”—what a pitiful exam-

ple of warmth!) The question of a system of ranks is rather more difficult.

Those who say that a system of ranks is reasonable use roughly the following arguments: (1) they base themselves on the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his worth,” which means that those with more responsibilities should consume more; (2) in the near future the “three-thirds” system of government intends to carry out a new salary system, and naturally there will be pay differentials; and (3) the Soviet Union also has a system of ranks.

In my opinion all these arguments are open to debate. As for (1), we are still in the midst of the revolution, with all its hardships and difficulties; all of us, despite fatigue, are laboring to surmount the present crisis, and many comrades have ruined their precious health. Because of this it does not yet seem the right time for anyone, no matter who, to start talking about “to each according to his worth.” On the contrary, all the more reason why those with greater responsibilities should show themselves willing to share weal and woe with the rank and file. (This is a national virtue that should be encouraged.) In so doing, they would win the profound love of the lower ranks. Only then would it be possible to create ironlike unity. It goes without saying that it is not only reasonable but necessary that those with big responsibilities who need special treatment for their health get such treatment. The same goes for those with positions of medium responsibility. As for (2), the pay system of the “three-thirds” government should also avoid excessive differentials; it is right that non-party officials should get slightly better treatment, but those officials who are party members should uphold our excellent traditions of frugal struggle so that we are in a position to mobilize even more nonparty people to join us and cooperate with us. As for (3), excuse my rudeness, but I would beg those “great masters” who can’t open their mouths without talking about “Ancient Greece” to hold their tongues.

I am not an egalitarian, but to divide clothing into three and food into five grades is neither necessary nor rational, especially with regard to clothes. (I myself am graded as “cadres” clothes and “private kitchen,” so this is not just a case of sour grapes.) All such problems should be resolved on the basis of need and reason. At present there is no noodle soup for sick comrades to eat and young students only get two meals of thin congee a day (when they’re asked whether they have had enough to eat, party members are expected to lead the rest in a chorus of “Yes, we’re full”). Relatively healthy “big shots” get far more than they need to eat and drink, with the result that their subordinates look upon them as a race apart, and not only do not love them, but even . . . This makes me most uneasy. But perhaps it is a “petty-bourgeoisie emotion” to always be talking about “love” and “warmth”? I await your verdict.

G.17 Concerning Wang Shiwei. *Chen Boda* (15 June 1942)⁷⁷

I have often heard others say that Wang Shiwei himself claims that he has several “*bêtes noires*”; I am also one of them. Last time, when I attended this forum, I heard

Wang Shiwei say that he had reported to the party that he had once joined the Trotskyites as a result of our debate on the question of literature and art in the spring of 1941. This made me recall my criticism of his piece, originally titled "A Short Discourse on National Forms of Literature and Art," later retitled "Old Mistakes and New Tendencies in National Forms of Literature and Art" (published in *Chinese Culture* [Zhongguo wenhua], vol. 2, no. 6). I recall how he was so agitated when he saw my piece "Comments on Wang Shiwei's 'A Short Discourse on National Forms of Literature and Art'" (which was not published) and how he worked very hard to try and stop publication of my piece. My piece was not well-written to start with; but perhaps one point made Wang Shiwei as nervous as a thief. Which point? The point that Wang Shiwei's article perhaps unintentionally revealed traces of his Trotskyite thinking. Perhaps he was intentionally smuggling in Trotskyite thinking under the cover of the question of literature and art. On this question, I quoted from his original text and made an analysis of it. (Of course, at that time, I know nothing about the fact that he was a Trotskyite.)

Now let us look at what Wang Shiwei said. He said, "The proletarian revolution depends on the proletariat that enjoys class consciousness and accepts Marxism. If it relies on the autonomous proletariat that does not yet have class consciousness, it will become the tail of the masses. The higher and faster development and progress of culture doubtlessly also has to rely on the masses. However, it must rely on the masses when they have mastered culture, and not on today's masses, who are oppressed and enslaved by the rulers. If the rulers take the masses seriously, first they should give them freedom and culture."

About these words of Wang Shiwei, I first wrote, "Beware, today's revolution is not what is called 'proletarian revolution,' but a national war against Japan." We all know that the Trotskyites have consistently believed that the revolution in China today is what they call "proletarian revolution." The Trotskyites deny the existence of the bourgeois democratic revolution and national war. We wish to debate with Wang Shiwei the issue of literature and art in today's war against Japan. However, Wang Shiwei has chosen to leave aside this national war against Japan and has mentioned only what he calls the "proletarian revolution." When we saw through this, he panicked. Second, I wrote, "If any revolution has to wait for the masses to acquire 'culture' of the standard specified by Wang Shiwei in order to rely on them to conduct the revolution, then this is equivalent to abolishing the revolution."

Third, I wrote that Wang Shiwei believed that the masses oppressed and enslaved by the ruling class were incapable of creating culture. This is factually wrong.

Fourth, I wrote, on the one hand, Wang Shiwei neglected the so-called masses who have not "mastered culture," thinking that they were not worth relying on; on the other hand, he wanted the rulers to provide the masses with culture. This entails a particular line of thinking, namely, the negation of the revolution, praise of the ruling class, and the idea that masses can only rely on the rulers for acquiring culture. Therefore, his article also stated, "In class-based societies, the masses are

regarded by the ruling class as ignorant; how can they create progressive literary forms?" This is equivalent to saying: the masses are incapable of creating progressive culture. In Wang Shiwei's view, what should the masses do? Wang Shiwei said, "Like the primitive aborigines in Africa, who themselves have little culture of any kind, they can do nothing but let the civilized rule them." (Comrades, listen!) This is what Wang Shiwei said. The masses without culture have to be ruled by those who "have culture." The Africans do not have culture, so they have to let the whites rule them. Then, since the masses are incapable of obtaining culture or creating culture, they only let the ruling class oppress and enslave them. The Japanese imperialists say that China is a barbarous and uncultured country incapable of independence; this is a view that would be very "reasonable" according to Wang Shiwei.

In Wang Shiwei's article, he also mentioned his interpretation of "nation." On this point, I wrote, "Wang Shiwei's interpretation of nation is not the same as Comrade Stalin's." Wang Shiwei said, "The most fundamental characteristic of a nation is its social and economic life. Next is its language; the characteristics of all the remainder of the social superstructure derive from these two characteristics." But Comrade Stalin said, "Nation—it is language, territory, economic life, as well as the stable commonality manifested in the historically formed common psychological structure of the common culture." He also said, ". . . we must emphatically point out that none of the above characteristics, if taken alone, is sufficient to define nation." Wang Shiwei did not mention "territory" or "the common psychological structure manifested in common culture." This should not be neglected. Comrades, these were my criticisms of him. We all know that the struggle we are waging against the Japanese imperialists is one over territory. Just as Comrade Stalin said, if this "territorial" characteristic is left out, this nation would cease to be a nation. The erroneous theory of the Japanese imperialists that "the Chinese nation is no longer a nation" is expressed in Wang Shiwei's article.

There are many other issues apart from the aspects of Wang Shiwei's thinking mentioned above. For example, he believed that proletarian dictatorship is a cultural issue, that the movement for popularized literature and art—even though it may be popularized 100 percent—may still have nothing to do with the masses. He believed that the basis for literary and artistic creation was what he called "progressive forms," rather than real life . . . I'm not going to say more about these kinds of issues here. I should explain that the main points repudiated in my article were deleted by Wang Shiwei in the article he published in *Chinese Culture*.

To sum up, Wang Shiwei's thinking contains a strain of Trotskyism that is antimasses, antination, counterrevolutionary, and anti-Marxist, and which serves the ruling class, the Japanese imperialists, and the international fascists. He himself revealed this and was caught by others; this caused him to panic and forced him to report to the party. However, this does not mean that he was about to give up his Trotskyite position; rather, he was preparing another arena for his activities. Now the facts are before us.

We all know that Wang Shiwei has give himself all the laudatory names that can be found in a dictionary. For example, he is a beautiful, pure, lofty man with a soul representing the truth, light, and youth, while disliking position or power. He is a kind man who serves the nation and the party. He is a real Marxist-Leninist, a great, tough man who possesses a feeling for humanity, and so on. In fact, when looking at him and trying to understand him we should take the precise opposite meaning of all these laudatory terms that can be found in the dictionary. In my view, it is too bad that while his clothes are quite clean, his soul is very dirty, base, and ugly. We can find in him various manifestations of all the dirtiest elements that can be found in humanity. His filthy soul rides in tandem with his real life. He wrote “The Wild Lily” [Doc. G.16] as if he wanted everybody to be really “equal.” In fact, the substance of his “egalitarianism” is: yours is mine, but mine is not yours; you should not be above me, but I must be above you. When he worked in the translation department of the Academy of Marxism-Leninism, he made a huge storm about fees for translation.⁷⁸ As we all know, he pointed at tables demanding to eat [food prepared] in special kitchens and that other cadres obey him. Further, when the Academy of Marxism-Leninism was reorganized last year, he suggested that the position of director for the department of literary studies be abolished. Yet later he pulled strings in order to become director of the department. In addition to resorting to such tactics of intimidation and coercion as pounding tables to improve his material conditions and position, he also adopted, on numerous occasions, a servile attitude toward his superiors (while everybody, including party leaders and ordinary members, detest such an attitude). For example, when he needed you, he would call you “Sir” whenever he spoke, which would make your flesh creep. On the one hand, he wanted to raise his standard of living to the highest level. On the other hand, he attempted to crawl into ever higher positions of power. He did one thing at a time.

He said he did not want position or power. This means that to begin with, his position was too low and he did not have any power. As soon as he had power, he would be ruthless and show no mercy toward any revolutionary or CP member. He said that he was kindhearted. But when the cruel and merciless Trotskyites murdered Kirov and Gorky, Wang Shiwei did not show any kindheartedness. As for the claim that he represented “truth,” what kind of “truth” did he represent? He fundamentally denied the existence of objective truth. What he represented were rumors and lies. From Wang Shiwei’s speech and the questions from the comrades at the last meeting, we can learn that he was good at spreading rumors and that he had practiced his ability to spread rumors. Did he represent “light”? We know that he hoped the Trotskyites would win; he hoped that darkness would win. As analyzed above, he negated the masses and wanted to abolish the revolution. What he represented was the darkest aspect. Did he represent youth? He attempted to use the weakness of youth to entice them to travel the road of darkness. Did he serve the party? We can say that he sabotaged the party—[at every level] from cells to branches to the entire party. Previously, I worked for some time in the Academy of Marxism-Leninism; I was in the same party cell. His presence stopped any cell

meeting from proceeding. He would use any means possible to reach his objective of sabotaging the party (my impression of him at that time tallies exactly with what he has done since). "The Wild Lily" represents only one means.

Wang Shiwei said that he had both love and hatred. This is true. It is also true that both his love and his hate are extreme. Whom does he love? He loves the Trotskyites and Trotskyism. He loves all kinds of counterrevolutionary forces. Whom does he hate? He hates the CP, Marxism-Leninism, and all the revolutionary forces. He uses every method to conceal his love and hate. For example, he said that he know nothing about politics. In fact, every one of his articles talked about politics. Isn't "The Wild Lily" politics? Isn't "Statesmen-Artists" politics?⁷⁹ What he talked about was his kind of politics. What he understood was his brand of politics, which is to say, Trotskyite politics. When he spoke at a meeting, whatever he said was highly abstract; it seems that even Wang Shiwei, as a human being, was no more than an abstract person. But we must know that Wang Shiwei is not some kind of abstract person, but rather a concrete one. He is a concrete human being; he can eat, put on clothes, make Trotskyite propaganda, and write Trotskyite articles. As a concrete human being, he indeed has a certain kind of "humanity" (humanity in parenthesis). He spoke of so-called humanity in every sentence. But what is the "humanity" he talked about? It is Trotskyite "humanity," the "humanity" of the exploiting classes and the fascists. This type of "humanity" and the CP's humanity are mutually exclusive. It is the enemy of the CP's humanity. Our CP's humanity is united with the spirit of our party members. Our humanity is our party spirit. Our party spirit is our humanity. We cannot have Wang Shiwei's kind of "humanity" within parenthesis. Similarly, the Trotskyite Wang Shiwei cannot have the same humanity as our CP members. It is glorious to be considered the enemy of such people.

Wang Shiwei is this kind of concrete human being. He uses the methods of the Trotskyites and the means of double-dealers to operate. When he spoke that day, he opposed Comrade Stalin, but pretended to support Comrade Mao Zedong. It is possible that a little later he will pretend to support other comrades in the CC while openly opposing Comrade Mao. We know that in the soviet areas the "A.B. League" and the "Trotskyites" had both played this game. Didn't the diehard elements and Trotskyites frequently fabricate rumors about "internal conflicts within the CP"? At the Academy of Marxism-Leninism, he frequently used this method to sow discord. He tried to use one thing to oppose the other, and he spread rumors and manufactured an atmosphere of confusion. Let us tell Wang Shiwei; our party is a unified one; it is unified from the Comintern to the CCP; our leaders are unified; they are unified from Comrade Stalin to Comrade Mao Zedong to Comrade Zhu De; our comrades are unified. You may try to sow seeds of discord, but you will not be successful.

All kinds of facts prove [not only] that he did not limit himself to maintaining a Trotskyite mentality, but also that he is still conducting Trotskyite activities. His real activities are those of a Trotskyite. We should use his practice as a criterion to measure him. Here he appears to be open and honest on the surface, but he works secretly. If we do not evaluate him on the basis of actual deeds, we will be deceived by him. It is

also not difficult to understand why his activities have become much more frenetic now. On the one hand, he sets up the field for his actions; on the other, he takes advantage of our difficulties. Before and after he reported to the party that he had joined the Trotskyites, he had been setting up this field. He waited for our current difficulties, and then tried to take advantage of them and to seize on some of the petty-bourgeois weaknesses of our comrades, believing that the time for him to act had arrived. But he was wrong. During our party's campaign to rectify the three styles, he exposed his true nature. This shows that our party's power is great.

Wang Shiwei said that he was "great and tough." He joined the party in 1926. After the failure of the Great Revolution, where was his "greatness"? Where was his "toughness"? In the more hospitable environment after the war against Japan began, he covered up his history of Trotskyism and infiltrated the party to conduct Trotskyite activities and corrupt the party. Is this "greatness and toughness"? I think that he could be as great as a "leech." This kind of leech hides in water; when people walk in water, it crawls on to people's feet or legs, using its suction to get into their skin and suck their blood. It can only be removed when people beat it. We think that Wang Shiwei's "greatness" is like [the greatness of] this kind of worm; it is truly "great." We all know that this kind of worm has no bones; no soft bones, let alone tough bones. We also know that "greatness" can change into meanness. If we say that Wang Shiwei changed from "great" to mean, he may also change into another kind of worm. A famous Chinese novel described one incident: a man went to a very clean room and saw a flyswatter; he was surprised and said to the man taking care of the room: "You are being too careful. How can this room have any flies and mosquitoes? What do you have this flyswatter for?" The man taking care of the room replied, "You do not know. Although there are no flies or mosquitoes, there is some kind of small insect that crawls through the screen and is invisible. When you fall asleep, it bites you, like the bite of an ant." Then the man said, "No wonder. The back of this house is close to water; it is surrounded by fragrant flowers; this room is also fragrant. Such insects grow in the hearts of flowers and come after the fragrance." Comrades, our party is already a strong, consolidated, and Bolshevized proletarian party. However, we must not believe that no worms will infiltrate our party. Such small worms attach themselves to human bodies and will hurt people. We must not be careless. We must beware of such small insects. Sometimes, such insects grow out of the "Wild Lily."

G.18 Diary of Struggle. *Wen Jize* (28 and 29 June 1942)⁸⁰

Wednesday, 27 May

The forum of the entire Institute on "Democracy and Discipline in the Party" began at 9:30 A.M.

Today eleven comrades spoke. Everyone realized that at the beginning of the Rectification Campaign we manifested an extreme democratic tendency. Several comrades said: At the mobilization meeting we vetoed the original decision to have every director of the research departments automatically appointed as a member of the investigation committee. We thought that the Rectification Campaign was only a case of “cutting off the big tails” of the leaders and that this was a manifestation of extreme democracy. However, a minority of cadres said that Vice-President Fan Wenlan had approved the decision at the mobilization meeting that only elected directors could become members of the investigation committee. Therefore, to veto the original decision to automatically nominate directors to investigation committees cannot be called extreme democracy—this is a controversial question.

Comrade Fan Wenlan made a speech. He made a deep and sincere self-criticism of his overly lenient attitude. This spirit of self-criticism deeply impressed everyone. Comrade Li Yuchao raised the question of Wang Shiwei. He declared, “There are many deviationists among us, but the case of Comrade Wang Shiwei is fundamentally different. From his articles and his comments at the mobilization meeting and his individual activities afterward, one can see that his mistakes are consistent, severe, and not accidental.” Another comrade said, “We should deeply and sincerely undergo self-examination. Our petty-bourgeois consciousness is too deep. On this point, we can say that there is only a quantitative difference with Wang’s mistakes. There is no qualitative difference.” This is another point of discussion.

Thursday, 28 May

Today the discussion lasted all morning. The majority of the speeches discussed the principle of democratic centralism, for example, the difference between democracy inside and outside the party.

A small number of speeches relaunched the discussion of the problem raised yesterday by Comrade Li Yuchao: Some comrades opposed his assessment of Wang Shiwei’s mistakes and believed that his speech “made groundless accusations and manifested vestiges of subjectivism.” Other comrades agreed with his assessment and said, “From the organizational point of view, Wang Shiwei is still our comrade. But from an ideological point of view, he has become our enemy.” The debate over these two opinions has not yet been resolved.

In the morning, Comrade Ai Siqu made a report on Comrade Mao Zedong’s conclusions at the forum on literature and art. The meeting reconvened in the afternoon. Three comrades spoke and they said that “from the comments of Wang Shiwei at the mobilization meeting, ‘Wild Lily’ and ‘Statesmen-Artists’ and his other articles, one can see that he has abandoned the party’s standpoint, has sown discord among lower and higher ranks, between statesmen and artists, etc., and has opposed the party and its standpoint. The nature of our deviation is completely different.”

Comrade Luo Mai [Li Weihai] intervened last, and he systematically replied to

the questions raised by the comrades on democratic centralism and party discipline. He expressed his opinion on the eradication of previous deviations and the question of Wang Shiwei. He also spoke on the question of deviations in the mobilization meeting. On Wang Shiwei, he agreed with the ideas of Li Yuchao and the others. He analyzed “Wild Lily” and pointed out that Wang Shiwei’s position was opposed to the party and that he had an oppositional viewpoint. This was not only an ideological error but also a serious political error that was in no way similar to our deviation. Our deviations were accidental and derived from our naïveté.

In the evening, a few comrades proposed to the Presidium that the next session should concentrate on the nature of Wang Shiwei’s thought. Discussion on the question of centralism was more or less concluded. The Presidium accepted the proposal.

Sunday, 31 May

The Presidium edited and distributed Wang Shiwei’s wall poster articles to all participants, to be used as reference material for the study of his thought.

Monday, 1 June

Today, the central theme of the meeting progressed from eradicating extreme democratic tendencies to a discussion on Wang Shiwei’s thought. The majority of the fifteen speeches during the day concentrated on this issue. The third speech was given by Li Yan. First, he gave some statistics: many of our Institute’s researchers more or less sympathized with Wang Shiwei when they first read “Wild Lily.” Even those who disliked this essay did not realize the fundamental mistake of the author’s position. But over two months of studying rectification documents and, moreover, attending the meetings convened by the CC Propaganda Department, studying “Oppose Liberalism and Egalitarianism,” “How to Be a Good CP Member,” and other documents and the debates on “Wild Lily” and “Statesmen-Artists” have clearly enabled everybody to know the seriousness of the errors in thought and method contained in “Wild Lily.” (How necessary is thought reform! How important were the rectification documents!) Li Yan went on to report on the process of the six talks held between Wang and the party committee. Wang did not admit his mistakes until now. In order to “cure the sickness to save the patient,” we must completely expose Wang’s mistakes and carry out a serious ideological struggle against him.

Afterward, Comrades Li Yuchao, Pan Fang, and Xue [Wei?] Yezhu stood up to present material demonstrating Wang Shiwei’s past association with the Trotskyites. They reported that Wang had claimed that “Stalin’s character is not admirable,” “Radek is an admirable man,” “the Comintern should be held responsible for the failure of the Great Chinese Revolution of 1927,” “the decision on the charge of high treason against Zinoviev is dubious,” “on certain issues Trotsky’s theories are

correct,” etc. His understanding of the Rectification Campaign is fundamentally erroneous: he slandered the leading organ of the party by believing that some members were corrupt, he said that the Rectification Campaign was “a unification under the leadership of Chairman Mao of honest people against dishonest ones,” he said that Comrades Luo Mai [Li Wei-han] and Fan Wenlan headed two factions on the question of democracy in our Institute, and he used the term “hard” to draw other comrades to his side and the abusive term “soft” to attack other comrades. At the end of the meeting, Ai Siqi read Wang Shiwei’s article in which he refuted the attacks made on him by Qi Su in “Concerning Wild Lily.” In this article, he is not content to slander the party but considers himself to be a leader of youth. He claims he is the “modern Lu Xun.” He calls on youth to shake his hand. On hearing these sickening phrases, the meeting roared with derisive laughter.

At the beginning of discussions about “Wild Lily” and “Statesmen-Artists,” some said that “Wang’s position was incorrect but that his intention was good.” Others even felt that his intentions were not pure. Today the issue was resolved and no one stated that his intentions were pure. Today the difference between Wang Shiwei’s ideological errors and our deviations was clearly revealed. It was shown that all his words and provocative acts were the result of a premeditated malevolence and that there was no question of regarding them in the same light as our spontaneous deviation.

Tuesday, 2 June

The presidium made a decision to adjourn the meeting until the next day. Everyone was told to read Lenin’s “Party Organization and Party Literature,” Lu Xun’s speech at the Founding Congress of Left-wing Writers Association, and the “Conclusions of the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art,” by Mao Zedong (notes), the first section of the tenth chapter of *History of the CPSU*, the *Selected Works of Stalin*, volume 2, pp. 93–98 and 346–48. (All these passages are about experiences and lessons derived from crushing the oppositional conspiracies in the CPSU.) These texts constituted an arsenal to fight against the Trotskyite thought of Wang Shiwei.

In the morning, Wang Shiwei presented the committee with his request to leave the party. He explained that “the contradiction between himself and the party’s utilitarianism had become virtually insoluble” and that he intended to “take the road he had chosen for himself.”

He is so stubborn that he refused party education. What a dangerous and incurable road he is going to take!

Wednesday, 3 June

In the morning, members continued to read the documents. In the afternoon, the meeting continued.

One comrade spoke: “In the extremely difficult situation faced in the border regions with respect to political and economic affairs, Wang Shiwei has tried to undermine unity, to propagate egalitarianism, etc. Under the slogan of opposing sectarianism, he has carried out provocations, and under the slogan of opposing the black elements in the party and promoting democracy, he has opposed the leading organs. This is an exact copy of the old methods used by the Trotskyites in the Soviet Union. One can expect the worst if he does not correct his errors.” Another comrade described briefly Wang Shiwei’s family situation. This showed that Wang’s thought was that of a petty bourgeois derived from that of a small ruined aristocrat. Comrade Ai Siqi spoke last: “Wang Shiwei’s viewpoints place him in the camp of the ultrareactionary petty bourgeoisie; he is the spokesman for the reactionary bourgeoisie in the party. Like a smuggler, he spreads Trotskyite thought that contains the following major elements: a hypocritical revolutionary zeal that conceals a genuine tragic pessimism; rejection of the united front; the conception of a classless ‘human nature’; and a factional view of inner-party struggle. His methods are truly ingenious! He knows how to make beautiful disguises (for example, his slogans ‘oppose subjectivism and sectarianism,’ ‘oppose formalism’ [literally, the party eight-legged essay], ‘oppose half-baked Marxism,’ etc. He uses provocative language and expressions). He uses the reactions of the young to pit them against the old cadres, subordinates against superiors, artists against statesmen, etc.” Comrade Ai Siqi concluded: “the most important lesson and education which we have gained in actual ideological struggle is the necessity to study correctly the twenty-two documents, rectify our thought, strengthen our political consciousness, and take up ideological weapons.”

After the meeting dispersed, everybody gathered together in small groups to discuss the question of Wang Shiwei’s leaving the party. That night, several comrades sought out Wang for a talk and tried once again to save him.

Thursday, 4 June⁸¹

Today many people were present from the central political research department and the literary association for resistance to Japan [*wen kang*]. Even every window sill was filled. The bell rang for the meeting to start, and several hundred eyes turned on Wang as he entered the room from the door on the left. This was the first time that Wang attended the forum.

After speeches by Comrades Li Yuchao and Pan Fang, it was time for Comrade Wang Shiwei to speak. He spoke in a low and deep voice “I hereby withdraw, solemnly and seriously, my appeal to the party committee for resignation, which was made under conditions of abnormal psychology. . . . The ‘love’ of some friends whom I respect has impressed me favorably.” A comrade interjected: “Is your political life determined by the ‘love’ of your friends?” Wang said, “Now I believe that ‘love’ and ‘hatred’ that are independent of class do not exist.” He continued “Just now, Comrade Li Yuchao said I was a Trotskyite, but I myself do not know.

In the past I never understood politics at all. . . . If you had read my article on national forms of literature published in *Chinese Culture*,⁸² you would know that I stand firmly behind the united front. How can I have Trotskyite thought?"

A comrade stood up and interjected: "You should not tell lies! You often spoke to me about the Trotskyite question, and up until now you still believe that Trotskyites exist in the USSR and that they are not running dogs of the fascist bandit gang. They are antifascist." Another comrade arose and said, "You told me the same thing." "I remember everything I have said. Yes, I said that I hated the Trotskyites who organized against Stalin. But I am deeply moved by their alliance with the CPSU against fascism." Again there was an intervention . . . "On what basis do you make the claim that Trotskyites still exist in the USSR? On what basis do you say Trotskyites oppose fascism?"

In his subsequent comments Wang admitted that in 1929 he began to make contact with Trotskyites for whom he had translated the last testament of Lenin, a testament revised by the Trotskyites. He also translated two chapters of Trotsky's autobiography and published short stories in a Trotskyite magazine. Up until 1936, Wang continued to correspond with Trotskyites. He never forgot Trotskyite elements such as Chen Qingchen and Wang Wenyuan [Fanxi], and he felt that they had a good nature. "I think that the Trotskyite criticism of the Li Lisan line is correct." (Nonsense!) . . . "I've read the August 1 Declaration [1935, see above, **Doc. E.5**]. I believe that this advocates the same idea as the Trotskyite call for a National Assembly. (Nonsense!) . . . Only after I had read Lu Xun's reply to the Trotskyites did I adopt a position in favor of the front."

Everyone was outraged by his unrepentant attitude and his blatant propagation of the theories of the Trotskyite bandits. The chair was asked to stop Wang Shiwei from straying from the subject and to reply clearly to the questions. One comrade stood up and asked him, "Why did you say that people have ignored the crimes committed by Stalin during the purge of the party in the USSR? You made this statement." "I believe that during the purges of the CPSU, many enemies could have been turned into comrades. Stalin's character is too brutal." This slander of Stalin aroused righteous indignation. "Why didn't you report honestly to the party about your association with the Trotskyites on your arrival in Yan'an?" "When I first arrived in Yan'an I encountered discrimination everywhere. . . . Up to 1940 I criticized Chen Boda over the issue of traditional forms. During the polemic, he scolded me for being an opportunist of the Second International. Can you imagine what it would have been like if he had scolded me for being a member of the Fourth [International]? I reported to the party's Organization Department the links I had with the Trotskyites." Beyond this, he grossly insulted Chen Boda: "He is a sectarian"; the chair silenced him.

Another comrade took the floor. "I ask that Wang Shiwei express his opinion on the following Trotskyite positions: (1) Trotsky's opinion on the question of the Soviet peasantry before the Twelfth Congress of the CPSU; (2) regarding the question of Lenin's last testament; (3) regarding the question of who, in the final analy-

sis, should be responsible for the failure of the Great Chinese Revolution of 1925–27. . . . Wang Shiwei has debated these issues with me in the past. Wang Shiwei showed that he continued to preserve his ‘original Trotskyite opinions.’ He added, ‘If my opinion was incorrect, why didn’t you educate me earlier?’ Did you ever discuss these matters with the party organization? Why didn’t you ask the party to help you correct your views? You prefer to speak loosely.”

Wang Shiwei could not reply to these objections. When the meeting adjourned, I walked out of the meeting hall with Wang. He said to me, “Only I can rectify my errors. Others cannot shed light on them even if they are philosophers.” I laughed coldly. He did not attend the meeting that afternoon.

Fifteen comrades spoke during the meeting and criticized his Trotskyite viewpoint. Those who had not recognized the true face of Wang Shiwei saw clearly today that he was a Trotskyite and that his errors were particularly serious and dangerous. To help understanding of Wang Shiwei with respect to his errors, the meeting designated three delegates to speak with him after the meeting. At the end of the session, the chair adjourned the meeting for two days to allow everyone to read the *Selected Works of Stalin*, vol. 2, pp. 85–156 (against the opposition); vol. 3, pp. 101–6 (on the question of Lenin’s testament); the August 7 Manifesto [1927, see above, **Doc. C.2**]; and the directives sent by the Comintern to the CCP during the Great Revolution.

We need these weapons in order to smash the Trotskyite opinions that Wang Shiwei has retained on a number of concrete problems.

Monday, 8 June

Beginning at 7:00 A.M. some 1,000 participants from over seventy organizations and schools came to listen. The public surrounded the presidium and spread out over the sports field (the provisional meeting place). When the chair announced “the meeting will begin,” the comrades could not restrain themselves from laughing. Never before had there been such a gigantic meeting!⁸³

At first, the chair made a brief report about the meetings of the previous two weeks in order to let those who had just arrived know the background. Comrades Li Yuchao and Liu Xuewei addressed relatively systematically Wang Shiwei’s Trotskyite thought, his historical links with the Trotskyites, his incorrect ideas about the party, his complete misunderstanding of the Rectification Campaign, and his activities during the campaign, etc.

During the lunch break, the Presidium decided to ask every organization and school to select representatives to attend the afternoon’s meeting. (It was impossible to hold a forum of 1,000 people.) The meeting continued in the afternoon, and the Presidium declared that those invited would also have the right to speak. A few comrades presented new documents on Wang’s personal life. These documents made it easier to evaluate how disgusting and filthy Wang Shiwei’s soul really was.

Tuesday, 9 June

Two magnificent speeches highlighted today's meeting: those of Comrades Chen Boda and Ai Qing.

Comrade Chen Boda began by criticizing the Trotskyite viewpoint in Wang Shiwei's manuscript on "national forms." Then he described Wang Shiwei's egotistical behavior at the translation and editorial department of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Central Research Institute. "This kind of person has no 'spine' but is like a spineless leech! There is no 'greatness' about him; he is as minute as a mosquito, like the kind that sneak in silently to bite you."⁸⁴

Comrade Ai Qing declared: "Wang Shiwei's articles are impregnated with a gloomy spirit. Reading them gives me the feeling of entering the temple of a spirit that protects the town. His style is mediocre. . . . He depicts Yan'an as dark and sinister; he pits artists against statesmen, old cadres against the young and stirs them up. His viewpoint is reactionary, and his remedies are poisonous. This 'individual' does not deserve to be described as 'human' let alone as a 'comrade.' "

The speech of another comrade set off a violent debate. He declared that "it is undeniable that ideologically Wang Shiwei is a Trotskyite, but we cannot prove that there is an organizational problem." This idea was challenged by six or seven comrades who thought that Wang Shiwei's mistakes were not limited to ideology and politics but extended to organizational questions. Everybody clearly saw that the serious mistakes of Wang Shiwei had been proved.

Wednesday, 10 June

In the morning, Zhang Ruxin made a systematic analysis and criticism of Wang's thought. First, he outlined the important points of Wang's thinking: the theory of "human nature," which forms the foundation of his philosophy of life; his theory of "degeneration," that is his ideological weapon to oppose the party; extreme democracy and extreme egalitarianism that are intimately linked to the previous two. Then, he analyzed Wang Shiwei's methods: using a "leftist" guise he exploits the weaknesses of youth, he sows discord, he is two-faced. His history confirms the consistency of his thought and activity and shows that they are no accident. Then he criticized Wang's Trotskyite thinking (notably on the question of the purge of the party in the Soviet Union, Lenin's last testament, the National Assembly, the Li Lisan line, the winning over of the Trotskyites, etc.) as well as his understanding of the party's problems (the difference between a proletarian party and a party of peasants and petty-bourgeois elements under the leadership of the proletariat, utilitarianism, and the relationship between the party and its members). Finally, he appealed to us to strengthen our unity in order to smash Wang Shiwei's Trotskyite thought, his influence, and his politics.

The meeting continued in the afternoon. All branches of personnel and research departments at the Institute as well as the Political Research Department

(Yangjialing) demanded unanimously that Wang Shiwei be expelled from the party. The Presidium decided that the party committee of the Institute should handle the affair. Twenty comrades spoke.

Thursday, 11 June

The last day of the forum. The public was particularly large today. The grand hall was thronged with people.

Comrade Ding Ling was the first to speak. She rejected the insults of the Trotskyite element Wang Shiwei about the cultural sphere in Yan'an. Then she made a self-criticism about her essay "Thoughts on 8 March."⁸⁵

Comrade Luo Mai followed her and addressed five questions:

1) He explained that the debates, over the two weeks, had eradicated past deviations and had thoroughly exposed Wang Shiwei's counterrevolutionary thought and his antiparty activities. Everyone had made progress in politics, in principle and methods of ideological struggle, and in form of thought. This is a great achievement of this meeting.

2) Wang Shiwei's thought is dominated by the Trotskyites; it is the ideology of the bourgeoisie. Those elements of petty-bourgeois thinking that he possesses are merely those of the bankruptcy of the petty bourgeoisie and its systematic sabotage, its stupidity, and its psychological desperation, which are characteristic of Trotskyite elements. His words and deeds had not only political goals but also organizational objectives. Responsible and ordinary members of the Institute have all tried to help him, and we have adopted the method of curing the illness to save the patient. However, he has not sincerely accepted our help. At this point, Luo Mai declared: "I agree that the question of his party membership should be arranged by the committee, but, at the same time, we should say: Wang Shiwei should have one last chance to pull himself out of his counterrevolutionary latrine."

3) This struggle and debate, Luo Mai explained, has a great educational and a serious political meaning. At this time of difficulty in the War of Resistance, it is necessary to purge antiparty thought, antiparty activists, and the influence spread by Wang Shiwei.

4) He explained that the deviation and Wang Shiwei's thought had similarities but also were distinct. It is necessary to clarify the nature of this deviation and the reality of Wang's thought in order to triumph over the deviation and to develop the struggle against Wang Shiwei. Over the past eighty days, everyone has gone through the process of study of the documents and continuous self-examination. This has been a great gain from this meeting. We know much more clearly the force of the party documents and the importance of the rectification documents.

5) Luo Mai expressed several hopes: he hoped that we would continue and extend the self-criticisms and mutual criticisms, study the documents more concretely and deeply, and make an examination of our consciences. He wished sufficient courage to those who did not possess the courage to engage in self-criticism.

Our slogan is not to let a single comrade retain or hide his faults. Finally, he hoped that comrades would take advantage of the situation to criticize leading responsible comrades, especially with respect to reform of their ideology and work-styles.

Fan Wenlan made the final speech. He asked, "Who is Wang Shiwei? He is a Trotskyite." He divided his comments into two parts. First, he explained that the party tried to save Wang Shiwei. The party committee already knew about Wang's counterrevolutionary thought and activities. We have continually showed generosity, and we tried to cure the illness to save the patient. Comrade Hu Qiaomu criticized him face to face and by letter, the party committee spoke with him on two or three occasions and charged five people with helping him, and other comrades criticized him on numerous occasions either verbally or in writing. Always, however, he refused a self-examination. We tried everything to pull him out of his latrine but he wanted to drag us down with him. This is outrageous! Now, we should declare: Wang Shiwei has one last chance to climb out of his counterrevolutionary latrine.

In the second part, he drew out the lessons of the struggle and indicated the points that were worthy of general attention: a resolute and total opposition to liberalism, strict adherence to discipline, a complete ban on rumor-mongering, heightening of our political vigilance, improvement of our study of the documents, and an increase in the seriousness of our self-examination.

At the end of Fan Wenlan's speech, the entire hall applauded enthusiastically. Amid this enthusiastic and victorious applause, the Presidium announced the conclusion of the meeting.

G.19 Speech at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art.

Mao Zedong (2 and 23 May 1942)⁸⁶

Comrades! I have asked you all to come together for a conference today to exchange opinions about, and study the proper relationship between, literary and artistic work and revolutionary work in general, and to seek the proper development of revolutionary literature and art and their greater cooperation with other revolutionary work, so that we may crush our national enemies and fulfill the work of national liberation.

The various fronts of our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people may be grouped into two: the civil and the martial; they are the cultural front and the military front. We must rely on armed troops to conquer the enemy, but this in itself is not enough. A cultural army is also indispensable for uniting ourselves and conquering the enemy. This cultural army has materialized in China since May Fourth [1919], it has helped the Chinese revolution, and has caused a gradual decrease in the territory dominated by a feudalistic and slavish culture which has yielded to imperialistic encroachments.

Literature and art have been an important and highly effective part of the cultural front since the May Fourth [Movement]. During the Civil War the revolutionary literature and art movement showed great development, and in its overall direction was consistent with the Red Army's struggle of that period, although in actual work the two were fighting in isolation, owing to the separation of the two fraternal armies by the reactionaries. Since the War of Resistance a great number of revolutionary literature and art workers have come to Yan'an and every other anti-Japanese base. This is a very good thing. However, merely coming to these bases is not the same as identifying oneself with the people's movement in the bases. If we are to push the revolutionary work forward, we will have to make these two become completely identified with each other.

The purpose of our meeting today is to make literature and art become a constructive part of the whole revolutionary machine; to use them as powerful weapons for uniting and educating the people and for crushing and destroying the enemy, as well as to help the people wage the struggle against the enemy with one heart and one mind. What are some of the problems which must be solved in order to achieve this aim? They are the problems of standpoint, attitude, audience, work, and study.

The problem of standpoint. We adopt the standpoint of the proletariat and the people. CP members must also adopt the standpoint of the party, of party spirit, and of party policies. Are there any of our literature and art workers who lack clear and precise understanding on this problem? I think so. Many comrades have frequently lost their own correct standpoint.

The problem of attitude. Following the question of one's standpoint, there arises the problem of the concrete attitudes we are to adopt toward various concrete issues and matters. For example, are we to sing praises or expose defects? These are problems of attitude. Which do we actually need? I say we need both. The question lies in who their recipient is to be. There are three kinds of people—enemies, friends, and ourselves, meaning by the latter the proletariat and its vanguard—and each one must be treated differently. Should we “sing the praises” of the enemy, the Japanese fascists, and all other enemies of the people? Decidedly not, because they are all the worst kind of reactionaries. In technical skills they may have some good points, such as their good weapons. But good weapons held in their hands are reactionary ones. The mission of our armed forces is to capture their weapons and turn those weapons around to crush them. The mission of our cultural forces is to expose the enemy's brutality, deception, and certain future defeat, to encourage the troops and people to be of one heart and one mind in resisting the Japanese, and to resolutely beat down the enemy. To our friends, our various allies, our attitude should be one of unity and criticism according to circumstances. We support their resistance to Japan, and we should praise their achievements. Yet we should criticize and oppose all who are anticommunist and antipeople and continually follow the reactionary road. On the other hand, we must certainly praise the masses of the people, the labor and struggle of the people, the army of the people, and the party of the people. The people also have some defects; among the

proletariat there are still many who cling to petty-bourgeois ideas, many peasants and petty bourgeois who have backward ideas. These are the burdens under which they are struggling, and we must unceasingly, patiently teach them and help them to get rid of those burdens so that they can stride forward. [[We must not ridicule them and must help develop their revolutionary qualities.]]

The problem of audience is the problem: for whom are literature and art? In the border region and every anti-Japanese base in north and central China, this problem is different from that in the [GMD] rear areas or in Shanghai before the war. In the Shanghai period, the recipients of revolutionary works of literature and art were for the most part students, office workers, and shop employees. In the [GMD] rear areas during the war, the sphere has become a little wider, but basically it is still these same types, because the government there has kept the workers, peasants, and soldiers away from revolutionary literature and art. In our bases it is completely different. The audience for works of literature and art in our bases is made up of the workers, peasants, and soldiers and their party, political, and military cadres. There are also students in our bases, but these students too are different from the old-style students. They are either experienced cadres or cadres-to-be. All kinds of cadres, soldiers in the army, workers in the factory, peasants in the village read books and newspapers if they can read. If they cannot read, they see plays, look at pictures, sing songs, or listen to music. They, then, are the audience for our works of literature and art. [[Our educational work among them is of great significance.]]

Since the audience for literature and art is made up of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and their cadres, the problem arises of understanding them and knowing them thoroughly. But in order to understand them and know them thoroughly, understand and know thoroughly every detail, understand and know thoroughly every kind of person among them, in the party and administrative organizations, in the villages, in the factories, in the Eighth Route Army, and in the New Fourth Army, one must work very hard. Our literature and art workers must do their own work, but this work of understanding people and knowing them thoroughly must take first place. What was the status of our literature and art workers previously with regard to this? I say that previously they lacked thorough knowledge, lacked understanding, and were heroes without a place to use their weapons. What did they not know thoroughly? They did not know the people thoroughly. The literature and art workers did not know thoroughly the characters in their own works or their audience and were sometimes even very unfamiliar with them. They did not know thoroughly the workers, peasants, soldiers, or their cadres. [[Yours is the language of intellectuals, while theirs is the language of the ordinary masses. We must study the language of the masses and undergo a long and potentially painful process of trial and hardship.]]

In this respect I can say a word about my own experience in the transformation of my feelings. I started out as a student and in school developed the habits of a student. It did not seem proper for me to do even a little bit of hard work such as carrying my own baggage in front of a whole crowd of students who were unable to

shoulder a load or pick up a heavy weight. At that time I felt that the only clean people were the intellectuals, and the workers, peasants, and soldiers were all comparatively dirty. I could wear the clothes of other intellectuals because I thought they were clean, but I did not want to wear the clothes of the workers, peasants, or soldiers because I felt they were dirty. After the revolution when I joined the workers, peasants, and soldiers, I gradually came to know them thoroughly, and they too gradually came to know me. At that time, and only then, did I basically outgrow those bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sentiments which the bourgeois school had taught me. At that time I compared the unreconstructed intellectuals with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and felt that the intellectuals not only were in spirit unclean in many places, but their bodies too were unclean. The cleanest ones still were the workers and peasants—even taking into account that their hands were black and their feet covered with cow dung, they were still cleaner than the bourgeoisie, big and small. This then is what is meant by outgrowing one's sentiments and changing from one class to another. If our intellectual literature would make their own works welcomed by the masses, they must transform and completely reconstruct their own thoughts and feelings. Otherwise, no work will be successful or effective.

The last problem is one of study. I mean by this the study of Marxism-Leninism and of society. To speak of oneself as a revolutionary writer of Marxism-Leninism, especially a party member writer, one must have a general knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. Today, there are some comrades, however, who are deficient in its basic concepts. For example, one of the basic concepts of Marxism-Leninism is that the objective determines the subjective, that is to say, the objective reality of the class struggle and national struggle determines our thoughts and feelings. Yet there are some comrades who try to turn this around, who say everything must develop from "love." Now what about love? In a class society there is only class love. Yet these comrades want to look for some kind of super-love that transcends classes—an abstract love, as well as abstract freedom, abstract truth, abstract human nature, etc. This clearly indicates that these comrades have been deeply influenced by the bourgeoisie. They must liquidate this influence to the very core and must humbly study works of literature and art, it is true, but Marxism-Leninism is a science which all revolutionaries must study, and workers in literature and art cannot be an exception. [[In addition, you must study society, the various social classes.]]

Conclusion (23 May 1942)

[[When discussing problems we must begin with facts, not definitions.]]

Now then, what is at the heart of our problems? I think basically our problem lies in serving the masses and in how to serve them. If this problem remains unsolved or is solved only inadequately, this may keep our literature and art workers from being attuned to their own environment and responsibilities and bring them up against a whole string of problems, both external and internal. In my conclusion, I shall take

this problem [that of serving the people] as the core and explain it, at the same time discussing some of the problems related to it.

I

The first question is: for whom are our literature and art?

[[There are literature and art that serve the exploiters and oppressors, and they still enjoy an influence today. For us literature and art serve the people.]]

We have said that the new stage of Chinese culture today is a proletarian-led, anti-imperialistic, antifeudalistic culture of the people. Everything belonging to the true people now definitely comes under the leadership of the proletariat; and everything which comes under the leadership of the bourgeoisie cannot belong to the people. Naturally the new literature and art of the new culture are the same. We do not refuse to utilize the old forms of the feudalistic and bourgeois classes for our own ends, but when these old forms have come into our hands, have been reconstructed, and have had new content added to them, they become a revolutionary thing for the service of the people.

Now, then, who are the people? The greatest mass of the people, those who constitute over 90 percent of the total population, are the workers, peasants, soldiers, and petty bourgeoisie. Therefore our literature and art are first of all for the workers, for they are the class which leads the revolution; second, they are for the peasants, for they are the most numerous, most firm ally in the revolution; third, they are for the workers and peasants who are armed, i.e., the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and other people's armed units, for they are the main strength of the struggle; and, fourth, they are for the petty bourgeoisie, for it is also an ally in the revolution and is able to cooperate with us in the long run. These four types form the greatest part of the Chinese nation and form the most extensive mass of the people. We must also cooperate with the landlord and bourgeois classes who are resisting the Japanese. They, however, do not favor the democracy of the broad masses, and both have a literature and an art which are for themselves. Our literature and art are not created for them, and they for their part reject them.

Our literature and art, then, must be for the above-mentioned four types, of which the most important are the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The petty-bourgeois class is comparatively small, its revolutionary determination is comparatively weak, and it has had a greater degree of cultural upbringing than the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Therefore our literature and art are first and foremost for the workers, peasants, and soldiers and second for the petty bourgeoisie. [[Theoretically everyone knows this but in practice many comrades place more emphasis on trying to understand intellectuals instead of trying to educate them.]]

Many comrades, because they themselves are petty-bourgeois intellectuals, find their friends only in the intellectual camp and use their powers of observation to study and describe that side. If these sorts of research and description adopt the standpoint of the proletariat, then it is all right. But they do not do this, or, at least,

not completely. They take their stand among the petty bourgeoisie and create their works as a self-expression of the petty-bourgeois class. We have seen this sort of thing in quite a few works of literature and art. [[Examples are given.]]

We encourage the revolutionary writers and artists to actively get close to workers, peasants, and soldiers and allow them complete freedom to create genuine revolutionary literature and art. Therefore this problem is nearing solution here. But a near solution is not the same as a complete and penetrating solution. We say that in order to solve this problem completely and penetratingly, we must study Marxism-Leninism and society, that is to say, a living Marxism-Leninism, which is completely applicable to the mass livelihood and mass struggle, and not the Marxism-Leninism of the books. If we transfer the Marxism-Leninism of the books to the masses and achieve a living Marxism-Leninism, there will no longer be sectarianism, and many other problems can be solved as well.

II

Having solved the problem of for whom we are working, we can now take up the next problem of how to go about working for them. To use the words of our comrades, shall we put our utmost strength into elevating [standards], or into popularizing? [[The problem of quality versus quantity is discussed.]] The elevation comes only from the foundation of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, from the present level of their culture and the foundation of their literature and art in their budding stage. Furthermore, our aim is not to raise them to the level of the feudal class, the bourgeoisie, or the petty bourgeoisie, but to educate them along the direction of their own progress. This then brings up the duty of learning from the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Only by proceeding from them will we be able to be correct in our understanding of popularization and elevation and be able to find a correct relationship between the two.

What is the source of both popularization and elevation? No matter what the literary and artistic quality of works may be, taken in an ideological form, they are all the result of the reflection and processing of the people's life on human minds. Revolutionary literature and art, then, are the result of the reflection and processing of the people's life on the minds of revolutionary writers. The resources of literature and art, which are actually contained in the life of the people, are things in their raw form, rough and crude things, but, at the same time, extremely lifelike, rich, and basic things. By comparison they are superior to all literature and art in the polished form and are the only inexhaustible source for such literature and art. [[Classical or foreign works are a secondary, not primary source, and they must not be indiscriminately plagiarized or imitated.]]

Popularizing is a popularizing among the people; educating, too, is an elevating of the people, and this sort of elevation is not formed out of thin air or behind closed doors, but is on a popular base. It is determined by the popularization, but at the same time gives direction to the popularization. Now to speak of China alone, the

development of the revolution and that of the revolutionary culture are not even, but by fits and starts. In one place there has been the popularization work and also that of elevation resting on the basis of popularization, while in other places popularization work has not yet begun. Therefore, the experience of one place can and should be utilized in other places to give guidance to the work and reduce the amount of traveling on detoured roads. On an international level, too, the experiences, provided they are good, of foreign countries, especially the Soviet Union, have a function in guiding us in the work of popularization and elevation. However, the whole guiding role of elevating work should not be arbitrary transplanting, which will only have a destructive role.

Besides elevation, which directly serves the needs of the masses, there is still another kind which indirectly serves them. This is the elevation serving the needs of the cadres.

[[Cadres are advanced elements among the masses, and literature and art on a higher level are absolutely essential for them. But our professionals should serve not only cadres but also, more importantly, the masses as well. Is this attitude utilitarian? Utilitarianism is not class free, and we are proletarian, revolutionary utilitarians.]]

III

Having established that our literature and art are for the people, we can go on to discuss the problem of their relationship within the party, that is to say, the relationship between the party's literary and artistic work and the work of the party as a whole; also the problem of their relationship outside the party, that is to say, the relationship between the party's literary and artistic work and the nonparty literary and artistic work—the problem of the united front of literature and art.

Let us first speak about the first problem. In the world of today, all culture or literature and art belong to some one definite class, some one definite party, i.e., some one definite political line. Art for art's sake, art which transcends class or party, art which stands as a bystander to, or independent of, politics does not in actual fact exist. Since art is subordinate to class and party in a society which has classes and parties, it must undoubtedly follow the political demands of those classes and parties, must follow the revolutionary period. If it deviates from these, it will deviate from the basic needs of the masses. Proletarian literature and art are one part of the entire proletarian revolutionary cause: as Lenin says, "a cog in the whole machine." Therefore, the literary and artistic work of the party has a definite and set position in the party's entire revolutionary work. Opposition to this sort of arrangement will certainly lead to dualism or pluralism, and its real nature will resemble Trotsky's "Marxist politics, bourgeois art." We do not favor over-emphasizing the importance of literature and art, but neither do we favor under-estimating their importance. Literature and art are subordinate to politics, but in turn also wield a great influence over them. Revolutionary literature and art are a part of the whole revolutionary cause. They are a cog which, while it may not be

as important as other parts, is indispensable to the functioning of the whole machine.

If we do not have literature and art in their broadest, most universal sense, the revolution cannot carry on, cannot be victorious. It is erroneous not to recognize this point. Furthermore, when we say literature and art follow politics, by politics we mean class politics, mass politics, and not that of a small number of politicians. Politics, no matter whether revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, is a struggle of class against class; it is not the activity of a small number of individuals. The struggle of ideas and the struggle of art, especially revolutionary ideas and art, must follow the political struggle, because only through politics can they express, in concentrated form, class and mass needs. The revolutionary politicians, the political specialists who understand revolutionary political science or political art, are the leaders of the millions of mass politicians; their duty lies in concentrating and extracting the opinions of those mass politicians, and then in giving them back to the masses, to become accepted and practiced by the masses. They are not those aristocratic types, so-called politicians who wishfully create behind closed doors, who pretend to be wise, and who say only that they have the right [to political activity]. This is the basic distinction between the proletarian and propertied class politics. It is also erroneous not to recognize this point and to narrow down or vulgarize proletarian politics and politicians.

Let us now speak about the problem of a united front in the world of literature and art. Literature and art follow politics. China's most fundamental political problem today is that of resisting Japan. Therefore, on this point the party's literature and art workers must unite with all the writers and artists outside the party (from party sympathizers and petty-bourgeois writers and artists on down to bourgeois and landlord class writers and artists). Next they must unite on the point of democracy. Since there are some writers and artists who will not agree on this point, the range of accord here narrows down a little. Next they must unite on a point which is a special problem in the world of literature and art—that of literary and artistic style. We advocate proletarian realism, but there are some who will not acquiesce in this, with the result that the range of accord will probably become still smaller. There may be unity on one problem, but on another there may be struggle and criticism. [[It is particularly important to win over the petty bourgeoisie.]]

IV

One of the most important methods of struggle in the world of literature and art is literary and artistic criticism. [[Our past work has been lacking as far as criticism in literature and art is concerned.]]

Literary and artistic criticism has two standards, political and artistic. According to the political standard, everything promoting unity in the War of Resistance, encouraging the masses to be of one heart and one mind, and opposing shirking and stimulating progress is good or comparatively good. Everything failing to promote

unity in the war, encouraging the masses to be of divided hearts and minds, opposing progress, and drawing the people into shirking is bad or comparatively bad. In the final analysis, are the good and bad of which we speak here to be looked at from the point of view of motivation (subjective aspiration) or from that of effect (social application)? Idealists emphasize motivation and disregard effect. Mechanistic materialists emphasize motivation and disregard effect. But, unlike these two, we, as dialectical materialists, advocate the unity of motivation and effect. The motivation acting for the masses and the effect welcomed by the masses are inseparable; we should keep them united. Motivation which serves the individual or the limited group is no good; neither is that which, while serving the masses, lacks an effect [which is] welcome or advantageous to the masses. When we examine the subjective aspirations of writers, that is, whether or not their motive is correct and good, we do not look at their words but at the effect of their activity [their work] on the social masses. Social application is the standard by which to examine subjective aspirations; the effect is the standard for examining the motivation. Our literary and artistic criticism must not have sectarianism. Under the great principle of unity in the War of Resistance we must allow the inclusion of literary and artistic works representing every kind and sort of political attitude. However, our criticism will be firm upon our principle and standpoint. We judge severely all works of literature and art that are antinational, antiscientific, antimasses, and anticommunist in viewpoint, because these so-called works of literature and art, their motivation and effect, all harm the unity of the war [effort].

According to artistic standards, everything having comparatively high artistic quality is good or comparatively good, and everything having low artistic quality is bad or comparatively bad. This sort of distinction, naturally, also requires a look at the social application. There are almost no writers or artists who do not consider their own works to be excellent. Our criticism ought to allow the free competition of every kind and sort of work of art, but if we supply correct criticism according to scientific standards of art, we can elevate comparatively low-grade art gradually to high-grade art, and change art which is not suitable to the needs of the mass struggle (even though it may be very high-grade art) into an art which does meet these needs. This too is absolutely necessary.

There is a political standard; there is an artistic standard. What is the relationship between the two? Politics is not synonymous with art; nor is a general view of the world synonymous with the methodological theories of artistic creation. We not only do not recognize abstract and eternal political standards, but also do not recognize such standards for art. Every class society and every separate class within that society has different political and artistic standards. But no matter what kind of class society or what kind of separate class within that class society it may be, it always puts the political standard first and the artistic standard second. The bourgeois class always rejects proletarian works of literature and art, no matter how high their standard may be. The proletarian classes must also reject the reactionary political nature of bourgeois works of literature and art, and assimilate their art only

in a critical manner. It is possible for some things [which are] politically and basically reactionary to have a certain artistry, for example, fascist literature and art. However, the more artistic a work which is reactionary in content is, the more harmful to the people it becomes and the more it ought to be rejected. The common characteristics of the literature and art of the exploiting classes in their period of decline are the inconsistencies between their reactionary political content and their artistic form. Our demand, then, is a unity of politics and art, a unity of content and form, and a unity of revolutionary political content and artistic form of as high a standard as possible. Works of art which are deficient in artistry, no matter how advanced they are politically, will have no force. For this reason, we oppose works of art whose content is harmful and also oppose the so-called slogan type tendency, which only considers the content and not the form. We must carry on this twofold struggle in the problem of literature and art.

These two tendencies exist among many of our comrades. There are many comrades who have a tendency to neglect artistic skill, and so they perforce pay heed to the elevation of artistic skill. But now something which has become more of a problem lies, I think, in the political sphere. Some comrades are deficient in basic general political knowledge and so have developed all sorts of muddled ideas. Let me give you a few examples from Yan'an.

"Human nature." Does such a thing exist? Certainly. However, human nature only exists in the concrete; in class society, it has a class character. Abstract human nature, transcending class, does not exist. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat; the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie uphold that of their own class. Yet the latter suggest that this is the only kind of human nature and thus proletarian human nature is incompatible with human nature. The so-called human nature peddled by some in Yan'an follows this reasoning, and it is held up as a theoretical basis for literature and art. This is completely mistaken.

[[Genuine love for humankind will only be possible in a classless society. There is no 50-50 balance between describing brightness and darkness in literature and art. This is not true of petty-bourgeois writers, and while Soviet literature describes shortcomings, its emphasis is on the bright aspects of society. Only genuine revolutionary writers can properly resolve the problem of praise and exposure. Concentrating on exposure alone is wrong. The only targets that revolutionary writers can expose are aggressors, exploiters, and oppressors, not the masses. We can use Lu Xun's sharp form of ridicule for attacking the fascists and reactionaries, but here in the Shaan-Gan-Ning the people enjoy complete democratic freedom and hence this form is unnecessary.]]

What does the existence of these questions among our writers and artists in Yan'an mean? It means that the three incorrect work-styles still seriously infect our writers and artists and that there are still many defects such as idealism, foreign dogmatism, utopianism, empty talk, slighting of actuality, and alienation from the masses, and we need a solid, serious movement to correct the unorthodox tendencies.

V

Many comrades are still not very clear about the difference between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. Many party members have joined organizationally but have not made a full commitment ideologically, or even any commitment at all. They carry around the filth of the exploiters and do not understand proletarian ideology, communism, or the party.

[[Some are worse and join the Japanese party, Wang Jingwei's party, etc. We must rely on the proletariat and its vanguard to reform the party and the rest of the world in their image.]] Since we must identify ourselves with the new era of the masses, we must thoroughly solve the problem of the relationship between the individual and the masses. Two lines from one of Lu Xun's poems ["Zichao"—"Self-ridicule"]—"With drawn brows I disdainfully face the stares of thousands as I gladly submit myself as a cow for the suckling child"—should become our motto. The "thousands" are the enemy, and we must not submit to any enemy, no matter how brutal and wicked. The "suckling child" is the proletariat and the people. All CP members, all revolutionaries, and all the revolutionary artists and writers must follow Lu Xun's example and be the "cow" of the proletariat and the people, and serve them humbly and devotedly until death. The intellectuals must identify themselves with the masses and must serve the masses. This process may, in fact it definitely will, produce much suffering and friction. But if everyone is resolved, these demands on us can be met.

What I have talked about today are only a few of the basic problems of direction in our literature and art movement. There are still other concrete problems which we must continue to study in the future. I have faith that the comrades will, with determination, march in this direction. I have faith that during the process of correcting the unorthodox tendencies and during their long period of study and work in the future the comrades will indubitably succeed in changing the face of themselves and their work; in creating many peasants, soldiers, and the people; and in advancing the literature and art movement of our bases and of the entire country to a glorious new stage.

G.20 Summary by Comrade Gao Gang at the Senior Cadres' Meeting of the Northwest Bureau (14 January 1942)⁸⁷

[[This meeting for senior cadres has lasted eighty-eight days. It has summarized the experience of the party's history, the border region, and the struggle between two lines; opposed independent tendencies and liberalism as well as a bureaucratic work-style at the lower levels and warlordism in military work. The Rectification Campaign provided the mental preparation for this meeting, and it has been con-

ducted under the direct leadership and with help from Mao Zedong and the CC. Participating cadres have used the method of seeking truth from facts, and this method should guide our future work. The meeting has taken place as the allies have moved from defense to offense in the war. Final victory in the war against Japan is two or three years away. China was the first to fight the War of Resistance but will be the last to gain victory. This is because the GMD does not have the correct policies and does not fight vigorously. This means that work in the border regions must be improved.

To improve work, I will address the following questions. First, correctly master the peaceful environment of the border region and carrying out the work of construction in a better-planned and more effective way. Second, there is the issue of supporting the peaceful unification of the country and resolutely defending the progressive democratic institutions in the border region. The united front with the GMD is based on the program of fighting the Japanese and instituting democracy.]]

Let us discuss then the previous unprincipled mistakes of capitulation within the party that sought unity without struggle. Now we all know that in order to maintain the anti-Japanese united front with the GMD we not only need to seek unity, but also must wage such struggles as are necessary. If there was only unity but no struggle, the diehard elements within the GMD would destroy us. Their not wanting us to unite with them renders the united front impossible. Did our party suffer in the past from such unity without struggle? Yes. The party suffered from it in the period of the Great Revolution; it also suffered from it after the outbreak of the War of Resistance. It was Chen Duxiuism during the Great Revolution. Was there Chen Duxiuism after the outbreak of the War of Resistance? Yes. Comrade Xiang Ying is a victim of Chen Duxiuism. Our Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region was damaged by Chen Duxiuism during a certain period. Of course, our party is totally loyal to the revolutionary cause and the interests of the people. Moreover, it has a very experienced leader, Comrade Mao Zedong, who knows well what kind of creatures China's big landlords and bourgeoisie are. As early as 1935, he warned the entire party of the danger of this neo-Chen Duxiuism. [[See above, **Docs. E.7** and **E.8** from the Wayaobao Conference.]] After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Mao addressed this problem in his 12 November 1937 speech. He pointed out that the most dangerous tendency in the party is now right opportunism [capitulationism], no longer "left" opportunism.⁸⁸ Chairman Mao not only raised [the issue] in terms of principle in such a sharp and distinct way, but also, referring to the situation in the border region at that time, pointed out and criticized specific instances of warlord tendencies in our military work and parliamentarian tendencies in our government work. But how did the border region party at that time implement this policy of Chairman Mao? The chair of the border region government was Zhang Guotao, who later became a traitor. He escaped to Wuhan in April 1938 and published statements and articles in the GMD press saying that he "felt so unsure about the CP CC's policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front." He believed that "the

border region should not become a base area for the CP, or a special area; it should not make its own laws.” “In general, there is no need for the existence of the border region government.” Of course, we cannot expect such creatures to do good deeds in the border region or expect them to implement the CC’s policy of fighting capitulationism. The secretary of the border region party committee was Comrade Guo Hongtao, who had been a famous “leftist” character with a terrifying reputation. What about his work in the border region during the War of Resistance? He did not faithfully execute Comrade Mao Zedong’s line. After December 1937 a capitulationist line emerged within the party, one which he faithfully executed. It is best for us to read an article he wrote. This article was published in vol. 1, no. 1, of the border region party committee paper, *Unity* [*Tuanjie*], on 1 February 1938. It was titled “The Border Region Steps Up Mobilization Efforts to Prepare a Counter to the Attacks of the Japanese Devils.” What did it say? “The border region government has not only changed from a soviet system into a bourgeois democratic system in form, but should change into a genuine parliamentary system in essence. We must turn the border region into part of the territory of the united Republic of China. The border region government must become a local government under a unified central government.” “The border region government establishes close relations with neighboring friendly governments and exchanges administrative experiences. During sessions of the border region assembly, we should invite neighboring friendly governments to send representatives to participate in, help, and guide its operations.” Since the peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident, since Chiang Kai-shek recognized at Lushan the legitimate status of the border region, and since this was approved by the 333rd meeting of the Executive Yuan, the border region has long been “part of the territory of the united Republic of China,” and “a local government under the unified central government.” How does one realize this is a problem for the GMD, not for the CP? The GMD cannot fulfill its promises and resolutions; it allows anticommunist spy agencies to control and sabotage its military and political regions. Although we, the CP, regret it very much, is there any way out of this? The democratic system of the border region today is the most progressive democratic system. Why should we change it into a parliamentary system like that of Yuan Shikai and Cao Kun? What would the border region and whole country gain from such a change? In fact, inviting neighboring governments for guidance amounts to inviting spy agencies to come here and give guidance (the nonspy elements in the neighboring governments will not be sent as representatives). What would the border region and country gain from this? However, the most delightful passages written by Comrade Guo Hongtao read as follows: “The fundamental principle for the work in the united front areas is the strict distinction between the united front areas and the border region. All the undertakings in the united front areas must be subordinated to the united front; every undertaking must pass through the united front. Under the guidance of this general principle, [let us] carry out the movement of saving the country in the areas neighboring the border region.” “The basic principles for conducting united front undertakings at the upper

levels are: first, under the principle of mutual assistance, mutual development, joint responsibility, and joint leadership, give our allies active support and reduce the previous frictions.

Second, under the principle of the supremacy of the War of Resistance, appropriately resolve the contradictions between the majority of the people and the upper classes and properly solve the problems of land rent, taxes, and land. Third, help the government to gradually adopt popular election or other means to purge bad local leaders, *baojia* heads, or even neighborhood chiefs, so that each level of government may become a genuine agency to lead the War of Resistance. Fourth, the Eighth Route Army in the united front areas does not interfere in administration and adopts the method of consultation to solve whatever problems may arise. Fifth, the work-style of the united front areas is to raise all issues from the standpoint of supporting the government in prosecuting the War of Resistance, opposing methods of total control and encouraging activists among the allies to work. We must be good at resolving contradictions between the allies so that they may be more united in fighting the Japanese. Oppose tendencies toward self-glorification; adopt a respectful attitude toward our allies. By adopting the above two methods, we believe that the united front at the upper levels will develop even further. Without notes, these two citations are not understandable. What is the so-called united front area? It turns out that areas like Guangzhong and Longdong in the border region had some formal government agencies left by the GMD when internal peace was realized. Since these areas had long had democratic governments created by the people themselves, the existence of the so-called GMD government agencies was, of course, extremely unreasonable and not legitimate. They should have been completely abolished. Yet not only does Comrade Guo Hongtao fail to demand that the GMD abolish these agencies that only exist in name, and which have nothing to do other than spy, but he even includes these areas in the so-called united front. Even Chiang Kai-shek recognizes them as belonging to the border region. [Comrade Guo claims they] are strictly distinct from the border region and that everything should be subordinated to, and pass through, the united front. This means that everybody obeys spy agencies and does everything through the spy agencies. Isn't this the most ludicrous thing? Spy agencies run amok in these so-called united front areas; they protect traitors, collude with bandits, oppress the people, organize the *baojia* system, embezzle and plunder people's properties, divide and drive out the Eighth Route Army, murder CP members, and even trapped the elder brother of Comrade Chui Tianfu in an icehole and strangled him. And yet you do not want the Eighth Route Army to intervene? You want it to support them and resolve the internal conflicts between the Fuxing and CC cliques?⁸⁹ Isn't this a fantasy? Comrade Guo Hongtao said that we should properly resolve the contradictions between the people and the ruling class. This appears to take account of the interests of the masses. Yet what does "properly" mean? "In the united front areas, we must take consistent measures and use the same unified legal method as our allies to organize the

masses. In general, we should adopt the organizational form of associations for fighting the enemy and supporting the rear and teams of supporters to organize and arm the masses. We should correct the narrow-minded method of organizing the masses secretly. Organizations of the masses should be maintained on the basis of supporting the government in fighting the war. While developing the power of the masses, we should avoid making things difficult for the ruling class and provide it with assistance. In terms of improving livelihood and promoting the democratic rights of the masses, we should raise slogans appropriate to the level of consciousness of the ruling class." Comrade Guo Hongtao was confident that his methods would greatly expand the united front at the upper levels. Whether such an expansion has occurred I do not know. I only know that the people's livelihood has not improved but has deteriorated. There was no gain in democratic rights, only losses. The masses were not well-organized. In addition, party organizations (such as those in Zhengyuan) were destroyed by spies. This is what the line implemented by Comrade Guo Hongtao in the border region at that time amounted to. However, one only has to look at his writing to see that the ideas that he disseminated and implemented were precisely neo-Chen Duxiuism. When implemented fully, they are very close to the demands of Zhang Guotao.

The capitulationist tendencies of Comrade Guo Hongtao during the War of Resistance did not begin with this article. The damage the border region suffered from capitulationism did not begin at this time either. After December 1937, however, capitulationism developed enormously within the party and became a line which influenced many comrades, including Guo Hongtao. This is shown by the fact that he had the courage to write such a shameful article. Now we must ask: under the leadership of such capitulationism, is the relationship between the border region and the GMD excellent? Was the united front strengthened and expanded? Just the opposite. The border region faced a very serious crisis. First, the territory of the border region contracted a great deal. The GMD troops encroached on the fringes of the border region. Up to April 1938, we lost Hongyi County, areas including Yulingqiao, Zhiruozheng, and Zhangchunze in Lu County—all are north and west of Yichuan; we also lost Gubei County north of Guyuan, areas east and north of Dingbian including Zhuanjing, Anbian, Gongbujing, and Bachaliang within the borders of Yanchi County, Xingcheng County southwest of Jingnan, Ningtiaoliang in the northwest, Hengshan County in the southwest of Hengshan (Changchen district and Weiwu district), and Duanlu County northwest of Duan County. The occupation of these counties and districts did not meet any resistance. The party's leading organs did not even know about the loss of some of them. Some were simply handed out by Comrade Guo Hongtao. For example, he did not want Hengshan County because the GMD already had a Hengshan County. In addition, because he was afraid of provoking the GMD, he abolished the name of Zhidan County and the existence of Zhichang County. Second, within the remainder of the border region, he made a further division of so-called united front areas. These included the entire branch district of Guangzhong, Longdong, and Suimi in Lu County, areas

near Wayaobao and Zhejiaping in Zhichang, and the metropolitan areas of Yan'an, Ganquan, Yanchang, and Yanchuan Counties. In these areas, he either abandoned the previous democratic regimes or recognized dual governments, or at least allowed the GMD spy agencies to establish legal bases. Third, political bandits and spies ran rampant. The occupation and gain of so many so-called united front areas do not satisfy the GMD diehards. They wanted even greater gains. They organized forty-eight bandit groups surrounding the border region to raid and harass us. The most famous of these groups was the so-called black army led by the traitor Zhang Tingzhi, who is the head of the chamber of commerce in Baotuo, and the old bandit Zhao Laowu in Longdong. At the same time, they used all kinds of cover to send a large number of spies to infiltrate the border region. They took advantage of the absence of vigilance both inside and outside the party to manufacture rumors, make maps, steal military secrets, recruit backward elements, etc. Fourth, the restoration of the landlords. The previous landlords of the border region, while still outside the so-called lost territories, took the opportunity provided by the GMD's efforts to reclaim the land that had been redistributed to the peasantry. They spread the rumor that the CP had capitulated and that now it was the landlords' turn again. They also said that a piece of stone had been discovered in Ansai on which was engraved: "objects restored to the original owner." Because the party did not stop this, many peasants became genuinely suspicious that the CP had ceased to represent the interests of the masses. The land taken back by the landlords accounted for over half the total amount of redistributed land. One landlord in Zhidan County alone took back 2,800 *xiang* of land. Fifth, the contemporary leadership confused not only the peasants but also many CP members. Some party members who were peasants followed the backward peasants by returning land to the landlords; some party members from landlord families demanded land back from peasants. Some party members took pride in receiving GMD appointments, in gaining promotion, and in making money. The Anding County party secretary at that time wrote down his history in the party on a form provided by the GMD in order to join the association for fighting the enemy and supporting the rear. The party [organization] in Longdong mailed internal party documents to Yan'an via the post office controlled by the GMD spies. In general, because the plague of capitulationism spread throughout the border region and its party [organization], everything fell into a state of extreme confusion. Comrades, please think, if we cannot overcome this kind of capitulationism, can the border region remain a border region? Can the border region resist the attacks of the diehard elements and defend itself? Can the Chinese people still have a free and clean piece of territory in the form of a border region? Obviously, the party must smash this treacherous capitulationism that endangers the War of Resistance and the people. Therefore, after Comrade Guo Hongtao left the border region party committee on 15 May 1938, the border region government and the garrison headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, under the instruction of Comrade Mao Zedong, issued a historic announcement and quickly put an end to this state of confusion. This announcement harshly condemned the diehard elements

who had been sabotaging the border region, unity, and the War of Resistance. It also put forward the following four points:

1) In all areas under the jurisdiction of the border region when internal peace is declared, the government is called on to protect the vested interests of the people and to forbid unauthorized changes with respect to land and housing already redistributed, and with respect to all annulled debts.

2) On, and after, the establishment of internal peace, the government protects the activities of the military, political, economic, cultural, and social groups that were organized to improve and develop themselves in line with the principles of the united front; the government also promotes their development and bans all acts of conspiracy and sabotage.

3) Under the principle of resolutely implementing the CC's program of fighting the War of Resistance and building up the country, the government is happy to promote all undertakings beneficial to the cause of fighting the Japanese and saving the country. This government always welcomes good-intentioned people from all walks of life. However, the government denies admission to the border region to those intending to conduct activities without the permission or documents of approval from the government and this office—regardless of the nature of their activities. This is to prevent the infiltration of spies.

4) When the War of Resistance entered an intense stage, [the government] invited the people to inform on all those who engage in conspiracy, sabotage, disturbances, incitement, or spying on military secrets. Such people were to be arrested on the spot and punished severely once interrogated.

After this announcement was made, the people immediately said that the CP and the Eighth Route Army have become good again. They supported and protected this announcement. The land seized back by the landlords was returned to peasants. The activities of spies were greatly restrained. Bandits did not dare to be as reckless as before. Most importantly, the party in the border region restored the correct revolutionary line. Relying on this correct line, we not only abolished the so-called united front areas but also defeated the repeated plots of the diehard elements. Thus, the border region, instead of being destroyed as the diehard elements had dreamed, became stronger day by day.

There are countless facts that demonstrate how the capitulationists made the border region suffer all kinds of losses and how we waged all kinds of struggles to defend the border region. But comrades, if you compare the article by Guo Hongtao cited above with the announcement of the border region government and the garrison of the Eighth Route Army, you can understand two absolutely different lines. The article by Guo Hongtao represents capitulationism within the party since the beginning of the war. It reflects the fantasy and slavish nature of some petty-bourgeoisie elements about the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China. On the surface, they describe the big landlords and big bourgeoisie as being as naïve and ignorant as they are themselves. In reality, using the standpoint of the War of Resistance and the revolution, they dare not wage a serious struggle against the big

landlords and big bourgeoisie. Therefore, even though they spout revolutionary words, objectively they are the big landlords' and big bourgeoisie's worms among the CP and the people. In contrast, the announcement of the border region government and the garrison of the Eighth Route Army is full of the revolutionary justice and spirit of the Communists and the people. It uses unity to deal with unity, struggle to deal with struggle; it provides both unity and struggle, it seeks unity through struggle; it is firm and uncompromising. Facts have proved that the former line can only induce the large landlords and big bourgeoisie to become insatiably greedy; it makes the party and people lose direction and disarm themselves; it drives the border region toward destruction; it turns unity into division; it pushes the War of Resistance to defeat. Only the latter line makes the party and the people become aware again, thus avoiding the betrayal and slaughter that the party suffered during the Great Revolution. It also makes the big landlords and big bourgeoisie become clearheaded; it stops them dead in their tracks after they see that the CP and the people cannot be bullied.

Now let us discuss the question of uniting different classes within the border region and constructing a new democracy. The politics we practice in the border region today is a form of democratic politics that allows people from all groups to speak out and engage in activities. It is different from the politics being practiced in the rear proper that gives only a few the power and the majority no power at all. The economy we are developing in the border region today is an economy that enables all the people to live a life of sufficiency, very different from the economy of the rear proper that enables only a few to be happy and the majority to be miserable. All our policies can take care of the interests of all the anti-Japanese classes. For example, in terms of land relations, on the one hand, we implement the policy of reducing rent and interest so that peasants may have clothing to wear and food to eat; on the other hand, we implement the policy of enforcing the payment of rent and interest, so that landlords can have clothing to wear and food to eat.

[[We help both workers and capitalists. Here, there is no polarization between peasants as in other areas. Even the majority of landlords and business people support the "three-thirds" system of government and use legitimate struggle to protect their class interests. Where the above policies have not been implemented and rural government has not been democratically reformed (e.g., the garrison zone, Longdong, and some areas in Guangzhong), the landlord class will never practice or support democracy of its own accord. Our progressive democratic institutions are supported by all the people in the border region.]] However, we must be aware that in our current work there exists the phenomenon of gravely isolating ourselves from the masses in some areas. This needs to be quickly corrected. The first manifestation of this is: in areas within the border region where the land has not been redistributed and where not much rent-reduction has been enforced, the landlords use all kinds of methods (such as changing tenants, false pawning and selling, abrogating leases to take back the land saying that they will till it themselves while actually renting it out secretly, and changing fixed rent into floating rent) in order to

resist the government's laws of rent-reduction and to intimidate peasants into not daring to accept rent-reduction. The government pays attention to protecting the property rights of landlords, but fails to protect the tenancy rights of the peasants or to punish the illegal activities of the landlords. This means that the masses have no incentive to produce and develop an indifference to the democratic regime and wonder whether our government has changed its character. They wonder whether our policies help the majority of the masses. Today, we can only concretely protect the tenancy rights of the peasants in these areas, thoroughly enforce the laws of rent-reduction, and mobilize and organize the peasants' struggle to reduce rent in order to increase their initiative to develop production and participate in democratic activities. Second, during the six peaceful years in the border region, the substance and style of our work, to a significant degree, has continued to be the same as during the war period. It lacks creativity and change; many cadres are capable only of crude mobilization work; they fail to grasp the construction of elaborate organizations; they fail to recognize the characteristics of today's new environment (a peaceful environment) or to study the new needs of the masses (developing production). We do not provide what the masses really need; but we have provided much that the masses do not need (many empty organizations and meetings); this does not benefit the masses, but instead hampers production by the masses. Such a situation only furthers the bureaucratic work-style and increases daily our isolation from the masses. Therefore, we must now educate our cadres how to understand correctly a peaceful environment, emphasize constructive work, seriously lead the masses in developing production, and specifically help the masses to solve all kinds of difficulties in developing production so that the people of the border region may grow increasingly wealthy and eliminate the obstacles between us and the masses. This will facilitate even greater support for us from the masses.

[[Fourth, there is the question of how to develop production and attain the objective of sufficient clothing and food for the whole border region. Chairman Mao has extended much energy on this question [see **Doc. G.6**]. This gives people confidence and a clear understanding of the economic construction of the new China. Cadres must treat economic work as the number one priority.]]

Fifth, there is the question of increasing our efforts in education. This is one of the current central tasks in the construction of the border region. However, since this meeting of senior cadres did not have time to discuss this question in detail, it has appointed a special commission to study it after the meeting. I simply raise some views here. In improving education, the first thing is to enhance cadre education. The most central task in preparing our forces to counterattack is the education and improvement of cadres. Current conditions in the border region provide the best opportunity for improving cadres. If we take this opportunity lightly, it will be very detrimental for both the party and individuals. In the past, the weakness of cadre education in the border region was caused mainly by dogmatism. Work was work and study was study, and the two had nothing to do with each other. Cadres at various levels of the propaganda and educational departments were mostly green

intellectuals who did not understand real conditions. Leaders also had weaknesses. At the same time, some cadres themselves lacked confidence, determination, and good learning habits. The bad phenomenon of “working when there is something to do; wandering around when there is nothing to do”—the phenomenon of not studying seriously—could be found everywhere. Cadre schools (previously the college of administration in the party school) lacked competent cadres to participate in its leadership. Education policy was vague; the content of education was separated from practice; little attention was paid to quality in the selection of teachers and students; schools were turned into “refugee stations” and the material conditions for students were very bad, all of which dampened enthusiasm for studying. These phenomena must not be allowed to continue. The Northwest Bureau has already made a decision on future cadre study in the border region. In the next year, the emphasis will be on carrying out study for rectification. After rectification, the following different guidelines for study should be adopted for different cadres: senior cadres above the level of prefect need to concentrate their study on the theories and history of the CCP. They should gradually read properly the thirty to forty Marxist-Leninist works assigned by Chairman Mao. Ordinary middle-level cadres must learn to apply policies. Thus, in the main, they should study the border region’s government program and other specific policies and should apply them in their own work. All cadres with insufficient education should make plans and be determined to become educated first and then to study theories. Ordinary cadres who are intellectuals must first go down to the grass roots to get some training in practical work and gain all kinds of practical work experience. In order to train and improve the veteran cadres of the border region in a planned way, the Northwest Bureau is determined to send a group of people to study in the Central Party School. This is very important for the future of the border region and the country. In terms of middle and primary school education, we can see very serious weaknesses. For example, some normal schools training middle-school teachers look toward schools run by the people outside [the border region] for educational principles; most of the curricula consist of the old things; they do not serve the people of the border region. Moreover, they openly allow anticommunist elements to conduct anticommunist activities on campus. The weakness in popular education is the coercive mobilization of students. Further, the content of education does not meet the needs of the countryside. It pits the family completely against the school. The quality of teachers is very low (about 70 percent are from primary schools and private schools); their family background is very complex. The government’s educational agencies seek only quantitative development, but not improvement in quality. They do not see that our schools are facing the danger of qualitative degeneration and become the easiest hiding ground for spies and saboteurs. Therefore, in the future, there should be a wide-scale investigation into, and transformation of, the middle and primary schools of the border region. We should emphasize quality and run these schools with a purpose. At the same time, the central task of the Youth Salvation Society [*Qingjiu*] should be to send its cadres to primary

schools to teach and run them well, so that spies and saboteurs cannot hide there. They should go to middle schools to organize and guide students in a progressive direction. In the past, they did not do so; in the future, they should work hard in this direction. Educational principles, teaching plans, and faculty and students in the higher institutions of learning in Yan'an (Yan'an University, Lu Xun Academy of Arts, etc.) should also be reviewed and reorganized according to the principle of reducing quantity, improving quality, and streamlining. They are to train cadres to meet the practical needs of the moment, the border region, and of the War of Resistance. This is not that we are wasting our limited labor power, material, and financial resources in every school. There is a special committee studying how to enhance education within the military, so I am not going to talk about this now.

Sixth, there is the question of raising our vigilance and strengthening the work of eliminating spies and increasing security. Although on the surface the border region enjoys a relatively peaceful environment, we must not forget that we live in a nationwide war against Japan and we are encircled by tens of thousands of GMD troops. Although today there is temporarily no open armed attack against the border region by the enemy and the GMD, sabotage activities by concealed spies have been stepped up. The enemy and the GMD both have huge spy organizations and equally huge anticommunist plans; they are doing their best to infiltrate our party, government, troops, and people in the border region to conduct secret sabotage. The report by Comrade Kang Sheng to the senior cadres' meeting has already clearly told us of the intensity of the sabotage by enemy spies, the harassment by bandits and armed plainclothesmen, the organized riots, the organized mutiny, and the engineered defection of our cadres. There are too many such things. In particular, the spies they have planted have infiltrated deep into our party organs, the government, and the military. Economic and cultural organs where our leadership is weak are the most easily infiltrated by these saboteurs. In the past, the ideological liberalism of some of our cadres, the self-acquired organizational autonomy, the laxity in organizational structure, the policies of leniency, and the generous treatment we have shown to those who should have been exterminated provided the enemy and the GMD spies with enormously favorable opportunities for sabotage. Our movement to develop production and the Rectification Campaign, as well as all other tasks, can never be carried out peacefully without encountering all kinds of sabotage by the enemy and the GMD spies. Comrade Stalin said, "A fortress is seized most easily from inside." We should realize that the activities of spies constitute the principal form of struggle by the enemy and the anticommunist diehard elements within the GMD to sabotage the border region. Therefore, we should never fall asleep; we must raise our vigilance and increase the work of eliminating spies and enhancing security. We must oppose taking a liberal and indifferent attitude toward activities by counterrevolutionaries; we should educate cadres and party members to recognize the seriousness of sabotage by spies and to learn the methods of how to fight counterrevolutionaries. We should purge the hidden spies by deepening the

Rectification Campaign, work inspection, and investigation of the cadres. We must tighten up our organizations and make our leadership more unified and monopolistic, thus denying saboteurs opportunities. We should strictly devise all kinds of systems according to objective reality and the needs and forms of struggle (such as security guards in all organs and schools; entry and exit permits; a system for receiving guests; a system for receiving, safekeeping, and transferring documents, household registration, of people's residency, and movement; the reporting and authorization of all kinds of gatherings and associations; the checking of passes by self-defense forces, etc.). Once these systems are devised, everybody must obey them. Above all, senior leaders must set a personal example to ensure their implementation and enforcement. Principal leaders in each organ must strengthen their leadership over investigations and antispies measures in their own departments. They should not depend exclusively on the organizational and security departments. Only this will make it difficult for bad elements to hide and operate, thus preventing setbacks in revolutionary efforts.

[[Seventh, there is the question of linking closely the decisions of this movement with this year's rectification campaign. The work of disseminating the decisions must be carried out properly.]]

G.21 Decision of the CCP CC Concerning the Motion of the ECCI to Disband the Comintern. (26 May 1943)⁹⁰

1) The CCP CC fully agrees with the proposal of the Presidium of the ECCI adopted on 15 May 1943 concerning the dissolution of the Comintern. From now on, the CCP is no longer bound by obligations arising from the constitution of the Comintern or any resolutions adopted at various Comintern conferences.

2) The Comintern has fulfilled its historic missions. Not only has it safeguarded revolutionary Marxism from being trampled by opportunism in Europe and Japan, helped progressive workers unite into genuine workers' political parties, supported the socialist Soviet Union, and staunchly opposed fascism and fascist war, but it has also used every means possible to help the liberation movement of the oppressed nations in the East and helped the progressive workers of oppressed nations organize their own political parties, which have become the people's vanguard in the forefront of all liberation movements. What the Chinese people cannot forget is that the Comintern exerted all possible efforts before Dr. Sun Yat-sen's death to make CCP-GMD cooperation possible in 1924 and subsequently helped China bring the Northern Expedition to a triumphant conclusion. Again, during the years from 1927 to 1937, when the Chinese revolution entered its most difficult stage, the Comintern gave moral support to the Chinese people. Recently, during the six years of the War of Resistance against Japan since 1937, it has appealed to its branches and the

workers in all countries to help China in the war against Japanese imperialist aggression. In short, throughout its existence the Comintern did its best to help the disaster-stricken Chinese people. Now, as the proposal of the Presidium of the ECCI says, because the domestic situation in each country and the international situation have become more complicated, this original form of organization is no longer suitable for the continued growth of the workers' movement in various countries. The reason is that in the current war of liberation waged by the antifascist allies it has become more necessary for the CPs in various countries to solve their own problems independently according to their special national and historical conditions, and to strive for a broadened and rapid national high tide and national mobilization so as to win complete victory. Another reason is that the CP in each country has a well-developed and politically mature leadership cadre. For these reasons, the Presidium of the ECCI proposed to the CPs of various countries the dissolution of the Comintern. Under present circumstances, the benefit of the dissolution of the Comintern outweighs that of its continued existence. Because of the present situation of the war, it is not possible to call an international conference to discuss the dissolution of the Comintern. Therefore, this proposal was made to the CPs of various countries by the Presidium of the ECCI. The CCP CC endorses the reasons stated in the proposal and approves the dissolution of the Comintern. The CCP CC pointed out that, after the dissolution of the First International by Marx, the workers' movement in various countries experienced further development. Now that the Third International is declared dissolved, victory in the world-wide antifascist war and the liberation of humankind will undoubtedly come sooner.

3) The CCP's establishment is a result of the development of the workers' movement in China after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, as well as the development of the contemporary history of China. Wherever there are proletarian and workers' movements there will someday appear a political party of the working class. If there had been no Comintern, the CCP would still have been born at some opportune time. This is an inevitable rule of history. Since its inception the CCP has, for the first time in the contemporary history of China, clearly pointed out for the Chinese people the road of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. In addition, all party comrades have set examples in their conduct, loyalty, and devotion to the liberation of their country. They shed their blood and immediately take the place of their fallen comrades. During its revolutionary struggle the CCP has received a great deal of assistance from the Comintern. However, the Chinese Communists have been able for a long time to determine independently their own direction, policy, and action according to the special situation in their own country. From the adoption of the resolution at the seventh conference of the Comintern in August 1935 that the Comintern shall not interfere with the communist organizations in various countries, the Comintern had always observed this resolution and had never interfered with the organization of the CCP. The various revolutionary forces created by the CCP have been the pillars of China's progress in all aspects and have been undertaking an unprecedentedly difficult struggle behind the enemy lines since

the beginning of the War of Resistance. These revolutionary forces were built with bare hands and fists by the CCP, independently and without any external help. It may be said that this is unprecedented in China's revolutionary movement in the last few decades. Revolution can be neither exported nor imported. It can only be caused by the internal development within each country. This truth is always expounded by Marxist-Leninists. The experiences of the CCP has entirely proved this truth. In this situation, the dissolution of the Comintern will all the more strengthen the confidence and creativity of party members, consolidate the link between the CCP and the Chinese people, and further enhance the party's combat strength. The Chinese Communists are the best sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. They will continue to stand in the forefront of the anti-Japanese war; cooperate with the GMD, all anti-Japanese political parties, and nonaligned personnel; support all the measures of the national government in connection with the War of Resistance; defeat the Japanese bandits and their German and Italian fascist allies; and fulfill the task of establishing an independent new China.

4) The Chinese Communists are Marxist-Leninists. Since Marxism-Leninism is a science, it has no international boundary. The Chinese Communists must flexibly apply Marxism-Leninism according to their own national conditions so that it will serve the interests of China's War of Resistance and national reconstruction. The Chinese Communists are the best heirs of their nation's cultural, philosophical, and moral heritage. They regard this excellent heritage as a blood relationship and will continue to make it manifest. The Rectification Campaign conducted by the CCP in recent years to overcome subjectivism, sectarianism, and formalist party writing style is intended to bring this revolutionary science—Marxism-Leninism—into close association with the practice of the Chinese revolution, Chinese history, and Chinese culture. This movement shows that the Chinese Communists have as much creative ability in thinking as in revolutionary practice and that the Chinese Communists can stand together with the Chinese people to accomplish various historical missions assigned to them by the Chinese people. The CCP CC is deeply convinced that all party comrades can be united to conquer their own shortcomings and manifest their creativity and positivism. If so, although Japanese imperialism is still strong and our road to progress is still fraught with difficulties, our tasks can definitely be accomplished.

G.22 Liquidate Menshevik Thought in the Party. *Liu Shaoqi*
(6 July 1943)⁹¹

[[In the twenty-two years since its foundation, the CCP has carried out three great revolutions and three great revolutionary wars. Armed struggle has been the princi-

pal form of conflict and organization, and the CCP's existence and development cannot be separated from this. In these twenty-two years, the CCP has experienced more great events than any other CP in the world.]]

The armed struggle or the mass struggle, the domestic or international struggle, the open or secret struggle, the economic or political struggle, or the struggle within or outside the party—all these different forms of revolutionary struggle have been experienced by our party, and our experience through it all has been rich. It is especially noteworthy that twenty-two years of bitter and complex revolutionary struggle have led our party, our national proletariat, and our national revolutionaries to find their own leader in Comrade Mao Zedong. During these twenty-two years of bitter and complex revolutionary struggle, our Comrade Mao Zedong has stood the test as a strong and great revolutionary, completely versed in Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics and possessing unlimited loyalty to the Chinese working class and the mission of Chinese national liberation.

Our party has had extremely rich experience in all aspects of the revolutionary struggle, yet until now it has not done well in summarizing this [experience]. One of the most important missions of our entire party at the present time is to summarize successfully our party's experience in all aspects of the revolutionary struggle in the light of the universal doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. This is because a Marxist-Leninist summary of these experiences is the most important condition for the consolidation, education, and elevation of the entire party for the attainment of victory in the Chinese revolution.

Only if our party members can correctly understand our party's historical experience can they raise their faith and valor to unlimited heights and push their own work and the party far ahead. Then they will be able to avoid a great many errors which have been committed in the past and greatly shorten the process of their work and the revolution. Chinese revolutionary experience must be used to educate Chinese revolutionaries, and the experience of the CCP must be used to educate CCP members; only in this way can more direct and practical results be obtained. If we reject such a rich body of experience in the Chinese revolutionary struggle; if we treat the experience of our party's struggle in these twenty-two years of great historical change lightly; if we do not diligently study these experiences; if we do not diligently learn our lessons from these experiences but only learn the lessons of the revolutionary experience of comparatively distant foreign countries, we will be turning things upside down and will have to travel many tortuous paths and encounter many more defeats.

The experiences of our party in the twenty-two-year struggle have been extremely rich and all-embracing. I cannot explain them here one by one, but of all our experiences, which is the most important? I believe that our most important experience is related to the questions "What is a true Marxist?" and "What is a true Bolshevik?" It is common knowledge that only Marxism can save China. In China there are many who style themselves Marxists. But what is true Marxism and what is a true Marxist? And what is false Marxism and what is a false Marxist? In all

these years, this problem has not been solved among the Chinese revolutionary masses or in the CCP.

There is a difference between true and false Marxism and between the true and false Marxist. This distinction between true and false is certainly not to be made according to everybody's subjective standards, but according to objective standards. Nothing could be more dangerous than for our comrades to fail to understand these objective standards for distinguishing between true and false Marxists and to follow unconsciously and blindly along behind false Marxists in carrying out the revolution. This would be the most bitter of all our party's bitter experiences. The principal reason that our party has encountered many unnecessary setbacks and defeats in the past and taken many detours which should not have been taken is that our party has contained these false Marxists, and many party members have unconsciously and blindly followed them, so that these people have occupied leading positions in certain organizations and movements and at times even occupied leadership positions for the whole party; as a result, they have led the revolutionary movement down a bitter and difficult road. This is a bitter experience that all our party members must take as a strict warning.

[[We have done well in every type of work and must admire our members' spirit for difficult work.]]

For a long time, however, our preparation in scientific Marxist-Leninist thought has been most inadequate. In past history our most painful weakness has been an inability to avoid mistakes in the guidance of the revolutionary movement. Because of this, the movement has met with partial and sometimes severe setbacks which were unnecessary. We must keep this historical lesson in mind and solve this problem completely in the future. It may be said that only if we can guarantee that no serious errors in principle arise in the guidance of the revolutionary movement can we then guarantee victory in the Chinese revolution. Because our revolutionary spirit and our spirit for difficult work are excellent, and because the objective conditions for the Chinese revolution are generally excellent, the revolution will certainly move toward eventual victory only if correct Marxist-Leninist guidance is given.

But how are we going to guarantee that our party commits no serious errors in principle in any aspect of its leadership of the revolutionary movement? This demands that our party members, primarily the cadres, be able to distinguish between true and false Marxism and all types of true and false Marxists; demands that all types of false Marxist systems and their cliques be smashed in revolutionary ranks and in the party; demands that we effectively take stock of our party's rich historical experience in the last twenty-two years; demands that we pursue studies and heighten our sense of perception; and demands that Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership penetrate into all working sections and departments.

As long as Marxism has existed, there have been both true and false Marxists in the Marxist movement. The entire history of the Marxist movement is filled with the story of the struggle between these two schools. In the same way, the Chinese

Marxist movement contains these two schools of Marxists and is also filled with the struggle between these two schools. This is something which all party members must thoroughly recognize and understand.

Over twenty years ago, Stalin very appropriately described these schools of Marxists.

[[His comments are relevant to the CCP. Stalin: The first school of Marxists has only a superficial understanding and uses it to attain its own ends. The name of this school is "Menshevik" or "opportunist." The second school makes Marxism a reality. These people are "Bolsheviks" or "Communists."]]

Here Stalin has made a very clear statement. Although these two schools both work under the banner of Marxism and both style themselves "true" Marxists, the work methods of both schools, and their modes of thought, are in complete opposition.

One is a school of false Marxists, a group of Mensheviks and opportunists. Accordingly, they only profess Marxism on the surface and give lip service to Marxism, yet they do not recognize the essence of Marxism and cannot put Marxism into practice; they change Marxism into formal dogma. When working, they do not rely on experience and calculations drawn up for actual work, but rely instead on books. Their decisions on orders and directives are not derived from analyses of actual, concrete life, but are instead derived from books or from analogous or similar events in history. In this way they are inconsistent, for what they say is Marxist, but what they do is completely un-Marxist. The developments of objective reality consistently cheat them, and they are invariably completely disappointed and disillusioned.

The other school consists of true Marxists, Leninists, and Bolsheviks. They practice Marxism and make something real of Marxism. They pay special attention to the formulation of methods and procedures for the implementation of Marxism according to environmental circumstances and to the changes in these methods and procedures. Their decisions on instructions and directives are not derived from analogies and similarities in historical events, but are derived from an examination and study of the conditions surrounding them. When working, they do not rely on quotations or clichés, but on practical experience. They also examine each step in their work from the view of experience, study and learn from their own mistakes, and teach others to make progress in their work. This school is consistent in word and action; it speaks Marxism and also practices Marxism. It not only explains the work, but is most emphatic about reforming the world. It constantly preserves the vital revolutionary vigor of Marxism.

These two types of Marxists have existed in the Chinese communist movement and in the CCP from the start. Examples of the first type of false Marxism in China were Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi and the Chinese Trotskyites, the Li Lisan line, the "left" opportunism of the Civil War period, and dogmatism. In essence, these things are Chinese Menshevism and Chinese "social democracy." True Marxists of the second type in China have been Comrade Mao Zedong and the many comrades who consolidated around him. From the start, the line they have upheld and strug-

gled for and their work methods have been, in essence, Chinese Bolshevism.

Our comrades and cadres must heighten their alertness and understand that in our party's history the Menshevik line and system of thought have existed. Although the various forms of expression of opportunism and dogmatism from Chen Duxiu, Peng Shuzhi, and Li Lisan onward have been different at different times and do not appear to be related organizationally in any way, they are still identical in their essential nature, in their work methods, and in their modes of thought. In thought and politics they possess a pervading system and do extremely severe damage to the party and the Chinese revolution.

Except for Chen Duxiu's Trotskyism, which is a true descendant of European Trotskyism, Chinese Menshevism has other forms which are not in any way descended from the European social democrats of Russian Menshevism, but which arose by themselves from the petty-bourgeois class of Chinese society and under the special conditions prevailing in China. Therefore, compared with European social democrats or the Russian Mensheviks, these people have many peculiarities in form. In form, Chinese Menshevism appears as "anti-Menshevism," "Leninism," "Bolshevism," "the international line," and in other forms and phrases. Under the cover of these attractive forms and revolutionary phrases, it actually struggles against Leninism and Bolshevism and propagates and implements what is essential Menshevism. Again, because the theoretical level of many comrades and cadres is low and their sense of perception is not highly developed, they cannot actually distinguish it as Menshevism, and thus are invariably deceived by these attractive forms and revolutionary phrases. Thus, they are frequently able to obtain the temporary acceptance of many party comrades and cadres and seize leading positions in the party or in certain of its sections. It is particularly the sectarianism and individualism of China's semifeudal petty-bourgeois society which they develop, and in addition they combine their schemes with the lumpen proletariat of Chinese society. If the harm they do to the party is especially grave, this shows particularly their superficial populism and their ambivalent and two-faced character. This is the principal characteristic of Chinese Menshevism.

The Chinese party does not have the tradition of the European social democratic parties, but it does harbor the tradition of a system of Chinese Menshevism.

These false Marxist-Leninists and false Bolsheviks are not to be distinguished merely from their words and the forms of appearance. In speech they can appear more Marxist than anyone else. In form they can appear more revolutionary and hardworking, more diligent and cooperative than anyone else. What they fear most, however, is an actual test and the use of the spirit of criticism in the examination of their work. Consequently, it is from their practices, from their work, from their methods of recognizing and disposing of problems, and from an examination of the results of their work that we must distinguish these persons and expose their true form. As they speak Marxism-Leninism but do not actually practice Marxism-Leninism, their pattern in actual practice is to refuse to accept the strict guidance of Marxist-Leninist theory. When working, they invariably base their actions on

books; on set phrases of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin; on a section from some regulation; or on general concepts and general theory, and not on actual experience or calculations drawn from practical work. Their decisions on problems and their decisions on directives never stem from reality or from the investigation and study of actual environmental conditions, but are from book formulas, historical comparisons, or from similar events in Russia, the countries of Western Europe, or from some other source. In reality they are idealists, and they therefore constantly commit errors in practical work. In the long run, they cannot do their work well. Their actual results are necessarily in contradiction to their initial expectations and their initial statements. If you concentrate on their work methods and use the spirit of criticism in investigating the results of their work, you will expose their real nature. In his report on the "Reform of the Three Styles," Comrade Mao Zedong severely criticized such individuals. The danger from such persons, however, lies in the fact that with their great mass of Marxist phrases, their Bolshevik trappings, and their *a priori* ambivalence, they are able to frighten and deceive many workers and peasants and many immature young comrades; even those comrades who are well seasoned and have had a great deal of work experience, but who are still very deficient in the power of theoretical discernment, are very often deceived and captured. These persons are consequently able to place the party's mission in great jeopardy.

The story of the struggle between the Bolshevik and Menshevik lines fills the past history of the party. In our party's history these two lines and two traditions exist. One is the Bolshevik line and tradition, and the other is the Menshevik line and tradition. The former is represented by Comrade Mao Zedong; the latter is represented by the various factions of opportunists within the party. These two lines and two traditions have undergone a long and fierce struggle of extremely rich content. Although the mistaken line in the party, the Menshevik line, has gained the upper hand in the struggle for short periods and achieved temporary victories, under most conditions the wrong line has been overcome. Although our party has consistently overcome mistaken lines in its work, the Menshevik system of thought has never been thoroughly subdued, has never been thoroughly liquidated, has never been given a fatal, smashing blow. As a consequence, the remnants of this thought and tradition still persist in the party, and in certain periods and under certain conditions they have become violent and endangered our party.

Now is the time for us to liquidate completely the remnants of Menshevism in party thought, politics, and work. We must successfully take stock of the party's historical experience, especially the experience of the struggle between the two lines, and use these experiences to teach our cadres and comrades. Only in this way can we fundamentally cure the disease, bring to practical realization the unity and discipline of the party rank and file, guarantee consistent and correct leadership for the entire party, and lead the Chinese revolution to future victory. If we do not do this, we cannot successfully realize our historical role as a progressive political party in future periods of great adversity and complexity.

Menshevism in the party is the reflection of a petty-bourgeois ideology; it is its

highest manifestation and has produced certain systems. To cast off the Menshevik ideology and its systems found in the party, we must utilize a proletarian ideology to rid the party of petty-bourgeois ideology, and we must see that our comrades are able to distinguish between proletarian and petty-bourgeois ideologies in all their forms. We are already engaged in this work, but in certain quarters it is still in the process of completion. This work is the Rectification Campaign for which Comrade Mao Zedong raised the battle cry last year. This Rectification Campaign is a movement for self-education and self-criticism unprecedented in the party's twenty-two-year history. It has given our party an unprecedented push along the road to Bolshevism, and on the foundation of this reform we should go on to take stock of our party's rich twenty-two-year historical experience, thoroughly liquidate the remnants of Menshevism in systems of thought, and bring our party's Bolshevization to a higher level. This is the central task today in our party's construction.

The history of the CCP should be the history of the development of Marxism-Leninism in China; it should also be the history of the struggle of Marxist-Leninists with all groups of opportunists. Objectively, this history has developed with Comrade Mao Zedong as its center. This history of the opportunist factions in the party can certainly not become the history of the party, and the system and tradition of party Menshevism can certainly not become the system and tradition of party thought. The history of the party is the history of the struggle with this system and tradition and its subjugation and annihilation. It is entirely necessary to expose this tradition and to eradicate the remnants of the tradition. There is no need for us to conceal or deny them, for this would be immensely harmful to the party.

All cadres and party members should diligently study the twenty-two-year historical experience of the CCP. They should diligently study and master Comrade Mao Zedong's doctrines on the Chinese revolution and other subjects. They should arm themselves with Comrade Mao Zedong's thought and use Comrade Mao Zedong's system of thought to liquidate Menshevik thought in the party.

Our comrades and cadres, however, should further promote alertness, for in recent years enemy factions have sent out special agents to worm their way into our party. These men also appear in the party camouflaged as Marxist-Leninists. They are to be differentiated from the earlier false Marxists. They are counterrevolutionary elements. We must ferret out these counterrevolutionary elements who have crept into the party. To do this, we must draw a clear line in the party between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary. To destroy the remnants of Menshevism in the party means to distinguish between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. The two divisions should be drawn clearly, but the methods and procedures in distinguishing them are not the same. In the first case, the method used in drawing the line is the investigation of cadres and party members. In the latter case, the method in drawing the line is the Rectification Campaign and the summarization of experience.

To use Marxism-Leninism to liquidate petty-bourgeois ideology and its systems

of thought in the party and to discover internal traitors—these are the two great current tasks in consolidating and promoting the party. When we achieve victory in these two great tasks, we will have prepared ourselves in thought and in organization and can then stand completely consolidated and completely prepared and look forward to a great and glorious era.

If we grasp the weapon of scientific Marxism-Leninism, and if we destroy the internal remnants of opportunism, we cannot be defeated.

G.23 Decision of the CC Concerning the Investigation of Cadres (15 August 1943)⁹²

It is no surprise that special agents are numerous. In the fascist countries of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the countries that they have occupied, they have cheated and coerced millions of young people into joining and serving fascist organizations. The Chinese feudal and fascist GMD, although it plays a useful role in resisting the invasion of foreign fascists, has been anti-CCP and antipopulist since 1927 and has created an enormous system of special agents. During the anti-Japanese war, although it has used the CCP to oppose Japan, it has also cheated and coerced many young people into joining the GMD organization and cultivated some of these young people to become professional spies to engage in the anti-CCP movement. The Japanese fascists used Chinese as spies in great numbers. As a result, the problem of spies is a universal, mass one. Failure to acknowledge this point will result in an inability to adopt the correct strategy.

At present, our party is engaged in a Rectification Campaign that calls for the investigation of cadres and, furthermore, that plans to step up its effort in investigating all personnel. We will not pursue the unsparing elimination of counterrevolutionaries. We will not adopt a policy of turning over all spies and suspicious elements to the Security Bureau to be dealt with. We will let responsible leaders take action themselves. The leadership and the masses must unite; general appeals and individual instruction must be united. We must conduct investigation and research. We must distinguish true from false, frivolous from serious. We must win over those who have taken the wrong road, cultivate cadres, and educate the masses. That is because this is a mass problem. If we alienate ourselves from the masses in the organs, schools, army, factories, and villages, and alienate ourselves from the cadres who have forged close and strong ties with the masses, it will be impossible to resolve satisfactorily this important question.

The aforementioned strategy of placing responsibility in the hands of the leadership is in direct opposition to the mistaken policy of unsparing elimination of counterrevolutionaries pursued in many areas during the Civil War periods. This mistaken strategy, simply put, is one of extorting confessions under pressure. Inter-

rogators physically and mentally torture, coerce, and intimidate spies and suspicious elements; as a result, those being interrogated will confess to almost anything and frame others. The interrogators and responsible officials unthinkingly believe these unreliable confessions, arresting, beating and killing at random. This is a completely subjective strategy and method. During the anti-Japanese war, the incident in Huxi (Shandong Province) involving the unsparing elimination of counterrevolutionaries resulted from just this type of strategy and method. Even today the poisonous influence of such erroneous ideas may be found among many cadres, especially those involved in security work. We must adopt the strategy of placing responsibility in the hands of the leadership in order to eliminate these errors of subjective thinking. We will investigate cadres and even investigate all personnel in order to reach our most appropriate and thorough goals.

What does "the leadership will take responsibility" mean? It means that the majority of questionable elements will remain behind in government organs, schools, and army units. We will trust and direct all levels of administrative officials to carry out the investigations (not including the several departments that have been taken over by evil people; we must first reform the leadership in these departments). Yan'an has been divided into three administrative units to carry out this work: ordinary, reformatory, and security. With regard to the questionable elements, 80 percent of them have been dealt with by party, political, military, civic, and educational organs. Ten percent of them have been sent to reformatory organs, such as the Northwest Public School and the Administration Institute. Ten percent of them have been sent to security organs, such as the Social Affairs Department, the Security Bureau, and the Military Tribunal. These three administrative organs (ordinary, reformatory, and security) will exchange the subjects who are under investigation during the investigative process. Some people have been sent from the ordinary organs to the reformatory and security organs. Some people have been returned from the reformatory and security organs to the ordinary organs after they underwent self-examination and penetrating investigation and expressed remorse. The majority of spies and suspicious elements sent to the ordinary and reformatory organs have gone back to their original work and study positions. Certain people have been put under surveillance and transferred in order to protect national security and to put an end to vandalism and suicide. All administrative organs and schools must tightly organize their own security forces to undertake surveillance duties for a fixed period. Only trustworthy personnel carrying passes on their person are allowed to exit and enter. All other questionable people have temporarily been denied freedom to exit and enter individually. They will only be permitted to come and go in groups.

What does becoming personally involved mean? It means that everyone from the highest-ranking responsible comrades down to the mess hall heads must all personally take part in the big and small meetings, persuasion and interrogation sessions, and research that are part of the campaign to investigate cadres in order to benefit from their collective experiences and direct the campaign. It would be a mistake to engage in a distanced commandism and a passive bureaucratism.

The leadership must unite with the masses. The most reliable administrative head will be chosen from among the personnel of each basic work unit. He will be the nucleus around which to organize a group of several people. These people will in turn serve as the nucleus for a group of from 10 to 100 people. This larger group will then serve as the core around which to organize the masses. The majority of questionable people must partake in discussions with this (nuclear) group and will be interrogated, persuaded, and struggled against by the masses. We will undertake a vigorous movement to seek frank confessions from these people. The core groups at all levels consist of all levels of study committees, party branch committees, and heads of cells. These people must be completely trustworthy. Furthermore, they must gradually emerge from the process of rectification and investigation of cadres.

What does investigate and research mean? It means investigating and researching everybody's history, seeking out contradictions, and discovering problems. The core leadership in every work unit must make two lists of names, one list containing names of those who, in their estimate, are unquestionable. The other list will contain names of those who, in their estimate, are questionable. These lists will be based on prudent consideration of the everyday behavior of the unit's members. Following their prudent consideration and the approval of their superiors, each of the questionable persons will be investigated and researched one by one, seeking truth from facts. Subjective, coercive methods will not be tolerated.

What does distinguishing the frivolous from the serious mean? It means using investigative, research methods to determine, in the first place, if the person is halfhearted (i.e., opportunist); or is a traitor; or is hiding the fact that he participated in other party factions. We absolutely must not confuse halfhearted, wavering people (members who have antiproletarian thoughts or have committed errors) with halfhearted people. Second, we must determine the severity of their crime: Are they ordinary elements whose plot is not serious? (The majority will fall in this category.) Are they middle-ranking elements whose plot is more serious? Or are they the upper-level elements whose plot is very serious? (The last two groups will be in the minority.) We must not automatically assume that all who have been accused are important spies or even spies at all. The mere fact of their being accused or arrested does not tell us if they are spies or if their crimes are serious. We must conduct investigation and research, gather information, and step up our analysis in order to determine if all of those accused are actually spies and, if so, the gravity of their crimes. If they have been unjustly or mistakenly accused, their grievances must be redressed. If they have been arrested, they must be released and their rehabilitation publicly announced. The final verdict for those who have not been arrested must be announced and their reputation rehabilitated. Left extremism will certainly manifest itself during the investigation movement, and coercive errors will be committed (coercion of both individuals and the masses). Fiction will be taken for fact and the frivolous mistaken for the serious. The leadership must pay careful attention to correct these errors at just the right moment. It is not good to correct left extremist erroneous tendencies either too late or too early. If corrected too early, we

may be reacting aimlessly and interrupt the development of the movement. If corrected too late, mistakes will occur that will drain our vitality. Our guiding principle must be: pay careful attention and correct errors at just the right moment. What is "winning over those who have taken the wrong road"? It means, in principle, carrying out an expansive policy of winning over little and big spies, traitors, and ordinary elements manipulated by the GMD and the Japanese (these are in the majority). Yan'an has investigated over 2,000 people (some of these people were misidentified or unjustly wronged; we are planning to rehabilitate them during the final investigation).⁹³ To this day not a single one of them has been put to death. The most pernicious, hardened, capricious, stubbornly unrepentant criminals should of course be sentenced to death. But these people are in the minority. The environment in the front lines and the border regions is special; therefore we must crack down earlier on certain individuals. However, our general strategy should remain one of persistently, patiently, and enthusiastically winning them over by any possible means. We must explain to them in big and small meetings and individual discussion groups that the death knell of fascism has already sounded. We must tell them of the evil and corruption of the GMD and the glory and limitless future of the CCP. We will win over their hearts by winning over their minds. Our experience in Yan'an indicates that we can win over the vast majority of these people, their indecision transformed into unwavering commitment. Many people have been transformed. The mission of this Rectification Campaign is to transform the indecisive into the committed. The GMD and the Japanese have employed a counterrevolutionary strategy of winning over and softening members so that they will serve their cause. On rare occasions, they kill people. Our party must adopt a strategy of winning over all, or a majority of, spies to serve our cause. Otherwise, we will fail. We must not be terrified of the possibility that spies will escape. Of course, it is not our intention to let them escape. We must not let our fear of their escaping serve as an excuse for killing more people. In certain situations, it is better to let them escape than to kill more people. It is more effective to have them escape than to have them die. The only way we can guarantee that we will not make mistakes in the end is by arresting fewer and executing no people, or arresting fewer and executing fewer people. The remaining people, if they have been treated unjustly, can be rehabilitated (if they have been treated unjustly, we must unhesitatingly rehabilitate them). If we arrest and kill many people, we will certainly commit irreversible errors.

We should recruit from 10 to 20 percent of the personnel who are involved in investigating others or who are being investigated themselves to teach them the theory and the technique of investigation, research, detective work, interrogation, and examination. For example, out of the 30,000 party, government, and military personnel and 10,000 citizens so involved in Yan'an, we should recruit from 4,000 to 8,000 people to be good at this work. From April to August 1943, 2,000 such people had already been recruited from the 10,000 cadres and several thousand staff members who participated in the first investigative campaign in Yan'an. It is only in this way that we can break the mystique of security work being very secretive. Further, it

will make it difficult for spies to invade our ranks. It is only in this way that we can train cadres who will be able to ferret out traitors, clean up our ranks, and win over and reform spies and destructive elements. In recruiting cadres, we should recruit from the ranks of both party members and spies. That is to say, we must not only focus on recruiting CP members (of course, this is important). We must also pay attention to counterrevolutionary spies, transforming them into revolutionary cadres who will ferret out traitors. The greater the spy, the greater his use will be to us when he turns. The Japanese and the GMD have used this strategy for a long time. They have quite successfully used this strategy to combat the CCP. In the past several months, Yan'an has already won over a large group of spies, turning them so that they now serve our cause. This benefits our investigative work.

What does educating the masses mean? It means mobilizing the masses and the core leadership group to carry out together the investigation of cadres and then the investigation of all personnel. In this manner not only will we recruit cadres, but also the masses will obtain invaluable experience. Their enthusiasm will be ignited, their eyes opened, and their consciousness raised. Only in this way can the party be solidified and strengthened. If we do not mobilize the masses, if they neither participate, practice, nor raise their consciousness, then the party will never truly be solidified and strengthened. We will surely never attain our goals if we alienate the masses and allow only a handful of people coolly to investigate cadres. In the past, all the extreme mistakes committed by the party during the course of investigating cadres have resulted from rightist approaches to organizational problems and alienating the masses. In order to recruit cadres and educate the masses, the upper ranks cannot stand in for the lower ranks, and one area cannot stand in for another area. For example, if the Central Bureau or regional party committees stand in for the lower ranks in investigating questionable people, in the first place, it will be impossible for them to stand in for all of them. In the second place, even if it were possible (i.e., possible to stand in for all the lower ranks in investigating the majority of cadres), it would effectively result in the local, county, and regional party committee members watching passively from the sidelines. They will never gain any experience in eliminating counterrevolutionaries or investigating cadres, party members, and bad elements. The effect of this will be that the questionable elements will be alienated from the masses and will be able to escape from their work positions, rendering clear investigation difficult. We must recruit people from the occupied areas to come to our base areas to carry out investigative work. Perhaps it is also necessary to transfer some chosen people from the base areas to a particular place (for example, to the party schools and the Anti-Japanese University, or to classes of the Rectification Campaign for concentrated investigation). But it is an error to pursue a general policy of letting the upper ranks stand in for the lower ones, and one area to stand in for another. In order to prevent the lower ranks from becoming biased, the upper ranks should thoroughly prepare their thoughts and organization before engaging in this work. They should also send people to help the lower ranks and bring up people from the lower ranks to help research. By paying

Careful attention and maintaining constant vigilance we can resolve the problem of bias.

We hope that comrades from all areas will study and adopt the important strategies and experiences outlined above, and develop their own experiences based on the concrete realities of their own environment.

Based on the available materials, each area must prolong its Rectification Campaign up to 1944. The movement to investigate cadres can be carried out simultaneously with the Rectification Campaign. Any areas which discover a spy movement and have prepared both ideologically and organizationally can commence investigations. We will begin with a number of important institutions, obtaining experience and solidifying these institutions. Afterward, we will let the movement gradually spread to other institutions and areas. We most certainly cannot start everywhere at once. In those areas which have not yet prepared ideologically or organizationally and those areas or institutions whose leadership has been seized by bad people, we cannot easily start the movement to investigate cadres. In these areas, we must continue to stress the rectification and reform of the leadership and prepare the necessary conditions for investigating cadres.

G.24 Instruction of the CC Concerning Urban Work (5 June 1944)⁹⁴

1) Without the occupation of large cities and vital communication and transportation lines, it is impossible to expel the Japanese bandits from China. Without winning over the hundreds of millions of working people and the urban masses who are oppressed by the Japanese, destroying the puppet armies and organizations, and preparing for armed uprisings, we cannot coordinate with the army and the countryside to occupy large cities and vital communication and transportation lines. In the past, people believed that only the GMD could accomplish the task of driving the Japanese bandits away from the large cities and vital communication and transportation lines. Now this viewpoint must be changed into the belief that some tasks can be accomplished only by our party while others can be accomplished mainly by our party and that it is hopeless to rely on the GMD. The GMD has already become extremely rotten. Several hundred thousand GMD soldiers retreated without a fight or retreated as soon as the battle started in Henan. This shows that in areas where our party does not have a strong army or base area, we are not in a position to shoulder responsibility.

2) Therefore, all bureaus and party committees must regard the work in cities and the bases as their own two major tasks and thus take the responsibility of preparing for the seizure of all large, medium, and small cities and vital communication and transportation lines. At present, the Japanese bandits are launching large-

scale offensives along the front battle lines in China. The Japanese bandits are in decline, and the struggle against Hitler by the West will soon be victorious. The counteroffensives against the Japanese bandits in the Pacific will certainly develop further in the future. On the one hand, all this has provided our party with favorable conditions for developing and consolidating bases, building much stronger armies, and strengthening local work as compared with the past. On the other hand, it enables us to win over the tens of millions of masses in the cities and along the vital transportation lines, to attack and win over the puppet soldiers, and police and to prepare for armed uprisings. When the time is ripe, these two factors will combine, enabling attacks on the Japanese from within and without and the occupation of large cities and vital communication and transportation lines. The idea of coordinating actions from within and without is our party's fundamental principle for expelling the enemy from large cities.

3) All bureaus and party committees must give first priority to the work of seeking to occupy all enemy large, medium, and small cities and vital communication and transportation lines, preparing the masses for armed uprisings, and changing the past position of neglecting and slighting urban work and that along the vital transportation and communication lines. They must arouse the attention of the whole party for this work and seriously and carefully summarize experiences, study methods, organize units, assign cadres, and carry out the work in the hope that in the second half of this year and the first half of next year we will achieve marked results and be ready to link up with the major developments in the world and to seize, when the time is ripe, all enemy-occupied cities and vital transportation and communication lines in the vicinity of our army troops and strong bases.

4) To accomplish this great task, the following concrete problems must be solved:

First, on ideology: Education of the broad ranks of cadres should be carried out so that they can understand the possibility, necessity, and importance of the final expulsion of the Japanese bandits. Without such ideological education, the whole party cannot be mobilized. Cadres should be made to understand that the present work in the cities and along the vital communication and transportation lines has entirely new objectives. The purpose of past work was to preserve the organization, survive the dark days, obtain intelligence information, and purchase [necessary] goods. The purpose of present work is to win over tens of millions of masses, puppet soldiers, and police to prepare for armed uprisings and to seize cities and vital communication and transportation lines. All efforts and work are aimed at and serve these objectives. Cadres should realize that now is the time to carry out this work because both the world's war of resistance against the fascists and the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan are indeed nearing total victory. The GMD is now extremely corrupt, and our party and army have succeeded in holding onto vast areas in the enemy's rear. The people of the whole country are disappointed in the GMD and pin their hopes on our party and army. The revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses in the enemy-occupied areas is bound to rise very rapidly in the future.

In comparison with the past, the social and mass conditions are more favorable for this work. Therefore, in the past it was correct not to put forward the task of preparing for armed uprisings and seizing large cities. However, the task must be put forward now. If we do not put it forward, we shall commit a big mistake, or we shall be forced to seize large cities and vital communication and transportation lines without being properly prepared. The result will be to deprive our army of adequate or properly coordinated actions from within the cities when they are attacked. The masses will not be quickly mobilized, revolutionary order will not be established, and the management of cities will not be grasped when the cities are seized. Cadres should realize that the work of preparation for armed uprisings to seize the cities and vital communication and transportation lines is protracted and arduous. Because of the special circumstances in China, the urban armed uprisings can only be victorious when they respond to military attacks from outside, or when the forces within and without can be coordinated (the Shanghai uprising of 1927). It is very difficult for the urban uprisings to be victorious in isolation. Therefore, in preparing urban armed uprisings, the mistakes of impatience and rashness in launching them should be opposed, and single-handed and premature launching of uprisings without being coordinated with our military forces outside should also be opposed. This is extremely complex and protracted work that requires patience; rashness cannot help. Cadres should also realize that it is impossible for us to keep secret all the guidelines and general tactics of our work in the cities and that they should be transmitted throughout the party. However, specific work plans and concrete organizational work for the cities and all enemy-occupied areas should be kept completely secret. The party should educate all members about secret work, and every party member and cadre should only know what they need to know and not all they can know.

Second, on planning and organizations: All bureaus and party committees must draft a rough plan covering such things as the distribution of responsibilities, organization of units, assignment of cadres, and training of cadres in light of the conditions in all large, medium, or small cities and of specific information about railroads and highways and the puppet armies and police in their own regions. Capable working committees should be set up taking as the focus of their work one city (large, medium, or small), one section of railroad or highway, or one puppet army unit or police organization. Large cities and large army units may also organize several subcommittees to work in subdistricts. Such committees will not be involved in work in the bases and should specialize in organizing and directing work concerning cities and vital transportation and communication lines and among the puppet armies. At present, these committees may be established in the bases or guerrilla war zones. If it is safe, they may be set up in cities. All bureaus and party committees of all districts should delegate [powers] to the working committees directly under them to carry out work in large and medium cities and important railroads within their sphere of responsibility. For all enemy-occupied county capitals and small cities, committees under the direction of various districts and county party committees should be organized. Committees should be set up under appropri-

ate party committees with one army or division of puppet troops, which often moves, as the focus of their work. At the same time, all party and army organizations should be mobilized to carry out work separately and through many different channels. All organizations ranging from the branches to the Center may directly dispatch personnel for work if it is possible to deal with cities, vital communication and transportation lines, and the puppet troops and police. Temporarily, they do not have to unify their actions; nor do their relationships have to be explained or revealed. When clashes occur in work and among the masses because of the different relationships, mutual consideration and assistance should be provided, and there should be no competition and complaints. The leadership of this work should be the responsibility of party committees at all levels. But, for the convenience of management, departments for city work may be formed under all bureaus and party committees. Apart from leading and organizing secret work in the cities and on vital communication and transportation lines, these departments should also lead small [groups of] plainclothes guerrilla troops near the cities and vital transportation lines in enemy-controlled areas so as to provide favorable conditions for work in the cities. These departments should be situated in the relatively secret areas of the bases and should not be mixed up with party, government, and army units in the base areas.

Third, concerning the direction of the work: The general situation is favorable for us. The objective of our work is to oppose the national enemy, and our party's powerful military forces are near or not far from cities and vital communication and transportation lines. This provides very good conditions for us to carry out this work. Among the people in the enemy-occupied cities and along the vital communication and transportation lines, there are only a few diehard traitors and collaborators and obstinately anticommunist elements. Most of the people will participate in, or sympathize with, various forms of anti-Japanese work. Therefore, we must carry out, on a wide scale, appropriate work among masses and people from all walks of life in cities and along the vital lines. This work must be carried out among those working for the puppet political, economic, and cultural institutions; young students; children and women; and even various secret societies and hooligan organizations. The focus of work, however, must be on winning over several hundred thousand puppet troops and police and several million workers and laborers. These are the decisive forces for the armed uprisings. In the past, this was a point we neglected in all regions. Our activities and organizations among the workers should be separated from the activities of the upper-level united front. The purpose of the upper-level united front is to cover up and assist the activities of the lower-level masses. Our activities should have nothing to do with the GMD organizations. We should expose to the masses the reactionary, corrupt, and incompetent nature of the GMD personnel and the fact that they put the interests of the minority above that of the national interest. This will eliminate any illusions about the GMD among the masses in the large cities. Our organizations and relationships in large cities established in the past for intelligence and economic work should continue this work.

They should only carry out work among the upper levels and the masses when conditions permit. In order to create extensive communication links between the base areas and cities (especially large cities) and along vital communication and transportation lines, and to prepare the military areas for launching the seizure of cities and the vital lines, adequate work should be done among the masses living in the vicinity. This will enable us to use guerrilla warfare and other appropriate methods to close in gradually on the cities and the vital lines from these areas. This will provide favorable conditions for work in the cities and along the vital lines. At the same time, it is necessary to mobilize large numbers of workers and revolutionary intellectuals in cities and along vital lines to come out of the cities and join the guerrilla warfare. Some should be prepared to be sent back to direct the armed uprisings when they occur, to coordinate actions from within and without, and to occupy large cities and vital communication and transportation lines. To repeat, the idea of coordinating actions from within and without is fundamental thinking of our party for the seizure of cities and vital lines. This is a point of departure for the deployment of all forces and arrangement of all work.

Fourth, concerning work methods: Work methods for the cities and along vital lines should be drawn from summarizing experiences and should be revised in light of future work. All good methods created by the masses should be popularized. However, it must be pointed out that the party's work methods in cities and along the vital communication and transportation lines in the Civil War period were, in the main, wrong. They should not be adopted and should be repudiated to avoid recurrence. Since the War of Resistance, all base areas have conducted very effective work to coordinate with the legal or illegal struggles in the enemy-occupied areas and some small cities near them. Much good work has also been done in some large cities. Generally speaking, these work methods are correct. If our work experience in the enemy-occupied areas and small cities is readjusted appropriately, it can be applied in large and medium cities and on the vital communication and transportation lines. All regions should carefully study the form of struggle that is appropriate for each district and each type of masses and the form of coordination between the legal and illegal struggles in each environment. Inside enemy-occupied areas, the party and anti-Japanese organizations should remain secret. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to ensuring that the work remains secret and that the work force remains small and competent. It is also necessary to strictly guard against infiltration by spies. However, we should use open and legal methods as much as possible to work in all ordinary mass organizations and to participate in mass activities. For example, we should take advantage of the existing various puppet organizations (the New People's Association, the Self-Defense League, etc.) and form various types of gray social organizations or set up purely professional social agencies and engage in professional activities that have close links with the masses (teahouses, restaurants, and pawnshops). Even factories, workshops, schools, and shops may be used to form certain undefined types of alliance of all personnel under the slogan of deceiving and dealing with the enemy and traitors and

protecting the Chinese people. This is also a very good form of mass organization. We have frequently taken note of the alliance of all inhabitants of villages near the base areas which have strict organization and division of work for deceiving and dealing with the enemy and traitors. This method should be adopted in some factories, workshops, schools, and shops in cities. Taking the protection of the masses' real interests as our starting point, we should unite them. For example, reducing burdens, eliminating harassments, concealing goods, increasing wages, and improving work conditions are all starting points for the organization of united mass activities. Together with the masses we should make good use of the enemy's deceptive policies toward China. We should use them for legal slogans. Furthermore, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army have an extremely good reputation among the people from all walks of life in the enemy-occupied areas. This can also be useful for our work in the cities. Many people are proud of hearing news about our army, establishing certain links with it, or obtaining certain articles of proof about our army. We should take advantage of this situation to promote the unity of the people. However, this is illegal in the enemy-occupied areas and should be done in a very covert and limited way. At present, all legal and illegal struggles in the cities and on the vital communication and transportation lines should be restricted so as not to affect and obstruct our legal organizations and struggles. This is different from the legal or illegal struggle in the guerrilla war zones near the base areas. The legal struggles in the guerrilla war zones are often aimed at covering up the activities and the existence of illegal guerrilla troops. On the other hand, illegal struggles in cities and on the vital lines should often take second place to legal struggles. Propaganda work in enemy-occupied areas should be carried out using many legal methods, such as various legal newspapers, periodicals, and books and various legal slogans. All forms of illegal propaganda should also be made use of, and adequate consideration should be given to these methods. At present, oral propaganda is the most important form, and even the method of spreading rumors may be adopted. There should be discrete organizations to issue illegal handbills, books, and newspapers. In a word, two work-method deviations should be avoided in cities. The first is the adventurist method of carelessness, irresponsibility, making loud noises, and rashness. The second is tailism, which is revealed by inaction, looking for cover, and refusal to establish links with the masses and to carry out mass work. The correct methods are to keep in contact with and unite as many of the masses as possible, raise the level of the awareness and organization of the masses, and hide the competent and secret organizations and activities among the masses and their legal activities. Before the uprisings, all types of organizations and struggles should avoid defined and systematic forms and should adopt undefined and scattered forms for the purpose of winning more victories and reducing losses.

Fifth, cadres: Large numbers of cadres should go to work in the cities and on vital communication and transportation lines. All methods should be used to persuade the existing cadres in the cities and the old cadres who worked in the cities in

the past to continue to shoulder the work and to absorb new experiences and work under the new methods. Moreover, years of the two types of struggle in the enemy-occupied areas near the various base areas have tempered numerous party and nonparty cadres who are good at legal struggles. Many are good at dealing with the enemy and have rich experiences in deceiving the enemy and conducting legal struggles. Some have even surpassed the old cadres who engaged in urban work during the Civil War period. Many can settle themselves in among the workers in the cities and in various professions. These cadres should be trained, cultivated, and used to maximum effect. As long as they have the means to settle in large and medium cities and on the vital lines and can carry out their work, some people should be selected, trained for a short period, and dispatched for work, regardless of whether they are intellectuals, workers, peasants, or from other professions or whether they are party or nonparty cadres. There are many such cadres in all base areas. Furthermore, all base areas have some people who often travel to the enemy-occupied areas for business and work. Especially in north Suzhou and Jiaodong, there are several hundred thousand people going every year to Shanghai, Hangzhou, and the cities of Manchuria to seek a living. Therefore, it is necessary to find and train various cadres for urban work from among these people. Moreover, some cadres may be trained from the puppet troops and prisoners and then sent back. Members of the gentry in the bases who are moving to live in the cities may be given certain tasks and pretexts to engage in activities. Even those who are politically suspect and who are not subject to easy investigation in the bases may also be sent to conduct certain independent activities in the enemy-occupied cities. This can be used to test them. Among the various cadres, special attention should be paid to cultivating local cadres in cities and on the vital lines. Cadres from outside should see themselves as the leaders and protectors of local cadres. In the base areas, cadres who grew up and lived in cities and on the vital lines should be found and trained in order to be sent back. In sum, we should be open-minded in utilizing various types of cadres to engage in all types of work, separate different types of work and different types of people to avoid confusion, and proceed to work independently and to use many different channels. At the same time, however, we must preserve the competency, purity, and reliability of the party organizations. Reliable strong party centers should be established in all large, medium, and small cities and along the railways and highways to form the leading force in the great work in the cities. This will link the party's leading cores with the broad masses. In addition, responsible cadres at all levels of the party, government, and army in the base areas should study effectively and master work, study the art of coordinating actions from within and without during armed urban uprisings, study ways to establish revolutionary order in the cities and to manage cities and large industrial and commercial enterprises for the purpose of preparing for the seizure and management of large cities and vital communication and transportation lines.

Sixth, finances: We must have large sums of money to finance our work in the cities and on the vital lines. As long as it does not give rise to waste on the part of

cadres and the idea of hiring by the personnel working in the cities, all necessary expenses should be paid. All base area organizations should refund the necessary expenses for the work in cities and along the vital lines. An adequate sum of money should be set aside in all base area budgets to finance the urban work. It is permissible to adopt the method of providing capital to do business in cities and along the vital lines and using the profits of the businesses to finance the expenses of the work.

5) The above opinions concerning various concrete issues should be effectively studied and flexibly used in actual work by all bureaus and party committees in light of local conditions and should be further developed in future work. Only with the solution of these specific problems can work in the cities and along vital communication and transportation lines achieve marked successes and can the objective of the armed uprisings be obtained.

G.25 Resolution of the CCP CC on Certain Historical Questions (20 April 1945)⁹⁵

I

Ever since its birth in 1921, the CCP has made the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution the guiding principle in all its work, and Comrade Mao Zedong's theory and practice of the Chinese revolution represent this integration. With the founding of our party, a new stage of the Chinese revolution immediately unfolded, the stage of the new-democratic revolution, as pointed out by Comrade Mao Zedong. Throughout the twenty-four years of struggle for New Democracy (from 1921 to 1945), throughout the three historical periods—the first Great Revolution, the rural revolution, and the War of Resistance against Japan—our party has consistently led the broad masses of the Chinese people in extremely arduous and bitter revolutionary struggles against their enemies, imperialism and feudalism, and has gained great successes and rich experience. In the course of its struggle the party has produced its own leader, Comrade Mao Zedong. Representing the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese people, Comrade Mao Zedong has creatively applied the scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, the acme of human wisdom, to China—a large, semifeudal and semicolonial country in which the peasantry constitutes the bulk of the masses and the immediate task is to fight against imperialism and feudalism, a country with a vast area and a huge population, where the situation is extremely complicated and the struggle extremely hard—and he has brilliantly developed the theories of Lenin and Stalin on the colonial and semicolonial question as well as Stalin's theory concerning the Chinese revolution. It is only because the party has firmly adhered to the correct

Marxist-Leninist line and waged a victorious struggle against all erroneous ideas opposed to this line that it has scored great achievements in these three periods; has arrived at today's unprecedented ideological, political, and organizational solidarity and unity; has developed into the powerful revolutionary force of today, having over 1.2 million members and leading China's liberated areas with their population of nearly 100 million and an army of nearly 1 million; and has become the center of gravity for the whole nation in the War of Resistance against Japan and in the cause of liberation.

II

[[In the first period (1921-27), especially from 1924 to 1927, the great anti-imperialist and antifeudalist revolution of the Chinese people, correctly guided by the Comintern and influenced, propelled forward, and organized by the correct leadership of the CCP, advanced rapidly and won great victories. It was defeated because of the betrayal of the GMD and, in particular, because of the rightist ideology in our party as represented by Chen Duxiu. Between 1927 and 1937, it was the CCP alone that upheld the banner of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. The party also fought against the counterrevolutionary activities of the Trotskyite Chen Duxiu clique and of Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao, and others. At last, toward the end of the rural revolutionary war, our party definitely established Mao Zedong's leadership in the central leading body and throughout the party. This was the CCP's greatest achievement in this period. The gravest error in this time was the "left" error in the political, military, and organizational lines from the time of the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC (January 1931) to the Zunyi meeting (January 1935).

III

Petty-bourgeois revolutionary impetuosity was aggravated by hatred of the GMD's policy of massacre and indignation at Chen Duxiu capitulationism. This led to the rise of "leftism" that first appeared at the 7 August 1927 emergency meeting. However, the meeting did make a positive contribution.]]

At a critical moment in the Chinese revolution, it [7 August meeting] resolutely corrected and ended the capitulationism of Chen Duxiu, decided on a general policy of rural revolution and armed resistance to the GMD reactionaries' massacres, and called on the party and the masses to continue the revolutionary fight. All this was correct and constituted the main aspect of the meeting. But in combating right errors the meeting paved the way for "left" errors. Politically, it failed to realize that either appropriate counterattacks or necessary tactical retreats had to be organized at that time, according to the different conditions in the different localities, in order to preserve revolutionary positions and muster the revolutionary forces in a planned way. Instead, it tolerated and fostered tendencies toward adventurism and commandism (especially the forcing of workers to strike). Organizationally, the meeting

initiated excessive and sectarian inner-party struggles, unduly or improperly stressed the importance of the leading cadres being exclusively of working-class origin, and brought about a rather serious state of ultrademocracy in the party.

[[After the meeting, "leftism" continued to grow, and at the November 1927 meeting it assumed the form of putschism (or adventurism). For the first time the "left" line was in a dominant position in the party's central leading organ. The theory of so-called continuous revolution dominated. This line, however, only lasted about six months. The line of the Sixth Party Congress (July 1928) was basically correct.]]

On the other hand, the Sixth Congress also had its shortcomings and mistakes. It lacked correct estimates and policies concerning the dual character of the intermediate classes and the internal contradictions among the reactionary forces; it also lacked the necessary understanding of the party's need for an orderly tactical retreat after the defeat of the Great Revolution, of the importance of rural base areas, and of the protracted nature of the democratic revolution. Although these shortcomings and mistakes prevented the thorough eradication of the "left" ideas existing after the 7 August conference, and although they were made more extreme and were greatly magnified by the subsequent "left" ideas, nevertheless they cannot eclipse the correctness of the Congress in its main aspect. For some time after the Congress, the party's work was fruitful. During that time, Comrade Mao Zedong not only, in practice, developed the correct aspect of the line of the Sixth Congress and correctly solved many problems which the congress had either not solved or had solved incorrectly, but also, in theory, provided a fuller and more concrete scientific Marxist-Leninist basis for the orientation of the Chinese revolution. Under his guidance and influence, the Red Army movement gradually developed into an important political factor in the country. In the white areas, too, party organizations and party work revived to some extent.

[[But during the second half of 1929 and first half of 1930 certain "left" ideas and policies that still existed in the party again gained some ground. They developed into the second "left" line. This was the Li Lisan line. Comrade Mao Zedong's correct ideas on how to advance a high tide of nationwide revolution were denounced as "utterly erroneous . . . localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality." The denunciation of the Li Lisan line was also short-lived, however, less than four months. Comrade Mao, in particular, never agreed with the Li Lisan line. Thus, the Jiangxi revolutionary base actually grew stronger. The Third Plenum of the Sixth CC played a positive role in ending the implementation of the Li Lisan line even though its documents showed a conciliatory and compromising spirit toward it (i.e., saying that the line was only wrong tactically). Thus, the struggle against "leftism" was not carried out fully. At this time, a number of party comrades who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle and guilty of "left" dogmatist errors came forward, led by Comrade Wang Ming. Although this "left" line under Comrade Wang Ming criticized Li Lisan's "left" errors, it mainly criticized them as "rightist."]]

On the question of the nature of Chinese society and class relations, the new "left" line exaggerated the relative weight of capitalism in China's economy, exaggerated the significance of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and the significance of the "elements of socialist revolution" at the present stage of the Chinese revolution, and denied the existence of the intermediate camp and of third parties and groups. On the question of the revolutionary situation and the tasks of the party, the new "left" line continued to stress that there was a "revolutionary high tide" throughout the country and that the party should have a "line of taking the offensive" on a national scale, and it held that an "immediate revolutionary situation" would soon occur in one or more major provinces containing key cities. From a "left" viewpoint it slanderously asserted that in China there was as yet no "genuine" Red Army and no "genuine" government of councils of workers, peasants, and soldiers [i.e., Soviets] and asserted with special emphasis that the main danger in the party then consisted of "right opportunism," "opportunism in practical work," and "the rich peasant line." Organizationally, the exponents of this new "left" line violated discipline, refused the work assigned to them by the party, committed the error of joining with a number of other comrades in factional activities against the central leadership, wrongly called on the party membership to set up a provisional central leading body, and demanded that "fighting cadres" who "actively support and pursue" their "left" line should be used to "reform and strengthen the leading organs at all levels"; they thereby created a serious crisis in the party. Hence, generally speaking, the new "left" line was more determined, more "theoretical," more domineering, and more fully articulated in its "leftism" than the Li Lisan line, even though it did not call for organizing insurrections in the key cities and, for a time, did not call for concentrating the Red Army to attack those cities.

In January 1931, the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CC was convened under circumstances in which pressure was being applied from all directions by the "left" dogmatist and sectarian elements headed by Comrade Wang Ming and in which some comrades in the central leading organ who had committed empiricist errors were compromising with these elements and supporting them. The convening of this session played no positive or constructive role; the outcome was the acceptance of the new "left" line, its triumph in the central leading organ, and the beginning of the domination of a "left" line in the party for the third time during the period of the rural revolutionary war. The Fourth Plenum immediately put into effect two interrelated and erroneous tenets in the program of the new "left" line: the fight against the alleged "right deviation" as the "main danger in the party at present," and the "reform and strengthening of the leading bodies at all levels." Ostensibly it still carried the banner of opposition to the Li Lisan line and to the "line of reconciliation," but in essence its political program was chiefly "against the right deviation."

[[The Plenum's resolutions did not analyze the current political situation. "Left" dogmatist and sectarian comrades were promoted to the central leading organ, and they excessively attacked those who had followed the Li Lisan line, wrongly attacked comrades headed by Qu Qiubai who were alleged to have been recon-

ciliationists, and immediately after the plenum wrongly attacked the great majority of the so-called rightist comrades. The Red Army in the base areas won great victories and smashed the enemy's second and third "encirclement and suppression" campaigns. The Japanese imperialist invasion began on 18 September 1931, arousing a new upsurge in the national democratic movement. From the beginning, the new central leadership made a wrong appraisal of the new situation created by these events. It greatly exaggerated the crisis in the GMD regime and the growth of the revolutionary forces. It ignored the fact that the intermediate classes were demanding resistance to Japan and wanted democracy. It categorically asserted that the intermediate groups were the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese revolution.

The period from the establishment of the provisional central leadership headed by Comrade Bo Gu in September 1931 to the Zunyi Conference in January 1935 was one of continued development of the third "left" line. When the leadership moved to Jiangxi early in 1933, this move facilitated the further application of its incorrect line there and in the neighboring base areas. This erroneous "left" line led to the problems of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and was applied in the Fujian Incident. The Fifth Plenum (January 1934) masked the peak of development of the third "left" line. During withdrawal from Jiangxi and during the Long March, the error of flightism was committed under the "left" line. The leaders of this "left" line were the two dogmatists, Comrades Wang Ming and Bo Gu.

The comrades who advocated the correct line, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their representative, were completely opposed to this line. As more cadres and members rallied to Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership, it was possible to put an end to the "left" line at the Zunyi Conference]].

The Zunyi Conference was entirely correct in concentrating all its efforts on rectifying the military and organizational errors, which at that time were of decisive significance. The meeting inaugurated a new central leadership, headed by Comrade Mao Zedong—a historic change of paramount importance in the CCP. Precisely because of this change, our party was able to conclude the Long March victoriously, to preserve and steel a hard core of cadres in the party and the Red Army under the extremely difficult and dangerous conditions of the Long March, to successfully overcome the line of Zhang Guotao who insisted on retreating and fleeing and actually set up a duplicate party, to save the north Shaanxi revolutionary base area from the crisis brought about by the "left" line, to lead the National Salvation movement of 9 December 1935 correctly, to settle the Xi'an Incident of 1936 correctly, to organize the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and to set in motion the sacred War of Resistance against Japan.

Since the Zunyi Conference, the political line of the central leading organ of the party, led by Comrade Mao Zedong, has been entirely correct. The "left" line has been gradually overcome politically, militarily, and organizationally. Since 1942, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, the party-wide movement for the rectification of subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped party writing [formalism] and also for the study of party history has corrected, at their very ideological

roots, the various "left" and right errors that have arisen in the history of the party. The overwhelming majority of the comrades who committed "left" and right errors have made great progress through a long process of learning from experience and have done much good work for the party and the people. They are now united with the masses of other comrades on the basis of a common political understanding. This Enlarged Seventh Plenum is happy to point out that through its successes and reverses our party has at last attained, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, the unprecedentedly high level of solidarity and unity it now enjoys ideologically, politically, organizationally, and militarily. It is a party that will soon win victory, a party no force can conquer.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenum holds that since the stage of the War of Resistance is not yet concluded it is appropriate to postpone to a future date the drawing of conclusions on certain questions in the history of the party during the War of Resistance.

IV

So that comrades may have a better understanding of the errors of the various "left" lines, and particularly of the third "left" line, so that "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" they may prevent the recurrence of such errors, we set forth the main content of these lines where they were contrary to the correct line politically, militarily, organizationally, and ideologically.

[[1) Comrade Stalin has pointed out and Comrade Mao Zedong has analyzed in detail that China currently is a semicolonial and semifeudal country, and that since World War I the Chinese revolution has been a national democratic one. It is a new democratic revolution, but its development is extremely uneven. This means that it will be protracted and tortuous. At the same time, armed revolutionary base areas can be established. The "left" lines were wrong politically in three main respects.

First, the various "left" lines were in error, above all, on the question of the task of the revolution and the question of class relations. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that the task of the Chinese revolution is to fight imperialism and feudalism and that the fundamental content of this was the peasant struggle for land. Thus, the Chinese bourgeois democratic revolution was in essence a peasant revolution and that the Chinese proletariat's basic task was to lead the peasant struggle. His basic ideas of new democracy were not understood and were even opposed by the various "left" lines. The third "left" line put the struggle against the bourgeoisie on a par with the struggle against imperialism and feudalism, denied the existence of an intermediate camp and of third parties and groups, and laid particular stress on the struggle against the rich peasants.]]

Second, the various "left" lines were in error on the question of revolutionary war and revolutionary base areas. Comrade Stalin said, "In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and

one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.” Like Comrade Stalin, Comrade Mao Zedong had correctly pointed out as far back as the early period of the rural revolutionary war that in the Chinese revolution armed struggle is the main form of struggle and an army composed chiefly of peasants is the main form of organization, because semicolonial and semifeudal China is a large, nonuniform country which lacks democracy and industry. Comrade Mao Zedong also pointed out that the vast rural areas inhabited by the broad masses of the peasantry are the indispensable, vital positions of the Chinese revolution (revolutionary villages can encircle the cities, but revolutionary cities cannot detach themselves from the villages), and that China can and must establish armed revolutionary base areas as the starting point for nationwide victory (democratic unification of the whole country). In the period of the 1924–27 revolution, when a coalition government had been formed through GMD-CCP cooperation, the base areas had certain big cities as their centers, but even then, in order to consolidate the foundations of the base areas, it was necessary, under the leadership of the proletariat, to build a people’s army with the peasants as the main body and solve the land problem in the rural areas. But in the period of the rural revolutionary war, since the cities were all occupied by powerful counterrevolutionary forces, base areas had to be set up, expanded, and consolidated mainly by relying on peasant guerrilla warfare (not on positional warfare) and first of all in the countryside, where counterrevolutionary rule was weak (and not in the key cities). Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that in China the historical conditions for the existence of such armed revolutionary rural base areas are the “localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy) and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit” and the resulting “prolonged splits and wars within the white regime.” [[Mao also pointed out the historic significance of such base areas for the Chinese revolution.]]

As for mass work in the cities during that period, the principal policies should have been those advocated by Comrade Liu Shaoqi, the exponent of the correct line for work in the white areas, namely, to act chiefly on the defensive (and not on the offensive); to utilize all possible legal opportunities for work (and not to reject the use of legality) so that the party organizations could go deep among the masses, work under cover for a long time, and accumulate strength; and always to be ready to send people to develop armed struggle in the rural areas and thereby to coordinate with the struggle in the countryside and advance the development of the revolutionary situation. Therefore, until such time as the general situation made it possible to again form democratic governments in the cities, offensives in the countryside and a general defensive position in the cities, even victory and the offensive in one rural area and defeat, retreat, and the defensive in another—all these formed the crisscross pattern of revolution and counterrevolution up and down the country during that period and accordingly determined the course from defeat to victory which the revolution had to follow. But the exponents of the various “left” lines did not understand the specific features of semicolonial and semifeudal Chinese society, did not understand that the bourgeois democratic revolution in China was in essence

a peasant revolution, and did not understand the uneven, tortuous, and protracted nature of the Chinese revolution; therefore they underestimated the importance of military struggle, and especially of peasant guerrilla warfare and rural base areas, and opposed what they called "the doctrine of the gun" and the "localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality." They were forever dreaming that the struggles of the workers and the other masses in the cities would suddenly break through the enemy's severe repression and surge forward, erupt into armed insurrections in key cities, achieve an "initial victory in one or more provinces," and bring about a so-called nationwide revolutionary high tide and nationwide victory; and they made this dream the basis on which all their work was planned and organized. In reality, however, given the general relation of class forces after the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the first result of this dream was none other than the failure of the urban work itself. This was how the first "left" line met with defeat; the second "left" line repeated the same error, the only difference being that now support was demanded from the Red Army, for the Red Army had become a considerable force. The second "left" line too ended in failure, yet the third "left" line continued to demand "real" preparations for armed insurrections in the big cities, the only difference being that now the main demand was for the Red Army to seize big cities, because it had grown even stronger, while the work in the cities had shrunk even further. The result of subordinating rural work to urban work, instead of the other way around, was that after the work in the cities failed, most of the rural work failed too. It should be pointed out that after 1932 the actions aimed at capturing key cities had in fact come to a halt because the Red Army could not capture or hold them, and particularly because the GMD was attacking on a large scale; furthermore, after 1933, owing to the still greater damage done to our urban work, the provisional central leadership itself moved from the city to a rural base area. Thus a change did take place. But as far as the comrades pursuing the "left" line were concerned, this change was not made consciously or as a result of correct conclusions reached through a study of the specific characteristics of the Chinese revolution; therefore they continued to direct all the work in the Red Army and the base areas from their erroneous urban viewpoint, and caused great damage to the work. The following instances are clear proof: they advocated positional warfare and opposed guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare of a guerrilla character; they wrongly stressed what they called "regularization" of the Red Army and opposed its so-called guerrillaism; they did not realize that they had to adapt themselves to dispersed rural areas and to protracted guerrilla warfare in areas cut off from one another by the enemy, and so they did not use the labor power and material resources in the base areas sparingly or take other necessary measures; in the campaign against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" they put forward the wrong slogans of "The decisive battle as between the two roads for China" and "Do not yield a single inch of territory in the base areas."

[[After the defeat of 1927, Comrade Mao Zedong correctly pointed out that the revolutionary tide was at a low ebb and that the enemy was stronger throughout the

country as a whole. Mao maintained, however, that it was possible for one or two small areas of red political power to exist. It would be possible to exploit enemy weaknesses and thus, in the same period, our tactics should vary according to our enemies' strengths. Comrade Mao's tactics were brilliantly developed. Comrade Liu Shaoqi's ideas on tactics for work in the white areas are likewise a model. The success of the 9 December 1935 movement proved the tactics correct.]]

This Enlarged Seventh Plenum declares emphatically that a change in the situation is now imminent, the very change our rural work should have promoted and our urban work should have awaited in the period discussed above. Only now, in the final stage of the War of Resistance against Japan, when the army under our party's leadership has grown strong and will grow still stronger, is it correct to place work in the Japanese-occupied cities on a par with work in the liberated areas, to actively prepare all the conditions for annihilating the Japanese aggressors in the key cities by coordinated attacks from within and without, and then to shift the center of gravity of our work to these cities. This will be a new change of historic significance for our party, which shifted the center of gravity of its work to the countryside with so much difficulty after the defeat of the revolution in 1927. All party members should prepare for this change with full political awareness and should not repeat the error of the "left" line on the matter of the shift from the cities to the countryside during the rural revolutionary war, an error which was manifested first in opposing and refusing a shift and then in shifting reluctantly under compulsion and without political awareness. In the GMD areas, however, conditions are different; therefore our immediate tasks, whether in the countryside or in the cities, are to go all out to mobilize the masses, to resolutely oppose a split and civil war, to strive for unity and peace, and to demand redoubled efforts in the war against Japan, the abolition of the GMD's one-party dictatorship, and the formation of a unified democratic coalition government. When the Japanese-occupied cities are liberated by the people and a unified democratic coalition government is really established and consolidated, the rural base areas will have accomplished their historical task.

In contrast to such correct direction of tactics, the comrades taking the various "left" lines failed to examine the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves objectively, failed to adopt corresponding forms of struggle and organization, and did not recognize or pay sufficient attention to the enemy's internal contradictions. Therefore, not only did they meet with defeat as a result of blindly executing a so-called offensive line when they should have been on the defensive, they also met with defeat even when an offensive was timely, because they did not know how to organize a victorious offensive. Their way of "appraising a situation" was to take individual, incipient, indirect, one-sided, and superficial phenomena favorable to their viewpoint and magnify them into something widespread, grave, direct, all-sided, and essential, and they were afraid to acknowledge or were blind to all facts not in conformity with their viewpoint (such as the enemy's strength and temporary victory, our weakness and temporary defeat, the inadequate political consciousness of the masses, the enemy's internal contradictions, and the progressive side of the

middle-of-the-roaders). They never envisaged the most difficult and complex situations which might arise; they always dreamed about the most favorable and simplest situations which could not possibly arise. In the Red Army movement, they invariably described the enemy encircling the revolutionary base areas as "terribly shaky," "extremely panicky," "approaching final extinction," "collapsing at an accelerating rate," "totally collapsing," and so on. The exponents of the third "left" line even held that the Red Army enjoyed superiority over all GMD forces, which outnumbered it many times, and therefore kept on pressing the Red Army to make reckless advances regardless of the conditions and even without resting. They denied the unevenness of revolutionary development as between southern and northern China resulting from the 1924-27 revolution (a situation that was not reversed until the War of Resistance against Japan), wrongly opposed what they called "the theory of the backwardness of the north," and demanded the establishment of red regimes everywhere in the countryside of northern China and the organization of mutinies in all the white armies there so as to form Red Army units. They also denied the unevenness of development as between the center and borders of the base areas and wrongly opposed what they called the "Luo Ming line." They refused to make use of the contradictions among the warlords attacking the Red Army and to reach compromises with those forces which were willing to stop attacking. As for work in the white areas, they refused to take the necessary steps for retreat and defense or to make use of all legal possibilities in the cities where the revolutionary tide had ebbed and the counterrevolutionary ruling forces which were very powerful. Instead, they continued to take the offensive in forms inadmissible under the prevailing conditions; they set up large unprotected party organizations and various "red mass organizations" divorced from the masses and duplicating the party; they constantly and regardless of conditions called for and organized political strikes, joint strikes, and strikes of students, merchants, troops, and policemen, and also parades and demonstrations, lightning meetings, and even armed insurrections—actions which were unlikely or unable to win the participation or support of the masses—and they misrepresented the failures of these actions as "victories." To sum up, the comrades taking the various "left" lines, and particularly the third, were versed in nothing but closed-doorism and adventurism, they believed blindly in "struggle above all and all for struggle" and in "continuously expanding the struggle and raising it to a higher level," and they therefore continuously met with defeats which should not have occurred and could have been avoided.

2) Militarily: At the present stage of the Chinese revolution, military struggle is the main form of political struggle. During the rural revolutionary war it became the most urgent question in the party line. Comrade Mao Zedong has applied Marxism-Leninism and formulated not only the correct political line for the Chinese revolution, but also, beginning with the period of the rural revolutionary war, the correct military line subordinate to this political line. Comrade Mao Zedong's military line proceeds from two fundamental points. First, our army is and can be an army of only one kind; it must be an instrument subordinate to the ideological

leadership of the proletariat and serving the struggle of the people and the building of revolutionary base areas. Second, our war is and can be a war of only one kind; it must be a war in which we recognize that the enemy is strong and we are weak, that the enemy is big and we are small, and in which therefore we fully utilize the enemy's weaknesses and our strong points and fully rely on the strength of the masses for survival, victory, and expansion.

[[The Red Army must shoulder the threefold task of fighting, doing mass work, and raising funds (currently production work). Guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of a guerrilla nature were the main forms of warfare. In strategy, the Red Army must oppose a war of quick decision and in tactics must oppose protracted fighting. The various "left" lines were diametrically opposed to Comrade Mao Zedong's line. The third "left" line formed a fully articulated system. The three tasks were reduced to the one of fighting. It opposed the sound guerrilla character as "guerrillism" and fostered formalism in political work in the army. They demanded positional warfare. They did not understand how to conduct a people's war properly. Their failings caused us to withdraw from the Jiangxi base area.]]

3) Organizationally: As Comrade Mao Zedong says, the correct political line should be "from the masses, to the masses." To ensure that the line really comes from the masses and in particular that it really goes back to the masses, there must be close ties not only between the party and the masses outside the party (between the class and the people), but above all between the party's leading bodies and the masses within the party (between the cadres and the rank and file); in other words, there must be a correct organizational line. Therefore, just as in each period of the party's history Comrade Mao Zedong has laid down a political line representing the interests of the masses, so he has laid down an organizational line serving the political line and maintaining ties with the masses both inside and outside the party. There were important developments in this respect during the period of the rural revolutionary war, which were crystallized in the resolution of the ninth party congress of the Fourth Red Army in 1929.⁹⁶ This resolution raised party-building to the plane of ideological and political principle and firmly upheld the leading role of proletarian ideology; it fought in a correct manner against the purely military viewpoint, against subjectivism, individualism, egalitarianism, the roving-rebel ideology, putschism, and other tendencies and the methods for correcting them. At the same time, the resolution firmly upheld strict democratic centralism, opposing improper restrictions either on democracy or on centralism. Proceeding from the interests of the unity of the whole party, Comrade Mao Zedong insisted that the bureaus and departments should obey the whole and, in accordance with the concrete characteristics of the Chinese revolution, he defined the proper relationships between new and old cadres, army cadres and other cadres working in the locality, and among cadres of different departments or localities. Thus Comrade Mao Zedong provided us with a model of how to combine perseverance in truth as a matter of principle with submission to organization as a matter of discipline, a model of how to conduct inner-party struggles in a correct way while maintaining inner-party unity in a correct

way. Conversely, whenever an erroneous political line became dominant, an erroneous organizational line inevitably emerged, and the longer the erroneous political line dominated, the more harm its organizational line did. Accordingly, the various "left" lines of the period of the rural revolutionary war were opposed to Comrade Mao Zedong's organizational line as well as to his political line; they created a sectarianism which alienated the masses within the party (that is, which did not subordinate the partial interests of some of the party members to the interests of the whole party and did not regard the leading body of the party as the concentrator of the will of the whole party) as well as one which alienated the masses outside the party (that is, which did not regard the party as the representative of the interests of the masses and the concentrator of their will). In particular, in order to enforce their will, the exponents of the third "left" line invariably and indiscriminately branded all party comrades who found the wrong line impracticable and who therefore expressed doubt, disagreement, or dissatisfaction, or did not actively support the wrong line or firmly carry it out; they stigmatized these comrades with such labels as "right opportunism," "the rich peasant line," "the Luo Ming line," "the line of reconciliation" and "double-dealing," waged "ruthless struggles" against them and dealt them "merciless blows," and even conducted these "inner-party struggles" as if they were dealing with criminals and enemies. This wrong kind of inner-party struggle became the regular method by which the comrades who led or carried out the "left" line raised their own prestige, enforced their own demands, and intimidated the party cadres. It violated the fundamental principle of democratic centralism within the party, eliminated the democratic spirit of criticism and self-criticism, turned party discipline into mechanical discipline, and fostered tendencies to blind obedience and docility; thus the development of living and creative Marxism was hampered and damaged. A factionalist policy toward cadres was combined with this incorrect kind of inner-party struggle. The factionalists did not regard veteran cadres as valuable assets of the party; instead they attacked, punished, and dismissed from the central and local organizations large numbers of veteran cadres who were experienced in work and had close ties with the masses but were uncongenial to the factionalists and unwilling to be their blind followers and yes-men. Nor did they give proper education to new cadres nor handle their promotion seriously (especially those of working-class origin); instead they rashly promoted new cadres and cadres from outside who lacked work experience and close ties with the masses but were congenial to the factionalists and were merely their blind followers and yes-men, substituting them for veterans in the central and local organizations. Thus, they not only attacked old cadres but also spoiled new ones. Moreover, in many places where an incorrect policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries became entangled with the factionalist policy toward cadres, large numbers of fine comrades were unjustly dealt with under false charges, and this caused the party most grievous losses. Such factionalist errors greatly weakened the party, causing dislocation between higher and lower organizations and many other anomalies in the party.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenum hereby declares: Any penalty, or any part of a penalty, that was wrongly inflicted on a comrade by the exponents of the erroneous line shall be rescinded in accordance with circumstances. Every comrade who on investigation is proved to have fallen victim to false charges shall be exonerated and reinstated as a party member, and his memory shall be held in honor by all comrades.

4) Ideologically: The correctness or incorrectness of any political, military, or organizational line has ideological roots—it depends on whether or not the line starts from Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism and historical materialism and whether or not the line starts from the objective realities of the Chinese revolution and the objective needs of the Chinese people. From the very day he embraced the cause of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Zedong has devoted himself to applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the investigation and study of the actual conditions of Chinese society; time and again during the period of the rural revolutionary war, he laid great stress on the principle “No investigation, no right to speak,” and time and again he fought against the dangers of dogmatism and subjectivism. Indeed, the political, military, and organizational lines then laid down by Comrade Mao Zedong were brilliant achievements, which he made on the basis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, of dialectical and historical materialism, by his concrete analysis of the actual situation and its characteristics inside and outside the country and inside and outside the party, and by his concrete summing up of the historical experience of the Chinese revolution and especially of the 1924–27 revolution. For Chinese Communists, living and fighting in China, the purpose of studying dialectical materialism and historical materialism should be to apply them to the study and solution of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution, as Comrade Mao Zedong has done. But, of course, none of the comrades who committed “left” errors was then able to understand or accept his method, and the exponents of the third “left” line even slandered him as a “narrow empiricist.” The reason was that their ideology was rooted in subjectivism and formalism, which during the domination of the third “left” line expressed itself in a still more pronounced form as dogmatism. It is characteristic of dogmatism that it starts not from actual conditions but from particular words and phrases taken out of books. The dogmatists did not base themselves on the Marxist-Leninist standpoint and method to make a serious study of China’s past and present—political, military, economic, and cultural—and of the practical experience of the Chinese revolution, to draw conclusions as a guide to action in the Chinese revolution, and to test the validity of these conclusions in the practice of the masses. On the contrary, throwing away the essence of Marxism-Leninism, they transported particular words and phrases from Marxist-Leninist literature into the country and took them for dogma, without any study of the suitability of these quotations to the actual conditions of present-day China. Inevitably, therefore, the “theories” of the dogmatists were divorced from reality, their leadership was divorced from the masses, and instead of seeking truth from facts they were opinionated, arrogant, glib, and afraid of proper criticism and self-criticism.

Empiricist ideology, which was the collaborator and assistant of dogmatism in the period of its domination, is likewise a manifestation of subjectivism and formalism. Empiricism differs from dogmatism in that it starts not from books but from narrow experience. It should be emphasized that all the useful experience gained by vast numbers of comrades in practical work is a most precious asset. It is definitely not dogmatism, but Marxism-Leninism, to sum up such experience scientifically as the guide to future action, just as it is definitely not dogmatism, but Marxism-Leninism, to take the theories and principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide to revolutionary action and not as dogma. But if there are some comrades among all those versed in practical work who remain satisfied with their own limited experience and with that alone, who take it for dogma that can be applied everywhere, who do not understand and moreover do not want to acknowledge the truth that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" and that "in order to lead, one must foresee," and who consequently belittle the study of Marxism-Leninism, which is the summation of world revolutionary experience, and are infatuated with a narrow practicalism which is devoid of principle and with a brainless routinism that leads nowhere; and if they nevertheless sit and give orders from on high, if in their blindness they style themselves heroes, put on the airs of veterans, and refuse to heed the criticism of comrades or to practice self-criticism—then indeed these comrades have become empiricists. Thus, in spite of their different points of departure, the empiricists and the dogmatists were essentially one in their method of thinking. Both severed the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism from the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution; both violated dialectical and historical materialism and magnified partial and relative truths into universal and absolute truths; and the thinking of neither corresponded to the objective, actual situation as a whole. Hence they shared many misconceptions about Chinese society and the Chinese revolution (for instance, their erroneous views about the cities as the center of gravity, about work in the white areas as the center of gravity and their erroneous views about "regular" warfare, irrespective of actual conditions). Such were the ideological roots which made it possible for these two different sets of comrades to collaborate. On account of their limited and narrow experience, most of the empiricists lacked independent, clear-cut, and systematic views on problems of a general nature and therefore they usually played second fiddle in their association with the dogmatists; but the history of our party proves that it could not have been easy for the dogmatists to have "spread their poison throughout the party" without the collaboration of the empiricists; and after the defeat of dogmatism, empiricism became the main obstacle to the development of Marxism-Leninism in the party. Hence we must overcome subjectivist empiricism as well as subjectivist dogmatism. Only by completely overcoming both dogmatist and empiricist ideology can the Marxist-Leninist ideology, line, and style of work spread far and wide and take deep root in the whole party.

The errors discussed above, political, military, and organizational, all stemmed ideologically from the violation of Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical ma-

terialism, from subjectivism and formalism, from dogmatism and empiricism.

This Enlarged Seventh Plenum points out that in negating the errors of the various "left" lines we must bear in mind and carry out Comrade Mao Zedong's injunction "Treat all questions analytically; do not negate everything." It should be noted that the comrades who made these errors were not wrong in all their views; some of their views on fighting imperialism and feudalism, on the rural revolution, and on the war against Chiang Kai-shek were in agreement with the views of the comrades who upheld the correct line. It should be further noted that despite the especially long domination of the third "left" line and the especially heavy losses it inflicted on the party and the revolution, the party in the same period scored great achievements in practical work in many areas and in many fields (for example, in warfare, in building the army, in war mobilization, in building political power, and in the work in the white areas), thanks to the active work and heroic struggles of vast numbers of cadres and members, together with the masses of the soldiers and the people. It was precisely because of these achievements that over several years we were able to sustain the war against the attacks of the enemy and to hit him hard; and it was only because of the domination of the erroneous line that these achievements were in the end destroyed. The party and the people will forever revere all the leaders, leading personnel, and cadres inside and outside the party, all the members of the party and the masses who heroically sacrificed their lives in the interests of the people during the domination of the various erroneous lines, just as they revere those who sacrificed their lives in other periods of the party's history.

V

[[The errors of "left" line had deep social roots. The line reflected the ideology of the Chinese petty-bourgeois democrats. People of petty-bourgeois origin make up most of the party membership. For petty-bourgeois elements outside the party, the party should be lenient, but those of petty-bourgeois origin who have voluntarily joined the proletarian party should be handled differently. Party members with a petty-bourgeois revolutionary character have joined the party organizationally but not yet ideologically, or have not done so fully. This means they cannot lead the new democratic revolution of today. The party must preserve its purity as a vanguard. The "left" errors of line outlined above have been reflections in the party of petty-bourgeois ideology. First, the petty-bourgeois method of thinking manifests itself basically in subjectivism and one-sidedness in viewing problems. Second, the political tendency is apt to manifest itself in a vacillation between the "left" and the right because of its mode of life and the resulting subjectivism and one-sidedness of its method of thinking. Third, owing to the limitations of the petty bourgeoisie in general, and particularly because of China's backward and decentralized social environment with its clans and guilds, the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie in organizational line is apt to manifest itself in individualism and sectarianism, which

alienate the masses. Education must be used to analyze petty-bourgeois ideology within the party and to help transform it into proletarian ideology.

VI

We cannot be casual or impetuous in trying to overcome these erroneous “left” or right ideologies. Comrade Mao Zedong’s policy used in the Rectification Campaign is a model for Marxists-Leninists to overcome errors within the party. The purpose is to attain within the party Marxist-Leninist ideological unity.

VII

The twenty-four-year history of the CCP proves that the line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, the line of struggle of our party, and of the people of the whole country, are entirely correct.]]

Notes to Commentary G

1. For an excellent collection of translated documents drawn from the twenty-two proposed for study in the movement, see B. Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44*. On the meaning of rectification in Yan'an, see F. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, pp. 58-101. September 1941 is chosen as the starting date for rectification rather than the normal timing of 1942. In September, the crucial Politburo meeting was held that elected to launch the movement. For an analysis of how the “new” party history was put together, see T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, pp. 263-98.

2. Mao Zedong, “On Policy,” 25 December 1940, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2, pp. 441-42.

3. The Yan'an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan'an zhengfeng yundong jishi*, p. 28.

4. Compilation of these materials began in July to mid-August 1941, following a Politburo decision that put Mao Zedong in charge of the work. Zhao Pu, “‘Liuda yilai’ he ‘liuda yiqian’ liangshu jianjie,” in *Dangshi yanjiu* (Research on Party History), no. 1 (1987): 7.

5. The Yan'an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan'an zhengfeng*, pp. 47-48.

6. Wylie has provided an interesting analysis of this speech on which this draws. R. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Po-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory 1935-1945*, pp. 151-54.

7. “Jinian Zhongguo gongchandang ershinian zhounian” (Commemorate the Twentieth Anniversary of the CCP), in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), 1 July 1941.

8. The Yan'an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan'an zhengfeng*, p. 41, and the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, *Zhongguo gongchandang shigao*, vol. 3, p. 145. In fact, it comprised a series of meetings culminating on 22 October 1941. It was attended by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Wang Ming, Ren Bishi, Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, Peng Dehuai, Bo Gu, Deng Fa, and Kai Feng. In addition, some 120 senior cadres in Yan'an also participated. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, p. 216.

9. Wang Jiaxiang, “Zhengzhijiu yao yi sixiang lingdao wei zhongxin” (The Politburo Must Take Ideological Leadership as Its Core), in Wang Jiaxiang, *Wang Jiaxiang xuanji*, p. 326.

10. See the telegram of 21 February 1942 from Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai in *Wenxian he yanjiu*, (Documents and Research). (1984): 19. See also, Zhang Jingru et al., *Zhonggong dangshi xueshi*, p. 67, and Zhao Shenghui, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao*, pp. 171–72.

11. “Zhongyang guanyu gaoji xuexizu de jue ding,” (CC Decision on the High Level Study Group), in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 11, p. 743.

12. It seems that the economic hardship afflicting Yan’an was also making itself felt on the party as on 26 September the Secretariat also passed a decision on party membership dues pointing out that it was the duty of all members to pay them. “Zhongyang guanyu dangfei de jue ding” (Decision on Party Membership Fees), 26 September 1941, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang (neibu ben)*, vol. 11, pp. 744–45.

13. “Resolution of the CCP CC on the Yan’an Cadre School,” in Compton, *Mao’s China*, pp. 74–79. The Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 52–55.

14. For good documentation on the Jin-Cha-Ji see, *Jin-Cha-Ji kang-Ri genjudi*, vols. 1 and 2. Volume 3 in this series provides an extremely detailed chronology of the base area.

15. On this point see P. Potter, “Peng Zhen: Evolving Views on Party Organization and Law,” in C. L. Hamrin and T. Cheek (eds.), *China’s Establishment Intellectuals*, pp. 27–28.

16. “Zhongyang guanyu ruhe zhixing tudi zhengce jue ding de zhishi” (Central Directive on How to Implement the Decision on Land Policy), in the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao*, vol. 5, pp. 24–27.

17. The report and associated reference materials were originally delivered to the senior cadres conference held in Yan’an by the CCP’s Northwest Bureau from 19 October 1942 to 14 January 1943. A. Watson, *Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region: A Translation of Mao’s Economic and Financial Problems*, p. 1. For a discussion of the conference see below. For a full discussion of this report and its background see *ibid.*, pp. 1–55.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

19. For a valuable collection of materials on the campaign, see the Editorial Group on the Construction of Political Power in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region (ed.), *Shaan Gan Ning bianqu de jingbing jianzheng: ziliao xuanji*.

20. See, for example, Mao Zedong, “A Most Important Policy,” 7 September 1942, *Jiefang ribao*, translated in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, vol. 3, pp. 99–102.

21. Mao Zedong, “Fandui dang bagu,” in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 23–27. A translation can be found in Compton, *Mao’s China*, pp. 33–53.

22. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu caizhi ganbu jiaoyu de jue ding” (Decision of the CCP CC Concerning the Education of Cadres in Service), 28 February 1942, translated in Compton, *Mao’s China*, pp. 80–88.

23. “Zhengzhijia, yishujia” (Statesmen, Artists), *Guyu* (Grain Rain), vol. 1, no. 4. Wang’s article is signed 17 February 1942 and was probably published 15 April 1942. It has been reprinted in *Zhongguo xiandai wenyi sixiang douzheng shi*, vol. 1, pp. 467–71; a translation can be found in G. Benton, *Wild Lilies: Poisonous Weeds—Dissident Voices from People’s China*, pp. 175–78. “Ye baihehua” (The Wild Lily), in *Jiefang ribao*, 13 and 27 March 1942, p. 4. For a translation, see below.

24. For an excellent account of Wang Shiwei in Yan’an and the party attacks on him see T. Cheek, “The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong’s Yan’an Talks in the First CPC Rectification Movement,” in *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 11: 25–58. For an account stressing the treatment of Wang Shiwei in terms of the consolidation of Mao’s power, see D. Apter and T. Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic*, pp. 59–68.

25. The other exception was Xiao Jun who had been less acerbic than Wang and who Mao criticized by name in his May talks. For an account of these left-wing intellectuals and their fates see M. Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China*.

26. This was made public by Mao Zedong in 1962. Addressing a CC work conference, Mao used the execution of Wang as a negative example of a local official having overstepped the line. Mao did, however, feel that penal sanctions against Wang were correct. See Mao Zedong, “Talk at an Enlarged Working Conference by the Central Committee,” in *Peking Review*, no. 27 (1978): 21.

27. See Mao’s speech to the Seventh Party Congress below, **Doc. H.8**.

28. Cheek, “The Fading of Wild Lilies,” p. 26.

29. For details of this earlier clash see *ibid.*, pp. 28–30.

30. The date chosen for publication was the seventh anniversary of the death of the famous Chinese writer Lu Xun. See *Jiefang ribao*, 19 October 1943. It followed a Politburo meeting that had decided to step up party leadership over ideological work. To formalize this as party policy, the propaganda bureau of the CC issued a decision on 7 November 1943 outlining the party’s policy toward literature and art. See “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu zhixing dang de wenyi zhengce de jue ding” (Decision of the Propaganda Bureau of the CCP CC on Carrying Out the Party’s Policy on Literature and Art), in the Teaching and Research Group of the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi*, vol. 5, pp. 146–51.

31. Wang Shiwei expressed this view in his article “Statesmen Artists.”

32. See above, Mao Zedong’s speech of 1 February 1942, **Doc. G.10**.

33. Mao’s economic report to this conference has been discussed above. See **Doc. G.6**.

34. Gao Gang, *Bianqu de lishi wenti jiantao*, 17 and 18 November 1942, pp. 1–50.

35. On this point see Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 228–31, and Saich and van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives*, pp. 263–98.

36. The meeting was attended by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Zhu De, Kang Sheng, Kai Feng, Bo Gu, Deng Fa, Zhang Wentian, Yang Shangkun, Peng Zhen, Gao Gang, and Ye Jianying. See the Yan’an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan’an zhengfeng*, pp. 368–69, and the Research Group on Party History of the CCP CC (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi*, p. 160.

37. The propaganda committee took unified control over the Central Propaganda Bureau, the *Jiefang ribao*, Xinhua News Agency, the Central Party School, the cultural committee, the publications office, etc. The organization committee took control over the Central Organization Department, the Central Party Affairs Committee, the United Front Department, the Mass Movement Work Committee, the Central Research Office, the Overseas Work Committee, etc. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, pp. 424–25.

38. At the same time, Mao was appointed to serve concurrently as the director of the Central Party School with Peng Zhen as his deputy. The Yan’an Rectification Campaign Writing and Editing Group (ed.), *Yan’an zhengfeng*, p. 369.

39. For a good discussion of the external factors see Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 195–203.

40. As Wylie points out, the Comintern had been effectively put to one side when it was decided to initiate the policies of the antifascist united front in 1935. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, p. 201.

41. See the Yan’an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan’an zhengfeng*, p. 374, and J. Harrison, *The Long March to Power*, p. 340.

42. Post-Mao CCP accounts try to shift the blame for the excesses to Kang Sheng, but clearly it was not the fault of one person and Mao must share part of the blame. See Zhong Kan, *Kang Sheng pingzhuan*, pp. 84–94. Clearly, many party members had been upset by the investigations, and at the Seventh Party Congress, Mao acknowledged that some “mistakes” had been made, and he apologized to those who had been incorrectly accused. See Mao Zedong, “Zai Zhongguo gongchandang diqi quanguo daibiao dahuishangde jielun” (Concluding Comments at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP), in *Mao Zedong zai qidade baogao he jianghuaji*, p. 215.

43. These meetings were on 21 May, 5 June, 9 November, 7 December, and 9 December 1944 and 18 February, 31 March, and 20 April 1945. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, pp. 229–30, and the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, vol. 3, pp. 216–18. A five-person presidium was elected to oversee the plenum comprising Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, and Zhou Enlai. Mao chaired both the presidium and the meeting as a whole. During the time the plenum was in session, it was decided that the Politburo and the Secretariat would stop carrying out their functions and the day-to-day running of party affairs would be handled by the plenum and the presidium.

44. See Mao Zedong, “Our Study and the Current Situation,” 12 April 1944, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 3, pp. 163–76.

45. The members were Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Kang Sheng, Liu Xiao, Wu De, Liu Shengzhi, Kong Yuan, Deng Fa, Chen Yu, Liu Ningyi, Zhu Rui, and Zhu Baoting. The Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, vol. 3, p. 217.

46. “Zhongyang guanyu jianli chengshi gongzuo burnen de zhishi” (Central Committee Directive Concerning the Establishment of Urban Work Departments), 4 September 1944, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang (neibu ben)*, vol. 12, p. 577.

47. Chen Kang, “Kangzhan chuqi Huabei wojun zhanlue fangzhen tantao,” in *Jindaishi yanjiu*, (Research on Modern History) no. 1 (1982): 87.

48. For details see Saich and van de Ven, *New Perspectives*, pp. 263–98.

49. “Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu guanyu yanjiu Wang Ming, Bo Gu zongpai jihui zhuyi luxian cuowu de zhishi” (Directive of the Secretariat of the CCP CC on Studying Wang Ming’s and Bo Gu’s Sectarian, Opportunist Mistakes of Line), 28 December 1943, in *Yan’an zhengfeng yundong (ziliao xuanji)*, pp. 123–24.

50. The Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, vol. 3, p. 218.

51. Feng Hui, “Mao Zedong lingdao qicao ‘guanyu ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi’ de jingguo,” (The Process of Mao Zedong leading the drafting of “Revolution on Certain Historical Questions”) in *Dangshi tongxun*, (Bulletin on Party History) March 1986.

52. Confirmed by the memoirs of Vladimirov, who notes that the Resolution was based on the draft report by Ren to the plenum titled “On the Political Line of the Party Between 1931 and 1935.” He further suggests that the report sparked a major debate and that although the resolution was based on the report there were significant differences in the final version. P. Vladimirov, *The Vladimirov Diaries: Yen-an, China, 1942–45*, pp. 374, 389–95. Wylie suggests that the real author was Mao’s alter ego, Chen Boda, but there is no further evidence for this. Wylie, *The Emergence of Maoism*, pp. 264–66.

53. See the Party History Materials and Research Department of the Central Party Archives, “Yan’an zhengfeng zhong de Wang Ming,” (Wang Ming during the Yan’an Rectification Campaign) in *Dangshi tongxun*, no. 7 (1987): 11. According to Wang himself, he initially refused to write a statement acknowledging the resolution and repenting his mistakes. Eventually, after discussions with friends, Wang claimed that he wrote the letter so that he could preserve his position for a future struggle against Mao Zedong. Wang Ming, *Mao’s Betrayal*, p. 145.

54. T. Saich, *China: Politics and Government*, pp. 20–21.

55. “Lun gongkai gongzuo yu mimi gongzuo,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 2, pp. 215–26. A full English translation can be found in Liu Shao-ch’i, *Collected Works of Liu Shao Ch’i Before 1944*, pp. 283–302.

56. “Gaizao women de xuexi.” This is a speech originally given by Mao Zedong on 5 May 1941 to a cadre meeting in Yan’an. The version published here was reworked by Mao before being distributed for study. This version is based on the translation in Compton, *Mao’s China*, pp. 59–68. The Chinese original can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian* (Rectification Documents), pp. 41–48.

57. “Guanyu jiaqiang dangxing de jue ding,” This decision was passed by the Politburo on 1 July 1942 and was drafted by Mao Zedong. The version here is based on the translation in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 156–60. The Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 112–14. It was originally published in *Gongchandangren* (The Communist), no. 19 (August 1941).

58. “Fandui zhuguan zhuyi he zongpai zhuyi,” in *Wenxian he yanjiu* (1985): 1–7. This was Mao's speech to the enlarged Politburo meeting that launched the Rectification Campaign. In fact parts of the speech amount to little more than notes.

59. This directive can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, pp. 209–19.

60. This may refer to the article by Luo Mai [Li Wei-han], “Wei dangde luxian er douzheng” (Struggle for the Party's Line), 6 May 1933, in *Douzheng* (Struggle), no. 47 (9 July 1933).

61. A translation of this can be found in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 69–73.

62. *Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] bianqu dangde gongzuo he jutai zhengce baogao*. The version used here is that published by the Central Party School in 1981. The total report runs to 209 pages. The extracts translated here are taken from pp. 7–15 and 20–54.

63. The July incident refers to the Marco Polo Incident in the outskirts of Beijing that marked the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. For the “double-ten policy” see above, **Doc. F.11**.

64. “Zhongyang guanyu kang-Ri genjudi tudi zhengce de jue ding,” in the Secretariat of the CCP CC, *Kangzhan yilai zhongyao wenjian huiji*, pp. 188–92. The translation here is based on that in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J.K. Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, pp. 276–85.

65. “Jingji wenti yu caizheng wenti.” The section used here is taken from the translation by Andrew Watson. Watson, *Mao Zedong*, pp. 113–21.

66. “Shaan-Gan-Ning bianqu zhengfu wei shixing jingbing jianzheng gei ge xian de zhishixin,” in the Editorial Group on the Construction of Political Power in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region (ed.), *Shaan-Gan-Ning*, pp. 13–16.

67. “Shaan-Gan-Ning bianqu zhengfu jianzheng zongjie (jielu),” in *ibid.*, pp. 154–67.

68. “Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng wenfeng.” This translation is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 375–92. The original Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 6–22. This was a speech to the opening ceremony of the Central Party School in Yan'an.

69. “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu zai Yan'an taolun zhongyang jue ding ji Mao Zedong tongzhi zhengdun sanfeng baogao de jue ding,” in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 1–5. The translation here is based on that in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 1–8.

70. “Lun dangnei douzheng.” The version here is based on the translation in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 188–238. The Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 142–80. It was a speech by Liu Shaoqi to the central China party school.

71. “Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu zai quandang jinxing zhengdun sanfeng xuexi yundong de zhishi,” in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang*, vol. 12, pp. 84–93.

72. This was published in *Jiefang ribao*, 5 June 1942.

73. “Yan'an yigeyue xuexi yundong de zongjie,” in *Jiefang ribao*, 5 June 1942.

74. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tongyi kang-Ri genjudi dang de lingdao ji tiaozheng gezuzhi jian guanxi de jue ding.” The version used here is based on the translation in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 161–75. The Chinese original can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 115–23.

75. “Ye baihehua,” in *Jiefang ribao*, 13 and 27 March 1942. The translation here is taken from that in Benton, *Wild Lilies*, pp. 179–86 (used with permission of Pluto Press). Another

translation can be found in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei and "Wild Lilies": Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942–1944*, pp. 4–9, 17–20.

76. These were orphaned children who acted as personal assistants to communist officials.

77. "Guanyu Wang Shiwei," *Jiefang ribao*, 15 June 1942, p. 4.

78. Wang had arrived in Yan'an in 1936 and began work as a research officer in the translation department. In 1941, the Academy was changed into the Central Research Institute.

79. Wang Shiwei, "Zhengzhijia, yishujia." A translation of the article can be found in Benton, *Wild Lilies*, pp. 175–78. Also translated in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei*, pp. 90–93.

80. "Douzheng rijì," *Jiefang ribao*, 28 and 29 June 1942. Also translated in Dai Qing, *Wang Shiwei*, pp. 102–13.

81. This is the start of part two of the account contained in *Jiefang ribao*, 29 June 1942.

82. This article was published in *Zhongguo wenhua* (Chinese Culture), vol. 2, no. 6: 32–38.

83. The fact that Wen Jize notes that the meeting began at 7:00 A.M. instead of the previous time of 9:30 suggests that the mobilization phase had clearly begun.

84. For Chen's written article stating this view see above, **Doc. G.17**.

85. "San ba jie you gan," in *Jiefang ribao*, 9 March 1942.

86. "Zai Yan'an wenyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua." This version is based on the translation in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 408–19. The Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 249–77. A complete English translation can be found in B. S. McDougall, *Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art": A Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary*, pp. 55–86.

87. "Gao Gang tongzhi zai xibeiju gaogan hui shang de jielun," published in Yan'an by the Northwest Bureau in 1943, pp. 1–27. I am grateful to the officials at the Bureau of Investigation Archives, Taipei, for allowing me to make a photocopy of this document.

88. "The Situation and the Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 2.

89. The Fuxing society was set up by Chiang Kai-shek as a secret police organization. The CC clique was run by the brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu and supported Chiang Kai-shek.

90. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu gongchan guoji zhiwei zhuxituan tiyi jiesan gongchan guoji de jue ding," in *Jiefang ribao*, 27 May 1943.

91. "Qingsuan dangnei de mingsaiwei zhuyi sixiang." The version here is based on the translation in Compton, *Mao's China*, pp. 255–68. The Chinese text can be found in Liberation Society (ed.), *Zhengfeng wenxian*, pp. 181–91.

92. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shencha ganbu de jue ding," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, neibu ben*, vol. 12, pp. 329–34.

93. Kang Sheng, the chief organizer of the campaign, indicated its exaggerated nature by claiming that of those who "confessed" less than 10 percent were actually spies or enemies. This was in a report delivered on 29 March 1944 at a senior cadres' conference in the CCP's Northwest Bureau. It is extracted in W. Kuo, *Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party*, book 4, p. 421.

94. "Zhongyang guanyu chengshi gongzuo de zhishi," in the Teaching and Research Department of the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi*, vol. 6, pp. 217–24.

95. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi," in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), *Liuda yilai*, vol. 1, pp. 1179–1200.

96. An abridged version of this text, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," can be found in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 105–16. A fuller version of the text can be found in the 1944 edition of Mao's selected works.

Commentary H

The Slide to Civil War and Preparation for Rule, July 1944–June 1949

As 1944 drew to a close, it was becoming clear to all that the war was nearing its end. Although the savage Japanese Operation Ichigo had begun in April 1944 to attempt to clear a land route from Korea south to Hanoi, by early winter it had become bogged down. By the end of the year, the operation was clearly exhausting Japan's military power, and Japan was already hard-pressed by its need to protect itself in the Pacific. In Europe, Italy was out of the war and Germany was gradually being forced homeward. This change in the international environment had implications for the situation in China. Indeed, the precarious military situation in China earlier in the year had already led to attempts to bring about closer CCP-GMD cooperation. By early 1945, the feeling that the war was drawing to a close led all parties concerned to consider what would happen afterward. Attempts were made to bring the CCP and the GMD together in a coalition, but as these negotiations stumbled, the two parties prepared for civil war. While the Civil War increasingly dominated this period, the CCP was also busy trying to sort out the administrative structures that would rule the new China.

The CCP directive of 1 July 1944 clearly showed that it felt that the war would end soon (**Doc. H.1**). The CC estimated that its regular troops numbered some 470,000, with a militia force of 2.1 million. It saw this total as being sufficient for holding the base areas but inadequate for the tasks of finally "driving the Japanese invader out of China." While it acknowledged that a major expansion of troop strength was necessary, the directive cautioned against such an expansion without first consolidating the existing troops. Thus, it called for a major political and military training program to take place over the following year, with the brunt of this training to take place during the winter months. This intense training would provide the core for a later rapid expansion of the communist forces. In line with criticisms made in Yan'an of formalism, the directive stressed that emphasis in training should be placed on the practical, while irrelevant book knowledge was to be rejected. Finally, in line with the campaign to improve self-sufficient production by the army, the administration, and the party, the directive suggested that the burden on the people be reduced by 10 to 20 percent in the coming year.

As early as January 1944, Mao Zedong had suggested that talks between the CCP and the GMD resume, and this was followed by substantive contacts in Xi'an

from 4 to 8 May 1944. Negotiations slowed, however, as the two parties put forward their contrasting positions. On 15 September, the CCP representative in the talks, Lin Boqu, outlined the CCP's view of how the negotiations had progressed.¹ Lin expressed the wish that discussions should continue in order to solve three main problems. First, there were military problems. While acknowledging that the CCP should unite under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, Lin proposed that this be accomplished by "ushering in" a "democratic form of government even during the war." The GMD would accept the formation of a coalition government only after war's end. Further, the CCP sought greater military strength than the GMD was willing to concede: five armies and sixteen divisions as opposed to ten divisions.² Second, the CCP called for the national government to recognize the status quo when administering the base areas behind Japanese lines, namely, domination by the CCP and pro-CCP elements. Third, Lin called for the lawful recognition of the CCP, something granted by the GMD to other political parties. This had been a major stumbling block in the negotiations as the GMD had rejected the suggestion on 5 June, stating that it preferred to defer the question until after the war had ended.

With negotiations for a comprehensive political and military agreement foundering, the United States obtained Chiang Kai-shek's reluctant permission to send an observers' group to Yan'an (the Dixie Mission) to review the possibilities for coordinating military activities in the China theater. The group was well received by the CCP in Yan'an, and the reports and dispatches it sent were, on the whole, positive and contrasted greatly with the negative views that many held concerning the GMD. The CCP quickly realized the importance of such delegations and in August 1944 issued a directive on the importance of diplomatic work (**Doc. H.2**). This directive instructed CCP cadres on how they should deal with diplomatic work and foreign contacts. The arrival of the Dixie Mission was seen by the CC as the beginning of an international diplomatic work united front. The directive saw even greater potential gains in this international united front than in the domestic one. Military cooperation was to be used to promote broader cultural and political cooperation. The CCP was well aware that the arrival of the mission provided it with the opportunity to present a positive image in comparison with the GMD thus, in turn, weakening U.S. ties with the Nationalists.

The arrival of General Patrick Hurley as President Franklin Roosevelt's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek brought a renewed effort to bring about broad-based political cooperation between the GMD and the CCP. On 7 November 1944, Hurley flew to Yan'an for a meeting with Mao Zedong, and together they signed an agreement on 10 November. Optimistically, this was to be an agreement between the CCP and the national government of China, the GMD. When Hurley returned to Chongqing, he found that the Nationalist leaders found it unacceptable, and on 22 November, they issued their own three-point agreement.³ These two agreements had the effect of clarifying the disagreements between the two parties. The CCP proposals called for the national government to be reorganized into a coalition government with representatives from all the anti-Japanese parties and organizations. Similarly,

the National Military Council was to be reorganized to include all the anti-Japanese armies. Supplies from foreign powers to the two bodies were to be shared equally. Finally, the CCP was to be recognized by the new government as an equal to the GMD and the other parties. The GMD response was to make it clear that the CCP was to subjugate itself to the national government. The CCP was to put all its troops under the national government through the control of the National Military Council, and the national government would then designate some CCP officers to sit on the Military Council. Thus, contrary to the CCP position, the GMD envisaged the CCP's placing itself under the authority of the national government as a prerequisite for discussions on reorganization and reform. The CCP would only turn its troops over to the national government, not the GMD, and then only when the GMD's one-party rule had been terminated and a coalition government of all parties had been formed.

On 24 January 1945, the CCP's chief negotiator, Zhou Enlai, returned for further talks to Chongqing, where he reaffirmed the CCP's position. On 3 February, an agreement was reached that seemed to provide the possibility for progress. The agreement stated that a political consultative conference would be convened to discuss the establishment of a constitutional government, the working out of a common political program, the unification of the military forces, and the creation of the form through which members of parties other than the GMD would participate in the national government.⁴

Although this appeared to offer the opportunity for a breakthrough, the GMD was suspicious about implementation and the CCP still held reservations. The GMD saw the demands for a coalition government as a ruse to supplant its rule by the Communists.⁵ On 15 February, before leaving Chongqing, Zhou Enlai stated that he thought the CCP would agree to the convocation of the political consultative conference.⁶ However, he was critical of the presentation by Dr. Wang Shijie, the GMD negotiator, of the agreement to the newspaper corps. He claimed that Dr. Wang had not mentioned the conditions put forward for a coalition government (**Doc. H.3**). In particular, Zhou criticized the GMD's stance that control of communist troops should be turned over to the National Military Council, as this would place them effectively under GMD control. Second, he pointed out that the question of the GMD's one-party dictatorship had not been resolved. Again he stressed the CCP's view that a coalition administration should be instituted to precede the formation of a democratic government.

On 1 March 1945, Chiang Kai-shek made it clear that while Communists and members of other parties could participate in the national government, the GMD would not give up its ultimate decision-making power until the people's congress had been convened to inaugurate constitutional government. This meeting was to be convened on 12 November. This was interpreted by the CCP as a way of perpetuating one-party GMD rule, and hence, on 9 March, the party wrote to the national government that it no longer felt obliged to respond to Wang Shijie's proposals for a political consultative conference. In addition, Zhou Enlai proposed that he, Dong Biwu, and

Bo Gu attend the allies' San Francisco conference in April to prevent representation of solely the views of the GMD by the Chinese delegation.⁷

**(a) The Seventh Party Congress—April–June 1945—
Mao Zedong Backs the Call for Coalition Government**

The question of coalition government was a key component of Mao's principal address to the Seventh Party Congress (23 April to 11 June 1945).⁸ In the officially published version of Mao's political report, he stated that it was necessary to unite representatives of all political parties and groups, as well as those without affiliation, to establish a provisional coalition government (**Doc. H.4**). This government would institute democratic reforms to overcome the current crisis and to mobilize all forces to fight with the allies to defeat Japan. Afterward, a national assembly would be convened and a democratic coalition government formed. Mao saw the establishment of a coalition government as the key to the struggle against Japan and the creation of a wealthy postwar China. Again, Mao explicitly rejected the GMD proposal to convene a national assembly, seeing it as an attempt to preserve GMD control of the new governmental form.

Mao's objective in this report was to undermine the GMD's position by attacking its conduct of the war and the system of rule in areas under its control. In contrast, Mao offered a positive view of the communist struggle against the Japanese invaders and of political life in the base areas under CCP control. Mao did not propose, however, that a socialist state system be instituted at the present stage because of the need to fight "foreign and feudal oppression" and because the "necessary social and economic conditions" were lacking. Instead, he proposed continuation of the minimum program of New Democracy. While the transition to socialism and communism would be several decades away, the new democratic state system would be under the leadership of the working class.

Thus, while the tone was entirely critical of the GMD, the official report sought to keep options open for a political settlement. Realizing that it would be necessary to compete for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, Mao displayed moderation on the land question. Emancipation of the peasants and reform of the land system were seen as imperative for defeating Japan and building a new China. Mao acknowledged that the CCP had made a major concession during the anti-Japanese war by changing the policy of "land to the tillers" (Sun Yat-sen's phrase) to one of reducing rent and interest. This had reduced landlord resistance in the liberated areas to CCP mobilization of the peasantry for war. As a result, Mao envisaged the policy continuing after the war, extending it throughout the whole country, and then gradually introducing measures to achieve the goal of "land to the tillers." As is discussed below, however, the moderate land policy soon came under increasing pressure from below.

Mao's address to the party faithful drew the line more sharply than did his written report (**Doc. H.5**). According to Mao, although GMD influence was declin-

ing, in many respects it remained more influential than the CCP. Especially in the international arena, the GMD carried weight. Mao felt that implementation of the CCP's program would drive the GMD into a corner and place the CCP at the center of political gravity. Thus, the objective was to raise the CCP's prestige while lowering that of the GMD. In this respect, it was important for the CCP to try to adopt the mantle of Sun Yat-sen. Such an approach, Mao claimed, would not be necessary in Soviet Russia, where the people had higher political consciousness.

Mao also explained why no mention was made in the written report of communism or Chiang Kai-shek. Mao felt that addressing the question of communism in the written report might provoke unhealthy and harmful criticism of the CCP by its enemies. In his comments, Mao was openly critical of Chiang but said that while criticizing him the CCP must not demand his removal as this would limit the room for maneuver.

Mao's address noted that revolution would be impossible in China without the peasantry and was critical of the fact that the party "forgot" about them in 1927. As Mao pointed out, anyone who forgot about the peasantry would be powerless. Yet, he reasserted that the party was still a proletarian party and, in line with the preceding Plenum's decision, commented on preparations for a return to the cities. According to Mao, it was un-Marxist to sit in the villages and rely solely on the peasantry. He called for a large force to be committed to developing work in the cities so that it would become the center of CCP activities.

The Congress had other important business to attend to. It reviewed the military situation to date, passing a report by Zhu De.⁹ Zhu took his cue from Mao, praising his wisdom on numerous occasions, and attacked the mistaken military line of the GMD while praising that pursued by the communist forces.

Zhou Enlai delivered a major report on the united front.¹⁰ It is important to note that in the context of the united front, for the CCP this was not a question of cooperation with the GMD alone. While the GMD was recognized as the most potent force and the CCP clearly wanted to avoid major armed conflict, much CCP activity was geared to wooing away support from the GMD and courting other independent groupings. Zhou claimed that coalition government was an extension of the anti-Japanese united front. This new "front" was to be led by the proletariat relying on the peasantry as its main ally. Zhou warned, however, that the proletariat could not automatically assume this position but had to justify it through its actions. Continuation of the "front" did not rule out struggle but, as Zhou pointed out, this was to take place "on just grounds" and be to the CCP's advantage.

In addition, the Congress passed the report by Liu Shaoqi on the revisions to the new Constitution, passed the new Constitution itself, and elected a new CC.

Liu's report of 14 May 1945 introduced the changes to, and significance of, the new party Constitution, the first to be adopted since 1928 (**Doc. H.6**). Both the Constitution itself and Liu's report highlighted the dominance of Mao's role and his position as the fount of wisdom concerning the Chinese revolution. Liu praised Mao Zedong Thought as the "most important historical characteristic of our current

revision of the party Constitution.” Mao’s thought, according to Liu, was “communism and Marxism” as applied to China, integrating Marxist-Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution. Further, it was the development of Marxism with regard to the national democratic revolution in the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal countries of the present period. In fact, Liu traced the development and maturing of Mao Zedong Thought from the founding of the party in 1921. With a flourish, Liu announced that “our Comrade Mao Zedong is not only the greatest revolutionary and statesman in Chinese history but also the greatest theoretician and scientist.”

Liu also paid detailed attention in his report to the problem raised by Mao as to how the party could have a proletarian nature with a predominantly peasant and petty-bourgeois membership. Liu highlighted a number of characteristics that ensured its proletarian nature such as the party’s history of struggle, the remolding of petty-bourgeois elements into proletarians through Marxist-Leninist education, the observation of the party’s iron proletarian discipline, and the strict adherence to the “Marxist-Leninist teachings sinified by Comrade Mao Zedong and to the political and organizational line formulated by him.” These factors meant, according to Liu, that the CCP was at least the equal of any proletarian party in the capitalist countries. The new party Constitution reflected the emphasis on Mao Zedong Thought, stating that together with Marxism-Leninism it provided the guiding principles for all party work (**Doc. H.7**). The Constitution ratified the changes that had taken place in party structure since the Sixth Congress. At the apex of the party, it recognized the post of chair of the CC, the incumbent serving concurrently as chair of the Politburo and the Secretariat. This marked a noticeable increase in the centralization of power within the Party Center and reflected, of course, Mao’s dominance. This was accompanied by a general increase in centralized power such as giving the CC the right to veto the election of secretaries and members of the standing committees of the provincial and regional party committees, and the call for less frequent convocation of national party congresses (every three years instead of every year). Similarly, the stipulation that the CC would only meet every six instead of every three months called together by the Politburo made it official that real power in the party now lay within the Politburo.

Despite this increase in centralization, the first component of democratic centralism also received more attention. In line with Mao’s strictures, the general program stressed the need for party members to learn from, and to listen to, the masses and not to become alienated from them. In fact, Liu Shaoqi devoted a whole section of his report to the question of the party’s mass line. Within the party, inner-party democracy received attention.¹¹ Three new articles (66, 67, and 68) called for party organs to be careful when considering cases of party members’ being punished and to analyze the cases in light of the circumstances in which the error took place. Presumably this was to limit the possibility of a witch hunt in the party now that the “correct” history had been accepted. Obviously, references to the Comintern were dropped but, more surprisingly, so was mention of the international situation. This

recognized the fact that the CCP's concern now lay where it had always been for Mao, with China's own situation.

The Congress elected the new CC of forty-four full and thirty-three alternate members. Despite the tendency toward centralization and the dominance of Mao Zedong, there was considerable debate over the elections, and Mao was not able to get his way totally.¹² The list of new CC members indicated Mao's dominance, if not his total control, over the party apparatus. While Mao and key supporters were placed toward the top of the list, Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi were numbers two and three, respectively, Gao Gang number twelve, and Wang Ming and Bo Gu numbers forty-three and forty-four, respectively.¹³

On 19 June 1945, the Seventh CC held its first plenary session to elect the party's new leading organs. It elected Mao Zedong chair of the CC and a Politburo of thirteen members, comprising Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Gao Gang, Peng Zhen, Dong Biwu, Lin Boqu, Zhang Wentian, and Peng Dehuai, with Mao as chair. Mao was also elected chair of the Secretariat, with Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi as the other members. The CC's administrative secretary was Ren Bishi, with Li Fuchun as his deputy.¹⁴ The final part of the new central leadership was put in place when the CC's Military Affairs Commission was set up on 23 August. Mao was chair, and its other members were Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, Nie Rongzhen, He Long, Xu Xiangqian, Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao, and Ye Jianying.¹⁵

(b) The End of World War II— While the CCP and the GMD Talk, the CCP Moves into the Northeast

Shortly before the Party Congress convened, on 13 April 1945, Soviet Russia announced that it would not renew its neutrality agreement with Japan. This was in line with the agreements that had been made at the Yalta Conference (4 to 11 February 1945). In a secret agreement, Soviet Russia agreed to enter the war against Japan two months after the German surrender. A Russian war with Japan would establish a strong Soviet position in Manchuria. Indeed, this happened much more quickly than the allies had anticipated and sooner than Chiang Kai-shek would have wished.

On 6 August, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, on 8 August Soviet Russia declared war on Japan, and on 10 August the Japanese indicated that they were willing to surrender. Beating the American ground forces to the port of Dalian (Dairen), the Russians were able to occupy it and establish a dominant presence in Manchuria. At the same time, Soviet Russia was negotiating with the Chinese Nationalist government; the Sino-Soviet Treaty was announced on 14 August.

With the end of the war, U.S. and Soviet interests in China led to further attempts to bring the GMD and the CCP together. On 14 August, Chiang Kai-shek invited

Mao to Chongqing to discuss the future. Prior to the signing of the agreement between the GMD and Soviet Russia, however, the CCP had continued its criticism of the GMD and had also been very critical of the role of American Ambassador Hurley.¹⁶ Further, it had decided to move quickly to seize territory that would be evacuated by Japanese troops.

The CC reacted swiftly to these changing circumstances and on 11 August sent out a decision to all party districts concerning the Japanese surrender (**Doc. H.8**). The party's tasks were to be completed in two phases. In the immediate period, the CCP was to concentrate its forces to ensure the enemy's surrender. Should the enemy not surrender, it was to be wiped out. Wherever possible, large and small towns and communication lines were to be occupied. In fact a directive on this had already been sent out by the CC on 10 August.¹⁷ In the second phase, the CC felt that it was possible that the GMD would launch an all-out assault, and thus the party had to mobilize troop strength to deal with civil war. Public criticism of Chiang and the United States was to be eased, however, even though no one was to be misled about his real intentions. Finally, the party had to strengthen its work in the urban areas. Large numbers of cadres were to be sent to the cities and were to quickly master financial and economic work.

Starting from midnight on 10 August and throughout the following day, Zhu De issued six telegrams providing detailed instructions for the CCP to accept the Japanese surrender.¹⁸ On 11 August, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the communist troops to hold their positions, but this was formally rejected by Mao and Zhu on 16 August. Consequently, He Yingqin, the Nationalist commander-in-chief, ordered the Japanese commander to instruct his troops to hold their positions and await the arrival of Nationalist forces.¹⁹

Chiang Kai-shek sent telegrams to Mao on 14, 20, and 23 August inviting him to Chongqing for peace negotiations. Stalin had also sent a telegram to the CC that China should negotiate and that Mao should go to Chongqing for peace talks. This was accepted at an enlarged Politburo meeting on 23 August. While Mao was away, Liu Shaoqi was to take over his duties as chair of the CC.²⁰ On 25 August, in line with the meeting's discussions, the CC published a declaration putting forward the slogans of peace, democracy, and unity.²¹

Mao remained in Chongqing for almost two months, returning to Yan'an on 11 October 1945. On 10 October, a summary of the discussions was drawn up and was issued by the Chinese Ministry of Information the following day.²² The summary included a call for democratization, military unification, and, a key demand of the CCP, recognition that the CCP and all political parties be equal before the law. It was agreed that a political consultative conference would represent all political parties. It would consider government reorganization and approve a new constitution. Thus, the CCP had relinquished its demands for an immediate coalition government. The Communists agreed to a gradual troop reduction and to withdraw from eight of their southern base areas; areas that happened to be their weakest. No agreement could be reached concerning the remaining ten base areas. In addition,

the GMD demanded that CCP troops participate in the Japanese surrender only after they were under the orders of the national government.

Even while the talks were taking place, both the GMD and the CCP were rushing to fill the vacuum being left by surrendering Japanese troops. Numerous clashes occurred, including many between the CCP and Japanese troops. It soon became clear that the recent agreement would be of no value in the swiftly disintegrating situation. With the CCP penetrating the northeast, the GMD asked the Soviet Union to delay its withdrawal to give its troops more time to reach the area. In accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 August 1945, Soviet Russia had agreed to pull its troops out of Manchuria three months after the Japanese surrender (mid-November). An extension was agreed to, and Nationalist troops were able to enter the area. Soviet troops only left in early May 1946.

Although the CCP was still infiltrating the northeast, the peace negotiations and, more particularly, the Soviet attitude caused the party to change its strategy. In a directive dated 29 August, the CC pointed out that because of Soviet Russia's desire to keep peace in the Far East and the demands placed on it by the Sino-Soviet Treaty, it would have to turn Manchuria over to the national government and would not be able formally to help the CCP (**Doc. H.9**). With the Soviet Union not due to withdraw for three months and thus making things difficult for the GMD, however, the directive said that this gave the CCP an excellent opportunity to win over the three provinces. Nothing was to be reported publicly about CCP actions. Instead of taking the main cities, the party was to concentrate on gaining control of the vast countryside and the smaller cities where there was no Red Army presence. Cadres were to be sent to begin work in the larger cities.

The northeast was clearly the main focus of party work.²³ On 14 and 15 September 1945, the Politburo met to discuss work in the northeast and decided to set up a Northeast Bureau with Peng Zhen as secretary.²⁴ On 19 September, the CC informed its bureaus that the policy was to expand in the north and defend the south.²⁵ After the October decision to pull out of the southern bases, the northeast became an even more important focus of party operations.

Following the mid-November Soviet decision to help the GMD take over major cities, the CC issued a directive on 20 November 1945 to the Northeast Bureau outlining the party's central task after evacuating the large cities. On 26 November, the Bureau drafted its own directive on the issue (**Doc. H.10**). The CC pointed out that good, close relations should be maintained with the people in the northeast. Thus, the withdrawal was to be orderly, and factories and buildings and railways were not to be destroyed. The only exceptions were where it was considered necessary militarily. Propaganda was to be conducted among the people for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts with the GMD and for the implementation of democratic self-rule.

The following month, on 21 December, the CC sent a directive to the Northeast Bureau on the necessity of setting up long-term bases in the region.²⁶ The new policy was outlined in more detail in a CC directive drafted by Mao Zedong on 28 December 1945 (**Doc. H.11**). Mao stated that while it would take three to four

years to build the bases, the ground work was to be laid in 1946. The directive reaffirmed the need to develop these bases in areas remote from the big cities and main communication lines as these would be occupied by the GMD. Given the military superiority of the GMD, the party was to concentrate on mass work, particularly the settling of accounts with traitors and the launching of campaigns for rent reduction and production.²⁷ Giving the masses tangible benefits was seen as the best way to gain their support in the fight against the GMD.

With the conflict escalating, the United States increased its attempts to bring the two sides together. In late November 1945, Ambassador Hurley resigned, and on 23 December General Marshall arrived as President Truman's special envoy. Agreement was quickly reached on the need to convene a political consultative conference and a three-person committee of General Zhang Qun, Zhou Enlai, and Marshall was convened to negotiate a cease-fire. An agreement was reached on 10 January 1946 to take effect from midnight 13 January. The Political Consultative Conference met from 10 to 31 January and succeeded in resolving, on paper, most of the political and military problems between the two parties.²⁸ Further, a three-person military committee (Marshall, Zhang Zhizhong, and Zhou Enlai) was set up, and on 25 February it announced plans for large-scale troop reductions. Despite the fine-sounding agreements, however, there was no organization that was capable of making sure that they would be implemented.²⁹

The cease-fire caused the CCP to signal a change in policy. On 26 January 1946, the party leadership sent an explanatory directive to Lin Biao and Huang Kecheng in the northeast calling for a halt to the Civil War (**Doc. H.12**). It explained that to refuse to cooperate with the GMD and to try to occupy the northeast independently would end in failure. The directive made it clear that both the Soviet Union and the United States were opposed to civil war in the northeast. Current party policy was to strive for a peaceful solution in the northeast and have the GMD recognize the CCP's legal position and for them to implement democratic reform and rebuild the region together. However, the CC recognized that it would be difficult to achieve these objectives. The new policy did not mean that the CCP was to give up its military strength, far from it. The army was to consolidate its position and the base areas.

On 1 February 1946, the CC issued a general directive on the current situation that had arisen as a result of the talks in Chongqing (**Doc. H.13**). The directive pointed out that the most important form of struggle in China now was a peaceful, parliamentary one rather than an armed one. It envisaged China entering a new period of peaceful, democratic construction. It pointed out, however, that given Chiang's past practice, it would take a long time. This optimistic assessment was short-lived, and in July at a CC meeting, Mao made a self-criticism on behalf of the Party Center.³⁰

Very quickly, the agreements began to unravel. In March 1946, the right wing of the GMD was able to force through changes to the January agreements. Curbs were placed on provincial autonomy, and presidential rather than the agreed-on cabinet

government was to be continued. Later, the CCP and the Democratic League were denied their joint veto power in the State Council that was to be set up. As a result, they refused to participate, and the Nationalists finally convened the National Assembly unilaterally in November.

Military clashes had been continuing unabated, and although Marshall managed to negotiate a two-week cease-fire for Manchuria to begin on 7 June 1946 which was extended until the end of the month, no agreement was reached. This was the effective end of any attempts to bring about peace. Within days of the end of the truce the GMD began its all-out offensive. In July 1946, the CCP launched a public attack on American policy in China and demanded that the United States withdraw.³¹

(c) May 1946—Radicalization of CCP Rural Policy

During 1946, the CCP's land policy took a more radical turn. On 4 May 1946, the CC released a directive drafted by Liu Shaoqi that marked a shift in focus from rent- and interest-reduction to a policy of "land to the tillers" (**Doc. H.14**). According to the directive, this shift was undertaken to keep pace with developments in the rural areas where people were seizing landlords' land.³² In some areas, the principle of "equal distribution of land" had been put into effect with everybody, including landlords, receiving three *mu* of land. This radicalization was pulling some in the party further than they wanted to go with land policy, but the directive stated that the peasants' reasonable demands should be supported and that land transfers that had already taken place should be endorsed. In essence, the directive was an attempt to come to terms with the changing situation and to prevent it from getting out of hand. The party was clearly worried that if it were seen to have been left behind, it would lose key support in the countryside.

Despite marking a clear policy shift, the tone of the directive was still moderate. Middle peasants were not to be alienated, and only where the masses demanded it was the land of rich peasants to be confiscated. Even in this latter case, the party was to see that the blow was not too heavy. Similarly, the gentry and landlords who were defined as being "on our side" were also to be treated prudently. While collaborators, evil gentry, and local despots were to be isolated completely and made to hand over land, even they were to be left enough land to make a living. The united front in the countryside was to be retained as far as possible in the changing circumstances.

(d) Civil War Between the CCP and GMD

With the Nationalist offensive under way, Mao outlined the new strategy for the PLA.³³ On 16 September 1946, he drafted a directive for the CC's Military Commission.³⁴ CCP victory would be achieved by concentrating overwhelmingly superior troops to destroy the enemy forces one by one. Unlike in the war with Japan,

concentration of troops for mobile warfare was now the primary task with troop dispersal for guerrilla warfare playing a supplementary role. This strategy was not aimed at holding or seizing territory but at wiping out the enemy troops.

The first year of war went badly for the CCP, and it was forced back or had to retreat from many of the areas under its control. In the northeast, with the exception of Harbin, all the cities were lost, as was Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) on 10 October 1946. Following the capture of Kalgan, the Nationalists announced that they would go ahead with the National Assembly, and it convened on 15 November without communist participation. When it was clear that further negotiations were impossible, Zhou Enlai left Chongqing for Yan'an.³⁵

The main battle theaters were Manchuria and East China (North Jiangsu and Shandong). In the winter of 1946–47 most of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) base was lost. Yan'an itself was lost in March 1947. On evacuating Yan'an, the CC decided to divide the leadership into two. At a meeting on 26 March 1947, in Zaolin'gou Village (Qingjian County), it decided to set up a Front Line Committee lead by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi on behalf of the CC. This committee was to remain in north Shaanxi to lead the national liberation struggle. A Work Committee led by Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De was also set up. Dong Biwu, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda were appointed Standing Committee members. The Work Committee moved to the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area and settled at Xibaipo Village (Pingshan County). On 9 April, it was decided that the CC and the general headquarters of the PLA would remain in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region.³⁶

By about May 1947, the GMD onslaught began to weaken as it became overextended and could not provide the necessary reinforcements or guarantee supply lines. Indeed, on 10 October 1946, Mao had already pointed out Chiang's overextended battle lines and his shortage of troops. According to Mao, this was "bound to be the direct cause of our victory and Chiang Kai-shek's defeat."³⁷ Mao repeated this assessment in February 1947 when he stated that the situation in China was about to enter a new stage of development. Mao envisaged the nationwide struggle against imperialism and feudalism developing into a "great new people's revolution."³⁸

While such comments may also have been designed to rally the troops, as the summer of 1947 arrived, the war began to turn the CCP's way. Lin Biao's hit-and-run raids across the Sungari River in the northeast had begun to weaken the Nationalist attacks and had disrupted the GMD's plans to take Harbin and pacify Manchuria. In May 1947, Lin Biao began his fifth attack on the Nationalist forces with a five-week siege of Sibinggai. Although the siege was lifted on 30 June with many communist losses, the initiative had switched to Lin Biao's forces.³⁹ In September, Lin launched the sixth offensive with the twin objectives of isolating the major cities in central and south Manchuria and cutting the communication lines with north China. These objectives were met by November. In June, troops under Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi had begun a counteroffensive in central and north China. In November 1947, the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) troops under Nie

Rongzhen captured Shijiazhuang enabling the Communists to merge the base with Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu and providing them with a new capital.

On 1 September 1947, Mao drafted a directive for the CC analyzing the progress of the war and outlining the tasks for the second year (**Doc. H.15**). CC policy now switched from strategic withdrawal to launching a nationwide counteroffensive, using the main forces to carry the war into the GMD areas. The operational principle of concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy was to remain the same. Finally, Mao stressed the importance of land reform in the old and new liberated areas, calling it the “most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning nationwide victory.”

**(e) The CCP Discusses Rural Policy—October 1947,
the Outline Land Law Is Adopted—Radicalization
Followed by Moderation**

Land reform was seen as one of the keys to communist victory, and the CC Work Committee convened a National Land Conference from 17 July to 13 September 1947 at Xibaipo Village to discuss the issue.⁴⁰ Attended by some 1,000 delegates, the conference was presided over by Liu Shaoqi, who delivered a major report and provided the summary. The meeting passed the Outline Land Law of China that was published by the CC on 10 October 1947.

After listening to the delegates’ reports, Liu Shaoqi sent a report to the CC based on their comments (**Doc. H.16**). According to Liu, only in the Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu and northern Jiangsu bases had land reform been thorough, unlike in the Jin-Cha-Ji, Shandong, and Jin-Sui (Shanxi-Suide) bases. The peasants’ most important demands were for land and democratic freedoms. Liu defined democracy as the basic condition for the guarantee and consolidation of land reform. However, Liu noted that a major problem in land reform was the bad, strongly oppressive work-style of many cadres. Liu’s own investigations led him to believe that after “rightist tendencies” had been corrected, “leftism” had appeared: cadres enjoyed unlimited power, forcing the masses to attend meetings and, in the struggle against landlords, forcing the peasants to beat and kill them. Liu cited this incorrect work method, which he termed bureaucratism,⁴¹ as the main reason why thorough land reform in Jin-Cha-Ji and other areas had not been completed.

Problems in implementation were compounded by the fact that many landlords and rich peasants were in leadership positions at the county level. In the villages, the largest number of cadres and party branch members were middle peasants, while there were quite a few landlords and rich peasants. The poor peasant majority that had existed in the earlier period of the anti-Japanese war was now a minority. It should be pointed out that the “three-thirds” system had been designed to allow these other groups a strong stake in the rule of the border regions. Clearly, now that the party wished to adopt a more radical land policy, this was no longer desirable. Although Liu warned of the tendency toward excessive abuse in the attacks on

incumbent cadres in the villages, he painted a picture of such ferocious corruption that it could only fuel the attacks on them. Liu claimed that even many veteran cadres had become tainted by marrying the daughters of landlords!

To try to rectify this situation, the party had sent work-teams into the villages but, according to Liu, they had not been successful as they were often lied to by the local cadres, thus forcing them to work secretly for a period of time in order to understand the situation. Liu's projected solution was to create a new power base in the villages that would place power in the hands of the farmhands and poor peasants. Poor peasant leagues and peasant associations were to become the most powerful organizations in the villages. Village cadres were to be elected every year as a way of keeping them responsive to the local community.

The most important decision made by the conference was the equal distribution of land among all the villagers regardless of sex or age. The conference decided to promote this as the key to land policy, but it seems that the issue generated considerable debate. On 5 September, the Work Committee sent a telegram to the CC for its opinion. The following day the CC replied that because of the advantages of such a policy the "conference should adopt a policy for the thorough division of land."⁴²

Equal distribution of land per capita formed the basis of the Outline Land Law adopted by the conference on 13 September and published by the CC on 10 October 1947 (**Doc. H.17**). Not only the land of landlords but also houses and all movable property was expropriated. The introduction to the law cited China's rural situation as the cause of the country's being the "victim of aggression, poverty, backwardness, and the basic obstacle to our country's democratization, industrialization, independence, unity, strength, and prosperity." The takeover of the land and its redistribution was to be managed by the village peasant associations, poor peasant leagues, peasant congresses, and subsidiary organizations. Forests, waterways, and communal sites were also to be divided or, where they were of major importance, to be administered by the local authorities. Arbitration was to be dealt with by people's courts, which were to be established.⁴³ Liu Shaoqi had, with the full support of the CC, thus devised a land policy that seemed to amount to a new revolution.⁴⁴ Thus, it not surprising that once the new policy was promulgated and discussed at conferences held in the various base areas, it led to a radical upsurge that threatened to undermine the party's position. The party found itself unable to deal with both the war and the massive social dislocation that the new land policy was causing.

Although the party warned of excesses in the land reform, it was not until May 1948, as the party began to take over new areas, that a call was made to moderate it. Indeed it seems that the CCP had overestimated the causal relationship between the extent of land reform and support for the war. The main problem was trying to decide who belonged to which class. The lack of clarity meant that the middle peasants were often victims. With the middle peasantry being squeezed, it became clear to the party that it risked alienating the support of a key group for economic production in the countryside. To try to provide a standard definition of classes that

would provide the local cadres with a rule of thumb, Mao's two 1933 articles on rural questions were republished.⁴⁵

In late 1947 and early 1948, Mao and other leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, began to criticize the "leftist" mistakes that were being made in struggling against well-off middle peasants as well as rich peasants. Land policy was considered by the CC from 25 to 28 December 1947 in a meeting at Yangjiagou (north Shaanxi).⁴⁶ In his report to the meeting, Mao warned that there should be no repetition of the incorrect 1931–34 "ultraleft" policy under which no land was allotted to landlords. Mao stressed the need to unite with the middle peasants and not to damage their interests. He also took up the issue of problems within the party raised at the Land Conference. Pointing out that party membership had grown from several tens of thousands in 1937 to 2.7 million in 1947, it was inevitable that many landlords, rich peasants, and "riffraff" had sneaked in. Because some had taken over leadership positions in the rural areas it was necessary to educate and reorganize the ranks of the party.⁴⁷

However, the various directives during this period did not alter the central thrust of the campaign. Ren Bishi dealt with the problems in a speech of 12 January 1948 to an enlarged meeting of the Northwest Field Operations Military Front Committee (Doc. H.18). In particular, Ren highlighted the problem of many middle peasants being classified incorrectly as rich peasants and then being deprived of property. Ren used the concrete example of Caijiaya Administrative Village to explain the incorrect application of criteria in class classification. He stressed that only one criterion was valid. This was the different relationships individuals had vis-à-vis productive capital. To solve the problem, he put forward a simple classification of the Chinese peasantry. Landlords owned much land but did not farm it themselves; rich peasants farmed part of their land but relied on hiring others to farm most of it; poor peasants had inadequate land and tools and were often dependent on unfavorable tenancy conditions; farmhands possessed no land or implements and worked for extremely low wages.

The problems and the need to be more cautious in the areas now falling to the Communists led to policy moderation. Following the conference, through 1948, measures were taken to slow the process of land reform. While radical land reform had been considered necessary to raise peasant enthusiasm during the early stages of the war, by 1948 it was feared that it would create more problems for the CCP than advantages. The main target of criticism in the implementation of land reform became "leftism" rather than "rightism." On 1 April, reflecting the new consensus, Mao spoke to a gathering of cadres about the "left" deviations that had occurred. According to Mao, a number of people had been wrongly classified as landlords or rich peasants but this problem had now been solved. Second, during land reform, the industrial and commercial enterprises of landlords and rich peasants had been encroached on. Third, in some cases, the Shanxi-Suide party organization had allowed landlords and rich peasants to be put to death needlessly. Mao reasserted that party policy on land reform was to attack only "the system of feudal exploitation by the landlord class and by the old rich peasants" and not to encroach on the national bourgeoisie or industrial and commercial enterprises run by rich peasants.

In two telegrams sent on 3 and 6 February 1948, Mao outlined a threefold categorization of liberated areas, each requiring a different land policy.⁴⁸ In the old liberated areas (those from before the Japanese surrender), the redistribution of land had already been completed and thus it was not necessary to do this again. In the semi-old liberated areas (from the Japanese surrender to September 1947), the land law was to be carried out completely. Here poor peasant leagues and peasant associations were to be set up with the poor peasant leagues as the leadership backbone. In the newly liberated areas, the land law was to be implemented in two stages. In the first stage, rich peasants were to be neutralized and only the landlords attacked. This was projected to take about two years. In the second stage, land rented out by rich peasants was to be redistributed, as was their surplus land and part of their other property. Landlords' land that was not thoroughly redistributed in the first phase was also to be redistributed. This stage would take one year.

On 12 March, Mao wrote a note of approval on three reports that were to be disseminated as good case studies for dealing with the problems of land reform and party rectification. According to Mao, such material was much more fruitful than any number of CC decisions and directives.⁴⁹ One of the reports, on the experiences of land reform and party rectification in Pingshan County (Jin-Cha-Ji), had been written in February by Liu Shaoqi. Liu's report was held up by Mao as a model for this work in the old and semi-old liberated areas.⁵⁰ Party rectification had become a major issue in land reform following Liu's "discovery" of the corrupt nature of many local cadres. Now, however, the movement had clearly gone to extremes, and while it was not to be halted, the horns were to be drawn in.

In a letter of 23 January 1948 to Bo Yibo, Liu had restated the integral link between land reform and party rectification and warned Bo to guard against any encroachment on the rights of middle peasants. Liu stated that while guarding against "rightist" mistakes, "leftist" mistakes and tailism were occurring.⁵¹ Yet while Liu pointed out, in his February report, that work-teams had been guilty of "leftism," his view that problems in the party branches derived from infiltration of landlords and "riffraff" tended to encourage continuation of the excesses (**Doc. H.19**).

In particular, Liu called for party meetings to be open to poor and middle peasants, thus rejecting his earlier views on the need to limit mass participation in controlling the party.⁵² However, Liu's view on opening up the party in this way was that it would lead to moderation as nonparty members would see the party as its own and adopt the policy of "cure the sickness to save the patient." This method of open meetings was adopted in a 22 February 1948 directive drafted by Zhou Enlai.⁵³ According to the directive, this kind of meeting would enable nonparty people to "examine and freely criticize party members and cadres whom they oppose or even those they support, so that they will feel they are in close touch with the party." Indeed the directive referred favorably to the positive experiences of Pingshan County. The directive was revised by Mao Zedong and thus, as late as February, Mao and Liu were clearly in harmony over the question of rural policy. Yet, the directive had no effect on dampening the movement.

Beginning in late March 1948, Mao signaled publicly that the CC now clearly saw “leftism” as a greater problem than “rightism.”⁵⁴ The moderation of land reform culminated with the CC directive drafted by Mao on 25 May 1948 (**Doc. H.20**). In the directive, Mao defined three necessary criteria for land reform. Unless all three were present, land reform was not to be designated as a task for 1948. First, all enemy troops had to have been wiped out and the situation stabilized. Second, a majority of the “basic masses” had to be demanding land reform. Third, land reform was not to be left to the spontaneous activity of the masses but was to come under the control of adequately prepared cadres. This led Mao to suggest that no land reform be attempted in a number of areas.

(f) September 1948—The Politburo Decides to Tighten Up on Organization in Advance of Victory

Between 8 and 13 September 1948, the Politburo met at Xibaipo (west Hebei) to undertake a major review of the previous several years and to plan for the future. It was the largest gathering of top party leaders since the end of the war with Japan.⁵⁵ Mao drafted an inner-party circular on the meeting that pointed out the successes to date in the war with the GMD and anticipated another five years before final victory would be achieved (**Doc. H.21**). Mao reaffirmed the call for a political consultative conference to be held in the liberated areas for nonparty democrats, the democratic parties, and people’s organizations in preparation for the establishment of the provisional government of the People’s Republic of China. This was part of the attempt to capitalize on the disillusionment of many with the GMD and to try to win them over to the side of the CCP in the final years of the struggle.

A key problem highlighted by Mao was the dislocation that the war had caused for party affairs. While a certain degree of local autonomy was necessary to provide the leadership with the flexibility of action, it had also led to problems of “undiscipline, anarchy, localism, and guerrillaism.” As a result, according to Mao, it was necessary to “centralize all powers that can and must be concentrated in the hands of the CC and its organs so as to bring about the transition in the form of war from guerrilla to regular warfare.” This problem of recentralizing control was to be aided by gradually shifting the center of gravity of the party’s work from rural areas to the cities.

To help regularize party life, the Politburo passed a resolution on the proper convening of party meetings (**Doc. H.22**). It pointed out that party committees must regularly convene congresses and conferences as stipulated in the Constitution and that there could be no infringement on the powers vested in them by the Constitution. To counteract the tendency toward one-person rule, the resolution stressed the need to strengthen the party committee system. All important questions were to be decided collectively after discussion. No decisions could be made on important matters by individuals.⁵⁶

The meeting also adopted a resolution to define more clearly the powers of the various party organs and to try to ensure that the CC was in control of the flow of

information. Attempts to make the party function more efficiently had been made throughout 1948. On 7 January, Mao had drafted a CC directive on setting up a system of reports from party bureaus and subbureaus, thus keeping the CC properly informed of events and helping overcome what he termed the problems of lack of discipline and of anarchy.⁵⁷ On 25 March, central control was tightened by demanding that all central departments, bureaus, and front committees send copies of directives concerning policy or strategy to the CC as well as digests of important reports sent to them.⁵⁸ These decisions were incorporated and fleshed out in the resolution on the reporting of information to the CC by central departments, bureaus, and military districts (**Doc. H.23**). By the time of the September meeting, the CCP was gaining the upper hand in the war. After the CCP meeting, CCP successes increased. By the middle of 1948, Chiang Kai-shek had effectively lost the northeast. Lin Biao had begun his seventh offensive in mid-December 1947, and by March 1948 he had taken over some nineteen cities and towns. The success of these campaigns enabled Mao to predict that the GMD would be defeated in three years, a reduction from his previous assessment of five years. He predicted that in 1949 a central people's government would be established and the various bases would be merged into one continuous area covering northeast China, north China, Shandong, north Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, and Anhui.⁵⁹ As it transpired, this was a conservative estimate.

Three campaigns proved decisive in the period from mid-September 1948 until the end of January 1949.⁶⁰ Between 12 September and 2 November 1948, Lin Biao launched his eighth offensive, completely defeating the Nationalist armies in Manchuria. This was the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign. The Beijing-Tianjin campaign (21 November 1948–31 January 1949) ended Nationalist resistance in north China. Faced with the combined force of Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen's North China Field Army, the GMD commander, Fu Zuoyi, agreed to withdraw his troops, and the Communists entered Beijing (then named Beiping) on 31 January. Finally, there was the Huai-Hai campaign (6 November 1948 to 10 January 1949), which opened the way to the Yangtze River and beyond. The main fighting centered around Xuzhou, with combined operations by Chen Yi, Liu Bocheng, and Chen Kang.

With these conflicts drawing to a conclusion, the Politburo met at Xibaipo from 6 to 8 January 1949 to discuss the situation. The resolution adopted by the meeting predicted that the war would end in national victory during 1949 and 1950 (**Doc. H.24**).⁶¹ It called for the occupation of the majority or the entirety of the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian and Gansu by the end of winter 1949. Looking ahead, it called for the formation of an air force and navy in 1949 and 1950 to protect the coast and rivers.

Yet, despite outlining a list of impressive achievements, the resolution warned against complacency. It proposed moderation on entering the south, calling for a policy of rent- and interest-reduction rather than the redistribution of land. Politically, it called for the political consultative conference to be convened in 1949, the founding of the People's Republic to be announced, and a central government to be established.

Finally, the resolution suggested that the Second Plenum of the Seventh CC be convened after Beijing had been taken. Displaying the domination of the government sector by the party that has characterized post-1949 organization, this meeting was to pass a draft of the joint political program to be given to the political consultative conference and a draft of the structure of the central government.

Although it is not certain, presumably the meeting also discussed the eight conditions for GMD surrender that were presented by Mao Zedong on 14 January 1949. Now that the tide was flowing inexorably in the CCP's favor, the conditions were much tougher than those proposed in 1945–46. War criminals were to be punished, the land system was to be reformed, and the GMD government was to surrender its powers to a democratic coalition government that would be formed through a political consultative conference.⁶²

Although Chiang Kai-shek rejected the proposals, his resignation of the presidency in favor of Li Zongren opened the way for formal peace negotiations.⁶³ Beginning on 1 April, abortive negotiations were held in Beijing, and when the 20 April deadline for acceptance of CCP terms passed and the GMD rejected them, the PLA began its advance across the Yangtze. Nanjing and Shanghai fell on 24 and 27 April, respectively, Wuhan in mid-May, and Canton on 14 October.

(g) The Second Plenum—March 1949—Preparation for Rule

Between 5 and 13 March, the Second Plenum of the Seventh CC was held at Xibaipo Village shortly before the party transferred its headquarters to Beijing.⁶⁴ The resolution adopted by the Plenum (**Doc. H.25**) showed the extent to which Mao dominated party decision-making as it followed almost to the letter Mao's report to the Plenum delivered on 5 March.⁶⁵ The Plenum reaffirmed the conditions for peace in the forthcoming negotiations, confirmed that the conditions were ripe for the convocation of the political consultative conference and the formation of a democratic coalition government, and affirmed the principles of the people's democratic dictatorship.

For the focus of party work, the Plenum confirmed the shifting of the center of gravity of party work from the countryside to the cities. This had been the party's stated objective since 1945. Now, with final victory within reach, this objective would be feasible on a national scale. Mao's report and the resolution pointed out that the focus of party work since 1927 had been in the countryside but that this era was now over. Thus in the south the PLA was to occupy first the cities and then the countryside. The party was to learn how to administer and develop the cities.

Liu Shaoqi's report to the plenum also dwelled on the question of work in the cities, with one interesting exception (**Doc. H.26**). In his opening remarks, Liu acknowledged that mistakes were made in rural work and that the CC was partly responsible for such mistakes, although most had been the fault of Liu himself. In the remainder of the report, Liu outlined the problems of trying to resume work with private enterprises and making prompt arrangements to hand enterprises over to

proper institutions so that normal production could be restored. As for private enterprises of major importance whose owners proved obstructive, Liu suggested sending in cadres or military representatives to supervise them. Finally, concerning the working class, Liu proposed that the party should ensure that their living standard be maintained (supplies should be second only to the military), that intensive education be conducted among them, and that they be organized.

The model for this move to the cities was based on the northeast and the experiments and policies that had taken place there. A series of regulations had been passed in the northeast that would act as the basis for policy throughout the reunified China. Important in terms of laying the ground for Mao's comments on moving the focus of work from the countryside to the cities was a city work conference held from late July until 31 August 1948 by the party's Northeast Bureau. On behalf of the Bureau, Zhang Wentian made the concluding speech (**Doc. H.27**). The speech was divided into six sections and, on 30 September, Zhang sent the majority of the third section to the CC for its approval. On 6 November the report was revised slightly, approved, and sent back to the Bureau for its comments on the revisions. On 25 November, the Bureau telegraphed its agreement to all revisions. The version used here includes the revisions as well as Zhang Wentian's comments on the revisions made by the CC. Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai are said to have written comments on the report.

The report outlined policies for the urban areas in particular and, more generally, for the economy as a whole. Zhang stressed that in the future the principal task would be to develop the state sector of the economy. He acknowledged that this sector was more developed in the northeast than throughout the rest of China. He claimed that the sector already had a socialist character and was the "foundation on which the economic alliance between the urban proletariat and rural peasants can be built." However, Zhang pointed out that the sector still had many weaknesses and that the Communists were "extremely poor" at managing economic enterprises. He felt that these problems could be resolved by studying economic management and bringing this sector under the control of a unified plan. In line with Mao Zedong's ideas, Zhang proposed a wide-scale development of the cooperative movement. The cooperatives were seen as the way to link the state with the huge numbers of small producers. Cooperativization was seen as a necessary step in preparing the countryside for the introduction of socialism. Further, Zhang warned that the private capitalist economy could not be neglected, yet neither could it be allowed to develop unchecked. He noted the emergence of state-capitalist forms in the northeast and felt that private capital attracted in this way was most favorable for the economic development of new democracy. In short, Zhang's report was an account of the policies of economic transformation of the new regime. No wonder it was described by Mao as an excellent document.

It now remained for the CCP to define the new state form that would rule China after full control had been achieved. On 30 June, to mark the anniversary of the founding of the CCP, Mao published "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,"

outlining this new state form (**Doc. H.28**). The people's democratic dictatorship was Mao's adaptation of his views on New Democracy to the current situation. Four classes made up the people in this dictatorship: the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. This coalition of classes would, however, be under the leadership of the working class. In reality this meant the CCP as the party had ascribed to itself the position of vanguard of the working class. This was despite the fact that the CCP had had no effective contact with the working class for some twenty-two years.

While political power was now firmly centralized in the hands of the CCP, this was not so with the economy. Here the notion of a coalition of four classes made some sense and related to reality. Given the war-torn economy the CCP had inherited, it was necessary to rely on the national bourgeoisie to restore the economic environment. Thus, the policy was to regulate capitalism not destroy it. However, the national bourgeoisie was to undergo suitable education. This education would advance when it was time to "realize socialism, that is, to nationalize private enterprise." Internationally, Mao put forward the important policy of "leaning toward one side," positioning China as a part of the "anti-imperialist front headed by the USSR."

CCP dominance of the state sector was implied but not made explicit in the "Organic Law of Central People's Government." This was adopted at the meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held in Beijing from 21 to 30 September 1949.⁶⁶ Article 1 confirmed that the people's democratic dictatorship was to be led by the working class, meaning effective leadership by its vanguard, the CCP. Although this was superseded by a new constitution in 1954 when the National People's Congress was set up, party penetration of the state apparatus has remained a distinctive feature of the PRC.

After the National People's Congress had been convened, the Political Consultative Conference continued to function as a symbol of united front politics, its fortunes waxing and waning with CCP emphasis on the need to widen its support base. In his speech on the Common Program, Liu Shaoqi particularly emphasized that the CCP's maximum program, the pursuit of socialism, was not written into the Common Program in order to avoid the impression that this represented concrete steps to be taken at the present time. By the mid-1950s, however, this was no longer a necessity.⁶⁷

The military situation in China at the end of the war was reflected in the division of China into six large administrative regions corresponding to the zones of responsibility of the major military units of the PLA. In each region a party bureau was set up to represent the CC. These were abolished in 1954, although they were recreated in the 1961–66 period and briefly in 1977.

As the CCP prepared to take over power, it also sought to reassert its control over what it termed the mass organizations. Thus, from 11 to 18 April 1949, the First Congress of the New Democracy Youth Federation was convened in Beijing, in early June the All China Literary Workers conference met, and in late July—early

August, a work conference of the All China Federation of Trade Unions was convened.

With only pockets of GMD resistance remaining and the central control of the party being reasserted, Mao Zedong was able to announce publicly in Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949 the founding of the People's Republic of China. However, ruling China was to prove even more difficult than winning China.

Note: I would like to thank Harvard University Press for permission to use the texts in documents H.4, H.7, and H.28.

DOCUMENTS JULY 1944-JUNE 1949

H.1 Directive of the CC on Reforming and Training the Military (1 July 1944)⁶⁸

1) Regular troops now number 470,000, and the militia, 2.1 million (the numbers reported by various areas may not be accurate). This force is sufficient for us to persist in the war and develop the base areas before [launching] a counterattack. These forces, however, are insufficient for seizing large cities and key transportation routes, or finally driving the Japanese invader out of China, or coping with possible unexpected domestic changes (attacks from behind) on the part of the GMD. Unless we double our military forces or increase their number several fold, we will be unable to fulfill the task of finally driving the Japanese invader out of large cities and key transportation routes and dealing with possible sudden incidents.

The enemy is now attacking on the main front. The enemy disposition in front of several base areas has temporarily changed. Good news such as the opening of the second front, the large offensives by the Red Army, and America's active attacks on Japan may boost the [people's] morale in the fight against the Japanese while demoralizing the enemy. These conditions should enable us to expand our base areas and military strength behind the enemy's lines. With the exception of more favorable areas, there are all kinds of constraints on expanding our military strength. First, our labor power and material and financial resources are about the same as during the last few years. This sets tight constraints. The past streamlining of the military and government was to adapt to this kind of constraint. These conditions have not basically changed (the policy of streamlining top and middle levels of administration will continue). Second, it is possible that the enemy will withdraw troops from the main front to conduct "extermination" campaigns and transfer forces from Manchuria to inside Shanhaiguan [i.e., inside the Great Wall]. Conditions will become more difficult as the war nears victory. It is possible that the most difficult period, between 1941 and 1942, will be repeated. We should prepare to deal with sudden incidents that will cause us greater difficulties. To prepare and avoid disaster, we should make mental, material, and organizational preparations beforehand [to cope with] these potential difficulties. Third, our troops have been fighting a dispersed guerrilla war for many years; they seldom receive training and remain unconsolidated. Having been tempered by seven years of fighting the Japanese, our army can be said to have improved in this respect. Now, however, our army is conducting an extremely dispersed guerrilla war (this is absolutely necessary) and is seldom gathered together for training or concentrated to fight battles. In this respect, our army can be said to have regressed. For the reasons cited above, ordinary areas cannot and should not adopt the policy of expanding the military, except for those areas with more favorable conditions. Our central policy should be

to seize the opportunity within the coming year to intensify the improvement and training of currently available troops and greatly improve our army's military training and political work so as to prepare the conditions for our army to at least double itself and preferably increase its number many times. This is in addition to countering "extermination" campaigns and encroachments by the enemy and collaborators, penetrating deep into the rear of the enemy, developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, expanding and strengthening our base areas, and doing our best to win over the troops and police of the collaborators and the majority of the masses in large cities and along key transportation routes. The current central task for all work in the base areas remains improvement, deepening, consolidation, and preparation of the conditions for great expansion in the future. This applies equally to our military, governmental, and economic activities, the popular movement, and cadre education. If we fail to fulfill this task, our future great expansion and our task of expelling the enemy from large cities will certainly be impeded. We must especially call our comrades' attention to the improvement, deepening, and consolidation of our military operations.

2) Therefore, we suggest that within one year, and mainly during this fall and winter, each bureau and party committee make a comprehensive plan, taking care not to interfere with combat or production, that will be implemented by military districts and subdistricts in order to use all possible opportunities to reform and train troops in rotation. Where conditions are better, several regiments or one regiment should be brought together to undergo training in separate groups. Where such conditions do not exist, training will be conducted in groups of battalions and companies. In general, within one year the entire Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army will receive one round of effective training.

3) This reform and training contains political and military aspects. Military training refers to drilling in military skills and summarizing experiences in leading and commanding troops. The content of drilling primarily covers combat skills and secondly tactics. The methods for drilling include, first, that of a mass movement. This will change the previous monopolization by a few instructors and the headquarters. It will turn education into a cause of the masses themselves and enable the masses (cadres, soldiers, and service personnel) to study and research on their own and help and compete with each other. Every individual and the masses in all large and small units care about their own, or their units', educational achievements and fear that their achievements will lag behind those of other comrades and other units. This will turn every place into a drill ground and classroom. Time is precious and must be utilized efficiently; nobody wants to lag behind. This [method] will enable officers to teach soldiers, soldiers to teach soldiers, and soldiers to teach officers. Second, there is the method of making study and application consistent with each other and changing the previous orthodox drill method. The previous orthodox method of training used books as the only basis for education. As a result, education was limited by book knowledge and precious practical experience was ignored. Teachers followed the orthodox and formalistic; they force-fed students but failed to

inspire the masses' own initiative. On the surface, they were very busy, but in reality they produced few results. The pupils regarded studying as painful and an unnecessary burden. Of course, we cannot say that all of our army's previous military educational methods were orthodox or formalistic. Many were beneficial and practical. The previous book-based education had a certain progressiveness and benefit for our army. However, serious orthodox and formalistic flaws existed in the previous methods. This is a fact which has not yet received the necessary criticism. This time, the training must correct this mistake. It is not that books are unnecessary, but that book knowledge must be applied correctly. Things in books that are not practical are to be deleted. New experiences must be constantly absorbed. In general, the content of training should be practical. We are not training for the sake of training, but in order to defeat the enemy. Third, concerning the method of training: every soldier must be mobilized so that everybody understands the necessity of training. Pay attention to persuading the backward elements and convincing them. Link the cadres with the masses. All cadres and active elements among the soldiers drill in the same way as ordinary field soldiers and observe discipline in the same way. Create and find typical examples. Convey their experience to all the people. Invite soldiers with excellent achievements to be teachers. Meetings of model students' representatives should be convened based on the unit of military subdistricts and regiments. After a period of training, every unit should select one cadre and two soldiers through secret ballot to attend the meeting at the regimental or subdistrict headquarters. This meeting should summarize experiences, launch competitions, and commend and reward active elements. As for the methods of training and the content of training, the Military Affairs Commission will provide details. Only the main points of several methods are given here.

4) In the one-year period of training, our political work must undergo a comprehensive, thorough, and planned reform. Based on the Gutian Resolution and Tan Zheng's report,⁶⁹ through examining mistakes and flaws, encourage excellent results and disseminate the experience of model companies. Commend and reward combat heroes, production heroes, model workers, and model students. Use these methods to attain the goal of reforming our political work. Political work must ensure the fulfillment of the overall task of improvement and training.

5) Military training and the reform of political work is to cover the 470,000 regular troops and the guerrilla forces. Within one year, they must undergo one major round of training. We have 2 million militia and even more self-defense troops. They are not only an indispensable and effective force in preserving and developing our base areas and supporting the regular army and the guerrilla forces in combat, but also the main source for expanding our army by 100 percent or by several times in the future. Within the year we must improve and train not only all the regular and guerrilla forces, but also all the militia and self-defense troops. Each bureau and party committee and all military districts and subdistricts should separately devise two kinds of plans for improvement and training concerning the regular and guerrilla forces, and the militia and self-defense troops. Improve and train

them separately. In the course of improving and training the militia and self-defense troops, we should summarize the experience of struggle of the militia and self-defense troops and reorganize their establishment. Those units that are too small should be expanded, and those that are backward should be improved. Cadres should be sent where they are needed. So long as the principle of combining labor and combat is not violated, we should realize the goal of turning all the people into soldiers. As for the method of improving and training the militia and self-defense troops, we should also carry out a mass movement, make study consistent with practice, link cadres with the masses, disseminate model experiences, introduce competition, convene meetings of heroes and model students, and reward excellent achievements in study. Those in military, party, and governmental organs at all levels who did not pay enough attention to the work of the militia and self-defense troops must make self-criticisms. Those in political departments in the military districts and subdistricts who did not pay enough attention to guidance and help in the political work of the militia and self-defense troops must immediately pay more attention [to it].

6) In order to expand our army by 100 percent or more, when the conditions become ripe in the future, party committees at all levels and in all military and political agencies should pay attention to training large numbers of cadres. At the moment, no matter whether in the regular armed forces, guerrilla forces, or militia and self-defense troops, our cadres' technical and tactical levels and abilities to train, lead, command, and preserve forces are generally not high or great. Some are very low. As far as political understanding and consciousness is concerned, most have flaws, and some are very poor. If we do not improve and train them in time, the implementation of future important tasks will be impeded. At the same time, however, no matter whether it is in our regular armed forces and guerrilla forces, or in the militia and self-defense troops, there are many heroic and intelligent cadres and soldiers with great prospects for development. Our cadres and the whole military have achieved great things. The low level of the cadres and some backwardness can be overcome. Within one year of training, each bureau, party committee, military district, and subdistrict should have a work plan for training the cadres to be implemented separately in each military district, subdistrict, and county. In the military districts, there are branches of Kangda [Resist Japan University] to train local military and political cadres above the level of company commander and political instructor, as well as local cadres who are doing party and governmental work but who are going to be transferred to the military and assume military and political responsibilities above the company level. Moreover, schools above the usual intermediary level must also join the military training course. In the military subdistricts, there should be a training course for squadron and platoon commanders in the regular army, and platoon commanders in the militia and self-defense troops. The former should include training squadron and platoon commanders in the regular armed forces and the guerrilla forces, as well as local party and government cadres who are preparing to assume the post of squadron and platoon commander in the

military. The duration of the course is to be determined by each area. The duration is between one and two months; graduates are sent back to work in their original areas. At the county level, there should be training courses for squadron leaders of the militia and self-defense troops. After one month's training, they will return to home villages. This will create a large number of cadres for the mass armed forces. Each area should invent its own various kinds of training methods and use the periods between battles and production to conduct such training.

7) We want you to report the tasks for one year of concentrated training to your affiliated military and political organs. In order to turn this one-year plan for concentrated training into a movement that will be participated in enthusiastically by the masses and into an effective movement, you must thoroughly explain the importance, principles, and methods of implementation of this task at meetings that include all senior party, government, and military cadres in the base area. After the meetings, you should follow the example of last winter's senior cadres meeting of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. All senior cadres, whether military or civilian, must join in exercises for five to seven days (those with very poor health may watch), thus creating the will and a fever for the training drive. Although the period is set for one year, we should note that the central period in our training is the four months between November this winter and February next spring. We must complete the training of sections of the armed working teams, the guerrilla forces, and the regular armed forces in three months—August, September, and October—this fall, so that they can be ready to relieve other units. They should be divided into separate groups to undergo concentrated training. You are to devise the plan for rotating the training of the militia and self-defense troops.

8) In addition, develop the state-run production of the military, the government, and the party to reduce the burden on the people by 10 to 20 percent (based on 1943). Pay attention to civilian requisitions. Under the principle of helping the people to recover, recruit appropriate numbers of new soldiers, according to the needs of individual areas, to replenish the losses suffered by companies and maintain the overall number of the troops in each strategic area. If our army can maintain a force between 470,000 and 500,000 after the one-year training program is completed and receive one period of focused training, then it will be a great success. Moreover, the policy of improving, training, and raising the quality of the troops outlined in this directive should not be understood as meaning relaxation of the streamlining of the top and middle levels of administrative organs, or as changing our troops' current dispersed guerrilla warfare. It must be understood that the policy of streamlining and dispersed guerrilla warfare is absolutely necessary in the present era.

H.2 Directive of the CC on Diplomatic Work (18 August 1944)⁷⁰

Shortly after the delegation of Chinese and foreign journalists visited Yan'an at the end of May [1944], the eighteen-member American military observation mission

arrived in Yan'an on Stilwell's orders and will soon go to the front. At the same time, the Fourteenth Division of the American Air Force sent one lieutenant colonel and one sergeant to go to the front of our Fifth Division in central Hubei. This will be a reconnaissance mission of the fifth war zone. Summarizing this situation, the CC makes the following special announcement:

1) Thanks to the great efforts by our party, government, army, and people, and owing to the increasing reactionary [nature] and incompetence of some in the GMD, the contrast between the two Chinas (the new democratic China and the fascist China) is becoming more obvious in the anti-Japanese camp. This time, foreign journalists and American military personnel came to our border region and base areas behind the enemy lines. This is the beginning of actual contacts after their initial understanding of our new democratic China. Therefore, we should not treat their visits and observation as ordinary events, but as the development of our international united front and the beginning of our diplomacy. However, it must be pointed out that now this kind of diplomacy is a semi-independent diplomacy. On the one hand, the Chongqing Nationalist government is still the central government recognized by the Chinese people (including us) and the allied countries. Many diplomatic activities have to be recognized by it. On the other hand, the GMD does not want us to conduct independent diplomatic activities. Only by breaking through all kinds of prohibitions and restrictions set by the GMD can we further our diplomatic activities with the allied countries and gain direct international support. Therefore, our diplomacy is already of a semi-independent nature. At the same time, it must be pointed out, diplomacy is also the least familiar of all our undertakings. On the other hand, our party comrades, starting with the senior leaders, should pay attention to and study this undertaking. If we all accept that the policy of the domestic united front over the last eight years has brought us great gains, the policy of the international united front in the future will possibly bring us even greater gains. Moreover, if the policy of the international united front is successful, it can be conclusively said that many benefits will be added to [winning] the victory of the Chinese revolution.

2) The main components of the international united front are the joint efforts to fight the Japanese and democratic cooperation. This [cooperation] can exist not only in the war against Japan, but it is possible even afterward. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain are the most crucial countries to China. At the moment, the United States and Great Britain, in alliance with China, are fighting the Japanese; the United States has the closest alliance with China. The objectives for American military personnel in coming to our border region and base areas behind enemy lines include the need for reconnaissance and field first-aid. On this basis, it will be possible to expand cooperation and mutual support in fighting the enemy. First, there is the basis for military cooperation; then there is cultural cooperation; and finally it is possible to realize political and economic cooperation. At present, however, expectations should not be too high. At the moment, the focus of the diplomacy of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain is still on the

GMD. Even within the United States and Britain, there are three kinds of forces: progressive, neutral, and diehard. It is the same within the British government, although the situation in Britain is not as good as that in the United States. Therefore, we should not treat their government personnel as the same, but should study and analyze them. However, for current diplomatic reasons, the diehards account for a minority of all the British and Americans and their military personnel who are willing to associate with us. Indeed, the diehards oppose their domestic CPs, but do not oppose us. Therefore, their situation is different from that of the domestic diehard elements. Therefore, the focus of our diplomacy should be placed on expanding our influence and winning over international cooperation. Even when we encounter stubborn elements, we should sincerely persuade them and give them a good impression. A Catholic priest in the journalists' delegation originally held deep prejudices against us; but after our persuasion, he expressed friendly feelings and refused the GMD's request to propagandize against the CP.

3) The policy of establishing an international united front should be the primary [focus of] foreign policy at the present time. Clause 21 in the government program of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region forms the general program of our party's foreign policy. The principle of implementation now includes, militarily, the entry of allied military personnel and armed forces into our areas to conduct joint operations against Japan. This is under the proviso that we authorize it and that they obey the laws of the government. They will also receive our assistance. At that same time, we also welcome the allied countries' support in terms of material, medical, and technical assistance. Politically, we welcome the allied countries to send diplomatic envoys to, or establish diplomatic missions in, our border region and main anti-Japanese base areas. In terms of cultural propaganda, we welcome the allied countries to cooperate [with us], and we welcome the news agencies or official news departments of the allied countries to establish bureaus in Yan'an. We welcome them to dispatch special correspondents and reporters to Yan'an; we will provide them with all conveniences for reporting in all areas. The government, in principle, does not give up the right to censor wire dispatches. In practice, we will approve anything that does not reveal military secrets, create rumors, or subvert the government; so as to demonstrate our difference from the GMD, we will not censor or seize such dispatches. In our propaganda for the enemy armed forces and civilians, we welcome the cooperation of the allied countries and the exchange of experiences with them. On the issue of religion, we strictly observe the separation of church and state. We allow foreign priests and preachers to conduct religious activities in the border region and the base areas behind the enemy lines; we will also return to them the churches and estates they should have. At the same time, these priests and preachers should pledge that they will not oppose the government and the leadership of the CP. On the issue of relief, we welcome the United States, Britain, and Canada to provide us with aid in the form of medical equipment and money. At that same time, we request that the international relief agencies recognize [the need for] aid for this area, which has over 80 million people and which has suffered from

the most savage enemy destruction. Economically, under the principle of benefiting both sides, we welcome international investment and technical cooperation. First, we want continued cooperation with the international industrial cooperation commission. These are the concrete measures of our current foreign policy.

4) To avoid making mistakes in our foreign policy and diplomatic activities, we must first take a firm national stand. The diplomatic history of China over the past century [shows that] the Chinese have demonstrated two wrong concepts with respect to national stance. Before the Boxer Movement [1898], the idea of keeping the foreigners out held sway; afterward, xenophobia dominated. From the May Fourth Movement [1919] to the Great Revolution [1925–27], this xenophobia was dissipated by the high tide of nationalism. However, during the twenty years of GMD rule, or even in the current period of fighting the war against Japan, xenophobia in high society has remained very strong. It cannot but influence Chinese society. Therefore, we should, on the one hand, strengthen national self-respect and self-confidence; but this does not mean keeping the foreigners out. On other hand, we should learn other peoples' strengths and be good at cooperating with others; but this is not xenophobia or foreign worship. This is the correct national stand and also the model for the new people in new democratic China. This model of the new person has already developed among the soldiers and civilians in the enemy's rear and in the border region. Moreover, our international friends have begun to understand it. Our new democratic Chinese [people] should persist in this stand and have no prejudices.

5) Concerning diplomacy, at the moment we should pay attention to: (a) seeking the initiative in everything and never falling into a passive position; we should not respond to every request for help, but should make choices and set priorities for important matters and those that are less so. All things that we can, and are willing to, let outsiders know and participate in can be actively arranged by us. We can even make them spontaneously make requests that are [really] our own, such as for material aid. The GMD is begging everybody loudly and daily; it wants this and that. Temporarily, we should not mention this. On the contrary, this will increase their respect for us, and they will make offers to us first. However, this will be difficult to realize because of opposition from the GMD. When our comrades encounter personnel from the allied countries, they must never ask for things immediately. (b) We should be firmly committed to policy implementation and execution. We should learn and know a great deal, as well as deliberate on things beforehand. Once a decision is reached and announced, however, we should try to implement it. Of course, this refers to matters of principle. If technical matters are involved, we should be very flexible and not limit ourselves too rigidly. (c) As far as documents, materials, and contents of conversations are concerned, things that we reveal should be true; things that cannot be revealed should be concealed. We should refuse to respond to or provide things that concern state secrets and inner-party secrets. Things that are not convenient to answer should be avoided or evaded. (d) Diplomatic attitudes should be cautious and open. On the one hand, do

not lose vigilance; on the other hand, do not equivocate. (e) We must be punctual, and we must keep any promises that we make. Hospitality should be simple but warm. On the one hand, there must be no extravagance; on the other hand, we should not be cold. (f) Any activities involving foreigners and specific discussions with them in all localities can be conducted only after the CC has been cabled for its approval.

In all matters related to the international united front or diplomatic operations, all the above should be relayed to the cadres; they should be discussed and uniformly obeyed.

H.3 Statement of Comrade Zhou Enlai Before Leaving Chongqing (15 February 1945)⁷¹

The statement by the representative of the Nationalist government, Dr. Wang Shijie, at the press conference for foreign journalists this Wednesday is neither candid nor fair. This is because he mentioned only the so-called concessions proposed by the government in the negotiations between the GMD and the CP. Moreover, he did not explain under which conditions or preconditions such concessions would be made. First, during the negotiations, the Nationalist government demanded that the CCP put all military forces it commands under jurisdiction of the military council of the Nationalist government. This means that [our military] will be placed under the command of the GMD because the Nationalist government is a government under the one-party dictatorship of the GMD. Second, during the negotiations, the GMD insisted that its one-party dictatorship would not end. Because of these two conditions or preconditions, all the so-called concessions are either empty or devoid of any meaning. They are not concessions but factors that will restrict or undermine the war against Japan. Specifically, first, the CCP will not be granted legal status if it does not turn its troops over to the GMD government. Second, the members of the Nationalist government's military council never convene any meetings; nor do they have any power. Third, the so-called war cabinet set up within the executive yuan governed by the party does not have final decision-making power. Fourth, without abolishing party rule or changing the military policy that discriminates against others, the three-person commission to reorganize the Chinese communist troops amounts to turning these troops over to the GMD government. Moreover, judging from the record of fighting the enemy, it is not the Chinese communist troops, but the GMD's, that should be reorganized. After this explanation, one can understand why I, representing the CCP CC, have rejected all the proposals of the Nationalist government. This is one aspect. The more important reason is that the Nationalist government has rejected our proposal for establishing a joint supreme command of a democratic coalition government to unify all the military forces in China and reform political, military, economic, and cultural policies. We have also proposed to the Nationalist government, the Chinese GMD, and the Chinese Alliance for De-

mocracy that the Nationalist government be authorized to convene a conference of all parties and groups to discuss and decide on how to end party rule or, for example, how to reform the government to turn it into a democratic coalition government. [The conference should also] draft a joint political program so that the policy of coalition government may be implemented after a consensus is reached. The Nationalist government's answer is a sort of consultative meeting that will already have decided to maintain the one-party dictatorship and oppose the democratic coalition government. Therefore, I must return to Yan'an to report to our party's CC. Our hopes were that the Nationalist government would first release patriotic political prisoners, annul all laws that repress the people, stop all espionage activities, and withdraw all the military forces that are besieging the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. These have not been accepted by the government authorities. This is the main content of the months of negotiations between the two parties. Over the past several months, both parties have been indebted to American Ambassador General Patrick Hurley's warm support and continuous efforts. I express my deep gratitude.

H.4 On Coalition Government. *Mao Zedong* (24 April 1945)⁷²

I) The Fundamental Demands of the Chinese People

Comrades! The long-awaited Seventh National Congress of our party is now opened. On behalf of the CC, I am going to make a report to you. [[Our Congress is held under the following circumstances.]]

A decisive victory has been scored in the sacred and just war against fascist aggressors throughout the world; the time is near for the Chinese people to defeat the Japanese invaders in collaboration with our allies; but China, still hard-pressed by the Japanese invaders, is not yet united, and a grave crisis still exists in China. In such circumstances, what should we do? Indubitably, what China urgently needs is the establishment, by uniting all political parties and groups and nonpartisan leaders, of a democratic, provisional coalition government so that democratic reforms may be instituted, the present crisis overcome, all anti-Japanese forces mobilized and united for the defeat of the Japanese invaders in effective collaboration with our allies, and the Chinese people liberated from the hands of the Japanese. This being done, the National Assembly, on a broad democratic basis, will have to be summoned to establish a regular democratic government, of a similar coalition nature, embracing more broadly all parties and groups and nonpartisan representatives. This government will then lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build an independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong new nation, in short, to build a new China after defeating the aggressors through unity and democracy.

We deem that only by so doing can the basic demands of the Chinese people be

reflected. Hence, my report is devoted mainly to a discussion of these demands. It also emphasizes the problems of coalition government, as that problem has been regarded with great concern by the Chinese people and the allied press.

[[The present situation demands that our party should work more solidly and thoroughly.

II) The International and Domestic Situations

Despite the expectations of all Chinese and foreign reactionaries, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union remain united. The prolonged war in China has awakened and united the struggling Chinese people. They are in the midst of a powerful, ever-rising nationwide democratic movement.

III) The Two Lines in the Anti-Japanese War

The Key to the Chinese Problem

There has been no real summing-up of the experience gained by China during the eight years of war.]]

Speaking of summing-up experiences, we may see clearly that there exist in China two different guiding lines: one of which helps to defeat the Japanese aggressors, but the other, while incapable of defeating the Japanese aggressors, in some respects actually helps them to undermine the anti-Japanese war.

The passive policy adopted by the GMD government toward the war with Japan and its reactionary policy of oppression toward the people have resulted in military defeats, the loss of large pieces of territory, a financial and economic crisis, the oppression of the people, hardships in the people's livelihood, and the undermining of national unity. These policies hamper the mobilization and unification of all the people's anti-Japanese forces for effectively waging the war, and impede the people's awakening and solidarity. But the movement of the people's awakening and unity has never been halted; it has been developing in a circuitous manner under the double oppression of the Japanese aggressors and the GMD government. The two lines—the GMD government's line of oppressing the people and carrying on a war of passive resistance, and the Chinese people's line of awakening and unity for the prosecution of a people's war—have clearly existed in China for a long time. Here lies the key to all Chinese problems.

[[History has followed a tortuous course.

The People's War

With our losses during the Long March, some people looked down on our forces and thought the GMD would be the main force resisting Japan. But our forces were of high quality and could wage the people's war.]]

While I am making this report, our regular forces have been expanded to the

strength of 910,000 soldiers, while the people's militia has increased to over 2.2 million. Our regular forces are still numerically smaller than the existing GMD army (including central and provincial troops) by hundreds of thousands, but considering the number of Japanese and puppet troops they are engaging, the vast battlefields they have to cover, their fighting power, their support from the people, the people's militia and the self-defense corps, their political quality, and their internal unity and solidarity, our regular forces have become the mainstay of the anti-Japanese war.

This army is powerful, because all who have joined it are conscientiously disciplined. They have come together to fight not for the selfish interests of a few or for cliques but for a just people's war, for the interests of the broad masses and the entire nation. The sole aim of this army is to stand closely by the people and to serve the Chinese people wholeheartedly. [[This has given the army a spirit of purpose and unity.]]

In the liberated areas, all anti-Japanese people in labor, peasant, youth, women's cultural, and other organizations, under the leadership of a democratic government, are engaging themselves heartily in various work to help the army, such as mobilizing people to join the army, transporting supplies for the troops, giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers, and solving material difficulties for the troops. Of greater importance in this respect is the mobilizing of guerrilla units, people's militia, and self-defense corps to attack the enemy, lay mines, do reconnaissance work, clean out traitors and spies, and carry and protect the wounded, all of which directly help the operation of the army. At the same time, all the people in the liberated areas are ardently performing constructive work in political, economic, and cultural fields and in public hygiene. Of the greatest importance in this respect is [the fact] that all the people are mobilized for the production of foodstuffs and daily necessities; all government organizations and schools, except in a few special cases, join in the productive work in their spare time for self-sufficiency.

[[The general slogan is everything for the front, everything for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people. From the very beginning, these have been the two fronts in the War of Resistance. On the GMD battlefield, there has been no serious fighting in recent years. The main brunt of the fighting has been borne by the front of the liberated areas. The Chinese liberated areas have a total population of 95.5 million people. The nineteen areas range from Inner Mongolia to Hainan Island with Yan'an as the directive center. The leading ruling clique in the GMD has persisted in maintaining a dictatorial rule and carried out a passive policy against Japan while it has upheld a policy of opposing the people within the country. This ruling clique represents the interests of China's big landlords, big banners, and the big compradore class. They put preservation of their own interests above the interests of the war against Japan. There are many indicators that this ruling clique is preparing to start a civil war once the Japanese are driven out. To defeat the Japanese, to build new China, and to prevent civil war, the CCP proposed the ending of GMD dictatorship and the setting up of a democratic coalition government. All our

proposals have been rejected by the GMD. This rejection and the refusal to effect any urgently needed democratic reform has caused an extremely serious situation as far as political relationships are concerned.]]

Two Future Courses

Viewing the situation as a whole and analyzing the above international and domestic situations, I urge you not to think that all our undertakings will be successful and perfectly smooth. No, far from it; the fact is, two possibilities, two future courses, one good and the other bad, coexist. Persistence of dictatorship and prevention of democratic reform; emphasis on the policy of oppressing the people instead of fighting the Japanese aggressors; the possibility of another civil war, which will drag China to its former dependent, unfree, undemocratic, disunited, poor, and weak state, even if the Japanese aggressors are beaten—this is one of the possibilities, one of the future courses. It still exists and will continue to exist even though there is a favorable international situation, a growth in the awakening of the people at home, and a development of the people's organized strength. Those who hope for the materialization of this probability are the antipopulist group in the GMD in China and the imperialist-minded reactionary elements in foreign nations. This is one side that must be noted, must not be ignored.

But, on the other hand, viewing the same situation as a whole and as analyzed above, we grasp, with more confidence and courage, the other possibility, the other future course, that is, to overcome all difficulties, to unite the entire nation, to abolish the dictatorship, to effect democratic reform, to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese forces, to beat the Japanese aggressors completely, and to build up a new, independent, free, democratic, united, and prosperous China. Those who hope for the materialization of this possibility are the broad masses, the CCP, and the other democratic elements and groups in China, as well as all nations who consider us their equals, the progressive elements and the masses abroad.

[[Essentially the international and domestic situation favors us Communists together with the Chinese people as a whole.

IV) The Policy of the CCP

Many people in the GMD areas are being kept in the dark, and therefore it is our duty to inform them of the true picture. Then people will understand that the dispute between us is a principled one.]]

Our General Program

This common program may be divided into two parts: general and specific. We will first deal with the general program, and then with the specific part.

Under the overall premise of annihilating the Japanese aggressors and of build-

ing a new China, the fundamental views of us CCP members are, at the present stage, identical with those held by the overwhelmingly majority of the Chinese populace. These are, first, that China should not have a feudal, fascist, antipopulist system of government exclusively controlled by big landowners and big bourgeoisie, because such a system has been proved to be entirely bankrupt by the chief ruling cliques of the GMD in their eighteen-year rule. Second, China cannot, and therefore should not, attempt to build a state along the old-type democratic lines ruled entirely by the liberal bourgeois dictatorship. For in China, the liberal bourgeoisie has so far proved itself to be economically and politically weak; on the other hand, there has been born in China a politically powerful new factor that leads the broad masses of the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and other democratic elements—the awakened Chinese proletariat and its leader, the CCP. Third, in the present stage, while the task of the Chinese people is still to oppose imperialistic and feudal oppression, while the requisite social and economic conditions are still lacking in China, the Chinese people cannot, and therefore should not, attempt to build a socialist state system.

What, then, is our proposal? We want, after annihilating the Japanese aggressors, to build a system of government based on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the united front, and on the coalition of democratic alliance [of parties and groups]. We call this the new democratic system of government. [[This kind of state system meets the demands of the great majority of the Chinese population.]]

The New Democracy we uphold demands the overthrow of external national oppression and doing away with the internal feudalistic, fascist oppression. After removing these oppressions we are not in favor of setting up an old democratic political system. Instead, we want to set up a political system based on the united front and the alliance of all democratic classes. These views of ours are entirely in accord with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's. In the manifesto of the First National Congress of the GMD [1924], Dr. Sun said: "The so-called democratic system in modern nations is often monopolized by the bourgeoisie, becoming an instrument with which to oppress the common people. But the GMD's principle of democracy is the common property of all common people, and not the privilege of a small minority." [[All should respect this principle.]]

The formation of the governmental structure of this New Democracy should be based on the principle of democratic centralization, with various grades of people's congresses making decisions on the major political policies and electing the government. This system is at once democratic and centralized, that is to say, it is centralization on a democratic basis and at the same time is democracy under centralized direction. This system alone can give expression to broad democracy by investing supreme power in the various grades of people's congresses; at the same time, it permits state affairs to be managed in a centralized manner, with the various levels of government doing the work entrusted to them by the various levels of people's congresses and safeguarding all the necessary democratic activities of the people.

The problems of the new democratic state and government include the problem

of a federal union. The various races in China should, in accordance with their own will and the principles of democracy, form a Union of Democratic Republics of China and set up a central government based on that union.

Troops and other armed forces form an important part of the new democratic state authority. Without them, the nation is without protection. Like other governmental authorities, the armed forces of the new democratic state authority are part of the people and protect the people but they are completely different from the old-time troops and police who belong to a few and are tools for oppressing the people and protect them.

Our views on the new democratic economy also conform to the principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. On the question of land, Dr. Sun maintained [the policy of] "land to the tillers." On the question of industry and commerce, Dr. Sun said in the manifesto mentioned above: "All native or foreign enterprises that are either monopolies or are of too large a scale to be managed personally, for instance, banking, railways, shipping etc., should be operated and managed by the state, so that private capital may not control the livelihood of the people. This is the essence of the regulation of capital." Our views on the economy in the present stage are in complete accord with those of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to the development of individuality, the development of private capital, and the protection of private property. These fears are unfounded. Imperialistic and feudal oppression has cruelly fettered the development of individualism and private capital and has caused destruction to the property of the broad masses. The task of our new democratic system is precisely to remove these fetters and check these destructions, to safeguard the free development of the people's individualism in their common life, to promote the free development of a private capitalist economy that benefits instead of controls the people's livelihood, and to protect all honestly acquired private property.

According to Dr. Sun's Principles and the experience gained in the Chinese revolution, China's economy in the present stage should be managed partly by the state, partly by private concerns, and partly by cooperatives. Here "state" is not one "monopolized by a few," but a new democratic state "owned by the common people."

The New Democratic culture should also belong to the common people, that is to say, should be national, scientific, and popular in character and decidedly should not be monopolized by a few.

Such is the general, or basic, program advocated by us Chinese Communists at the present stage—the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution. In contradistinction to the future, or ultimate, program of our socialist or communist system, this is our minimum program.

The carrying out of this program does not yet advance China to socialism. This is not a question of being subjectively desirous or undesirous of making this advance; it is owing to the fact that the objective political and social conditions of China do not permit such an advance.

We Communists never conceal or disguise our political platforms. Our future, or

ultimate, program is to push China forward to socialism and communism; this is definite and beyond question. The very name of our party and our Marxist world outlook definitely point in this boundlessly bright, beautiful, and most ideal direction. When we joined the party, we had in mind two clearly defined objectives: to struggle for the new bourgeois democratic revolution at present, and to strive for the materialization of the future proletarian socialist revolution. We must resolutely disregard the ignorant and base enmity, false accusation, and vituperation from the enemies of communism and deal determined blows to them. But to the well-intentioned skeptics we should explain [our cause] in a friendly and patient manner. Such things are very clear, definite, and not the least bit ambiguous. [[It is a law of Marxism that socialism can be attained only via the stage of democracy.]]

Some people do not understand why the Communists, far from being afraid of capitalism, actually promote its development. Our answer is simple: to replace the oppression of foreign imperialism and native feudalism with the development of capitalism is not only an advance but also an unavoidable process; it benefits the bourgeoisie as well as the proletariat. What China does not want is foreign imperialism and native feudalism, [but] not native capitalism, which is, on the contrary, too weak. Strangely enough, some spokespersons of the Chinese bourgeoisie dare not openly and directly advocate the development of capitalism, but talk about it in a very roundabout manner. On the other hand, some people maintain that we should not allow capitalism to develop broadly in China; they talk of advancing directly to socialism and [say] that the Three Principles of the People and socialism can be established "at one stroke." Obviously, such phenomena immediately reflect the weakness of China's liberal bourgeoisie toward the people. We Communists, according to our Marxist understanding of the laws of social development, clearly realize that, under the conditions of China today and the rule of the new democratic state, private capitalist economy—in addition to state economy, the individual economy of the laboring people, and the cooperative economy—must be given facilities for extensive development if the state, the people, and the forward development of our society are to be benefited. No empty talk and deception can possibly mislead the sober thinking of the Chinese Communists. [[Some question whether we are sincere when we declare that the Three Principles of the People are what China needs today. Yet we are their most thoroughgoing executors.]]

Some people wonder if the Communists, once in power, will establish a dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party system, as they have done in Russia. Our answer is that a new democratic state of a union of several democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state of a proletarian dictatorship. China, throughout the period of its new democratic system, cannot and should not have a system of government of the character of a one-class dictatorship or a one-party autocracy. We have no reason not to cooperate with political parties, social groups, or individuals outside the CP, who adopt a cooperative, but not a hostile, attitude. Russian history has created the Russian system. There the social system in which man exploits man has been abolished; the newest form of democracy—the socialist

political, economic, and cultural system—has been established; all antisocialist political parties have been thrown out by the people, who support only the Bolshevik party. To the Russians, such a system is completely necessary and rational, but even in Russia where the Bolshevik party is the only political party, the governmental authority is invested in a union of workers, peasants, and intellectuals, or in an alliance of party members and nonparty members; it is also not one in which only workers or the Bolsheviks can work in the governmental organs. Chinese history will create the Chinese system. A special type, a new democratic type of state with a union of several democratic classes, will be produced, which will be entirely necessary and rational to us and different from the Russian system.

This also answers another question, which is this: You CP members advocate the setting up of a coalition government because, at present, there is no democratic election system and a coalition government is necessary for national unification and for waging the anti-Japanese war. But in the future too, when there will be a democratic election system, why not let the majority party in the National Assembly set up a one-party government instead of still wanting to organize a coalition government? Our answer is this: China's historical conditions prescribe a coalition government. I have mentioned above that matters have been changed by the appearance of a new factor, the CCP, which represents not only the proletariat but, by virtue of its program and actual struggle, also the broad peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and other democratic elements. Any government that excludes the CP will not be able to achieve a single worthy thing; this is the basic characteristic of China in the historical stage of New Democracy.

Our Specific Program

[[Our party must have a specific program for each period based on this general program.]]

We consider the following demands as the appropriate and minimum ones:

The Chinese people demand the mobilization of all forces, in concert with the allied nations, for the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and for building up an international peace; they demand the abolition of the GMD one-party dictatorship and the setting up of a democratic coalition government and a united supreme command; they demand national unification and the punishment of the pro-Japanese, fascist, and defeatist elements that impair national solidarity and oppose the people; they demand the punishment of those reactionary elements that instigate civil war, and an assurance of internal peace; they demand the punishment of traitors and Japanese spies, and the prosecution of officers who have surrendered to the enemy; they demand the abolition of reactionary secret police organizations and activities that are used for suppressing the people, and of the concentration camps; they demand the rescinding of the reactionary laws and regulations that suppress the people's freedom of speech, of publication, of assembly, of association, of thought,

of belief, and of person, so that the people may acquire their full rights; they demand the recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties and groups; they demand the release of all patriotic political prisoners; they demand the withdrawal of all troops now surrounding and attacking the liberated areas, and employment of these troops on the anti-Japanese front; they demand the recognition of all anti-Japanese forces and popularly elected governments in the liberated areas; they demand the consolidation and expansion of the liberated areas and that their armed forces at the expense of enemy-occupied territory be given assistance in organizing underground forces for an armed revolt; they demand that they be armed for the defense of the nation; they demand the political and military reform of GMD-directed troops that always lose to the enemy, always oppress the people, and discriminate against non-GMD forces, and the punishment of the generals responsible for the defeats; they demand the improvement of the conscription system and the living conditions of the rank and file; they demand preferential treatment for the families of soldiers who fell for their country and for disabled veterans, and employment and assistance for veterans; they demand the development of the war industry for better waging the war; they demand the just distribution of allied military and financial aid to all anti-Japanese forces; they demand the punishment of corrupt and grafting officials, and the realization of honest government; they demand better treatment for the middle and lower classes of government employees; they demand the right of democratic self-government for the people; they demand the abolition of the oppressive *baojia* system; they demand relief for war refugees and famine-stricken areas; they demand the setting apart of large funds for the extensive relief of the people in enemy-occupied areas when these areas are recovered; they demand the abolition of oppressive and burdensome taxes, and the imposition of a consolidated progressive tax; they demand rural reforms, reduction of rent and interest, proper protection for the rights of tenants, low-interest loans to poor peasants, and organization of the peasants for the development of agricultural production; they demand the prohibition of bureaucratic capitalism; they demand the abolition of the present system of economic control; they demand the checking of unrestricted inflation and the rise of commodity prices; they demand assistance to small industries by extending them loans and facilities in purchasing raw materials and in sales; they demand the improvement of the living conditions of workers, relief for the unemployed, and the organization of workers for the development of industrial production; they demand the abolition of party-regimented education and the promotion of national, scientific, popular culture and education; they demand the assurance of the livelihood of teachers and academic freedom; they demand the safeguarding of the interests of youth, women, and children, relief for needy students, the organization of youth and women for war and social work, freedom of marriage, equal status for both sexes, and education for youth and children; they demand better treatment for the racial minorities in China, according them the right of self-determination and

of forming a union with the Han [Chinese] people on a voluntary basis; they demand protection for the interests of overseas Chinese and assistance for returned overseas Chinese; they demand protection for foreigners fleeing to China from the oppression of the Japanese invaders, and assistance to them in their anti-Japanese struggle; they demand the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations.

To achieve these demands, the most important thing is to put an end at once to the GMD dictatorship and set up a nationally supported, democratic, unified, provisional central coalition government that includes all anti-Japanese political parties and representatives of nonparty elements. Without this prerequisite it will be impossible to institute serious reform on a national scale—that is, in GMD-controlled areas.

[[Only these [demands represent] the voice of the broad [masses of the] Chinese people, and also of the wide public of the allied countries. Below we shall criticize some of the wrong viewpoints held by the GMD ruling clique and answer some questions raised by others. 1) Destroy the Japanese Aggressors Completely, Allow No Compromise Halfway. 2) Abolish the GMD One-party Dictatorship and Establish a Democratic Coalition Government. 3) Freedom for the People. 4) Unity of the People. 5) The People's Army.]]

6) The Land Problem

Why do we call the present stage of the revolution a “bourgeois democratic revolution”? Because the target of the revolution is not the bourgeoisie in general but imperialist and feudal oppression; the program of the revolution is not to abolish private property, but to protect private property in general; the results of this revolution will clear the way for the development of capitalism; “Land to the tillers” means the transfer of land from the hands of feudal exploiters to the hands of peasants to become their private property, to enable the peasants to be free from their feudal land relationship, agriculture to advance from its antiquated backwardness to the modern level, and industry to obtain a market, thus creating the possibility of changing the nation from an agricultural to an industrial [economy]. So, the policy of “land to the tillers” is a bourgeois democratic policy, not a proletarian and socialist one. It is the policy of all revolutionary democratic groups, not of the Communists alone. Under the conditions present in China, the Communists act differently from the others only in that we take the policy seriously: [we] do not only talk about it, but also act on it. Who are the revolutionary democratic groups? Besides the proletariat, who are the most thorough revolutionary democrats? The peasants form the largest revolutionary democratic group. The overwhelming majority of the peasants, with the exception of those rich peasants who cling to the tail [i.e., remnants] of feudalism, are actively demanding “land to the tillers.” The urban petty-bourgeoisie is also a revolutionary democratic group. It will benefit by the development of agricultural productivity, made possible by the policy of “land to the tillers.” The liberal bourgeoisie is a vacillating class; it also supports the policy of “land to the tillers,” because it needs a market; but many of them fear the policy because most of them have some connection with landownership.

Those who are resolutely opposed to the policy of “land to the tillers” are the antipopulist groups within the GMD, because they represent the class of big landlords, big bankers, and big compradores. As there is no political party in China exclusively representing the peasant class, as political parties representing the liberal bourgeoisie lack a resolute rural policy, the Chinese Communists—who have a firm land program and who really fight for the interests of the peasants, securing the broadest masses as their allies—as a result have become the leaders of the peasants and all revolutionary democrats. [[In the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese Communists made the correct policy adjustment to reducing rent and interest instead of “land to the tillers.” We can continue this policy after the war and gradually introduce “land to the tillers.”]]

The peasants are the source of China’s industrial workers, and millions of them in the future will go the cities and into factories. If China needs to build up a powerful national industry and many modern cities, then it has to undergo the lengthy process of transforming the rural population into an urban population.

The peasants are a market for China’s industry. They alone can supply it with the richest food and raw materials and absorb the vast quantities of industrial products.

The peasants are the source of our armies. The soldiers are peasants in military uniform. They are the mortal enemies of the Japanese aggressors.

The peasants, at the present stage, are the main foundation of democracy in China. Chinese democrats can achieve nothing if they do not rely on the 360 million peasants for support.

The peasants, at the present stage, are the main foundation of China’s cultural movement. Divorced from the 360 million peasants, are not the illiteracy elimination campaigns, the universal education, the popular literature, and the national health campaigns all empty phrases?

I said “main foundation” because naturally I would not ignore the political, economic, and cultural importance of the remaining 90 million people, particularly the working class, politically the most conscious of all classes of the Chinese people and able to lead all democratic movements. This must not be misunderstood.

To understand all this thoroughly is necessary not only for the Chinese Communists but for all democratic groups as well.

The peasant’s enthusiasm in production will be increased once land reforms—even preliminary reforms such as reduction of rent and interest—are carried out. By degrees, when the peasants are organized on a voluntary basis into agricultural production cooperatives or other cooperatives, their productive power will develop. Such agricultural production cooperatives at present can only be collective, mutual-aid labor organizations such as the labor-exchange brigades, mutual-aid groups, and worker-exchange groups, built on the peasant’s individual economic basis (based on the peasant’s private property), but the development of productive power and the increase in productive capacity already is astonishing. This system, universally adopted in the liberated areas, should be extended to other areas in the future. [[Urban intellectuals often wrongly approach rural work because they approach it

from an urban point of view and fail to understand that the economy is still scattered and backward and an individual economy.]]

The broad revolutionary intellectual elements of China should realize the necessity of merging with the peasants, who need them and are waiting for their help. They should enthusiastically go to the villages, exchange their student's clothes for the coarse garb of the peasants, start willingly from the bottom, understand the peasants' demands, help to awaken the peasants and organize them, and fight for the completion of the extremely important task in China's democratic revolution—the rural democratic revolution.

After the Japanese aggressors are annihilated, land belonging to them and to the principal traitors should be confiscated and distributed among those peasants having little or no land.

[[7) The Problem of Industry

Without an industry, there will be no consolidated national defense, no well-being for the people, no prosperity and strength for the nation. We must build up light and heavy industry to transform China from a rural to an industrial nation. While we will protect the interests of the workers, reasonable profits of state, private, and cooperative enterprises will be guaranteed.

8) The Problem of Culture, Education, and the Intellectuals

9) The Problem of National Minorities

10) The Problem of Foreign Policy

The GMD must end its hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and immediately improve Sino-Soviet relations.

The tasks in the GMD areas. Here, the people are not free to engage in patriotic activity, and democratic movements are considered illegal. Yet, activity is increasing. The CCP must help this activity. We must pursue the policy of a broad Anti-Japanese National United Front. The tasks in the Japanese-occupied areas. We should call on all to follow the French and Italian examples and form organizations and underground forces to prepare armed uprisings. When the time comes, they can coordinate with the attacks from the armies outside. We must send large numbers to these areas. The tasks in the liberated areas. Communists should follow the old policy by closely cooperating, on the basis of the program of New Democracy, with all anti-Japanese democratic elements, irrespective of class, political affiliation, and faith.]]

V) All Members Unite and Struggle for the Realization of Party Tasks

[[The current international and domestic situation opens up bright prospects and provides unprecedented favorable conditions for us and the Chinese people as a whole. But serious difficulties remain.]]

The universal truth of Marxism, as a reflection of the actual struggles of the world proletariat, becomes a useful weapon available to the Chinese people only when it is wedded to the concrete reality of the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese proletariat and the broad masses. This is exactly what the CCP has put into practice. The development and progress of our party is effected through the process of determined struggles against all kinds of dogmatism and empiricism that are in contradiction to this universal truth [of Marxism]. Dogmatism deviates from concrete reality, while empiricism mistakes partial experiences for universal truth; both these opportunist concepts are contradictory to Marxism. In its twenty-four years of struggle our party has overcome and is overcoming such erroneous thoughts, greatly consolidating the party ideologically. Our party now has about 1.21 million members, the overwhelming majority of whom joined the party during the anti-Japanese war. Among these members, as well as among some who joined the party before the anti-Japanese war, there still exist various incorrect concepts. The work of correcting unorthodox tendencies in the past few years has greatly eliminated these incorrect ideas, with excellent results. This work should be continued, and the ideological education inside the party should be greatly expanded, with the spirit of "learning from the past as a warning for the future, and curing the sickness to save the patient." All key party workers on the various levels throughout the land should understand that the close union of theory and practice is one of the salient features by which our Communists are distinguished from all other political parties. Therefore, the mastery of ideological education is the principal factor in consolidating the party and carrying on its great political struggles. If this mission is not accomplished, then all the party's political tasks cannot be fulfilled.

Another salient feature by which we Communists can be distinguished from all other parties is the very close relationship between us and the broadest masses of the people. We begin by devoting ourselves to serving the Chinese people earnestly and wholeheartedly and are not to be severed from the people for a single moment, setting out always from the viewpoint of the interests of the people and not from the interests of one's own small group or oneself, and holding ourselves responsible to the people as well as to our leading organs. Communists must always be ready to uphold the truth, because all truth is in conformity with the people's interests. Communists must always be ready to rectify errors, because any error is against the people's interests. The experience of our twenty-four years has told us that all correct tasks, policies, and work-styles are in conformity with the demands of the people at a particular time and place, and they are never separated from the people. No erroneous tasks, policies, and work-styles conform to the people's demands and are separated from the people. Dogmatism, empiricism, authoritarianism, empiricism, sectarianism, bureaucratism, militarism, and arrogance in one's work attitude are undesirable and bad because they alienate the people. Anyone who makes such mistakes must correct them because these mistakes sever us from the masses. This Congress should call on the whole party to be alert and watch every comrade in every link of party work, not to be estranged from the people. The party should

educate every comrade to love the people, to listen to them carefully, to mix with them wherever they go, instead of overriding them, to enlighten and heighten the consciousness of the masses in accordance with their degree of consciousness, and to help them, under the principle of genuine volition, to organize themselves step by step for all necessary struggles that are feasible under the particular circumstances.

Authoritarianism is wrong in all kinds of work because its impetuosity tends to suppress the people's degree of consciousness and violates the principle of the volition of the masses. Our comrades must not assume that what is understood by them is also similarly understood by the masses. We must go among the masses to find out whether they have understood and whether they are willing to take action. If we do this we shall be able to avoid authoritarianism. Tailism is also wrong in all kinds of work because it lags behind the consciousness of the masses, violates the principle of leading the masses to progress forward, and suffers from the mistake of inertness. Our comrades must not assume that the people do not understand what they themselves have not yet understood. Many times the people advance ahead of us. They are anxious to go forward, but our comrades, instead of leading them on, keep reflecting the views of some of the backward elements and mistaking these views for the views of the broad masses and so become their "tail." In short, every comrade should be taught to understand that everything a Communist says or does is judged by its conformity with the major interests of the broad masses or whether it is supported by them. Every comrade should be taught to understand that as long as we rely on the people, have confidence in their inexhaustible creative power, trust them, and unite as one with them, no difficulty will be too great to be overcome and no enemy will be able to crush us, but on the contrary we shall be able to crush our enemies.

[[Yet another salient feature by which we can be distinguished from members of other parties is our serious self-criticism.]]

Comrades! When our Congress concludes, we are going to the battlefields to fight for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China, following the resolutions of this congress. To attain this end we must unite with the people of the whole country. Let me repeat: we must unite with anyone who favors the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China, irrespective of his class, political affiliation, social group, or personal background. To achieve this goal, we must, under the organization and discipline of democratic centralism, keep the party more efficiently and powerfully united than ever. We must unite with any comrade who is willing to abide by the party's platform, constitution, and resolutions. In the period of the Northern Expedition our party had no more than 50,000 members; most of them were later on dispersed by the then enemy. In the rural revolutionary period [we had] no more than 300,000 members; the majority of them were again later on dispersed by the then enemy. Now we have over 1.2 million members, and this time we shall never allow the enemy to disperse us again. If we can absorb the experiences of these three periods, adopt a humble instead of an arrogant attitude, stand together in a greater solidarity within the party, and are more closely united with all the people of the whole country outside the

[party], then it is certain that we shall not be dispersed by the enemy, but shall instead resolutely, thoroughly, and completely exterminate the Japanese aggressors and their faithful running dogs, and, after exterminating them, shall build up an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, and strong China.

[[A new democratic China will soon be born. Let us hail that great day!]]

H.5 Speech to the Seventh Party Congress. *Mao Zedong* (24 April 1945)⁷³

I shall discuss three issues: (I) The current situation and the party line; (II) policy issues; (III) problems concerning the party.

I) The Current Situation and the Party Line

The Seventh Party Congress should decide the basic line. Our political line is to mobilize the masses and strengthen the people so as to defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the entire Chinese people, and establish a new democratic China under our leadership. First, there is organization and next there is the question of purpose, namely the establishment of an independent, free, democratic, unified, and rich new China. Hasn't this always been our party's line? Yes, it has. Since the October Revolution the character of the Chinese revolution has changed from old to new democracy. From the Great Revolution to the Civil War and the War of Resistance against Japan, our line or our program, in a nutshell, has been the mass revolution against imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the proletariat. This is our one and only program. Over the years, the entire party and people throughout the country have fought and united solely for this program. Our army is an army of the masses who oppose imperialism and feudalism and is led by the proletariat. Our politics is the politics of the masses who oppose imperialism and feudalism and the leadership of the proletariat. In essence, all our current revolutionary tasks have this character. This involves forces, enemies, and commanders (leaders). Forces refers to the masses, the enemies are the imperialist and feudal elements, and the commanders and leaders are the proletariat. Some say that our programs are numerous and difficult to remember. This simple program is often forgotten by our comrades. The anti-imperialist part is easier to remember but the antifeudalist part is often forgotten. Why? Because there are peasants as well as landlords among the masses. The so-called masses are mainly the peasants. The peasants were forgotten for a period of time. They were forgotten in 1927. When the peasants reached out for help, the Communists failed to remember them. Such mistakes were also made at the beginning of the War of Resistance against Japan. On whom do we rely to overthrow the Japanese and build a new China? The main body of the so-called masses are the peasants. The petty-bourgeoisie comprises another section, and a less significant section consists of other democratic elements. To forget the peasants is to forfeit

everything, including the democratic and socialist revolution. If you forget the peasants, you will do a million other jobs in vain, because you will not have the necessary forces. A few petty-bourgeois and liberal bourgeois elements are not a sufficient force. The masses are mainly composed of peasants, without whom nothing can be achieved. Without the peasants, who will provide you with food and become soldiers? And without food and soldiers, nothing can be achieved.

A section of the proletariat established the CP, which is the conscious force of the proletariat. Of course, other people such as peasants, petty-bourgeois elements, intellectuals, liberal bourgeois elements, and landlords also join the CP. We refer to them by their family origins. Family origins and joining the party are different matters. Once they join the party, they become the proletariat. To make revolution, the party needs to organize its forces and to rely on the peasants. Organizing forces requires a commander. In China, there is a spectrum with the proletariat at one end and big landlords and the big bourgeoisie at the other. The representatives of these two poles are the CP and the GMD. The spectrum of Chinese society has two small poles and a large center. The small poles are strong, and the large center is politically weak. The poles are strong, because the GMD and the liberal bourgeoisie compete with us for leadership. Do not imagine that the liberal bourgeoisie is very progressive and similar to the CP. It has its own independent programs and actions. The statement made by Zhang Lan, chair of the Democratic League (which also has petty-bourgeois members), represents its independent political view. Zuo Shunshen has made similar statements. They support a coalition government and are in agreement with us on this. Therefore, we should close ranks with them for the time being. However, they have their own position. They are opposed to both poles. On the one hand, they are not satisfied with the GMD's one-party dictatorship while, on the other hand, they are not in complete agreement with the CP. They stand between the GMD and the Communists. This defines their own character: the so-called center force.

We made mistakes during the Great Revolution. From 1921 to 1926, we were a Marxist party. In the later period, there was very little or no Marxism about us. Before the Great Revolution, we organized over 10 million peasants. What is Marxism? Peasants making revolution under the leadership of the proletariat is Marxism. So, at that time, there was Marxism. When Chen Duxiu led the party in 1927, it forgot the masses, the peasants, and the proletarian leadership. There was no Marxism. Chen did not want proletarian leadership and sometimes did not want the peasantry. When the peasants reached out for help, he discouraged them. If the CP is influenced by landlords and discourages the peasantry and abandons them, how can it oppose feudalism? How can it oppose imperialism? The imperialists come to China for profits. Four out of every five persons in China are peasants. For example, one could use the force of all five fingers to beat the enemy. If four fingers were cut off and only the little finger is left (the one-fifth of the urban population), the proletariat would be isolated. A general commander of the proletariat without the peasantry would be a "shadow" commander. If the peasants do not participate, the petty-bourgeoisie would not participate and would desert us. We cannot blame the

petty-bourgeoisie, because its decision depends on our strength. Sometimes, the petty-bourgeoisie is very arrogant, acting as if it rules the world. Yet sometimes, it is also very timid and scared. If you have only one small finger left, comrade, and you ask him to come, would he? He would not. He would say that he had other things to do at home and that his wife was sick. We cannot blame the petty-bourgeoisie but only the fact that our general commander has no soldiers, no forces. As long as our general commander recruits soldiers, buys horses, gathers fodder, and stores food, we will have the four other fingers, or the peasants, who constitute four-fifths of the population, as well as people from other walks of life. If we have strength, he will come. If you ask him to come, he will come even though he has other things to do. He will say that he is free and that his wife is fine. A past mistake was to forget about the issue of leadership. If one wants to lead, there must be others to be led. In the latter part of the Great Revolution, the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie did not join us. The landlords could concentrate their forces on fighting us, and our friends also gave us a big slap in the face. As a result, we were beaten down. When we got up, we were more clearheaded and carried out land reform. It was correct to engage in land reform. There was a hastiness, however, which also led to ignoring the peasants. They rushed to attack the major cities with only the workers and used the peasantry as a supplementary force. They lived in the countryside but did not understand the peasants. They rode on horseback but did not look at the flowers. To get off the horse and look at the flowers implies investigation and research. Having traveled 25,000 *li*, they did not look at the flowers (peasants). What is a middle and a rich peasant? Sorry, I don't know. petty-bourgeois and other democratic elements were also ignored. Again, the commander was a "shadow" one. Our party experienced two rounds of expansion and contraction. During the first expansion it had 50,000 members, yet later there were only over 10,000. During the second expansion, it had 300,000 members, yet there were only 25,000 later. Now we have stood up again. We cannot permit any reduction. Like a woman with bound feet, it is time to open the bandages and not to bind them further. We were prepared before the War of Resistance against Japan. The slogan was to mobilize the masses and strengthen the people. The CC has always stated that only a people's war can defeat the enemy. During the 102 years of Marxism's existence, no genuine Marxist in the world has said that a people's war is not necessary. The so-called people's war means that peasants can defeat the enemy. No one has ever said that the enemy can be beaten without a people's war. (There are many types of struggle, including political, ideological, and economic struggles. Military struggles are the highest form of political struggle.) However, many comrades with little knowledge of Marxism often forget about the peasants and abandon the people's struggle. Such people are self-styled or false Marxists, even if they declare themselves to be Marxists. Some believe that the Japanese can be defeated by relying on the GMD. This shows that they are not Marxists. There are many such people inside the party. The Party Congress in May 1937, the Luochuan Conference in August [1937], and the conference of activists in November⁷⁴ [1937], all approved the CC's political

line and affirmed the politica! line of mobilizing the masses. If the CC does not have faith in the people's capability to overthrow the Japanese and liberate China, it loses, at least temporarily, its Marxist character. If it retains this faith, it will not lose its Marxist character. The temporary loss of the Marxist "soul" can be recovered. To believe that the Japanese can be defeated only by the masses is not to lower the proletariat to the level of the bourgeoisie but to elevate the bourgeoisie to the level of proletariat. This argument poses the question of whether the bourgeois program should be raised to the level of the proletarian program, or the proletarian program should be reduced to the level of the bourgeois program. The question is about whether the proletariat attracts the bourgeoisie or vice versa. This argument has been denounced as non-Marxist, because it implies competition for leadership. Why is it not Marxist? The bourgeoisie thinks that it is always right. We should educate the peasants and promote unity between the peasants and the petty-bourgeoisie. We can only defeat the Japanese and win victory through unity. Only these words are those of a communist propagandist. These words are not complicated. They indicate the need for people to unite and organize a people's army, people's political party, and people's government. There must be reforms. We expect that by relying on the Chinese people, democrats, and international forces, we can reform that GMD. In reality, the GMD wants to reform us and we have not sized up the situation correctly. Fortunately, however, this has not cost us a lot. We should reiterate every day that we must reform them. The common people know that the GMD has a very dirty face that needs washing. Can the GMD be reformed? There are two possibilities: either it can be reformed or it cannot. If conditions exist for promoting the progressive forces, winning over the center, and isolating the die-hards, there will be the possibility of reforming it. Our CP asks Chiang Kai-shek to reform and wash his face. He refuses and says, "I am very clean and beautiful." The common people argue that he should clean himself up. At the rally in Xi'an, some shouted, "Long live Chiang Kai-shek!" However, the common people shout, "Quickly hand over grain and taxes!" It is a victory if the common people know that he needs to wash his face. Up until now, our policy has been, and still is, to invite him to wash his face and not to cut off his head. This is a policy of urging him to correct his own mistakes. The older one gets the less willing and likely one is to change one's ways. He may make some gestures and pretend to wash or not even touch his face while competing with us for leadership. The Sixth Plenum [September–November 1938] made it clear that it was the GMD reactionary clique, the representatives of big landlords, big bankers, and big compradores who have dragged China into darkness. Some comrades did not demand that the GMD wash its face and said that it was very beautiful. They put forward the slogan of supporting and helping the GMD and its government in all things, in all places, and at all times. The Sixth Plenum made some corrections to this situation. Initially, people thought the GMD was very beautiful. Later, it adopted a policy of "restricting other parties" and launched the first anticommunist upsurge, thus exposing its true colors and awakening our comrades. During the second anticommunist upsurge in 1941,

the GMD demanded the dismantlement of the CP. This basically dashed our people's illusions about the GMD. Most comrades formed a new picture with an understanding that defeat of the Japanese was not dependent on the GMD but on the mobilization of the masses and expansion of the people's forces. This shows that taken by itself it is not enough to remove erroneous ideas. It is imperative to have experience. We have had two volunteer teachers. One is the Japanese fascists and the other is the Generalissimo. They did not even ask for payment to educate so many of our comrades. Our resolute leadership over the peasantry, petty-bourgeoisie, and landlords since the Sixth Plenum has strengthened our party, army, and political power. For example, the liberated areas have smashed the enemy's numerous attacks (mopping up campaigns). Since last year, by shifting the emphasis to the offensive, stressing attack while giving a supplementary role to defense, we have defeated three anticommunist upsurges and numerous attacks by the GMD. As a result, the influence of the GMD has declined and its forces have been reduced. The Generalissimo also invited a teacher by the name of Okamura Reiji, who greatly discouraged him. However, we should not underestimate the influence and forces of the GMD. The GMD still retains some influence among the masses, and this will take several years to eliminate. The GMD has fifty years of history and influence whereas we have only twenty-five years. If our influence does increase, its influence will not go away. Its influence is on the decline, but it still exists. Its forces are still formidable, with a population of 200 million and 1.5 million troops. Internationally, it has the recognition which we do not have. Although its forces are diminishing, they have not disappeared. During the War of Resistance against Japan, we implemented a correct line of mobilizing the masses and became the center of resistance against Japan and for the salvation of the motherland. The masses pinned their hopes on us, and the influence and forces of the GMD declined. Now, facts have proved that only this line is the correct one. Seeking leadership and independence reflects the demands of the entire people and of the majority of party comrades. This policy line has developed from China's own situation, and it is an anti-imperialist and antifeudalist line of the people under the leadership of the CP. Unlike in the past, this point is now clearer to all. Until the third anticommunist upsurge, some comrades were still skeptical about this point. Has this skepticism disappeared completely? There are many points of view inside the party. Not every comrade completely understands this correct line, and not every comrade is 100 percent Marxist. Among us, there are those who have only one percent of Marxism and those who have 99 percent. There are also those who have 100 percent, but not many. Some do not believe in this line and abandon leadership, independence, and the principle of unity plus struggle. With regard to the war, our position is temporary and regional self-defense. This is a reasonable, favorable, and dignified position. This position is conducive to unity. Why doesn't the GMD dare to make a final break with us? We wanted to send people to the San Francisco Conference. Chiang opposed it. We insisted, and Chiang still turned us down. In the end, we sent someone. Our representative has already arrived in Washington.⁷⁵ Power is won

through struggle and cannot be given as a gift. Someone [Deng Baoshan] said that our philosophy was a philosophy of struggle. He was right. We say that their philosophy is also that of struggle and that the proletarian philosophy of struggle appeared after theirs. To talk about unity without struggle or to struggle inappropriately and feebly are the weaknesses of the petty-bourgeoisie. A person by the name of Zhang Naiqi told Comrade Enlai that he made mistakes.⁷⁶ I once criticized Zhang Naiqi's doctrine of "more concrete action, fewer slogans" in a speech. The failure to ask Chiang to wash his face is symptomatic of the liberal bourgeois weakness. His theory has been overthrown by us. He has stopped shouting "long live the GMD" because the GMD does not accept him. Like Jia Yi of the Han dynasty, his intelligence and wisdom are not appreciated. However, he has not changed completely and shouted "long live the CP" either. Liberal bourgeois elements like him will continue to affect the CP with their weaknesses. They deliberately send us sweet-smelling fragrances like those of Lin Daiyu. Roses are pretty but also thorny. Our *Liberation Daily* emits rose fragrance every day. They like Xue Baochai, but not Tanchun. Troubles still lie ahead. Revolution itself is trouble. If one is afraid of trouble, one should report to the king of hell. Our party's willpower has increased and will not be subdued by them.

To summarize the issues raised above:

1) Concerning the peasantry. For twenty-five years, and especially during the last eight years, the peasants have warmly welcomed our policies. However, the party's guiding ideology should help distinguish us from the peasants and not confuse us with them. It is hard for comrades of peasant origin to recognize the difference. Family backgrounds and joining the party are two different matters. When a person of peasant origin joins the party, he or she becomes a party member and a vanguard of the proletariat. He or she should distinguish him or herself from the peasants and raise the consciousness of the peasants to the level of the proletariat. In the future, people outside the party should be urged to improve themselves and accept Marxism. Of course, this is a matter to be dealt with over several decades. But failure to accept this point is not in line with Marxism.

2) Concerning the petty-bourgeoisie. petty-bourgeois intellectuals (including those inside and outside the party) have dual characters, namely, a revolutionary spirit and vacillation. Vacillation can be overcome through methods such as holding discussions on literature and art. The party can reform them. This applies to those outside the party. We have vast liberated areas and strong forces. If we educate them properly, we can influence and stabilize them.

3) Regarding the liberal bourgeoisie. At the present, [liberal bourgeois] are our allies. But their vacillation is more serious. Their desire for democracy is something in common with us. So they are our allies. Under our resolute influence, their vacillation can be neutralized and they can even follow us.

4) Big landlords, big bankers, and big compradores are representatives of the GMD reactionary clique and are reactionaries. They fought with us for leadership during the War of Resistance against Japan and are our most vicious enemies

among the ranks of the anti-Japanese forces. They want to drag China back to its dark old days and they are the long-term targets in our struggle. They attempt to control and exploit the 360 million peasants.

5) Concerning foreign countries. The Soviet Union poses no problem. With regard to other countries, we should unite with as well as fight against them. There should not be another Scobie.⁷⁷ There are strong reactionary forces abroad. The report points out that the unity among the three countries is of paramount and overriding importance. The report talks less of the dark side. We should be on our guard against them, because they support the Generalissimo and sometimes pretend to be officials from heaven willing to bestow fortunes.

The above concerns the current situation and policy line.

II) Policy Issues

[[1] New Democracy provides the general program; guiding principles and detailed articles are the specific programs.]]

2) Concerning Sun Yat-sen. We have quoted many of his fine statements and should affirm his strong points throughout our lives. We should ask our sons and daughters to affirm them after we die. But there are also differences. Our New Democracy is much more progressive and comprehensive than Sun Yat-sen's doctrine. There are many members of our party who are not too happy with Sun Yat-sen. I do not know why. This shows that they do not have enough awareness and still retain the work-style of the Civil War period. During the Civil War, the GMD used Sun Yat-sen to strike us, and it is, therefore, pardonable to abandon him. At the same time, we could afford to abandon him, because our forces were small during that period. The current situation is different from that of the Civil War period. Now, as our party is stronger with greater forces, it is to our advantage to have him. The stronger our forces grow in the future, the more beneficial it will be for us to have him. The Soviet Union did not want religion in the past, but it allows it to exist now. If you are strong, it does not bother you. The Soviet Union did not actively prohibit religion even in the past. We should be perceptive and make use of the banner of Sun Yat-sen. As our forces grow, it is increasingly to our advantage to make use of him.

3) Concerning capitalism. In my report, I have elaborated on this issue, giving it greater and fuller endorsement. What is the advantage of doing so? What we have endorsed is not the capitalism that controls the state economy and people's livelihood. A comrade once said, "The property of the big landlords, big bankers, and big compradores should be confiscated." The consideration at that time was that the general program already used Sun Yat-sen's words, and it was not appropriate to mention them in the specific programs. The general program states that businesses and interests that control the state economy and people's livelihood should not be allowed to exist. In practice, this means that they should be confiscated. There are only advantages and no disadvantages to endorsing the wide expansion of private

capitalism in addition to publicly owned and cooperative economies. At the present stage, only the properties of Chiang [Kai-shek], Song [T.V. Soong], Kong [H.H. K'ung], and the Chens [Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu] need to be confiscated.⁷⁸ Some people say that the issue has not been raised. It has been raised, and it was Sun Yat-sen who raised it. The ordinary bourgeoisie are not the targets of struggle at present. The so-called ordinary bourgeoisie refers to the petty-bourgeoisie and special bourgeoisie who do not control the state economy and people's livelihood. In Europe, even the properties of these bourgeoisies are to be confiscated. The property of traitors and collaborators should be confiscated. There is nihilist thinking inside our party which advocates the direct transition from a feudal to a socialist economy. Later, all Russian nihilist "social revolutionary party" members became reactionaries. Bolsheviks, in contrast, endorsed the idea that Russia should not bypass capitalism. This is beneficial to the proletariat and not to the bourgeoisie. After the October Revolution, a part (a very substantial part) of the businesses and interests of the middle and petty-bourgeoisie as well as those of the rich peasants was still allowed to exist. Our comrades are very impatient. They see others implement socialism, and they want to do the same. Others only eliminated the rich peasants in the Second Five-Year Plan after the October Revolution. Before that time, the rich peasants were the main suppliers of food.

4) On communism. This subject was mentioned but not emphasized in the report. The communist program is to confiscate private property and destroy class differences. The only advantage of including such wording in the text is to educate party members. Many party members do not know what communism is. The redistribution of landlords' land to peasants is communism. It is not proper to mention it here.

Some people advise us to change our name. They say, "Your ambition is good, but your name is not." Many people told us that our name was not good and that they would join us if we changed it. The United States also tried to persuade us to change. What name should it be changed to? The GMD or the conservative party? Friedman [*Fuerman*] wrote a book called *Red China* which talks about a red star shining over China.⁷⁹ No matter which new name we use, they will always call us the red party. All that is red will be associated with us. An ordinary person who is afraid that his son might not be able to survive gives him a name such as small dog or little cat. Should we do the same? Mr. Shou Jin, a journalist, said that ours is a "moderate democratic centralism." He is a bourgeois liberal, and even he thinks that we are very moderate. This is a good name, and we should not change it. The common people like it very much. People in Jiangxi Province call us "Gongsandang" [the "common umbrella party"], which is nice.

5) The criticism of the GMD is sharp but also is objective and not exaggerated. All its strong points are given credit, but there are too few of them. There should be some leeway in making sharp criticisms, so that it is possible to cooperate and negotiate with them. There were no statements like "down with the 'Generalissimo.'" The word "Generalissimo" does not appear. Among the dead, only Sun Yat-sen and Roosevelt are mentioned. It is better to make fewer references to those who

are still alive. We only mentioned Hitler among the reactionaries and Stalin among the revolutionaries. With some leeway, we will make fewer mistakes. By saying "down with Chiang Kai-shek," we will make the wrong move. They have instigated us several times to say down with the GMD. We refused and still say, "If you wash your face, we can still marry, for we are still deeply in love with each other." However, we must maintain our position of self-defense. Their offense against us should certainly be met with our counterattack. Their attacks must be dealt with. The verbal and armed attacks, especially the latter, must be responded to. We must resolutely, quickly, thoroughly, and completely eliminate the enemy. The enemy should be completely wiped out. I have told a liaison officer that our policy is that we shall not be the initiator (Laozi: Do not fire the first shot). Second, we shall try to avoid engagements (*Zuozhuan*: retreat 90 *li*). Third, it is stated in *The Book of Rites* that courtesy demands reciprocity. You should deal with others as they deal with you. "If you do not attack me, I shall not attack you. If you attack me, I shall certainly attack you." This was our past policy and is still our current policy. So long as I have a gun in my hand, I will fight to the end.

If you have fired ninety-nine shots, that is very good. But I shall also shoot. There was a story about the foolish old man who removed the mountains.⁸⁰ He did not believe that he could not remove them. The world's reactionaries must be eliminated. If we cannot complete the task in our lifetime, our children will continue to fight until all the reactionaries in the world are defeated. We must fight. However, our position is one of self-defense, a reasonable position. When some comrades are in high spirits, they forget this position. This is wrong. We will make mistakes if we act contrary to the policy of temporary and regional self-defense. We should be prepared for prolonged troubles caused by the GMD.

[[6) We should win over old army soldiers and officers. 7) Our armies have formed a united front with the Shazong Red Army and the Shanxi New Army. We should form alliances with other armies during the Civil War; at present, we are a people's army. 8) Expansion of the liberated areas. Any place that can be seized should be attacked. At the same time, we should defend ourselves from enemy attacks. Now there are two rules: The first is offense, and the second is defense. The present policy is attack because the situation has changed. This is not adventurism. Gradually, scattered guerrilla warfare will be turned into conventional warfare. This will make us invincible. 9) The countryside and the cities. In due course, the rural line should be changed into an urban one. Some describe us as the "emperor of the countryside," but it is not to our advantage to remain so forever. Now we should be ready to shift the emphasis to the cities. But this does not mean all efforts should be made in the cities. Urban work is equally important. 10) The army and the base areas. The base areas are strategic launching pads.]]

11) On the issue of the Conference of People's Representatives from the Chinese People's Liberated Areas. This conference proposed by the congress will be an important event. The so-called conference implies that the representatives will not be elected through a general election but by nomination by the army, government,

mass organizations, etc. General elections will have to wait until after the war. After the conference is convened, speeches will be used to make decisions, and a leading organ will be produced. The leading organ should start work as soon as possible. Its majority should be made up of nonparty personages. It is tentatively called the Chinese People's Liberation Federation [*Zhongguo renmin jiefang lianhehui*]. When it meets, it should send a telegram to the Generalissimo and invite him to organize a coalition government. We have invited him several times. Chiang said that the coalition government was intended to overthrow the present government and that conferences among various factions are nothing but conferences for dividing up the booty. We told him that Sun Yat-sen also convened national conferences. He replied, "By treating me like a northern warlord, you behave as if you are the prime minister." He is simply a hooligan.

The federation is not called a government, but should play the role of a government. When it is established, we shall be condemned as seeking domination by challenging the supremacy of the government. We shall see which bastards dare to oppose us.

III) On Several Questions Concerning the Party

1) Individuality and party spirit. During rectification [*zhengfeng*], this issue was raised. Some journalists criticized us for destroying individuality and insisting only on the party spirit—i.e., the spirit as emphasized in our party documents. This criticism is incorrect. The report states, "National and feudalism ruthlessly restricts the development of the individuality of the Chinese people." This makes their mental and physical development impossible. Lu Xun had the kind of strong dignity and integrity which is precious in a semicolonial country. Under oppression, some people have become foreigners' slaves. There is a sign at the entrance of a Shanghai park saying, "Chinese and dogs not allowed." Foreign countries should not be allowed to oppress China, and fascists should not be permitted to oppress the people. The CCP opposes such oppression on behalf of the Chinese people and does not allow the people to be suppressed. This of itself allows the expression of individuality.

Party organization is a different matter. Our party is the organized and united army of the proletariat. It strives for a common goal. Without unity, it would be destroyed by the enemy. We cannot do without democratic centralism. Revolutionary democracy differs from the old democracy in that the democracy is greater. Party members are those among the people who voluntarily accept the party's programs and constitution and offer to sacrifice everything. (Those who do not join the party are not restricted by the party.) Party members should observe the party Constitution, programs, and decisions because their self-sacrifice for the sake of people is voluntary.

Our party is more united than in the past. It is a more rigorous and united army. We only talk about unity in a relative sense and not about an absolute, realized

unity. Some say that if we set the issue to one side there will be no problem, but if we discuss it, there will be many problems. This is right. There were 20,000 organized party members in 1936. Now, there are over one million, a massive expansion since the beginning of the War of Resistance. There are many differences of opinion. The party will continue to expand in the future and will contain more different opinions. To move forward, the first priority is to establish unified thought. Otherwise, with all the differences and people like Wang Shiwei who sought domination, we cannot make progress. In 1941, when Wang Shiwei was the “general commander” in Yan’an, he put up wall posters. Many people from outside the south gate came to see the “Wild Lily” [see above, **Doc. G.16**]. When he was the general commander we experienced defeat. We accepted our defeat and seriously began the Rectification Campaign. The literary circle in Yan’an wants to find “the Han of Jingzhou,” and what type of people have they found? They have found people with powder and makeup on their faces and from the “front line” to act as the Han of Jingzhou. We believe that Wu Manyou, Zhao Zhankui, and Zhang Yeguo are the “Hans of Jingzhou.” Our “Hans of Jingzhou” are the workers, peasants, and soldiers. Therefore, we cannot progress without rectification.

The Rectification Campaign has solved the psychological problems, and production has solved the material problems. The present situation is good. A remaining problem is that the party is not completely unified. Without democracy and self-criticism, it is impossible to reach a higher level of unity. Problems are solved, occur and are solved again. Development lies in solving problems. This is the process of making progress. If differences of opinion are not straightened out and imbalances not adjusted, there will be no absolute unity.

Therefore, the CC and various leading party organs should listen to what others have to say. Refusal to listen is like closing the window and not letting in fresh air. How can we know who has made mistakes? We are running a political factory. If we open the window, air will continuously come in. This is to encourage all to say what they know without reservation, not to blame the speaker but to be warned by his or her words. One should correct mistakes that one has made and guard against those that one has not made. Some people understand why they should do a certain thing, but they never act accordingly. In a word, party spirit represents universality, and individuality embodies differences. Universality is built on differences. Without party spirit, there will be no party, and without differences, there will be no universality. Every staff member (workers, peasants, and soldiers in the soviet or white areas) is different. Their depth of understanding of Marxism is not the same, and a man changes from his youth to his old age. It is untenable to erase these differences and unify them according to one standard. Individual strong points and individuality should be allowed to develop. The sun has its own track. All eight planets are different. We do not know whether there are human beings on other planets because we have not investigated and studied them. Some of the stars also show their independence. In the evenings, we often see stars eclipse. Erasing differences will not lead to unity.

"The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

2) Several groups of cadres inside the party are discontented because they feel that they have not been treated fairly. Special attention should be paid to them.

a) Theoretical workers. The Rectification Campaign put emphasis on seeking truth from facts and opposing dogmatism. The criticism of intellectuals during rectification gave the impression that they had fallen out of favor. Without theory there will be no action. Thus, party members should study theory. The theoretical level in the party was not correct, but it has improved somewhat in recent years. However, the ability to explain various aspects of a movement and their linkages and to distill these into theories is still quite weak. What is theory? Theory is systematic knowledge based on Marxism and generalizations based on practical experiences of struggle.

Comrades who work as translators should not dislike translation work. We need to do more and more translation. There are few in the party who can read the original texts. Works by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as well as Marxist works by British and American writers should be translated for comrades to read. It is a very good job. We should pay attention to theoretical workers, treat them as people who can make contributions, and respect them.

b) Intellectuals. Without intellectuals, a class cannot win victory. There are senior intellectuals, ordinary intellectuals, and of course other types of intellectuals. There are intellectuals in all states in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. All those who wear the clothes of eight diagrams are intellectuals. There are also intellectuals in the stories of *The Water Margin*. Every class has intellectuals who serve its interests. Greece had Socrates, a philosopher of the slaves, and China had a Duke of Zhou and later Liu Bowen and others. Without intellectuals, the proletariat cannot stand up. The Rectification Campaign and the investigation of cadres suppressed the intellectuals, and now they should be compensated and put on an equal footing with others. They are welcome to work in the interests of the people. All departments in our party, army, and economic organizations need intellectuals.

c) Comrades from enemy-occupied areas in the rear thought that they were better than people from the base areas. The investigation of cadres placed them under suspicion and caused them trouble. They came from Xi'an and Shanghai. They were repeatedly investigated. Now everything is clear. Apologies have been made to those who have had wrong hats put on them. The hats have been taken off, and due respect should be paid to them. They will gradually adapt to the work-style of the base areas, with which they do not feel comfortable.

d) Local cadres. The report states that local military cadres should be treated like brothers and sisters. Some newcomers to north Shaanxi complain that people there can set up bases but cannot lead the Red Army. I think the complaint is a valid one. Are there such situations in central and north China? If there are, we should correct them. If there are no such situations, we should prevent them from occurring. This point is very important. There were many historical disputes which grew out of these issues. When Wang Zhen and Dai Jiying set out, we talked about these issues, and now we need to talk some more.

I believe that people are not perfect, and neither is the CP. Such a party is called "Bolshevik with defects." But you cannot say that it is not Bolshevik. Some comrades have marched 25,000 *li* more than others, and this burden has bowed them. Others have not walked 25,000 *li*, but have bases. You have walked the distance, but have no base areas. If those comrades ask me to compensate them for the loss of the central soviet regions, I cannot do so. The burden has become greater. The burden for the young comrades is that because they have quicker reactions and faster movements, they look down on old comrades, whom they call vulgar and decrepit. Old comrades describe the young as naïve.

The old and young should not talk like this. If one grows crops, one should learn from Wu Guoyou; if one becomes a worker, one should look up to Zhao Zhankui; if one is a soldier, one should follow the example of Zhang Zhiguo.⁸¹ Wherever you go, you should act in the communist spirit and integrate yourself with the local people. We should take note of mountaintops, take them into consideration, reduce and eliminate them. All burdens we create ourselves should be removed. We should strive to remove all burdens and thus make every comrade happy. This is the way to unite the party, the whole party.

Wherever one goes, it is necessary to look at the military work in the base areas. Once in a new place, one should spare no effort in the performance of one's duty, and should not behave like an "imperial envoy." We should see others' strong points and not blindly despise them. It is every party member's duty to respect all local comrades and to have a good relationship with them as well as with the local people's army.

e) Economic work and cadres engaged in logistical support work. In the past, we did not explain adequately the importance of such work. Thus, some people told me that logistical support work is not popular. The director of the logistics department does not talk about his job as logistical support but as "general work." His job is not popular. Now we should help him become popular. They have the feeling that they are not a part of the "central army," but from the "mixed brand army." We are all "central army," and there are no "mixed brands."

f) Cadres for the people's movement, including workers, peasants, youths, and women. When the big cities are opened up, there will be many workers', youth, and women's movements. Ours is a workers' party. In the past, few comrades were engaged in the workers' movement, and there are not many now. We should treasure them. Youths are important, and women are indispensable.

g) Cadres who joined the party during the War of Resistance against Japan. Cadres from the Great Revolution and Civil War periods have rich experiences and good leadership skills. We cannot do without them. Right! But the cadres from these two periods only number, at most, 20,000. The cadres from the war against Japan period amount to 1.19 million. The old cadres have greater burdens and are very conscious of their position. We have our own strong points and are indispensable. However, the focus of attention should be on the one million or more. They must not be looked down on, and they must be called cadres who joined the party during the War of Resistance

rather than new cadres. They should be allowed to say what they think as they please, so that they feel it is easy to get close to us. We should make them feel that it is easy to get close to us. We should not make them feel awkward about approaching us.

h) The question of nonparty member cadres is an important one. The 4.5 million party members throughout the country now make up only one percent of the entire population. The tasks of every party member are to unite with the other 99 percent and form an army. A party member who does not know how to unite with others is not a good party member. Why is it necessary to have CP members? It is because they are needed to unite the 99 percent, so as to fight the enemy and build a new China. Otherwise, the revolution will not triumph. Some people want to carry out the revolution only against the finance department.

The revolution will triumph only when more than 99 percent of the people have been won over. One party member cannot accomplish this task. CP members alone are not enough to achieve victory. The organizational departments should conduct investigation and research of nonparty member cadres in all areas and hold discussions in order to understand them and develop leaders and cadres among them.

3) Speaking the truth.

Be modest, be prudent, and guard against arrogance.

“Do not steal, pretend, and boast.”

What is stealing? I have seen such things. Copying the documents of the Rectification Campaign and changing only few words is called “plagiarism.” Comments should be attributed to those comrades who made them.

What is pretending? “If you know, you know. If you do not know, do not pretend to know.” Do not pretend to know what you do not.

Stealing and pretending are social phenomena and are not inherited from the mothers’ wombs. Pigs with scallions in their noses still do not look like elephants.

Our party should tolerate ignorance and the lack of knowledge. It does not matter. We should advocate reading five books: *The History of the CPSU*, *Two Tactics*, *Left-Wing Communism—An Infantile Disorder*, *From Utopia to Scientific Communism*, and *The Communist Manifesto*.

The third point is to not boast and to be honest. In reports to superiors, exaggeration must be prevented and information must be truthful. Shortcomings should be made known to others in order to get rid of the problem. If others call you a bureaucrat, you deserve it. Cows are also bureaucratic. Everybody has the right to drink milk, but you must get it yourself. Lu Xun and others have said that gathering manure is better than writing articles. To recognize the situation of contradiction and unity and to achieve peace on earth requires a work-style of genuine honesty.

The party is a great party, one with twenty-five years of history. We are prepared for victory and will meet the challenge of victory. We work for the liberation of the entire Chinese people.

H.6 Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution.

Liu Shaoqi (14 May 1945)⁸²

I) Introduction

[[Comrades, Mao Zedong's report to the Seventh Party Congress is the Magna Carta for the building of a new democratic republic. Our party is a creative Marxist political party, because at no time have we tied ourselves ideologically or politically to any rigid formulas, or regarded the organizational forms of our party as hard and fast patterns that cannot be altered. It is necessary to revise our party Constitution in light of the new environment and changed situation in the party. It is sixteen years since we adopted the last Constitution, and we need to incorporate recent experiences.]]

It is quite clear that our party now has certain outstanding features which did not exist in any of its previous historical periods. Those features are as follows:

1) Our party is national in scale and has a broad mass character. It is a party the people throughout the country are looking up to. With a membership totaling 1.21 million and with its organizations and members operating in all parts of the country, it is regarded by the whole people as their sole liberator.

2) Our party has been steeled in prolonged revolutionary wars and has mastered the art of leading them. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the other armed forces of the people, which have been organized under its leadership, constitute the main forces in the present War of Resistance against Japan. The Chinese nation and people rely on these armed forces of the people to carry on the protracted war against the Japanese aggressors, and they will continue to rely on these forces to make postwar China a democratic and united new China.

3) Our party has led the 95 million people living behind the enemy lines in setting up strong revolutionary base areas, where democratic reforms of various forms have been introduced and where new democratic development in the political, military, economic, and cultural fields are under way. These democratic reforms and developments have resulted in increased production, an improvement in the people's living standard, greater social stability, and a heightening of the people's cultural level and political consciousness. The party has mobilized and united all the people in these base areas in vigorously resisting the Japanese aggressors, and this has encouraged the revolutionary struggles of people throughout the country. These base areas are a model of new China, and they guarantee that the whole people of our country will win victory in the revolution.

4) Our party has overcome various kinds of erroneous ideas and achieved unprecedented ideological, political, and organizational unity and solidarity through a rectification movement. Past opportunist lines have been liquidated, and non-proletarian ideas have been largely defeated in the Rectification Campaign, while the proletarian, Marxist-Leninist ideology and line as represented by Comrade Mao Zedong have won an unparalleled, solid victory throughout the party and attempts

to undermine the nation have been combed out. Thus, our party has become united and consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally as never before. This has contributed immeasurably to the cause of China's liberation.

5) Last, but by no means least, our party has a great leader of its own. He is none other than Comrade Mao Zedong, the organizer and leader of our party and of the present-day Chinese revolution. Comrade Mao Zedong is an outstanding representative of the heroic proletariat of our country and of the fine traditions of our great nation. He is a talented and creative Marxist, integrating, as he does, the universal truth of Marxism—the most advanced ideology in the history of humankind—with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. He has thus raised the ideology of the Chinese nation to a rational height unknown before and has shown the suffering Chinese nation and people the only correct road leading to complete liberation—the road of Mao Zedong. Following this road, our party and the Chinese people launched the great pre-1927 revolutionary movement, of which he was one of the organizers. During the rural revolution in the soviet areas, the great red areas and the Red Army were created with Comrade Mao Zedong as their most outstanding founder and leader. In the War of Resistance against Japan, the great liberated areas and the people's armed forces—the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army—were created, and again he was the founder and leader. Comrade Mao Zedong is the leader of our party, but he is also an ordinary member of our party, being completely at the service of the party and most scrupulous in the observance of party discipline in every respect. He is the leader of the masses, yet he bases everything on the will of the people. He stands before the people as their most loyal servant and their most modest pupil. Being a figure who has emerged from the revolutionary struggles of the people and who has been tested through more than thirty years of the great Chinese revolutionary struggle, he is well known to the entire party and the people of the whole country. It is the carefully considered choice of our party and of the Chinese nation and people that he becomes their leader. Our party has not only a great leader of its own but also a large number of well-trying cadres who, rallying around him armed with Mao Zedong Thought, act as the backbone of the party. These cadres have proved, during a long period of struggle, to be the finest people, the cream of the Chinese nation, and men of action in every field of the Chinese people's revolution and national construction. With such a great leader and with a large group of such cadres, we are invincible and will vanquish all the enemies of the Chinese nation and people.

Comrades, our party is already a Marxist-Leninist party which is national in scale; has a broad mass character; is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally; and is under a leader of its own. It has now become the determining factor in China's political life.

Such are the main features of our party today. Such are the brilliant successes our party has achieved. They are great victories for the Chinese people as a whole, great victories for Marxism-Leninism among the Chinese people and great victories for the teachings and leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, the leader of our party.

[[However, our party does have shortcomings and weaknesses.]]

II) The General Program of the Party Constitution

[[1) The general program sums up the party's twenty-four years of experience, draws on the best worldwide experiences, and is an embodiment of the teachings of Comrade Mao Zedong. Although the main body of the party is operating in the countryside and the vast majority of party members come from the peasantry and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, while only a small percentage are workers, in the aggregate, party members of proletarian or semiproletarian (poor peasant) origin constitute the majority. The proletarian character of our party is determined by the following: (1) It has absorbed best traditions of the world Marxist-Leninist movement; (2) it has developed according to Marxist-Leninist teachings as sinified by Mao Zedong; (3) its proletarian program makes it distinct from other political parties; (4) every party member must observe our party's iron proletarian discipline; (5) over twenty years of civil and national war have steeled our party; (6) Marxist-Leninist education will enable a thorough ideological remolding of members of petty-bourgeois origin.]]

A party founded, steeled, and educated in such a manner is certainly not inferior—to say the very least—to any proletarian party of the capitalist countries.

It is not just the social origins of party members but our party's political struggles and political life, its ideological education and its ideological and political leadership that decide things, and the General Program of our party and its organizational principles ensure the dominance of the proletarian ideology and proletarian line. No matter how broadly petty-bourgeois ideology is manifested in the party, it has no legitimacy and is being constantly corrected through education and the Rectification Campaign. Moreover, this ideology has been shown to be incompatible with the interests of the people in serious practical struggles and has thus become increasingly discredited. The social origin of our party membership does not determine the character of our party any more than the social composition of the membership of the labor parties in certain European countries does. Although the majority of their members come from the working class, these labor parties do not represent the working class in their countries; nor are they able to perform the tasks of the working class.

In China, a large number of petty-bourgeois revolutionaries have joined our party, and this is a very good thing. Our party must not reject them. While it is true that we should pay close attention to recruiting the advanced elements from among the workers, we should, at the same time, draw in numerous advanced elements from all other sections of the laboring people. Only then will it be possible for our party to become a powerful party with a mass character. The proletariat must constantly replenish its ranks by recruiting members from the petty-bourgeoisie—this is an immutable historical law.

The petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry are transitional classes which go through a process of disintegration under the capitalist system. Except for a small number of their members who will become members of the bourgeoisie, the majority will go

bankrupt and swell the ranks of the proletariat. Being transitional classes, they may accept the political leadership of either the liberal bourgeoisie or the proletariat, and ideologically they may be influenced by either of these groups. Hence, under certain historical conditions, large numbers of revolutionary elements among the petty-bourgeoisie may join the proletarian party and be susceptible to proletarian education. The proletarian party, our party, is capable of educating and remolding them. Experience shows that after joining our party on our terms, most are conscientious in their studies, willing to receive the party's education in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, observe party discipline, and take part in the practical revolutionary struggles of the people. Consequently, they change their original character and become Marxist-Leninists, fighters for the proletariat, and many have even sacrificed their lives for the party's cause—the realization of communism in China. However, there is also a very small number who, after joining the party, fail to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought earnestly and correctly. Holding onto their old viewpoints or work-styles and sometimes even stubbornly opposing those of the proletariat, they try to reconstruct our party and rebuild its internal life according to their own petty-bourgeois concepts and tastes. Quite naturally, they not only fail to become genuine Marxist-Leninists, fighters for the proletariat, but are also responsible for many mistakes and divergences occurring in the party. The party's experience shows that this has happened over and over again.

Therefore, all those who join our party must seriously study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The petty-bourgeois revolutionary elements must, both before and after their admission into the party, be especially studious in order to remold their ideology. They must discard their original class stand to adopt the class stand of the proletariat and must overcome their subjective, individualistic, and sectarian tendencies. They cannot become good party members without such remolding. This is generally a long, painstaking process which, when they are not yet fully aware of the need, can even be agonizing for many petty-bourgeois revolutionary elements. This remolding is a particularly important question or aspect in the building of our party.

Inherent in our party are the essential contradictions between proletarian and nonproletarian ideologies. The principal contradiction is between the ideology of the proletariat and the ideology of the peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie. Our party building and the cause of our party can only advance and develop when we have gradually resolved this contradiction by intensifying our education and training in Marxism-Leninism, which is the scientific ideology of the proletariat, and by continuously overcoming the petty-bourgeois and other ideologies reflected in our party. If, conversely, petty-bourgeois ideology is allowed to spread freely within the party, and if it should come to dominate the party's leadership and repress the development of proletarian ideas, the development and work of our party will certainly retrogress and fail. Hence, in our party building the principal need is for ideological development, that is, remolding our party members, especially the petty-bourgeois revolutionary elements, through education in Marxism-Leninism, the sci-

entific ideology of the proletariat. In other words, we need to combat and overcome every kind of nonproletarian ideology in the party.

China's petty-bourgeoisie is numerically large, and many of our party members are of petty-bourgeois origin. In the past, both China's proletariat and our party were in their infancy, lacking experience. Our party did not have sufficient ideological preparation in Marxism-Leninism before its foundation; nor did it have enough time thereafter for theoretical study and propaganda work because it immediately immersed itself in turbulent, practical revolutionary struggle. For these reasons, our party suffered for a long time from inadequate Marxist-Leninist ideological education. It was, therefore, possible for the petty-bourgeois elements inside our party who had not undergone remolding to propagate what was in essence opportunism under the cloak of Marxism-Leninism, by taking advantage of the ideological ignorance of many party members and the petty-bourgeois sentiments in the party. This is how petty-bourgeois ideology gained temporary predominance in the party's leading bodies at certain periods.

When petty-bourgeois ideology was predominant in the party leadership, right or "left" opportunist lines were carried out not only politically but also in the building and organization of the party. The right opportunist line in the building and organization of the party took the form of the liberal line pursued by certain comrades. They attempted to turn our party into a liberal party of the petty-bourgeoisie. They opposed and discarded the party's principled stand in ideological and organizational matters. They undermined the party's democratic centralism and iron discipline by enrolling party members en masse and without discrimination, allowing all sorts of erroneous ideas to spread within the party unchecked, abandoning vigilance against the party's enemies and saboteurs, and encouraging "showing off," lax discipline, factional tendencies, and spontaneity within the party. It is quite obvious that, had these things continued, the result would have been to prevent our party from accomplishing anything and to bring about its collapse.

The "left" opportunist line in the building and organization of the party found expression in the actions of some comrades who, ignoring China's special characteristics, mechanically imported the party-building experience of parties abroad and turned them into absolute dogmas. They placed one-sided emphasis on inner-party centralism and inner-party struggle, and they admitted no compromise and laid stress on mechanical discipline. They discarded inner-party democracy and harmony, serious discussion of problems, and relevant criticism and paid no heed to the political consciousness and initiative of party members. Like patriarchs, they issued orders and ruled arbitrarily within the party. They pursued a policy of obscurantism. They encouraged blind obedience on the part of party members, carried on merciless inner-party struggles, and engaged in punitiveness. They punished, expelled, or purged party members wholesale. As a result, mechanical discipline and a feudalistic order prevailed in the party, and inner-party life became stagnant. Temporarily this may have created the appearance of inner-party unity. But such unity was false, superficial, and mechanical. Once found out it could have given way to a state of

inner-party anarchy, characteristic of ultrademocracy. It is quite obvious that such a line could destroy our party by relegating it to a narrow, lifeless, sectarian faction.

These two deviations are reflections of petty-bourgeois liberalism and sectarianism as well as impetuosity on the question of organization.

[[In addition, other comrades stressed only the organizational aspect of party building to the neglect of the ideological and political building of the party. Thus, party building became a formality. Our party has overcome such erroneous lines by ceaselessly waging uncompromising struggle against them. It has followed Comrade Mao Zedong's correct line in party building.]]

For many years the bulk of our party has been operating in the rural areas because China is a semicolonial and semifeudal country and because the peasant masses constitute the main force of the present revolution. In addition, the Chinese working class, being oppressed in the cities and for a long time unable to carry on revolutionary activities freely, has had to send its vanguard to the countryside to organize its vast ally and to act in coordination with it to liberate the cities when conditions became favorable. There lies the true significance of our party's long-term work in the countryside. Under the circumstances as they exist in the present period, this is the only way our party can represent the Chinese working class and carry out its tasks. If our party acts otherwise, it will never represent the Chinese working class because the present revolution in China is essentially a peasant revolution. The basic and immediate task of the Chinese working class is to emancipate the Chinese peasantry. Under the leadership of a proletarian party, the great peasant war differs from all others in Chinese history, and it absolutely can be victorious. It is quite logical, therefore, that over the long years our party has, as the vanguard of the working class, been organizing and leading this peasant revolution in the countryside with might and main.

The general program of the party Constitution points out that our party represents the interests of the Chinese nation and people. This is no doubt the essence of our party and of Mao Zedong Thought. The interests of the Chinese proletariat are at all times identical with those of the Chinese people. The new democratic revolution now being waged by our party against imperialism and feudalism is in the interests not just of the working class but of the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie, too. The CCP can succeed only when it stands for the interests of the whole people, instead of merely for the partial and immediate interests of one class, and only when it organizes and unites the entire nation and people for the struggle, instead of merely organizing and uniting one class. The proletariat cannot win its own emancipation if it fails to emancipate the people as a whole. On the other hand, the Chinese working class and the working people as a whole constitute the main body of the Chinese nation. It is their interests that form the foundation of the interests of the Chinese nation and people. In fighting for an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, and powerful new China, the CCP is representing the interests of the entire Chinese nation and people as well as those of the Chinese working class.

The same will be true in the future when it will fight for socialism and communism, because the realization of a socialist and communist society will mean the final emancipation of all mankind.

2) Concerning the Guiding Ideology of the Party

The General Program of the party Constitution states that the CCP is guided in all its work by Mao Zedong Thought—the doctrine that integrates the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution—and that it is opposed to any dogmatic or empiricist deviations. As for our Chinese and foreign heritage, we neither reject nor accept it without discrimination; we accept critically what is valuable and appropriate and repudiate what is erroneous and inappropriate, basing our judgment on Marxist dialectical materialism and historical materialism. All this is made very clear.

What needs explaining is Mao Zedong Thought.

The general program of the party Constitution provides that Mao Zedong Thought shall guide all the work of our party. The Constitution also states that it is the duty of every party member to endeavor to learn the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. This is a most important historical characteristic of our present revision of the Constitution. I believe that this Congress and the entire party membership will heartily support this provision.

For over a century the Chinese nation and people have suffered incredible hardships. They have accumulated rich experience in the struggles for their own emancipation, in which much blood has been shed. Their practical struggles and experience inevitably gave rise to a great body of theory demonstrating that the Chinese people are not only good at fighting but also capable of arming themselves with modern scientific revolutionary theory. Because of the political and economic flabbiness of China's bourgeoisie and because of its lack of contact with the people and its limited outlook and thinking, its representatives could only advance certain revolutionary programs and democratic ideas. We have already adopted all the good points of their programs and ideas as part of our heritage. These representatives could not, however, formulate a systematic revolutionary theory, much less a comprehensive, systematic, and scientific theory in relation to the whole course of Chinese history and the Chinese revolution. Such a theory can only be created by the representatives of the Chinese proletariat, of whom the greatest and most outstanding is Comrade Mao Zedong.

Our Congress should warmly celebrate the development of a unique, integrated, and correct theory of the people's revolution and national reconstruction, which has been maturing since the founding of the CCP. This theory has led our party and our people to great victories, and it will lead us to ultimate and complete victory and emancipation. It is the greatest achievement and glory of the party and the Chinese people in their long struggles and will benefit our nation for generation upon generation. This theory is none other than Mao Zedong Thought—Comrade Mao Zedong's theories with regard to Chinese history, Chinese society, and the Chinese revolution, and relevant policies.

Mao Zedong Thought is the theory that integrates Marxist-Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution. It is communism and Marxism applied to China.

Mao Zedong Thought is the development of Marxism with regard to the national-democratic revolution in the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal country of the present period. It is an outstanding example of how Marxism is applied to a given nation. It has taken shape and developed in the course of the long revolutionary struggles of the Chinese nation and people, which include the three great revolutionary wars (the Northern Expedition, the rural revolutionary war, and the present War of Resistance against Japan). It is at once Chinese and thoroughly Marxist. It has evolved through the application of the Marxist world outlook and social outlook, specifically, dialectical materialism and historical materialism. In other words, it has evolved through careful, scientific analysis of the exceedingly rich experience of all modern revolutions. This includes, of course, the experience gained by the CCP in directing the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people in the light of the characteristics of the Chinese nation and on the solid foundation of Marxist-Leninist theories. Mao Zedong Thought has developed theories and policies for achieving the emancipation of the Chinese nation and people by applying the scientific method of Marxism-Leninism to a synthesis of China's history, social conditions, and entire revolutionary experience with a view to furthering the interests of the proletariat and consequently the interests of the entire people. These are, therefore, the only correct theories and policies with which the proletariat and all the working people of China fight for their emancipation.

Mao Zedong Thought—the theory and practice of communism applied to China—has come into being and developed not only in the course of the revolutionary struggles against domestic and foreign enemies but also in the course of the principled struggles against various erroneous opportunist ideas within the party, such as Chen Duxiuism, the Li Lisan line, and the subsequent “left” deviationist line, capitulationist line, dogmatism, and empiricism. It is our party's only correct guiding ideology and its only correct General Line.

In the twenty-four years since its birth, Mao Zedong Thought has developed and matured. It has stood the test of the innumerable bitter struggles of millions upon millions of people and has been proved to be objective truth and to embody the only correct theories and policies for saving China. Numerous historical events have borne out the fact that whenever the revolution follows the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, it will go forward and succeed, and whenever it departs from that leadership, it will go downhill and eventually fail. The integration of Marxist theory with both the practice of the proletarian revolution in the era of imperialism and the practice of the Russian revolution gave rise to Russian Bolshevism—Leninism. Leninism has not only led the Russian people to complete emancipation but has also guided and is still guiding the people of the whole world in their struggle for emancipation. As a pupil of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, Comrade Mao Zedong has exactly effected the integration of Marxist-

Leninist theories with the practice of the Chinese revolution. This has given rise to Chinese communism—Mao Zedong Thought—which has guided, and is still guiding, the Chinese people toward complete emancipation and which has made a useful contribution to the cause of emancipation of the people all over the world, particularly people in the East.

Mao Zedong Thought, in terms of world outlook and work-style is Marxism being developed and improved through its application in China. It constitutes the comprehensive theories of revolution and national reconstruction for the Chinese people. These theories are to be found in Comrade Mao Zedong's writings and in many works of our party literature. They include Comrade Mao Zedong's analysis of the present world situation and China's conditions and his theories and policies with regard to New Democracy, the emancipation of the peasantry, the revolutionary united front, revolutionary wars, revolutionary bases, the establishment of a new democratic republic, party building, culture, etc. These theories and policies are at once thoroughly Marxist and thoroughly Chinese. They are the highest expression of the wisdom of the Chinese people and the most succinct of theoretical generalizations.

Because of the distinctive characteristics of China's social and historical development and its backwardness in science, it is a unique and herculean task to apply Marxism systematically to China, to transform it from its European form into a Chinese form and thereby to solve the various problems in the contemporary Chinese revolution from the Marxist standpoint and with the Marxist method. Many of our problems have never been considered or approached by the world's Marxists because, unlike the conditions in other countries, in China the main sections of the masses are not workers but peasants, and the fight is directed not against domestic capitalism but against foreign imperialist oppression and feudal practices. This can never be accomplished, as some people seem to think it can, by memorizing and reciting Marxist works or by just quoting from them. It requires a high level of the combination of scientific and revolutionary spirit. It requires profound historical and social knowledge, rich experience in guiding the revolutionary struggles, and skill in using Marxist-Leninist methods to make an accurate, scientific analysis of social and historical conditions and their development. It further requires boundless and tenacious loyalty to the cause of the proletariat and the people, faith in the strength, creative power, and future of the masses and skill in crystallizing the experience, ideas, and will of the masses and in bringing what is crystallized back to the masses for application. Only thus is it possible to make original and brilliant additions to Marxism-Leninism in the light of the historical development of each specific period and the concrete economic and political conditions in China, to express Marxism-Leninism in plain language easily understood by the Chinese people, to adapt it to the new historical environment and China's special conditions, and to make it a weapon in the hands of the Chinese proletariat and working people. No one but our Comrade Mao Zedong has so splendidly and successfully performed the extremely difficult task of adapting Marxism to China.

This constitutes one of the greatest achievements in the history of the Marxist movement all over the world, and the dissemination of Marxism—the best of all truths—in a nation of 475 million people is unprecedented. This is something for which we should be particularly grateful.

Our Comrade Mao Zedong is not only the greatest revolutionary and statesman in Chinese history, but also the greatest theoretician and scientist. He has had the prowess to lead the whole party and the entire Chinese people to wage struggles that shook the world and, what is more, he has been the best-versed in and the sternest challenger to theories. In the theoretical field, he has been bold in blazing the trail. He has discarded certain specific Marxist principles and conclusions that are outmoded or incompatible with the concrete conditions in China and replaced them with appropriate new ones. For this reason he has been able to successfully carry out the difficult and monumental task of sinifying Marxism.

Because of inadequate theoretical preparation, our party and many party members have been confused about how to do their work and so have suffered a great deal, making quite a few unnecessary detours. Now, thanks to Comrade Mao Zedong's painstaking work and brilliant creativity, the theoretical groundwork has been fully laid for our party and the Chinese people. This will greatly enhance our self-confidence and our ability to fight and speed the Chinese revolution to victory. Therefore, the important task now is to mobilize the entire party membership to study and disseminate Mao Zedong Thought and to arm our membership and the revolutionary people with it, so that it may become a living, irresistible force. For this purpose, all party schools and training classes must adopt Comrade Mao Zedong's writings as basic teaching material, and the cadres must study these writings systematically. Our entire party press must propagate Mao Zedong Thought in a systematic way. The propaganda departments of the party should edit Comrade Mao Zedong's important works into popular reading matter suited to the level of the average party member.

Having overcome thought-stifling dogmatism in the party, we must make further efforts to remove the obstacle of empiricism and to start a campaign in the party to study Mao Zedong Thought. We may then anticipate a great upsurge in the party of Marxist culture, which is ideological preparation for the victory in the people's revolution in China.

Mao Zedong Thought is the foundation of the present revised party Constitution and its general program. It is the duty of all party members to study it, to disseminate it, and to follow its guidance in their work.

[[3) Present-day Chinese society is semicolonial and semifeudal in nature, but the liberated areas have a new democratic character. 4) Particular stress has been placed on the mass line because it is the fundamental political and organizational line of our party.]]

[[Excluded are the sections: democratic centralism within the party; the problem of cadres; the basic organizations of the party; commendation and discipline; and the party's strictness and flexibility.]]

H.7 Constitution of the CCP (11 June 1945)⁸³

General Program

The CCP is the organized vanguard of the Chinese working class, the highest form of its class organization. Standing for the interests of the Chinese nation and people, its task in the present stage is to struggle for the realization of New Democracy in China. Its ultimate aim is the realization of communism in China.

The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the combined principles derived from the practical experience of the Chinese revolution—the ideas of Mao Zedong—as the guiding principles of all its work; it denounces any one-sided tendencies toward dogmatism and empiricism. The CCP is based on the dialectical and historical materialism of Marxism, accepting with critical attitude its historical heritage both in China and in other countries, and denouncing any idealistic or mechanistic-materialistic conception of the world.

Because the present Chinese society, except in the new democratic liberated areas, remains semicolonial and semifeudal; because the dynamic forces of the Chinese revolution are the working class, the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and other democratic elements; because a powerful CCP is already in existence; and because of present international conditions, the Chinese revolution at the present stage must take the form of a new bourgeois democratic revolution of the masses under the leadership of the proletariat. This revolution has extensive allies at home and abroad. Therefore, the tasks of the CCP at the present stage are: internally, to organize and unify the Chinese workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and all anti-imperialist and antifeudal elements and national minorities on its side; and, externally, to unite with the world proletariat, with all oppressed peoples, and with all those nations which treat us with equality—to struggle for the emancipation of the Chinese nation from foreign imperialist aggression, the liquidation of the feudal oppression of the masses, the establishment of an independent, free, democratic, united, and prosperous and strong new democratic federated republic based on the alliance of all revolutionary classes and free union of all races, and to struggle for the realization of world peace and progress.

During the future stage of the Chinese revolution, after the complete victory of the national and democratic revolution in China, the task of the CCP will be to struggle, by necessary steps, according to the requirements of China's social and economic development and the will of her people, for the realization of socialism and communism in China.

In China, a semicolonial and semifeudal country with a vast area and a huge population but not yet a unified country, there is, on the one hand, a heroic and fighting revolutionary tradition among the masses of the people, particularly the workers and peasants; but, on the other hand, there are especially powerful obstacles along the revolutionary path. Because of these conditions the Chinese revolutionary struggle is complicated, and it must, for a very long time, find primary

expression in armed struggle. Before the victory of the revolution in the key cities, it will be preeminently important to consolidate the villages as a revolutionary base, and it will also be necessary for the party to undergo a long period of patient work among the popular masses. Based on all these characteristics of the Chinese revolution, the CCP must therefore, on the long road of Chinese revolution, be very bold, well experienced, and always alert to mobilize and organize the great masses to overcome all difficulties and avoid all dangers in its path, so that it may march toward its goal while continually training its rank and file.

In its revolutionary struggle the CCP must endeavor to establish itself as the core of all revolutionary mass organizations and of the revolutionary organizations of the nation. It must carry on a solemn struggle against everything of internal or external origin which threatens to undermine the unity of the working class, the alliance of all revolutionary classes, and other revolutionary tasks.

Within its ranks the CCP cannot tolerate the existence of right or left opportunism. It must wage an uncompromising but effective struggle within the party against opportunists, liquidationists, and adventurists and must expel from party membership all those who are obstinate in their errors, in order to maintain unity among the rank and file.

The CCP should not conceal its own mistakes or the shortcomings committed in its work. It should use the methods of criticism and self-criticism constantly to rectify its own mistakes and shortcomings and should educate its own party members and staff to correct their own mistakes speedily. It objects to egotism, to being afraid to acknowledge its own mistakes, and to fear of criticism and self-criticism.

The CCP members must possess the spirit of wholehearted and undivided service to the Chinese people; they must have close cooperation with the masses of workers, peasants, and other revolutionary elements and must constantly consolidate and expand this cooperation. Every party member must realize the harmony of interests between the masses and the party and the identity between being responsible to the party and to the people. He must listen carefully to the voice of the people and to understand their pressing needs and must help them become organized to struggle for the attainment of these needs. Every party member must be determined to learn from the masses, while at the same time tirelessly educating them and developing their mass consciousness with revolutionary spirit. The CCP must constantly guard against the danger of being alienated from the masses and must prevent and liquidate within its rank and file such incorrect tendencies as tailism, isolationism, authoritarianism, bureaucracy, and militarism, which will cause its alienation from the masses.

The CCP is a unified combat organization built on the principle of democratic centralism and held together by the discipline which all party members must observe conscientiously and voluntarily. The strength of the CCP rests on its solidarity, unified will, and integral action. The party cannot tolerate any internal action which deviates from its program and Constitution or is detrimental to discipline; it cannot tolerate any demand for autonomy within the party, factionalism, or two-

faced deeds which pretend to obey the party while opposing it in practice. The CCP must constantly purge from its ranks those who violate the program, Constitution, and discipline of party membership and who are incorrigible in their mistakes.

The CCP asks that every party member carry on his or her work positively, in the spirit of self-sacrifice, so that its program and resolutions can be realized, and the complete liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people achieved.

Chapter I: Membership

1) Those who accept the program and Party Constitution, participate in the activities of its organizations, comply with its resolutions, and pay membership dues may become members of the party.

2) Party members shall perform the following duties:

a) Endeavor to raise the degree of their consciousness and study the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao Zedong Thought.

b) Observe party discipline strictly, participate positively in the political life of the party and in the nation's revolutionary movements, carry out actively the party's policies and the resolutions of party organs, and struggle to overcome all internal and external phenomena detrimental to the interests of the party.

c) Serve the masses, strengthen the tie between the party and the masses, understand and reflect speedily the needs of the masses, and explain the policies of the party to the masses.

d) Observe in exemplary fashion the disciplines of the revolutionary government and revolutionary organizations, be proficient in one's own work, and set examples for the people in all revolutionary undertakings.

3) Party members shall enjoy the following rights and privileges:

a) participation in free and practical discussions on the enforcement of the policies of the party, either in party meetings or in party publications.

b) The right to elect and be elected for office within the party.

c) Submission of suggestions or statements to any organ of the party up to the CC.

d) Criticism of the work of any member at party meetings.

4) Only those persons who are eighteen years of age or over are eligible for party membership. All persons seeking admission into the party shall individually comply with the admission procedures according to the following sections:

a) Applications for membership by workers, coolies, hired farmhands, poor peasants, urban poor, and revolutionary soldiers shall require the recommendation of two regular party members. The application shall be decided on at a plenary meeting of the party cell and be approved by the district party committee, or a corresponding committee. New members shall undergo a probationary period of six months before they become regular members.

b) Application for membership by middle peasants, salaried employees, intellectual elements, and professionals shall require the recommendation of two regular

party members, one of whom must be a regular member of one year's standing. The application shall be decided on at a plenary meeting of the party cell and be approved by the district party committee, or a corresponding committee. The probationary period for such new members shall be one year before they become regular members.

In areas where the revolution has only recently been developed, the CC or its representative organ, or the provincial party organization or regional party committee may establish temporary regulations without regard to the qualifications of sponsors and the probationary period of new members as provided in sections a) and b).

c) Applications for membership by persons who have any other social background than provided for in sections a) and b) shall require the recommendation of two regular party members, one of whom must be a regular member of three years' standing. The application shall be decided on at a party cell plenary meeting and approved by a county or district party committee, municipal party committee, or other committee corresponding to the party committee. The probationary period for such members shall be two years before they become regular members.

d) Applications for membership by persons who have withdrawn from another party in which they were ordinary members shall require the recommendation of two regular party members, one of whom must be a member of three years' standing. The application shall be decided on at a party cell plenary meeting and approved by the county party committee, or its equivalent. If the applicant was a responsible officer of his former party, his application shall require the recommendation of two regular party members, one of whom must be a member of five years' standing. The application shall be decided on at a party cell plenary meeting and be approved by the provincial party committee, or its equivalent. (If the applicant was an important responsible officer of his or her former political party, the application requires the approval of the CC.) The probationary period for such new members shall be two years before they become regular members.

5) In special circumstances, committees of the county or higher level, or a corresponding party committee, shall have authority to decide directly on the membership of individual applicants.

6) The sponsors shall be responsible for representing faithfully to the party the ideology, character, and background of the applicant; and before making their recommendation they shall carefully explain to the applicant the Constitution, program, and policies of the party.

Before deciding on and approving the membership application, the party committee shall designate a working party member to interview the applicant carefully and must conduct a serious investigation of the applicant.

7) The purpose of the probationary period is to provide preliminary training for probationary members and to ensure the party organization of a chance to observe the political character of such members in the light of their activities.

The duties and rights and privileges of probationary members are similar to those of regular members, except that they do not possess the right to elect, to be elected, or to vote.

8) The promotion of probationary members to the status of regular members at the termination of the probationary period shall be decided on at a party cell plenary meeting and approved by the higher party committee by which the original application was approved, or its corresponding organs.

The probationary period may be lengthened or shortened by the appropriate party committee.

If observation of the probationary member indicates that he or she is not qualified to join the party, the probationary membership may be invalidated.

9) The seniority of new members is determined by the date on which they acquire the status of regular member.

10) If a regular or probationary member is transferred from the area of one party organization to another, he or she shall be considered a regular or probationary member of the latter organization.

11) Regular or probationary members who wish to withdraw from the party shall make formal application to the party cell, which will be acted on at a plenary cell meeting where their names shall be eliminated, and reported to the higher party committee for its records.

12) A regular or probationary member of the party who, without justifiable reason, has failed to participate in the work of the party continuously for a period of six months, or to carry out the work assigned him or her to pay membership fees, shall be considered to have voluntarily withdrawn from party membership; the revocation of his or her membership shall be decided on at a plenary meeting of the party cell and reported to the higher party committee for its records.

13) The expulsion of regular or probationary members shall take effect after the question has been carefully discussed and decided on at the party cell plenary meeting and approved by the higher party committee.

Under special circumstances, party committees higher than the cell may decide on the expulsion of regular or probationary members, but it will take effect only after the approval of the next higher committee.

Chapter II: The Party's Organizational Structure

14) The party structure is organized on the principle of democratic centralism. The principle of democratic centralism is centralism based on democracy, and democracy under centralized leadership. Its basic conditions are as follows:

a) The leading organs of all levels of the party shall be established through elections.

b) The leading organs of all levels of the party shall submit periodic reports to the organizations by which they are elected.

c) Individual members shall obey the party organizations to which they belong; the minority shall obey the majority; lower organizations shall obey higher organizations; all organizations shall uniformly obey the CC.

d) Party discipline shall be strictly observed, and party decisions shall be enforced unconditionally.

15) Organizations of the party shall be established on the basis of the localities or branches of production to which the members belong.

The organizations which take overall charge of party activities in a certain locality shall be deemed higher than the individual party organizations within the locality.

16) The system of party organization shall be as follows:

a) At the national level, there shall be a National Congress of the party, a CC, and a National Conference of Party Representatives.

b) At the provincial, border region, and local levels, respectively, there shall be: provincial congresses, provincial party committees, and provincial conferences of party representatives; border region congresses, border region party committees, and border region conferences of party representatives; and local congresses, local party committees, and local conferences of party representatives.

c) At the county level, there shall be county congresses, county party committees, and county conferences of party representatives.

d) At the municipal level, there shall be municipal congresses, municipal party committees, and municipal conferences of party representatives.

e) At the urban or rural district level, there shall be district congresses (or district plenary party meetings), district party committees, and district conferences of party representatives.

f) In each factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, company of the army, public organization or school, there shall be a plenary party meeting, a party cell committee, and a conference of party cell representatives.

17) The authority at the various levels of party organization shall be: in the party cell, the plenary meeting; in districts, counties, municipalities, localities, border regions, and provinces, the congress; for the whole party, the National Congress. When these are not in session, the committees elected by them are the supreme authorities at the various levels of party organization.

18) The leading organs at the various levels of the party organization shall be established through election, where possible. Only if it is impossible, because of environmental or other restrictive conditions, to hold general meetings of party members for direct elections may the leading organs be elected by the conferences of party representatives, or be appointed by the higher authorities.

19) The election of party committees at the various levels shall be conducted according to nomination lists by secret ballot or open vote. The right of electors to criticize or change any of the nominees is guaranteed.

20) Party committees at the various levels may call cadres' meetings and meetings of active members to transmit and discuss important decisions of higher party organs or to study or prepare for their own work.

21) Before decisions have been reached regarding the policy of the party and various problems [of the party], all party members may freely and practically discuss them, and express their own opinions, within party organs and in party meet-

ings. But once decisions have been adopted they shall be obeyed and enforced unconditionally.

22) The leading organs at the various levels of party organization shall conduct their activities in accordance with the principle of inner-party democracy so that the revolutionary positiveness and constructiveness of its members may be developed and party discipline strengthened. Party discipline shall be enforced self-consciously rather than mechanistically, so that the leading organs may perform their functions effectively and the system of centralism may be solidly constructed on a democratic basis. But the leading organs of the various levels of party organization, in performing their functions, shall not violate the principle of centralism within the party. Democratic criticism within the party, which is legitimate and beneficial for centralized action, shall not be misconstrued as anarchistic deviation (such as autonomy and extreme democracy).

23) To ensure that the principle of inner-party democracy shall be enforced in a manner helpful to the undertakings of the party; that there will be no danger of a weakening of combat morale or party solidarity in case of emergency; that there will be no possibility for any conspirator, renegade, or factionalist to utilize the principle of democracy to injure or divide the activities of the party; and that no small minority will be able to take advantage of the unawareness in thinking of the overwhelming majority to attain its private ends, the broad and general consideration, discussion, and examination of party policies on the national or local scale shall be conducted only under the following conditions:

a) They shall be conducted when time permits, that is to say, when the objective conditions are not critical; and

b) they shall be based on the resolutions of the CC or of local leading organs of the party; or

c) they shall be conducted only on the proposal of more than one-half of the members of the lower organizations, or on the proposal of the higher authority.

24) Party organizations at the various levels shall ensure that all publications under their direction propagate the resolutions and policy decisions of the central or higher organizations.

25) Prior to their determination and announcement by the CC, local and other party organizations, or their responsible officer, shall discuss questions of a national character only among themselves, or submit their proposals respecting such questions to the CC. In no case shall they make a public announcement of their views or decisions. Local party organizations shall have the right to make decisions concerning questions of a local character, but they are not to be inconsistent with the decisions of the CC or higher organizations.

26) The establishment of any new party organization must be approved by its immediately higher authority.

27) To facilitate the direction of local party work, the CC may, according to the requirements of the situation, establish a central bureau or central branch bureau with jurisdiction over several provinces or border regions. Such a central bureau or

central branch bureau is the representative organ of the CC; it shall be appointed by, and be responsible to, the CC. These representative organs of the CC may be dissolved or amalgamated whenever they are found to be no longer necessary.

28) To facilitate the conduct of their practical work, party committees of the various levels may, according to the requirements of the situation, establish different departments or committees for the administration or party affairs, propaganda and education, military and economic matters, or mass movements. Such departments or committees shall perform their respective functions under the unified leadership of the party committees of the various levels.

To perform certain temporary or special work, party committees of the various levels may establish appropriate temporary working committees or departments.

Chapter III: Central Party Organization

29) The National Congress shall be determined and convened by the CC. Ordinarily, it shall meet once every three years; but in special circumstances the CC may either postpone it or call it in advance.

The CC shall call the National Congress if local party organizations representing more than one-half of the membership of the party request it.

The National Congress, to be constitutional, must be attended by delegates representing more than one-half of the membership of the party.

The number of delegates to the congress, and the procedure for their election, shall be determined by the CC.

30) The National Congress shall have the following functions:

- a) to hear, deliberate on, and approve the reports of the CC or other central organizations;
- b) to adopt or amend the program and Constitution of the party;
- c) to determine the basic guiding principles and policies of the party; and
- d) to elect the CC.

31) The number of members of the CC shall be determined, and they shall be elected by, the National Congress. Vacancies in the CC shall be filled by alternate members in due order.

32) The CC shall represent the party in maintaining relations with other political parties or groups and shall be responsible for establishing all of the organizations of the party, directing their activities, and allocating human and financial resources.

33) Plenary sessions of the CC shall be convened by the Central Politburo once every six months. The Central Politburo may either postpone or call them in advance, as the situation warrants. Alternate members of the CC shall have the right to speak at plenary sessions.

34) The Central Politburo, the Central Secretariat, and the chair of the CC shall be elected at the plenary sessions of the CC.

Between plenary sessions of the CC, the Central Politburo shall be the central directing organ of the party and shall direct all its work.

The Central Secretariat shall perform the routine functions of the CC under the Central Politburo.

The chair of the CC shall serve concurrently as chair of the Central Politburo and chair of the Central Secretariat.

The CC, according to the requirements of [party] work, shall establish organization, propaganda, and other departments; the military affairs commission, the party publication committee, and other committees; and other working organs to administer the different functions of the central authorities under the direction and supervision of the Central Politburo, the Central Secretariat, and the chair of the CC.

35) In the intervals between National Congresses, the CC may call National Conferences of Party Representatives from various local party committees for the consideration and determination of current questions of party policy.

36) Members of the National Conference of Party Representatives shall be elected at a meeting of the National Committee, which shall consist of the provincial, border region, and other party committees immediately subordinate to the CC. The number of representatives to the conferences shall be determined by the CC.

37) The quorum of the National Conference of Party Representatives shall have the power to remove regular or alternate members of the CC who are found to be incapable of performing their duties, and to elect part of the alternate members of the CC. But the regular or alternate members removed from, and the new alternate members elected to, the CC by such a conference shall not exceed one-fifth of the total number of regular and alternate members of the CC at one time.

38) The resolutions adopted by the National Conference of Party Representatives, and the removal or election of regular or alternate members of the CC by it, shall require the approval of the CC.

After approval by the CC, the resolutions adopted by the National Conference of Party Representatives shall be enforced by all party organs.

Chapter IV: Provincial and Border Region Party Organization

39) Provincial or border region congresses and provincial or border region party committees shall be under the direction of the CC or its representative organs.

40) Provincial and border region congresses shall be called once every two years by the provincial or border region party committees. In special circumstances the provincial or border region party committees may either postpone (such congresses) or call them in advance. But they must be convened by the provincial or border region party committees if more than one-half of the lower party organizations so request, or on the proposal of the CC or its representative organ.

The number of members of the provincial or border region congresses, and the procedure for their election, shall be determined by the provincial or border region party committees, with the approval of the CC or its representative organ.

41) Provincial or border region congresses shall hear, deliberate on, and approve the reports of the provincial or border region party committees or other party organs

of the province or border region; they shall deliberate on and determine the problems and activities of the provincial or border region organizations and shall elect the provincial or border region party committees and the delegates to the National Congress.

42) The standing committee, secretary, and deputy-secretary of the provincial or border region party committee shall be elected at the plenary session of the provincial or border region party committee and shall administer its routine affairs. Secretaries and members of the standing committees of provincial and border region party committees must be approved by the CC. The secretary must be a party member of five years' standing.

Plenary sessions of the provincial or border region party committees shall be held at least twice every year.

43) Provincial or border region party committees shall enforce within their jurisdiction the resolutions adopted by the National Congress and the CC and shall establish all party organs, allocate the human and financial resources of the party, and direct the activities of party and nuclei in nonparty organizations outside the party.

44) In the intervals between sessions of provincial or border region congresses, the provincial or border region party committees may summon the representatives of local, county, or other party committees directly under them to provincial or border region conferences of party representatives to deliberate on and determine various questions affecting the work within their jurisdiction.

Provincial or border region conferences of party representatives shall have the power to remove and elect a part of the members of the provincial border region party committees, but such number shall in no case exceed one-quarter of the total.

45) Resolutions adopted by provincial or border region conferences of party representatives, and the removal or election of members of provincial or border region party committees by them, shall require the approval of the provincial or border region party committees.

Chapter V: Party Organizations in Localities, Counties, Municipalities, and Districts

46) Party organizations and their work methods in localities, counties, municipalities, and districts are similar to the organization and work methods of party organizations in the provinces and border regions as set out in the preceding chapter. They shall be subject to the direction of their respective superior organs.

47) Congresses in localities, counties, municipalities, and districts shall be held once every two years. In intervals between congresses, conferences of party representatives may be held.

48) Local and county party committees shall hold plenary sessions at least four times a year. Municipal and district party committees shall hold plenary sessions at least monthly.

Members, secretaries, and deputy-secretaries of local, county, municipal, and district party committees shall be approved by the higher party organization. Secretaries of local, county, and municipal party committees shall be elected from party members of more than three years' standing. Secretaries of district party committees shall be party members of more than one year's standing. In areas where the revolution has only recently developed, the regulations concerning the seniority of members to hold office may be modified with the approval of the provincial or border region party committees.

Chapter VI: Party Basic Organizations

49) Party cells are the basic organs of the party. A party cell shall be established in a factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, company of the army, public organization, school, etc., where there are three or more party members. Where the party members thereof are less than three, they shall join the nearest adjoining party cell.

The establishment of party cells shall be approved by the county or municipal party committee.

50) Where there is a relatively large membership, the members shall be organized under the party cell committee into small groups on a natural, residential, or vocational basis. Each group shall elect a leader; a deputy-leader shall be elected when necessary.

Where there are more than fifty regular and probationary members in a village, or more than 100 regular or probationary members in a factory, public organization, or school, a principal party cell may be established, under which members shall be organized into a number of branch party cells according to their residence, factory section, public organization department, or school class. Branch party cells shall enjoy the same privileges as ordinary party cells.

51) In large villages or towns, factories, public organizations, and schools where there are more than 500 regular and probationary members, there may be established, through election, with the approval of the provincial or border region party committees, a village committee, factory committee, public organization committee, or school committee, under which members shall be organized into different party cells according to residence, section, department, or class.

52) Party cells shall unite the masses closely with the party. Party cells have the following functions:

a) to carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses with a view to carrying out the party program and the decisions of higher party organs.

b) to constantly watch and reflect to the higher party authority the aspirations and demands of the masses; to pay close attention to the political, economic, and cultural life of the masses; and to organize them for the solution of their own problems.

c) to absorb new members, to collect party membership dues, to examine and decide on admissions to membership, and to enforce party discipline among the party members.

d) to educate the party membership and organize members for learning.

53) At its general membership meeting, the party cell shall elect the cell committee, which shall administer its routine functions. The tenure of the party cell committee shall range from six months to one year. The number of members of the party cell committee shall be determined by the size of the party cell membership, with a minimum of three and a maximum of eleven. A secretary shall be elected by the committee; a deputy-secretary may be elected in case of necessity. The distribution of functions among other members of the committee shall be determined according to practical needs.

Where a party cell has no more than seven members, there shall be elected only a secretary, or a secretary and deputy-secretary, and there shall be no party cell committee.

Chapter VII: Party Underground Organizations

54) In areas where it is impossible for the party to maintain legal existence or conduct open activities, the structural forms and working methods of the underground organizations shall be especially prescribed by the CC in directives based on the party Constitution. Where the provisions of this Constitution cannot be applied literally to the structural forms and working methods of underground organizations, they shall be applied with modifications.

55) Underground organizations of the party shall be even more careful (than provided in the Constitution) in considering the admission of new members. New members shall be required to comply only with those admission procedures which are practicable under secret conditions.

Chapter VIII: Party Control Organs

56) A central control committee and local control committees may be established whenever the CC deems it necessary.

57) The central control committee shall be elected by the plenary session of the CC. All local control committees shall be elected at the plenary sessions of the local party committees with the approval of the higher organ.

58) The duties and powers of the central and local control committees shall be to decide on or review punishments and deal with complaints from party members.

59) The control committees of the various levels of party organization shall perform their functions under the direction of their respective party committees.

Chapter IX: Party Groups in Nonparty Organizations

60) In government organizations, labor unions, peasants' associations, cooperatives, and other mass organizations in which three or more party members hold responsible positions, party groups shall be established. The duty of the party group shall be to direct the work of the members in the leading organ in the organization

to work for the purpose of strengthening the party's influence and carrying out the party's programs.

61) There shall be a secretary in each party group. Where the party group has ten or more members, a party group secretariat may be established to conduct the routine work. The party group secretariat and secretary are designated by the party committee to which the group belongs.

62) Party groups in nonparty organizations at various levels shall be under the direction of the corresponding party committees, and shall enforce their decisions. Party committees on the various levels may include leading personnel of key party groups to participate in their meetings.

Chapter X: Rewards and Punishments

63) Party members and party organizations which, in the performance of their tasks, display their complete loyalty to the interests of the party and the people, set themselves as models in maintaining the discipline of the party and of the revolutionary government, manifest distinguished and constructive resourcefulness in executing the party program and the policies and decisions of the CC and higher organs in the course of party work, and win over the sincere support of the popular masses shall be rewarded.

64) Those who fail to execute the resolutions of the CC and higher organs, or violate the Constitution and discipline of the party, may be punished by party organs of the various levels according to the concrete situation in the following ways:

a) The punishments to be imposed on entire organizations shall be: censure; partial reorganization of the leading organ; dissolution of the leading organ and appointment of a temporary leading organ; and dissolution of the whole organization and the reregistration of its members.

b) The punishments to be imposed on individual party members shall be: personal advice or warning; public advice or warning; cancellation of assigned duties; subjection to party surveillance; and expulsion from party membership.

65) If a regular or alternate member of the CC commits any act which seriously offends against party discipline, the CC shall have the power to deprive him of his regular or alternate membership; but the expulsion shall require a two-thirds' vote of the CC.

66) When punishment is imposed on a party organization or an individual party member, the party organization or member shall be informed of the reasons for the punishment. If the party organization or member so punished has any objection to the punishment, proceedings may be instituted and a petition may be filed for reconsideration and appeal to the higher organ. The party committees of the various levels shall transmit such petitions without delay, and in no case shall they be withheld.

67) Expulsion from party membership is the most severe punishment within the party. In deciding on and approving such punishment, party organs of the various

levels should maintain a high degree of caution and be careful in hearing the case of the appellant and in analyzing the offense in the light of the circumstances in which it was committed.

68) The party's positive aim of reward and punishment for party members is to educate them and the masses, including the members rewarded or punished. It is by no means intended to encourage exhibitionism or to enforce any principle of mere punitivism within the party. To reward party comrades who have distinguished records is to create good practices within the party and to set up models among the members. To criticize or impose punishment on comrades who commit offenses is a method of correcting past errors and guarding against future errors, or curing malfeasance and saving regenerate individuals.

Chapter XI: Finances

69) The revenues of the party are derived from membership dues, proceeds from all kinds of production and enterprises operated by the party, and outside contributions.

70) Membership dues for regular and probationary members shall be determined and enforced by the provincial or border region party committees, or other corresponding party committees.

H.8 Decision of the CC Concerning the Party's Tasks After the Japanese Surrender (11 August 1945)⁸⁴

Issued to every local party committee:

1) After Russia entered the war, Japan announced its surrender. The GMD actively prepared to reclaim liberated areas and grab the fruits of the anti-Japanese victory. This rivalry will grow ever more fierce in the future.

2) Under these circumstances, our party's task will comprise two phases: the first, and current, phase is to concentrate our main power, forcing our enemies to surrender. If they do not surrender, we must unhesitatingly launch an attack based on the concrete situation, wiping them out step by step and vigorously expanding the liberated areas. All large and small towns and communication lines that it is both possible and necessary to occupy must be occupied. Weapons and resources must be seized. Furthermore, we must arm the masses. In order to achieve this goal, each locality must concentrate its military power and break away from the guerrilla mentality, separate into three ranks (organized by regiment, troop, and division), and overcome parochialism to transform itself into a true fighting force. Its actions must be concentrated to preserve our victory while we are dealing with our enemies. After disposing of the enemy, we should rapidly concentrate and consolidate our main forces and raise our fighting capability to prevent civil war. But, in order to protect the localities, every area must still maintain a necessary minimum of local

militia and guerrilla troops and promote local cadres to lead the troops. We must leave the guns in the hands of the citizen soldiers; we absolutely must not amass all the guns. During this phase, Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Jingshui, Taiyue, Henan, Hubei, Central Anhui, West Zhejiang, Xiangyue, and other areas must have the necessary troop strength to repel GMD attacks. The remaining troops will be employed to finish off the enemy. The CC has already issued a directive to those areas with special characteristics.

Second, the future phase may include a large-scale, all-out GMD assault. Our party should prepare to transfer troops to deal with civil war, basing troop numbers and scale on the situation at hand. With regard to some of these areas, such as Jiangnan, Shandong, Guangdong, Jingshui, etc., the first phase may be somewhat shorter: we must undertake a thorough estimate of such a possibility.

3) We must rapidly fortify our work in the cities, especially in those cities that we can and must seize. We must send capable cadres to these cities so they can quickly learn to manage the cities' finances and economy. We must take advantage of all potential candidates in our work in the cities in order to maintain order. We must suppress the resistance of the counterrevolutionary forces; however, we must not kill arbitrarily. We must have a focus in our use of soldiers and cadres if we are not to forfeit all.

4) Policy-making must be firmly under our control. We must not alienate ourselves from the masses in any of our activities. Expansion of our military strength is essential, but we must do so without exceeding the limits of the financial burden the masses are able to bear. It is equally necessary to amass resources, but we also must not focus exclusively on the military, and above all we must avoid harming the people's interest. We must have a unified command and strict discipline in order to capture enemy strongholds and occupy the cities. We must expedite our cadres' training and our army's political training.

5) The labor resources of our army comprises the militia; it defends the countryside, so we must rapidly expand our militia organization.

6) During this winter and next spring, we must mobilize the masses to reduce the portion of their crops they pay the landlords in rent (except in those areas where this has already been accomplished). In all the newly liberated areas we must carry out this rent campaign, mobilizing and organizing the masses. We must set up local parties and governments and promote local cadres to quickly establish our party's base among the masses and solidify our control of the newly liberated areas. However, we must not harm the interests of the middle peasants (they are also a fundamental part of the masses). We must not develop our assault on the rich peasants beyond carrying out the rent-reduction campaign among the ranks of the feudal exploitative elements. We will allow the landlords to survive. It is too early to expropriate and redistribute the land. In areas where land redistribution has already been carried out, it can be left as it is. However, we must think of a way to provide relief for the landlords, to draw in the rich peasants, and to compensate those middle peasants who have suffered losses. If we do not pay attention to these concerns, we

will surely destroy the united front in the countryside and alienate and marginalize our own party to the GMD's advantage.

7) The resumption of GMD-CCP negotiations must be based on consideration of new international and domestic trends. Yan'an's criticism of the GMD and the United States must temporarily ease up. No one can be allowed to indulge in misguided notions about Chiang Kai-shek; we must lay bare to the masses his treachery and deceit. We must be mentally prepared for the civil war with which Chiang Kai-shek threatens us. But at present we must concentrate our efforts on eliminating the enemy—courageously, determinedly, and thoroughly pursuing victory. We must not divide our attention. At the same time, we must nevertheless save the American wounded. We must prepare to act in concert with the American landing force for our mutual benefit. We must express our good intentions to the democratic elements among the American people and government. However, the possibility of a Scobie-type crisis still exists.⁸⁵

8) We hope that every locality will follow these guiding principles and carry them out in line with the local situation.

H.9 Directive of the CC Concerning Swiftly Occupying the Northeast and Controlling the Vast Countryside (29 August 1945)⁸⁶

Attention: Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] Bureau—to be passed on to the Shandong and Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu [Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan] Bureaus and the Hua-Zhong [Central China] Bureaus and departments:

Telegram received on the twenty-seventh

1) Wishing to maintain peace in the Far East and restricted by the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Soviet Russia must return the three northeastern provinces to the GMD government. GMD troops will enter the three northeastern provinces. If our party and troops enter these provinces, the Soviet Red Army will neither negotiate with nor help us.

2) The Sino-Soviet Treaty contains a clear stipulation: "All Chinese nationals, regardless of whether they are military or civilian, are under the authority of the Chinese government." Russia will not interfere in China's Civil War; furthermore, articles in the *Red Star* consistently express the view that China must follow the path of continual progress and democratic development. According to this way of thinking, it is sufficient that the activities of our party and troops in the northeastern provinces are in harmony with the principles of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In the future, Russia may adopt a *laissez-faire* attitude; furthermore, it may express great sympathy for our cause. Concurrently, the GMD has no base in the northeastern provinces and in Jehol [Rehe] and Chahar. Therefore, the GMD will encounter difficulties in sending troops to these areas; their route is not yet clear. The Soviet

Red Army will withdraw within three months. This will furnish us with an excellent opportunity to seize the three northeastern provinces as well as Jehol and Chahar.

3) Jin-Cha-Ji and Shandong are preparing to send cadres and troops to the northeast. They must be sent immediately. The troops can use the name "Northeast Army" or "Yi Yong Army." As long as the Soviet Red Army does not resolutely oppose us, we can illegally enter the three northeastern provinces. We must not make this public; we must not publish the news in the papers. We must not enter the big cities of the three northeastern provinces by train. By taking the back roads we can control the numerous villages and small cities where the Soviet Red Army is not quartered. There we can establish and develop our local political and military power. In the big cities that our troops are unable to enter, we must nevertheless do our best to dispatch cadres to work there. We can maintain illegal contacts with the Soviet Red Army. We can pass on intelligence to the Red Army, but we must not force them to make formal contacts with us; nor must we ask them for assistance. It will be enough if the Red Army keeps its lips sealed and does not resolutely oppose us. But we must reflect carefully on any of our activities which the Red Army does oppose. We must avoid causing the Red Army diplomatic embarrassment. The Shandong cadres and troops should use the sea route to enter the three northeastern provinces. Speed is of the essence.

4) The two provinces of Jehol and Chahar do not fall within the scope of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. We must completely control them. We must quickly send cadres and troops to work in all the critical areas and establish political power and local military strength. Furthermore, we must not look to the Red Army for help. We can push ahead immediately with all our activities, provided that the Red Army is not opposed.

5) We are not yet clear about the situation in the areas occupied by the Red Army in the northeast and in Jehol and Chahar. Everything must be handled in light of the local situation and information be reported to us as it arises. Jin-Cha-Ji and Shandong should send capable cadres carrying radios behind the Red Army lines to communicate with us.

H.10 Directive of the Northeast Bureau on Evacuating Large Cities (26 November 1945)⁸⁷

1) As a result of the development of our party and the army in the northeast, the Chiang [Kai-shek] diehards have found it impossible to enter the area and seize political power smoothly. The United States has begun a diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union causing a crisis in foreign relations. This is an international confrontation, a struggle between the United States and Chiang on the one side and the Soviet Union and the Chinese people on the other.

2) To carry out the struggle successfully, the Soviet Union must first of all take the initiative and gain a firm diplomatic foothold. Therefore, all the cadres and organizations of our party and army whose identities have been made public in the

cities must swiftly and resolutely withdraw into rural areas where no Red Army troops are stationed, so that the Soviet Union will not have the slightest trouble in complying with the Sino-Soviet Treaty.⁸⁸ This is a necessary condition for smashing the diplomatic offensive waged by the United States and Chiang and for frustrating treacherous intervention by the United States in China's domestic affairs. Only this course of action will make it possible for the Soviet Union to gain a free hand in its struggle against the United States and benefit the struggle of the people throughout the nation to oppose Civil War and American intervention in China's domestic affairs.

3) Now our party commands an army in Manchuria of old and new troops that is 200,000 strong. It has taken over most of the political power in the area and has made initial plans and formed extensive links with the masses in major cities. Some of the people have been mobilized and a group of cadres sent to every district. Although the people's congress had to adjourn before the scheduled end of the session, the administrative program put forward by our party has won unanimous support from the people of all circles. We have occupied positions that are advantageous for defeating the attacks by the Chiang diehards and for capturing the whole of Manchuria in the future. Today, when we withdraw, the situation is drastically different than it would have been if we had done so a month or six weeks ago. Take Shenyang for example. After our comrades were appointed to administrative positions, they provided relief for workers, the Japanese refugees, and the Chinese nationals who are in misery; paid wages, partially transformed the police, formed an extensive united front, and eliminated large numbers of reactionary armed forces (while making few new enemies). None of these factors were present two months ago. They will constitute favorable conditions when we resume our work in the cities.

4) At present, any organization in the military or any cadre in government, if its identity has been given away, should be withdrawn swiftly and resolutely. This also applies to all those cadres working in the armies or in big cities who have lost their foothold. However, those cadres who do not stand in the way of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and are able to keep their footholds in the cities, should remain where they are so as to establish secret leading organs and organizations and continue their work in the cities. We should make use of all kinds of connections in the administrative organs and the police forces and work in every possible way to put in place those who will accept our leadership. A core organization should be formed within the police and substantial efforts made to gain hold of the police force. Resigned magistrates and police chiefs should stay in the suburbs and use them as their base and use the cover of the plainclothes armed forces to keep in contact with the public security personnel and the police and try to win them over to our side so that they will work for us to maintain a neutral position. It is imperative at present to build up a wide united front for the purpose of isolating the GMD reactionaries and make sure not to make too many enemies and isolate ourselves. (To avoid diplomatic disputes, the political powers in the suburbs must not issue public notices.)

5) The tasks in the major cities from which our army has evacuated are: to prepare for actions from inside when it is time to recapture the cities in the not-too-distant future, or, in other words, to build up underground party organizations; to organize underground armed forces; to make use of all kinds of lawful means for propaganda, association, and struggle; to carry out extensive work in propaganda and organization among the people of all circles and lead them in legitimate struggle. The purpose of this is to rally forces, armed and unarmed, especially the forces among the workers, coolies, police, and security troops as well as small plainclothes armed forces (which should currently refrain from any armed struggle before the Red Army withdraws), so that they can coordinate with the major forces from outside the cities in the smooth occupation or recapture of the cities that we are giving up for the time being.

6) During and after the evacuation, it is imperative to provide the masses of the people with convincing explanations, making it known to them that we are withdrawing in the interests of the whole, for the sake of peace, and for the sake of the realization of democracy and self-government of the northeastern people. Our temporary retreat from the cities is aimed at securing peace and establishing a firm base area in the northeast (which is a powerful guarantee for our recapture of the major cities), so that the Red Army may, after this retreat, return to the cities without a hitch and with vital communication lines under our control. Our present task is to strive for the big cities on the condition that we respect the foreign policies and the world prestige of the Soviet Union. The arrangement of all our work is geared to this great objective of our struggle.

H.11 Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast.

Mao Zedong (28 December 1945)⁸⁹

1) Our party's present task in the northeast is to build base areas, stable military and political base areas in east, north, and west Manchuria. To build such base areas is no easy job; it requires hard and bitter struggle. Three or four years are needed to build such base areas. But a solid preliminary groundwork must be laid in the year 1946. Otherwise, we may not be able to stand our ground.

2) It should now be made clear that these base areas are not to be built in the big cities or along the main communication lines that are or will be occupied by the GMD; under present conditions this is not practicable. Nor are they to be built in regions close to big cities or main communication lines held by the GMD. The reason is that the GMD, having seized the big cities and the main communication lines, will not let us build stable base areas in regions very close to them. Our party should do adequate work and set up our first line of military defense in these regions, which must never be lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for both parties and not our stable base areas. Therefore, the regions in which to build stable bases are the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centers

of GMD occupation. Those regions should not be designated so that we can dispose our forces accordingly and lead the whole party toward this goal.

3) After we have decided on the location of our stable base areas and disposed our forces, and after our army's numerical strength has greatly increased, mass work will be the center of gravity of our party's work in the northeast. All cadres must be made to understand that the GMD will be stronger than our party in the northeast for some time and that unless our starting point is to arouse the masses to struggle, solve their problems, and rely on them in every way, and unless we mobilize all forces to work painstakingly among the masses and lay a solid preliminary foundation within a year, and particularly in the next few critical months, we shall become isolated in the northeast, be unable to build stable base areas or defeat the attacks of the GMD, and indeed may encounter immense difficulties or even fail. Conversely, if we rely firmly on the masses, we shall overcome all difficulties and reach our goal step by step. Mass work consists of arousing the masses for struggles to settle accounts with traitors and of launching campaigns for rent-reduction and wage increases and campaigns for production. In these struggles we should form various kinds of mass organizations, set up party nuclei, build armed units of the masses and organs of people's political power, speedily raise mass economic struggles to the level of political struggles, and lead the masses to take part in building the base areas. The directive on arousing mass struggles recently issued by the Jehol Provincial Party Committee⁹⁰ may be applied in the northeast. Our party must bring tangible material benefits to the people in the northeast; only then will the masses support us and oppose the GMD attacks. Otherwise, the masses will be unable to see clearly which of the two parties, the GMD or the CP, is good and which is bad, may be taken in for a time by deceitful GMD propaganda, and may even turn against our party, and thus an extremely unfavorable situation would be created for us in the northeast.

4) At present there is a subjective difficulty for our party in the northeast. Large numbers of our cadres and armed forces in the northeast are newcomers, unfamiliar with the place and the people. Cadres are dissatisfied because we cannot occupy large cities, and they are impatient with the arduous work of arousing the masses and building base areas. These circumstances are in contradiction with the present situation and the tasks of the party. Again we must teach all cadres from other areas to pay attention to investigation and study, to acquaint themselves with the place and the people, and to resolve to become one with the people of the northeast; and we must train large numbers of activists and cadres from among the masses. We should explain to the cadres that although the big cities and the communication lines are in the hands of the GMD, the situation in the northeast is nevertheless favorable to us. So long as we spread among all cadres and soldiers the idea of arousing the masses and of building our base areas and so long as we mobilize all forces and quickly undertake the great struggle to build these base areas, we will be able to establish ourselves firmly in the northeast and in Jehol and be sure of victory. We must tell the cadres that they should on no account underestimate the strength of the

GMD or become impatient with arduous work because they think the GMD is going to attack eastern and northern Manchuria anyhow. Of course, in making these explanations we should not lead the cadres to believe that the GMD is terribly strong and that its attacks cannot be smashed. It should be pointed out that the GMD has no deep organized foundation in the northeast and that its attacks can be smashed; it is therefore possible for our party to build base areas. But the GMD troops are now attacking the Jehol-Liaoning border, and if no blows are dealt them, before long they will attack eastern and northern Manchuria. All our party members must therefore resolve to undertake the most difficult tasks, swiftly arouse the masses, build our base areas, and smash the GMD attacks in west Manchuria and Jehol resolutely and in a planned way. In east and north Manchuria we should quickly prepare the conditions for smashing the GMD attacks. We must thoroughly clear away all ideas among our cadres of winning easy victories through good luck, without hard and bitter struggle, without sweat and blood.

5) Promptly delimit military areas and subareas in western, eastern, and northern Manchuria and divide our forces into field armies and regional troops. Distribute a considerable part of the regular troops among the military subareas to arouse the masses; wipe out bandits; set up organs of political power; organize guerrillas, people's militia, and self-defense forces so as to make our areas secure; coordinate with the field armies; and smash the GMD attacks. All troops must be assigned to specific areas and specific tasks; only in this way can they quickly unite with the people and build stable base areas.

6) This time over 100,000 of our troops have entered the northeast and Jehol; the army there has recently expanded by more than 200,000, and the trend is to keep on expanding. Adding party and government workers, we estimate that the total will exceed 400,000 within a year. A situation in which such a large number of personnel, divorced from production, depends solely on the people of the northeast for supplies certainly cannot last long and is very dangerous. Therefore, all army units and government organs must take part in production when not fighting or doing their regular work, except for those field armies which are concentrated and charged with major military actions. The year 1946 must not pass without results; the entire northeast must promptly make plans accordingly.

7) In the northeast the direction in which the workers and intellectuals move is vitally important to building our base areas and winning future victories. Our party should therefore give its full attention to work in the big cities and along the main communication lines and especially to winning over the workers and intellectuals. In view of the fact that in the early years of the War of Resistance our party did not pay sufficient attention to winning over the workers and intellectuals to come to the base areas, besides paying attention to underground work in the GMD areas, the party organizations in the northeast should now do everything possible to draw workers and intellectuals into our army and into the various construction tasks in the base areas.

H.12 Directive of the CC to the Northeast Bureau on the Question of Policy for Northeast Work (26 January 1946)⁹¹

Northeast Bureau, Lin Biao, and Wang Kechang

1) The GMD's New Sixth and First Armies (among others) are making their way to the northeast. America will certainly aid Chiang Kai-shek in occupying the northeast, and Russia must also help Chiang take over the northeast. We must acknowledge that Chiang has the power to invade and conquer the northeast. Although we have influence in the northeast, we still have no legal position. As a result, the Russian army cannot openly turn the northeast over to us. At present, we have a national ceasefire (here the ceasefire is enforced by Chiang; it is not a plot of Chiang's). We must implement the ceasefire in the northeast. Given the international and domestic situation, it is not possible for the northeast to single-handedly carry on the Civil War. When the GMD army attacked Jingzhou, Fuxing, and Jehol, we were unable to respond vigorously to their attacks. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek underestimates our strength in the northeast. He believes Du Yueming's report: he believes it will be unnecessary to use a great deal of force to defeat our troops in the northeast and control the northeast. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek refuses our proposal to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the northeastern problem with us. He does not want to acknowledge our position in the northeast. He continues to insist on solving the problem with force. Under these circumstances, armed conflict in the northeast will be difficult to avoid for the time being.

2) Our party's present strategy in the northeast should be one of earnestly seeking peaceful solutions and cooperation with the GMD in implementing democratic reform and peaceful development in the northeast, on the condition that the GMD recognizes our legal position there. Given the present international and domestic situation, this is the only strategy that is both appropriate and feasible. As a result, if we seek to occupy the northeast, refusal to cooperate with the GMD is inappropriate and unfeasible. We must eliminate such thoughts (of refusal) within the party. Under the current circumstances such thoughts are very risky. The current objective situation does not allow for such thoughts. If we pursue a strategy of carrying out civil war with the GMD, we will certainly fail.

3) Since Chiang Kai-shek is still unwilling to acknowledge our legitimacy in the northeast, to peacefully resolve our problems, and to peacefully implement democratic reform, we still face serious difficulties in achieving peaceful resolution and democratic cooperation. We will have to undergo serious struggles, even bloodshed, to achieve our goals. But we shall certainly succeed if only we steel our resolve to implement this strategy and are tireless in our efforts. Neither Russia nor the United States will permit the GMD and the CCP to carry on a long-term civil war in the northeast. All the Chinese people and the people of the northeast oppose civil war. Nobody, neither the CCP nor the GMD, can frustrate the people's aspirations and

carry on a protracted civil war. After the ceasefire, the assembly-reorganized government reached the following results in its negotiations: the nation must peacefully cooperate with the GMD; we must not fight among ourselves. We have strength in the northeast. We can sustain ourselves there for a long time. Chiang Kai-shek faces many difficulties in the northeast. If he encounters only one or two defeats there, his prestige will inevitably decline. Owing to these objective conditions, we should not doubt that the northeast problem can be peacefully resolved and that we can peacefully cooperate with the GMD.

4) It is nevertheless true, however, that we face serious difficulties in peacefully resolving the northeastern problem and democratically cooperating with the GMD. To achieve these goals, we must meet the following conditions:

a) We must adopt a firm, open, and clear strategy for peaceful cooperation. We must mobilize the whole party, the whole army, and all the people of the northeast to struggle for peace and democracy in the northeast. Furthermore, we must severely restrict our own activities to self-defense. We must not give the opposing side any excuses to destroy peace. We must not aggravate them. Furthermore, we must adopt any methods which would allow us to carry out peaceful negotiations with the GMD and express our sincere desire to cooperate with it.

b) We must aggressively strengthen our military capability; solidify our military bases; build up a firm, long-term infrastructure; and, under wholly self-defensive conditions, achieve one or two significant victories.

c) We must aggressively seek the Soviet Union's diplomatic cooperation with our strategy of peaceful cooperation. We hope you will diligently achieve the above. The United States, the Soviet Union, all the Chinese people, and all political parties support our adoption of a strategy of peaceful cooperation. If we are militarily strong and strike out against Chiang, we can definitely defeat Chiang's civil war strategy and attain peace and a legitimate position in the northeast.

5) In order to realize the preceding strategy, the central government has already instructed Zhou Enlai to negotiate with the GMD and Marshall and propose that we jointly send people to govern the northeast, transform our military into a local militia, allow local democratic elections and local self-government, restrict GMD troop strength in the region to 100,000, and send Sino-U.S. ceasefire monitors to Yingkou. If the GMD refuses to negotiate, it will have to shoulder responsibility for the ensuing conflict in the northeast. The central government is preparing to announce the situation in the northeast and its proposals for that region. At the same time, we hope that you will immediately carry out the following:

a) Avoid military encounters with Chiang's troops in the vicinity of Changchun and in other big cities such as Wushu, Jilin, Longjiang, Mudanjiang, etc. We should retreat from Changchun and those other big cities as an expression of our willingness to make concessions. But we must firmly control the vast areas on either side of the Changchun road and prepare an annihilatory attack in the event that Chiang launches an attack against us. We must adopt a wholly self-defensive military posture. We should evince no deliberately provocative behavior. We must defeat

Chiang's troops under self-defensive, justified conditions. We must not fight in the big cities or near railroad lines. This is militarily advantageous.

b) We must increase our efforts to mobilize the masses in the countryside so that, in the event of defeat, we can maintain ourselves for a long time in the countryside and avoid failure.

c) We must, on the one hand, maintain adequate vigilance against and, on the other, express our sincere desire to work together with the GMD personnel sent to govern the northeast. We must neither reject nor harm these personnel. We must attempt to cooperate with their lower-level officials in order to further cooperation with the higher-ups.

d) We must peacefully attack the GMD officials and soldiers, attempt to make our officials' names (i.e., Li Zhaoling et al.) publicly known, attempt to negotiate with the GMD, and organize contacts between the local gentry and the GMD.

e) We must fully explain our strategy for peaceful cooperation to our brothers and ask them to cooperate with us. We hope that you will resolutely carry out the preceding measures and transmit news of the situation to the central government.

H.13 Directive of the CC on the Current Situation and Tasks (1 February 1946)⁹²

Heads of all bureaus, party committees of all districts, and columns

1) The political consultative conference in Chongqing, after heated debates, has achieved important results. The conference decided to reform the government and passed the governmental program and the draft principles for the Constitution. It also decided to hold a national conference to adopt the Constitution, reorganize the national army, and implement principles for separating the army and the party, separate military and civilian control, a political army, a parliamentary and cabinet system, regional self-government, and popular elections of provincial governors. The decisions and their implementation indicate the beginning of the destruction of the GMD's one-party dictatorship and of the democratization of the country as a whole. This will consolidate domestic peace and legalize our party and army and the liberated areas created by our party. This is a great victory for the Chinese national revolution. China has embarked on a new stage of peaceful democratic construction. Although tortuous roads certainly lie ahead, this new stage has already arrived. Various resolutions of the political consultative conference have already been made public. It is expected that all localities, especially various big cities, will carry out wide-ranging and appropriate propaganda inside and outside the party and hold celebration meetings to send telegrams of congratulation, demanding that the government immediately implement the resolution. For our part, we should be prepared to strive with determination for the realization of these resolutions.

2) The achievement of significant agreements in Chongqing this time is the result of the decisions of the three-country conference in Moscow and intervention in

China (represented by Marshall). The existence of our strong party, four months of resolute struggle in self-defense, the resolute opposition of the entire Chinese people to the Civil War and to the one-party dictatorship and the internal difficulties of the GMD are forcing the GMD to reluctantly abandon its one-party dictatorship and begin the democratization of the country. Although all the resolutions remain to be implemented, and although even their implementation would be far from bringing about the democratization of the whole country, as long as all parties and factions are legalized and people have elementary political freedoms, the democratic movement can develop step by step and become an irresistible force, destroying the feudal dictatorship and promoting the nation's continued democratization. China's prospect for continued democratization is guaranteed by the support of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain, the cooperation of three major domestic political parties (the GMD, the CP, and the Democratic League), and the demands of three main strata (the working people, the middle class, and a section of the big bourgeoisie) and the powerful Soviet Union, the CP, and the awakened working people. It should be pointed out that the internal and external enemies are still very strong and that the current democratization and reform of Chiang Kai-shek's GMD, like its past resistance to Japan, are very passive. Therefore, the road of China's democratization is still a long and tenuous one. There are still many among the American and British big bourgeoisie and the Chinese big bourgeoisie who conspire to turn China into an anti-Soviet base. Our party and the Chinese people still face great difficulties. However, all these difficulties can, and must, be gradually overcome. The main form of struggle of the Chinese revolution has shifted from armed struggle to unarmed mass and parliamentary struggles. Domestic issues should be settled politically. The entire work of the party should be adapted to this new situation.

3) Our party will participate in the government, and other parties and groups will also come to the liberated areas for all kinds of social activities and even join the government of the liberated areas. Our army will be reorganized into the regular national army, local security forces, self-defense forces, etc. After reorganization, political commissars, and party committees and branches will be abolished in the army. The party will no longer issue direct orders to the army. The relationship between the party and the army will be the same as that between the GMD and the army. However, all party members in the army will retain their membership, and all military and political cadres will remain in and serve their original units. Political work must be strengthened. The comrades of the entire party must realize that this change is completely necessary. The army created by the party can only obtain legal status by this means, it can only be preserved by the recognition of all parties and groups at home and governments of all countries. This is done in exchange for the legalization of the party throughout the entire country and the democratization of the country and in exchange for the divorce of GMD troops from the control of the GMD and private or factional groups. Therefore, such concessions are compatible with the interests of the people of the whole country. They will in no way change

the nature of our army as the army of the people. On the contrary, they will further reform the armies of the whole country, democratize them, and turn them into a people's army. In the future, party members in our army must change their work methods so as to cope with the new situation. After being shifted from the party's direct command, organization, and leadership, they can only learn about the party's positions and the direction of the party's activities from the party's general calls and general policies and through other indirect means. Thus, they will have to rely more on their own initiative and creativity to carry out their work. They should be more united than before, more disciplined, and more eager to learn Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and to strengthen political work in order to maintain and improve their own character as the proletarian vanguard and preserve and improve the character of our army as the people's army. During eighteen years of arduous struggle, the army and most of its cadres were tempered under the direct leadership and education of the Party Center and Comrade Mao Zedong. After victory in World War II, party rectification, and the Seventh Congress, some people tried to destroy this people's army of ours, and this must be strictly guarded against. However, it is the Center's firm belief that our army will not degenerate, disintegrate, or betray the people because of the suspension of activities of the party organization within it. (It is necessary to guard against such behavior from a few individuals.) On the contrary, our comrades in the army will be tempered and become more mature because of this change. If the GMD troops can be removed from the GMD's direct leadership, we believe that our troops can also be separated from our party's direct leadership.

4) Apart from a few areas where the GMD may still attack us militarily (we should have a high vigilance against these attacks), armed struggles have generally stopped. To safeguard domestic peace, all localities should use the present opportunity to train troops for three months in a big way and be prepared for, and not afraid of, a possible breakdown of the peace. During this period, it is essential to prepare for the reorganization of the army and reduction of troops and streamlining of administration. For this, psychological preparations should be made; this should be considered carefully and orders awaited. The current reduction of troops and streamlining of administration must avoid the shortcomings of the last time. At the same time, energetic mobilization of the masses should be made in six to ten months (the current main danger is the fear of many cadres to mobilize in a bold way) to reduce land rent in the old and new liberated areas and consolidate our party's mass bases in the liberated areas. The leadership of the production movement should be exercised in a better way to speedily overcome the financial difficulties. Troop training, reduction of rent, and production are the three central tasks of the liberated areas now. Moreover, we must still be prepared to shift the focus of the work of the whole party to unarmed mass and parliamentary struggles and exert efforts to learn and organize legal struggles and to coordinate the work of the united front of the upper and lower levels. The party's work should be promoted throughout the country, and in all big cities in particular. We should participate broadly in the economic construction of the whole country and its industrialization. Only with

the mobilization and organization of the broad masses to carry out these struggles and through work throughout the country can we guarantee the democratization of China and all agreements and secure the party's continuous development and improvement of its political position in the country. The preservation of, and new positional gains and the future of, the Chinese revolution all depend on our party's skill in the organization and leadership of the broad masses. Our party can take the initiative with respect to new forms of struggle and organization by adopting swift and skillful methods. In the eight years of the War of Resistance against Japan, our party has made great achievements in these respects. As far as making use of these new forms, our party should be relatively more skilled than the GMD. We still have many shortcomings, however, and these must be quickly overcome.

5) Thus, we must point out that the most dangerous phenomenon in the party at the current time is the narrow closed-doorism of some comrades. Because of the GMD's counterrevolutionary policies and eighteen years of fierce struggle between the two parties, many people, both party and nonparty members, do not believe that the Civil War can really be stopped and that peace can be truly realized. They do not believe that Chiang Kai-shek and the GMD, which exerts coercion in all fields, can bring about democratic reform or that they can continue to cooperate with our party in national construction. They do not believe that the peaceful new democratic stage has arrived, and they take a suspicious view. They [Chiang and the GMD] will never be able to genuinely reform, and they cannot diligently study the parliamentary form of struggle and that of the unarmed masses. Thus, all local party committees must explain in detail the current new situation and tasks and fully overcome these erroneous tendencies. The nonparty people are more leftist than party members, and they must be brought around. With the development of the political forces, the CC believes that these kinds of erroneous tendencies are easy to overcome. In the subsequent period, however, with the rise of the nation's peaceful new democratic stage, after the masses have seen things clearly and when the GMD has implemented some major reforms, rightist sentiments can increase. Moreover, this might become the most dangerous tendency. At this time, we must pay attention to overcoming such rightist sentiments. Today, however, we must concentrate on overcoming those among the masses who suffer from left closed-doorism.

H.14 Directive of the CCP CC on Settling Accounts, Rent Reduction, and the Land Question. *Liu Shaoqi* (4 May 1946)⁹³

According to reports by comrades who have recently come to Yan'an from various places, mass movements have been unfolding on a broad scale in the liberated areas in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and central China. In combating Chinese collaborators, settling accounts with landlords, and reducing rent and interest, the people have seized land directly from the landlords, thus realizing the principle of "land to the tillers." Their enthusiasm is at a high pitch. Where the mass movement has been

thorough, the land problem is being or has basically been solved. In some places the movement has progressed to the point where the principle of "equal distribution of land" has been put into effect, with everybody (even the landlords) getting three *mu* of land.

On the other hand, some of the Chinese collaborators, evil gentry, despots, and landlords who have fled to the towns or cities are heaping abuse on the mass movement in the liberated areas, and some middle-of-the-roaders have reservations about it. Even within our party a few people think that the movement is going too far.

Under such circumstances, our party cannot do without its own resolute policy, and it cannot but support the masses in their direct implementation of rural reform. We must give them planned guidance in the light of the scale and extent of the development of the mass movement in the various liberated areas so that the reform can be completed as quickly as possible.

In the face of the large-scale mass movement, the party committees of all localities should not be afraid of a general change in rural relations in the liberated areas. Nor should they fear the peasants' acquisition of a considerable amount of land and the landlords' forfeiture of it, the abolition of feudal exploitation in the rural areas, the abuse and slander of landlords, or the temporary dissatisfaction or vacillation on the part of the middle-of-the-roaders. Rather, they should firmly support all the peasants' reasonable demands and just actions and endorse the transfers of land which have occurred and those which are now taking place. We should repudiate abuse by collaborators, evil gentry, and landlords, give explanations, remove the doubts in the minds of middle-of-the-roaders, and educate the comrades within the party who hold incorrect views.

The party committees of all localities should understand clearly that solution of the land problem in the liberated areas is the basic historical task confronting our party and the key link in all our present work. With maximum determination and effort, they must boldly arouse the masses and lead them in accomplishing this historic task. They should correctly guide the current mass movement in accordance with the following principles:

- 1) Our party should firmly support the demands of the masses as they realize the principle of "land to the tillers" by taking land from the landlords, as they combat collaborators, settle accounts with the landlords, reduce rent and interest, and get the landlords to return the overcharged portion of rent and interest.

- 2) We should resolutely use every means to draw the middle peasants into the movement and see that they benefit by it. It is impermissible to confiscate their land. As for those middle peasants who have been dispossessed of land, we should try to return it to them or compensate them for the loss. Throughout the movement, we should try to gain the genuine sympathy of all the middle peasants, including the well-to-do ones, and make them feel satisfied.

- 3) Generally speaking, the land of the rich peasants shall not be confiscated. If, in the course of rural reform and related struggles, the confiscation of some of their

land cannot be avoided owing to the demands of the masses, we should see to it that the rich peasants are not subjected to overly heavy blows. They should be treated differently from the landlords. With rich peasants, emphasis should be on reducing rents, and they should be allowed to keep that part of the land which they till themselves. If the rich peasants are hit too hard, the middle peasants will waver, and production in the liberated areas will be adversely affected.

4) As for the gentry and landlords whose family members include anti-Japanese soldiers and cadres, and the enlightened gentry and other people in the liberated areas or the GMD areas who cooperated with us during the anti-Japanese war and do not oppose the CP, we should treat them prudently, give them due consideration and, as a rule, adopt methods of arbitration or mediation in dealing with them. On the one hand, we should persuade them not to turn down the reasonable demands of the masses but to adopt an enlightened attitude of their own accord. On the other hand, we should educate the peasants so that they will give these people a bit more land and help them save face in consideration of their service in the War of Resistance against Japan, or of the service of their family members as anti-Japanese soldiers or cadres.

5) Proper consideration should be given to the livelihood of the middle and small landlords. They should be treated differently from the big landlords, evil gentry, and local despots. Disputes between them and the peasants should most often be solved through arbitration or mediation.

6) Attention should be concentrated on waging resolute struggles against collaborators, evil gentry, and local despots so as to isolate them completely and make them hand over their land. We should, however, leave them a certain amount of land from which to make a living. We should adopt the policy of winning over and disintegrating the ranks of those middle and poor peasants and others from poor families who were used as stooges by collaborators, evil gentry, and local despots, and we should work on them so that they will make a clean breast of their crimes and mend their ways. We should not take away their land. When they have confessed and mended their ways, they should receive the benefits due to them.

7) With the exception of those owned by the Chinese collaborators who are found guilty of heinous crimes, the shops, workshops, factories, and mines of the rich peasants and landlords should not be confiscated, but protected, so that the development of industry and commerce will not be impeded. The methods used in solving the land problem and combating the feudal landlord class in the rural areas should not be applied in dealing with the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. There is a difference in principle in our attitude toward these two classes. In some places, the mistake is made of applying the method of settling accounts with the landlords in rural areas to the owners of factories and shops. An immediate halt to this practice must be called for, or the consequences will be disastrous.

8) We should accede to the people's demands for the execution of those collaborators and public enemies who have committed heinous crimes by sentencing them to death after trial by the courts. Apart from this, however, we should generally

enforce a policy of leniency and refrain from executing people or beating them to death, and we should refrain from making too many arrests, so as not to isolate ourselves by playing into the hands of the reactionaries. To combat collaborators and settle accounts with the landlords is essential, but the number involved should not be too large, or else the masses will become panicky and the reactionaries will have a pretext for attacking us.

9) We must do our utmost to win over all intellectuals who can be united with, and we should give them the chance to study and work. As for the enlightened gentry, the nonparty personages, and the liberal bourgeoisie in the cities, so long as they are in favor of our democratic program we should continue to cooperate with each and every one of them, bar none, no matter how many shortcomings they may have or how skeptical or discontent they may be with the current rural reform. This will help to consolidate the united front against feudal dictatorship and for peace and democracy. As for the landlords and others who have run away, they should be allowed to return home, and they should be provided with the opportunity to earn a living. Even if some of them return with the intention of making trouble in the liberated areas, it will be to our advantage to let them stay and have them placed under the supervision of the masses. This would reduce the antipopular forces in the cities.

10) In places where the masses have not yet been aroused to solve the land problem, we should set about it right away and see to it that the problem is completely, or at least largely, settled by the end of this year, not dragged on into next year. In the struggle, it is imperative that we stick to the mass line, conduct the fullest possible discussions, and get the masses really mobilized so that they will pitch in and settle the land problem themselves. Any approach that contravenes the mass line—such as commandism, monopolization of affairs, and bestowing favors on the masses—is forbidden.

11) The masses have come up with various solutions to the land problem. For example:

- a) confiscating and distributing the land of major collaborators;
- b) giving priority to the tenant-peasants in the purchase of the land which landlords are willing to sell after rent-reduction;
- c) guaranteeing the tenant-peasants the right to rent land after rent-reduction with the result that the landlords give the tenant-peasants 70 to 80 percent of their land while retaining the remainder to till themselves; and
- d) allowing the landlords to sell their land to compensate the peasants in the course of settling accounts on such issues as rent and interest, seizure of property, shifting of financial burdens, and other forms of exploitation.

The peasants have obtained land by the above means, and most have also obtained ownership deeds prepared by the landlords. Thus, the land problem has, in the main, been solved by methods quite different from those adopted during the Civil War period. These methods, which have put the peasants in a legal and tenable position, can be applied in various places in the light of local situations.

12) The fruits of this movement should be distributed equitably and rationally among the poverty-stricken family members of martyrs, anti-Japanese soldiers, cad-

res and their families, and peasants with little or no land. Having obtained a share of land on a fair and rational basis and having their ownership of the land fixed, the peasants' enthusiasm for production will increase, and so they will work diligently, practice economy, and become rich and prosperous. This will help to expand production in the liberated areas. The inviolability of the property of those who have, after the solution of the land problem, prospered and become rich through hard work, thrift, and good management should be safeguarded. It is not advisable to drag out the settling of accounts and the waging of struggle, for this will only dampen the peasants' enthusiasm for production. As for idlers and sluggards, we should educate them and encourage them to engage in production so as to improve their livelihood.

13) Both during the movement and after the solution of the land problem, attention should be paid to the consolidation and expansion of the peasant associations and the militia, the expansion of the party organizations, the training and promotion of cadres, the reorganization of governments at district and township levels, and the education of the masses both for the struggle in defense of their land and the democratic governments and for the struggle for the democratization of the country.

14) Generally speaking, in outlying areas where our political power is not yet consolidated and which are thus vulnerable to enemy harassment, no action should be taken to arouse the masses to demand land. Even in our efforts there to reduce rent and interest, in order to avoid sustaining damage in the confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution, we must be prudent and must not act in the same way as we are doing in the central areas. Of course, it is quite another matter in areas where conditions permit such actions.

15) Party committees in various localities should go all out to launch and lead the mass movement in the liberated areas and solve the land problem resolutely in accordance with the principles outlined above. So long as we adhere to these principles, keep over 90 percent of the rural population on the side of our party (farm laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants, handicraft workers, and other impoverished people make up about 92 percent of the rural population, and landlords and rich peasants about 8 percent), and maintain a broad antifeudal united front, we will not make adventurist mistakes. Solving the land problem in the liberated areas with a population of over 100 million will substantially help to consolidate these areas and promote the nationwide movement toward democratization. If, however, we fail to guide the movement correctly according to those principles, if we encroach on the land of the middle peasants, or deal the rich peasants overly severe blows, and if we fail to give due consideration to those who are entitled to it, there will be a split among the people in the rural areas. As a result, we will not have more than 90 percent of the rural population on our side; the poor peasants, farm laborers, and our party will be isolated; the landlords and the reactionaries in the cities will become stronger; and the mass movement for rural reform will run up against enormous obstacles. Certainly this would be very disadvantageous to the masses. Therefore, we should convince the masses and cadres that adherence to these principles is for the good of the people.

16) It is therefore essential to hold meetings of cadres in each area to analyze experience and discuss the directives of the CC, to have these directives distributed and explained among all party cadres, to draw up plans for carrying out the directives in the light of the conditions prevailing in each area, and to assemble a large number of cadres for short-term training before sending them to newly liberated areas to carry out the directives. At the same time, it is necessary to make appropriate explanations to nonparty personages. We must ask them to support the demand of the peasants, pointing out to them that the solution to the land problem is the just demand of over 90 percent of people, it is in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles and the resolution of the political consultative conference⁹⁴ and, what is more, it considers the interests of people of all walks of life including the rich peasants and the landlords. Meanwhile, the cadres in various places, especially those at the district and township levels, should be educated to give play to their spirit of serving the people, a spirit characteristic of CP members, and to refrain from securing undue benefits by taking advantage of their leading position. Otherwise, the masses will feel incensed and turn against the cadres. In cases where such things have already occurred, we should persuade the cadres to act justly when dealing with people, so as to avoid alienating themselves from the masses.

17) In the past few years, various localities have correctly implemented the decision on land policy made by the CC in 1942⁹⁵ and have launched large-scale mass movements, rendering support to the anti-Japanese war. Now, as the movement to settle accounts and reduce rent spreads and deepens, we have to make a major change in our land policy in keeping with the demands of the people. This does not mean, however, changing everything, for we are not abandoning the policy of rent-reduction altogether.

18) With regard to the right and "left" deviations manifested within the party concerning the land question, all localities should correct them in accordance with this directive by conducting education with great warmth and sincerity. This will help us to lead the masses in the struggle to accomplish the rural reform and consolidate the liberated areas.

H.15 Strategy for the Second Year of the War.

Mao Zedong (1 September 1947)⁹⁶

[[1) In the first year of fighting—June 1946 to June 1947—we wiped out 1.12 million of the enemy. 2) In the first year, our army rightly adopted the strategy of fighting on interior lines.]]

3) In the second year of fighting, our army's basic task is to launch a nationwide counteroffensive, that is, to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the GMD areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines, and completely wreck the GMD's counterrevolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to continue to carry the war into the liberated areas,

further damage and drain our labor power and material resources, and make it impossible for us to hold out very long. In the second year's fighting, a partial task of our army is to use a portion of our main forces and large numbers of our regional troops to continue fighting on interior lines, wipe out the enemy there, and recover lost territory.

4) Our army will of course meet many difficulties in carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines and bringing the war into the GMD areas. For it takes time to build new bases in the GMD areas, and we can build stable bases only when we have wiped out large numbers of the enemy in many back-and-forth mobile operations, aroused the masses, distributed land, established our political power, and built up the people's armed forces. Until then, there will be quite a few difficulties. But they can and must be overcome, for the enemy will be forced to spread out even more, and vast territories will be available to our army as battlefields for mobile operations, and so we will be able to wage mobile warfare. The broad masses in those territories hate the GMD and support us; and though part of the enemy forces still has a comparatively high combat effectiveness, on the whole, the enemy's morale and combat effectiveness are much lower than a year ago.

5) The keys to victory in fighting in the GMD areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined and win as many battles as possible; and, second, to carry out resolutely the policy of winning over the masses and enable the broad masses to benefit so that they side with our army. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory.

[[6) Details are provided of the disposition of the enemy forces. The GMD will have difficulty reaching its target of recruiting 1 million troops because it relies on press gangs. Our policy of fighting to exterior lines will reduce their strength further.]]

7) The operational principles of our army are still the same as those laid down before:

Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first (this applies also to a large-scale campaign of annihilation directed against several brigades, such as the Laiwu campaign in February and the southwest Shandong campaign in July this year); attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.

Take medium and small cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.

Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a place our main objective. Holding or seizing a place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape through the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of their flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces.

On the one hand, be sure to fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. On the other hand, give full play to our fine style of fighting—courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time). Strive to draw the enemy into mobile warfare, but at the same time lay great stress on learning the tactics of positional attack and on stepping up the building of the artillery and engineer corps in order to capture enemy fortified points and cities on a large scale.

Resolutely attack and seize all fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Attack and seize at opportune moments all fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. For the time being, leave alone all fortified points and cities which are strongly defended.

Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the soldiers captured from the enemy (80–90 percent of the soldiers and a small number of the junior officers). Seek replenishment chiefly from the enemy and from the GMD areas and only partly from the old liberated areas; this applies especially to the armies on the southern front.

In all the new and old liberated areas, we must resolutely carry out the land reform (which is the most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning nationwide victory), develop production, practice economy, and strengthen the building of war industry—all for victory at the front. Only by doing this can we support a long war and win victory throughout the country. If we do so, we shall certainly be able to support a long war and win victory throughout the country.

8) The above sums up the year's fighting and sets forth the principles for future fighting. Leading comrades in all areas are requested to pass the contents on to all cadres of regimental rank and above, of the level of prefectural party committee and above, and of the level of prefectural commissioner's office and above, so that everyone will understand his own task and carry it out resolutely and unwaveringly.

H.16 Report to the CC Concerning Each Locality's Report to the Land Conference on Conditions and Suggestions for the Future.

Liu Shaoqi (4 August 1947)⁹⁷

The CC:

1) The reports to the Land Conference on the situation in various areas will be completed in a few days; then discussion [of these reports] will follow. Land reform in the country is relatively thorough only in [the border regions of] Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu [Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan] and north Jiangsu. [Land reform in the border regions of] Shandong, Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] and Jin-Sui [Shanxi-Suide] is not thorough. Fierce struggles need to be waged in order to solve the problem. The

situation in the northeast and the new district of Jehol is quite good. In summary, the demands of the peasants in various areas focus on four aspects: land, production capital, protection of the peasants' democratic freedom and rights, and fair distribution of burdens. Of these, land and democracy are the basic demands. Democracy is the fundamental condition for the protection and consolidation of complete victory with land reform and an urgent demand of all the peasants to our government and cadres. The reason is that the practice of our cadres in imposing on, oppressing, and keeping themselves aloof from the masses has reached a frightening level. Many of our cadres are corrupt, selfish, and evil. The masses urgently demand that such practices be changed and that those rotten cadres be removed and penalized. As for all kinds of problems arising from land reform itself, we should consult with representatives from various areas to solve them. As far as democracy is concerned, however, there are very important issues of principle to be tackled. Special guidance is thus requested.

2) From Jin-Sui to Fuping, I paid special attention to the causes for not thoroughly completing land reform. Having fought rightist tendencies on the part of the leadership in Fuping, I quickly discovered the disease of left rashness in west Shanxi. The village cadres had unlimited power. They forced the masses to attend meetings, vote, and shout slogans. They forced the masses to beat up and kill people in the struggle against landlords and the so-called GMD spies. They coerced 90 percent [of the localities to write] formalistic reports to the higher levels of leadership. I put a firm end to this movement in west Shanxi and then carefully investigated the situation within the party and among the cadres. After attending the Land Conference, talking to representatives from various areas, and listening to many reports, I discovered that the fundamental causes for incomplete land reform and backwardness in Jin-Cha-Ji and other areas are serious: an impure attitude, an incorrect work-style, bureaucratism among leaders, and the lack of concrete ideological education within the party and among the cadres. In Jin-Cha-Ji (Jin-Sui is much the same), those from landlord and rich peasant families make up a very large percentage of party and government cadres above the county level. Village cadres and party branch members are mostly middle peasants. Among them, many landlords and rich peasants occupy, directly and indirectly, positions of power. Although farmhands comprised the majority within the party at the beginning of the war against Japan, now they form, generally speaking, only a minority and play no role. They are still the most oppressed social stratum. There are not many village cadres of middle and poor peasant origin who are not influenced by landlords and rich peasants outside of the party. Most military officers come from local landlord and rich peasant families. Most veteran cadres have married daughters of landlords. They helped their fathers-in-law during land reform. The military in Jin-Cha-Ji once launched a high tide of antireform, although this has now been corrected. There are almost no landlords or rich peasants in the old base areas who do not have a relationship, either as relatives or friends, with our cadres. Many landlords lowered their class classification thanks to the help of our cadres. They often make use of

various of our organizational forms to protect themselves and oppress the masses. Cadres who come from local landlord and rich peasant families have more or less protected the landlords during land reform. Each time the masses rise up, they cry leftism; each time we oppose leftism and correct radicalism, they take the opportunity to retaliate and suppress the masses. Sometimes they are purposefully leftist and turn good things into bad in order to provoke their superiors into opposing leftism. The worst of them fawn on their superiors and do what the latter want; they use coercive means to fulfill tasks quickly or they make false reports; they exaggerate their results in newspapers to gain the trust of, and to receive rewards from, their superiors; they give themselves the title of models. However, they totally control and suppress the masses. There are, after all, some good cadres from landlord and rich peasant families—there are many such cadres who have few flaws and many strengths. But during land reform they sympathize largely with the landlords. In the past, our leading organs totally ignored this situation.

3) For many years, village cadres have not been subject to reelection. Most are totally irresponsible or unaccountable to the masses or are not subject to the supervision of the masses. In their work they rely on coercive orders. Many are selfish and corrupt elements who have embezzled most of the fruits of the revolution. Previously most cadres were poor peasants; now, most are middle and rich peasants. They have antagonized the masses and are afraid that the masses may expose them and retaliate. Therefore, they want all the more to control and terrorize the masses. Those who criticized their mistakes and exposed their dark dealings were immediately persecuted. Most of these cadres do not serve in the military; they resist war requisitions and only have light burdens. They lower their class classification and resort to military conscription, military requisition, heavier burdens, and [manipulation of] class classification to persecute their opposition and favor their supporters. They completely control elections and meetings. Village cadres are sometimes divided into two or three factions that oppose each other and take over power in turns. However, the practice of each faction is generally similar. The masses are neutral and indifferent. A few of the worst elements have become the new village bosses, and they commit every crime imaginable. Those who keep themselves the farthest away from the masses are usually the five principal leaders in the village: the party secretary, the village head, the director of the committee for the armed forces, the security chief, and director of the peasant association. Although ordinary party members and village cadres are not rotten, they often have internal squabbles. Most are under the control of the rotten cadres. There is no democracy within the party. Honest people are oppressed and are prevented from gaining power. Evil forces are in the ascendant. When we sent some work-teams to villages, many branches operated an organized and illegal blockade of information and made false reports to prevent the teams from learning the truth. When the work-teams sought information directly from the masses, very often there were elements who intimidated the masses. For a while the work-teams often had to work secretly in order to obtain the facts. When the peasant ranks were organized and they

criticized village cadres, many village cadres maligned poor peasants as hoodlums and good-for-nothings. They accused the work-teams of overriding organizational rules and used every means to divide and sabotage the poor peasant leagues. Only when poor peasant leagues were consolidated and peasant associations were established after allying with the middle peasants did these cadres feel isolated, begin to act humbly, and become divided. Some applied to join the peasant associations and poor peasant leagues; others were in a dilemma. They listened in everywhere, asked others to speak on their behalf, and became very nervous. Some work-teams had to use half of their labor power to educate branch and village cadres and could only use the other half to directly mobilize the masses in order to reduce obstructions and guide them [cadres] to take part in the movement together. However, there remained a minority of rotten cadres who took the role of spectators, scorned or maligned [the movement], or secretly obstructed or strongly resisted [the movement]. The poor peasant ranks should invite lower-middle peasants to join the peasant associations or poor peasant leagues. Upper-middle peasants must have sponsors in order to join the peasant associations; landlords and rich peasants must be rejected. Some of the village cadres were welcome to join; some had to be rejected. All new admissions had to be examined and approved by the meeting [of the peasant associations]. Most of the five principal leaders in the village were rejected; despite explanation by the work-teams, they were not allowed [to join]. Some were permitted to join the associations only after they had turned over a new leaf. Only then did those previously bad village cadres begin to relinquish their arms, confess their mistakes, and submit themselves to the poor peasants and the masses. But those who had committed embezzlement and serious crimes were still unwilling to confess. By this time, the masses had often made excessive suggestions or actions. They forced village cadres to confess their crimes at large meetings; those who did not thoroughly confess their crimes were interrogated, beaten, and incarcerated. Those who had been wronged took revenge and exaggerated the crimes. By this time, if the leaders were unable to effectively persuade the masses and establish courts of law to accept indictments, the above suggestions would be supported by the masses, and incidents of beating and jailing took place. Some cadres ran away and committed suicide in face of such mass actions. Thus, we carried out investigations in nearly thirty villages; most of them experienced the above. Only one village party branch and cadres in that village had the confidence of the masses. Land reform was completed through their smooth organization and leadership over the poor peasant leagues and peasant associations. In the remaining twenty-nine villages, most of the five principal leaders were rejected and excluded from the peasant associations. Many other party members and cadres had their application to join the peasant associations rejected. Even more were kept out of the poor peasant leagues. In some villages, the peasants first struggled against village cadres and then against landlords. Kang Sheng conducted an investigation in over thirty villages. The results were about the same. Perhaps because there is no systematic ideological mobilization among the local cadres and the dispatched cadres came

from different departments it is inevitable that weaknesses are found first and that achievements are neglected. This gives rise to the prejudice that exaggerates the problems of the village cadres. Perhaps after sufficient mobilization has been carried out within the party and various disciplines have been announced, resistance may be reduced significantly to enable the village cadres to participate in the movement together with the work-teams, and the number of party branches which independently complete the task of the land reform can be increased. But the direction of the development of the above process, generally speaking, will not be wrong. Many poor peasants, who previously had been considered backward elements, have now become village leaders or activists. From the very beginning their organization established strict discipline and pledged fair administration; they pledged to listen to the views of the masses, to be selfless, to work for the masses, and to keep secrets. When they have been successful in leading the peasant associations, in the struggle to tell of suffering and to fight the landlords, in fairly distributing the fruits of the revolution, in eradicating feudalism, in thoroughly solving the land problem and, particularly, in struggling against the village cadres, the atmosphere in the villages will be fresher, the masses will be more lively, and the work-style will be changed. But poor peasants lack experience in administration; they will meet difficulties without the help of veteran village cadres. Other weaknesses have yet to be noticed. With correct leadership and education in the future, they will change the practice of the whole party.

4) When the peasants rose up to depose village cadres, especially when there were excessive leftist actions among the masses—such as calling large meetings to struggle against some village cadres, beating, maligning, or imprisoning them, and incidents such as suicide and flight—they had an enormous impact. The local poor peasants and masses who had been discontent with their village cadres felt elated and sent for the work-teams. They informed on their village cadres to the work-teams. On the other hand, the cadres were agitated; some had reasonable views, asking only that they not be struggled against at large meetings and that the seriousness of the justice and injustices [they had committed] and their responsibilities be clarified. Some cadres held views that were fundamentally opposed: they emphasized the merits of the village cadres and the responsibilities of their superiors. They asked whether we wanted to retain the cadres and threatened that if things continued in this way, nobody would dare to become a cadre, and nobody would take responsibility for tasks such as collecting grain for the state, conscription, and military requisitions. It would be like taking off the load and then killing the donkey. [The cadres] experienced sorrow and fear, stopped or neglected their work, and manufactured many rumors which [they] reported to their superiors. This affected village cadres and even cadres in district, county, area, and regional party committees and party schools. People there talked about nothing but this; they listened only to the views of one side and were influenced by them. Some cadres were preparing to link up for defense and to gradually form organized illegal resistance when the work-teams arrived. Moreover, dozens of cadres in the training courses burned incense on

the tombs of those who had committed suicide; they staged demonstrations and shouted slogans. When supported by their superiors, the village cadres suddenly had more guts and refused to submit themselves to the masses, and they even dared to put up all kinds of illegal resistance. Now they do not know the view of the entire organization [of the party]. But when [this movement] is fully launched in the future, grave incidents will surely take place if there is no correct leadership and careful preparation. Landlords and counterrevolutionaries may join [the movement] and factional fighting [might occur]. Such serious mistakes as the Futian Incident, the purge of the A.B. League, and the purge of the Reorganizationists might be repeated. This is quite likely when the military situation is tense.

5) I have been considering how to solve this problem for the past two months. The only effective method discovered is as follows: through the poor peasant leagues and peasant associations, mobilize the masses, fully establish democracy to thoroughly complete land reform, reform the party organizations and cadres and the government and civilian [organizations], and create conditions for a democratic work-style. However, this method entails an intense process of struggle. If it is implemented across the country, it will inevitably lead to the masses' abandoning hundreds of thousands of party members and a large number of cadres, or to their undergoing criticism, struggle, and trial. Some incidents will inevitably occur. Therefore, this is a critical issue of principle that requires a great deal of responsibility. However, land reform must be thoroughly completed and the democratic freedom of the peasantry must be protected. The work-style must change, and cadres who have divorced themselves from the masses must be removed; criminals must be punished appropriately. Therefore, I make the following specific suggestions:

a) The entire party should establish the policy of completing land reform and reforming the party, government and civilian organizations, and cadres through organizing poor peasants into peasant associations and through encouraging democracy. All party organizations and cadres must be completely loyal to, and implement correctly, this policy. Tasks must be fulfilled properly. If some party organizations and cadres are unable to implement this policy effectively, superior organizations should send work-teams to implement this policy directly. People who resist and undermine implementation of this policy should be penalized according to the actual situation. This can include dismantling their organizations and expelling them from the party. In areas where land reform has been completed, efforts should be made to reform their organizations and cadres.

b) Set up meetings of peasant representatives at all levels (in cities, meetings of representatives of urban residents) and when conditions are appropriate, establish the national peasant association [*quanguo nongmin zonghui*] in order to temporarily replace the defunct unions of the various sectors at all levels and act as the supreme agency at those levels. Establish the rights, which are not defined explicitly, to dismiss and elect governments at all levels. Plans for collecting grain for the government, budgets, conscription, and requisition can be implemented only after being approved by the peasant representatives' meetings. Resolutions of peasant associa-

tions should also be enforced by the governments. The masses are to be linked directly through the peasant representatives' meetings to break down bureaucratism and establish the position of the farmhand and poor peasants in the leading organs at all levels. Youth and women's organizations should also join the peasant associations. When the time is ripe, we should establish the "three-thirds" system of government at all levels.

c) It should be mandated that on the first day of each Chinese New Year (or another date) all village cadres should be relieved of their positions. Peasant meetings or their representatives should be delegated to review the work of the cadres and conduct a reelection. Ten days after the reelection of village cadres is complete, district representatives' meetings should be convened to reelection district cadres and, after another ten days, to reelection county cadres; the reelection of provincial and regional cadres is to be determined separately.

d) The CC or local party committees should issue declarations to the people in the liberated areas and call on the people to take their destiny into their own hands. Establish the rights of the freedom of speech and assembly. [They] supervise, evaluate, elect, and depose their servants—the cadres at all levels. Oppose the cadres' practice of illegally violating the people's rights and oppressing the people. Cadres must make appropriate self-criticism of their previous mistakes of remaining aloof from the masses. If this declaration is issued by the CC, we may draft it, have it reviewed by the Land Conference, and report to the CC.

e) The CC or local party committees should issue declarations to party members in the liberated areas to call on them to accept the criticisms and evaluations of the masses, respect the people's rights, obey the decisions of the masses, and work for the people as their servants. Those who are wrong must admit their mistakes; party members from landlord and rich peasant families must persuade their families to accept the demands of the peasantry and not to resist the masses in order to avoid struggle. Then let the masses decide on some favorable provisions. Moreover, party members should be called on to observe discipline strictly.

f) Party membership in the base areas is secret; in some areas the masses demand that the identities of party members be made public and that peasant associations and poor peasant leagues introduce party members. I think that this demand can be accepted. There is no harm in it. Party organizations in secured areas can be made public. Those who the masses oppose and see as unfit to be party members should be denied admission and downgraded to candidacy after the party has conducted a review and found that such a demand is justified.

g) Party members from landlord and rich peasant families, except those with special permission, must avoid working in their own counties or districts in order to circumvent the problem of being besieged by their relatives and friends. Party discipline should be strictly enforced. Declare: anybody who protects landlords, sabotages land reform, violates the people's rights, makes false reports to deceive superiors, obstructs superior personnel from gathering information, threatens and retaliates against the masses, purposefully destroys and severs the ties between the

party and the masses, conceals his own class background and personal history, refuses to return illegally appropriated fruits of the struggle, wages a double-dealing struggle against the party, carries out small-group activities, or conceals and protects the illegal acts of other party members must be punished, even including expulsion from the party.

h) If the above suggestions are approved by the CC, they will be immediately submitted to the Land Conference for discussion, and then the document will be reported to the CC for approval. Afterward, leading organs in all areas should reach a consensus and then call meetings, based on the unit of the district party committee, of cadres above the level of the county. Party members and cadres from landlord and rich peasant families should be brought together for a lecture, to advise them how to conduct themselves during land reform. Then district and township cadres' meetings should be convened and poor peasants should be brought together for training. Thus, implement the above plans. At these meetings, call on cadres at all levels, especially senior cadres, to return the fruits of the revolution, confess mistakes, and make the guilty ones confess their crimes.

i) To prevent the masses from randomly beating and killing people during the movement, we should send reliable cadres to set up people's courts in various areas to accept the masses' indictments and conduct investigations and interrogations. The guilty ones should be punished accordingly. When the masses struggle against the cadres, strictly protect the proper rights of the few. The cadres have the right of denial, of debate, to state different views, and to attend and walk out of meetings. Prohibit beating, all torture, and forced confessions during meetings. The masses have only the right to criticize, depose, elect, and indict cadres during meetings. If the cadres have committed crimes, they must be turned over to the courts to be dealt with after investigation and interrogation. Only the courts have the power of arrest and imprisonment. Thus, protect the cadres and a few people from infringement of their rights by some excessive acts on the part of the masses, and expose, prove, and penalize their criminal acts.

j) As for the cadres removed by the masses, cadres who have committed crimes, and cadres from landlord and rich peasant families, if they obey the masses and the party, we should consistently adopt the policy of treating the sickness to save the patient, persuading, educating, and reforming them, instead of destroying them. Order them to undergo training and assign them jobs. However, some bad elements must be purged. Those who have made mistakes must be punished accordingly. If this is not done, it will lead to unprincipled severity. The causes and responsibilities for the merits and mistakes of cadres must be suitably criticized among the masses in order to avoid emphasizing only one aspect. Carry out the policy of uniting with new cadres promoted during the movement and with the veteran cadres.

6) The above plan has already been discussed with the Presidium. If it is discussed by the conference, there may be many revisions; it will be converted into the form of resolutions. I seek the approval in principle of the CC. In addition, there is one problem that cannot be solved. In old areas some branches are huge, with over

100 party members. However, poor peasants and farmhands make up only a small portion of the total membership. For example, even if we admit 20 percent of the poor peasants into the party, they will still be in the minority. Thus, it is difficult for poor peasants and farmhands to gain superiority and leadership within the party. If the poor peasants and farmhands do not occupy the leading position, however, it is very difficult for the branch to lead the poor peasant leagues and peasant associations. How should this problem be solved? Please advise.

H.17 Outline of China's Land Law (10 October 1947)⁹⁸

Resolution:

China's rural system is unjust in the extreme. Speaking of general conditions, landlords and rich peasants, who make up less than 10 percent of the rural population, hold approximately 70 to 80 percent of the land, cruelly exploiting the peasantry. Farmhands, poor peasants, middle peasants, and other people, however, who make up over 90 percent of the rural population, hold a total of approximately only 20 to 30 percent of the land, toiling throughout the whole year, knowing neither warmth nor a full stomach. These grave conditions are the root of our country's being the victim of aggression, oppression, poverty, backwardness, and the basic obstacles to our country's democratization, industrialization, independence, unity, strength, and prosperity.

In order to change these conditions, it is necessary, on the basis of the demands of the peasantry, to wipe out the rural system of feudal and semifeudal exploitation, and to realize the system of "land to the tillers." For twenty years, and especially in the last two years, under the leadership of the CCP Chinese peasants have obtained enormous achievements and rich experiences in carrying out land reform. In September of this year, the CCP convened a nationwide rural conference,⁹⁹ and at the conference it presented detailed research into conditions of the Chinese rural system and experience of the land reform and enacted the basic program on Chinese rural law to serve as a proposal to the democratic governments of all areas, peasants' meetings, peasants' congresses, and their committees. The CCP CC is in complete accord with the basic program on rural law and is furthermore publishing it. It is hoped that the democratic governments of all areas, peasants' meetings, peasants' congresses, and their committees will discuss and adopt this proposal, and furthermore will work out concrete methods appropriate to local conditions to unfold and thoroughly carry through a nationwide land reform movement, completing the basic task of the Chinese revolution.

CCP CC

10 October 1947

Basic Program

1) The rural system of feudal and semifeudal exploitation is abolished. The rural system of "land to the tillers" is to be realized.

2) Landownership rights of all landlords are abolished.

3) Landownership rights of all ancestral shrines, temples, monasteries, schools, institutions, and organizations are abolished.

4) All debts incurred in the countryside prior to the reform of the rural system are canceled.

5) The legal executive organs for the reform of the rural system shall be the village peasants' meetings, and the committees elected by them; the assemblies of the poor peasant leagues and organized and landless and land-poor peasants of villages, and the committees elected by it; district, county, provincial and other levels of peasant congresses, and committees elected by them.

6) Except as provided in article 9, section b, all land of landlords in the villages, and all public land, shall be taken over by the village peasant association, and together with all other village land, in accordance with the total population of the village, irrespective of male or female, young or old, shall be unifiedly and equally distributed; with regard to the quantity of land, surplus shall be taken to relieve dearth, and with regard to the quality of land, fertile shall be taken to supplement infertile, so that all the village people shall obtain land equally; and it shall be the individual property of each person.

7) The unit for the distribution of land shall be the *xiang*, or the administrative village equivalent to *xiang*. But district or county peasant associations may make certain necessary adjustments between various *xiang* or equivalent administrative villages. In areas where the district is extensive and the population sparse, and for the purpose of convenient cultivation, comparatively small units below the level of the *xiang* may be taken as units for the distribution of the land.

8) Village peasant associations shall take over the landlords' animals, agricultural implements, houses, grain, and other properties of rich peasants; and these shall be distributed to peasants lacking in these properties and to other poor people, and furthermore an equal portion shall be distributed to the landlords. The property distributed to each person shall be their personal property, thus enabling all the village people to obtain proper materials for production and for life.

9) Methods for dealing with certain special lands and properties, provided as follows:

a) Woods and hills, irrigation and waterworks, marshland, orchards, pools, wasteland, and other distributable land shall be divided in accordance with the ordinary standards for land.

b) Great forests, great hydraulic engineering works, large mines, large pasture land, large wastelands, and lakes shall be administered by the government.

c) Famous sites and historic spots shall be securely protected. Special libraries, antiques, works of art, etc., which are of historic or academic value and which have been taken over shall be inventoried and turned over to the senior government of the area.

d) Ammunition, arms, and those large quantities of money, valuables, and

grain left over after satisfying the needs of the peasants shall be inventoried and turned over to the senior government of the area for settlement.

10) Methods for dealing with certain special questions in the distribution of the land provided are as follows:

a) Poor peasants with only one or two persons in the family may be given land equivalent to that of two or three people by the village peasant meetings, in consideration of prevailing conditions.

b) Rural laborers, individual professionals, and their families, in general, shall be given land equivalent to that of peasants; but if their profession is sufficient for constant maintenance of all or most of their living expenses, they shall not be given land, or shall be given a partial portion of land, as determined by the village peasant meetings and their committees in consideration of prevailing conditions.

c) For all personnel of the PLA, democratic governments, and all people's organizations whose home is in the countryside, they and their families shall be given land and properties equivalent to that of peasants.

d) Landlords and their families shall be given land and properties equivalent to that of peasants.

e) For GMD army officers and soldiers, GMD government officials and personnel, GMD party members, and other enemy personnel whose homes are in rural areas, their families shall be given land and properties equivalent to that of the peasants.

f) For all traitors, collaborators, and Civil War criminals, they themselves shall not be given land or properties. If their families live in the countryside, have not taken part in criminal activities, and are willing to cultivate the land themselves, they shall be given land and properties equivalent to that of the peasants.

11) The government shall issue deeds to the ownership of the land, and they shall be given to the people, and moreover it shall recognize their right to free management, buying and selling, and under specially determined conditions to rent out the land. All land deeds and all notes on debts from before the reform of the rural system shall be turned in and shall be null and void.

12) The property and legal operations of industrial and commercial elements shall be protected from encroachment.

13) For the sake of making the land reform thorough and complete, people's courts shall be established to try and punish those who resist or violate the provisions of this law. The people's courts shall be organized from personnel elected by the peasant meeting or peasant congress and from personnel appointed by the government.

14) During the period of the reform of the rural system, for the sake of maintaining the order of the rural reform and protecting the wealth of the people, the village peasant meeting or its committee shall appoint personnel by definite procedure to take necessary steps for carrying out the responsibilities of taking over, recording, liquidating, and holding all transferred lands and properties; to guard against damage, waste, corruption, and destruction. The peasant association shall forbid anyone

from, for the sake of interrupting equitable distribution, deliberately butchering animals; felling trees; destroying agricultural implements, irrigation and water-works, buildings and construction works, or crops or other materials; and the acts of theft, seizing, secretly giving away to others, concealing, burying, dispersing, or selling their goods. Violations shall be tried and punished by the people's courts.

15) For the sake of guaranteeing that all measures of land reform shall be in accord with the will and interests of the overwhelming majority of the people, the government shall take the responsibility for securing proper democratic rights for the people; securing full rights for the peasants and their representatives at all meetings to freely criticize and impeach all cadres of all kinds and levels; and full rights at all appropriate meetings to freely remove and change and to elect all cadres of the government and peasant organizations. Anyone who infringes on the above democratic rights and powers of the people shall be punished by the people's courts.

16) In places where the land has already been equally distributed before the promulgation of this law, and provided that the peasants do not demand redistribution, the land need not be redistributed.

H.18 Several Problems in Land Reform.

Ren Bishi (12 January 1948)¹⁰⁰

[[I want to talk about several issues that have arisen during land reform.]]

I) What Are the Criteria for Classifying Classes in the Countryside?

To provide local government with some references on how to designate classes in the countryside, the CC recently reissued two documents from 1933: "How to Differentiate Classes in the Rural Areas" and "Decision on Some Problems in the Land Struggle."¹⁰¹ Although they are documents from 1933, they are generally applicable today. They have very specific clauses regarding landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farmhands. The CC reissued these documents because some local governments committed errors in the determination of classes; they did not grasp the correct criteria for classes and wrongly classified many people's class status, confusing the line of demarcation between us and the enemy. Chairman Mao told us to lay down a clear line of demarcation to delineate us from the enemy, to isolate and divide them while avoiding isolating ourselves. If many people are given a wrong class classification, this will create chaos within our own camp; this will be very dangerous. Now let me cite one report on Jin-Sui [Hebei-Suide] to explain the gravity of such a danger. Last month, the Jin-Sui [party] bureau reported on the correction of the mistakes in class classification in the administrative village of Caijiaya, Xing County: it said that the entire administrative village of Caijiaya (the natural village of Quechaershang is excluded) has altogether 512 families. Of these, 124 families were designated as landlords and rich peasants, 22.46 percent of the

total. According to conventional estimates, under the old regime, landlord families accounted for about 3 percent of the total number of families in the countryside, with rich peasant families making up about 5 percent. Altogether landlord and rich peasant families accounted for about 8 percent of the total families and 10 percent of the population. Within the old liberated areas, many landlords and rich peasants have been transformed into other classes. The number of landlord and rich peasant families in Caijiaya should be under 8 percent, but the number of landlord and rich peasant families in Caijiaya is almost three times that much. Later, the branch bureau followed the principles laid down in the two 1933 documents “How to Differentiate the Classes” and “Decision on Some Problems in the Land Struggle.” As a result of the review of class designation by the committee of peasant representatives, of the 124 families, eleven bankrupt and declining landlord families and twenty productive rich peasant families—altogether thirty-one families—could be reclassified as wealthy middle peasants or middle peasants. Thus, the number of landlord and rich peasant families could be reduced to ninety-three, 16.84 percent of the total. Later, when the time limit was pushed back from 1937 to 1940, landlord and rich peasant families in the whole of Caijiaya (including 579 families in Quechaershang) were reduced to seventy-one, 12.26 percent of the total. If those landlords who had worked for five years and those rich peasants who had stopped exploiting for three years had been considered peasants, the number of landlord and rich peasant families would have been even smaller.

Caijiaya in Xing County is a place that has a relatively high concentration of landlords and rich peasants. Most of the villages in that county do not have as many landlords and rich peasants as Caijiaya. However, the experience of Caijiaya has offered us an important lesson. It is that we must classify classes according to practical conditions. In land reform, we must never classify as landlords and rich peasants those who have never been so; we must never expand the scope of our target wrongly and confuse the revolutionary camp, thus helping the enemy and isolating ourselves. This is an enormously important issue that must receive the attention of all party comrades.

How did the comrades engaged in land reform in Caijiaya, Xing County, wrongly classify classes? Reportedly, the following reasons were given for the lowering of the class [status] of thirty-one families:

a) Those who had grandfathers and fathers who had exploited others but who were engaged in little exploitation before 1936, or the year before the establishment of the anti-Japanese democratic government, or those who had stopped exploiting—fifteen such families were wrongly classified.

b) Those who had enjoyed the life of landlords and rich peasants in their early years. After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war (in their later years), they worked themselves, or did not exploit others, or did not exploit much—five such families were wrongly classified.

c) Those who had worked very hard and had engaged in little exploitation, but who had a large amount of assets—seven such families were wrongly classified.

d) Those who had been very poor in their early years, been adopted by or sold to landlords and rich peasants as their sons, worked for a living, engaged in little or no exploitation of others—three such families were wrongly classified.

e) Those who were orphans, widows, or otherwise without labor and had to hire labor for some time, or those whose father was a peasant and who grew up to become a peasant as well—one family was wrongly classified because it lost its labor power through an accident and had to hire help.

f) In addition, in the process of some class classification, the up or downgrading of the class status of those who were difficult cases in terms of economic exploitation depended on their political attitude.

In general, in Caijiaya, Jin-Sui, and many other places, exploitation, history, life-style, political attitude, and many such categories were previously used as criteria for class classification. Apart from exploitation, it is wrong to use the other categories as criteria for class classification. Thus, in one administrative village like Caijiaya alone, over fifty families were wrongly categorized. We treated nearly 300 people as part of the enemy camp. This did not isolate the enemy; it isolated us. What a serious error to have sent people from our own ranks to the enemy's side.

What attitude did peasants express about a wrong class classification being given to so many people? The comrades of the branch bureau said: When it was discussed in the committee of peasant representatives, many members approved of the methods of class classifications in "How to Differentiate the Classes" of 1933; but they were afraid to rectify [their mistakes]. Some said: Poor peasants and hired hands felt a long time ago that we had made too many class enemies, but they were afraid to speak out, fearing that they would be considered to be protecting landlords and rich peasants. Most committee members said that some so-called productive rich peasants were middle peasants to begin with; with much difficulty they were classified as rich peasants. The fact that they were not eligible to join up [with us] was not to our benefit. Some also said: if those productive rich peasants who engaged in less exploitation were classified as middle peasants, it would encourage middle peasants to produce without fear, and this would benefit production. Thus, it can be seen that peasants are dissatisfied with the fact that a large number of people have been classified as landlords and rich peasants. They think this makes too many enemies, weakens our own strength, and obstructs the development of production. This is a very correct view.

We must point out here that the problem I have raised concerning the incorrect class classifications in Caijiaya, Xing County, is only one example. We can certainly say that there are similar—and many—cases of Caijiaya-style wrong class classifications in other villages in Jin-Sui; in north, east, and central China; in the northeast, and in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region in the northwest. All leading comrades in the liberated areas and all comrades engaged in land reform work must seriously examine the question of class classifications and publicly and clearly correct the mistakes they themselves have made. Even if they wrongly classified only one person, they must correct the mistake.

If it is wrong to classify classes according to the criteria used in Caijiaya, then what are the correct criteria for class classification? We must understand this first. There is only one criterion for class classification. This is to classify different classes according to the relationships individuals have vis-à-vis productive capital. Different relationships between the exploiters and the exploited originate from the possession of productive capital, the amount possessed, the content of the possessed, and the use of the capital. This is the sole criterion for class classification. What is productive capital? In industry, productive capital consists of factories, machines, raw materials, and other assets. In agriculture, productive capital consists of land, draft animals, farm tools, and residential houses. The different relationships between the exploiters and the exploited originate from whether one possesses and how much productive capital one possesses—such as land, draft animals, farm tools, and residential houses—and from what one possesses and how one uses it (self-cultivation, hiring labor, or leasing)—these are the sole criteria for class classification in the countryside.

On the basis of the above criteria, it is very easy to distinguish different classes in the countryside. In general, the major classes in the countryside may be classified as follows:

a) Those who own a large amount of land, who do not work, but rely exclusively on exploitation through the rent paid by the peasantry, or make high-interest loans and rent out some land. On the one hand, they themselves work, quite close to the peasantry; on the other hand, they engage in feudal and semifeudal exploitation, quite close to landlords.

b) Those who own land, draft animals, and farm tools but who themselves work, do not engage in exploitation of other peasants, or engage in only a little exploitation are middle peasants.

c) Those who own a small amount of land and farm tools but who themselves work and sell some of their labor are poor peasants.

The major classes in the countryside should, generally speaking, be so divided. However, should everybody who rents out land or hires farmhands be classified without exception as a landlord and rich peasant? There are exceptions. For example, those who are single, widowed, handicapped, sick, or have lost their ability to work may rent out small pieces of land belonging to them. Further examples are doctors, primary school teachers, and workers who have a small amount of land in their families but cannot farm it themselves because they are engaged in other professions. Furthermore, those who, although they are renting out land or hiring help to farm it, can barely make a living should not be classified as landlords or rich peasants either. In addition, there are some complicated cases that need to be specified in detail. What is discussed here is the most typical situation.

The question of how to distinguish between rich and middle peasants requires a very cautious solution. Generally speaking, middle peasants do not exploit others; and those who engage in negligible or accidental exploitation should still be viewed as middle peasants. On this issue, the CC recently decided to adopt a policy that is

more lenient than that of 1933. Those who engage in small-scale exploitation (such as hiring help to herd cattle or sheep, hiring labor on an *ad hoc* or monthly basis, or even hiring long-term help, renting out small pieces of land and making loans of small amounts) are still classified as middle or wealthy middle peasants, provided that income from such exploitation does not exceed 25 percent (one-quarter) of their total income. Only those whose income from exploitation exceeds 25 percent [of their total income] for three years running should be classified as rich peasants.

Those landlords and rich peasants who had become bankrupt and became middle or poor peasants during the year preceding the establishment of democratic government in the new areas should also be recognized as middle or poor peasants. The decision to change their class classification after one year is made because they were forced to become poor under the squeeze of GMD rule. However, those who have climbed to the status of landlord or rich peasant from that of peasant, or who have become rich after long years of hard work, may be classified as a landlord or rich peasant only after three years.

Landlords and rich peasants in the old liberated areas who have become poor because of reasonable burdens, reduction of rent and interest, the struggle to clean up old accounts under the democratic regime, or for other reasons, should have their class classification changed to that of peasant (middle or poor peasant or hired labor, according to actual situations), provided that for five years running the landlords themselves engage in agriculture labor and stop exploiting others. Rich peasants who have stopped exploiting others for three years running should also be allowed to change their class classification to that of peasant. However, landlords and rich peasants who have retained much feudal property should surrender their surplus property for distribution to poor peasants. Peasant associations and peasant leagues will conduct the screening and decide on a case-by-case basis whether, after changing their class classification, landlords and rich peasants are allowed to join peasant associations or peasant leagues.

In the class analysis of 1933, it was said that "elements among the soldiers in the Red Army from landlord and rich peasant families all have the right to receive redistributed land, under the condition that they fight for the interests of workers and peasants, regardless of whether they or their families are commanders or fighters. Recently, however, in some places attention was paid only to social background, but not to political behavior; and the land given to Red Army soldiers from landlord and rich peasant families who had fought resolutely for the interests of workers and peasants was reconfiscated. This is wrong."¹⁰² This was the solution in 1933 for Red Army commanders and soldiers from landlord and rich peasant families. Today, a small number of landlord and rich peasants who have been permitted to join the PLA should also have their class [status] changed and enjoy the benefits of ordinary revolutionary soldiers if they have broken away from their families, received revolutionary education, experienced the test of combat, fought resolutely and bravely during combat, did not cover for landlords and rich peasants or sabotage land reform. Because they have participated in bloody struggles, their time

limit should be shorter than [for those] in the civilian sector. In the army, two years after landlords, rich peasants, and other exploiters who meet the above criteria join up; and one year after intellectuals from landlord, rich peasant, and other exploitative families join up, they may change their class [status] into that of revolutionary soldier. The land and property distributed to these individuals and their families must not be less than that given to ordinary peasants (nor should they exceed the peasants' share). Those who die in combat, suffer crippling wounds, or are discharged should be treated as revolutionary martyrs, honorable soldiers, and veterans. But those who demonstrate vacillation in battle or commit other crimes and those who express opposition to and sabotage land reform should be resolutely purged even if they have been in the army for a very long time.

Is there any danger in allowing landlords to change their class classification after five years of labor and rich peasants to do the same after three years of no exploitation? I see no danger in this. Because their land and property (as far as rich peasants are concerned, we should appropriate their surplus property, rather than confiscate all of it) have already been distributed, in addition to so many years of labor, such [measures] can reform people. Before their class classifications are changed, landlords and rich peasants in the liberated areas, except for a few during the period of intensifying land reform, should generally have their rights of military service suspended. Such duties as joining the stretcher-carrier teams and participating in other activities in support of the front should still be assigned to them.

II) We Should Firmly Unite with All Middle Peasants

It is a very cruel struggle to eliminate feudal classes. We must rely on poor peasants and hired labor as our chief supporters, satisfy their demands, and firmly unite all middle peasants in order to succeed in this cause. The Bolsheviks' Eighth Congress especially emphasized the importance of uniting with middle peasants, pointing out that middle peasants must be given "careful consideration" and that "it violates all the principles of communism" to confuse rich with middle peasants. This issue is elevated to such a level of importance because violating the interest of middle peasants will certainly make them vacillate and even allow them to be used by landlords and rich peasants, thus isolating poor peasants and hired labor. If this occurs, the revolution will fail.

Middle peasants account for 20 percent of the population under the old regime. In the old liberated areas, on average they account for roughly 50 percent of the population. After land has been thoroughly redistributed, most of the people in the countryside become middle peasants; only a small minority do not. In the past, when [we] were fighting the Japanese, middle peasants contributed much energy. They made contributions to fighting the Japanese. Now, when [we] are fighting Chiang Kai-shek, [we] also rely on them to contribute most of the labor power and food. Today, between 30 and 40 percent of the soldiers in our PLA are middle peasants. If we harm the interests of middle peasants, or even put them in the

position of an opposition, this will lead to our defeat in this war. During the economic construction of New Democracy, and in the course of transformation from a private to a collective economy, [we] mainly rely on new and veteran middle peasants. They possess rich production experience, which is worth studying by poor peasants and hired labor. Their production tools are also more complete; [they] can also give help to poor peasants and hired hands. In the future, middle peasants can also advance to socialism together with us. Therefore, middle peasants are our permanent allies.

We are aware, however, that in many places where the land reform movement has been launched, and in all the liberated areas, the leftist tendency of violating the interests of middle peasants and excluding middle peasants has occurred. This tendency manifests itself in the following problems.

The first problem is the wrong class classification of some middle peasants. For example, in the administrative village of Caijiaya mentioned above, over fifty middle and rich peasant families (even some poor peasants) were wrongly classified as so-called productive rich peasants or bankrupt landlords. In many places, those whose classes were wrongly designated had their property confiscated, and some were even beaten up.

The second problem is the exclusion of middle peasants from various activities. Middle peasants doubt whether they are still wanted. Except for the old liberated areas where land redistribution has been completed, it is necessary to unite poor peasants and hired labor and organize poor peasant leagues as the backbone to lead the land reform movement. But some areas have gone to the point of letting poor peasants and hired labor monopolize everything. This is wrong. For example, among the elected peasant congress representatives and committee members, there are only poor peasants and hired labor, but no middle peasants. Middle peasants are excluded from many decisions on crucial issues, such as meetings concerning class classification, distribution of the fruits [of struggle], and burden-sharing. This makes middle peasants feel that their fate is completely controlled by the poor peasants and hired labor, and thus they become extremely disturbed.

Moreover, middle peasants are not given much consideration when it comes to distributing burdens: particularly when those for middle peasants are increased. In some places it was discovered that only small groups of poor peasants and hired labor were involved in discussing and determining the amount of government-levied food. Since after the land reform landlords and rich peasants are unable to assume the burdens, the share of the government-levied food that should have been paid by landlords and rich peasants is completely transferred to be the responsibility of middle peasants. Even the task of transporting such foodstuffs is assigned to middle peasants. Such a practice is bound to create opposition from middle peasants.

In addition, when the fruits [of struggle] are being distributed, [some places] give middle peasants absolutely nothing. Thus, middle peasants are made to feel that they are required to participate in struggles, at the cost of missing many days of work, but that they have no share in the distributed fruits [of struggle]. Middle

peasants are even excluded from attending the meetings where such distribution is discussed.

The above tendency of impinging on the interests of middle peasants, giving them no consideration, and excluding them is very dangerous. This is an anti-Marxist-Leninist and extreme left adventurist tendency. This should receive the attention of the entire party. [We] must resolutely correct this wrong tendency; otherwise, we will isolate ourselves and lead the revolution to defeat.

Some breaches exist between poor peasants, hired laborers, and middle peasants; but it is possible to resolve them. Middle peasants generally suffer from exploitation and oppression in the old society. On such fundamental issues as opposing imperialism, overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek, destroying the feudal system, and demanding democratic politics, they possess all the conditions for struggling together with poor peasants and hired labor under the leadership of the CP. The breaches between them lay mainly in the fact that poor peasants and hired laborers are dissatisfied with the less-than-resolute positions taken by middle peasants during struggles against landlord and rich peasants, and with their occasional vacillation. This kind of weakness on the part of middle peasants does exist. But as long as we implement the leadership principle in Chairman Mao's instructions to resolutely lead middle peasants to struggle against the feudal classes and win victories while at the same time not harming their interests and providing them with political education, we can lead middle peasants to struggle together with us. Second, when land is being equally distributed, wealthy middle peasants may not be willing to distribute some of their land. The equal distribution of land is the best and most thorough way of destroying the feudal system. In distributing land, most middle peasants will neither lose or gain any land; only a small number of wealthy middle peasants may have to give away some land (none of their liquid assets may be touched), while lower-middle peasants may be given some land. However, when land is being equally distributed, [we] must talk with middle peasants and obtain their permission. If [we] distribute some parts of the land belonging to wealthy middle peasants, and if they show opposition, we should make concessions to them and not touch their land. When the fruits [of struggle] are being divided up, we should explain to poor peasants and hired labor: Leave a portion to be given to middle peasants for the sake of unity. In general, we must pay attention to uniting with all middle peasants on all kinds of issues; we must understand that uniting 90 percent of the rural population is the fundamental condition for destroying feudalism and winning victory in the war. No matter what, we should limit our target to the group of genuine feudal exploiting classes, and never go beyond this. In places formerly ruled by the GMD and now reached by the PLA, such targets should be even fewer. In such places, we first strike at big landlords, evil gentry, despots, landlords' armed forces, the *baojia* system, and spies. In line with victory in the war and consolidation of the base areas, and in line with the levels of consciousness and degree of organization of the masses, we shall gradually progress toward destroying the entire feudal system.

In order to unite all middle peasants, we must first ensure that the interests of

middle peasants not be violated and that their class not be wrongly classified. Those whose class has been wrongly classified must have it reclassified. We should explain to them that the mistakes were made in the past because we had not mastered class analysis. Things confiscated from them should, whenever possible, be returned. Things that have already been distributed or used should be compensated for out of some of the assets confiscated from landlords. If middle peasants have surplus grain that poor peasants and hired labor urgently need, we may borrow it from them. Of course, it is certainly good if middle peasants voluntarily donate some food to help relieve famine.

Second, we must get middle peasants to participate in our activities. Representatives from the middle peasants should be present among those at the peasant congress and on peasant committees. This will enable middle peasants to truly enjoy their political rights. In places where poor peasants and hired labor make up the majority, middle peasants may account for up to one-third of the peasant representatives and members of peasant committees, while poor peasants and hired labor may make up two-thirds. In the old liberated areas where middle peasants form the majority (most of them are new middle peasants elevated from poor peasant and hired labor status), the ratio of middle peasant [representation] should be increased, perhaps with poor peasants and hired labor making up one-third and middle peasants two-thirds. Middle peasants should participate in the organs of government at all levels. All decisions, such as class classification, distribution of burdens, and division of land and property, should be discussed first by poor peasant leagues (or groups of poor peasants) but may be implemented only after they are passed by peasant meetings that include all the peasants. Moreover, the views of middle peasants should be well respected during these meetings. Their sound suggestions should be adopted. If they have incorrect views, we should provide patient persuasion or offer appropriate criticism. However, criticism and even necessary struggle under some special circumstances can still be used to realize the fundamental principle of uniting with all middle peasants.

Third, distribution of burdens should be fair and reasonable. For example, the burden of providing government-levied food, supporting the front, [supplying] other kinds of labor power, and mobilizing material resources must never be completely added to the responsibilities of middle peasants simply because landlords and rich peasants are unable to bear them. This is what middle peasants are most afraid of; this is the wrong practice. It is necessary to give appropriate consideration to poor peasants and hired labor in terms of burden-sharing; but [the difference] should not be too much vis-à-vis middle peasants. Moreover, the distribution of all the burdens should finally be discussed and passed by peasant meetings that include all peasants.

As long as classes are not wrongly classified and the interests of middle peasants are not violated, as long as middle peasants are allowed to participate in our work and the share of their burden is fair, as long as middle peasants are often given careful consideration and education, then we will certainly be able to unite very well with all middle peasants. This is in compliance with the principles of commu-

nism. Leading organs should constantly pay attention to this and check on it frequently. If we discover a tendency to violate the interests of middle peasants and to exclude them, we must resolutely correct it. Such a correction must be public, so that everybody will know; it should be publicized in newspapers.

III) Methods of Struggle Against Landlords and Rich Peasants

It is no easy task to destroy landlords as a class in economic terms. It is a fierce battle. After it has been overthrown politically, the landlord class does everything possible to preserve its strength economically; it attempts to restore itself at every moment. Landlords and rich peasants do everything imaginable to try to infiltrate the government and the party; they marry off their daughters to cadres and buy off their running dogs, rotten cadres, and corrupt party members. If we want to organize poor peasant leagues to implement land reform, they will also organize some false poor peasant leagues and peasant associations to conduct false confiscation and distribution. They also convene rallies to “struggle against landlords and rich peasants.” They use these methods to attain the goal of preserving their land and property. Therefore, implementing land reform requires meticulous and artistic leadership. In order to destroy feudal classes, we must genuinely mobilize the masses. We must never resort to simplistic and hasty methods to carry this out. It will not be easy to accomplish the land reform movement in all the old liberated areas and semi-old liberated areas in the two regions of Jin-Sui and Shaan-Gan-Ning before this year’s spring season. It will be good enough if we can do the land reform work thoroughly throughout the entire region over the next two to three years, in addition to reforming the party and the government and establishing the new democratic work-style.

The chief [method] for destroying the landlord class and the feudal system is to confiscate the landlords’ assets such as land, grain, draft animals and farm tools, as well as to appropriate rich peasants’ surplus property to distribute to peasants. The most basic method is to redistribute land. Do not spend too much time on hidden assets. Do not pile up the confiscated liquid assets of landlords for a long time without redistributing them. This will impede the redistribution of land—the key link [in all this]. This is done in some places now. In areas where transportation, industry, and commerce are more developed, landlords find it more advantageous to invest cash in industry and commerce than burying it underground. Therefore, in the 1930s, when we were conducting the land revolution in Jiangxi, we did not look on the hidden assets of landlords as very important. In areas where transportation is inconvenient and the economy is more backward, there may be more hidden assets. If suitable methods are employed—without killing anybody—to uncover hidden assets, this will do a lot to help solve peasant difficulties in obtaining draft animals, farm tools and seeds. But do not plunge into trying to get at the hidden assets at the cost of delaying the redistribution of liquid assets and land, thus hampering the productive efforts of the masses. We may take some time to uncover the hidden

assets. At the same time, we should not rely on uncovering hidden assets alone to solve peasants' difficulties. The government should make loans to help peasants solve problems after land reform. Destroying the system of feudal exploitation means liberating rural productive forces from their fetters, so that the rural economy may have an opportunity for rapid development. Therefore, after land has been equally distributed, we should call on the peasants to work hard, improve farming techniques, develop the cooperative movement, seek improvements in their standard of living, make it possible for the democratic government and the PLA to have sufficient food supplies so as to help defeat the reactionaries, and strive for ever-increasing quantities of food and raw materials for sale as commodities so that the urban people and industries may have enough agricultural products.

At the moment, in many places the methods of struggle against landlords and rich peasants are inappropriate. Rich peasants are struggled against using the same methods as those used for landlords; sometimes a few people even get beaten to death. The method of expulsion from their own homes is used without exception toward landlords and rich peasants. It is necessary to take away the prestige of landlords, but we should not necessarily use the same method against every landlord and rich peasant. First of all, there should be a difference between the struggle against rich peasants and that against landlords. The Outline Land Law [Doc. H.17] specifies the abolition of the landowning rights of the landlord class and confiscation of landlords' livestock, farm tools, real estate, and other assets. As for rich peasants, except for equally distributing their land, only the surplus portions of the above assets are appropriated, instead of complete confiscation. To struggle against rich peasants in the same way as against landlords not only confuses the above difference but also, more importantly, may cause panic and vacillation among middle peasants. Because middle peasants are a class that stands between rich peasants and poor peasants, they always want to move up to the position of rich peasants when there are no other better means of advancement. If we strike excessively at rich peasants, this may cause fear among middle peasants. Therefore, we must distinguish landlords from rich peasants.

In the future, we can employ only the method of appropriating rich peasants' surplus assets; we must not confiscate all their assets or houses, let alone use the method of expulsion to deal with ordinary rich peasants. Getting at the hidden assets of rich peasants should also be done in a different way from that used for landlords because rich peasants themselves take part in labor; part of their savings is the fruit of their own labor.

The methods for struggle against landlords should also be distinguished in terms of big, medium, and small landlords, despots and nondespots. The struggle against big landlords and despots should be more severe so as to warn other landlords and make them understand that land reform is an unstoppable trend; [this will make them] surrender their land and assets without resistance. We may also use the method of negotiation to make them turn over land and assets. Those who have surrendered their land and assets should not be dragged along to rallies to be

struggled against. We will spare them as long as they submit themselves, lower their heads, and obey the government and its land laws.

We adopt a policy of extermination against the system of exploitation of the landlord class; but we do not adopt a policy of extermination against landlords as individuals. Except for a small minority of traitors, Civil War criminals who may be found guilty by courts of law, all landlords should be given the same amount of land allotted to peasants according to the Outline Land Law in order to force them to work and reform themselves. Because landlords will become a considerable productive force after they participate in labor, they should not be abandoned. Further, if we do not allot to them the necessary land and assets, they will rob, steal, and beg, and this will cause social disorder and make peasants suffer. Even for criminals, as long as the severity of their crimes does not warrant a death sentence by a court of law, we must also give them a necessary allotment of land and assets so that social order remains stable. The revolution led by our CP is superior to all the revolutions in history because only we can adopt the fairest and most reasonable policies, develop the productive forces of society to their maximum, enable everybody to have clothes to wear, food to eat, houses to inhabit, and things to do, and ensure that all individuals get satisfaction out of life. In doing so, first we make sure that the working people will be satisfied and then offer a way out to landlords. If landlords retain enough industrial and commercial assets to maintain their livelihood, naturally we may not give them any land. If their industrial and commercial assets are too small to maintain them, we must give them some land.

There should be a difference between dealing with new rich peasants and old rich peasants. Some poor peasants have moved up to the status of new rich peasants through their own labor under the democratic government. They should be accorded the same treatment as wealthy middle peasants during this period of equal land distribution. When their land is redistributed, we should get their permission and then take away the surplus part according to the level of the ordinary middle peasant. If they do not permit this, we should not take away their land. Since the new rich peasant type of production is developed with the assistance of the democratic government, striking at such rich peasants now will sow doubt among middle peasants. The existence of these rich peasants is not harmful to us. Moreover, they will develop further in a given future period. In the past, we encouraged these rich peasants, people such as Wu Man, to develop their production. This has played an enormous role in stabilizing middle peasants and stimulating their productive initiative. Our policies for the future should also follow this line.

IV) Policies Toward Industry and Commerce

[[We must not adopt a policy of adventurism toward industry and commerce. Instances of damaging industry and commerce have already taken place in various areas. For example, when Gaojiabao in Shenmu District of north Shaanxi was taken by our army, even small peddlers had their assets confiscated. This is a suicidal

policy. Only the property of bureaucratic capitalists and big despots and counterrevolutionaries should be turned over to the state or the people. Even these should be allowed to continue business. Private businesses must exist because the cooperatives have not developed widely and are poorly run.

V) The Issue of Intellectuals and Enlightened Gentry

Many intellectuals are from landlord and rich peasant families. We must avoid adopting any adventurist policies toward students, teachers, professors, and ordinary intellectuals. In general, they are from landlord and rich peasant families, but the professions they themselves pursue are a kind of mental labor. Toward these mental laborers, the democratic government should adopt a policy of protection and, moreover, do this best to get them to serve the people's republic.

Most students are disaffected with Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary dictatorial rule and yearn for democracy.

VI) The Issue of Beating and Killing

The CP resolutely opposes indiscriminate beating or killing, as well as the use of torture against criminals. While we oppose indiscriminate killing, this does not mean that no one may be killed. Genuine counterrevolutionaries and big despots can be sentenced to death by people's courts. The sentences must be approved by the relevant government organs. Secret executions are forbidden, and the crimes of those executed must be publicized. Killing too many people will lose us sympathy. While we should sympathize with the masses' outrage, we should not organize beatings.]]

H.19 The Experience of Land Reform in the Pingshan Old Liberated Area. *Liu Shaoqi* (27 February 1948)¹⁰³

Examples were set in party rectification integrated with mobilization of the masses during the period of land reform in the Pingshan liberated area of the Jin-Cha-Ji [Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei] Border Region. I shall summarize the experiences gained there for study and reference in other areas.

Pingshan County comprises semi-old liberated areas—those liberated for two and a half years—and old liberated areas—those liberated for over ten years. In the old liberated areas, reduction of rent and interest was carried out during the War of Resistance. Whether in old or in semi-old liberated areas, however, land reform and “reexamination” have been universally enforced, a new rich middle peasant economy has gained supremacy, and the number of poor hired peasants has been relatively reduced.

In the old liberated areas, peasants with little or no land generally constituted no more than 30 or 40 percent; those without good land or land in the vicinity of their homes, only 20 percent. In the semi-old liberated areas, peasants with little or no land made up only 40 percent. Almost all the landlords and rich peasants with more and better land were families of party members, cadres and nonparty people under the "three-thirds" system. Although the old rich peasants had more land than those landlords subjected to struggle, actually they had less than the new rich peasants and even the new rich middle peasants. Many landlords and ruffians also infiltrated the party and turned the party's rural branches into small sectarian groups, doing evil deeds and suppressing the masses. This caused discontent among the broad masses. Hence this latest land reform was not only a social but also an internal party problem. Before we could deal with it properly and find a justifiable and concrete solution, the problem had given rise to the following unfavorable tendencies:

First, the masses rose to struggle against the bad party members and cadres. In many districts party members and cadres were arrested and beaten, causing panic among other members and cadres. Second, the landlords and rich peasants who had been struggled against intrigued to take revenge and incite the masses to struggle confusedly against party members and cadres. Third, the work-teams insisted, rather mechanically, on hitting the landlords first and solving the cadre question afterward. They arbitrarily separated land reform from the democratic movement of party rectification; they restrained the masses from carrying out struggles against party members and cadres, or removed large groups of party members and cadres whom the masses opposed to other places like "stones." Consequently, the work-teams created a situation whereby they were isolated from the masses. Fourth, the work-teams abused their power by compelling the masses to carry out struggles against the landlords who had already been struggled against in an attempt to whip up a "high tide" and create a so-called great dynamic. Consequently the teams made the mistake of leaning toward the "left."

Pingshan's land reform integrated with the democratic movement of party rectification created the precious experience of mobilizing the masses to divide land equitably in the old liberated area, and the principal form of integrating and reform with party rectification. From the beginning, the rectification campaign was made an open, public undertaking carried out with the help of the broad masses. In this way party meetings were merged with mass meetings. Next, people's congresses were set up from the village to the county and vested with full power. In the beginning, the party branches examined the class status and work-style of cadres and discussed the elimination of sectarian groups behind closed doors. After seven or eight meetings, however, they obtained no results. Then they opened their doors and invited first the nonparty poor peasants and then the nonparty middle peasants to their meetings, resulting in an attendance of twenty to thirty party members but seventy to eighty nonparty peasants. This changed the mysterious atmosphere of the rural party branch meetings and finally broke the barriers erected by bad elements to

prevent the party from establishing ties with the masses. In this way, every party member's class thinking, work-style, and conduct could be examined before the masses as witnesses. The masses could express their critical views concerning party members, and their views were accepted by the party branches without delay. The party members praised or criticized were either rewarded or punished. Under this circumstance, bad elements could only repent and turn over a new leaf, and all the small sectarian groups immediately disintegrated. Such meetings sometimes continued for twenty-four hours; the masses seemed unwilling to bring them to an end. It could be seen how enthusiastic they were in attending the meetings. The masses believed that if only the party would no longer shield its members and cadres and accept the views, censure, and education of the masses, they would unhesitatingly stand on the side of the party. They said, "This way we come into contact with Chairman Mao, and the party will be truly Chairman Mao's party."

Hence it is not simply a technical but a serious political problem for the rural party branches to accept openly the masses' views and to reform and educate party members. It was the mystery of the rural party branches in the past that made it possible for the bad elements to isolate the party from the masses. Today we have opened the doors of the party to the public in the old liberated areas. This is where the key lies in improving the party's relations with the masses.

The democratic movement of party rectification has created the following benefits:

First, party branches hold general meetings where those attending can reason and examine facts. Nonparty peasants invited to the meetings have every right to speak, give evidence, and express their views. Hence, the peasants who come with grievances to vent through vilification and revenge find that their attitude is unconsciously changed to one of "curing the sickness to save the patient," making criticism, and expressing opinions. Since the party promptly criticizes and deals with bad party members and cadres opposed by the masses, and rewards and promotes those who are praised by them, the meetings not only provide opportunities for the nonparty masses to give vent to their pent-up feelings but also for them to obtain redress for their grievances. In this mutually beneficial way, the party leadership can, on the one hand, come into close contact with the masses and thus mobilize them for action and, on the other, look after the interests of its members and cadres. It is of great educational significance to party members, cadres, and the masses that at the meetings the masses are allowed to make criticisms and fully express their opinion fully toward party members and cadres.

Second, such general meetings of party branches in which the broad masses can participate and have the full right to criticize carry the weight of mass meetings. It is impossible for anybody to cover up or deny his mistakes and cheat the masses. Reinforced by strong leadership, the meetings are able to analyze problems with a full understanding of the general situation, give opportunities to the criticized cadres to reason and state that for certain mistakes they have committed their superiors should bear the responsibility, and the superiors can verify their statements so that the responsibilities can be clearly divided. In this way every problem can be realisti-

cally solved, avoiding the masses' criticism of party members and cadres based only on simple and partial observation.

Third, to get the party members and cadres of landlord and rich peasant families to surrender their land and property, persuasion by the party integrated with the masses' democratic strength is more suitable than subjecting them to struggles at mass meetings.

H.20 Directive of the CCP CC Concerning the Work of Land Reform and Party Consolidation in 1948. *Mao Zedong* (24 May 1948)¹⁰⁴

I

It is necessary to pay attention to the seasons. In areas designated by the CC bureaus or subbureaus, the whole of next autumn and winter, that is, the seven months from this September to next March, must be devoted to carrying out the following tasks in the proper order:

- 1) Make an investigation of rural conditions.
- 2) Carry out the initial work for party consolidation in accordance with correct policy. A working corps or work-team sent by a higher organ to a rural district must first of all unite with all the activists and better members in the local party branch and together with them lead the work of land reform.
- 3) Organize or reorganize or strengthen the poor peasant leagues and the peasant associations and launch the land reform struggle.
- 4) Identify class status according to correct criteria.
- 5) Distribute feudal land and property in accordance with correct policy. The final result of the distribution must be such that it is considered fair and reasonable by all the main strata and that the landlords also feel that there is a way for them to make a living and that this is assured.
- 6) Form people's representative conferences and elect government councils at the township (or village), district, and county levels.
- 7) Issue land certificates fixing the ownership of land.
- 8) Adjust or revise the rates of the agricultural tax (i.e., public grain). These rates must conform to the principle of giving consideration to both public and private interests; in other words, they must help support the war, on the one hand, and get the peasants interested in restoring and developing production, on the other, which will help improve their livelihood.
- 9) Complete the work of the organizational consolidation of the party branches in accordance with correct policy.
- 10) Shift our work from land reform to rallying all the rural working people and to organizing the labor power of the landlords and rich peasants in a general strug-

gle to restore and develop agricultural production. Start organizing small-scale work-exchange groups and other cooperative units according to the principles of voluntary participation and exchange of equal values; prepare seed, fertilizer, and fuel; work out production plans; issue rural credits (chiefly loans for means of production, to be definitely repaid and to be strictly distinguished from relief grants) when necessary and possible; draw up plans, where possible, for building water conservancy works.

This is the whole process of work from land reform to production, a process which all comrades directly engaged in land reform must be brought to understand so that they can avoid one-sidedness in their work and, without missing the seasons, accomplish all the above tasks in the coming autumn and winter.

II

To achieve these aims, it is necessary to get the following work done in the next three months—from June through August:

1) Designate the areas for land reform. Each such area must meet the following three conditions:

a) All the enemy armed forces must have been wiped out and conditions must have become stable; it must not be an unstable guerrilla zone.

b) The overwhelming majority of the basic masses (the farm laborers, poor and middle peasants), not just a minority, must already be demanding the distribution of land.

c) Party cadres must be adequate both in numbers and in quality to grasp the work of reform and must not leave it to the spontaneous activity of the masses.

An area where any one of these three conditions is lacking should not be designated for land reform in 1948. For example, since they do not meet the first condition, we should not include in this year's plan for land reform those parts of the liberated areas in north and east China, the northeast and the northwest, which border on enemy territory, or most of the area enclosed by the Yangtze, Huai, Yellow, and Han Rivers, which is under the jurisdiction of the Central Plains Bureau of the CC. Whether they are to be included in next year's plan will depend on circumstances. In these areas we should make full use of the experience acquired during the period of the War of Resistance against Japan and put into effect the social policy of reducing rent and interest and of properly adjusting supplies of seed and food grains, as well as the financial policy of reasonable distribution of burdens, so as to unite with or neutralize all social forces that can be united with or can be neutralized, help the PLA to wipe out all the GMD armed forces, and strike blows at the local tyrants who are politically the most reactionary. Neither land nor movable property should be distributed in these areas, because they are newly liberated and border on enemy territory, and distribution there would not be of advantage to uniting with or neutralizing all social forces that can be united with or neutralized for the accomplishment of the basic task of wiping out the GMD reactionary forces.

2) Make cadres' conferences a success. At cadres' conferences concerned with the work of land reform and party consolidation, all the correct policies relating to these two tasks must be fully explained, and a clear line must be drawn between what is and what is not permitted. All cadres working on land reform and party consolidation are required to study seriously and understand fully the important documents issued by the CC; cadres must be enjoined to adhere to them all and must not make any unauthorized change. In cases where parts of the documents do not suit local conditions, cadres may and should propose amendments, but they must secure the approval of the CC before actually making any change. The higher leading organs of the various areas must make adequate and proper preparations beforehand for the cadres' conferences, which are to be held at different levels this year. That is to say, before a conference is convened, there should be discussions among a few persons (with one of them taking the main responsibility), in the course of which questions are raised and analyzed and an outline is written; this outline must be carefully worked out in content and wording (be sure to make it clear and concise and avoid long-windedness). Then a report should be made at the conference; discussion should be unfolded; the outline should be supplemented, revised, and finalized in the light of the views expressed in the discussion; and the final document should be circulated throughout the party and published, as far as possible, in the newspapers. It is necessary to oppose holding meetings in an empiricist way, that is, with no advance preparations, no problems raised or analyzed, and no report carefully prepared and well-weighed in content, but with the participants allowed to indulge in pointless, random talk so that the sessions drag on without reaching any clear, well-considered conclusion. Pay attention to eliminating this harmful empiricist way if it is found in the leadership work of any CC bureau or subbureau, or in any area, provincial, or prefectural party committee. Conferences to discuss policy should not be attended by too many people and can be shortened if there is enough preparation. Generally it is proper for a dozen or so people, or twenty to thirty or forty to fifty—the number varying according to circumstances—to meet for about a week. Meetings for transmitting policy may have a larger attendance, but must not last too long either. The only conferences which may have a larger attendance and may last longer are those for party consolidation among senior and middle-ranking cadres.

3) By the first half or, at the latest, the second half of September, all cadres who are to take a direct part in land reform must arrive in the villages and start work. Otherwise, it will be impossible to utilize the whole of the coming autumn and winter to complete land reform, party consolidation, and the formation of organs of political power and to prepare for spring plowing.

III

At cadres' conferences as well as in their work, cadres must be taught how to analyze concrete situations and how, proceeding from the concrete situations in

different areas with different historical conditions, to decide on their tasks and methods of work in a given place and time. Distinctions must be drawn between the cities and the rural areas and among the old liberated areas, semi-old liberated areas, areas bordering on enemy territory, and new liberated areas; otherwise, mistakes will be made.

IV

The land problem should be considered solved, and the question of land reform should not be raised again in areas where the feudal system has been fundamentally abolished, where the poor peasants and farm laborers have all acquired roughly the average amount of land, and where there is still a difference (which is permissible) between their holdings and those of the middle peasants, but where the difference is not great. In these areas the central tasks are to restore and develop production, to complete the party consolidation and the formation of organs of political power, and to support the front. If, in certain villages in these areas, some land is still to be distributed or readjusted, the class status of some individuals still needs to be revised, and some land certificates still have to be issued, these tasks should of course be completed in accordance with the actual circumstances.

V

In all the liberated areas, whether or not land reform has been completed, we must direct the peasants to cultivate the wheat fields and to plow part of the land this autumn. In the winter, the peasants should be called on to collect fertilizer. All this is vitally important to agricultural production, and the 1949 harvests in the liberated areas and must be accomplished through administrative measures coordinated with mass work.

VI

It is necessary to resolutely overcome certain manifestations of lax discipline or anarchy existing in many places. There are people who, without authorization, modify the policies and tactics adopted by the CC or other higher party committees and apply extremely harmful policies and tactics, which go against the united will and discipline but which they, opinionated, believe to be correct. There are also people who, on the pretext of the pressure of work, adopt the wrong attitude of neither asking for instructions before an action is taken nor submitting a report afterward and who regard the area they administer as an independent realm. All this is extremely harmful to the interests of the revolution. Party committees at every level must discuss this matter again and again and work earnestly to overcome such lax discipline and anarchy so that all the powers that can and must be centralized will be concentrated in the hands of the CC organs.

VII

The CC, its bureaus (or subbureaus), the area (or provincial) party committees, and the prefectural, county, and district party committees down to the level of party branches must establish close contact with each other in order to have a good grasp of trends in the various movements, constantly exchange information, and experience and promptly correct mistakes and spread successes. For these purposes, they should make full use of such means of communication as the radio, telegraph, telephone, mail, and couriers; of such methods of consultation as small meetings (of four or five persons), joint local conferences (of a few counties), and personal talks; of such inspection tours as may be made by small groups (of three to five persons) or by individual committee members with prestige; and of the news agency and newspapers. There should be no waiting for several months, half a year, or even longer before a lower organization submits its summary report to the one above, or before a higher organization issues general directives to those below. For such reports and directives often become out of date, losing all or part of their usefulness. And mistakes are made and cannot be corrected in time, causing serious damage. What the whole party urgently needs is reports and directives that are timely, vivid, and concrete.

VIII

In exercising their leadership, the CC bureaus and subbureaus and the area, provincial, prefectural, and municipal party committees must give proper attention to both urban and rural work, to the tasks of both industrial and agricultural production. That is to say, they should not, on account of directing land reform and agricultural production, neglect to give leadership to urban work and industrial production or slacken their efforts in this regard. Since we now have many big, medium, and small cities and a vast network of industries, mines, and communications, we shall make mistakes if any of the leading organizations concerned becomes negligent or slackens its efforts in this respect.

H.21 Circular of the CCP CC on the September Meeting. *Mao Zedong* (10 October 1948)¹⁰⁵

1) In September 1948, the CC convened a Politburo meeting, attended by seven members of the Politburo, fourteen members and alternate members of the CC, and ten important functionaries, including principal leading comrades in the party and army in north China, east China, the Central Plains, and northwest China. This meeting convened by the CC had the largest attendance of any since the Japanese surrender. The meeting examined the work of the past period and set the tasks for the period ahead.

2) Since the party's Seventh National Congress in April 1945, the CC and the leading cadres of the whole party have displayed even greater unity than during the War of Resistance against Japan. This unity has enabled our party to cope with many important events at home and abroad in the three years since the Japanese surrender; and in the course of these events our party has pushed the Chinese revolution a big step forward, shattered the political influence of U.S. imperialism among the broad masses of the Chinese people, combatted the new betrayal by the GMD, repulsed its military attacks, and enabled the PLA to shift from the defensive to the offensive.

In the last two years of fighting, from July 1946 to June 1948, the PLA has wiped out 2.64 million enemy troops, including 1.63 million captured. The main war booty of the two years amounts to nearly 900,000 rifles, over 64,000 heavy and light machine guns, 8,000 pieces of light artillery, 5,000 pieces of infantry artillery, and 1,100 heavy mountain and field guns. In these two years the PLA has grown from 1.2 to 2.8 million strong. Our regular troops have increased from 118 brigades to 176, that is, from 610,000 to 1.49 million strong. The liberated areas now cover 2.35 million square kilometers, or 24.5 percent of China's total area of 9.597 million square kilometers; their population is 168 million, or 35.3 percent of China's total of 475 million; and they have 586 big, medium, and small cities, from county towns up, or 29 percent of China's total of 2,009 such cities.

Because our party has firmly led the peasants in carrying out reform of the land system, the land problem has been thoroughly solved in areas containing about 100 million people, and the land of the landlord class and of the old-type rich peasants has been more or less equally distributed among the rural population and, first of all, among the poor peasants and farm laborers.

Our party membership has increased from 1.21 million in May 1945 to 3 million at present. (In 1927, before the GMD betrayal of the revolution, it was 50,000; after the GMD betrayal of that year, it dropped to about 10,000; in 1934, as a result of the successful development of the rural revolution, it rose to 300,000; in 1937, owing to the defeat of the revolution in the south,¹⁰⁶ it dropped again to about 40,000; in 1945, because of the successful development of the War of Resistance against Japan, it rose to 1.21 million; and now, because of the successful development of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek war and the rural revolution, it has reached 3 million.) On the one hand, the party has in the past year basically overcome, and is continuing to overcome, some unhealthy phenomena which existed to a certain degree in its ranks; these were impurities in class composition (landlord and rich peasant elements), impurities in ideology (landlord and rich peasant ideology), and impurities in work-style (bureaucracy and commandism). On the other hand, the party has in the past year overcome, and is continuing to overcome, some "left" mistakes which accompanied the large-scale mobilization of the peasant masses in the struggles to solve the land problem; these were the partial but fairly numerous encroachments on the interests of the middle peasants, the damage done to some private industrial and commercial enterprises, and the overstepping in some places of certain lines of

demarcation in the policy for suppressing counterrevolutionaries. Through the great, fierce revolutionary struggles of the past three years, and especially of the past year, and the conscientious correction of our own mistakes, the whole party has made a big step forward in political maturity.

The party's work in the GMD areas has been crowned with tremendous success. This can be seen from the fact that in the big cities we have won over to the side of our party the broad masses of workers, students, teachers, professors, cultural workers, ordinary residents, and national capitalists as well as all the democratic parties and people's organizations, and have thus resisted GMD oppression and completely isolated the GMD. In several large areas in the south (Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi, the Hunan-Guangdong-Jiangxi, the Guangdong-Guangxi, and the Guangxi-Yunnan areas, south Yunnan, the Anhui-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Border Region, and east and south Zhejiang), bases for guerrilla warfare have been established, and their guerrilla forces have grown to over 30,000.

During the past two years and especially last year, we have carried out an orderly, well-led democratic movement in the PLA, with all fighters and commanders taking part. In this movement we have unfolded self-criticism, have overcome and are continuing to overcome bureaucracy in the army, and have restored the party committee system at various levels of the army and the soldiers' committee system in the companies, both of which produced good results from 1927 to 1932 but were later abolished. All this has greatly heightened the political enthusiasm and consciousness of commanders and fighters, strengthened their combat effectiveness and discipline, and helped us to absorb some 800,000 captured GMD soldiers and change them into liberated fighters who have turned their guns against the GMD. During the past two years, in the liberated areas, we have mobilized some 1.6 million of the peasants who obtained land to join the PLA.

We already have quite a number of railways, mines, and industries, and our party is learning on a large scale how to manage industry and carry on trade. In the past two years our war industries have grown considerably. But they are not yet adequate to meet the needs of the war. We lack some important raw materials and machines and, generally speaking, still cannot make steel.

In areas in north China with a population of 44 million we have set up a unified people's government in which our party cooperates with nonparty democrats. In order to facilitate support for the front, we have decided to entrust this government with the task of unifying the work of leading and administering the economy, finance, trade, banking, communications, and war industries in three regions—north China, east China (with a population of 43 million), and the northwest (with a population of 7 million)—and we are prepared in the near future to extend the unification of this work to two additional regions, the northeast and the Central Plains.

3) In the light of our successes in the past two years' fighting and of the general situation between the enemy and ourselves, the meeting convened by the CC considered it fully possible to build a PLA of 5 million in a period of about five years

(beginning in July 1946), to wipe out a total of some 500 brigades (divisions) of the enemy's regular forces (an average of about 100 brigades a year), to wipe out a total of some 7.5 million soldiers of their regular and irregular forces and of the special arms (an average of about 1.5 million troops a year), and to overthrow the reactionary rule of the GMD completely.

The military strength of the GMD was 4.3 million soldiers in July 1946. In the past two years, 3.09 million of its soldiers have either been wiped out or have deserted, and 2.44 million have been recruited. Its present strength is 3.65 million. It is estimated that in the coming three years the GMD may still be able to recruit 3 million soldiers and that some 4.5 million will probably be wiped out or desert. Thus, as a result of five years' fighting, the remaining military strength of the GMD will probably be only some 2 million. Our army now has 2.8 million soldiers. In the coming three years we plan to admit into our forces 1.7 million captured soldiers (estimated at 60 percent of the total we shall capture) and to mobilize 2 million peasant to join the army. Allowing for depletion, our army, as a result of five years' fighting, will probably approach 5 million troops. If five years' fighting brings these results, then it may be said that we have overthrown the reactionary rule of the GMD completely.

To fulfill this task, each year we must wipe out about 100 brigades (divisions) of the enemy's regular forces, making a total of about 500 brigades (divisions) in five years. This is the key to the solution of all problems. In view of the fact that we wiped out ninety-seven brigades (divisions) of the enemy's regular forces in the first year and ninety-four brigades (divisions) in the second year, our targets can be fulfilled and even overfulfilled. Of the GMD's existing military strength totaling 3.65 million troops, 70 percent is at the fronts (north of the line of the Yangtze River and the Bashan Mountains, east of the line of Lanzhou and the Helan Mountains, and south of the Chengde-Changchun line); only about 30 percent are in the rear (including those south of the line of the Yangtze River and the Bashan Mountains and those west of the line of Lanzhou and the Helan Mountains). Of all the existing GMD regular forces, which consist of 285 brigades or 1.98 million troops, 249 brigades or 1.742 million troops are at the fronts (99 brigades or 694,000 soldiers on the northern front, and 150 brigades or 1.048 million troops on the southern front). Only 36 brigades or 238 soldiers are in the rear, and most of them are newly formed troops of low combat effectiveness. Therefore, the CC has decided that during the third year the whole of the PLA will continue to operate north of the Yangtze River and in north China and the northeast. To accomplish the task of wiping out the enemy, it is necessary to utilize large numbers of captured soldiers in addition to mobilizing people in the liberated areas, in a planned and prudent way, to join the army.

4) Because our party and our army were long in a position in which we were cut apart by the enemy, were waging guerrilla warfare, and were in the rural areas, we allowed very considerable autonomy to the leading organs of the party and army in the different areas. This enabled the party organizations and armed forces to bring

their initiative and enthusiasm into play and to come through long periods of grave difficulties, but at the same time it gave rise to certain phenomena of lax discipline and anarchy, localism and guerrillaism, which were harmful to the cause of the revolution. The present situation demands that our party should do its utmost to overcome these phenomena of lax discipline and anarchy, localism and guerrillaism, and centralize all the powers that can and must be concentrated in the hands of the CC and its organs, so as to bring about the transition in the form of the war from guerrilla to regular warfare. In the past two years both the army and its operations have become more regular in character, but this is not enough; in the third year another big step forward must be made. For this purpose, we must do everything possible to repair and operate modern means of communications, such as railways, highway transport, and steamships, to strengthen the administration of cities and industry, and to step by step shift the center of gravity of our party work from the rural areas to the cities.

5) The task of seizing political power throughout the country demands that our party should quickly and systematically train large numbers of cadres to administer military, political, economic, party, cultural, and educational affairs. In the third year of the war, we must prepare 30,000 to 40,000 cadres of lower, middle, and higher ranks, so that in the fourth year when the army advances they can march with it and bring orderly administration to newly liberated areas with a population of some 50 to 100 million. China's territory is very large, its population is very numerous, and the revolutionary war is developing very rapidly; but our supply of cadres is very inadequate—this is a great difficulty. In preparing cadres during the third year, while we should rely on the only liberated areas to supply the greater part, we must also pay attention to enrolling cadres from the big cities controlled by the GMD. In the big cities in GMD areas there are many workers and intellectuals who can take part in our work and who have, generally speaking, a higher cultural level than the workers and peasants in the old liberated areas. We should make use of large numbers of working personnel from the GMD's economic, financial, cultural, and educational institutions, excluding the reactionary elements. School education in the liberated areas must be restored and developed.

6) The slogan of convening a political consultative conference¹⁰⁷ has rallied around our party all democratic parties and people's organizations and all democrats without party affiliation in the GMD areas. We are arranging for representatives of these parties and organizations to come to the liberated areas and are preparing to convene a conference in 1949 of the representatives of all China's democratic parties, people's organizations, and democrats without party affiliation, in order to establish the provisional central government of the People's Republic of China.

7) The restoration and development of industrial and agricultural production in the liberated areas is an important link in supporting the war and in defeating the GMD reactionaries. The meeting convened by the CC held that, on the one

hand, the PLA must develop its victorious offensive into the GMD areas and obtain from the GMD forces and areas the large supply of labor power and material resources needed for the war; and that, on the other hand, every effort must be made in the old liberated areas to restore and develop industrial and agricultural production so as to raise their level to some extent. Only if these two tasks are fulfilled will it be possible to ensure the overthrow of the reactionary rule of the GMD; otherwise, that will not be possible.

We will have many difficulties in carrying out these two tasks. When our armies enter the GMD areas in force to make war with no rear area or with no adequate rear area, they will have to get all or most of their military supplies themselves on the spot. The restoration and development of industrial and agricultural production requires good organizational work, good leadership of markets in the liberated areas, control of trade with outside areas, the overcoming of shortages of certain machinery and raw materials, and, most important of all, the solution of the problems of communications, transport, and the repair of railways, highways, and waterways. At present there are great difficulties in the economic and financial situation in the liberated areas. Although our difficulties are much smaller than those of the GMD, they do exist. The main ones are that our material resources and labor power are inadequate for the needs of the war and that inflation has developed to a considerable degree. And one cause of these difficulties is the inadequacy of our organizational work, especially in the financial and economic sphere. We believe these difficulties can be overcome and must be overcome. In the struggle to do so, we must fight waste and practice economy. At the front we must see to it that everything captured is handed in, cherish our effective strength, take good care of weapons, use ammunition sparingly, and protect captured soldiers. In the rear we must reduce government expenses, reduce the mobilization of labor power and draft animals not urgently needed, reduce time taken by meetings, observe agricultural seasons so that farm work is done on time, reduce costs in industrial production, raise labor productivity, mobilize the whole party to learn to manage industrial and agricultural production and carry on trade, make the greatest possible efforts to organize the economies of the liberated areas properly, overcome disorder in the markets, and wage the necessary struggles against all speculators and manipulators. By getting down to all these jobs, we can certainly overcome the difficulties facing us.

8) Raising the cadres' theoretical level and broadening inner-party democracy are important links in the fulfillment of the above tasks. The meeting convened by the CC adopted a special decision on broadening inner-party democracy. It also discussed the problem of raising the cadres' theoretical level and drew the attention of all comrades present to the problem.

9) The sixth national labor congress has been successfully held, and the ACFTU¹⁰⁸ has been founded. In the first half of next year a national women's congress will be convened to form the All-China Federation of Democratic Women,¹⁰⁹ a national youth congress will be convened for the All-China Youth Federation, and the New Democratic Youth League will be established.¹¹⁰

H.22 Resolution of the CCP CC Concerning the Convocation of Party Congresses and Conferences at All Levels (September 1948)¹¹

Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theories and democratic centralism have served as the basis for the CCP from the day it was established. As a result, in the CCP's twenty-seven-year history, it has ceaselessly struggled to overcome inner-party anti-Marxist erroneous tendencies and deviations, to lead the masses in struggle against internal and external enemies, to pull through many difficulties, and to obtain many great victories. But in our party the normal development of democratic life has been impaired owing to the environment of struggle and our underground status. This situation remained unchanged even after the revised Party Constitution was passed at the Seventh National Congress in 1945 [**Doc. H.7**]. This mandated the convocation of party congresses and conferences at all levels. The lack of normal democratic life in the party and the inadequacy of democratic life in government work can be attributed to the serious factors of bureaucratism and departure from the mass line that have developed in our party organizations and government organs. In addition, democratic extremist and anarchist sentiments have manifested themselves in the wake of the launching of inner-party criticism and self-criticism. This situation can be blamed on the surreptitious spread of erroneous opinions, conniving factional tendencies, and undisciplined attitudes in the party, all of which have led to serious losses on the part of the party and the people. In the past, in every liberated area separated by the enemy, the gravity of the wartime environment necessarily set limits on the democratic life of the party and government. At present, this trend is already undergoing a great change. The expanded liberated areas are reunited and conversely exhibit a stable behind-the-lines atmosphere, carrying out the work of establishing production. Land reform has already been carried out over a large area. The Red Army ceaselessly advances into GMD strongholds and will attain total national victory in the near future. Our party has already expanded to become a mass party of over 3 million members. Increasingly, all segments of the Chinese masses are enthusiastically and widely demanding participation in democratic political life. Under these circumstances, our party and government will both probably and necessarily realize true democratic life. The past phenomenon of inadequate democratic life must be changed. With regard to the establishment of people's congresses in the liberated areas and the expansion of normal democratic life in the people's democratic government, the North China Provisional People's Congress has recently passed many decrees and ordinances. We hope other liberated areas will follow their lead. As to the establishment and expansion of normal democratic life in the party, the CC has specially issued the following resolutions:

- 1) In all the stable liberated areas, party committees at all levels must respect the rules set out in the party Constitution. Henceforth, they must fix a date for the convocation of party congresses and conferences at all levels and discuss the CC's

instructions and work. In addition, they must hold elections and by-elections for party committees at all levels. In the future, these kinds of congresses and conferences will not be replaced by ordinary cadre meetings and must meet according to schedule.

Every area led by a central bureau or subbureau should convene district party congresses. Even if central bureaus or subbureaus of certain areas obtain the CC's permission to transform themselves into party committees, they must still convene district party conferences.

The scope of authority of these party congresses and conferences is stipulated in Articles 40, 44, and 45 of the party Constitution.

Regarding the Red Army, distinctions should be made based on the different circumstances of the military regions and the field armies. The party organizations directly corresponding to every level of military region, in addition to dispatching representatives to participate in the regimental local party congress and conference, should set up their own administrative organs, schools, and military party congresses and committees at all levels. The field armies, because they are engaged in an extreme war situation and are constantly on the move, are not compelled to follow the usual rules in setting up party congresses and conferences. Instead, they should go only as far as prevailing conditions allow, obtaining their superior's approval before setting up limited congresses and conferences.

2) Party congresses and conferences at all levels must respect the powers laid down in the party Constitution; violations are forbidden. We must guarantee full freedom of speech to all representatives (they must have the power not only to praise but also to oppose and criticize the opinions praised by the majority of representatives). These rights must be guaranteed in order to foster inner-party criticism and self-criticism and to educate the cadres and the masses. At the same time, however, we must ensure that the minority submits to the majority and that inferiors submit to the rules laid down by their superiors in order to preserve inner-party unity and discipline. We must follow Lenin's hallowed dictum: before problems have been resolved, we can allow free dissemination of opinions and debate. But when a consensus has been formed and superiors have approved it, we must wholly submit to, and resolutely carry out, the program; opposition will not be tolerated. Those elements who do not respect the Constitution and who destroy discipline and inner-party order must be punished. In expanding normal democratic life in the party, we must be vigilant in immediately redressing democratic extremist, anarchic, undisciplined, and disorganized tendencies. We must ensure that normal democratic life in the party is carried out by the central leadership in an organized, orderly, and disciplined fashion in order to strengthen leadership organs' confidence and ability to resolve problems and to carry out their work. We must not weaken this ability and confidence.

3) Congresses, committees, and conferences of lower-level party organizations must seek the approval of higher-level party organizations for important resolutions before implementing them. Higher-level party organizations have the power to re-

wise the resolutions of lower-level party congresses, committees, and conferences. They also have the power to nullify such resolutions in whole or in part. Resolutions promulgated by party congresses and conferences at all party levels should follow a formal, set pattern (at the very least, conferences above the county level should adopt resolutions of this kind). But these resolutions must also be practical and simple; they should serve to resolve current, pressing work problems of all kinds. At all costs, we must refrain from passing long-winded, meaningless resolutions. After these resolutions have been approved by higher-level party organizations, any that can be publicly announced should be published in local party newspapers or announced to the public by other means. When higher-level party organizations believe that lower-level party congresses, committees, and conferences have committed errors, they must, in addition to blocking their resolutions, publicly criticize them and lead them in reconvening the congress, committee, and conference meeting to carry out a new resolution to replace the old one.

4) After party congresses and committees at all levels have been convened, inner-party normal democratic life will already have been expanded, and with the development of criticism and self-criticism it is likely that there will be an increase in different opinions within the party. Leading party organs at all levels must immediately and accurately report these differences of opinion (regardless of whether these differences occur in the party congress, committee, or conference) to the higher level. Important disputes must be reported to the CC in order to allow it and senior party members to understand changing inner-party sentiments and instruct accordingly. In the past, some party units hid these disputes. Such behavior is entirely wrong; from now on we must resolutely correct it. Some comrades are opposed to reporting disputes between party members and cadres to party seniors. Others feel that it is tantamount to lodging a complaint with their superiors or with the CC. They fear retribution from those they have reported. Such opinions and behavior are wrong; they must be stopped. We must end this sort of behavior and denounce the incorrect attitude of these comrades. Understanding the development of inner-party self-criticism and disputes can be of great educational value to cadres, party members, and the masses if such disputes can be restricted to ordinary channels. It is entirely beneficial. But unprincipled, disorderly, or unresolvable disputes, or disputes that arbitrarily destroy party discipline and order, will seriously impede the people's cause and party unity. If such disputes do occur with the party, they must be quickly and accurately reported to higher levels of the party and the CC so that they may be rectified.

5) When party committees at all levels convene congresses or conferences, they must be properly prepared. They must collect materials in advance, draw up realistic reports, and draft resolutions; be prepared to submit all the issues to be discussed and decided by the congress or conference; and then conduct the meeting. Only in this way can they minimize the length of the meeting and obtain satisfactory results. Otherwise, the meeting will be unnecessarily prolonged and yield unsatisfactory results.

6) Establishing the party committee system is an important step in favorably realizing democratic centralism. Party committees at all levels, especially those above the local level and party committees above the level of military regiment, must adapt a system of collectively discussing issues and reaching decisions. The resolution of important problems should not be left to individuals. Neither collective leadership nor individual responsibility should be overemphasized at the expense of the other. Meetings should not be convened too frequently. Military leaders have the right to handle problems provisionally as they arise in emergency situations.

H.23 Resolution of the CC Concerning the System of Reporting to the Center by CC Bureaus and Subbureaus, Military Districts, Subcommittees of the Military Commission, and Front Committees (September 1948)¹¹²

The following special regulations have been made to adapt to the present requirements for the development of the revolutionary situation, to guarantee complete uniformity of various policies and the successful implementation of military plans by the entire party and army and overcome some serious situations of lax discipline or anarchy existing inside the party and army now, to cover the scope of the decision-making power of the CC in various types of work, in particular the issue of decisions that have to be implemented only after the approval of the CC and the issue of decisions of which must be reported to the CC afterward for consideration:

A) General Aspects

1) Decide and publicize (inside and outside the party) the party's general line and general policies and programs, decide and issue (inside and outside the party) various national specific policies and guidelines in accordance with the party's General Line and general policies and programs. This should include various military policies relating to military construction, military operations, and external relations; land policies for reducing rent and interest and land redistribution; economic and labor policies for developing production, promoting economic prosperity, taking care of private and state-run enterprises at the same time, and benefiting both labor and capital in the liberated areas; policies for the construction of the state and political power of the people's democratic dictatorship based on the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the CCP; cultural and educational policies that will serve the people; judicial policies to punish serious culprits while treating their accomplices differently, rewarding meritorious service, prohibiting excessive arrests, random arrests, indiscriminate beating and killing, and obtaining confessions by physical punishment; lenient prisoner-of-war policies of releasing and seeking to reform captured officers and soldiers; guidelines for handling the GMD government organs, economic institutions, and state-run enterprises; guide-

lines for handling schools and cultural agencies in the GMD-ruled areas; guidelines for handling the GMD Three Principles of the People Youth Corps [*San qingtuan*]¹¹³ and other reactionary and spy organizations.

2) Decide and publicize (inside and outside the party) in all liberated areas throughout the whole country (old and new areas) basic programs and tasks for the work of the party, government, army, and the mass movements; basic programs and tasks for the work of the party and the masses in the GMD-ruled areas; basic programs and tasks for the work of national minorities and overseas Chinese and international activities.

3) [Decide on] matters concerning the establishment of the organizational system of the party, government, and army in various liberated areas.

4) Decide on certain important regulations and laws that are implemented by the entire party, government, and army, such as the organization, labor, criminal and civil, land, tax, and marriage laws and regulations on political work, on the system of military ranks, on soldiers' committees, and on the work of party committees etc.

5) [Decide on] matters concerning two or more regions.

6) [Decide on] annual work tasks, programs, and plans for various liberated areas and separate plans for assorted important work.

7) Adopt guidelines for convening party congresses and conferences for the whole region and the army, important cadre meetings, and people's congresses for the whole region.

8) Plan important constructions and installations and the overall work in cities with a population of over 100,000.

Decision-making power on items 1) to 5) above belongs entirely to the CC. Localities may make suggestions to the CC. Decision-making power still remains with the localities as far as items 6) to 8) are concerned, but they must seek instructions from the CC beforehand and can issue and implement the decisions only after approval from the CC.

The various regulations above apply to political, military, economic, cultural, party, and all other aspects of general work. Regulations on specific matters in various fields are stipulated below.

B) Political Aspects

1) Speeches and written reports on the situation and expositions of the party's attitudes and programs on national issues.

2) Matters concerning the establishment of cooperation between our party and other national democratic parties, mass organizations and independent personages, and the making of suggestions or representations to them on relevant national political activities.

3) Handling of national war criminals and counterrevolutionary criminals.

4) Guidelines for establishing diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign countries and the handling of schools, churches, hospitals, charity, and relief agencies run by foreign residents, merchants, and other foreigners and other matters

concerning external relations (concrete implementation can be entrusted to localities, but they must obtain instructions from the CC beforehand), as well as the dispatch of personnel working in the field of external affairs.

5) The handling of international activities and the dispatch of personnel to deal with these matters.

6) The preparation of candidate lists for our party, other parties, and nonparty members of the government and for people's congresses at the provincial level and above.

7) The handling of leaders of national minorities, distinguished personages, owners of medium and big enterprises, and non-CP members of democratic governments at the county level and above who have committed crimes.

8) The handling of main responsible persons of GMD provincial and city (cities directly under the center) governments and provincial party headquarters and main responsible persons of other reactionary parties at the provincial level and above. The handling of important cases concerning special task forces and agents such as those at and above the level of station chief of the GMD military investigation bureau and directors at the provincial level and above of the GMD CC investigation bureaus.

The CC has the decision-making power as far as items 1) to 5) are concerned, but localities may make suggestions. Decision-making power still remains with the localities as far as items 6) to 8) are concerned, but they must obtain instructions from the CC beforehand and carry out implementation only after approval from the CC.

C) Military Aspects

1) Strategic programs and strategic planning.

2) Battle plans for field armies or army corps.

3) Plans for training and consolidation of military districts, field armies, and army corps.

4) The military organization of divisions and [units] above, the formation of field armies and army corps, and the delineation of the first- and second-level military districts.

5) Decisions on the establishment of the military system and on programs for military education.

6) Planning for local mobilization, expansion of the armed forces, and assistance to prisoners of war and the establishment of reserves.

7) Unified regulations for secret communication systems, the establishment and adjustment of special intelligence organs.

8) Establishment of a logistics system; determination of production plans for weapons factories; adjustment of raw materials and technical personnel for important weapons factories; regulations for the basic quantity of ammunition and the establishment of systems for weapons gathering and maintenance; the unified distribution of various important military equipment and ammunition; the review, ap-

proval, and adjustment of complete supply plans; the establishment and coordination of transport station lines; the adjustment and command of various major military districts.

9) Work plans for the first- and second-level military districts.

10) Approval of the extent of expansion of the armed forces and plans for replenishment by reserves.

11) Appointment and dismissal of cadres at the division (brigade) level and above.

12) Destruction of major bridges and other communication and transportation installations that we do not have the technology to restore, destruction of major mines and factories and removal of important large factories.

13) Principles and methods for gathering grain and money by troops fighting in new areas, various important installations used in the martial law period after the military occupation of medium and big cities.

14) Treatment and release of generals, commissioners, and officers from the enemy's armed forces and other special persons in the work of handling prisoners of war.

15) Review, training, and disposal of returned prisoners of war from our own armed forces.

16) Plans for general and specific political work.

The Central Military Commission has sole decision-making power over items 1) to 8) above, but military districts, field armies, or army corps from various regions may make suggestions. All military districts, fields armies and army corps may make suggestions on items 9) to 16) and implement them on approval by the Central Military Commission.

D) Economic Aspects

1) Determination of economic, financial, monetary, and trade policies applied throughout all liberated areas.

2) Financial adjustments between the major liberated areas, the adjustment of monetary and trade relationships, the issuance of paper currency, the use and distribution of coins such as white silver and white coins.

3) Guidelines for external trade (including with foreign countries and with the GMD-ruled areas) and unified management.

4) Establishment of factories, mines, and enterprises.

5) The number of nonproduction personnel of the whole region and their percentage of the population, the increase or decrease in the annual fiscal budget and supply standards.

6) Plans for the issuance of currency (including amount, distribution, use, and preparation).

7) Policies on taxation; regulations on the levy of agricultural, industrial, commercial, and salt taxes (including methods for regulating table salt); and import duties; methods of restriction and management of goods from other liberated areas.

8) Policies on wages, the wage system, and standards for privately owned enterprises and cooperatives, the wage system and standards in the countryside.

9) Plans for the restoration and construction of railroads and other important mines and factories in the region, plans for the construction of major highways and dredging of rivers.

The CC has the decision-making power as far as items 1) to 4) are concerned, but all regions may make suggestions. The regions must obtain the CC's approval before implementing items 5) to 9), or the CC may decide on them after soliciting opinions from all regions.

E) Cultural, Educational, and Propaganda Aspects

1) Publishing articles and delivering lectures and speeches inside and outside the party that have party-wide implications.

2) Handling national newspapers and periodicals of the democratic parties and groups.

3) Handling the national newspapers, periodicals, and broadcasting stations of the GMD and other reactionary parties and groups and all other nationwide cultural agencies and businesses.

4) Plans for the region's cultural and educational publishing, the management of special schools and above, famous cultural and academic institutes and historical relics.

5) The editing and publishing of works by responsible comrades from the CC (or even their republication) and books about the history of the party and history of the Red Army.

6) Educational programs and plans for party schools and universities directly under the various regions.

7) Programs and plans for running party newspapers in all regions.

8) Programs and plans for cadre education and national education in all regions.

9) Programs for the management of films, drama, and other artistic enterprises.

With the exception of item 1), where decision-making power lies solely with the CC, the localities can make decisions on implementation after seeking instructions from the CC first.

All local party newspapers must unconditionally publicize the CC's line and policies and should not place the CC on the same level as organs (i.e., CC bureaus and subbureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees) entrusted by the CC to implement its line, policies, and tasks. On the contrary, open statements must be made inside and outside the party to the effect that all organs entrusted by the CC are intended to execute the CC's line, policies, and tasks. Before issuing their decisions, instructions, orders, and ordinances, all CC bureaus and subbureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees must pay attention to this point and should not put themselves on par with the CC or even create an influence within the party and army that surpasses that of the CC. It is even less acceptable to allow any individual party member to be treated on the same level as the party and the CC in external or internal propaganda.

F) Party Work

1) The CC has the sole right to decide the composition of CC bureaus, sub-bureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees, and the appointment of their members.

2) Appointment and dismissal of members of regional or provincial party committees, secretaries of district committees, directors, and deputy directors of administrative offices at the provincial level, and disciplinary actions concerning their party membership.

3) Different opinions and disputes among members of regional or provincial party committees over matters of policy, tactics, and principles, and the handling of these differences and disputes. (Including important differences among cadres at the district level and below.)

4) General programs and methods adopted to streamline local party organizations.

5) Matters of principle, rules and organizations for party building. All issues the principle of which are not stipulated in the party Constitution, or when stipulated still require flexible handling because of special circumstances.

6) Programs and plans for mass movements of workers, peasants, youths and women, and others in the whole region.

7) Work plans and measures for forming the youth league.

Before implementation of items 2) to 7) instructions must be sought from the CC, and prior approval for an implementation must be given by the CC.

G) For these articles above where decision-making power belongs solely to the CC and where the CC has already made relevant decisions and instructions, localities must firmly observe and correctly implement them. If difficulties and special circumstances or different opinions arise during implementation, explanations and suggestions may be made to the CC for approval. But unauthorized changes are not permitted. On those items on which the CC has not made any decision or instructions, localities have the right to make suggestions to the CC and to suggest ways and means of handling them, to draft resolutions or regulations for the CC, and to decide on and promulgate, or to publish in the name of the locality on approval by the CC.

Apart from those items above on which decisions should be made by the CC or can be implemented only on approval by the CC, various CC bureaus and sub-bureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees have the right to decide on and implement them. If, in future work, it is discovered that some items must still be decided on or approved by the CC, it can take such decisions and then publicize its decisions for implementation. Party committees at all levels may decide on specific plans and rules for implementation of the decisions, instructions, and stipulations issued by the CC in light of local conditions. The texts or gist of important specific plans, detailed rules of implementation, and local decisions of execution should be reported to the CC for future review.

H) Except for the above items that have already been reported to the CC, all

decisions, instructions, and regulations that are already in the process of implementation must be reported to the CC for retrospective review.

I) In addition to mandatory bimonthly comprehensive policy reports to the chair of the CC and the Military Commission by the secretaries of various CC bureaus and subbureaus and chief officers of military districts, field armies, and army corps and other report systems of the Military Commission and other departments, the implementation process, outcome, and experience related to Sections a to e should be reported at all times. Production and consumption of key industries in all regions should be reported at the end of each month. Agricultural production and consumption should be reported once or twice a year. The secretaries of party organizations of all departments and governments in major liberated areas and the secretaries of party organizations inside mass organizations should report at least every six months unless there are other regulations to be observed. Written documentation on the following should be sent to the CC for subsequent examination: relatively important installations in the liberated areas with a population of over 50,000; the assignment of secretaries of county committees, members of district committees, and cadres at the regimental level; newspapers at the provincial level (including those of regional party committees and cities directly under the CC bureaus) and the level of major military district; publications for internal party circulation only and decisions, instructions, orders, and stipulations on policy and principle pertaining to them and important publications, propaganda articles, and notes for circulation outside the party. Some representative materials below the level of district committee should also be selected systematically and regularly sent to the CC. Important reports on policy or tactics by the lower levels to various CC bureaus and subbureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees should also be sent to the CC (extracts may be sent of lengthy materials) for timely study.

Moreover, if some CC bureaus or subbureaus, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees have already been reporting to, and obtaining instructions from, the CC on a timely basis, this practice may continue as in the past. However, certain purely technical and unimportant matters may be reduced, so as to concentrate attention on matters of policy and principle.

J) The various items above must be implemented and strictly observed by the consolidated regions. If there are specific reasons or temporary difficulties, explanations should be given and a temporary flexibility can be introduced for certain regulations, and certain types of report may be reduced in number, exempted, or postponed with the CC's approval. In battle areas, unconsolidated regions, and those areas where there are military actions, real objective difficulties, and emergency circumstances that have to be dealt with flexibly, changes may be made but must be reported to the CC for retrospective approval. For those matters on which the CC has already laid down principles and stipulations, these should be followed and reported to the CC for subsequent review. However, on those issues for which

the CC has not laid down any principles and guidelines and for which urgent solutions must be found, instruction must still be sought from the CC beforehand, and implementation can only be carried out after the CC's approval. In sum, implementation of the above items should be as thorough as possible and be kept within the objectively permissible scope.

K) For those items above that require instruction, and reporting and sending documents and reports to the CC for subsequent review, telegrams should be sent in urgent cases, secret radio stations should be used for secret matters, New China [Xinhua] News Agency radio stations can be used for general materials. Materials over 5,000 or 6,000 words in length that are not needed urgently should be sent by localities inside Shanhaiguan in written form as much as possible. For this purpose, transportation and communication between the CC and localities should be improved as much as possible to ensure the smooth operation of this system. Written documents and reports sent to the CC for approval or reply must have passed through regular procedures and must be received by the general secretary of the CC for handling. They should not be mixed up with other ordinary materials.

L) How to write reports? How to seek instructions? In addition to the comprehensive bimonthly reports which should be continued in line with the CC's and Military Commission's telegram of 7 January,¹¹⁴ the following points should also be taken into consideration:

1) All work reports or reports on special issues should be written in conformity with the gist of the instructions of the 7 January telegram, emphasizing the implementation of policy, summarizing experiences, and avoiding a simple description of process. They should explain the dynamics of the work, discover problems and tendencies that have risen in work, and discover their causes and solutions. The details of the reports must be proved, analyzed, and sorted out. The practice of simply putting together tedious raw materials drawn from the lower levels and inaccurate statistics should be avoided. The attitude in writing reports should be honest, seeking truth from facts, and saying what one really knows and acknowledging what one does not know. Carrying out one's duty in a perfunctory manner is totally prohibited; this prevents reports from becoming purely formal. The wording of reports should be as precise as possible. Long articles which cannot explain the issues should be strictly avoided. Reports on all types of work and reports on specific issues must be drafted by the responsible persons of various departments and be checked and approved by the secretaries.

2) When sending drafts of questions, proposals, decisions, plans, and regulations to the CC, the purpose of issuing these documents must be made clear to serve as the basis of the CC's considerations. With regard to the allocation of cadres, when seeking the CC's approval and reporting to it for subsequent review the age, place of birth, sex, family origin, work experience, and personal class status, a short and

precise appraisal of the cadre should also be reported. No reports are necessary if [the matter] has been reported already.

Finally all CC bureaus and subbureaus, military districts, subcommittees of the Military Commission, and front committees should, in line with the above spirit and principles, determine a specific system for seeking instructions and reporting to superior organizations by regional party committees, provincial party committees, and armed forces party committees in an effort to overcome the existing serious situations of lax discipline and anarchy throughout the party and army; to achieve complete unity in guidelines, policy, and actions of the whole party and army; to unite the people of the whole country in the speedy expulsion from China of the American imperialist aggressive forces; and to overthrow the GMD's reactionary rule and establish a united and democratic people's republic.

H.24 The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks for 1949 (8 January 1949)¹¹⁵

A. The Current Situation

1) In the military sphere, our one-year plan has been exceeded in half a year. Between July and December 1948 we annihilated 148 divisions of the enemy's regular troops, including 111 full-strength divisions. When the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong had been concluded, over sixty full-strength enemy divisions had been destroyed. This means that altogether some 210 enemy divisions have been wiped out, some 173 of them being full-strength divisions. After the spring of 1949, the GMD will have only about 160 divisions, most of which are newly formed or have been replenished after annihilation, or have a weak fighting capability. Only a small number of them possesses a relatively strong fighting capability, for example, the Gui clique and the Ma family. In 1949 the GMD could mobilize half a million people who, apart from replenishing the existing divisions, will be formed into several new divisions which will have no fighting capability whatsoever. After the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong, may we say that we have basically overthrown the GMD regime? In terms of destroying its main military strength, we may say yes. But there are several major battles to be fought in Nanjing, Wuhan, and Xi'an. After these battles have been fought, then, not only in military terms but also in political and economic terms, we will have basically overthrown the GMD regime. Basically overthrowing the GMD is not the same as completely overthrowing the GMD. There are many enemy troops in China waiting for us to destroy; there are many areas waiting for us to occupy and work in. The idea of treating the enemy lightly should not be entertained at any time. We must never let victory go to our heads.

2) The balance of power between the classes in China has undergone a funda-

mental change. The majority of the people are leaving the GMD's influence and control in huge numbers and coming over to our side. The liberal bourgeoisie is seeking a way out from us. Very few of them are following the GMD. The representatives of each democratic party and private organization have come, or are coming, to the liberated areas in large groups. The GMD's entire strategic front north of the Yangtze River has collapsed. The GMD is in a state of great confusion and collapse within the areas it still rules. We are completely confident that we will defeat the GMD throughout the whole country. Nineteen forty-nine and 1950 are going to be the two years in which the Chinese revolution will achieve victory throughout the whole country. We must carry the revolution through to the end; we must never allow it to abort halfway. We must persuasively carry out educational work within the party, within the PLA, and among the people. We must provide explanations for the representatives of all the democratic parties and private organizations, so that all will understand why the revolution must be continued to the end and must not be allowed to abort halfway. The GMD's plot of so-called peace negotiations must be continuously exposed and foiled.

3) The favorable conditions for fighting in the south are: the GMD's military no longer has any main strength left, while we have a powerful army; the GMD's prestige is totally gone, while our party enjoys extremely high prestige; the south is a region that experienced the revolution of 1924-27 and the years of the land revolution; now there are many guerrilla forces and areas of guerrilla warfare there. These are the favorable conditions. The unfavorable conditions for fighting in the south are: most of the areas there are under GMD rule. Our party's organizations there are not strong; the masses there have not been mobilized. Under these circumstances, supplies to our army will meet many difficulties in the initial period. It is easy to seize big cities, but it is more difficult to control them than the northern cities. These are unfavorable conditions. We must be aware of both the favorable and unfavorable conditions. We must also clearly tell them to all the cadres and soldiers going south, so that they will have full mental preparations and use the favorable conditions well to overcome unfavorable conditions, thus striving for victory throughout the whole country.

4) We have always calculated in our battle plans the possibility that the United States will send troops directly to occupy several coastal cities in China and involve us in combat. This calculation is not to be given up now, lest we be totally unprepared should such a thing happen. But the stronger and more resolute the Chinese people's revolutionary forces, the smaller the possibility that the United States will resort to direct military intervention, and the smaller the possibility that it will use finance and weapons to aid the GMD. In the past year, especially in the past three months, the attitude of the U.S. government has continued to waver and has undergone some changes; this has proved the above point. Among the Chinese people and within our party there exist erroneous views that overestimate the strength of the American imperialists. We must continuously expose these views and overcome them.

5) The American imperialists' China policy has changed from only supporting the GMD's armed anticommunism to a two-faced policy. This is: on the one hand, they support the GMD's remaining military forces and regional warlords in their continued resistance against the PLA. On the other hand, they send their lackeys to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and organize the so-called opposition to sabotage the revolution from within. When the People's Liberation War nears nationwide victory, they will not even regret using the method of recognizing the People's Republic to gain legal status and implement this policy of "internal sabotage." We must raise our vigilance against and resolutely smash this plot of the imperialists.

6) In the past several years, and particularly in 1948, the majority of party cadres have systematically learned all the specific policies and tactics for working in the countryside, in the cities, and for military operations. They have systematically corrected right and "left" deviations. Many comrades learned in a year what previously they still did not know even after a long period of time. Thus, the party's General Line can be implemented throughout the entire party. This is the greatest and most fundamental victory. This represents an enormous increase in the degree of political maturity of our party. This example clearly illustrates: our party will be able to control power throughout the country in the not-too-distant future. In order to guarantee victory, a widespread and deepening education about policy should be carried out in 1949. When we say "we have learned," this does not mean that we do not have to continue to learn. We have to learn many things. When we say "deviations have been corrected," this does not mean that there are no deviations within the party or that no deviations will occur in the future. There are some deviations within the party now, and deviations will occur in the future. We must pay attention to correcting deviations within the party all the time.

B. The Party's Tasks for 1949

1) In the three seasons, summer, autumn, and winter of 1949, we should try to occupy the major parts of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Gansu. Some of these eight provinces will be occupied in their entirety.

2) We must transfer and train in time the 53,000 cadres to be used together with the army in the summer, autumn, and winter of 1949.

3) We must regularize further all the field armies in 1949; this is mainly to strengthen artillery and army engineering, use modern transportation tools like railways, highways, and waterways, strengthen the organization and discipline of the troops, resolutely overcome the problems of lack of discipline that seriously exist within the army, and strengthen the work of the headquarters.

4) We should try to form a serviceable air force and a navy that can defend our coasts and rivers in 1949 and 1950. This possibility exists.

5) We must genuinely raise agricultural and industrial production throughout the liberated areas in 1949 in comparison with 1948. The main railways and highways in our areas should be repaired and used. Economic and financial operations in our

areas should be more planned and unified, where possible and necessary, in order to avoid waste in labor power and material resources and obstacles increased production and to work to support the front.

6) In 1949, where possible and necessary, we must strengthen the organization and efficiency of logistical work in the rear areas of the PLA so as to support effectively their great advances into the southern provinces. Such operations involve appropriate planning for production in the munitions industry, the readjustment and establishment of other military-related industries outside of the munitions industry, the establishment of a weapons system, a unified regulation governing the standards of all kinds of supplies, the unified distribution of medical and communications equipment, the division of labor between the front and the rear in transportation and storage, and the establishment of the organization and system of logistics in the rear.

7) In 1949, in terms of the political work of the PLA, we must summarize, under the leadership of the political department of the Military Affairs Commission, the "New Movement to Rectify the Army," the "Party Committee System," the "Revolutionary Soldiers' Committee," and the "Work of the Company Party Branches." Devise regulations and charters to be popularized throughout the army and establish such institutions.

8) Work in land reform in all major liberated areas and party rectification in 1949 must revolve around the production movement. Use the leisure time of the masses, and complete one step at a time the remaining work in redistributing or readjusting land and the work of party rectification. Establish people's conferences in all the major liberated areas and elect committees of the people's government at all levels. Perfect the system of party committees in all major liberated areas; convene party conferences at all levels. Enforce the reduction of rent and interest in the liberated areas of the Central Plains, and mobilize the masses. In the provinces south of the Yangtze River, within the next three to five years, the problem is not that of redistributing land but reducing rent and interest and mobilizing the masses. Redistribution of land can only be dealt with after reducing rent and interest and mobilizing the masses.

9) Plans for educating cadres in 1949, and plans for studying the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and the specific policies of the Chinese revolution in schools for training cadres and among cadres on the job must meet the needs of the current revolutionary situation and satisfy the tasks of the revolution.

10) Education plans for citizens in 1949 (higher education, all kinds of technical education, middle-school education, primary school education, and remedial education for adults) must meet the needs of the current revolutionary situation and satisfy the tasks of the revolution. The work of the news agencies and newspapers is similar. The work in literature and the arts is also similar.

11) In 1949, the work of the labor unions, the youth leagues, and among women should have better results than in 1948. In the first half of 1949, work for the national youth conference and the national women's conference should be completed.

12) In 1949 we must convene the political consultative conference of all democratic parties and private groups which will have no reactionary participants and have as its goal the fulfillment of the Chinese people's revolutionary goals. Declare the founding of the PRC, form the republic's central government, and pass the joint political program.

13) After the campaigns of Beijing-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong, the major field armies must take at least two months of rest and training to finish all the preparations for crossing the river and entering the south. Then, they are to proceed through the south steadily, step by step.

14) The struggle within the leading party and army organs at all levels against the lack of discipline and anarchy that seriously exist must be completed before the end of March 1949, in line with the CC's directive. Resolutions on this matter by party committees above the level of regiment in the army and above the county level in the localities must be delivered to the CC by April. Those who have special reasons to postpone this must finish this in April and deliver the resolutions to the CC in May.

15) We must cautiously develop party organization in all the newly occupied areas. In particular, adopt the policy of strictly examining the applications of high-level intellectuals to join the party. We must pay attention to this especially in big cities. We would rather have fewer than have more less qualified [members].

16) We must step up security in all the liberated areas. Firmly struggle against all the concealed or open counterrevolutionaries.

17) After the liberation of Beijing [Beiping], we must convene the Second Plenum of the Seventh CC. The tasks for this meeting will be to: (a) analyze the current situation and define the party's tasks; (b) pass the draft of the joint political program that is to be handed over to the political consultative conference; (c) pass the draft for forming the major components of the central people's government; (d) pass the military plans; (e) decide on the policies of economic construction; (f) determine foreign policy; and g) other matters.

H.25 Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP CC (13 March 1949)¹¹⁶

The Second Plenum of the Seventh CC, in line with Comrade Mao Zedong's report, holds that the CC's leadership has been correct since the party's Seventh Congress, and adopts the following resolutions:

1) Since the three campaigns of Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai, and Beijing-Tianjin,¹¹⁷ the main forces of the GMD have been destroyed. The GMD fighting units have only over 1 million troops left, scattered over vast areas and along the battle lines from Xinjiang to Taiwan. The ways to solve the problem of this million or so GMD troops will be none other than the three methods used in Tianjin,

Beijing, and Suiyuan. Elimination of the enemy through fighting, as was the case in Tianjin, must still command our foremost attention and must be prepared for. No commanders and soldiers of the PLA should relax their will to fight in the slightest, and all ideas of relaxing their will to fight and underestimating the enemy are wrong. The possibility of solving the problem in line with the Beijing method has increased. This is to force the enemy troops to convert to PLA forces, peacefully, expeditiously, and thoroughly. This method of struggle is a bloodless one, but it does not mean that the problem can be solved without struggle. The Suiyuan method refers to deliberately keeping intact a part of the GMD reactionary forces, retaining their original form completely or not changing their basic form. This is to say that temporary concessions will be made to this portion of the troops, to win them over to our side politically or to ensure that they remain neutral, so that we can concentrate our forces on tackling the core of the GMD remnant forces first. Then, only after a quite long period of time (several months, half a year, or several years), will this body of troops be turned into PLA troops of the Wu Wenhua and Zeng Zesheng type in conformity with the PLA system.

2) The PLA will always remain a fighting unit. Even after the nationwide victory, our army will be a fighting unit in the historical period in which classes are not eliminated at home and the imperialist system exists in the world. There should be no misunderstanding and wavering on this point. At the same time, the PLA is a work-team. This is especially so in the various regions in the south where the Beijing and Suiyuan methods have been used. As the fighting gradually subsides, the role of the work-teams increases. There is the possibility that not long thereafter, all PLA units will be turned into work-teams. We must foresee this situation. The 53,000 cadres who are currently ready to follow the troops south are nowhere near enough to meet the demand in the extremely vast new regions that we shall soon occupy. We must be prepared to transform completely the 2.1 million-strong field army units into work-teams. Then we shall have enough cadres, and work in the vast areas can be carried out. We must regard the 2.1 million-strong field armies as a huge cadre school.

3) From 1927 until now, the focus of our work has been in the countryside, concentrating forces in the countryside, surrounding the cities from the countryside, and finally seizing the cities. The period of using such a work method has ended. From now on, it is the period from the cities to the countryside and of the cities leading the countryside. The focus of party work has shifted from the countryside to the cities. In various parts of the south, the PLA will occupy the cities first and the countryside later. Attention must be paid to both the cities and the countryside, closely linking the work then together—workers and peasants, industry and agriculture. The countryside should not be neglected in order to pay attention only to the cities. This kind of thinking is entirely wrong. However, the stress in party work must be put on the cities. Utmost efforts must be exerted to learn to manage cities and build up cities. It is imperative to learn to wage political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic struggles with the imperialists, the GMD, and the bourgeoisie in the

cities. Both overt and covert methods of waging struggle with them should be grasped. If we refuse to pay attention to these issues, and to learn to struggle with these people and achieve victory in the struggle, we shall not be able to maintain our regime and consolidate our position; we shall fail. After the armed enemy has been eliminated, the unarmed enemy will still exist and will inevitably wage a life-and-death struggle with us. We must not underestimate this enemy. If we do not raise and understand the issue in this way, we shall commit extremely grave mistakes.

4) On whom do we rely in the struggle in the cities? Some confused comrades hold that the poor peasant masses should be relied on, instead of the working class. Some even more confused comrades think that the bourgeoisie should be relied on. With regard to the development of industry, some muddleheaded comrades believe that the main task is to assist the development of private enterprises and not that of state-run enterprises. Some hold the opposite view that attention should be paid only to state-run enterprises and that private enterprises can be neglected. We must repudiate these confused ideas. We must rely on the working class wholeheartedly, unite with other working people, win over the intellectuals, and strive to enable the largest possible number of the liberal bourgeoisie and their representatives who are able to cooperate with us to stand on our side or to remain neutral. All this is required to carry out a resolute struggle against the imperialists, the GMD, and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and to overcome these enemies step by step. Meanwhile, we must start building up our cause and learning to manage cities, to restore and develop production in cities step by step. On the issue of restoring and developing production, it must be affirmed that the first priority is the production of state-run enterprises, the second is that of private enterprises, and the third is handicraft production. As soon as we take over a city, we must focus on the restoration and development of the city's production. It is essential to avoid reaching out blindly, while forgetting the central task. It is absolutely intolerable that, having been occupied for several months, a city's production and construction would still not be on the right track and that its many industries would still be halted, causing unemployment and lower standards of living and resentment among workers toward the CP. To avoid this, our comrades must wholeheartedly study technical and managerial methods of production and must learn commercial, banking, and other work related to production. Only when production in the cities has recovered and developed, and consumer cities are turned into production cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. Other work in cities, such as the party's organizational work, the construction of government organs, the work of trade unions and of various mass organizations, the work in cultural and educational aspects, the work of eliminating reactionaries, and the work of news agencies, newspapers, and broadcasting stations, should all be arranged around the central work of production and serve this central task. If we are ignorant in production, cannot grasp production work quickly, cannot restore and develop production quickly and achieve actual results so as to improve the livelihood of workers first and then that of other ordinary people, we

shall certainly not be able to maintain our political power: we shall lose our position and we shall fail.

5) As circumstances in the south and north are different, the party's work tasks are naturally different. At present, the south is still under GMD rule. There, the task of the party and the PLA is to destroy the GMD reactionary armed forces in the countryside; build up party organizations; establish our political power; form trade unions, peasant associations, and other mass organizations; establish people's armed forces; mobilize the masses; eliminate the remnant forces of the GMD; and restore and develop production. In the countryside, the priority is to carry out the struggle against bandits, despots, and the ruling members of the landlord class step by step, and to finish preparations for the reduction of rent, so that one or two years after the PLA's arrival, the task of reducing rent can be completed, thus creating the precondition for the redistribution of land. At the same time, attention must be paid to maintaining the existing level of agricultural production and avoiding a decrease. Apart from a few areas, the situation in the north is completely different. Here, the GMD rule has been overthrown, the rule of the people established, and the land question fundamentally solved. The central task of the party here is to mobilize all forces to restore and develop production and to regard this task as the focus of all other work. At the same time, cultural and educational activities must be restored and promoted, remnant reactionary forces must be eradicated, and the whole north should be consolidated to support the PLA.

6) We have already engaged in broad economic construction, and the party's economic policies have been implemented in actual work and achieved marked results. However, as regards the reasons for the adoption of these economic policies instead of others, there are still many confused ideas about theories and principles inside the party. How to answer these questions? We think that they should be answered in the following manner. The ratio between China's industry and agriculture in the national livelihood is approximately 10 percent industry and 90 percent agriculture. This is the consequence of the oppression of China by the imperialist and feudal systems. This is the economic form of semicolonial and semifeudal old China. This is and will be the basic point of departure for all issues in the Chinese revolutionary period and for a considerably long period after the revolutionary victory. Proceeding from this, a number of strategic, tactical, and policy questions have arisen for our party. Further precise understanding and solution of these questions are an important current task for the party. That is to say, first, China already has about 10 percent modern industrial economy. This represents an advance and is different from ancient times. Because of this fact, China already has new classes and new political parties, i.e., the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and a political party for the proletariat and political parties for the bourgeoisie. The Chinese proletariat and its party, the CCP, have been tempered by the oppression of several layers of enemies, and thus obtained the qualifications to lead the Chinese people's revolution. Whoever neglects and underestimates this point will commit right opportunist mistakes. Second, China still has about 90 percent scattered and

private rural and handicraft economy. This is backward and is not very different from ancient times. We still have about 90 percent of our economic life stuck in ancient times. The feudal landownership system of ancient times either has been abolished by us now or will be abolished soon. On this point, we have distinguished or will distinguish ourselves from the old times and have achieved or shall achieve soon the possibility of moving our agriculture and handicraft industry gradually toward modernization. Today and for a considerably long period of time in the future, the basic forms of our agriculture and handicraft industry still are and will be scattered and private, or similar to that of ancient times. Whoever neglects or underestimates this point will commit "left" opportunist mistakes. Third, although China's modern industry accounts for only about 10 percent of the total production output of the national economy, it is highly concentrated, and the largest and most important amounts of capital are concentrated in the hands of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Chinese bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Confiscating this capital and returning it to the ownership of the People's Republic under the leadership of the proletariat will enable the People's Republic to control the lifelines of the country and become the leading component in the entire national economy. This portion of the economy is of a socialist, not a capitalist, character. Whoever neglects or underestimates this point will commit right opportunist mistakes. Fourth, China's private capitalist economy occupies second place in the modern industrial economy, and it is a force not to be trifled with. The Chinese liberal bourgeoisie and its representatives often adopt the position of either participating or remaining neutral in the people's democratic revolutionary struggle, owing to the oppression or restrictions of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Because of these facts, and the still backward situation of the Chinese economy at present, the enthusiasm of private capitalists in the cities and the countryside needs to be put to use to the fullest possible extent for a considerably long period of time after the victory of the revolution in order to promote the national economy. All elements of capitalism in the cities and the countryside that are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and develop. Free competition and free trade at home are not only inevitable but economically necessary. But the existence and development of Chinese capitalism and the existence and development of free competition and free trade will not be unrestricted and spread unchecked as in the capitalist countries. Yet, it will not be restricted and reduced to an extreme extent as in the East European new democratic states. They will follow China's own pattern. They will be restricted in several aspects: operational scope, taxation policies, marketing prices, and conditions of work. In all these aspects, appropriate and flexible policies for restriction should be adopted in light of the concrete conditions in each locality, each industry and trade, and each period. Sun Yat-sen's slogan of restricting capital is still useful, and we must use it. For the benefit of the entire national economy and the present and future interests of the proletariat and the working people, however, it is essential that private capital should not be restricted too much and must be permitted to exist and develop along the track of the economic policies

and economic planning of the People's Republic. Adopting restrictive policies concerning private capital will naturally cause various degrees and forms of resistance from the bourgeoisie, especially from the owners of big enterprises or big capitalists. Restrictions and counterrestrictions will become the main form of class struggle in the new democratic country. It is completely wrong to believe that we need not restrict capitalism now and that the slogan of "restricting and regulating capital" can be abandoned. This is the right opportunist viewpoint. But it is also a complete mistake to believe, at the other extreme, that private capital should be severely restricted in scope and degree or that private capital can be simply eradicated quickly, so as to enter speedily into a socialist society under the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is the "left" opportunist or adventurist viewpoint. Fifth, it is possible to guide the scattered and private rural and handicraft economy that accounts for 90 percent of the national economy to develop in the direction of modernization and collectivization; the view that it can be allowed to develop unchecked is wrong. Production, consumption, and credit cooperatives and the leading organs of these cooperatives should be organized at the central, provincial, county, district, and township levels. These cooperatives are collective economic organizations of the working people, based on the private system and regulated by the government under the leadership of the proletariat. The cultural backwardness and the lack of tradition of cooperation among the Chinese people cause great difficulties in promoting and developing the movement of cooperatives. However, they can be organized, must be organized, promoted, and developed. With only a state-run economy and without a cooperative economy, it is impossible for us to lead the working people's private economy gradually toward collectivization, it is impossible to turn a new democratic country into a socialist country in the future, and it is impossible to consolidate the right of proletarian leadership over the government. Whoever neglects or underestimates this point will commit the gravest mistake. The state-run economy is of socialist character, and the cooperative economy is semisocialist. Together with the private capitalist economy, the private economy and the state-capitalist economy, which consist in cooperation between the state and private citizens, are the main economic forms of the People's Republic. They form the economy of the new democracy. Sixth, the recovery and development of the national economy of the People's Republic cannot be carried out without unified regulation policies for foreign trade. The elimination of the rule of imperialism, feudalism, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the GMD (the latter is the central manifestation of the sum of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism at home) does not mean the complete settlement of the question of China's independence in decision making. Only when the economy has developed greatly, when a backward agricultural state has changed into an advanced industrial state, and when the economy relies on no foreign countries and has achieved total independence can this question be solved. It is impossible to obtain this objective without a system of unified regulations for foreign trade. After the nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution, there will remain two basic contradictions in China. The first is the domestic contradiction

between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The second is the external contradiction between China and the imperialist countries. For these reasons, the state system of the People's Republic under the leadership of the proletariat should not be weakened and must be strengthened after the victory of the people's democratic revolution. Internal restriction of capital and the regulation of external trade are the two basic policies of this state in the economic struggle. Whoever neglects or underestimates this point will commit extremely grave mistakes. Seventh, the Chinese economic legacy is backward, but the Chinese people are brave and industrious. With the victory of the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the People's Republic, the leadership of the CCP, and the assistance from the proletariat of all countries in the world, mostly from the Soviet Union, the speed of Chinese economic construction will not be slow and will possibly be rather fast, and the prosperity of China will arrive in a short space of time. There is absolutely no evidence to support a pessimistic viewpoint concerning the revitalization of the Chinese economy.

7) The old China was a semicolonial country controlled by the imperialist system. The thorough anti-imperialist nature of the Chinese people's democratic revolution gives rise to great hatred of this revolution by the imperialists, who exert their utmost efforts to help the GMD, thus arousing the Chinese people's deep indignation at the imperialists and casting away the last bit of reputation of the imperialists themselves among the Chinese people. At the same time, the entire imperialist system has been greatly weakened since World War II, and the strength of the anti-imperialist frontline of the world headed by the Soviet Union has increased unprecedentedly. All this means that we can and should adopt the policy of destroying the imperialist right of control in China in a step-by-step and thorough manner. This imperialist right of control manifests itself in political, economic, and cultural aspects. In every city and every locality where the GMD troops have been wiped out and the GMD government has been struck down, the imperialists political right of control has been destroyed in the process, and their economic and cultural rights of control have also been drastically weakened. Economic and cultural enterprises directly run by the imperialists still exist, however, and diplomats and journalists recognized by the GMD are still here. With regard to these matters, we must decide our priorities and find appropriate solutions.

8) All the conditions for convening a political consultative conference and setting up a democratic coalition government have matured. All democratic parties and groups, mass organizations, and independent democratic personages are standing on our side. The bourgeoisie in Shanghai and along the Yangtze River are trying to establish relations with us. Navigational and postal services between the south and the north have started. The disintegrating GMD is isolated from all the masses. We are preparing to negotiate with the Nanjing reactionary government and other reactionary local governments and military cliques. If we allow negotiations, we have to be prepared for the many troubles that will arise after the success of the negotiations, and we must prepare a clear mind to deal with the other side's adoption of the policy of Sun [Wukong] who sneaks into the stomach of Princess Iron Fan to stir up

trouble.¹¹⁸ As long as we are prepared psychologically, we can overcome any such Sun who tries to stir up trouble. In this way, we must prepare both comprehensive negotiations or partial and peaceful negotiations. We should not be afraid of trouble and prefer quietness and refuse these negotiations. We should not accept these negotiations with confused ideas. Our principles must be firm, and we must also have all the necessary and permissible flexibility to realize these principles.

9) The people's democratic dictatorship based on the alliance between workers and peasants and under the leadership of the proletariat requires our party to unite resolutely with the entire working class, the entire peasant class, and the broad [stratum of] revolutionary intellectuals, who are leading forces and the foundation of this dictatorship. Without such unity, the dictatorship cannot be consolidated. At the same time, it requires our party to unite with as many petty-bourgeois and liberal bourgeois representatives who are able to cooperate with us as possible, and their intellectuals and political groups with an aim to isolating the reactionaries and completely overthrowing domestic reactionary forces and imperialist forces in the revolutionary period, and rapidly recovering and developing production, dealing with foreign imperialists, and enabling the steady transformation of China from an agricultural country into an industrial country, from a new democratic state into a socialist state after the revolution. Therefore, our party's policy of long-term cooperation with democratic personages outside the party must be affirmed in the thinking and work of the entire party. We must treat the majority of democratic personages outside the party as our own cadres, discuss and settle those issues that must be negotiated and settled in an honest and aboveboard manner, and give them work to do, granting them positions and power in their work and enabling them to achieve success in their work. Proceeding from, and to achieve the objective of, uniting with them it is necessary to make correct and appropriate criticism of or struggle against their mistakes and shortcomings. It is incorrect to adopt an attitude of accommodation toward their mistakes or shortcomings. Further, it is incorrect to adopt a closed-door and perfunctory attitude toward them. We should cultivate a group of independent personages who can cooperate with us and have prestige in every big and medium city, strategic area, and province. The incorrect closed-door style of work toward the democratic personages outside the party that was fostered during the period of the land revolution was not entirely overcome in the period of resisting Japan, and it exploded again in various base areas during the period of land reform in 1947. This attitude will only isolate our party, obstruct the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship, and win allies for the enemy. Now, the first Chinese political consultative conference under the leadership of our party will be held, a democratic coalition government will be set up, and the revolution will triumph nationwide. The entire party must make a serious self-examination and have correct understanding on this issue, must oppose right accommodationism and the two "left" tendencies of closed-doorism and perfunctoriness, and adopt completely correct attitudes.

10) We shall win a nationwide victory soon. The victory will break through the

eastern front line of the imperialists and has a great international significance. It will not be long or take very much effort before we achieve this victory. It will require a great deal of time and great efforts before we can consolidate this victory. The bourgeoisie suspects our capability for construction. The imperialists predict that, sooner or later, we shall have to go to them to beg for our survival. It is possible that arrogant sentiments, the airs of a hero and wanting to stop and make no more advances, of seeking pleasure and avoiding hardship will grow inside the party because of victory. Because of victory, people will be grateful to us, and the bourgeoisie will come and praise us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us. But the bourgeoisie's praises may conquer those in our ranks who are weak-willed. There may be some Communists who have not been conquered by the armed enemy. They are worthy of the title of hero in front of these enemies, but they cannot stand the attacks by people with sugarcoated bullets and will be defeated. We must guard against this situation. The achievement of a nationwide victory is only the first step in a long march of 10,000 *li*. It is silly to pride ourselves on this first step. What is more worthy of pride still lies ahead. The Chinese revolution is a great one, but the road after the revolution is even longer and the work even greater and harder. This point must be made clear to the party now, so that comrades can continue to preserve the work-style of modesty, prudence, and no arrogance or rashness. Comrades must continue to keep the style of hard work and struggle. We have the Marxist weapon of criticism and self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad work-style and preserve a good work-style. We can learn what we did not know before. We should not only be capable of destroying an old world, but should also be capable of creating a new one. The Chinese people not only can survive without begging from the imperialists, but also will live better than those in the imperialist countries.

H.26 Some Questions Concerning Urban Work.

Liu Shaoqi (12 March 1949)¹¹⁹

Chairman Mao has delivered a very good report, and many comrades have made fine speeches, too. I agree with them all.

During the rural reform, mistakes were made in various places, for which the CC is in part responsible because most were my fault. The focus at the land conference was on repudiating right deviations, and although at the same time "left" deviations were criticized and combatted, not enough was done to prevent them.¹²⁰ Although to a certain extent anarchy and a lack of discipline were noted and reproved, these deviations were not set right until Chairman Mao developed a systematic criticism and laid down methods for their correction.

From now on, urban work will be the focus of our work throughout the party. I would now like to discuss a few relevant questions.

1) The cities and villages. We should regard the cities and villages as an integral whole. So far, we have been dealing with rural problems only, but the addition of urban problems means we now must attend to the difficulties related to large industries, state-owned enterprises which are socialist in character, state capitalism, the relationship between the cities and the countryside, and so on. In guiding the work of our party as a whole, we must focus on urban work by keeping these problems in mind and giving them due consideration. We must change the practice of concentrating on just one area at a time or we will make mistakes.

2) The takeover of the cities. This problem has by and large been solved. Although there are some shortcomings, the people are pleased with the results to date. Two problems remain to be solved, however.

One concerns the resumption of work in private enterprises. Many private enterprises in Beijing have not yet resumed operations. It is true that some capitalists find it difficult to do so, but there are certainly others who are causing trouble and going slow in an attempt to promote their own influence with the workers by weakening the party's. Therefore, I propose that we adopt the principle of sending cadres or military representatives to such big cities as Nanjing and Shanghai to supervise private enterprises that have a vital bearing on the national economy and people's livelihood and whose owners cause trouble or move slowly. While it is not yet advisable to issue a general decree on the supervision of private enterprises, detailed instructions should be given both to those who are sent as supervisors and to the enterprises concerned. Full preparations must be made in advance. The situation in the enterprises must be sized up (we can have talks with the capitalists) and relevant problems clarified before the supervisors are dispatched. The powers and functions of the military representatives should be specifically defined in instructions which should lay down, among other things, that the owner must submit a detailed report to the military representative without withholding anything, that trade unions should be organized to conduct education among the workers, and that the capitalists should be prevented from moving slowly or engaging in sabotage. In principle, the party has no right to ban strikes by workers. But it must suppress the disruptive activities of capitalists and reactionaries in order to safeguard production. Naturally, where necessary and feasible, it is proper to assist capitalists to overcome their difficulties in resuming work and maintaining production by helping them do such things as procure raw materials and establish markets.

The second problem concerns making prompt arrangements for handing the enterprises over to the proper institutions to run so that normal production may be carried on. Of course some enterprises, such as the Shanghai textile mills, do not fit anywhere and cannot resume normal production if they are handed over to local institutions. But since the central government has not yet been established and there is no one available to take charge of them, Shanghai Municipality should try to do it. Once established, the central government should make preparations for taking over the large enterprises in big cities like Shanghai and Hankou.

The basic problems of administration of the cities after their takeover has not yet

been solved. We should study the matter earnestly and find a solution after the current session is concluded. Our successful takeover of the cities must be followed up by their successful administration and transformation. We must get rid of some of the old things—but not too many all at once—and we should let new things grow. Successful administration of the cities means building them up and increasing production, thus bringing the workers and peasants closer to each other.

3) Rely on the workers and increase production. With regard to administration of the cities, Chairman Mao raised two questions: On whom should we rely and to what purpose? His answer is to rely on the workers in order to increase production.

We must rely on the workers. But are they reliable? Marxism holds that the working class is the most reliable. Generally speaking, this is correct, but we still have some specific problems. So we must strive to enable our working class to become completely reliable. If we ignore these problems and rely on the workers without doing any work among them, they will not necessarily be reliable.

Our party once had close ties with the workers, but subsequently we were compelled to move to the countryside. The GMD has been operating among the workers for so many years that, through its influence, it has made the ranks of workers more complicated. Moreover, our ties with the workers have been weakened, and our cadres (including members of the CC) do not know them very well and are no longer good at working among them. Hence, we must study assiduously, always bear in mind Chairman Mao's instruction to rely on the workers, strengthen our work among them, and turn them into a completely reliable force. There are three principal measures we must take: do all we can to maintain the workers' living standard and prevent it from falling too low, conduct intensive education among the workers on a broad scale, and get them organized.

a) We must maintain the workers' livelihood. Whenever feasible and necessary, the people's government should give the workers preferential treatment. For example, when we are short of goods and materials, we must ensure supplies for the workers (who come second only to the armed forces in this matter), and we should see to it that their living standard is higher than that of the staff members of our own institutions in the rear areas. Of course, it would be wrong for the workers to make unduly high demands and pursue nothing but material benefits, and we have already criticized this. However, failure to protect the workers' livelihood or lack of concern for it would be an even more serious mistake. If we lead an even harder life than the workers when times are most difficult, we will be in a better position to influence the workers and gain their understanding and support. Comrade Chen Yun told the workers in Shenyang that we were using coal tailing just as they were and that the best quality coals were being saved to run the trains which take our troops to the front. Then he posed the question, "Should good coal be used on trains or for cooking?" Once things were clarified, the workers had no complaints. That was the proper way to explain things.

There is no doubt that the CP fights for the improvement of the life of the working class; this principle has not changed. If we do not give the working class

anything to look forward to, they will say that things remain the same and that we are no different from the GMD. We must disseminate the idea that the living standards of the workers will surely be improved in the days to come and that it is in the interest of the war effort, of construction, and of the future that we are leading this hard life today.

At present, many peasants complain that the workers, being exempt from obligatory labor and grain taxes, are better off than they and that this is unfair. The complaint is not entirely groundless, but we cannot accept it as it stands. The workers, for their part, say that the peasants have obtained land, and ask what they have received. Their wages have not been raised, their work hours have not been reduced, and everything remains about the same as in the past. This is not entirely groundless either, but they should direct their attention to the future. Naturally, things are different with the workers in that handing the "factories to the individual workers" cannot be allowed. Efforts should be made, however, to explain to them that their living standards will be improved as soon as possible.

The problem of wages has not yet been solved. We plan either to convene a special national conference after we move to Beijing, or perhaps to begin by studying one trade and trying to solve the problem there. It will involve a great deal of work, and I hope that everyone will give it their attention.

b) We must educate the workers. Once we enter the cities, we should immediately begin educational work; we should spend a few months or half a year conducting extensive education among the workers and staff members, beginning with the workers. Old guilds and societies should be reorganized. As for the former staff members, a distinction should be made between those working in enterprises and those in government institutions. Those in enterprises for the most part should be kept where they are. In the old government institutions, however, things will be thoroughly reorganized, so those who can be kept on will generally be transferred to other institutions (excepting those who are needed for their special skills). It would be wrong to leave the old government institutions intact.

To sum up, both staff members and workers should receive education, especially political education. This can be done through short-term training classes lasting one or two or perhaps three to four months by giving general lectures or running night schools. General lectures should be the main form at first. According to Comrade Li Lisan,¹²¹ 3,000 staff members and workers have attended training classes, and 30,000 have attended lectures since the liberation of Shenyang. It goes without saying that former staff members who are retained should receive retraining.

Most of our training classes have focused largely on teaching our policies. Policies have to be discussed, but the neglect of instruction in historical materialism and the failure to conduct adequate propaganda on the proletarian world outlook are major shortcomings. In the movement for pouring out grievances, the prisoners of war changed sides within a week, courageously turning their guns against the enemy. The same was true of the peasants during rural reform. That is Marxist class education. Persons who have adopted the class viewpoint and stand as well as the

theories of class struggle and historical materialism can stand firm; those who have not, even though they may be well aware of the policies, will become unsteady and vacillate when confronted with grave difficulties. This has happened again and again. In educating the workers, we should pay special attention to this point. We must intensify class education among them so as to enhance their class consciousness. The liberation of Beijing and Tianjin has provided favorable conditions for such education, and the workers have shown their warm enthusiasm for it by asking us to give lectures, which they attend even after a hard day's work. The workers' enthusiasm will cool if, after we have been in the city for six months, we have not undertaken this task. Therefore, we must strike while the iron is hot, that is, go all out in conducting workers' training classes and short-term training courses and in selecting fine comrades to attend workers' political colleges. The colleges should be run in the same way as colleges are run in the northeast. At the schools there, priority is given to teaching the basic concepts of Marxism-Leninism (historical materialism, the concept that labor creates the world, and the theories of surplus value and class struggle) and the basic questions of the Chinese revolution. Following instruction in those two subjects, the schools focus on our various policies and the concrete problems of organizational work. In general, these are the four subjects to be taught.

Only through such education can the workers, or at least the advanced ones, acquire a higher political consciousness. The next thing to do is set up trade unions and expand party organizations among the workers. In principle, the party should admit a large number of members from among their ranks. In this way we can get a grip on the industries and the cities. When the workers have raised their political consciousness and organized themselves into trade unions, and when there is a large number of party members among them, they will be the most reliable force, and we will understand each other better. Mutual understanding is very important. We have been cut off from the workers for a long time and have lost touch with them. Just as many of our leading cadres know very little about the workers, they know very little about us. They are, however, eager to get to know us. So, after entering the cities, our leading comrades should go among the workers, talk with them, and get close to them in order to build genuine mutual understanding.

c) We must organize trade unions. The ACFTU should adopt a resolution concerning the organization of trade unions. There are several million industrial workers throughout the country, and the number may amount to 10 million when the handicraft workers are included. It should be stipulated that only those who live by selling their labor power are qualified for membership and that this excludes small handicraftsmen. Trade union federations of a national character, such as a federation of railway trade unions, can be organized to represent several large trades. In principle, all the workers should be organized into trade unions.

The workers' representative conference is a very good form of organization. Such conferences can be convened in any factory or government institution which has over 300 workers and staff members. When linked together, these conferences will constitute the basis of a municipal workers' representatives conference.

A municipal workers' representatives conference can be convened prior to the establishment of trade unions. To begin with, it can discuss problems concerning the workers' daily life and then gradually move to questions of production and municipal administration. Such a conference can serve as the first step in the establishment of a municipal people's representatives conference. A municipal government can then report its work plans to the municipal workers' representatives conference, put forward proposals, give explanations, and ask the representatives to discuss them. When enough experience has been gained with the workers' representatives conference, we can proceed to organize student and neighborhood representatives conferences and, after several months or a year, go further to organize a municipal people's representatives conference.

The people's representatives conference constitutes the principal system and form of organization for the people's political power, because it is a whole chain of conferences at different levels that will elect corresponding government councils. As a democratic form, it is the main form, and it will be in constant and general use as the link between higher and lower levels and between administrative orders and mass movements. A factory director's orders will be more readily carried out if they are discussed and approved by the workers' representatives conference before being passed down to the grass roots. All localities should adopt this form and go about instituting it on a broad scale. We did not do anything like this during the great revolution; nor did we do much during the Civil War and the War of Resistance against Japan years, but we cannot put it off any longer. If we do, it will be detrimental to our effort to combat bureaucratism and to effectively overcome all the maladies attendant on administrative orders. It is time for all localities to convene people's representatives conferences.

To recapitulate, a guaranteed livelihood will help enhance the workers' morale, intensive education will raise their political awareness, and organization will unite them and add to their strength. This is the way to win the support of the working class and to get the workers to back us up by striving to increase production. It will lead to a mutual reliance and close ties between the CP and the workers.

H.27 Outline of Basic Policies Concerning the Structure of the Economy in the Northeast and Its Economic Construction. *Zhang Wentian* (15 September 1948)¹²²

1) The Economy of the Northeast

Now that feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism have been completely destroyed and the imperialists' economic privileges in the northeast abolished, the economy of the Northeast is basically composed of five elements: the state sector, the cooperative

economy, the national capitalist economy, the private capitalist economy, and the small-scale commodity economy (the natural economy plays a small role but because its influence is small, it is omitted). A correct understanding of the character, position, direction of development, and mutual relations of these five elements is the starting point and basis for correctly determining economic policies for the northeast. Only with this starting point can we keep on the track on the economic front and provide correct leadership by the proletariat for socioeconomic construction.

2) The State Sector

Because of the special historical conditions of the northeast, the state sector is more developed relative to other regions of China. Almost all large enterprises are completely controlled by the state, such as railways; electrical industry; coal mines; iron ore mines; transportation; postal communications; gold mines; and other mining, forestry, chemical, textile, paper manufacturing, salt industries; as well as banks, foreign trade, state farms, and large trading companies. All are controlled by the state. The state sector does not occupy an absolute majority of the total output of the northeast, but it accounts for a large percentage, controls the arteries of economic activities in society, and occupies a position of leadership in the national economy. Particularly in the industrial and commercial sectors this leadership position of the state sector is even more obvious. This type of economy in the new democratic state led by the proletariat already has a socialist character. This kind of state sector economy constitutes the primary material strength for supporting the people's revolutionary war and fighting for victory at the present time. It is the foundation on which the economic alliance between the urban proletariat and rural peasants can be built. It is the principal economic basis of the new democratic politics and the pillar of the economy of New Democracy. It is the most powerful weapon for the proletariat to fight speculation and manipulation on the economic front and compete economically with capitalism. It is the state's most valuable asset. Its future development is limitless. Therefore, we must pay special attention to it, enable it to develop as far as possible, and place it in the most important position in national economic construction. The heavy and military industry especially should be treated in this way. We must be frugal and use every means to accumulate capital for recovery and the development of the state sector. Any downplaying or neglect of recovery and development of the state sector is wrong. The new democratic state led by the proletariat will suffer irreparable losses or even final defeat if it does not consciously control this artery of the national economy, or use every possibility and legitimate means to strengthen this economic force. Of course, this socialist economy managed by the new democratic state led by the proletariat stands directly opposed to the private capitalist economy; its competition with the private capitalist economy is unavoidable. This contradiction, or the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is the fundamental contradiction in the new democratic society after the complete destruction of the oppression by imperialism, feudalism,

and bureaucratic capitalism. The struggle surrounding this contradiction, particularly the long-term economic competition surrounding this contradiction, will determine the future development of the new democratic society: whether it will transform to a socialist society, or to an average capitalist society.

However, the state sector has many weaknesses at the present time. In addition to the economic destruction and difficulties caused by the state of war, right now we are extremely poor at managing economic enterprises. Many economic units are very badly managed and often lose money. Moreover, the state has not made enough of an effort to manage all state-owned enterprises in a planned, proper, and centralized manner. Many enterprises still operate independently; a serious state of anarchy exists among individual state-owned enterprises, thus adding to the state of anarchy and confusion on the market. Because our policies on economic construction are not specific or clear, many comrades often use old capitalist methods or bureaucratic capitalist methods to manage the state sector, thus preventing it from effectively leading the market and the entire national economy, and from serving the people. Therefore, we must seriously study economic management; all state sector economic activities must be under the centralized management of the state. All economic agencies of the state must conduct economic management under a unified law, system, and plan and commanded by a unified authoritative agency. They must first destroy their own state of anarchy and then fight the anarchy on the market. Therefore, the state must issue strict laws, specify tight regulations, and establish strong and effective unified authoritative agencies; it should create a proper division of labor for the different sectors and industries; [it should] establish all kinds of companies and trusts [which] are responsible for individual management. Specialized agencies should exclusively manage the supply of raw materials, hiring of workers and staff, transportation of finished products, short-term loans for cash flow, etc. There should also be a unified pricing policy governing the purchase of raw materials and the sale of commodities in different periods and in different areas. Individual state enterprises are banned from using different prices to compete on the market. The state bank must widely develop and promote its activities in production and the stabilization of the market. Apart from the state central bank, all kinds of specialized banks must be established, such as industrial, agricultural, commercial, communication, and savings banks. They should conduct banking operations in all areas. Thus, all state-owned enterprises can be guided by management through a unified plan. The majority of small producers may be incorporated, through the cooperative system, under the leadership of the state sector economy. Moreover, elements of private capital may also be absorbed into the economic system of the state sector by using the methods of state capitalism. This makes it possible for the new democratic state led by the proletariat to organize the economy of the entire society and country and turn it into a planned economy, thus avoiding the state of anarchy and panic of a capitalist economy.

3) The Cooperative Economy

The cooperative economy in the northeast has already begun in the areas of production and sales (consumer goods); but it is just beginning.

The cooperatives at present consist mainly of labor mutual aid organizations in agricultural production. [They are], as Chairman Mao said, "collective labor organizations founded on the basis of the microeconomy (on the basis of private property)." Although they are quite popular in the countryside in the northeast, they have many problems. There are cooperatives of artisans in the cities, but their number is very small. Supply cooperatives (or consumer cooperatives) exist in cities, but most of them are jointly owned small shops that do not really function as cooperatives; there are very few of them in the countryside.

We believe that the efforts to organize small producers (mainly peasants) into cooperatives such as labor mutual aid groups must strictly follow the principles of consent and mutual benefit to promote their development. Such cooperatives can raise productivity and increase products and the wealth of small producers. This will foster the habit of labor mutual aid among small producers and create several favorable conditions for the future collectivization of the peasantry. However, the efforts to organize all small producers and working people into supply cooperatives demands our serious attention at the present time. There are only production cooperatives, but no supply cooperatives. Thus, between small producers and the state there is no economic bridge or economic linkage. On the other hand, if we widely establish supply cooperatives in the countryside and the cities, the state can directly link up with small producers economically through such cooperatives. Staple consumer goods, tools for handicrafts, and agricultural equipment that are produced by the state sector may be reasonably distributed to small producers via supply cooperatives; all kinds of products and raw materials produced by peasants and small producers may also be purchased by the state via supply cooperatives according to plan and then distributed by the state to individual factories, or for sale and export. Thus, the state sector can get abundant supplies of raw materials, grain, and all finished goods, and possess sufficient material resources for distribution in the production process and for export. It can also fight all sorts of economic speculation and manipulation that undermine the New Democracy. Moreover, small producers can also sell their products according to plan and use their goods to exchange for all kinds of necessity, thus eliminating the middleman exploitation used by commercial capitalists. Through this kind of economic integration between the state and small producers via supply cooperatives, the incentives for production on the part of small producers will be greatly increased, thus further promoting the development of production cooperatives of the peasants and artisans.

It is very clear that unless we have a large number of supply cooperatives to act as bridges and linkages to integrate small producers with the state sector, the state led by the proletariat will be incapable of carrying out effective economic leadership over tens of millions of dispersed small producers, or of pursuing smoothly the

national economic construction of New Democracy. In this situation, the private capitalist economy will then lead the tens of millions of small producers and prevent the proletariat-led state sector from leading the national economy.

It must be understood that when the proletariat leads the peasantry to rise up and destroy the feudal system, we can use direct revolutionary methods, or administrative means, to reach our goal. But to provide economic leadership for agricultural small producers, and make tens of millions of them produce according to the proletariat's plan, as well as advance toward the socialist future, it is totally useless to resort to administrative means; moreover, it is very dangerous. The proletariat must adopt economic methods acceptable to agricultural small producers in order to organize and lead them economically. The [correct] economic method is the cooperative, the supply cooperative, the production cooperative, in the future the collective farm [*jiti nongchang*], etc. The present supply cooperatives in the countryside are the headquarters that economically command the agricultural small producers and form the central link in organizing production and consumption. It is the primary form for economically organizing peasants and artisans after the land reform. Without such supply cooperatives, we cannot organize economically, lead, or command the tens of millions of agricultural small producers. Because agricultural small producers depend on the market, in the past they had to depend on the merchants who cruelly exploited them. But today they have the right to expect that the proletarian leadership will not exploit their supply cooperatives and that they can carry out their commodity production on a small scale. If the proletariat can provide them satisfactory assistance and leadership in this area, they will naturally follow the proletariat forward. Otherwise, they can only depend on the merchants and follow the bourgeoisie forward. Therefore, we must emphasize this central link and rely on the supply cooperatives as our principal means at the moment to promote the production enterprise of agricultural small producers and to lead them economically.

Since the political power of the state is more concentrated in the northeast, and since transportation facilities, people's staple goods like cooking oil, salt, cloth, coal, timber, matches, some grain, etc., are mainly in the hands of the state, the material conditions for setting up supply cooperatives on a wide scale are very favorable. Supply cooperatives should be widespread economic organizations for all the laboring people in the cities and villages alike. Their mission is to supply cooperative members, at the most reasonable prices, the inputs they need (such as tools and raw materials) and consumer goods (such as food, coal, cooking oil, salt, cloth, etc.), as well as to purchase the goods produced by its members (such as the peasants' surplus grain, cotton, and the finished goods of the artisans) and to export or sell them to the state. This will avoid the exploitation of the middleman and will economically serve the cooperative members and protect their interests. They must order goods directly from the state economic agencies and other production agencies, transport them to the places where they are needed by all cooperative members, and sell them to the members. They also sell directly to the state economic agencies or consumers the raw materials thus purchased without going through

merchants. They must assume on a large scale the function of social distribution between the producer and consumer and replace speculative and manipulative merchants. Therefore, supply cooperatives should never manage their business in the same way merchants do; they should never buy low and sell high solely for the pursuit of profit and dividends. Instead, they should sell staple goods to the members at relatively low prices and buy the products from small producers at reasonable prices. Only by doing this can [we] solidly organize tens of millions of small producers and laboring people into supply cooperatives. Failure to do so will mean that we can never organize small producers and the laboring people on a wide scale or avoid failure. Aside from the rationalization and frugality of the organization and management of the cooperatives themselves, in order to enable the supply cooperatives to organize tens of millions of small producers and working people, to supply staple goods to their members at relatively low prices, and to purchase products from small producers at reasonable prices, it is absolutely necessary for the state to provide regular and appropriate favorable treatment and assistance in terms of capital, taxation, transportation and ordering of goods. Moreover, the supply cooperatives must be managed under the unified economic plans of the state to avoid competition and anarchy between the cooperatives and the state economic agencies, as well as among the cooperatives themselves. In order to fulfill this great responsibility for the tens of millions of laboring people, the supply cooperatives must devise their unified charter and specify their mission, principles of business management, the rights of cooperative members, the discipline and obligations they must observe, as well as the scope and structure of their organization. The government must also make laws for the cooperatives, strictly protect their assets, safeguard the implementation of the cooperative charter, specify favorable treatment for them in state taxation and with the transportation authorities, and outlaw all kinds of speculative and manipulative practices designed to exploit the people in the name of the cooperatives. This kind of supply cooperatives must have a system of hierarchical organization, including a general cooperative for the entire northeast, individual provincial cooperatives, and cooperatives at the county, city, district, and village levels with branches in factories, administrative agencies, and schools, and some specialized general and branch cooperatives, such as salt and fishing cooperatives. Within the cooperatives, a strict system of democratic centralism must be implemented; regular conferences of members, representatives' meetings at all levels, and meetings of representatives must be convened; committees at all levels must be elected. These committees should appoint managers at the different levels and other important executives and strictly enforce the rule that the minority obeys the majority and the lower level obeys the higher level. The establishment of lower-level cooperatives must be authorized by higher-level organizations. Business is conducted under a unified plan. Our party must set up fully operational party groups [*dangzu*] at the different levels of leadership in such cooperatives. We should also run seminars for the cooperative movement to train to a sufficient degree a large number of competent cadres to form their backbone. There must be a large number

of cadres who understand the theories of Marxism-Leninism, clearly know the specific rules of development governing the socialist economy of the New Democracy, command expert knowledge of cooperative management, and wholeheartedly serve the working people. Only with such cadres leading the cooperatives can the proletariat's correct line be executed systematically and the cooperatives be made a success, thus fulfilling the great social responsibilities and the state's mission as outlined above. Otherwise, it will be impossible to accomplish this mission. After such supply cooperatives have been properly organized, many of the shops of the state-owned trading companies may set about learning the needs and conditions of the market in various areas, based on the unified accounting system of the state-owned and cooperative stores. The state and cooperatives can plan and guide all kinds of productive enterprises according to the real needs and conditions of the market; this will avoid blind production and economic crisis. However, to run such cooperatives well is not a very easy thing to do; it must be done gradually and selectively.

We believe that the cooperative economy under the political system of New Democracy led by the proletariat is, to varying degrees, a socialist-type economy and the most reliable and effective assistant of the state sector. Without help from the cooperatives, the state sector will be isolated and without support on the economic front. Only by integrating, guiding, and helping the cooperative economy can the state sector have a reliable economic ally and attract tens of millions of small producers to its side in fighting all sorts of behavior of private speculation and manipulation and in combatting activities of anarchy and unorganized economic sabotage. This will enable the planned economy of New Democracy to gain the advantage. On the other hand, only by integrating with the state sector led by the proletariat and gaining the leadership and help of the state economic agencies can the cooperative economy organize the small producers within the cooperatives, avoid exploitation by commercial capitalists, and enable all to become rich. Only in this way can they get all kinds of machinery from the state sector and further realize the collectivization [*jitihua*] (cooperativization [*hezuohua*]) of production. Only this can prevent them from traveling along the capitalist road and help them along the socialist road via New Democracy.

4) The State Capitalist Economy

This type of economy has emerged in the northeast and will develop in the future; the more striking forms are listed below: (a) Renting: the state rents to the capitalists for development forestry areas, farms, fisheries, and even mines which the state at present does not have the ability to develop. It signs a contract for one year with the capitalists that spells out terms favorable to both sides; the capitalists are responsible for development and thus can make profits. The state provides the capitalists with certain conveniences and receives certain sums in rents. (b) Processing: the state provides the capitalists with raw materials and negotiates contracts for process-

ing; the capitalists sell the state the finished products for a profit. (c) Contracting: the state orders from the capitalists certain amounts of goods of a certain quality; thus the capitalists make some profit. (d) Commission: the state provides some private stores or companies with finished goods and lets the stores or companies market them; the capitalists thus make certain commercial profits. After the supply cooperatives have expanded enormously in the cities and the countryside, the need for such a commission system will be greatly reduced. At the moment, processing is relatively more developed in the northeast; the other forms are just beginning. The characteristic of this kind of state capitalism is that the state, out of economic necessity, provides private capitalists with certain necessary conditions for production and exchange. The private capitalists, using these conditions, make certain profits from the activities in production and exchange; this is the contract between the state and the capitalists on the basis of consent and mutual benefit. [This contract] also provides for the necessary management and supervision of the capitalists' activities. The direction of development of this form of state capitalism benefits the new democratic economy because, based on the needs of the state, private capital is attracted to serve the state, is put under its management and supervision, and is turned into an organic part of the plan for national economic construction. Moreover, the necessary capital cannot be supplied by a small capitalist but requires joint capital or the joint shares of many capitalists. This can promote the concentration of small capital production, thus increasing the scale, and further facilitates the state's management and supervision.

This type of private capitalist economy is most favorable to the economic development of New Democracy. Therefore, we should consciously recognize the economic realm of "state capitalism" and consciously promote and organize it. At the beginning, in particular, we should provide it with favorable terms, guarantee its supply of raw materials and grain, and provide transportation. In the new democratic economy, it should form a beneficial direction for private capitalism to develop in.

In the past we did very little in this area; or we did things only under duress, or spontaneously and blindly. We still lack initiative to do this on our own. In this area, we must overcome many mistakes in the thinking of the cadres. Some of our cadres often adopt a *laissez faire* attitude toward developing a conventional private capitalist economy and even excessively accommodate private capitalists. Conversely, their attitude toward developing state capitalism is to close the door; they are particularly afraid of the renting form of state capitalism. They would rather let abundant natural resources lie idle than allow the capitalists to develop them, fearing that the state will be shortchanged. They do not understand that developing all sources of wealth and increasing the total wealth of society, even by using private capital, still benefits the welfare of the country and the people. In absolute terms it is beneficial, even though the capitalists make some profits. In places where the state cannot provide management, or where management by private capital contributes to the welfare of the entire country, it is wrong to adopt a policy of excluding private capital.

5) The Private Capitalist Economy

The private capitalist economy in the northeast mainly consists of medium and small capitalists, particularly small capitalists. Because of war, private capitalism at the moment is biased in favor of commercial speculation and some small machine tool industries needed both for military and civilian use, as well as small-scale handicrafts. As a rule, the larger private capital is dispersed. Because the strength of the state sector at the moment is very limited, the cooperative economy is not yet particularly developed; because of all kinds of demands imposed by the war and the people, and because of the development of free trade, development of the private capitalist economy is inevitable and, within certain limits, necessary. Wherever the force of the state sector and cooperative economy cannot penetrate, the significant development of the private capitalist economy plays an important constructive role in terms of production and exchange and must never be neglected. Nor should methods for limiting the private capitalist economy be prematurely adopted. At the same time, because of the enormous political and economic strength of the proletariat in the state apparatus, development of the private capitalist economy is not a frightening prospect. Our current policy is to guide the private capitalist economy, which inevitably will develop in a direction beneficial to the national strategy and people's livelihood, as well as to limit its scope. Apart from guiding a portion of private capital onto the track of state capitalism, other private capital should contribute to the war and the people. All our economic policies should help accomplish the following: private capital that serves our national strategy and people's livelihood should be rendered profitable, and thus can survive and develop; all private capital that does not serve, or even harms, our national strategy and people's livelihood should be rendered unprofitable, so that it is forced to go into other businesses. It is particularly important to force commercial speculative capital to switch to industrial capital. In the old GMD-ruled China, commercial speculative capital that was very harmful to the national economy underwent an enormous expansion, turning almost all banking capital into commercial speculative capital. Commercial capital in the cities often comprised between 80 and 90 percent of the total capital. We must take firm measures to deal with such a huge commercial speculative capital in society and force it to switch to industrial and agricultural production. Apart from legislation by the state forbidding all economic activities designed to control the national economy, the measures include the development of commerce in the state sector and cooperative commerce to replace private commercial capital on a large scale, so that commercial capital cannot have high profit margins and thus is forced to switch toward productive areas. This is our criterion in encouraging as well as restricting private capital. It is also the criterion for alliance with, or struggle against, private capital.

Since they are capitalistic, all private capitalist economies, even the state capitalist economy, contain speculative and manipulative characteristics and anarchic, unorganized destructive economic activities. Therefore, the struggle against the

speculative and destructive economic activities of the private capitalist economy is the permanent mission on the economic front. Only by correctly persisting in this struggle can private capital develop in the direction of benefiting the national economy by reducing its destructiveness and increasing its constructiveness. However, this struggle is a long-term and regular struggle; it mainly consists of peaceful economic competition; we should not adopt incorrect administrative methods to carry out this struggle.

Of course, the ratio of composition of the private capitalist economy to the national economy in the northeast today lags behind the state sector and will fall behind the cooperative economy in the future. Its ratio today is not very large. But, as a result, we should not neglect its role and significance, particularly because it has deep roots in the small-scale commodity economy. Since the small-scale commodity economy, according to Lenin, breeds capitalism every day and every minute, it will develop in the future. Therefore, if we let private capitalism develop freely, it will ally with small producers via free trade and thus develop anarchic and unorganized economic activities and the speculation and manipulation inherent in commodity capitalism in the production process and exchange. These activities will in turn undermine the planning of the new democratic economy, thus pushing the entire national economy in the direction of capitalism.

Therefore, to prevent private capital from producing such adverse effects on the economic development of New Democracy, and in order to turn it into an aid to the cooperative enterprise of the state sector in organizing small producers, we must appropriately strengthen the state's control and supervision. The *laissez faire* attitude toward private capitalism is fundamentally very dangerous and mistaken.

We need not worry about how ordinary private capitalists can invest and make money under our control and supervision. In fact, they have more and richer experiences in this regard than we do. On the contrary, in terms of rational production technologies and economic accounting, we should genuinely learn from the capitalists.

6) The Small-Scale Commodity Economy

This type consists mainly of the small-scale commodity economy of the peasants. It enjoys a numerical advantage in the national economy of the northeast. Stalin said, "The peasant economy is not a capitalist economy. For most peasants, it is a small-scale commodity economy. What is small-scale commodity peasant economy? It is an economy that stands at the crossroads of capitalism and socialism. It can develop either in the direction of capitalism, as is the case in capitalist countries at present, or in the direction of socialism, such as in our country. This is bound to happen under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship." When explaining the reasons why the peasant economy is so "unstable" and "dependent," Stalin said, "The cause lies in the economic disorganization and dispersion of the peasant economy, its dependence on the cities, on industries, on the credit system, and on the character of the political regime. Finally, there is one reason all of us know, which is the fact

that, both in material and cultural aspects, the countryside follows behind the cities, and has to follow and must follow the cities."¹²³

Obviously, this kind of small-scale commodity economy will also develop in a socialist direction under the new democratic political system led by the proletariat. This has been proved in many of the new democratic countries in Eastern Europe and will be proved in new democratic China [albeit] after a longer period of transition than in the countries in Eastern Europe. However, this is precisely because here the state sector coexists simultaneously with the private capitalist economy, and thus the development of the small-scale commodity economy in a socialist direction will go through a relatively long period of education and struggle.

As for small-scale commodity producers (mainly peasants), we now should use every method to consolidate their private property rights and encourage their enthusiasm for production on the basis of their private economy, so that they will work hard and create wealth. As mentioned above, according to the principle of consent and mutual benefit of small producers, we should organize them into various cooperatives, but we should not weaken their private property rights. Instead of violating their demand for creating wealth, this is precisely to enable them to improve their lives and create wealth more rapidly. This kind of cooperation is very beneficial to small producers themselves. In order to accomplish this, however, we must emphasize:

First, this kind of cooperation of small producers is based on their private economy and on backward artisan technologies; it is not the kind of collective farm that exists in the Soviet Union. The system of collective farms must be created in order to enable China's agriculture to become socialist. However, under China's circumstances, this cannot be done for a very long period of time. It requires many preparatory steps, mainly through the new agricultural machinery provided by the state and preferred by the peasants.

Second, because such cooperation between small producers is based on the mutually beneficial principle of "equivalent exchange" and "to each according to his labor," the phenomenon of differences between the rich and the poor based on their industriousness will certainly exist among the cooperative small producers.

Third, because such cooperatives are based on the principle of consent, small producers can and should have complete freedom to join and withdraw from the cooperatives. Therefore, apart from the organized small producers, it is natural for independent and unorganized small producers to exist; actually, they may be rather numerous.

Because of the above conditions, in the process of developing the small-scale commodity economy, polarization—to a certain degree—is natural and inevitable among the peasant small producers. A small number of rural small producers will rise to become rich peasants or small capitalists later; others will fall to the status of poor peasants and tenants, or semi-employed or fully employed laborers for others. This is the inevitable result of the upward development of the forces of production in society, and we should not be afraid of it. As long as we persist with the new

democratic economic policies, we can, through the route of developing cooperatives, enable the majority of the rural small producers to rise to become rich peasants or rich artisans, instead of repeating the tragic route of the capitalist era with a small number of people rising to become rich peasants and capitalists while the majority become trapped in poverty and bankruptcy. But definitive victory can only be won through a long period of struggle, through fully exercising the power of the economic construction of New Democracy, and through overcoming all obstacles.

In the process of the development of the small commodity economy, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will certainly wage struggles among the small producers to gain influence and leadership. The new democratic political economy led by the proletariat will use every means to organize rural small producers in supply and production cooperatives, so that they will form a solid alliance with the state sector and facilitate their transition to socialism. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie, assisted by all the remnants of feudalism and bureaucratic capital, will use all its resources to win over rural small producers so that it may develop in the direction of the capitalist road. What about rural small producers? They are laborers. Therefore, as long as we do not commit any policy mistakes, they will be willing to organize under the leadership of the proletariat to develop in the direction of the cooperative economy. At the same time, however, the rural small producers are sellers of some products and therefore possess, more or less, the speculative characteristic of small merchants. This gives rise to the possibility that the bourgeois merchants may win them over and cooperate with them to oppose the state in its control and supervision of capitalism. We must clearly perceive and prevent the danger of this kind of development.

As discussed above, the strength of the bourgeoisie lies not only in the capitalist economy itself but also in the commodity economy of small producers. The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is fundamentally to isolate the bourgeoisie not only politically but economically from the small producers (mainly peasants). It is also to place the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat. It is no easy business to accomplish this goal and to place the peasant small producers economically under the leadership of the proletariat. Even after organizing them into cooperatives, the small producers' original weaknesses, such as the lack of organization, discipline, and commitment and tendencies toward speculation, extreme selfishness, and narrow-mindedness, will still work against, in varying degrees, the leadership of the proletariat within the cooperatives. If the leadership of the proletariat lacks firmness, if there is no iron discipline within the leadership group of the proletariat, if we surrender to those weaknesses of the petty-bourgeoisie, then the nature of the cooperatives will change. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for influence among small producers will exist within the cooperatives for a long time. Therefore, it is an inseparable part of the struggle against the bourgeoisie for the proletariat to struggle against and conduct education on all kinds of weaknesses of the small producers, as well as to overcome them. This struggle exists not only within the cooperatives but similarly in the state

sector, within the CP, and within the people's government. We will certainly fail to overcome these weaknesses of the small producers if we adopt the method of administrative coercion. Only the method of "patient persuasion and demonstration by example" as pointed out by Chairman Mao will be effective. This is where the difficulty and complexity of the struggle lies. Therefore, the proletariat must be extremely tolerant. However, we believe that the victory of the politics of New Democracy and the development of the state sector, as well as other international and domestic factors favoring the Chinese proletariat, will nevertheless guarantee the final victory of the Chinese people in this struggle and the small commodity economy's final switch to the socialist road. During their advance and according to their own experiences, peasants and artisans will finally understand that only cooperation and the integration of the cooperatives with the state sector led by the proletariat can prevent polarization among small producers and the situation in which only a minority rises to become capitalists while the majority falls into poverty and bankruptcy. Only this can genuinely unite the private interests of small producers and the public interests of all the people; only this can subordinate such private interests of small producers to the public interests of the majority of the people and thus advance toward socialism.

7) The Class Line in Economic Construction in the Northeast

What is discussed above is the specific content of the composition of the economy in the northeast. Generally speaking, all five types of economy described above should be developed at the present time. In the process of development, however, we should implement a clear line of proletarian leadership in terms of economic policy. This line should be: treat the development of the state sector as the principal task; widely develop and closely rely on the cooperative economy of the masses; help and transform the small-scale commodity economy; permit and encourage the private capitalist economy that benefits the national economy, particularly the state capitalist economy; prevent and oppose the speculation and destruction inherent in the commodity economy of capitalism; ban and undermine all speculative and manipulative management harmful to the national economy. The proletariat must make great efforts to implement this line in the economic construction of New Democracy. Only by implementing this line can the economy of the society of New Democracy be developed smoothly and the socialist element in the economy of New Democracy be strengthened. Only this will open up the routes of development of the entire national economy, so that, in the future, we may smoothly switch to socialism without bloodshed. On the other hand, if we equate developing the economy of New Democracy with developing the capitalist economy, if we place all our hopes in the development of the capitalist economy, if we make unprincipled concessions to the demands of the capitalists and surrender to the weaknesses of the petty-bourgeoisie, we will not be able to construct the economic foundation of the new democratic society. We will weaken, instead of strengthen, the socialist ele-

ment in the economy of New Democracy. In fact, we will build the economic foundations of capitalism. Then, because of the shortcomings in the economic foundations of New Democracy, the politics of our New Democracy will not be consolidated or prolonged. The politics of New Democracy will certainly degenerate into the politics of old democracy. In reality, this will surely mean the restoration of the old semicolonial and semifeudal rule. This line is a petty-bourgeois line in the economic construction of New Democracy, and it renounces the leadership position of the proletariat. This we should firmly oppose. We must clearly see the struggle between these two lines in the economic construction of New Democracy and thus consciously carry out the struggle between the two lines within our party by opposing leftist or rightist inconsistency on every specific question of economic construction.

Only on the basis of this correct line of the proletariat can we make clear plans for economic construction, reduce blindness and spontaneity, and avoid waste. Because of the special characteristics of the economic construction of New Democracy, it possesses clear planning. A clear economic plan can help it to allocate our labor power and material resources appropriately. Thus, it can mobilize tens of millions of people to struggle for the realization of this plan.

H.28 On the People's Democratic Dictatorship.

Mao Zedong (30 June 1949)¹²⁴

This date, 1 July 1949, shows that the CCP has lived through twenty-eight years. Like a person, it has its childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. The CCP is no longer a child; nor is it a youth in its teens; it is an adult. When people reach old age they die; it is the same with a party. When classes are eliminated, all the instruments of class struggle, political parties and the state apparatus, will, as a result, lose their functions, become unnecessary, and gradually wither away; and, its historical mission accomplished, [humankind] will move to a higher plane of human society. We are just the opposite of the political parties of the bourgeoisie. They are afraid to talk of the elimination of classes, state authority, and parties, while we openly declare that we struggle hard precisely for the creation of prerequisites [which will] achieve the elimination of these things. The CP and the state authority of the people's dictatorship constitute such prerequisites. Anyone who does not recognize this truth is no Communist. Young comrades who have just joined the party and have not read Marxism-Leninism may not yet understand this truth. They must understand this truth before they can have a correct world outlook. They must understand that all humankind has to go through the process of eliminating classes, state authority, and parties; the question is only one of time and conditions. The Communists in the world are more intelligent than the bourgeoisie in that respect. They understand the law governing the existence and development of things. They understand dialectics and thus see farther ahead. The bourgeoisie do not welcome

this truth because they do not want to be overthrown by the people. To be overthrown, as in the case of the GMD reactionaries, who are being overthrown by us at present, or of Japanese imperialism, which was overthrown by us along with peoples of various countries in the past, is painful and is inconceivable to the persons overthrown. But for the working class, laboring people, and Communists, the question is not one of being overthrown but of working hard and creating conditions for the natural elimination of classes, state authority, and political parties, so that humankind can enter the era of universal fraternity. We have here touched on the perspectives of the progress of humankind in order to explain the following questions.

Our party has lived through twenty-eight years. Everybody knows that [they were] not passed peacefully but amid difficult surroundings. We had to fight against enemies at home and abroad, and within and outside the party. We owe thanks to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, who gave us weapons. These weapons are not machine guns but Marxism-Leninism.

Lenin in his book *"Left-Wing" Communism—An Infantile Disorder*, written in 1920, described how the Russians sought revolutionary theory. After several decades of hardships and tribulations they eventually discovered Marxism. There are many things which are similar between China and Russia before the October Revolution. The feudal oppression was the same. The economic and cultural backwardness was similar. Both countries were backward, China even more backward. Progressive people endured hardships and struggled to seek the revolutionary truth, so as to bring about national recovery; this was the same [in both countries].

[Influences from the West]¹²⁵

After China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840, progressive Chinese underwent countless tribulations seeking for the truth from the Western countries. Hong Xiuquan, Kang Youwei, Yan Fu,¹²⁶ and Sun Yat-sen represented this group of people who sought for truth from the West before the birth of the CCP. At that time, all Chinese who sought progress read every book that contained any fresh Western teaching. The number of students sent to Japan, England, America, France, and Germany was staggering. Great efforts were made to learn from the West; in the nation, the imperial examination system was abolished and schools were established, [such measures] multiplying like bamboo shoots after rain. What I learned in my youth consisted of such things. These constituted the culture of Western bourgeois democracy, or the so-called new school of learning, which included social doctrines and natural sciences of that time as opposed to the culture of China's feudalism, or the so-called old school of learning. For quite a long time people who learned the new knowledge were confident that it was sure to save China. Apart from people of the old school, very few of the new school expressed doubt. To save the country, the only way was to enforce reforms, and to enforce reforms, the only way was to learn from foreign countries. Of the foreign countries at that time only the Western capitalist countries were progressive. They had successfully established

their modern bourgeois states. The Japanese got good results by learning from the West; therefore the Chinese also wanted to learn from the Japanese. To the Chinese of that time, Russia was backward, and very few people wanted to learn from it. This was how the Chinese learned from foreign countries during the period from the 1840s to the beginning of the twentieth century.

[The October Revolution and China]

Imperialist aggression shattered the Chinese dream of learning from the West. They wondered why the teachers always practiced aggression against their pupils. The Chinese learned much from the West, but what they learned could not be put into effect. Their ideals could not be realized. Many struggles, including the Revolution of 1911, had all failed. Meanwhile, conditions in the country worsened day by day, and the environment was such that the people could not live. Doubt sprang up; it grew and developed. World War I shook the whole world. The Russians carried out the October Revolution, creating the first socialist country in the world. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin the revolutionary energy of the great Russian proletariat and laboring people, which had lain hidden and could not be seen by foreigners, suddenly erupted like a volcano. The Chinese and all humankind then began to look differently at the Russians. Then, and only then, did there appear for the Chinese an entirely new era both in ideology and in living. The Chinese found the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, which holds good everywhere, and the face of China was changed.

It was through the introduction of the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October Revolution the Chinese not only did not know Lenin and Stalin but also did not know Marx and Engels. The gunfire of the October Revolution helped the progressive elements of the world and of China to use the world outlook of the proletariat as the instrument for perceiving the destiny of the country, and for reconsidering their own problems. Travel the road of the Russians—this was the conclusion. In 1919, the May Fourth Movement took place in China, and the CCP was formed in 1921. In his moment of despair Sun Yat-sen came across the October Revolution and the CCP. He welcomed the October Revolution, welcomed Russian help to China, and welcomed the cooperation of the CCP. Sun Yat-sen died [March 1925], and Chiang Kai-shek came to power. During the long period of twenty-two years [since 1927] Chiang Kai-shek has dragged China into hopeless straits.

During this period the antifascist World War II, with the Soviet Union as its main force, defeated three big imperialist powers, weakened two other big imperialist powers, leaving only one imperialist country in the world, the United States, which suffered no loss. However, the domestic crisis in America is very grave. It wants to enslave the entire world and has aided Chiang Kai-shek with arms to slaughter several million Chinese. Under the leadership of the CCP, the Chinese people, after having driven away Japanese imperialism, fought the people's war of

liberation for three years and gained a basic victory. Thus the civilization of the Western bourgeoisie, the bourgeois democracy, and the pattern of the bourgeois republic all went bankrupt in the minds of the Chinese people. Bourgeois democracy has given way to the people's democracy under the leadership of the proletariat, and the bourgeois republic has given way to the people's republic. A possibility has thus been created of reaching socialism and communism through the people's republic, of attaining the elimination of classes and universal fraternity. Kang Youwei wrote the book *On Universal Fraternity* but he did not, and could not, find the road to it. The bourgeois republic has existed in foreign countries but cannot exist in China, because China is a country oppressed by imperialism. The only [way for us] is to travel the road of the people's republic under the leadership of the proletariat and attain the elimination of classes and universal fraternity.

[The Birth of the CP]

All other things had been tried and had failed. Of those who yearned for other things, some had fallen, some had awakened to their mistake, and others are in the process of changing their minds. Events developed so swiftly that many people felt surprised and the need to learn anew. This state of mind is understandable, and we welcome such a well-intentioned attitude that asks to learn things anew.

Having learned Marxism-Leninism after the October Revolution, the vanguard of the Chinese proletariat established the CCP. Following this, it entered into the political struggle and had to travel a zigzag path for twenty-eight years before it could gain a basic victory. From the experiences of twenty-eight years, just as from the "experiences of forty years" as Sun Yat-sen said in his will, a common conclusion has been reached, namely, "the firm belief that to attain victory we must awaken the masses of the people and unite ourselves in a common struggle with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality" [quoted from Sun's famous testament]. Sun Yat-sen had a different world outlook from us, and he started out from a different class standpoint in observing and dealing with problems, but in the 1920s, on the problem of how to struggle against imperialism, he arrived at a conclusion which was fundamentally in agreement with ours.

Twenty-four years have elapsed since Sun Yat-sen's death, and under the leadership of the CCP, Chinese revolutionary theory and practice have made big forward strides, fundamentally changing the realities of China. Up to the present, the Chinese people have gained the following two major and basic experiences: (1) [We must] awaken the masses in the country. This is to unite the working class, the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie into a national united front under the leadership of the working class and develop it into a state of the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class with the alliance of workers and peasants as its basis. (2) [We must] unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world who treat us on the basis of equality and with the people

of all countries. This is to ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, to ally ourselves with all the new democratic countries, and to ally ourselves with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in other countries to form an international united front.

["You Lean to One Side"]

"You lean to one side." Precisely so. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the CCP have taught us to believe that in order to win and to consolidate victory we must lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique who lean either to the side of imperialism; we also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage, and a third road does not exist.

"You are too provocative." We are talking of dealing with domestic and foreign reactionaries; that is, imperialists and their running dogs, and not of any other people. With regard to these people [foreign and domestic reactionaries], the question of provocation does not arise, for whether we are provocative or not makes no difference to their being reactionaries. Only by drawing a clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries, only by exposing the designs and plots of the reactionaries, only by arousing vigilance and attention within the revolutionary ranks, and only by raising our own morale while subjugating the arrogance of the enemy can the reactionaries be isolated, conquered, or replaced. Before a wild beast you cannot show the slightest cowardice. We must learn from Wu Song¹²⁷ on the Qingyang ridge. To Wu Song, the tiger on the Qingyang ridge would eat people all the same whether they provoked it or not. You either kill the tiger or are eaten by it; there is no third choice.

"We want to do business." Entirely correct. Business has to be done. We only oppose domestic and foreign reactionaries who hamper us from doing business, and do not oppose any other people. It should be known that it is no other than imperialists and their lackeys—the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique—who hinder our doing business with foreign countries and even hinder our establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Unite all forces at home and abroad to smash the domestic and foreign reactionaries and then there will be business, and the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with all foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial sovereignty.

["International Assistance"]

"Victory is also possible without international assistance"—this is an erroneous conception. In the era when imperialism exists, it is impossible for the true people's

revolution of any country to win its own victory without assistance in various forms from the international revolutionary forces, and it is also impossible to consolidate victory even when it is won. The great October Revolution was thus won and consolidated, as Stalin told us long ago. It was also in this way that the three imperialist countries were defeated and the new democratic countries established. This is and will be the case with the People's China at present and in the future. Let us think it over; if the Soviet Union did not exist, or there had been no victory in the antifascist World War II, and especially for us, no defeat of Japanese imperialism; if the various new democratic countries had not come into being; if there had been no rising struggles of the oppressed nations in the East; if there had been no struggles of the masses of people in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and other capitalist countries against the reactionary cliques ruling over them; and if there were no sum total of these things, then the reactionary forces bearing down on us would surely be many times greater than they are at present. Could we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not; it would also be impossible to consolidate victory even when it was won. The Chinese people have had much experience in this matter. The remark made by Sun Yat-sen before his death, that alliance must be made with the international revolutionary forces, reflected this experience long ago.

[Aid from the British and American Governments]

“We need the assistance of the British and American governments.” This is also a childish idea at the moment. At present the rulers in Britain and the United States are still imperialists. Would they extend aid to a people's state? If we do business with these countries or suppose these countries would be willing in the future to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit, what would be the reason for it? It would be because the capitalists of these countries want to make money and the bankers want to earn interest to relieve their own crisis; that would be no aid to the Chinese people. The CPs and progressive parties and groups in these countries are now working to bring about business [relations], and even to establish diplomatic relations with us. This is well meant; it means to help us, and it cannot be regarded in the same light as the acts of the bourgeoisie in these countries. During his lifetime Sun Yat-sen repeatedly appealed to the imperialist countries for aid. The attempt was futile, and instead he met with merciless attacks. In his lifetime Sun Yat-sen received international aid only once, and that was from the USSR. The reader can refer to the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in which he did not ask the people to look and hope for aid from imperialist countries, but earnestly bade them “to unite with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality.” Dr. Sun had had the experience; he had been duped. We must remember his words and not be duped again. Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the USSR, and we can look for genuine friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front.

[The People's Democratic Dictatorship]

"You are dictatorial." Dear sirs, you are right; that is exactly what we are. The experience of several decades, amassed by the Chinese is: the right of reactionaries to voice their opinions must be abolished, and only the people are allowed to have the right to voice their opinions.

Who are the "people"? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasant class, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. Under the leadership of the working class and the CP, these classes unite together to form their own state and elect their own government [so as to] carry out a dictatorship over the lackeys of imperialism—the landlord class, the bureaucratic capitalist class, and the GMD reactionaries and their henchmen representing these classes—to suppress them, allowing them only to behave properly and not to talk and act wildly. If they talk and act wildly their [action] will be prohibited and punished immediately. The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The right to vote is given only to the people and not to the reactionaries. These two aspects, namely, democracy among the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, combine to form the people's democratic dictatorship.

Why should it be done this way? Everybody clearly knows that otherwise the revolution would fail, and the people would meet with woe and the state would perish.

"Don't you want to eliminate state power?" Yes, but we do not want it at present; we cannot want it at present. Why? Because imperialism still exists, the domestic reactionaries still exist, and classes in the country still exist. Our present task is to strengthen the apparatus of the people's state, which refers mainly to the people's army, people's police, and people's courts, for the defense of the country, and the protection of the people's interests; and with this as a condition, to enable China to advance steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the CP, from an agricultural to an industrial country, and from a new democratic to a socialist and communist society, to eliminate classes and to realize the state of universal fraternity. The army, police, and courts of the state are instruments by which classes oppress classes. To the hostile classes the state apparatus is the instrument of oppression. It is violent, and not "benevolent." "You are not benevolent." Just so. We decidedly will not exercise benevolence toward the reactionary acts of the reactionaries and reactionary classes. Our benevolence applies only to the people and not to the reactionary acts of the reactionaries and reactionary classes outside the people.

The [function of the] people's state is to protect the people. Only when there is the people's state is it possible for the people to use democratic methods on a nationwide and all-around scale to educate and reform themselves, to free themselves from the influence of reactionaries at home and abroad (this influence is at present still very great and will exist for a long time and cannot be eliminated quickly), to unlearn the bad habits and ideas acquired from the old society and not to let themselves travel on the erroneous path pointed out by the reactionaries, but to

continue to advance and develop toward a socialist and communist society, accomplishing the historic mission of completely eliminating classes and advancing toward a universal fraternity.

The methods we use in this field are democratic; that is, methods of persuasion and not coercion. When people break the law they will be punished, imprisoned, or even sentenced to death. But these are individual cases and are different in principle from the dictatorship over the reactionary class as a class.

[The Future of the Reactionaries]

After their political regime is overthrown, the reactionary classes and the reactionary clique will also be given land and work and a means of living; they will be allowed to reeducate themselves into new persons through work, provided they do not rebel, disrupt, or sabotage. If they are unwilling to work, the people's state will compel them to work. Propaganda and educational work will also be carried out among them and, moreover, with care and adequacy, as we did among captured officers. This can also be called "benevolent administration," but we shall never forgive their reactionary acts and shall never let their reactionary activity have the opportunity of free development.

Such reeducation of the reactionary classes can be carried out only in the state of the people's democratic dictatorship. If this work is done well the main exploiting classes of China—the landlord and bureaucratic capitalist classes—will finally be eliminated. [Of the exploiting classes] there remain the national bourgeoisie among many of whom appropriate educational work can be carried out at the present stage. When socialism is realized, that is, when the nationalization of private enterprises has been carried out, they can be further educated and reformed. The people have in their hands a powerful state apparatus and are not afraid of the rebellion of the national bourgeois class.

The grave problem is that of educating the peasants. The peasants' economy is scattered. Judging by the experience of the Soviet Union, it requires a very long time and careful work to attain the socialization of agriculture. Without the socialization of agriculture, there will be no complete and consolidated socialism. And to carry out the socialization of agriculture a powerful industry with state-owned enterprises as the main component must be developed. The state of the people's democratic dictatorship must solve this problem [of the industrialization of the country] step by step. The present article does not intend to deal with the economic problem, so I shall not discuss it in detail.

In 1924, a well-known manifesto was approved by the GMD First National Congress, which was directed personally by Sun Yat-sen and participated in by Communists. The manifesto stated: "The so-called democratic system in countries of modern times is often monopolized by the bourgeois class and turned into an instrument for oppressing the common people. But the democracy of the GMD belongs to the people in general and is not the private possession of a few." Except for the question of who is to lead whom, the democracy mentioned here, when viewed as a

general political program, is consistent with the people's democratic dictatorship practiced by us at present. If the leadership of the working class is added to the state system, which is only allowed to be the common possession of the common people and not the private possession of the bourgeoisie, this state system will be that of the people's democratic dictatorship.

Chiang Kai-shek betrayed Sun Yat-sen and used the dictatorship of the bureaucratic capitalist class and the landlord class as an instrument for oppressing the common people of China. This counterrevolutionary dictatorship remained in force for twenty-two years, and not until now has it been overthrown by the Chinese common people under our leadership.

["Dictatorship" and "Totalitarianism"]

The foreign reactionaries who vilify us for carrying out "dictatorship" and "totalitarianism" are in fact the very people who are carrying out dictatorship and totalitarianism of one class, the bourgeoisie, over the proletariat and other people. They are the very people referred to by Sun Yat-sen as the bourgeois class in countries of modern times who oppress the common people. Chiang Kai-shek's counterrevolutionary dictatorship was learned from these reactionary fellows.

Zhu Xi, a philosopher of the Song dynasty [A.D. 960–1260], wrote many books and said many things which we have forgotten, but there is one sentence we have not forgotten, and it is, "Apply to anyone the method he has first used on others." This is what we are doing. That is, to apply to imperialism and its lackeys, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionary clique, the same method with which they treated others. Simply this and nothing else!

Revolutionary dictatorship and counterrevolutionary dictatorship are opposite in nature. The former learns from the latter. This process of learning is very important, for if the revolutionary people do not learn the methods of ruling over counterrevolutionaries, they will not be able to maintain their regime, which will be overthrown by the reactionary cliques at home and abroad. The reactionary cliques at home and abroad will then restore their rule in China and bring woe to the revolutionary people.

The basis of the people's democratic dictatorship is the alliance of the working class, the peasant class, and the urban petty-bourgeois class and is mainly the alliance of the working class and the peasant class because they constitute 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population. It is mainly through the strength of these two classes that imperialism and the GMD reactionary clique were overthrown. The passing from New Democracy to socialism mainly depends on the alliance of these two classes.

[The Leadership of the Working Class]

The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class, because only the working class is most farsighted, just, and unselfish and endowed

with revolutionary thoroughness. The history of the entire revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class the revolution is bound to fail, and with the leadership of the working class the revolution will be victorious. In the era of imperialism no other class in any country can lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie had led the revolution many times and each time had failed.

The national bourgeoisie is of great importance at the present stage. Imperialism is still standing near us, and this enemy is very fierce. A long time is required for China to realize true economic independence and become free from reliance on imperialist nations. Only when China's industries are developed, and it no longer depends economically on powerful nations, can there be real independence. The proportion of China's modern industry in the entire national economy is still very small. There are still no reliable figures at present, but according to certain data it is estimated that modern industry only occupies about 10 percent of the total productive output in the national economy. To cope with imperialist oppression and to raise our backward economic status one step higher, China must utilize all urban and rural factors of capitalism which are beneficial and not detrimental to the national economy and people's livelihood, and unite with the national bourgeoisie in a common struggle. Our present policy is to restrict capitalism and not to eliminate it. But the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolutionary united front and should not occupy the main position of state power. This is because the social and economic status of the national bourgeoisie has determined its feebleness; it lacks foresight, lacks courage, and in large part fears the masses.

Sun Yat-sen advocated "awakening the masses" or "helping the peasants and workers." Who is to awaken and help them? Sun Yat-sen meant the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. But this is in fact not feasible. Sun Yat-sen's forty years of revolutionary work were a failure. Why? The reason lies precisely here, in that in the era of imperialism it is impossible for the bourgeoisie to lead any true revolution toward success.

Our twenty-eight years have been entirely different. We have plenty of invaluable experience. A party with discipline, armed with the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, employing the method of self-criticism and linked up closely with the masses; an army led by such a party; a united front of various revolutionary strata and groups led by such a party—these three are our main experiences. They all mark us off from our predecessors. Relying on these three things, we have achieved a basic victory. We have traversed tortuous paths and struggled against right and left opportunistic tendencies within the party. Whenever serious mistakes were committed in these three matters, the revolution suffered setbacks. The mistakes and setbacks taught us and made us wiser. Thus we were able to do better work. Mistakes are unavoidable for any party or person, but we ask that fewer mistakes be committed. When a mistake is committed, it must be corrected, the quicker and the more thoroughly the better.

[The First Step on a March of 10,000 *li*]

Our experience can be summarized and boiled down into one single thing, namely, the people's democratic dictatorship based on the alliance of workers and peasants led by the working class (through the CP). This dictatorship must unite in concert with international revolutionary forces. This is our formula, our main experience, our main program.

In the twenty-eight long years of the party we have done only one thing, and that is, we have won the basic victory and a victory in a large country like China. But there is plenty of work before us, and, as on a march, what work has been done in the past is like the first step on a march of 10,000 *li*. Remnants of the enemy still have to be wiped out, and the grave task of economic reconstruction still lies before us. Some of the things with which we are familiar will soon be laid aside, and we are compelled to tackle things with which we are unfamiliar. This means difficulty. The imperialists are positive that we are incapable of tackling our economic work. They look on and wait for our failure.

We must overcome difficulties and must master what we do not know. We must learn economic work from all who know the ropes [no matter who they are]. We must acknowledge them as our teachers and learn from them respectfully and earnestly. We must acknowledge our ignorance and not pretend to know what we do not know, or put on bureaucratic airs. Stick to it, and eventually it will be mastered in a few months, one or two years, or three or five years. At first some of the Communists in the USSR also did not know how to do economic work, and the imperialists waited for their failure also. But the CPSU won. Under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin they could do not only revolutionary work but also reconstruction work. They have already built up a great and brilliant socialist state. The CPSU is our best teacher, from whom we must learn. The international and domestic situation is favorable to us. We can rely wholly on the weapon of the people's democratic dictatorship to unite all people throughout the country, except the reactionaries, and advance steadily toward the goal.

Notes to Commentary H

1. Lin's views were published in *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily), 22 September 1944. An English translation can be found in *The China White Paper, August 1949*, pp. 545–48.
2. Originally, the CCP had asked for only four armies of twelve divisions.
3. The Hurley agreement and the three-point agreement can be found in *The China White Paper*, pp. 638–39 and 675, respectively.
4. *The China White Paper*, p. 81.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
7. Only Dong Biwu actually attended. For Chiang's and Zhou's views, see *The China White Paper*, pp. 83–86.
8. The congress was attended by 544 full delegates and 208 alternates representing 1.21 million party members. The Congress elected a presidium of fifteen people: Mao

Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Lin Boqu, Peng Dehuai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, He Long, Xu Xiangqian, Gao Gang, Bo Gu, and Peng Zhen. Its Standing Committee comprised Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi. The secretary of the congress was Ren Bishi with Li Fuchun as his deputy. Peng Zhen was chair of the commission to check delegates' credentials. Wang Jianying (ed.), *Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian*, p. 480. The full body of delegates met twenty-two times. Mao delivered his report on 24 April, Zhu De on 25 April, and Zhou Enlai on 30 April, and from 30 April until 11 May, seven meetings were held to discuss them. On 14 and 15 May, delegates listened to Liu Shaoqi's report, on 21 May to a talk by a delegate of the Japanese CP. From 21 to 23 May, Mao's, Zhu's, and Liu's reports were discussed. On 24 May, Mao gave a report on the method for elections, and Zhou Enlai on the draft of the regulations for elections. On 30 May, Zhu De made a summary of the discussions on his report, as did Liu Shaoqi on his. The following day Mao did the same. On 31 May, the "Resolution on the Political Report" was passed, as was the military report. On 9 June a new CC was elected and the alternates were elected the following day. On 11 June, the new Constitution, Liu Shaoqi's report on its revision, and a resolution on the memorial conference were passed, and the Congress listened to Mao's closing comments ("The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains," in Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 3, pp. 321-23). The Yan'an Rectification Campaign Editing and Writing Group (ed.), *Yan'an zhengfeng yundong jishi*, pp. 470-72, and Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao*, pp. 232-36. In total, Mao delivered eight reports or speeches to the Congress. They can be found in Documentation and Research Department of the CCP CC (ed.), *Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianghuaji*.

9. Chu Teh (Zhu De), *The Battlefront of the Liberated Areas*. This is a translation of the speech "Lun jiefangqu zhanchang," delivered on 25 April 1945.

10. Zhou Enlai, "On the United Front," in Zhou Enlai, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, vol. 1, pp. 213-44.

11. See C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J.K. Fairbank (eds.), *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, p. 421.

12. In particular, Wang Jiaxiang, a key supporter of Mao, could rank no higher than second on the list of alternates. See F. Teiwes with W. Sun, "From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party: The CCP's Changing Leadership, 1937-1945," in T. Saich and H. van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*. For the regulations for the elections see "Zhongguo gongchandang diqici quanguo daibiao dahui xuanju xin de zhongyang weiyuanhui de tiaolie" (Arrangements for the Election of the CC of the Seventh National Party Congress), 24 May 1945, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 50-52. For Mao's two reports on the election of CC members and alternates, see Documentation and Research Department of the CCP CC (ed.), *Mao Zedong zai qida*, pp. 159-79 and 229-33.

13. The forty-four full members were: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Lin Boqu, Lin Biao, Dong Biwu, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, Guan Xiangying, Chen Tanqiu (deceased), Gao Gang, Li Fuchun, Rao Shushi, Li Lisan, Luo Ronghuan, Kang Sheng, Peng Zhen, Wang Ruofei, Zhang Yunyi, He Long, Chen Yi, Zhou Enlai, Liu Bochong, Zheng Weishan, Zhang Wentian, Cai Chang, Deng Xiaoping, Lu Dingyi, Zeng Shan, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Deng Zihui, Wu Yuzhang, Lin Feng, Teng Daiyuan, Zhang Dingcheng, Li Xiannian, Xu Teli, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Wang Ming and Bo Gu. Xinhua News Agency, Yan'an, 13 June 1945 quoted in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, p. 292.

14. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 481.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 481-82.

16. See, for example, Mao Zedong, "The Hurley-Chiang Duet Is a Flop," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 3, pp. 331-34; "On the Danger of the Hurley Policy," in *ibid.*, pp. 335-36,

and "Xinhuashe jizhe zai ping Heerli zhengce" (Xinhua Journalist Again Criticizes Hurley's Policy), 19 July 1945, in *Jiefang ribao*, 20 July 1945.

17. "Zhongyang guanyu Sulian can zhanhou zhunbei jinzhanchengshi jiaotong yaodao de zhishi" (CC Directive Concerning the Occupation of Cities and Communication Lines After Soviet Entry into the War), 10 August 1945, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, p. 115.

18. Zhu ordered his troops in the Hebei-Rehe (Jehol)-Liaoning region to move out toward Harbin, Rehe, and Liaoning, and He Long's and Nie Rongzhen's troops were ordered to move to Inner Mongolia. The six orders can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 116–21. A translation of the order of midnight, 10 August 1945, can be found in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, p. 30.

19. Suzanne Pepper, "The KMT-CCP conflict 1945–1949," in J. Fairbank and A. Feuerwerker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 13, *Republican China 1912–1949*, part 2, p. 726.

20. *Jiefang zhanzheng jishi 1945–1950*, p. 15; and the Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, pp. 180–81. Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei accompanied him.

21. See "Zhonggong zhongyang dui muqian shiju xuanyan" (CC Declaration on the Current Situation), 25 August 1945, in *Jiefang ribao*, 27 August 1945. On 26 August 1945, Mao drafted an inner-party circular concerning the forthcoming talks that pointed out that agreement might be reached to allow the CCP to operate legally. Yet, at the same time, Mao urged the continuation of the CCP offensive to take over key cities and communication lines. See "On the Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang—Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 47–51.

22. "Summary of Conversations Between Representatives of the National Government and of the Chinese Communist Party," *The China White Paper*, pp. 577–81.

23. For the fullest account of CCP policy and activities in the northeast, see S. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1948*.

24. The other members were Chen Yun, Cheng Zihua, Wu Xiuquan, and Lin Gang. *Jiefang zhanzheng jishi 1945–1950*, pp. 30–31. Lin Biao replaced Peng as secretary on 16 June with Peng Zhen, Luo Rongtan, Gao Gang, and Chen Yun as deputy secretaries. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

25. "Zhongyang guanyu xiang bei fazhan xiang nan fangyu de bushu" (CC Notice on Developing the North and Defending the South), 19 September 1945, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 147–48.

26. "Zhongyang guanyu jianli changqi yongyou genjudi gei dongbeiju de zhishi" (CC Directive to the Northeast Bureau Concerning the Establishment of Long-Term Bases), 21 December 1945, in *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 251–52.

27. Mao had highlighted rent-reduction as one of the two key elements in gaining mass support in protecting the liberated areas on 7 November 1945. See "Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Important Matters for the Defense of the Liberated Areas," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 71–73.

28. The conference was attended by thirty-eight delegates, including eight from the GMD and seven from the CCP.

29. Pepper, "The KMT-CCP Conflict," pp. 730–31.

30. *Jiefang zhanzheng jishi*, p. 85.

31. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui wei jinian 'qiqi' jiuzhounian xuanyan" (The Manifesto of the CCP CC in Commemoration of the Ninth Anniversary of 7 July), 7 July 1946, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 440–48.

32. This is difficult to verify, and while it seems to be true in some regions, it is not the case in others. Kyoko shows that the radical turn in CCP land policy was influenced by the events taking place in the north and northeast. See Tanaka Kyoko, "The Civil War and

Radicalization of Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy, 1945–1947,” in *Papers on Far Eastern History* (September 1973): 70–114.

33. In July 1946, the troops under CCP command were renamed the People’s Liberation Army.

34. “Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One,” 16 September 1946, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 103–7.

35. For Zhou Enlai’s assessment of the year he had spent negotiating in Chongqing, see “Yinianlai de tanpan ji qi qianyu” (A Year’s Negotiations and Their Future), in the Teaching and Research Department on Party History of the Central School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao*, vol. 6, pp. 208–19.

36. The Party History Research Group of the CC (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao*, p. 195; *Jiefang zhanzheng jishi 1945–1950*, pp. 193 and 195–96; Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, p. 132; and Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 253. For the Circular of 9 April 1947, see *ibid.*, pp. 130–31.

37. This was a CC directive drafted by Mao entitled “A Three Months’ Summary,” in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 113–18.

38. This was a CC inner-party directive drafted by Mao, “Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution,” in *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 119–25.

39. Pepper, “The KMT-CCP Conflict,” p. 765.

40. For an account of how CCP land reform policy affected Long Bow Village (Shanxi), see the classic account by Hinton based on his visit of spring and summer 1948. W. Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*.

41. In his concluding speech to the conference, Liu cited three main problems that had held up the proper implementation of land reform: a lack of thoroughness in the policies guiding the movement, defects in party organization, and bureaucratism. “Speech Concluding the National Land Conference,” 13 September 1947, in Liu Shaoqi, *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, vol. 1, pp. 379–92.

42. The Work Committee also told the CC of its intention to pass a Land Law and to draft an inner-party directive on the methods of how this should be implemented. These suggestions were also approved by the CC. For the two telegrams of 5 and 6 September, see the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 705–6.

43. Liu Shaoqi, in his summation speech to the conference, proposed a hit-or-miss method for developing the courts. Acknowledging that the party had no experience in this respect, experience was to be learned through practice. “Speech Concluding the National Land Conference,” 13 September 1947, in Liu, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, p. 387.

44. In the Cultural Revolution, attacks on Liu indicated that there had been a major split between Liu and Mao over the question of land policy at this time. Liu was accused of provoking “leftist” excesses in the movement, while Mao was portrayed as providing the right corrective. Clearly, however, the radicalization of policy was launched with the full support of the CC, including Mao Zedong. This supports the findings of both Kyoko and Teiwes, who have found no hard evidence of a split between Mao and Liu on this issue or during the subsequent period when policy was moderated once more. See T. Kyoko, “Mao and Liu in the 1947 Land Reform: Allies or Disputants,” *China Quarterly*, no. 75 (September 1978): 566–93; and F. Teiwes, “The Origins of Rectification: Inner-Party Purges and Education Before Liberation,” *China Quarterly*, no. 65 (March 1976): 32–53.

45. These were “How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas (October 1933)” and “Decision on Some Problems in the Land Struggle (10 October 1933).” The former article is translated in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 137–39. The latter can be found in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 4, pp. 43–65; it is signed by Mao Zedong as chair of the soviet government and by Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao as vice-chairs.

46. The meeting was attended by nineteen people: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi,

Lu Dingyi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Lin Boqu, Zhang Zongxun, Xi Zhongxun, Ma Mingfang, Zhang Desheng, Gan Siqi, Wang Weizhou, Li Jingquan, Zhao Lin, Wang Ming, Xie Juezai, Li Weihai, and Li Taogong. Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, p. 260.

47. "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," 25 December 1947, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 157–76. In an inner-party directive drafted by Mao on 18 January 1948, Mao spelled out further the need not to alienate middle peasants. Mao suggested that peasants who derived less than 25 percent of their total income from exploitation should be classified as middle peasants. Those who derived more were rich peasants. "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy," 18 January 1948, in *ibid.*, vol. 4, p. 183.

48. The telegram of 3 February to Liu Shaoqi can be found in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 193–94. The telegram of 6 February to Li Jingquan and Xi Zhongxun can be found in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, pp. 21–22.

49. "Mao Zedong dui Shanxi Guoxian tudi gaige daibiao huiyi qingkuang baogao de piyu" (Mao's Comments on the Situation Reports at the Guo County, Shanxi Province, Land Reform Conference), 12 March 1948, in *ibid.*, vol. 14, pp. 71–72.

50. The other two reports were by Tan Zhengwen on the question of the equal division of land in Guo County (Jin-Sui) and one on land readjustment in Suide County (Shaan-Gan-Ning). All three are in *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 72–99.

51. For the letter, see *ibid.*, vol. 14, pp. 7–8.

52. On this point see F. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950–1965*, pp. 93–94.

53. Zhou Enlai, "Agrarian Reform and Consolidation of the Party in Old and Semi-Old Liberated Areas," 22 February 1948, in Zhou, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 322–31.

54. Mao Zedong, "Circular on the Situation," 20 March 1948, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 219–20.

55. The meeting was preceded by an eleven-day preparatory conference. The Research Department on Party History of the CCP (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi*, pp. 207–8. The Politburo meeting was attended by seven members of the Politburo (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, Peng Zhen, Dong Biwu), fourteen members and alternates of the CC (Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, Rao Shushi, Zeng Shan, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Deng Yingchao, Liao Chengzhi, Tang Daiyuan, Ye Jianying, Zhang Dingpi, He Long, Liu Lantao), and ten other leading functionaries (Yang Shangkun, Li Weihai, Hu Yaobang, Fu Zhong, Hu Qiaomu, An Ziwen, Li Tao, Feng Wenbin, Huang Jing, Li Kenong). Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 268–69; and "On the September Meeting—Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," 10 October 1948, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, p. 269.

56. This question of restoring rule by party committee was sufficiently important that, on 20 September 1948, Mao drafted a decision for the CC. See "On Strengthening the Party Committee System," 20 September 1948, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 267–68.

57. The directive also called on leaders of field armies and military areas to provide regular reports to the chair of the party's Military Commission. "On Setting Up a System of Reports," 7 January 1948, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 177–79.

58. "Zhongyang guanyu jianli baogao zhidu de buchong zhishi" (CC Supplementary Directive Concerning Setting Up the Report System), 25 March 1948, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, p. 100.

59. This was an inner-party directive drafted by Mao for the CC. Mao Zedong, "A Circular on the Situation," 20 March 1948, in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 219–25.

60. See Pepper, "The KMT-CCP Conflict," pp. 775–82.

61. Reflecting his increasing optimism as the war progressed during the September and October 1948, Mao had already predicted that the GMD would be basically overthrown in a year or so. See message from Mao Zedong to Lin Biao, Luo Ruantan, Liu Yalou, and Tan

Zheng, 11 November 1948, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, pp. 422–23. For details of the meeting see Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 271–75.

62. Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, p. 318.

63. Chiang resumed active control of GMD affairs in the summer of 1949.

64. The meeting was attended by thirty-four members and nineteen alternates, and another twelve attended as nonvoting delegates. The full members were: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Lin Boqu, Dong Biwu, Kang Sheng, Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Li Fuchun, Rao Shushi, Li Lisan, Zhang Yunyi, He Long, Chen Yi, Cai Chang, Deng Xiaoping, Lu Dingyi, Zeng Shan, Nie Rongzhen, Deng Zihui, Wu Yuzhang, Lin Gang, Teng Daiyuan, Zhang Dingpi, Li Xiannian, Xu Teli, Tan Zhenlin, Wang Ming, Liao Chengzhi, Wang Jiaxiang, and Chen Boda. Wang Jianying, *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 573–74; and Jiang Huaxuan et al., *Zhongguo gongchandang*, pp. 275–76.

65. Mao's report to the plenum can be found in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 361–74.

66. Preparations for this meeting had been under way for some time. On 1 May 1948 the CC had already called for the convocation of such a meeting, and various representatives had agreed to attend. See the telegram from representatives of the various democratic parties to Mao Zedong, 5 May 1948, in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, p. 260. Between 1 August and 25 November 1948, these representatives discussed the general terms of such a conference, and on 15 June 1949 a preparatory committee was set up in Beijing consisting of 134 delegates from twenty-three parties or groups. The conference itself was in session from 21 to 30 September 1949 and was attended by 585 delegates and seventy-seven alternates. Its most important decisions were to pass the Organic Laws of the Central People's Government and of the People's Political Consultative Conference and its Common Program that served as an interim constitution of the new regime; it made Beijing the capital, changing its name from Beiping to Beijing; it adopted the national flag and anthem; it elected Mao Zedong chair of the Central People's government; and it elected 180 members of the national committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference.

67. Liu Shaoqi, "Strengthen the Great Revolutionary Unity of the Chinese People," 21 September 1949, in Liu, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, p. 431.

68. "Zhongyang guanyu zhengxun jundui de jue ding," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 12, pp. 529–34.

69. The Gutian Resolution refers to the resolution drafted by Mao Zedong for the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Army held in December 1929. See "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 105–16. Tan Zheng's report presumably refers to that delivered on 11 April 1944 to the Northwest Bureau's senior cadres' conference. See "Guanyu jundui zhengzhi gongzuo wenti" (On the Question of Political Work in the Military), *Zhengfeng wenjian*, pp. 1–25.

70. "Zhongyang guanyu waijiao gongzuo zhishi," in the Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 12, pp. 573–76. The directive was most probably drafted by Zhou Enlai.

71. "Zhou Enlai tongzhi li Yu qian de shengming," in *Jiefang ribao*, 17 February 1945.

72. "Lun lianhe zhengfu," published by *Jiefangshe* (May 1945). The translation here is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 295–318.

73. "Zai Zhonggong diqici daibiao dahuishang de jianghua," in *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui*, pp. 62–82. This was Mao's oral report to the Seventh Party Congress. Steven Levine was the first to draw attention to this report. He translated the version that was in the original Russian publication of the Vladimirov diaries. This report was not translated in the English version of this work. P.P. Vladimirov had been in Yan'an as a TASS correspondent and

Comintern agent from spring 1942. See S. Levine, "Mao Tse-tung's Oral Report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP Summary Notes." I am grateful to Michael Schoenhals for providing the Chinese version of the text translated here.

74. These three meetings formed important steps in the consolidation of Mao Zedong's power in the party and army.

75. Zhou Enlai had originally proposed that he, Dong Biwu, and Bo Gu attend the allies' conference in San Francisco. Eventually, only Dong attended.

76. Zhang had been prominent in leftist circles and had been arrested in November 1936 for leading the National Salvation Association and for his promotion of total resistance to the Japanese invaders.

77. Scobie was the commander of the British forces in Greece who entered the country in October 1944 together with the Greek government-in-exile.

78. Communist propaganda often attacked these "'four big families" for running China as their own personal fiefdom.

79. I have been unable to find this book. However, it is possible that Mao is referring to Edgar Snow's book *Red Star Over China*, which was published by Random House in 1938 and 1944.

80. Mao's concluding speech to the Congress (11 June 1945) was entitled "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains." See Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 3, pp. 271–74.

81. These were various models promoted in Yan'an and the other base areas for emulation.

82. "Guanyu xiugai dang de zhangcheng de baogao." The translation here is based on that in Liu Shaoqi, *Three Essays on Party-Building*, pp. 163–300.

83. "Zhongguo gongchandang dangcheng." The translation here is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 422–39.

84. "Zhongyang guanyu Riben touxiang hou wodang renwu de jue ding," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 123–25.

85. See note 77.

86. "Zhongyang guanyu xunsu jinru dongbei kongzhi guangda xiangcun de zhishi," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 138–39.

87. "Dongbeiju guanyu chetui da chengshi gongzuo de zhishi," in *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 208–11.

88. The Sino-Soviet treaty was signed on 14 August 1945. Under the treaty, the Soviet Union was obliged to pull its troops out of Manchuria within three months of the Japanese surrender.

89. "Jianli gonggu de dongbei genjudi." The translation here is based on that in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 81–85.

90. "Directive on Arousing the Masses," December 1945. This stated that the central task in arousing the masses was to launch a mass campaign of accusation and retribution to settle accounts with traitors and secret agents.

91. "Zhongyang guanyu muqian dongbei gongzuo de fangzhen wenti gei dongbeiju de zhishi," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 315–17.

92. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu muqian xingshi yu renwu de zhishi," in *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 318–22.

93. "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu qingsuan jianzu ji tudi wenti de zhishi." The translation here is based on that in Liu, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 372–78. In this work it is titled "Directive on the Land Question."

94. This refers to the "Program for Peace and National Construction" adopted by the meeting held in Chongqing in January 1946.

95. This refers to the CC's decision on land policy for the anti-Japanese base areas adopted 28 January 1942. See *Doc. G. 6*.

96. "Jiefang zhanzheng diernian de zhanlue fangzhe," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 141–46.
97. "Liu Shaoqi guanyu tudi huiyi gedi huibao qingxing ji jinhou yijian xiang zhongyang de baogao," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 13, pp. 686–93.
98. "Zhongguo tudifa dagang," in *ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 723–26. It was adopted by the National Land Conference on 13 September and approved by the CC on 10 October. The Chinese text has been checked with the English translation in Hinton, *Fanshen*, pp. 615–18.
99. The conference was held at Xibaipo Village from 17 July to 13 September 1947.
100. "Tudi gaigezhong de jige wenti," in the Teaching and Research Department on Party History of the Central Party School (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi*, vol. 6, pp. 343–64. It was originally published in Jiefangshe (ed.), *Muqian xingshi he women de renwu*. This was Ren Bishi's speech to an enlarged meeting of the Northwest Field Operations Military Front Committee.
101. The former can be found in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 137–39, and the latter in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), *Mao Zedong ji*, vol. 4, pp. 43–65.
102. This is from the 10 October article "Decision on Some Problems in the Land Struggle."
103. "Pingshan laojiefangqu tugai jingyan." The translation here is based on that in Liu Shao Ch'i (Liu Shaoqi), *Collected Works of Liu Shao Ch'i 1945–1957*, pp. 119–22. Here it is titled "P'ingshan Sets Example in Land Reform and Party Rectification." The Chinese text can be found in *Tudi zhengdang dianxing jingyan*, pp. 24–25, and the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, pp. 92–95.
104. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yijiu siba nian tudi gaige gongzuo yu zhengdang gongzuo de zhishi." The translation here is based on that in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 253–59.
105. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiuyue huiyi de tongzhi." The translation here is based on that in *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 269–76. This circular concerned the September meeting of the Politburo held at Xibaipo between 8 and 13 September 1948.
106. This refers to the withdrawal in 1934 from the southern revolutionary bases.
107. This had been raised as one of the 1948 May Day slogans.
108. The labor congress was held in Harbin in August 1948, and it reestablished the union federation.
109. This congress was held in March 1949 in Beijing.
110. The youth congress was held in May 1949 in Beijing, and the league was founded in January 1949 following a decision of the CCP CC. The league's first congress was held in Beijing in April 1949, and the league was renamed the CYL in May 1957.
111. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhaokai dangde geji daibiao dahui he daibiao huiyi de jueyi," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, pp. 339–43. This resolution was adopted by the September 1948 Politburo meeting.
112. "Zhongyang guanyu ge zhongyangju, fenju, junqu, junwei fenhui ji qianwei hui xiang zhongyang qingshi baogao zhidu de jueyi," in *ibid.*, vol. 14, 53. This resolution was adopted by the September 1948 Politburo meeting.
113. The Corps was established in 1938 as the GMD's youth organization. It promoted GMD policies in the schools and tried to dominate various school organizations. In September 1947 it was amalgamated with the GMD, thus losing its formal autonomous status.
114. This was drafted by Mao Zedong. See "On Setting Up a System of Reports," in Mao, *Selected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 177–79.
115. "Muqian xingshi he dang zai 1949 de renwu," in the Central Party Archives (ed.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (neibu ben)*, vol. 14, pp. 488–93.
116. "Zhongguo gongchandang diqijie zhongyang weiyuanhui dierci quanti huiyi jueyi," in *ibid.*, vol. 14, pp. 587–97.

117. The Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign lasted from 12 September to 2 November 1948, the Huai-Hai campaign from 6 November 1948 to 10 January 1949, and the Beijing-Tianjin campaign from 21 November 1948 to 31 January 1949.

118. This is an allusion to a passage from the Chinese classical novel *Xi youji* (Journey to the West).

119. "Guanyu chengshi gongzuo de jige wenti." The translation here is based on that in Liu, *Selected Works*, vol. 1, pp. 417–23. This is Liu Shaoqi's speech to the Second Plenum of the Seventh CC.

120. This conference was convened between 17 July and 13 September 1947. For Liu's report on the conference see **Doc. H.16**.

121. At the time, Li was vice-chair of the ACFTU and secretary of the party group of the Federation.

122. "Guanyu dongbei jingji goucheng ji jingji jianshe jiben fangzhen de tigang," in Zhang Wentian, *Zhang Wentian xuanji*, pp. 396–417. This was Zhang's summary of the work conference held by the party's Northeast Bureau from late July until 31 August 1948.

123. This is translated from Stalin's book *Problems of Leninism*.

124. "Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng." The translation here is based on that in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History*, pp. 449–61, which was taken from a Xinhua News Agency translation in *China Digest*, vol. 6, no. 7 (13 July 1949). A Chinese version can be found in Shen Songfang (ed.), *1950 renmin nianjian*, pp. 1–12.

125. The editors of *China Digest* inserted these subheads.

126. Hong Xiuquan was the leader of the Taiping movement; Kang Youwei was one of the first Chinese advocates of constitutional monarchy and leader of the 1898 reform movement; Yan Fu was a pioneer translator of Western philosophical works and a man deeply disillusioned with his own intellectual heritage.

127. Wu Song was one of the 108 heroes in the classical Chinese novel *Shuihu zhuan* (The Water Margin) who killed a tiger with his bare hands.

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a) Contemporary Chinese Periodicals

Listed below are the contemporary Chinese-language periodicals and newspapers that were consulted either in whole or in part for this volume.

- Balujun junzheng zazhi* (Military and Political Journal of the Eighth Route Army). Began publication on 15 January 1939 and ceased publication on 25 March 1942. It was the organ of the General Political Office of the Eighth Route Army.
- Buersheweike* (The Bolshevik). Began publication in Shanghai on 24 October 1927 as the organ of the CCP CC. Originally, it was a weekly but changed to a bi-monthly and finally a monthly. It was a secret journal, and it ceased publishing in July 1932.
- Dangbao* (The Party Paper). The CCP's first internal party paper. It began publication on 30 November 1923 with an unspecified publication regularity. It is unclear when it ceased publication, but one issue appeared on 1 June 1924.
- Douzheng* (Struggle). A weekly that began publication in February 1933 as the organ of the Central Bureau, it was widely disseminated among the base areas. Issue 73 was published on 30 September 1934.
- Gongchandang* (The Communist). The publication of the first party group in Shanghai. It began publication on 7 November 1920 as a monthly. Issue six was published on 7 July 1921.
- Gongchandangren* (The Communist). Began publication in Yan'an on 20 October 1939 as an internal CCP paper. It was published nineteen times, ending publication in August 1941.
- Hongqi ribao* (Red Flag Daily). An organ of the CCP CC that began publication on 20 August 1930 in Shanghai. Starting on 9 March 1931, its name was changed to *Hongqi zhoubao* (Red Flag Weekly).
- Hongqi zhoubao* (Red Flag Weekly). The successor publication to *Hongqi ribao* (Red Flag Daily), it began publication on 9 March 1931. In August 1933, it became a bi-monthly. It ceased publication on 1 March 1934 with issue no. 64. Because it was a secret publication, it often had a fake cover.
- Hongse Zhonghua* (Red China). Began publication on 11 December 1931 at Ruijin as the organ of the Central Soviet government. After the evacuation of the base area its publication effectively stopped (October 1934), to be revived in the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area. From 29 January 1937 its name was changed to *Xin Zhonghua bao* (New China).
- Jiefang* (Liberation). Began as a weekly of the CCP CC that was later changed to a bi-monthly. It began publication in Yan'an on 24 April 1937 and ended in May 1941. In all, 134 issues were published.
- Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily). Set up as a publication of the CCP CC on 16 May 1941. It was the major paper for the base areas, and many other publications were halted to allow concentration of news reporting. It ended publication on 27 March 1947.
- Laodongzhe* (The Laborer). Began publication on 3 October 1920 and continued publication until 2 January 1921.
- Litou* (The Plow). Began publication in Canton on 25 January 1926 as the organ of the Guangdong Peasant Association. Initially, it was published every ten days but subsequently was changed to a weekly. The last issue (no. 23) was published on 7 January 1927. It was generally pro-CCP.
- Qianfeng* (The Vanguard). First published on 15 July 1923. Not a success, only three issues were published before it ceased publication in early 1924.

- Qunzhong* (The Masses). An open weekly CCP publication for the GMD-ruled areas and Hong Kong. It began publication on 11 December 1937 in Hankou and later was moved to Chongqing. In June 1946, it began publication in Shanghai but was forced to stop by the GMD in March 1947. In Hong Kong it was published as a weekly from January 1947 until it voluntarily ceased publication on 20 October 1949.
- Renmin ribao* (People's Daily). Started as the organ of the North China Bureau of the CCP. It began publication on 15 June 1946 with the fusion of the *Jin-Cha-Ji ribao* (Jin-Cha-Ji Daily) and the *People's Daily*, both published in the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu base area. In March 1949 publication was moved to Beijing, and in August it became the official organ of the CCP CC.
- Shihua* (True Words) The organ of the CC, it was set up in Shanghai in October 1930. It was superseded by *Hongqi ribao* (Red Flag Daily).
- Xiangdao zhoubao* (The Guide Weekly). Began publication in September 1922 in Shanghai. In all, 201 editions were published, with publication ending on 18 July 1927.
- Xianqu* (The Pioneer) The fortnightly journal of the SYL, it began publication on 15 January 1922 and ceased publication on 15 August 1923.
- Xin qingnian* (New Youth). Launched in September 1915 in Shanghai, it had a major impact on progressive thinkers during the May Fourth Movement. Originally called *Qingnian zazhi* (Youth Magazine), its name was changed in September 1916. From September 1920 it was operated as a publication of the Shanghai communist small group and was an organ of the CCP after its foundation. In July 1922 it temporarily stopped publication, reappearing in June 1923 as the party's theoretical organ. It finally ceased publication in July 1926.
- Xin Zhonghuabao* (New China News). A publication of the Central Soviet government published in Yan'an as a successor to *Hongse Zhonghua* (Red China), it began publication on 29 January 1937. In January 1939, it became the publication of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government. It published a total of 230 issues, ending publication on 15 May 1941.
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- Zhongguo wenhua* (Chinese Culture). A theoretical journal published in Yan'an, it began publication as a monthly on 15 February 1940 but only ran until 20 August 1941.

b) Chinese-Language Books and Articles

i) Books

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